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VERLAG KARL ALBER A

Die internationale Zeitschrift Schelling-Studien bietet ein Forum für wissenschaftliche Arbeiten zur Philosophie Schellings und für über- greifende Fragestellungen des Idealismus und seiner Wirkungs- geschichte. Sie versammelt aktuelle internationale Beiträge der For- schung in deutscher, englischer, französischer und italienischer Spra- che. Jeder Band enthält eine offene Sektion für Beiträge und einen thematischen Schwerpunkt. Eine wichtige Rolle nimmt die Rubrik »Dokumente« ein. Hier werden Berichte über neu entdeckte oder er- schlossene Dokumente zur Philosophie Schellings abgedruckt und kürzere historische Dokumente publiziert. Berichte aus der aktuellen Forschung sowie Rezensionen der wichtigsten internationalen Neu- erscheinungen runden jeden Band ab. Die Zeitschrift Schelling-Stu- dien wird ergänzt durch die Reihe Beiträge zur Schelling-Forschung.

Schelling-Studien Band 3

Der dritte Band der Schelling-Studien versammelt aktuelle Beiträge von Forschern aus sieben Nationen. Der »Schwerpunkt« ist in diesem Jahr der Würdigung des Werkes von Wilhelm G. Jacobs gewidmet, einem der wichtigsten Schelling-Forscher unserer Zeit, der im April dieses Jahres seinen 80. Geburtstag feiern durfte. Die aktuelle Aus- gabe enthält die Edition eines Notizbuchs von König Maximilian II. zum Thema »Philosophie und Religion«, einen Bericht zu den Akti- vitäten der North American Schelling Society und Rezensionen von internationalen Neuerscheinungen.

Die Herausgeber:

Lore Hühn, Professorin für Philosophie an der Albert-Ludwigs-Uni- versität Freiburg. Präsidentin der Internationalen Schelling-Gesell- schaft.

Paul Ziche, Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Utrecht. Sekretär der Internationalen Schelling-Gesellschaft.

Philipp Schwab, Emmy Noether-Nachwuchsgruppenleiter an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg.

SCHELLING- STUDIEN Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie Herausgegeben von Lore Hühn

SCHELLING-

STUDIEN

Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie

Herausgegeben von

Lore Hühn (Freiburg), Paul Ziche (Utrecht) und Philipp Schwab (Freiburg) im Auftrag der Internationalen Schelling-Gesellschaft

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat:

Claudia Bickmann (Köln), Christoph Binkelmann (München), István M. Fehér (Budapest), Franck Fischbach (Straßburg), Thomas Leinkauf (Müns- ter), Ernst-Otto Onnasch (Utrecht), Peter L. Oesterreich (Neuendettelsau), Anders Moe Rasmussen (Aarhus), Petr Rezvykh (Moskau), John Sallis (Boston), Claus-Artur Scheier (Braunschweig), Jason Wirth (Seattle), Günter Zöller (München)

SCHELLING-STUDIEN

Internationale Zeitschrift zur klassischen deutschen Philosophie

Band 3

Herausgegeben von Lore Hühn, Paul Ziche und Philipp Schwab

im Auftrag der Internationalen Schelling-Gesellschaft

Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg /München

Anschrift der Redaktion:

Philipp Höfele, M.A. Philosophisches Seminar Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg Platz der Universität 3 D–79085 Freiburg i. Br. philipp.hoefele@philosophie.uni-freiburg.de

Originalausgabe

© VERLAG KARL ALBER in der Verlag Herder GmbH, Freiburg im Breisgau / München 2015 Alle Rechte vorbehalten www.verlag-alber.de

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Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier (säurefrei) Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany

ISBN 978-3-495-46603-2 ISSN 2196-4521

Vorwort

Der vorliegende dritte Band der Schelling-Studien enthält aktuelle Beiträge von Forschern aus sieben Nationen in deutscher und eng- lischer Sprache. Wie die bisherigen Bände gliedert sich auch diese Ausgabe in fünf Sektionen. Die Beiträge der ersten, thematisch offe- nen Sektion »Aufsätze« behandeln Schellings frühe Naturphiloso- phie (Thomas Leinkauf), die Theorie des Urteils und der ›Kopula‹ in den Weltaltern und der Spätphilosophie (Marcela García) sowie die Rezeption von Schellings Weltaltern bei Rosenzweig und Heidegger (Philipp Höfele). Die zweite Sektion »Schwerpunkt« ist in diesem Jahr nicht einem speziellen Thema der Philosophie Schellings gewidmet, sondern der Würdigung des Werkes eines der wichtigsten Schelling-Forscher un- serer Zeit, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, der im April dieses Jahres seinen 80. Geburtstag feiern durfte. Der einleitende Text von Paul Ziche wür- digt das Werk Wilhelm G. Jacobs’ unter dem Titel »Schelling lesen« und betont Jacobs’ Einsatz für die Erschließung von Schellings Werk in editorisch-historischer und philosophisch-interpretierender Hin- sicht. Zugleich informiert diese Einleitung über die im Schwerpunkt versammelten Beiträge von Gian Franco Frigo, Christoph Binkel- mann, Damir Barbarić, Walter E. Ehrhardt und Claus-Artur Scheier, die in vielfacher Weise der Person von Wilhelm G. Jacobs und seinem Werk verbunden sind. Die dritte Sektion »Dokumente« enthält in dieser Ausgabe zwei Beiträge. Eine Edition von Vicki Müller-Lüneschloß macht ein bis- lang ungedrucktes Studienheft Maximilians II. von Bayern zugäng- lich, das den Themen von Philosophie und Religion gewidmete Ge- spräche des Kronprinzen mit Schelling aus der Mitte der 1840er Jahre festhält. Eine Miszelle von Wilhelm G. Jacobs zu Gottlob Christian Storrs Annotationes beleuchtet die Kant-Rezeption im Tübinger Stift zu Schellings Studienzeit. In der vierten Sektion »Berichte« informiert ein Beitrag von

Vorwort

Jason M. Wirth und Sean J. McGrath über die Aktivitäten der 2012 gegründeten North American Schelling Society und gibt damit Zeug- nis von der international regen und stetig zunehmenden Auseinan- dersetzung mit dem Denken Schellings. Rezensionen zu englisch- sprachigen Neuerscheinungen schließen als fünfte Sektion den Band ab.

Für den vierten Band 2016 bitten die Herausgeber zu allen Sektionen um Einsendungen – insbesondere auch für die thematisch offene Sek- tion »Aufsätze« sowie die Bereiche »Berichte« und »Rezensionen«. Die Einreichungsfrist ist der 31. März 2016; die Einrichtungsregeln sind bei der Redaktion erhältlich. Das »Schwerpunkt«-Thema des Bandes wird Schellings erster Berliner Vorlesung 1841/42 gewidmet sein. Abgedruckt werden Beiträge in deutscher, englischer, französi- scher und italienischer Sprache. Alle Einreichungen werden in einem anonymen Peer Review Verfahren von zwei Gutachtern bewertet. Ausdrücklich erwünscht sind Manuskripte, die nicht exklusiv auf Schelling und die deutsche Philosophie dieser Zeit beschränkt sind, sondern weitere inhaltliche und nationale Kontexte einbeziehen.

Ein herzlicher Dank gilt allen Personen und Institutionen, die zum Zustandekommen dieses dritten Bandes der Schelling-Studien bei- getragen haben. Insbesondere sei an dieser Stelle den Gutachterinnen und Gutachtern gedankt, die an dem anonymen Peer Review und damit wesentlich an der wissenschaftlichen Qualitätssicherung der Zeitschrift mitgewirkt haben. Das Projekt einer jährlich erscheinen- den Zeitschrift wird von der Internationalen Schelling-Gesellschaft (Leonberg) getragen. Für die Unterstützung bei der Korrektur und Einrichtung danken die Herausgeber Georg Spoo und bei der vorlie- genden Ausgabe insbesondere Christoph Rüßler. Ein großer Dank gilt schließlich Philipp Höfele, der den Band in bewährt professioneller Weise redaktionell betreut hat und dem mithin an seinem Entstehen ein wesentlicher Anteil zukommt.

Die Herausgeber Lore Hühn (Freiburg) Paul Ziche (Utrecht) Philipp Schwab (München)

Inhalt

I. Aufsätze

Thomas Leinkauf (Münster) Schelling, Einheit und Totalität Zur Struktur des idealistischen Systems mit Blick auf die frühe Naturphilosophie

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Marcela García (Mexico City) Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

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Philipp Höfele (Freiburg/Straßburg) ›Scheidung von sich selbst‹ und ›Ekstase‹ Zur Rezeption von Schellings Weltaltern bei Rosenzweig und Heidegger

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II. Schwerpunkt: Zu Ehren von Wilhelm G. Jacobs

 

Paul Ziche (Utrecht) Schelling lesen Wilhelm G. Jacobs zum 80. Geburtstag

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Gian Franco Frigo (Padua) Konstruktion und Anschauung:

Der Status des Absoluten in Schellings Identitätsphilosophie .

 

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Christoph Binkelmann (München) Derivierte Absolutheit Die Bedeutung des transzendentalen Idealismus Fichtes für Schellings Freiheitsschrift

 

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Inhalt

Damir Barbarić (Zagreb) ›Die große Dissonanz, mit der alles anfängt‹ Das Prinzip des Negativen in Schellings Freiheitsphilosophie .

 

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Walter E. Ehrhardt (Hannover) Samothrake: »(an Boussolen wird niemand denken)«

 

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Claus-Artur Scheier (Braunschweig) Schiller zählt – Zur Architektonik der Abhandlung Ueber die tragische Kunst

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III.

Dokumente

 

Vicki Müller-Lüneschloß (München) Philosophie und Religion Aus dem Notizbuch von König Maximilian II. – Freund und Schüler des Philosophen F. W. J. Schelling

 

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Wilhelm G. Jacobs (München) Miszelle zu Storrs Annotationes

 

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IV.

Berichte

Jason M. Wirth (Seattle) and Sean J. McGrath (St. John’s) Report on the North American Schelling Society

 

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V. Rezensionen

 

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Beiträgerinnen und Beiträger

 

213

Siglen

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I. Aufsätze

Thomas Leinkauf

A = B für B, B 1 ,B 1a und B 1b ,B 2

Konstruktion 1. Potenz: Magnetismus, Elektrizität, chemischer Pro- zess = Kategorien der ursprünglichen Konstruktion der Natur (Mate- rie) – da die Natur als Prinzip selbst nicht gegenständlich wird, sind diese Kategorien die Schemata der Konstruktion der Materie (vgl. AA I,8, 71). Natur erscheint als unentstanden, »von jeher gewesen« (AA I,8, 72).

Konstruktion 2. Potenz: Sensibilität, Irritabilität, Bildungstrieb = Ka- tegorien der Konstruktion der organischen Natur in jedem Individu- um; Leben ist beständiges Verhindern der Indifferenz (= anorgani- scher Zustand) (vgl. AA I,8, 71–73). Natur erscheint als entstanden, zufällig; die Kategorien der organischen Natur sind die Potenzen der entsprechenden unorganischen: Sensibilität = höhere Potenz des Magnetismus, Irritabilität = höhere Potenz der Elektrizität, Bildungs- trieb = höhere Potenz des chemischen Prozesses (vgl. AA I,8, 74 f.).

Bibliographie

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1695: »Specimen dynamicum pro admirandis na- turae legibus circa corporum vires et mutuas actiones detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis. Pars I«. In: ders.: Mathematische Schriften, hg. v. Carl Im- manuel Gerhardt. 2., reprograph. Nachdruck d. Ausg. Halle a. d. Saale 1849– 1863, Hildesheim/New York 1971, Bd. 6, 234–246. Leinkauf, Thomas 1998: Schelling als Interpret der philosophischen Tradition. Zur Rezeption und Transformation von Platon, Plotin, Aristoteles und Kant. Münster.

– 2009: »Der Ternar essentia – virtus – operatio und die Essentialisierung der Akzidentien. Ein Beispiel für die produktive Funktion antiker Philosopheme in der Entwicklung frühneuzeitlicher Philosophie«. In: Philosophie im Um- bruch. Der Bruch mit dem Aristotelismus im Hellenismus und im späten Mittelalter – seine Bedeutung für die Entstehung eines epochalen Gegensatz- bewusstseins von Antike und Moderne, hg. v. Gyburg Radke-Uhlmann/Arbo- gast Schmitt. Stuttgart, 131–153.

– 2011: »Implikationen des Begriffs natura naturans in der Frühen Neuzeit«. In: Ludi naturae. Spiele der Natur in Kunst und Wissenschaft, hg. v. Natascha Adamowsky/Hartmut Böhme/Robert Felfe. München, 103–118. Peetz, Siegbert 1995: Die Freiheit im Wissen. Eine Untersuchung zu Schellings Konzept der Rationalität. Frankfurt a.M. Spinoza, Baruch de 1677: Ethica Ordine Geometrico demonstrata. In: ders.: Ope- ra posthuma. Quorum series post Praefationem exhibetur. Amsterdam, 1–264.

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

Marcela García (Mexico City)*

Abstract

This paper aims to reconstruct Schelling’s ‘theory of judgment’ fol- lowing his own account in The Ages of the World (Die Weltalter). I suggest that Schelling develops a notion of judgment as ‘separation of an indistinct, undifferentiated unity in order to achieve a higher, explicit unity’ throughout his different phases, and that the different ways of interpreting the copula correspond systematically to the mo- ments implied by judgment. Furthermore, I underline how his par- ticular understanding of judgment and its moments (undifferen- tiated unity, separation, explicit unity), in relation to different senses of the copula, allows Schelling to relate the structure of judg- ment to existence, to underline the difference between potentiality and actuality, and, especially, to discover a structure of judgment that makes room for freedom. Finally, I briefly connect the tension be- tween an identity ‘previous’ to any subject-object distinction and the free activity of uniting what is separate, as found in Schelling’s no- tion of judgment, to the tension between ‘embodied coping’ and con- ceptual normative activity in contemporary debates.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Schelling’s ‘theory of judg- ment’ and to bring out, following Schelling’s own account in The Ages of the World (Die Weltalter), the dialectic of unity and separa- tion as a thread that connects different reflections on judgment and different interpretations of the copula found in Schelling’s work. Indeed, it has long been a desideratum of Schelling scholarship to obtain a consistent view of the way Schelling understands judgment. Several of his reflections on judgment have received attention in the

* I am thankful to Mathis Koschel, Christian Martin, Sebastian Rödl, Philipp Schwab,

José María Torralba and Paul Ziche for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Marcela García

literature, but there has been no systematic account of the way the different notions might come together, whether they correspond to different periods of Schelling’s thought, or whether they can be con- nected systematically. Schelling’s views on judgment at times seem to echo Hölderlin’s dictum of judgment as separation (Ur-Theilung) of what was always already ineffably one, and at times seem to share Kant’s emphasis on the activity of synthesis (for Schelling, this is an activity that would bring back together what we have previously separated). His discus- sion of judgment lets the tension between a unity of subject and ob- ject presupposed by knowledge and the role of the knowing and acting subject become evident. Is the articulation of reality due to our activ- ity or is reality in itself already articulated? Early on, in the System of Transcendental Idealism of 1800, Schel- ling remarks on these two views of judgment and the tension between them. According to him, judgment first separates concept and object, relates them to each other and then posits them as equal: “In judg- ment, therefore, concept and object have first to be opposed, and then again related to each other, and posited as equal to one another”. 1 Two questions worth considering are how we are to understand this ‘separation in order to unify’ that constitutes judgment, and what kind of unity Schelling is aiming for through the separation. Throughout Schelling’s works, we find different ways of understand- ing judgments, or at least different ways of interpreting the copula. I suggest that he holds a notion of judgment as separation of an indis- tinct, undifferentiated unity in order to achieve a higher, explicit unity throughout his different phases, and that the different ways of interpreting the copula correspond systematically to these three mo- ments implied by judgment. This becomes clearer in his later philosophy, where his particular understanding of judgment and its moments, in relation to different senses of the copula, will allow Schelling to relate the structure of judgment to existence, to underline the difference between potential-

1 Schelling 1978, 136 / AA I,9,1, 206; trans. modified. This is the context of the pas- sage: “But now if concept and object originally coincide so far that neither of them contains more or less than the other, a separation of the two is utterly inconceivable without a special act whereby they become opposed in consciousness. Such an act is that which is most expressively denoted by the word judgment (Urteil), in that by this we first have a separation of what was hitherto inseparably united” (Schelling 1978, 136 / AA I,9,1, 205 f.).

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

ity and actuality and, especially, to find a structure of judgment that makes room for freedom.

I. Judgment as Paradigm of Existence

While there has been a long tradition, since Aristotle, of regarding the act of judgment as that of unifying or separating two notions (unify- ing in the case of affirmative judgments, separating in the case of negative ones), this is not quite what is meant by unification and separation in Schelling’s context. When Kant speaks of the activity of judgment as synthesis (cf. KrV, B 142), he means the unity that is required to form the content of judgment in the first place, and not just the specific quality of the judgment (that is, whether it is af- firmative or negative). It is, in a sense, a synthesis of subject and object. Hölderlin, on his part, speaks of judgment as an “original sep- aration [Ur-Theilung]” of the undifferentiated unity of subject and object, the separation which makes subject and object possible at all. 2 In The Ages of the World, a work which marks the turning point to his so called ‘late philosophy’, Schelling himself gives us a systematic account of both unity and separation as moments implied by judg- ment. The act of judgment separates what was previously indistinct in order to connect it explicitly; it is a cut, a ‘cision’ (Scheidung) that presupposes a certain kind of unity (as its condition, as its past) and opens up the possibility of a different sort of unity (as its future). In this sense, inscribed in judgment itself is a certain historicity in the moments it presupposes, its ‘geological layers’, as it were. Any level that is overcome or put behind, still remains as “sustaining past [tra- gende Vergangenheit]” (WA I, 62). 3 Furthermore, in this work, Schelling is not simply interested in specifying judgment or its epistemological role, rather, he develops

2 “In the concept of separation lies already the concept of the mutual relation of object and subject to each other and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which object and subject are the parts” (Hölderlin 1795, 216). Unless otherwise indicated, all trans- lations are mine.

3 There is no published English translation of the 1811 version of The Ages of the World (WA I). All translations of this work are my own. I have taken Jason Wirth’s translation of the 1814/15 version (Schelling 2000 / SW VIII, 195–344) into account, and have greatly profited from his work there.

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Marcela García

judgment as the paradigm of existence. 4 To exist, strictly speaking, is to become manifest out of hidden depths, to be pronounced. Existence requires alterity (cf. WA I, 4): one aspect of what exists is manifest only because another aspect of the existent is latent as its substrate or ground. In this sense, existence has in itself a doubleness that is par- allel to that of judgment, where one aspect functions as subject of another, the object or predicate. Schelling’s model for intelligibility itself is not one of vision here, but one of pronouncing (aussprechen), of expressing what was un- said, of making explicit what was only implicit. “All experiencing, feeling, seeing is in and for itself mute and requires a mediating organ to reach pronouncing” (WA I, 7; my emphasis). If pronouncing is the paradigm of intelligibility, it is less like seeing a picture and more like a dialogue, a process that requires time.

[W]hat is known is not something finished and readily available from the beginning, but something that is always originating from the in- ward. The light of science must emerge by internal cision and libera- tion […]. (WA I, 5)

Schelling speaks of ‘manifestation’ or ‘revelation’, of becoming un- derstandable, of coming into freedom, through a process of continu- ous separation and clarification that requires alterity in order to “make distinguishable, pronounce, take apart what is one” (WA I, 5). As it turns out, pronouncing (aussprechen) is not merely some- thing that the individual knowing subject does, but something that reality itself undertakes in an ongoing process of separation and ex- plicitation.

All being [Seyn] 5 is a being-out-posited [Hinaus-gesetzt-seyn], a being- exposed [Exponirt-seyn], a standing-out [Hinausstehen], as it were, like the Latin Exstare expresses. (SW XII, 56)

Existence itself consists in becoming expressed or revealed out of the silent indistinct depths. Our activity is part of an ongoing process of pronouncing and making explicit.

4 Among other works that underline Schelling’s ontologization of judgment are Buchheim 1992; Gabriel 2011; Iber 1994 and Sollberger 1996.

5 I will generally translate ‘Seyn’ as ‘being’. Below, in passages where a distinction between ‘Seyn’ and ‘Seyendes’ is required, the translation for ‘Seyendes’ will be ‘what is’. Cf. footnote 22 below.

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

All being strives to its revelation and accordingly to development; all that is has the sting of progressing, of expanding itself; an infinity that it wants to pronounce is locked within it; because everything that is demands to be not merely inwardly, but to be, what it is, again, namely, outwardly. (WA I, 14; my emphasis; cf. also WA I, 18)

Indeed, as I hope to show in what follows, Schelling thinks existence, as becoming manifest, from the standpoint of judgment, and judg- ment in turn from a particular conception of freedom.

II. Moments of Judgment and Interpretations of the Copula

Let us now look at the three moments implied by judgment: initial unity, separation, higher unity, and at the different interpretations of the copula that correspond to these moments.

1. Unity as Identity – Copula as Substrate

In the first version of The Ages of the World (1811), Schelling distin- guishes between three senses of unity. The first of these senses is the ineffable, absolute unity of that which is not yet pronounced. This ‘absolute unity of subject and object’ (reminiscent of Hölderlin) is simply presupposed by the further senses of unity. There is no copula here, no duality to be connected, and any aspects that could be distin- guished later on are here merely potential. The first unity that involves some kind of link or copula is ex- pressed by Schelling with the following formula: “that which is A is that which is also B” (WA I, 28; my emphasis).

X

A is A is that which is also B” (WA I, 28; my emphasis). X B Both

BA is that which is also B” (WA I, 28; my emphasis). X A Both principles

Both principles 6 (A and B) are not one and the same. Indeed, those who know “the laws of judgment”, he writes, understand that “in no judgment whatsoever […] do we understand a sameness but al-

6 Cf. WA I, 18 f. and 25. Schelling speaks of two “principles” or “forces” of one and the same nature. These are two “wills” (an expansive, communicative one and a con-

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Marcela García

ways an actual duality, without which the unity itself would not make sense” (WA I, 27). What we have here, then, is an identity, not of predicates, but of the subject. Not A and B for themselves but the ‘X that A is’ and the ‘X that is B’ is one and the same. As Schelling explains:

There is no simple unity here, but one that is doubled within itself or an identity of identity. In the proposition A is B is contained firstly the proposition A is X (that same one which is not always mentioned, of which both subject and predicate are predicates); secondly, the proposi- tion X is B; and only because these two are again united, that is, through reduplication of the copula, does thirdly the proposition A is B originate. (WA I, 28; second emphasis is mine)

 
  A A is X

A

A is X

X

 
B
B

X is B

A

is X

X

is B

A

is B

In

this sense, Schelling maintains that

the judgment is already pre-formed in the simple concept and the syllo- gism is already contained in the judgment. Hence, the concept is just the furled judgment and the syllogism the unfurled judgment […]. (WA I,

28)

Schelling calls this sense of unity ‘indifference’ (Indifferenz) since there is an existential equality (existentielle Gleichheit) between these two principles A and B even though they are essentially un- equal. In other parallel texts, Schelling gives several examples of this identity of the subject understood as substrate. For instance, ‘body and soul are one’: it does not mean that the soul is made of material components but that that which is body is also that which is soul (cf. SW VII, 342).

It follows from itself that the copula in judgement is what is essential and that which lies at the bottom of all parts. The subject and the pred-

tracting, selfish one) that are opposed to each other but constitute one being from the standpoint of existence.

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

icate are each for themselves already a unity and what one by and large calls the copula just indicates the unity of these unities. 7

We find this interpretation of the copula as middle term in some of Schelling’s earlier works as well, for instance in the Würzburger Sys- tem (1804). 8 There, Schelling considers these three ‘functions’ of thought (concept, judgment, syllogism) in relation to the three ‘di- mensions’ of syllogism (major, minor and conclusion), and those in turn in relation to the three forms of judgment of relation (categori- cal, hypothetical, disjunctive). An interesting point to note is that the conclusion of the syllogism is understood as a disjunction, so that ‘A is B’ is construed as ‘X must be either A or B’, thus generating the totality of possible aspects of X. 9 I will come back to this disjunctive understanding of the conclusion below. In The Ages of the World, this interpretation appears again but only as a first attempt to understand the copula. This first attempt must be overcome. It is not false, but it is insufficient. As will become clear, this sense of the copula is merely potential, it generates a total- ity of possibilities, but cannot express existence or actuality. Why is the interpretation of the copula a topic discussed in The Ages of the World? As Hogrebe has argued, the question that Schel- ling is attempting to answer in The Ages of the World is a radical question: how is determination possible? How do we go from X (the indistinct substrate of any predicate) and Φ (the totality of possible predicates) towards Fa? The inquiry into the earliest origins of intel- ligibility out of indistinct chaos can also be understood as a theory of predication. 10

7 Schelling 2000, 14 / SW VIII, 214; my emphasis, trans. modified.

8 As several scholars have noted, since 1806 Schelling reacts to Hegel’s criticism by suggesting an identity that is not sameness but incorporates difference and articula- tion. Cf. Iber 1994, 187; Schwab 2016.

9 “The disjunctive syllogism presents the highest totality, articulated, as it were, be-

cause it contains all conditions for the determination of the object. […] The conclusion

is always disjunctive; for instance, in the syllogism

A = B (Reflection)

B = C (Subsumption)

A = C (Reason)

A and C, which are one in relation to B, are disjuncted in the conclusion A = C, and are

only posited as equal through the disjunction” (SW VI, 526 f.). Schelling seems to

refer to Kant’s Logic here, cf. Jäsche-Logik, AA 9, 121–131 (§§ 60–79).

10 Cf. Hogrebe 1989, 69 f.

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In a later text, Schelling explicitly connects the kind of radical, abstract questioning into the origins of pronounceableness that takes place in The Ages of the World with the investigation of the roots of judgment:

What is more abstract than the meaning of the copula in judgment, what more abstract than the concept of pure subject, which appears to be nothing; since we learn what it is only through the predication, and still it cannot be nothing without the attribute; what is it then? When we pronounce it we say of it: it is this or that, for instance a human being is healthy or sick, a body dark or light, but what is it, before we pronounce it? Evidently only what can be this, for instance, healthy or sick; the general concept of the subject is to be pure potency [reines Können]. (SW XI, 50; my emphasis)

In the context of such an investigation, the act of judgment corre- sponds to the emergence of existence, that is, of pronouncing out of the depths of absolute undifferentiated unity.

The First Existent

After discussing the copula as identity of the substrate, Schelling’s next step in The Ages of the World is to explain how the unity men- tioned above comes to exist and immediately acquires a distinction of two possible aspects or perspectives: inward and outward being, which he respectively calls das Seyende (‘what is’) and Seyn (‘being’). This reduplication of aspects corresponds to the aforementioned notion that existence, as pronouncing, consists in being not merely inwardly but outwardly, that is, “being again” (WA I, 14, 18; my emphasis). These two aspects each contain the two forces or principles (A and B) that belonged to the first unity: on the one hand, an affirming and expansive force (‘essence’ (Wesen)), on the other hand, a con- tracting force that constitutes the will to exist (‘being’ (Seyn)). How- ever, in each of the two aspects (‘das Seyende’ and ‘Seyn’) the two forces (‘Wesen’ and ‘Seyn’) have different positions and a different connection to each other. As the existent first comes to exist, the two forces take up the following positions (cf. WA I, 22, 60 f., 64):

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

Starting position of the ‘first existent’

‘In what is’ (im Seyenden)

Wesen – subjective, latent, inward Seyn – objective, effective, manifest – subjective, latent, inward Seyn – objective, effective, manifest

‘In being’ (im Seyn)

Seyn – subject, active, inward Wesen – objective, latent, passive – subject, active, inward Wesen – objective, latent, passive

What seems important to Schelling is that we have two different dis- tinctions here: one of conceptual content or essence (whether a prin- ciple is an affirming or a contracting force, according to its nature) and one of position within the existent (whether a principle is active or latent, whether it is ‘objective’ – outward – or ‘subjective’ – inward). To be in the position of the actively being principle is to be as ‘what is’ (das Seyende), to be in the position that is made latent, passive, sub- ject to the active one, is to be as the mere ‘being’ (Seyn). There is an iteration of ‘being’ (Seyn) as principle (opposed to ‘essence’ (Wesen)) and ‘being’ (Seyn) as one of the aspects of the existent (in this case opposed to ‘what is’ (das Seyende)). This itera- tion, related to the reduplication of being once it exists, 11 points pre- cisely to a converging correspondence in due time between the two possible positions that each principle may adopt and the two aspects of the existent. Now, if we consider the starting position of the first existent (cf. figure above), it is ‘being’ (Seyn) which is actually in the position of the ‘actively being’ principle, ‘what is’ (das Seyende). This starting position is only a privative one, since things are not as they should be. 12 The principle that is ‘actively being’ according to its nature should become das Seyende according to its position as well. The principle ‘being’ (Seyn), the contracting force, should end up in the position of mere ‘being’ (Seyn): objective, latent and passive in ‘being’ (Seyn) as aspect of the existent; subjective, latent and inward in ‘what is’ (im Seyenden). There will be a teleological process from this initial situation of existence towards a correspondence between positions

11 “Being is what is always predicated” (SW X, 17). Buchheim also comments on this reduplication in enunciation: “Die Aussagestruktur, in der ‘sein’ seinen Ort hat, re- agiert auf ihre Teilung wie eine Hydra, die sich in der Zertrennung nur vermehrt” (Buchheim 1992, 96).

12 “Everything that comes into the world, that becomes actual for and in the world, requires a presupposition, a beginning, which is not the real thing [das Wahre], is not what properly should be” (SW XIV, 315).

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and principles in each of the aspects. How does such a process begin? In the account of The Ages of the World, this is the moment where the cision (Scheidung) appears.

2. Cision – Transitive Copula

The cision is the separation of these two forces, the liberation from the bond that held them together. The copula as the substrate that bound them is placed in brackets, as it were, and new ways of relation between the elements appear. Unity is not based on the copula as identical substrate anymore, but on a dynamic relation between the two positions. The forces are now free to follow their own develop- ment. Thus, the cision makes the process of explication possible by re- leasing the two forces from their bond so that new relations between them can emerge and the whole process of nature and history is set free. Throughout this process, the affirming force (‘essence’ (Wesen)) will gradually gain the upper hand, it will become actively being, in two different ways, one for each of the aspects: inward or outward. Each of these aspects follows its own process which in turn becomes a world: the ‘realm of spirit’ (human history, we might say) or ‘nature’. In both of them the expanding force will become the actively being principle and the negating force the relatively non-being one, but in each aspect through different means (cf. diagram on p. 36). The final unity is the telos of a free and voluntary process of clar- ification, a future horizon in which the first unity will be realized but freely, consciously (cf. WA I, 63), after a long process of manifesta- tion, of pronouncing, of decision, in which both aspects converge through the free development of their principles. Nature and spirit will be one. The cision is seen as ‘the Word’ that liberates and allows the dif- ferent elements to take their place. “The existent seeks […] the word through which it can be pronounced, liberated, unfurled, and every- where it is only the word, begotten or found, that dissolves the inner discord” (WA I, 57). The cision transforms the copula into word, ar- ticulating the relation between the elements and putting each of them in place:

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

The cision should only be a dissolution [Lösung], through which each of the principles is placed independent of the other or in its own freedom. We will consider this dissolution most correctly if we see it as articula- tion of the once mute copula of existence, through which it is trans- formed into the audible, speaking word, in which vowels and consonants are put in the proper, pronounceable relation to each other. (WA I, 61; my emphasis)

Therefore, the cision means a shift from a focus on contents, on the essence or nature of the elements that are connected, towards a focus on the position of these elements, that is, on their connection to each other, the nexus or if you will the operators between them.

And in both are actually the same principles, the same separating and uniting word. Not their being different, but only the inverted relation of the forces in both makes the difference. (WA I, 64; my emphasis)

By dissolving the mute copula, the separation or cision makes an in- version of their positions possible (cf. diagram on p. 36). The principle that in each of these aspects is the active one can be said to be the other one, in a transitive sense. 13 I use the term ‘transi- tive’ to underline that the copula functions here as a verb with a direct object (cf. SW XIII, 72). In that case, ‘A is B’ doesn’t simply mean that there is an identity between them or an identity of their substrate, but rather that ‘A’ is responsible for the existence of ‘B’, ‘A puts B into existence’. For this reason, according to Schelling, ‘B’ would be in accusative case. The inversion of the nexus is only possible because the cision re- veals an act that is not fully determined by contents. Indeed, Schel- ling sees separation in the sense of cision (Scheidung) as the proper moment of the act of judgment. There is a play on the Greek krinô, krinein, krisis, meaning judgment but also separating, distinguishing; deciding a dispute or a contest, choosing, picking out, preferring; the turning point of a disease. Schelling takes advantage of these multiple dimensions of meaning in his own expressions: Scheidung (cision), Entscheidung (decision), Abscheidung (excision), Ausscheidung (ex- pulsion).

13 As Schwab underlines (cf. Schwab 2016), Schelling explicitly conceives of subject and predicate as ground and consequence. Cf. SW VII, 346.

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> > < > > 8 :

> > < > > 8 :

the ineffective outward

Wesen becomes the active outward

Wesen becomes the active inward (natura naturans)

the latent inward

(natura naturata)

becomes

becomes

Inversion (cf. pp. 34 f.)

Seyn

Seyn

Seyn – objective, effective, manifest

Wesen – subjective, latent, inward

Wesen – objective, latent, passive

Seyn – subject, active, inward

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‘is subject to’/

copula means

Where the

‘grounds’

B is

A

A is B
A
is
B

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im Seyenden (Spirit- world)
im
Seyenden
(Spirit-
world)

copula means

Where the

‘produces’

A is

B

B is A
B
is
A
im Seyn (Nature)
im
Seyn
(Nature)

Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

Judgment would mean here to separate and then unite, but asym- metrically (in contrast with the first interpretation of the copula as indifference), to unite in different positions, and through this ‘un- stable’ asymmetry of the positions, to make a process possible. In comparison, from the standpoint of separation, the unity of ‘the same X that is A is the same X that is B’ is a ‘mute copula’, in Schel- ling’s words, not a true judgment after all. It focuses on conceptual contents, on the essence (Wesen), but it does not express any nexus between A and B other than the identity of their substrate. Once we see the cision as act, we realize that the previous unity of the copula remained merely potential. ‘X is A and X is B’ : X has both possibili- ties. There is no decision here, which is why Schelling was able to interpret ‘A is B’ also as a disjunction that generates a totality, as mentioned above. Schelling refers to the two positions also as ‘subject’ and ‘object’, where these terms take on an ontological meaning. ‘Subject’ in the literal, ontological sense of hypokeimenon (underlying), what has been subject to something else and serves as its ground; 14 ‘object’ as the manifest, predicated determination of the subject; or as ‘what pronounces’ (Aussprechendes) and ‘the pronounceable’ (Aussprech- liches) respectively. 15 Positing something in the position of the subject is tantamount to making it latent, seeing it as ground, that is, as matter or potency of something else. In other words, the cision makes a cut and puts a certain element in the past, as ground or matter to the next determi- nation. For this reason, the cision as act represents the present, while the substrate or substance represents the past. Indeed, recalling his earlier model of the dimensions of the syllogism, 16 Schelling speaks in a fragment to The Ages of the World of judgment as present and the concept as past. 17 In a sense, the model of ‘simultaneous identity’ as a whole is now posited as the past of the act of judgment as cision.

14 “Nothing is object immediately, it is only object for another [Subject, M. G.], that is, insofar as it presupposes another [Subject as ground, M. G.]” (SW, XII 54 f.).

15 Cf. Schelling 2000, 29 / SW VIII, 241.

16 Cf. footnote 9.

17 “Whereas the past is before us only in the concept and the science, the present, however, belongs to subsumption and judgment” (WA III, 194).

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Transitive Copula

a) Ground

In several works, Schelling mentions two cases of this transitive cop- ula. In most of Schelling’s examples, the subject is literally subject to the predicate, it is completely subject to it and becomes invisible against the determination it grounds. 18 “A is B means: A is itself

nothing, it is only bearer, that is, subject of B” (SW X, 264; my em- phasis).

When I say, this matter is a plant, then this means that what, according to its nature, can be something else or nothing at all, has forgotten its own formlessness, as it were. By being plant, it is not matter anymore. It exists only as bearer of the plant. (GPP, 445)

In other words, the subject becomes latent and subjugated to the pro- nounced (ausgesprochenen) object or determination whose existence it serves. It is only against this determination, in contrast to it, that it is posited as matter. For instance, if I have a piece of wood that is turned into a statue, there is at first something actual (the piece of wood) that is then made potential against something actual (the stat- ue) and becomes its matter. In this sense, ‘matter’ is again a position but not a particular thing or stuff. Anything, or almost anything, can become the matter of something else: its bearer, its ground.

b) Cause

There is however another case of ‘A is B’ in a transitive sense, and that is the case where an actuality puts the ‘material’ aspect into existence. An example would be that of the Aristotelian soul as the ‘cause of being’ that actualizes a potential body.

It [the fourth cause, M. G.] means for him [Aristotle, M. G.] the desig- nation, the exponent of what is merely material. Eminently it means for him the soul, in the sense in which we say that the general is the soul of the army, that which actually is it [das es eigentlich seyende], since

18 “Whatever is in some respect the mere subject is precisely for that reason what in this respect should not itself be. What is not itself being, however, which is not noth- ing, can only be as the potency or possibility of another. What can be shall not be the subject, or as we can also say, the presupposition of itself (of its own being), it shall be the presupposition (the subject) of what is. In this case it is itself no more, as it were. Itself, it disappears completely as being for itself, and if we want to pronounce it now, we must say: what can be is not what can be, but rather it is what is purely being” (SW XIII, 228).

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without him it would be something merely material, a multitude with- out name or concept, that only becomes something, namely, an army, through him. (SW XI, 411)

In both cases, it seems, whether as potency or as actuality, whatever takes the place of the subject is responsible for the existence of the object or predicate. This is what Schelling referred to as the position of ‘active being’ (das Seyende) in the model of The Ages of the World. It is worth noting that these two cases of ‘transitive copula’ corre- spond to the two ways in which, throughout the process, the affirm- ing force will gradually become the actively being one: as acting from the inside (in nature) and as manifest towards the outside (in the realm of spirit). This interpretation of the copula corresponds to the asymmetry that has been established by the cision. Between A and B (which des- ignate positions that can be filled by different elements) there is no ‘existential indifference’ anymore, but rather a definite direction within the process of gradual pronouncing and explicitation that takes place in nature and history. It is not surprising that, in the Exposition of Philosophical Em- pirism (Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus), Schelling re- fers to this second moment (second potency) as being that of ‘cause’. In contrast, the first moment of unity as a substrate expresses ‘sub- stantiality’ and it is explicitly called the Spinozistic model (cf. SW X,

280).

3. Higher Unity – Emphatic Copula

The cision, then, is a separation of what was inarticulate in order to unite it in an explicit, free manner. According to Schelling’s model of three levels or ‘potencies’, the third moment, that is, explicit unity should be a synthesis of some sort of the first unity and the cision. At the same time, it should express a higher level of consideration, one that posits the previous levels as its past. What could a unity of a higher level or ‘of higher potency’ mean here? Let us start by considering a third interpretation of the copula that appears in later works, in what Schelling calls ‘emphatic judgment’.

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Emphatic Copula

‘A is B’ (or ‘A is! B’) is said emphatically when A could have been otherwise than B. In fact, according to Schelling, it only makes sense to enunciate ‘A is B’ if at the same time it is implied that ‘A can be C’. Otherwise we would only be expressing a tautology. Only emphatical judgments actually pronounce something (cf. SW XI, 305), they are authentic, actual judgments.

In every proposition that is not an authentic judgment, the IS is posited without any emphasis. Should the IS be emphatic, then the subject of the proposition must be able to be and not to be what it is. (GPP, 97)

The emphatic understanding of the copula incorporates the previous ‘transitive copula’ and completes it by making its presuppositions ex- plicit. It is not so much a different interpretation of the copula, but a further underlining of all that is implied by ‘emphatic’ judgment. In emphatic judgment we also have decisiveness, cision: A is em- phatically B, it is not at the same time something else. But ‘A is! B’ as the result of having overcome other possibilities and made them po- tential. 19

Because the true sense of the expression: to be something is precisely this. When being is said cum emphasi, then the expression: to be some- thing = to be subject to this something. The is, the copula in every prop- osition, for instance in the proposition: A is B, if it is significant at all, namely, emphatic, that is, the copula of an actual judgment, then “A is B” means as much as: A is subject to B, that is, it is not itself and by its nature B (in this case the proposition would be an empty tautology) but rather: A is what can also not be B. If that which stands in the place of the subject in the proposition, if A were such that it could only be what stands in the position of the predicate, and not also not be, then this proposition would be insignificant, meaningless. I can only say of a hu- man being: he is healthy, inasmuch as I presuppose, not that he is be- yond and outside any possibility of being sick (since the proposition would then be insignificant), but rather only that this possibility is sub- jugated in him, that is, that it is mere subject or – latent. By negating that he is sick, at the same time I let the possibility of the opposite shine through (the proper meaning of the word emphasis). (SW XII, 53 f.)

19 Just as the copula can be emphatic, knowledge can be emphatic, according to Schel- ling, when it has overcome doubt (cf. GPP, 97).

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We encounter here the same notion of the transitive copula that we had in the previous step, but instead of showing the subject only as ground of the predicate, instead of making only one possibility visi- ble, emphatic judgment completes the picture by (a) presupposing different possibilities that the subject has, and (b) at the same time affirming that only one of these possibilities is actual, thus ‘overcom- ing’ both a state of mere potentiality or indecisiveness (corresponding to the first kind of unity) and the restriction to only one possible actualization (corresponding to the transitive copula of the cision). In a way, emphatic judgment expresses a double subjection: we don’t just have the position of the subject, A, that is completely made latent and subjugated to B. We now have a distinction of aspects with- in A, and it is said that A takes its non-B capacities and makes them potential in turn, in order to ‘be B’. It seems that the second moment, the cision, underlined the asymmetry of the A and B positions, turn- ing A completely into the ground of B. Now this third moment turns the direction around and lets A come back into its own being, so that it is not exhausted in ‘being (transitively) B’.

a) Ground Here is an example that uses almost the same words as a passage quoted above, but adds the potentiality of not being B, going back to the subject’s own being. Whereas in the passage above we read ‘it exists only as bearer of the plant’, here Schelling writes “the matter is also something without the plant”, it is “indifferent against the form”:

When I say: that which I see here is a geranium, then the subject of the proposition is actually the matter of the plant. This matter is also some- thing without the plant, the plant can be destroyed and the matter re- mains, the matter is indifferent against the form, in her kind it is also an ἄπειρον, that is, it is capable of being not this plant but another one, or of not being a plant at all. Only for this reason can I say cum emphasi: it is this and no other plant. In the proposition A is B or A is subject of B is implied: 1) A could be something else or is capable of being non-B. But 2) precisely because it could be something other than B, it makes this its – “capable of being other” against B to mere potency or possibility of B and it is only B in this way. (SW XIII, 228 f.; my emphasis)

To make his point, Schelling even applies emphatic copula to a judg- ment that would not normally be considered ‘emphatic’ but analytic:

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The Arab does not say: homo est sapiens – this does not exactly express the actual relationship, inasmuch as one could also understand: the hu- man being is altogether only wise, he has no opposed potency, no po- tency of not-being-wise in himself, what, as we all know, is not the case, and besides it would turn the proposition into a merely tautological one. Without presupposing in the subject a potency opposed to the predicate, all sentences would be only tautological. […] The sense is then: the hu- man being bears, he is only the bearer, only the subject of being-wise, he is only wise insofar as he has posited the potency of the opposite being in himself as mere potency, he is capable in this way of being-wise […]. (SW XIII, 229 f.) 20

The difference to the previous interpretation of the copula is simply that we now see that whatever takes the place of ‘A’ is not completely exhausted by putting ‘B’ into existence. ‘A’ has a being of its own, that is, it would be possible for A not to be ‘B’.

b) Cause In the other case, the actualization of potentialities, Schelling ex- pounds on the difference between something that is completely ex- hausted in actualizing a potential being and something that still has a being of its own beyond being the actualizer. This is actually exactly the difference between the Aristotelian ‘soul’ (as mentioned in the previous example) and the ‘spirit’ (the next potency): while the soul actualizes the potential body, it does not have ‘a being of its own’ beyond this actualization, it cannot choose not to actualize a particu- lar body. The spirit is said to be ‘separated’ from anything potential, it is a self. We see a parallel notion in a late passage where Schelling says that God, the ‘Ideal’, is the ‘Idea’ (i. e. the sum total of possibility, in refer- ence to Kant’s Ideal of pure reason) in a transitive way, where ‘Idea’ acts as accusative or direct object. 21

20 Immediately before this passage, Schelling has explained how the transitive notion of the copula is expressed by the Arabic language: “In the Arabic language, the Is (of the copula) is expressed through a word that is quite our German can (Können). This makes sense, since in related dialects of the Arabic language this word has at the same time precisely the meaning of the subject, of the foundation, of what grounds or assures. Moreover, it is only from this meaning that one can explain that, in contra- distinction to all languages known to me at least, in which the verb sum is followed by nominative, the Arabs alone construct it with the accusative” (SW XIII, 229).

21 Related passages are found in Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus (cf. SW

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Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpretation of the Copula

The Ideal is cause of being to the Idea and not the Idea to the Ideal, as one generally says that the Idea is actualized through the Ideal. Thus, in the proposition: the Ideal is the Idea, the is does not have the meaning of the mere logical copula. God is the Idea does not mean: he is himself only Idea, but rather: he is for the Idea (the Idea in that high sense in which it is everything according to possibility), he is for the Idea cause of being, cause that it Is, αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι, in the Aristotelian expression. (SW XI,

586)

This transitivity of the copula makes it possible to consider God for himself as more than being the Idea: because God is the Idea (transi- tively), he is more than the Idea. God is first himself, and then, as his attribute or accident (cf. SW XI, 314), he actualizes the Idea, but his own existence does not consist in being the Idea. Or in another paral- lel passage, with somewhat complicated wording: “Because God is Being, but against this still has a being of his own, a being that He has even without Being” (SW XI, 418). 22 Going back to the question regarding the higher unity: what does Schelling want to achieve with these three moments? What is this higher unity that is the end of judgment?

In a way, emphatic judgment can be considered a synthesis of the two previous interpretations of the copula. The first kind of unity as iden- tity underlined that both determinations, A and B, were the same thing, they had the same substrate. Now this final unity states that something has different potentialities as alternatives, it can choose among them which to actualize and which to make latent. The differ- ence between these two perspectives was achieved by the cision that established the possibility of different positions in the first place. We might say that, in the first moment, the subject is seen as being identical to all its possibilities, without any possible movement or relation to them. In the second moment, it is seen as being the potency or possibility of something else. Only in the third moment

X, 264 f.), in the Historisch-kritische Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie (cf. SW XI, 50) and in Philosophie der Offenbarung (cf. SW XIII, 229). 22 In this case, I have translated ‘das Seyende’ as ‘Being’, because in this work (Dar- stellung der reinrationalen Philosophie) Schelling himself explains that he takes this term to mean the same as “l’Être” in French (SW XI, 272n.). Furthermore, in this text, ‘das Seyende’ corresponds to Kant’s ens realissimum, the totality of what can be thought, rather than an individual existent or something actively being. Cf. footnote 5.

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is the subject seen as actively having possibilities. 23 There is a turn upon itself, the possibilities are its own. As I mentioned above, these moments of judgment are akin to geological layers that, even once they are past, still bear the present one. Similarly, the further interpretations of the copula do not elim- inate the previous ones but rather explicate further aspects that were implicit. The copula expresses the identical substrate (1), but this matter can ground the manifest existence of something else (2), while keeping its peculiar potency as possibilities that it has (3).

[S]ince everything that is related to another as potency or subject has a certain might [Gewalt] over what it puts on [as predicate, M. G.], namely the might [Gewalt] to put it on and so to be it, and not to be it, that is, to exclude it, to repulse it. (SW XIII, 230)

In emphatic judgment we have both the act (actively being) and we regain possibilities, but both are asymmetrical, that is, the disjunction is now seen as potential or latent in contrast with the cision as crisis, choice, judgment, actuality: decisiveness. A is! B, but could be C, D, E, etc.

4. The Free Spirit as Third Potency

The three moments that we have considered are also reflected in Schelling’s ‘potencies’ (as triadic structure of thought and being man- ifest in judgment). Just as the first moment or potency within these ‘layers’ implied by judgment represents ‘substance’ (Seynkönnendes – pure potency), and the second represents ‘cause’ (rein Seyendes – pure being without any potency), Schelling says the third potency, the unity made possible by the cision, is best understood as being ‘free from being substance’ because it is cause and being ‘free from being cause’ because it is substance (cf. SW X, 248 f.). In other words, this third potency is able to go out of itself towards another, like a cause, but it must not be out of itself (it must not be spent on actualizing another aspect). It can also turn back upon itself, as a substance. To go back to the terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’, the higher

23 Cf. Buchheim 1992, 36–40; Sollberger 1996, 310.

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unity will not be an identical substrate that is potentially both, but rather an object that does not lose its potency, that is, that does not stop being a subject. What we want, says Schelling, is a subject “pos- ited as such” (SW XII, 56), ‘actively being’ subject, and not merely being subject to a further aspect. Whereas Schelling had operated earlier with the notion of a dis- junction that unifies (if the X that is A is the same X that is B, X can be either A or B) and at the same time generates a totality of possible determinations, here we have a negative disjunction, a “double nega- tion” (SW XIII, 247): the third potency is ‘neither nor’.

[T]he third potency is only thinkable as negation of unilateral ability and unilateral being. But this double negation is only possible as the third determination of a subject that, according to previous determina- tions, is already unilateral ability and unilateral being. (SW XIII, 247)

Since the positions of mere subject and mere object are already taken, the third potency is excluded from being a mere subject, so only ob- ject remains, and it is excluded from being a mere object, so only subject remains. It is the tertium datur, in a positive sense, as Schel- ling says. It has to be the subject-object that, while being actual, re- tains its potency. It is that which can determine and be determined: it determines itself, in other words, it is spirit.

For this which owns itself, abides with itself, which remains potency in act and remains power to be while being, language has no other word but spirit [Geist]. (SW XII, 57)

How does the spirit as third potency relate to the ‘higher unity’ that Schelling envisions as the same undifferentiated unity we had at the very beginning of The Ages of the World, but now as explicit, con- scious and free? (Cf. WA I, 63) A problem would remain, if the higher unity made possible by the cision were only the aforementioned ‘fu- ture goal’ of the process of nature and history, the diachronic order of the process in view of this end. It is not clear how contingency (the emphasis on what could have been otherwise) would play a role if the higher unity were simply the totality of the process. On the one hand, the third potency as ‘double negation’ is not ‘either A or B’ but rather ‘neither A nor B’. Its own self is always beyond these contents, not determined by them. However, the double negation could still be considered a disjunction that generates a total- ity of possible determinations that are negated. On the other hand,

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according to Schelling, a totality is merely potential. 24 The cision, in contrast, is also a decision, it picks out one actuality over all the po- tentialities that could have been. Emphatic judgment underlines the cision and decision that leaves behind that which is potential and at the same time opens up new possibilities that become visible. As the emphatic judgment expresses: A could have been C, D, E determina- tions, but it is! B. This decision, this act of judgment destroys the totality 25 by recognizing the radical difference between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ that Schelling underlines in his late philosophy. This is the final unity that the cision has made possible: a structure of judgment that makes room for freedom. This structure is ‘what we want’ in Schelling’s words, to be able to think of the free subject, the ‘spirit’, as the true active unity. The third moment implied by judgment, the unity made possible by the cision, the spirit, expresses this aspect of freedom that defines existence in its more specific meaning: not being determined by con- tents we might instantiate, by our nature, but having leeway (Spiel- raum) to adopt different relations or positions towards them, making some latent or others manifest.

Human beings are used to considering being as something completely devoid of will and as an addition to essence, as it were. Nevertheless, if they wanted to pay attention to inner existence, they would find the contrary and realize, for instance, that the best that might be in them according to their disposition, does not bloom into actuality without participation of their own self. Because they know very well to elevate and bring to light those properties that are agreeable and of particular advantage to them through diligent care; likewise, when it serves a good or evil end, to give up whole aspects of their existence and, if not anni- hilate them, bring them to latency indeed. (WA I, 22 f.)

This process of selection and decision, to have maneuvering room between aspects of oneself that are not fully transparent or readily available, is what it truly means to exist. As Schelling writes: “To will oneself, to receive oneself, to condense oneself, to posit oneself in

24 “But precisely this one [the absolute individual] is the πᾶν, Being – according to its content (not active being) in which all possibilities of being are – (the sum total of principles), that he is it means: he is to this, which is not for itself (μὴ ὄν) and is mere omnipossibility, cause of being precisely because He is it” (F. W. J. Schelling to K. F. A. Schelling, March 16 th , 1854, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, A:Schelling, Nr. 74.309).

25 Cf. Buchheim 1992, 3, 178–187.

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one’s completeness, is all the same, it is the only active, true ex- istence” (WA I, 23). In this way, while existence is considered from the structure of judgment, judgment is thought in turn from the standpoint of the spirit, of the free subject.

CODA

Is this notion of judgment relevant beyond the history of Schellin- gian philosophy? Recently, there has been a debate between defenders of a normative understanding of knowledge (both practical and theo- retical), who maintain that the primary dimension of human activity is its normative structure that goes ‘all the way down’ in the sense that perception is already conceptual, and defenders of an embodied engagement who argue for a primary dimension of human existence in the world that is neither active nor passive, in which the subject does not yet distinguish itself from the object. According to this sec- ond view, it is only by recognizing this dimension of openness that we can make sense of higher levels of self-conscious conceptual and nor- mative activity. The non-conceptual ‘coping’ at the most fundamental level would thus be a precondition of higher-level conceptual cogni- tion. This contemporary discussion (the so-called ‘Dreyfus-McDow- ell debate’ after the most representative contenders) 26 reflects to a certain extent what is at stake in the tension between an identity ‘previous’ to any subject-object distinction and the free activity of uniting what is separate. Does ‘being’ or ‘actuality’ have priority over ‘consciousness’ ? This would be a polemic between two orientations of post-Kantian phi- losophy: on the one hand the project of a first foundation of all knowledge grounded on the self, on the other hand a more ‘realistic’ tendency to give ‘being’ priority over consciousness or knowledge. Schelling in his late texts not only argues that consciousness and knowledge stem from being but thinks being itself according to the paradigm of manifestation, progressive revelation and pronouncing of what was unsaid. Both sides of the Dreyfus-McDowell debate recognized these lev- els of human activity, a pre-conceptual and a conceptual one. The pre-

26 Cf. Schear 2013.

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conceptual one can only be explained a posteriori, from a conceptual stance, and the conceptual one requires a pre-conceptual layer in some way. However, what they could not agree on was the question which of these modes of activity was the fundamental human one. The same difficulties that the ‘embodied coping’ approach has in order to explain from which perspective we become conscious of that ‘previous’ dimension of being one with the world can be found in Schelling’s thought. He writes in The Ages of the World:

The end is not attained in mere vision [Schauen]. Because in vision in and for itself is no understanding. […] All experiencing, feeling, seeing is in and for itself mute and requires a mediating organ to reach pro- nouncing. If the one who sees is missing this […], he loses the necessary measure, he is one with the object and for any third party like the object itself […]. (WA I, 7)

Against this background, Schelling’s titanic efforts to articulate the pre-articulate in The Ages of the World remain significant. Further- more, the thesis that the third sense of unity, that is, conscious, free activity, is nothing other than the first sense, non-distinction of sub- ject and object, but elevated to a higher potency, could mean, on the one hand, that there is no opposition between the preconceptual ac- cess to the world and the conscious, free, active one. When we get to the articulated level we realize that this ‘spirit’ is of the same source as ‘nature’, that the conscious and free activity is only possible starting out from the preconceptual one, even if the embodied non-conceptual being in the world does not exclude its development and articulation into action (free/conscious), which in turn does not stem from differ- ent principles than nature does. On the other hand, however, there is an important point that Schelling makes, when he thinks existence from the standpoint of judgment, in terms of pronouncing: we can only look at the previous, ‘mute’ stages, from the standpoint of what pronounces. They are al- ways in the past, the present belongs to the act of judgment precisely as the cision that lets go of the past, posits it as past. In that sense, Schelling is able to write: “Nature is an abyss of the past”. 27

27 Schelling 2000, 31 / SW VIII, 243.

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Bibliography

GPP Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph: Grundlegung der posi- tiven Philosophie. Münchener Vorlesung WS 1832/33 und SS 1833, ed. and comm. by Horst Fuhrmans. Turin 1972.

Buchheim, Thomas 1992: Eins von Allem. Die Selbstbescheidung des Idealismus in Schellings Spätphilosophie. Hamburg. Gabriel, Markus 2011: Transcendental Ontology. Essays in German Idealism. London/New York. Hogrebe, Wolfram 1989: Prädikation und Genesis. Metaphysik als Fundamen- talheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings “Die Weltalter”. Frankfurt a.M. Hölderlin, Friedrich 1795: “Urtheil und Seyn”. In: id.: Sämtliche Werke. Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe, ed. by Friedrich Beißner, vol. 4,1: Der Tod des Empedo- kles. Aufsätze. Stuttgart 1961, 216 f. Iber, Christian 1994: Das Andere der Vernunft als ihr Prinzip. Grundzüge der philosophischen Entwicklung Schellings mit einem Ausblick auf die nachidea- listischen Philosophiekonzeptionen Heideggers und Adornos. Berlin/New York. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 1978: System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. by Peter L. Heath with an introd. by Michael Vater. Charlottes- ville, VA. – 2000: The Ages of the World, trans. and with an introd. by Jason Wirth. Albany, NY. Schwab, Philipp 2016: “Von der Negativität zum Ungrund. Hegels Phänomeno- logie des Geistes und Schellings Freiheitsschrift”. In: Systembegriffe nach 1800–1809: Systeme in Bewegung, ed. by Violetta L. Waibel/Christian Danz/Jürgen Stolzenberg. Hamburg (forthcoming). Schear, Joseph K. (ed.) 2013: Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World. The McDo- well-Dreyfus Debate. London/New York. Sollberger, Daniel 1996: Metaphysik und Invention Die Wirklichkeit in den Suchbewegungen negativen und positiven Denkens in F. W. J. Schellings Spätphilosophie. Würzburg.

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