PLDT vs. NLRC, G.R. No.

80609 August 23, 1988

Facts:
Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, was accused by two complainants of having demanded and
received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of
their applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and
accordingly separated from the service. She went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she
had been illegally removed. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the
company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Nevertheless, the dispositive
portion of labor arbiter’s decision declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.
Considering that Dr. Bangayan and Mrs. Martinez are not totally blameless in the light of the fact that the
deal happened outhide the premises of respondent company and that their act of giving P3,800.00
without any receipt is tantamount to corruption of public officers, complainant must be given one month
pay for every year of service as financial assistance.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, which
upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. The private respondent took no further
action, thereby impliedly accepting the validity of her dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us
to question the affirmance of the above- quoted award as having been made with grave abuse of
discretion.
The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an employee illegally dismissed is
entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws. However, an employee dismissed
for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because
his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded
financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10 year service in the company
despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded rather than punished for her
dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification. The award is made on the ground of equity
and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium on
dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal.
The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense but merely to help her for the
loss of her employment after working faithfully with the company for ten years. In support of this position,
the Solicitor General cites the cases of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa
and Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, where the employees were dismissed for cause but were
nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social and compassionate justice.
Issue: WON Separation pay is proper.
Held:
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker,
the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance,
or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than
punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal
only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has.
Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly
dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks
he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to
do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve
the protection and concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by
the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any
more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice
may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen
to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved
they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their
own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is
unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and
affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the
PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10
years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it
will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the
efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.
Petition granted
TOMAS VS. SALAC, ET AL., G.R. NO. 152642, NOVEMBER 13, 2012
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities
of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant
Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from
the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was
passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government
agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers
abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007,
RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed
Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

WALLEM SHIPPING, INC. VS. MINISTRY OF LABOR 102 SCRA 835

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer that the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and
April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board (NSB) be declared null and void. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen for a period of ten months on board the M/V
Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch vessel owned and operated by petitioner's European principals. While their
employment contracts were still in force, private respondents were dismissed by their employer, petitioner
herein, and were discharged from the ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport
Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's rates to their crew.

Private respondents were repatriated to the Philippines on October 27, 1975 and upon their arrival in
Manila, they instituted a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and recovery of wages and other
benefits corresponding to the five months' unexpired period of their shipboard employment contract.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are liable for breach of their employment contracts for accepting salaries
higher than their contracted rates

HELD:
The findings and conclusion of the Board should be sustained. As already intimated above, there is no
logic in the statement made by the Secretariat's Hearing Officer that the private respondents are liable for
breach of their employment contracts for accepting salaries higher than their contracted rates. Said
respondents are not signatories to the Special Agreement, nor was there any showing that they instigated
the execution thereof. Respondents should not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but
human for them to grab every opportunity which would improve their working conditions and earning
capacity. It is a basic right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for themselves but for their
families as well, and this can be achieved through collective bargaining or with the assistance of trade
unions. The Constitution itself guarantees the promotion of social welfare and protection to labor. It is
therefore the Hearing Officer that gravely erred in disallowing the payment of the unexpired portion of the
seamen's respective contracts of employment.

it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed the respondents without just cause
and prior to the expiration of the employment contracts. As the records clearly show, petitioner voluntarily
entered into the Special Agreement with ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were actually given their
salary differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of respondents' fault that
petitioner made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special agreement.

In brief, We declare petitioner guilty of breach of contract and should therefore be made to comply with
the directives contained in the disputed Orders of December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979.

SUZARA VS BENIPAYO (1989)

Facts:
Suzara et al entered into employment contracts with Magsaysay lines to work aboard vessels
owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12 calendar months and with different rating/position,
salary, overtime pay and allowance. The contracts were approved by the National Seamen Board. Upon
arrival at the port of Vancouver, Canada, demands for increase in wages were made through the help of
the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF), a militant worldwide especially in Canada,
Australia, Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting foreign vessels and demanding wage
increases for third world seamen. Wages were increased but complaints were filed by Magsaysay before
the NSB. NSB ordered the return of the additional wages paid for being obtained thru violent means and
for lacking NSB approval. NLRC affirmed the order. Meanwhile, Magsaysay filed estafa charges against
the seamen. In this petition, the seamen seek for the reversal of the NLRC decision and the quash al of
the complaints for estafa.
Issue:
Whether the increase in wages needed the approval of the NSB to be legal.
Held:
No. There is nothing in the record supporting the finding that the workers resorted to violent means to
obtain an increase in their wages. It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the
middle of a labor struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway around the world
in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an
agreement of which the employer was willing to sign. According to the case of Vir-Jen, the form contracts
approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign ship owners
who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums which must be
incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code). They are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts
which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. The NSB,
the Department of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workingman's
interest and the nation's as a whole. the NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding
the petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal means in breaching their contracts of employment
and punishing them for these alleged offenses.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the National Seamen Board and
National Labor Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty of the offenses for which they were charged. The
petitioners' suspension from the National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The
private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages and overtime
pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the Special
Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, are ordered
DISMISSED.

PEOPLE VS. PANIS, 142 SCRA 664 (1986)

Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo
City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging
fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named
therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he
was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in
Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation
to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited
articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge
embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is
unavoidable.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code.
Held:

Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and
placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an
exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is
engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal
recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign
land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be
awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
PEOPLE V LAOGO, GR NO. 176264 JANUARY 10, 2011
Facts: Appellant Teresita Tessie Laogo was the proprietor and manager of Laogo Travel Consultancy, a
travel agency firm located along Padre Faura Street in Manila. An information was filed against her and a
certain Susan Navarro, charging them of the crime of illegal recruitment (large scale).
According to one of the complainants, Teodulo dela Cruz, Gary Bustillos introduced him to Susan as
somebody who could help him find work abroad. Since Susan was Garys aunt, Teodulo immediately
trusted Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in Guam, USA. Upon
Susan’s instruction, Teodulo filled up an application form and gave herP3,000 after the latter promised to
process his application to work abroad. On May 22, 2000, Susan accompanied Teodulo to appellants
travel agency office in Ermita where he paid an additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee. A receipt
bearing the logo and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by Susan .Months
later, when Susans promise to send him abroad remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other
applicants, went to appellants office and to Susans house to follow up their application, but the two
always told them that their visas have yet to be released.
The other complainants suffered the same fate as dela Cruz and personally rendered payments to Susan,
who in turn, gave them to appellant, in the appellant’s travel agency in Ermita in the hope that they can
acquire a job abroad as offered them by Susan.
On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest were issued against Susan and appellant. When arraigned,
appellant pleaded not guilty. Susan, meanwhile, remained at large. An alias warrant of arrest was issued
by the trial court against her but to no avail.
During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal activities undertaken by Susan. She
insisted that Susan was not in any way connected with her travel agency and that she confronted the
latter when she came to know of Susans recruitment activities. Appellant claimed that she even had to
rename her travel agency to Renz Consultancy and Employment Services to avoid being associated with
Susans recruitment activities. Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susans house during the town
fiesta, but denied knowing the other complainants. According to appellant, she came to know Rogelio
when Susan specifically identified him as the one who cooked the dishes after some guests prodded
Susan. Unsatisfied with appellants explanation, the trial court promulgated a Decision finding her guilty of
large scale illegal recruitment.
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed appellant’s conviction.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment.
Held: Yes. The appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment. Recruitment and placement refers to the act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. And when the
illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is
deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of
economic sabotage.
Both the trial court and the CA found that all the five complainants were promised to be sent abroad by
Susan and herein appellant as cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up transactions between appellant
and her victims were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to the victims
bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy, with two of the said receipts personally signed by
appellant herself. Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting together made complainants believe
that they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had
the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth and in fact it had none as
certified by the POEA.
The appeal is denied.