ESTOLAS VS.

MABALOT
G.R. NO. 133706, MAY 7, 2002

FACTS:
On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in favor of respondent
over a 5,000 square meter lot located in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. Sometime in
May, 1978, needing money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the
petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent,
there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting
on the transfer, the DAR officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan authorized the survey and issuance
of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of
the petitioner. Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner redeeming the subject land
and the case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform. On July 8, 1988, the DAR’s
District Office submitted an investigation report finding that respondent merely gave the subject
land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan and recommending that the CLT remain
in the name of respondent and that the money loan be returned to petitioner. Another
investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by
DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of
respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting abandonment
thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land. CA ruled: The
transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be returned to respondent. Respondent
had not effectively abandoned the property, because he tried to redeem it in 1981 and 1983.

ISSUE:

W/N respondent abandoned the subject property, thereby making it available to other
qualified farmer-grantees.

RULING:

There was no abandonment and even if there was it could not be transferred to anyone
other than the Government. PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its
mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government shall not be transferable
except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal
means. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. For abandonment to exist, the
following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or
claim or to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed
or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment;
otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated
by another. Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7, 1994, defines abandonment or
neglect as a “willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household,
to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific
economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.” In the present case, no such
“willful failure” has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to claim
dominion over the land. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s
landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The proper procedure for
reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed abandonment, and that the
subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.

CORPUZ VS. GOROSPE

333 SCRA 425, YEAR 2000

FACTS:
Gavino Corpuz was a former-beneficiary under the OLT Program of the DAR. Pursuant
to PD 27 he was issued a certificate of land transfer over 2 parcels of agricultural land. Corpuz
then mortgaged the land to the Grospes. In their mortgage contract, Corpuz allowed the spouses
Grospe to use or cultivate the land during the cultivation of the mortgage. Corpuz subsequently
instituted a complaint which alleges that the Grospes had entered the disputed land by force and
destroyed the palay that he had planted on it. However, according to the Grospes, Corpuz had
already executed a “Waiver of Rights” over the landholding in favor of the spouses in
consideration of P54,000.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled that Corpuz abandoned
and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Nueva Ecija. Said Samahang Nayon
even passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of said lots to the
Grospes, “who were the most qualified farmers-beneficiaries.” The DARAB and CA both
affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the waiver of rights is contrary to agrarian law.
2. W/N Corpuz had abandoned his landholding.
3. W/N Corpuz had voluntarily surrendered his landholding.

RULING:
1. Yes. The sale of transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or
through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old
feudal system in which the landowners reacquire vast tract of land thus, negating the
government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.
2. No. Corpuz’ surrendered of possession did not amount to an abandonment because
there was an obligation on the part of the Grospe's to return the possession of the
 landholding upon full payment of the loan. There was no clear, absolute or
irrevocable intention to abandon.
3. Yes. Corpuz' intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He
signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions. His voluntary surrender
to the samahang nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because
such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and reallocation of of
farmholdings of tenant farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY ET AL,

G.R. NO. 133450, JULY 9, 2002

FACTS:
The government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the
works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. A few years after, the PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands.
This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. The Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are:
that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public
domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
the JVA itself is illegal. On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of
the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as a
violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations. Petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of
pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

ISSUE:

W/N AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own the lands under the amended
joint venture agreement having 367.5 hectares s. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in
Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the Constitution.
RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended Joint Venture Agreement seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain. The Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935
Constitution which allowed private corporations to acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain, and the 1987 Constitution reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the Ponce
Cases cannot serve as authority for a private corporation to acquire alienable public lands, much
less submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a private corporation like Amari is
barred from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.

LUZ FARMS VS. HON. SEC. OF DAR (GATACELO)

G.R. NO. 86899, DEC. 4, 1990

FACTS:

Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, prayed that
Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16(d), 17, and 32 of R.A. No. 6657, including the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, be declared unconstitutional for being
repugnant to the due process clause. Sections 13 and 32 directed "corporate farms", which
included livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans"
(pending final redistribution of their landholdings) that would distribute from three percent (3%)
of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation. Luz Farms also argued that livestock or poultry raising was not similar to crop or
tree farming; it was not the primary resource in this undertaking and represented no more than
five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Thus, they
must not be covered by the law. On the other hand, DAR commented that livestock and poultry
raising were embraced in the term "agriculture" based on Webster's International Dictionary’s
definition. The Court, then, took cognizance of the case, as it assailed the constitutionality of the
law.
ISSUE:

W/N the contested provisions and implementing rules, which covered livestock and
poultry industry under agrarian reform, were unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural" clearly showed that it was never the intention of the framers
of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. Moreover, the
Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A.
3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds,
idle and abandoned land. Simply, the said provisions and rules were violative of the Constitution.

MORTA VS. OCCIDENTAL ET AL

G.R. NO. 123417, JUNE 10, 1999

FACTS:

Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano
Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from
their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants. Occidental claimed that
he was a tenant of the actual owner of the land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla
were not actually the owners of the land in question. The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and
Padilla. Occidental, et al. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable by the DAR
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of
Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related problem which falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:

W/N the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB.

RULING:

NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is
clearly outside DARAB’s jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. At any rate, whoever is declared to
be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it still fails to
comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the case
is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot
claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for
failure to comply with the requisites, the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the
DARAB. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1. That the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; 3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4. That the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5. That there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE ET AL VS. CA

G.R. NO. 138016, JAN. 30, 2002

FACTS:

The spouses Edilberto Romero and Felisa Romero owned a piece of agricultural land
in Alegria, Surigao del Norte. On different dates, the Romeros sold separate portions thereof
to Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson. Claiming to be the agricultural tenants of the
land in question, Jose Juanite (now deceased) and his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a
complaint with the Provincial Agricultural Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), against the spouses Edilberto and Felisa Mercado and their vendees
above-named for the cancellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to exercise their
right of redemption pursuant to RA No. 3844, section 12 of which reads: ‘Sec. 12. Lessee’s
Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge
of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided,
further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right
of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption
under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall
have priority over any other right of legal redemption.’ Edilberto Romero, et al., as defendants,
filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses. They alleged that the Romeros, being
the owners of the property, had the perfect right to sell any portion thereof to any person. They
strongly denied the allegation of the Juanites that the latter were their tenants. On October 28,
1993, the PARAB (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) rendered his decision
declaring the Juanite spouses as tenants; directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) to prepare the leasehold contract in their favor; declaring the deeds of sale executed by
the Romero spouses in favor of Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonsonnull and void; and
directing the latter to vacate the premises. On appeal, the DARAB reversed. In its decision
dated April 21, 1998 , it declared that the Juanites were not tenants on the subject landholding;
and hence, had no right of redemption.”

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioners were tenants of the Romero spouses (respondents) as to entitle them
to the right of redemption.

RULING:

The court affirmed the decision of PARAB. The PARAB declared the petitioners to be
tenants on the basis of the following evidence: a) certification of 28 persons to the effect that
spouses Juanite had been working on the land as tenants; b) in the deed of absolute sale signed
by Edilberto Romero as vendor, he stated that spouses Juanite were his tenants; c) the
spouses Juanite had been in possession and cultivating the land since 1969. Without any
evidence to support its finding, the DARAB reversed the finding of the PARAB and found that
petitioner Juanites were not tenants because they failed to submit evidence that they
were sharing the harvests of the with the landowners, respondent Romero spouses. SC agreed
with the Court of Appeals that the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his
status as a dejure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws. But note that from the time of
the landowners’ admission that petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element
of “sharing harvest” is assumed as a factual element in that admission.

NUESA VS. CA
G.R. NO. 132048, MARCH 6, 2002

FACTS:

On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an “Order of Award” in
favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Buenavista Estate, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters, respectively, under the following
conditions: · Within 6 months, he shall personally cultivate at least ¼ of the area; or · Occupy
and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment In no
case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale be issued in favor of the covering the lots without
a certification issued by the Land Reform Project Team Leader of Land Settlement
Superintendent that the awardee(s) has/have developed or devoted to some productive enterprise
at least one-half of the area thereof, or constructed his/her/their house therein in case of
residential land. After twenty-one years, private respondent filed an application with the
Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that
he had complied with the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner,
filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation of
private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had been
cultivating the same. Petitioner had filed his own application for said parcels in opposition to that
of private respondent. On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Regional Office undertook an investigation and found that the subject lots were
previously tenanted by other persons and it is clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the
terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor. On January 24, 1994, petitioner,
the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order, cancelling Order of
Award issued in favor of Jose Verdillo and giving Restituto Rivera the opportunity to purchase
said lots.

ISSUE:

W/N the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners’ claim that in this case, the Board
(DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the DARAB and its officials have not
committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The case
involves the strict administrative implementation and award of lots. The matter falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction and administrative competence of the DAR (Regional Director and
Department Secretary) and not of the DARAB (including the Provincial Adjudicator and the
Provincial Adjudication Board itself). Centeno vs. Centeno, “the DAR is vested with the
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program.” The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction “to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos.
229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws
and their implementing rules and regulations.” Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law),
“agrarian dispute” is defined to include “(d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

ALMUETE VS. ANDRES

G.R. NO. 122276, NOV. 20, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of land located at
San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and his family farmed the
subject property peacefully and exclusively. However, unknown to petitioner, an Agrarian
Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin on August 17, 1979 filed false reports
making it appear that Almuete has waived his right as awardee and made it appear that one
Marcelo Andres was the actual occupant of the land from 1967 to date. Consequently, DAR
issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of respondent who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons
armed with bolos, immediately entered the subject property claiming exclusive right of
ownership and possession. Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted no time in filing an
action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela. The Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final
and executory upon Marcelo Andres's failure to appeal. The latter filed a petition for certiorari to
prevent the implementation of the writ of execution which was entertained by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

W/N this case is considered an agrarian dispute. Whether or not regular courts have
jurisdiction.

RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and said thatit gravely
erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by
petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts. The Supreme Court held that this case is not of
an agrarian dispute. An agrarian dispute is refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In this case no juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and
respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In
fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of
land. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of possession and
reconveyance of title: there is no "agrarian dispute" involving tenancy relationship between the
parties that the issue should fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

CABALLES VS. DAR

G.R. NO. 78214, DEC. 5, 1988

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by public
respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Secretary, the Hon.
Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner
and the private respondent. The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only
sixty (60) square meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes (petitioner),
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes.
This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters,
situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses,
private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding,
paying a monthly rental of ₱2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed
Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by
both on a fifty-fifty basis. Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. For four years, he
paid the ₱2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to the
owner.As the property was sold, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they
needed the property, but Abajon refused. On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an
Affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and
jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut
down the banana plants on the property worth about ₱50.00. A criminal case for malicious
mischief was filed against Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of
the banana plants, had been done by Abajon). Upon motion of the respondent in open court, the
trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office of the Public Respondent for a
preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. The Regional Director of DAR
held that there is the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. On appeal by the
petitioner, the Secretary of DAR, reversed the decision of the Regional Director. Upon motion
for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the New DAR Secretary sets aside the
previous decision and finds the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.

ISSUE:

W/N there is an existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.

RULING:

There is none. The Higher Court laid down the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship. All requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,
or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. This does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof
especially when the area tilled is only 60 square meters and located in an urban area and in the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of
land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who
was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a
garden of some sort rather than a tenant. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being
absent in the arrangement is a clear proof that the private respondent was never a tenant.

PHILBANCOR FINANCE VS. CA

FACTS:

Private respondents Alfredo Pare, Pablo Galang and Amado Vie filed with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a complaint for maintenance of possession with
redemption and tenancy right of pre-emption against petitioners Philbancor Finance, Inc. and
Vicente Hizon, Jr. They allege that the subject lots are occupied by them as legitimate and bona
fide tenants thereof, spanning for 50 years, and that such was mortgaged by the owner Hizon to
Philbancor without their knowledge. The lots were subsequently foreclosed and sold at public
auction to Philbancor upon failure of Hizon to comply with his obligations to the former. They
further allege that they came to know of the transaction only when they were notified by
petitioner Philbancor to vacate the lots, threatening to take from them the actual or physical
possession of the agricultural lots.
 On the other hand, Philbancor avers that it has no tenancy or agricultural relationship
with private respondents considering that it acquired ownership over the disputed lots by virtue
of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale and that it is not an agricultural lessor a contemplated in
Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended. Furthermore, it contends that assuming
private respondents have the right to redeem the lots in question, it had already expired as it was
not exercised within 2 years from the registration of the sale.

The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, which

was affirmed in toto by DARAB. Petitioners then filed a petition for review of the decision of the
DARAB, but such was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents could still exercise their right of redemption over
the property sold at public auction due to foreclosure of the mortgages thereon considering that
they invoked their right to redeem only after seven years after the date of registration of the
certificate of sale.

RULING:

NO. Republic Act No. 3844, Section 12, provides that in case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. The right of redemption under this
section may be exercised within two (2) years from the registration of the sale and shall have
priority over any other right of legal redemption." In this case, the certificate of sale of the
subject property, which was sold at public auction, was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga on July 31, 1985. The two-year redemption period thus expired on July 31, 1987. The
complaint for redemption was filed by respondents only on July 14, 1992, five (5) years after
expiration of the redemption period prescribed by law.

Nonetheless, private respondents may continue in possession and enjoyment of the land
in question as legitimate tenants because the right of tenancy attaches to the landholding by
operation of law. The leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding.

ROMAN SORIANO VS. CA

G.R. NO. 128177, AUG. 15, 2001

FACTS:

A parcel of land originally owned by Adriano Soriano passed on to his heirs who leased
the same to the spouses de Vera for 15 years beginning 1967(until 1982). Roman, one Adriano’s
children, was to act as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease. However, in 1968,
the de Vera spouses ousted him from the property and appointed Isidro and Vidal
Versoza as his substitutes. Because of this, Roman filed a case for reinstatement and
reliquidation against the de Vera spouses. On appeal to the CA, he won. Prior to the execution of
the CA’s decision in 1972, the de Vera spouses and Roman entered into a post-decisional
agreement wherein the spouses allowed Roman to sub-lease the property as an agricultural tenant
until the termination of the lease in 1982.The said agreement was approved by the agrarian
court. After executing an extrajudicial settlement among themselves,
Adriano’s heirs divided the property into 2 lots. The first was assigned to Lourdes, Candido, and
the heirs of Dionisia; the other was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio, and Roman. In
1971, the first lot was sold by its owners to the spouses Abalos, while the ¾ of the second lot
was sold to the same spouses by Elocadio, Francisca, and Librada. In 1976, the spouses Abalos
filed with the RTC of Pangasinan an application for registration of title over the lots they bought
from the heirs of Adriano (the first one and the ¾ pro-indiviso share of the second lot sold to
them). The application was granted by the RTC, and affirmed both by the CA and SC.
In 1983, Roman, along with Elocadio and Librada, filed a case against the Abalos spouses
for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership, and damages. It was denied by the
trial court. In 1984, or 11 years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement
between Roman and the spouses de Vera, the Abalos spouses filed with the agrarian court a
motion for execution of the said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman
Soriano to sub-lease the property. The motion prayed that the spouses Abalos be placed
in possession of the subject property, jointly with RomanSoriano, and to levy so much
of Roman’s property to answer for the use and occupation of Roman of 6/7 share of the property.
When Roman died in 1985, he was substituted by his heirs. It appears that in 1988, the land
registration court’s decision was partially executed by partitioning the second lot into two—one
part in favor of Roman and the other in favor of the spouses Abalos. Roman’s heirs appealed
to the CA, which affirmed the partition but reversed the order of the land registration
court directing the ssuance of a writ of possession because of the pendency of the case instituted
by Roman against the Abalos spouses.

In 1993, the SC ultimatelydismissed Roman’s case of annulment of document and/or rede

mption, ownership, anddamages against the Abalosspouses; as well as the motion for execution
instituted by the Abalos spouses. Roman’s heirs then filed with the DARAB a
complaint against the Abalos spouses for “Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo
Order and Preliminary Injunction.” The Abalos spouses, on the other hand, in view of the SC’s
disposition of the case, moved for the issuance of an alias
writof execution and/or writ of possession to place them in possession of the first and ¾ of the
second lot. The trial court held this case in abeyance until after DARAB resolves the
complaint filed by Roman’s heirs. The Abalos spouses’ MR was denied by the trial court, and on
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC, ordering the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
Abalos spouses.

ISSUE:

W/N the winning party in a land registration case can effectively eject the possessor
thereof, whose security of tenure rights is still pending determination before the DARAB.

RULING:
No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as
a necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically
include possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is occupying the
land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The court says “allegedly” due to the fact
that there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and
Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest
by final judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act, which
protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the lawful owners.
The exercise of the rights of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural
tenant. Since the rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending litigation in the DARAB
he is protected from dispossession of the land until final judgment of said court unless Soriano’s
occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.

NATALIA ET AL VS. DAR

225 SCRA 278, 1993

FACTS:

PP 1637 set aside several hectares of land in Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as town
site areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the
Lungsod Silangan Town Site, where Natalia Realty’s properties were situated. Estate Developers
and Investors Corporation (EDIC), the developer of the Natalia properties, was granted approval
to develop the said properties into low-cost housing subdivisions. The Natalia properties then
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

When the CARL came into effect, the DAR issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivisions. Natalia immediately registered its
objection to the said Notice and requested the DAR Secretary to cancel same. However,
members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA) filed a complaint against
Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain them from developing areas
under their cultivation. The RA issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction. Natalia and EDIC
appealed to the DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the RA. Natalia then
requested the DAR Secretary to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither the DAR Secretary not
the DAR Director concerned took action on the protest letters.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the Natalia properties were validly converted from agricultural to residential
land.
2. W/N the Natalia properties are covered by the CARL.

RULING:

1. Yes. The Natalia and EDIC complied with all the requirements of law, even securing
prior approval from DAR. As a matter of fact, there was no need for Natalia and
EDIC to do so because the Natalia properties were within the areas set aside for the
Lungsod SIlangan Reservation. Since PP 1637 created the town site reservation for
the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro
Manila, it in effect converted for residential use what where erstwhile agricultural
lands provided all requisites were met.
2. No. The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered
as “agricultural lands.” These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to
be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation.