UP BOARD OF REGENTS v.

CA
G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999
313 SCRA 404

FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology
of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required and finished her dissertation
and was ready for oral defense.
After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism.
However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark
except Dr. Medina.
UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she expressed her
disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion
of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time,
hence Celine graduated.
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to
her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate
degree.
The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the
University Council.
She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by
President.
Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without
affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive due
process.

RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had
committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a
controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of
the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given opportunities to answer
them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P.
chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters
to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of
Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

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&gl=ph
G.R. No. 115147 January 4, 1995
GEORGE I. RIVERA, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988,
by the LBP President with having committed the following offenses:
(1) Dishonesty;
(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection
therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of
receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons;
(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;
(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and
regulations;
(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.1
Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he
could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission.
Rivera was said to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from
the LBP.
Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority required by Civil
Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal
consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and
allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing
Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation.
Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective 19 February 1988). After a formal
investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in
accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section
12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3,
paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced
resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera.

ISSUE: WON CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of
unsubstantiated finding and conclusions.

RULING: This Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution.
This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind of prejudicial issue.
In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals,8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's
own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary
a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
in his first view of the case.
The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil
Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its chairman, had earlier "concurred."
*Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally
from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a
fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of
29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/jan1995/gr_115147_1995.html

G.R. No. L-26136 October 30, 1978

THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or "BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as operator of the
RURAL TRANSIT, vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

FACTS: While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver
Maximo Jacob from the service", dated July 24, 1961. The reasons given for the petition were alleged violations of the
Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo Jacob resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which
occurred on June 9, 1961 resulting in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company.

An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees Association
whereby it denied the charges and alleged that the June 9, 1961 accident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which
was beyond the control of the driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the service was not justified.

In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez dismissed the company's
petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages from the date of his
suspension up to his actual reinstatement. 3

Bachrach's motion for reconsideration 4 having been denied 5, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari on June 15, 1966
which in the Court's Resolution of July 18,1966 was given due course.

ISSUE: CIR erred in its decision to dimiss company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his
reinstatement with backwages from the date of his suspension up to his actual reinstatement.

RULING: Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob.
Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to
appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been
deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the
direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers,
is fundamental right which is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258)

In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, defendant's witness failed to appear at the continuation of hearing during
which the witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court denied defendant's motion for
postponement and ordered the unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off the record. In sustaining said order,
this Court held inter alia:

Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly
cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault
of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.

The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil
cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the
accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally
based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such
cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and
may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the
case. (64 SCRA 610, 636- 637; emphasis supplied)

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1978/oct1978/gr_26136_1978.html

Pefianco v. Moral
322 SCRA 439
G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000

FACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty. She was
dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report. It was denied.

ISSUE: WON respondent is deprived of administrative due process.

HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent had been accorded these rights.

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VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C. BASCONCILLO

G.R. No. 113911. January 23, 1998

FACTS: Leonides O. Basconillo (private respondent) was hired as Chief Engineer for the MV Boracay by shipping
company Vinta Maritime through manning agent El Kano Ship Management (petitioners). His contract for employment
was effective for a duration of one year.
Basconillo joined the vessel at the port of Rotterdam and assumed his duties and responsibilities.
Barely three months later, Basconillo was informed by Capt.Orquinaza that he was relieved of his duties, as per
recommendation of the Marine Superintendent Robinson, due to his poor performance. He was, in effect, terminated from
the service.
Prior to his termination, Basconillo had a verbal altercation with Robinson regarding the discipline of the Filipino crew
under Basconillo’s supervision.
No inquiry or investigation regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever conducted. Neither was
Basconillo furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause of his dismissal.
Contrary to his perceived incompetence, Basconillo’s Seamen’s Book contained the following entries: Conduct
–
Very Good; Ability – Very Good; Remarks
–
Highly Recommended.

Basconillo filed a complaint with the POEA Workers’ Assistance

andAdjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta and El Kano.

In their answer, Vinta and El Kano alleged that Basconillo was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent
performance (ex. closed off an air valve despite a sign on the valve that said, “Donot close,” failure to change the sea
suctions resulting in the overheating of the engine, etc.) and that he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to
improve his substandard work performance.

The POEA ruled that Basconillo was illegally dismissed, and orderedVinta and El Kano to pay Basconillo his salaries for
the unexpiredportion of his employment contract.
The NLRC affirmed, and denied Vinta and El Kano’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Is trial indispensable in administrative due process?

RULING: NO, Vinta and El Kano claim that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion inupholding the POEA's decision,
which was based on the position papers anddocuments submitted by the parties. They insist that a hearing was
anindispensable condition before a judgment could be rendered in the case.Although bound by law and practice to observe
due process,administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonethelessfree from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements. As applied to theseproceedings, due process requires only an opportunity to explain one's side.In
labor cases, the Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have beensatisfied when parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers.The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter
andthe parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. More often than not, alitigant may be heard more creditably through
pleadings than through oralarguments. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with dueprocess in its strict
judicial sense.

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Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission [G.R. No.143964. July 26, 2004]

FACTS: Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the
interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe pointed out
procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out that another network,
Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the
ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals
sustained the NTC Order.

ISSUES: Whether or not: (1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting
services; (2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995.

RULING: (1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS.
This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS. However, the move should
be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an
even-handed manner. This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and
review by the NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smart’s SMS
offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could
have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope
up with the advent of the technologies it superintends. With the persistent advent of new offerings in the
telecommunications industry, the NTC’s role will become more crucial than at any time before.

(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS
as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for
due process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry
within a cumbersome regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally
regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere
that the industry would prosper. It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately.
But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented
haphazardly.

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G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City,
and FELIPE RAMOS
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged
that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to
be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the
Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from
settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer.
Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of
accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other
than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jul1989/gr_85215_1989.html

G.R. No. L-46732 May 5, 1979

MARIO Z. REYES, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
FACTS: It appears that in December, 1973, the Company sponsored a sales promotional contest to advertise
its pondocillin products. A certain Evangeline R. Tagulao, a nurse employed at Singer Industries Phil., Inc., won the first
prize - a Volkswagen Beetle 1200. However, Miss Tagulao chose to receive the cash value of the car which was
P24,000.00. Accordingly, the Company issued PCIB Check No. 416234 dated December 19, 1973 for P24,000.00 in favor
of Miss Tagulao. The check was delivered to Miss Tagulao by petitioner Reyes, accompanied by his co-employee Victor
Santos. Together, the three of them went to a bank to cash the check.

On January 16, 1974, the Company received two handwrite ten letters from Miss Tagulao saying that she only received an
amount of P20,000, and was informed by Mr. Reyes that the remaining P4,000 will go to the consolation prizes.

On the following day, January 17, 1974, respondent Company wrote to Miss Tagulao attaching RCBC Check No.
1363018 for P4,000.00, and indicating that the said check was in lieu of the amount withheld by petitioner Reyes. The
Company thereafter advised petitioner Reyes that he was being placed on suspension starting January 18, 1974. It also
filed with National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on January 21, 1974, an application for clearance to terminate
complainant's services alleging that "(P)ending further investigation and considering that this constitutes misappropriation
of company funds, and in accordance with existing policy as well as the applicable rules and regulations, Mr. Reyes has
been placed under preventive suspension effective as of the close of office hours on January 17, 1974 pursuant to Section
2 of NLRC Implementing Instructions No. 1 issued on November 9, 1972 and Presidential Decree No. 21 issued on
October 14, 1972." It added further that "the preventive suspension of Mr. Mario Z. Reyes is necessary in order to prevent
further violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other statutes as well as the established employment
policies and reasonable company rules and regulations, said violation being inimical to the interests of the company."

Toward the latter part of January 1974, the Company received two letters from Miss Tagulao this time informing it that
she was returning the check for P4,000.00 because she ... actually received the full amount of P24,000.00

On January 30, 1974, petitioner Reyes filed with the NLRC an "Opposition to Request for Clearance to Dismiss" which
was docketed and considered as a complaint for illegal dismissal. He alleged that "in spite of results of investigations
tending to exculpate him from the charges, he has been placed under harassing situations to the prejudice of himself and
his family ... and prayed that respondent Company be ordered "to immediately reinstate (him) to his former position with
full back-salaries ..."

The case was assigned to Mediator-Fact-finder Mirasol Corleto for mediation and/or fact-finding. After hearing, she
submitted a "Mediation Report" dated February 25, 1974 to the NLRC wherein she found petitioner innocent of the
charge of misappropriation and recommended his reinstatement with backwages.

The NLRC issued an Order dated February 14,1974 adopting the "findings of Mediator-Fact-finder Mirasol Corleto dated
25 February 1974 (sic)." Contrary to Corleto recommendation however, the NLRC ordered the Company to reinstate
petitioner without backwages.

From the NLRC's order, both parties appealed to the Secretary, now Minister, of Labor. Respondent Company's, "Motion
for Reconsideration” dated April 2, 1974, which was denied, was considered as its appeal to the Minister of Labor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in conducting new hearings on appeal.

RULING: Petitioner's bare allegation that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion in conducting a new hearing on appeal is devoid of merit. Firstly, if that were his belief, he
should not have taken part in the hearing, and testified therein. 31 He should have taken proper legal steps to raise his
objection at the earliest opportunity. With his participation and cooperation in said new hearing, he is now estopped from
complaining that the Office of the President conducted new hearings on appeal. Secondly, petitioner can cite no law or
jurisprudence to support his argument. For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "(T)here is no law which
prohibits the Office of the President from conducting additional hearings in an appealed case" * and that the said Office
"is by itself an administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-finding prerogative, especially so when the purpose
thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the case." Further, the Solicitor General observed that
the new hearing was necessary because "public respondent found the evidence on record wanting in some important
factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not petitioner's suspension and/or dismissal was justified."

This petition also lacks merit. In the first. place, the office of the writ of mandamus is to direct "any tribunal ... , board or
person" to perform " an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station ... . " In
the instant case, there is no duty that the Office of the President neglected to do which would warrant the issuance of a
writ of mandamus. Secondly, as has been observed earlier, the petitioner did not take legal steps to prevent said hearings.
On the contrary, he participated in the same. He is therefore now estopped from questioning the said proceedings through
a request for the issuance of a writ of mandamus which, obviously, is not the proper remedy.

Full text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1979/may1979/gr_l_46732_1979.php

G.R. No. 54424 August 31, 1989

NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Private respondent Juanita Collado was employed by petitioner as a security guard on September 9, 1970. He
was assigned as lst Sergeant of the NALCO Security Force at Nasipit. In the course of Collado's employment or on
August 20, 1976, four (4) crates of lawanit boards containing 1,000 panels were stolen from petitioner's premises,
particularly the crating section of the Philippine Wallboard Corporation, a NALCO affiliate.

Collado was implicated in the theft and was thereafter placed under preventive suspension. On September 8, 1976,
NALCO filed a petition (application) for clearance to dismiss Collado with the Regional Office No. X of the Department
of Labor in Cagayan de Oro City. 1 On September 15, 1976, Collado filed an opposition to said application for clearance
to dismiss. The case was set for hearing the following day, September 16, but Collado, despite notice, failed to appear.
Hence, NALCO was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

On October 12, 1976, the application for clearance to dismiss was approved in an order issued by Regional Office No. X
Officer-in-Charge Roy V. Seneres. 2 The order was based on the investigation report of the head of the Agusan Provincial
Labor Office. Collado filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order on the ground that he was not given an
opportunity to rebut the false findings or adduce evidence in his favor. He further denied participation in the theft. 3

On December 7, 1976, the said Officer-in-Charge, through a subordinate, certified the case to the Executive Labor Arbiter
for compulsory arbitration. 4 Notice and summons were issued.NALCO and Collado were then required to submit their
respective position papers under pain of a default judgment. 5 After a perusal of the records, Executive Labor Arbiter
Ildefonso G. Agbuya returned the case to the Regional Director of Regional Office No. X in Cagayan de Oro City for
whatever appropriate action he may deem fit.

Consequently, the case was elevated to the Secretary of Labor. On June 7, 1978, Acting Secretary of Labor Amado G.
Inciong issued an order affirming the order of Officer-in-Charge Roy V. Seneres thereby granting petitioner's application
for clearance to dismiss Collado. 7

Instead of resorting to this Court on a petition for certiorari, 8 on October 9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before the
Butuan District Labor Office, Butuan City, for unjust dismiss and reinstatement with backwages and benefits. 9Without
going to specifics, Collado averred therein that his termination from employment "was unfounded, unjust and illegal,
based as it was on uncorroborated and malicious suspicion, insinuation and hearsay, and characterized by harassment."

NALCO filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a restraining order, seeking to annul the NLRC decision and to prohibit its execution. It imputed to the
NLRC lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
overturning the final decision of the Acting Secretary of Labor thereby denigrating the time-honored doctrine of bar by
former judgment or res judicata. It assailed Collado's reinstatement as improper inasmuch as the employer-employee
relations of the parties had been legally severed by the approval of the clearance to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON the principle of res judicata applies in this case.

RULING: We hold that this is one of the cases wherein the pronouncement of this Court thru Justice Vicente Abad Santos
in Razon vs. Inciong applies. The Court stated therein that the principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor
relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code provides that such proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law." Said pronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers.

Be that as it may, the possibility that there would be two conflicting decisions on the issue of Collado's dismissal may now
be considered academic. The requirement of a written clearance from the Department prior to termination was abolished
by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981. Dismissal proceedings are now confined within the establishments.
The NLRC or the labor arbiter steps in only if the said decision is contested by the employee.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/aug1989/gr_54424_1989.html

G.R. No. 139034 June 6, 2001

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On September 10, 1976 plaintiffs Environmental Aquatics Incorporated and Land & Services Management
Enterprises, Inc., executed a MORTGAGE in favor of defendant Development Bank of the Philippines, over two (2)
fishing boats (with engines, equipment and accessories) and a parcel of land (its building & improvements) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 209937 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, situated in New Manila, the lot being in
the name of Land & Services Management Enterprises, Inc., Exhibits "2", "2-A", and "A". The mortgage was given to
secure the payment of P1,792,600.00 or for whatever amount the plaintiffs corporations might be indebted to the DBP.
One of the clauses of the mortgage provides that in case of a violation by mortgagors-plaintiffs of any of the conditions of
the contract, the mortgagee-defendant Bank "may immediately foreclose this mortgage judicially or extrajudicially under
Act No. 3135 as amended, or under Republic Act No. 85, as amended, and or under Act No. 1508 as amended". The
encumbrance was annotated on said torrens title, Exh. "9", "9-A" and "9-A-1".

The above initial loan granted under DBP Board Resolution No. 3103 dated August 11, 1976, Exhibits "8" to "8-B", was
subsequently restructured thru a liquidation loan of P2,163,800.00 granted under DBP Board Resolution No. 813 dated
March 14, 1979, Exhibits "8-C" to "8-F", which was also annotated on TCT No. T-209937, Exh. "9-B-1".

On August 31, 1981, plaintiffs corporations were again granted an opportunity to restructure their loan account as
evidenced by three (3) Promissory Notes marked during the trial as Exhibits "1", "1-A" and "1-B". Exhibits "1" is for the
amount of P1,973,100.00 while Exhibit "1-A" is for P190,700.00 – both of which mature on March 14, 1986. On the other
hand, Exhibit "1-B", taken for interest in the amount of P684,788.00, matures on March 14, 1982.

On October 25, 1990, plaintiffs sisters corporations being unable to pay their debt which amounted to P16,384,419.90 as
of September 11, 1990, the defendant Development Bank of the Philippines applied and asked the Quezon City Ex-Officio
RTC Sheriff to foreclose and sell the mortgage property at public auction in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, Exhibit "3".

So, on November 16, 1990, in accordance with the terms of the promissory notes and the mortgage contract itself, Ex-
Officio Sheriff notified plaintiffs corporations of the scheduled public auction and had the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale
published as required by law, Exhs. "4" and "B". The Sheriff accordingly extrajudicially foreclosed and sold the subject
lot at auction on December 19, 1990, with defendant Bank itself as the highest bidder for P1,507,000.00 Exh. "C".
Thereupon, a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated December 19, 1990, was issued by the Ex-Officio Sheriff covering TCT
No. 209937, Exhs. "5" and "D". Upon the certificate of sale issued in favor of the defendant DBP, a condition was made to
the effect that the period of redemption will expire one year from and after the date of registration of the sale in the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City.
Plaintiff Mario Matute, thru counsel Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr., to whom plaintiffs-corporations assigned or transferred its
rights of redemption, wrote defendant DBP on July 27, 1991, Exhibits "G" and "10", made known his desire to redeem the
New Manila property.

Under date of August 16, 1991, defendant Bank Bacolod Branch objected to "piecemeal redemption" but adding that
should redemption be effected, the entire amount owed to the Bank as per updated Statement of Total Claim as of August
31, 1991", Exh. "7-A", be paid. The following was the reply of defendant DBP, Exhibit "7":

ISSUE: WON CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to file its appellant’s brief on time.

RULING: After a thorough and assiduous deliberation of this case, the Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeals
should give due course to petitioner’s appeal.

In the 1999 case of Republic v. Imperial, the Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss the government’s
appeal for late filing of its appellant’s brief. The case had its origins in a complaint filed by the government, as represented
by the Solicitor General, for the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of defendants covering several parcels
of land with a total area of 18,142 square meters. It was the position of the government that such properties belonged to
the public domain being foreshore land. The trial court eventually dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
The case was appealed. Invoking its heavy workload, the Solicitor General asked for two 30-day extensions, in two
successive motions, within which to file its appellant’s brief. The appellate court granted the additional time prayed for,
but in granting the second extension, it declared that no further extensions would be permitted. This last resolution was
received by petitioner, however, only after it had already filed its third motion for extension. Moreover, even after it had
learned of such resolution, petitioner proceeded to file a fourth motion for extension with the appellate court. In its
decision penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the Court held that "[t]he need xxx to determine once and for all
whether the lands subject of petitioner’s reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for
relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension xxx" and constituted an "exceptional
circumstance" which impressed petitioner’s appeal with public interest. Thus, petitioner’s appeal was given due course
despite the late filing of its appellant’s brief.

Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner’s appeal is denied due course, a government
institution could lose a great deal of money over a mere technicality. Obviously, such an appeal is far from being merely
frivolous or dilatory.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_139034_2001.html

G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963

PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch X), in its Civil Case No.
41639, enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes
in a fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province of Pampanga, covered by
T.C.T. No. 15905.

The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga,
and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and
hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati;
otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the
respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.
The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal.

The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it
invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority
to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters
and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged
unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

ISSUE: WON the objections to the unconstitutionality of RA No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power
to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, tenable.

RULING: It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions
or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed
of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions
of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive
officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056,
section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value can not be done except
through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable
to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the complainants
and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized
dikes either as "public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees
clearly are in the latter class.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are
entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion (Com. of Customs vs.
Valencia, 54 O.G. 3505), none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court below
erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1963/nov1963/gr_l-17821_1963.html

G.R. No. 128305. March 28, 2005

FELINO QUIAMBAO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On 22 December 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening, Espie Catolico (Catolico) was walking along Capulong
Street in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of her housemaid Gynalin Garais who left the house the day
before. After having asked her neighbors and bystanders to no avail, an old woman told her that a certain policeman was
looking for her as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the area as directed by the old woman but there she was
allegedly accosted by petitioner, PO3 Felino Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Western
Police District Command, and five (5) other persons. Quiambao and his companions forcibly took Catolicos handbag and
carried away its contents consisting of precious assorted merchandise, jewelry and other personal items worth
approximately Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00). Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his owner-type jeep
and brought her to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and, while thereat, he slapped her on the face several times and
warned her not to look anymore for her housemaid. [5]
In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn statement on 24 June 1991 with the PNP Inspectorate Division,
accusing petitioner and six (6) others, with robbery-holdup and mauling committed on 22 December 1990. [6] The
complaint was corroborated by Grace Commendador who witnessed the actual incident and confirmed the statement of
Catolico.[7]
On 22 August 1991, Catolico filed another administrative complaint with the Office of the Hearing Officer at
NAPOLCOM, Western Police District, Manila, charging petitioner with grave misconduct for the same incident which
occurred on 22 December 1990.[8] An investigation was conducted on this administrative charge by the Office of the
Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM. On 30 March 1993, the case was forwarded to the City of Manilas Peoples Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) for adjudication.[9]
The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise conducted an investigation on the charges filed. On 31 October 1992, the
Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer (SDHO) recommended the dismissal of petitioner. This recommendation was
approved by Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy Director General, Raul S. Imperial (Acting PNP Chief). [10]
Petitioner appealed the 31 October 1992 resolution to the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM. On
25 October 1993, the Third Division of the NAB, rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from police
service.[11] The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a Resolution dated 27 December 1993. [12] But
it was only on 23 September 1996 when petitioner received a certified xerox copy of the Resolution of the NAB denying
his petition for reconsideration.[13]
On 7 October 1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. [14] On 10 January 1997, the
appellate court dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the appellate court erred in sustaining the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB.
RULING: In the case at bar, the complaint for grave misconduct against petitioner was first filed by Catolico before the
PNP Inspectorate Division on 24 June 1991. However, another case was filed by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing
Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, on 22 August 1991. The charges filed with the PNP Inspectorate Division were investigated,
and on 31 October 1992, the SDHO recommended the dismissal of petitioner which was approved by the Acting PNP
Chief. Petitioner appealed the case to the NAB which affirmed the decision of the Acting PNP Chief. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Thus, in accordance with paragraph (c) of Section 41, the PNP Inspectorate Division had
acquired exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint of Catolico to the exclusion of other investigating body. It is as
if the second complaint filed by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, had not been filed.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB were bereft of jurisdiction to rule on the
complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at the earliest opportunity, neither raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the
PNP Inspectorate Division nor with the NAB but only before the appellate court. [43] Despite the existence of a
jurisprudential rule[44] that jurisdictional question may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, an equitable exceptional
rule has also been laid down by this Court bars a party from raising jurisdictional question on ground of laches or
estoppel.[45] Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped
from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to
the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.
[

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G.R. No. 158455. June 28, 2005
SHERWILL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. SITIO STO. NIO RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC.
FACTS: Petitioner Sherwill Development Corporation is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Muntinlupa,
Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 131918 [2]consisting of 8,774 square meters, while Lot
86, with an area of 16,766 square meters, is covered by TCT No. 131919. [3] Both lots form part of the Muntinlupa Estate,
while the titles thereon were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on September 24, 1913.
On October 16, 2002, the petitioner filed a Complaint [4] for quieting of title against respondents Sitio Sto. Nio
Residents Association, Inc. (SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres, and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB).
As part of its prayer for relief, the petitioner prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering the LMB to
cease and desist from proceeding with the hearings in LMB Case No. 7-98, a case pending before it where petitioners
titles to the subject lots were being questioned by the respondents SSNRAI and Nilda Devilleres.

ISSUE: WON LMB has no jurisdiction to try LMB Case No. 7-98 inasmuch as cases like this fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of regional trial court.

RULING: As a rule then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the
LMB.
The OSG correctly invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this case. Indeed, the courts cannot and will not resolve
a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view. And in such cases, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence, in this case,
the LMB.
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioners action was barred by the pendency of the proceedings before the
LMB. For litis pendencia to lie, the following requisites must be satisfied:
1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for;
3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
4. Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration.
To the Courts mind, these requisites are present in the instant case. For one, the parties in the LMB case and in SP
Civil Action No. 02-237 are the same. There is, likewise, identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. The petition
filed by the private respondents SSNRAI and its President Devilleres before the LMB alleged that the lots in question had
been the subject of double titling; on the other hand, the petition with prayer for preliminary injunction filed before the
RTC sought the declaration from the court that TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919, in the name of the petitioner, are
indefeasible and conclusive as against the whole world. The resolution of the foregoing issue would likewise require the
presentation of evidence from the parties. Verily, the conclusion in one proceeding would amount to the adjudication of
the merits on the other that is, a favorable ruling from the LMB would have virtually removed any and all existing clouds
from the petitioners titles to the subject property; in the same vein, a declaration of the indefeasibility of TCT Nos. 131918
and 131919 would preempt any ruling of the LMB on the matter.
Indeed, the underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that
the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons. [31] The RTC of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 205, recognized this doctrine when it dismissed SP Civil Action No. 02-237 to avoid the possibility of two
contradictory decisions on the question of the validity of the subject titles.
In any case, should the petitioner disagree with the ruling of the LMB, it is not precluded from taking the matter up to
with the courts of law.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[32] Considering
our pronouncement that the requisites of litis pendentia barred the filing of SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly
dismissed the same on the additional ground of forum shopping.
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Leonardo Paat vs Court of Appeals, et. Al.

GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to
Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained
Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the
DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and
Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because
the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to
one’s cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit
for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
writ ordering the return of the truck.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/jan1997/gr_111107_1997.html

G.R. No. L-17860 March 30, 1962

R. MARINO CORPUS, vs.MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR.
FACTS: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of
the Philippines — a position declared by the President of the Philippines as "highly technical in nature and placed in the
exempt class" (Appendix "D", Exhibit "VV"), he was, on or about March 7, 1958, charged in an administrative case, for
alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc. preferred against
him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man
committee to investigate him. The committee was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of the respondent therein, the committee heard the case,
receiving testimonies of witnesses on both sides. On May 5, 1959, the committee submitted its Final Report, the pertinent
conclusion and recommendation therein reading as follows: .

(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary
action against respondent, and therefore respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated.

Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which
considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension." The pertinent portion of the
resolution reads thus: .

After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the aforesaid fact finding committee, in conjunction
with the entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and respondent, through their
respective counsel, and, further, after a thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly the
various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955,
which all involve fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover, upon formal statement of the Governor that
he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export
Department (such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds
that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the best interest
of the Central Bank and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers
the respondent, Mr. R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.

Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July 23, 1959, approving the appointment of
herein respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino Corpus.

On August 18, 1959, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, against the herein respondents.

ISSUE: WON the lower court is correct in its opinion that petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him.

RULING: The doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative
remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial
remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted (42 Am. Jur. 583).

There is another reason. It must be remembered that the amended petition is for certiorari, mandamus and quo
warranto. The allegations of the second cause of action of the amended petition as above quoted sufficiently comply with
Section 7, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on quo warranto proceedings, which requires that "When the action is against a
person for usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled
thereto. If any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof." And
the complaint was filed within the period of one year from the date of separation, pursuant to Section 16 of the same Rule
(Madrid vs. Auditor General, 58 Off. Gaz., January, 1962, pp. 41, 42-43).

Section 9 of said Rule 68 provides that the time for pleadings and proceedings may be shortened and the action may be
given precedence over any and other civil business. Section 16 of the same Rule requires the filing of the action against an
officer for his ouster within one year after the cause of such ouster. These judicial rules underscore the need for speed in
the determination of controversies to public offices (Remata vs. Javier, 37 Phil. 699; Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil. 828). As
was stated in Pinullar vs. President of the Senate, G.R. No. L-11667, June 30, 1958, the rationale is that the Government
must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service as
against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering
service although entitled to do so (see also Madrid vs. Auditor General, supra).

Giving life and effect to these provisions, we have held in Casin vs. Caluag, 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 9, p. 379, that a
special civil action for quo warranto may be tried and decided independently of a pending criminal case. In another case
(Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off. Gaz. 930), we denied by resolution a supplemental motion for reconsideration where the
petitioner had contended that the reglementary period of one year was suspended by the order of the President exonerating
him from certain administrative charges because the petitioner "was justified in waiting for the President of the
Philippines to reappoint him as the logical and legal consequence of his exoneration," and "only after considerable delay,
when his hopes failed, did petitioner institute the present proceedings." Finally, in Torres vs. Quintos, G.R. No. L-3304,
April 5, 1951, we recalled the Abeto case, supra, by commenting therein that the denial of the motion for reconsideration
in that case had of course the effect of rejecting the theory that the pendency of an administrative remedy suspends the
period within which a petition for quo warranto should be filed, and we gave the reason thus:

The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is
compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another
and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period.
As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 O.G. 3683, public interest requires
that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as practicable.

Upon the foregoing, we have to disagree with the legal opinion of the trial judge and hold that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is inapplicable and does not bar the present proceedings.

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