1. What are the three requisites in estoppel in pais?
miserable judgment, and lose money by them — indeed, all they have in the world;
a. as to the party estopped
b. as to the party claiming estoppel (Kalalo vs Luz)
The essential elements of estoppel in pais may be considered in relation to the
party sought to be estopped, and in relation to the party invoking the estoppel in his
favor. As related to the party to be estopped, the essential elements are:
(1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material
facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than,
and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert;
(2) intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall be acted upon by, or
at least influence, the other party; and
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related to the
party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of
the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in questions; (2) (reliance, in good
faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) action or
inaction based thereon of such character as To change the position or status of the
party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.
2. What is the presumption as to the sanity and motives of a person? (Valles vs Villa)
All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be moved by
substantially the same motives. When of age and sane, they must take care of
themselves. In their relation with others in the business of life, wits, sense,
intelligence, training, ability and judgment meet and clash and contest, sometimes
with gain and advantage to all, sometimes to a few only, with loss and injury to others.
In these contests men must depend upon themselves — upon their own abilities,
talents, training, sense, acument, judgment.
(yawyaw ) The fact that one may be worsted by another, of itself, furnishes no
cause of complaint. One man cannot complain because another is more able, or
better trained, or has better sense of judgment than he has; and when the two meet
on a fair field the inferior cannot murmur if the battle goes against him. The law
furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior, any more than it
protects the strong because he is strong. The law furnishes protection to both alike —
to one or more or less than to the other. It makes no distinction between the wise and
the foolish, the great and the small, the strong and the weak. The foolish may lose all
they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law will give it back to them
again. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad
bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts,
or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of
persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has
been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use
but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a
violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong,
before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.
3. What is the test in determining where the burden of proof lies? (Aznar vs Aying)
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party
to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts
averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain.[21] Moreover, one alleging a
fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance
of the evidence, his cause will not succeed.[22] Thus, the defendant bears the burden
of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff’s
claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has
alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is
predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his
favor.
4. Burden of proof of negative allegation; Compare the SC rulings in the following
cases:
a. People vs Quebral
The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative
avernment, like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by
law, inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the same. (Sec. 297, Act No. 190; U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306,
307.) In view, however, of the difficult office of proving a negative allegation, the
prosecution, under such circumstance, need do no more than make a prima facie
case from the best evidence obtainable. (U.S. vs. Tria, supra.) It would certainly be
anomalous to hold ". . . that mere difficulty in discharging a burden of making proof
should displace it; and as a matter of principle the difficulty only relieves the party
having the burden of evidence from the necessity of creating positive conviction
entirely by his own evidence; so that, when he produces such evidence as it is in his
power to produce, its probative effect is enhanced by the silence of his opponent. (22
C.J., pp. 81, 82.)
The rule, however, is different when the subject of the negative avernment does not
constitute an essential element of the offense, but is purely a matter of defense. In
such case, the burden of proof is upon the defendant. As to whether or not a negative
avernment is a matter of defense, is a question which we have fully discussed in
United States vs. Chan Toco (12 Phil., 262).
b. Abenes vs CA
Additional cases for Evidence 1
 In view of the foregoing provisions, while it is well-settled that under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that the accused has
no license or permit to carry a firearm lies with the prosecution; under the Omnibus
Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is exempt from
the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with the accused.
c. People vs Lagman
Zeng’s claim that the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license or
authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride likewise fails. The general rule
is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a negative
averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove
the charge. However, this rule is not without exception.
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the
facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests
upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive
evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by
established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the
production of documents or other evidence within the defendant’s knowledge or control.
For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business
without a license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of a
regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter which is
peculiarity within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction.[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the negative averment that Zeng had no license or
authority to possess shabu could have easily been disproved by presenting a copy of
the license or authority or any other document evidencing authority to possess it.
This he failed to do.
d. Berdin vs Mascarinas
Although a public hearing is necessary for the enactment of Tax Ordinance
No. 88-11-36, still we uphold its validity in view of petitioners’ failure to present
evidence to show that no public hearing was conducted.[41] Petitioners, as the party
asserting a negative allegation, had the burden of proving lack of public hearing.[42]
Although the Sangguniang Bayan had the control of records or the better means of
proof regarding the facts alleged and respondent public officials assumed an
uncooperative stance to petitioners’ request for copies of the Minutes of their
deliberation, petitioners are not relieved from this burden.[43] Petitioners could easily
have resorted to the various modes of discovery under Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of
Court.[44] Furthermore, petitioners could have compelled the production of these
documents through a subpoena duces tecum or they could have required testimony
on this issue by officials in custody of the documents through a subpoena ad
testificandum. However, petitioners made no such effort.
5. May estoppel arise from silence? (Pasion vs Melegrino)
An estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words. ‘Estoppel by
silence’ arises where a person, who by force of circumstances is under a duty to
another to speak, refrains from doing so and thereby leads the other to believe in the
existence of a state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may
support an estoppel whether the failure to speak is intentional or negligent.
‘Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation
and concealment of facts, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of
such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the
other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has
induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This doctrine
rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain
silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when
he should be silent.’
6. What are the requisites for the presumption of ‘suppression of evidence’ to apply?
(Blue Cross vs Olivares)
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx
xxx xxx
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the
disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.[22]
Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report
was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient.
7. Meaning of “possession of stolen objects” (Roque vs People) in relation to Rule
131, section 3(j)
The foregoing requirements presume that the personal property is in the
possession of another, unlike estafa, [where] the possession of the thing is already in
the hands of the offender. In People vs. Lacson, 57 Phil. 325, it was held:
“Commentators on the Spanish Penal Code lay great stress on the taking away, that
is, getting possession in theft, laying hold of the thing, so that if the thing is not taken
Additional cases for Evidence 2
away, but received and then appropriated or converted, without consent of the owner,
it may be any other crime, that of estafa for instance.”
Can a person tasked to receive and collect capital contributions and having collected
and received in her capacity as teller as alleged in the information, be guilty of theft?
The question should be answered in the negative. xxx[10]
Petitioner’s argument contradicts jurisprudence. In U.S. v. De Vera,[11] the accused,
Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an Igorot, a bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams
for the purpose of having a silversmith examine the same, and bank notes amounting
to P200 to have them exchanged for silver coins. Accused appropriated the bar of
gold and bank notes. This Court, citing Spanish and U.S. jurisprudence, ruled that the
crime committed was theft and not estafa since the delivery of the personal property
did not have the effect of transferring the juridical possession, thus such possession
remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with gainful intent and lack of owner’s
consent constituted the crime of theft.
8. Does presumption of regularity in official duty apply to:
a. Discretionary acts( Republic vs Prinicipalia)
Finally, the presumption of regular performance of duty by the
POEA under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, finds no application in the
case at bar, as it applies only where a duty is imposed on an official to act in a certain
way, and assumes that the law tells him what his duties are. Therefore the
presumption that an officer will discharge his duties according to law does not apply
where his duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion.[23]
The issue threshed out before the trial court was whether the order of suspension
should be implemented pending appeal. It did not correct a ministerial duty of the
POEA. As such, the presumption on the regularity of performance of duty does not
apply.
b. When the act pertain to another person or agency(Reyes Jr. vs
Belisario)
As a general rule, “official acts” enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the
presumption may be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary.[30] When an act is
official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the assumption that the law tells
the official what his duties are and that he discharged these duties accordingly. But
not all acts of public officers are “official acts,” i.e., acts specified by law as an official
duty or as a function attached to a public position, and the presumption does not
apply when an official’s acts are not within the duties specified by law,[31] particularly
when his acts properly pertain or belong to another entity, agency, or public official.
In the present case, the CSC had spoken by way of an en banc resolution,
no less, that the petitioner LWUA Administrator’s reassignment orders were illegal
because, by law, the authority to reassign officers and employees of the LWUA lies
with the LWUA Board; the LWUA Administrator’s authority is merely to recommend a
reassignment to the Board. For reason of its own, the Office of the Ombudsman
disregarded this clear statement of the legal allocation of authority on the matter of
reassignments. This omission cannot but have fatal consequences for the
Ombudsman’s decision, anchored as it is on the presumption that the petitioner
regularly performed his duty. For, shorn of any basis in law, the petitioner could not
have acted with official authority and no presumption of regularity could have been
applied in his behalf. Without a valid presumption of regularity, the major linchpin in
the Ombudsman’s decision is totally removed and the decision is left with nothing to
support itself.
9. Who has the burden of proving sufficient consideration in a contract? (Estate of
Millers vs Estate of Parsons)
A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to
prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and to
the party against whom it operates rests the burden of overthrowing by substantial
and credible evidence the presumption.[18] Under the law on evidence, it is
presumed that “there was sufficient consideration for a contract.”[19]
10. What requisites must be established for the presumption of “receipt of mail
matter” to apply? (Barcelon vs CIR)
In Protector’s Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that when a
mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set forth under
Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was received in the regular
course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that
the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed.
While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of
mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a
direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.
11. What is the effect of the presumption “continuing existence of a thing” in the
burden of proof? (Teves vs Sandiganbayan)
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,[18] owned the cockpit in
question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September
1983[19] with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as
in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989[20] he stated that he is the owner
and manager of the said cockpit.
Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his
ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist
Additional cases for Evidence 3
continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.[21] His affidavit[22] dated 27
September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he “turned over the
management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no
longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure” is
not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only
the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January
1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every
element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or
has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of
petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.
12. May the TSN of testimony of the witness-accused in another trial be admissible
against him?(Fullero vs People)
Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit F, or the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner
against Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, is
not what it purports to be. Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier
elucidated, one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official records
made in the performance of duty by a public officer. Exhibit F, being an official entry in
the court’s records, is admissible in evidence and there is no necessity to produce the
concerned stenographer as a witness.
13. What is the doctrine of incomplete testimony? Does the rule admit of any
exception?
a. People ve Gorospe
The Court, therefore, hereby resolves to admit the testimony of Fajardo. This
resolution finds support, though indirectly, from Section 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, which empowers the court to stop the introduction of further testimony upon a
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more to the same
point cannot reasonably be expected to be additionally persuasive. The position
herein taken by the Court in brushing aside technicalities is in accordance with a
fundamental rule that the provisions of the Rules of Court shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of
Court)." (Id, p. 418.)
b. De Castro vs De Castro
Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been
completed and as she has not been cross-examined, her testimony has become
useless. Apparently, petitioner is alluding to the rule that oral testimony may be taken
into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-
examined by the adverse party; until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore,
be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the
case.[25] The rule will not apply to the instant case.
Private respondent, who was present in court during the August 20, 2003 hearing and
did not register any objection to the trial court's order nor move to strike out
petitioner's testimony from the records, is deemed to have waived his right to cross-
examine petitioner. Thus, petitioner's testimony is not rendered worthless. The
waiver will not expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial court will
still weigh the evidence presented by petitioner vis-à-vis that of private respondent's.
The situation is not akin to default at all, where, for failure of defendant to file his
responsive pleading and after evidence for the plaintiff has been received ex parte,
the court renders a judgment by default on the basis of such evidence.
14. May an adverse evidence presented by a party be used against him or an
evidence presented by plaintiff be considered in favor of defendant? *No case 
15. Is the party who calls the adverse party as his hostile witness bound by whatever
testimony the latter gives?
Gaw vs Chua
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the
calling party will not be bound by the former’s testimony. The fact remains that it was
at his instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary
witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party,[32] except by evidence of his bad character.[33]
Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling
party does not vouch for the witness’ veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.[34]
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the
latter’s testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other
evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that
provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony
does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely
that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from
impeaching him.
16. May a complaint in an administrative case may be impeached that she was
charged with criminal cases? (CSC vs Belagan)
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of
the criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great
Additional cases for Evidence 4
majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been
arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or
confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following
grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not
logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or
accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until
his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or
discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular
wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the
waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared
to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.[28] As it happened in this case,
Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges against her listed by
respondent.
17. Are documents kept by the church considered public documents? (Spouses Fidel
vs CA)
Records show that Primitivo was born in 1895. At that time, the only records
of birth are those which appear in parochial records. This Court has held that as to
the nature and character of the entries contained in the parochial books and the
certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character of
being public documents for the purpose of proving acts referred to therein, inasmuch
as from the time of the change of sovereignty in the Philippines to the present day, no
law has been enacted abolishing the official and public character of parochial books
and entries made therein. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the
parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such they may issue
certified copies of the entries contained therein in the same manner as do keepers of
archives.[14]
The baptismal certificate of Primitivo is, therefore, a valid and competent
evidence to prove his filiation by Vicente.
18. Are financial reports of corporation considered public documents? Does it make
any difference if the reports are audited? What if the copy is a certified copy and
obtained from BIR or SEC?
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial
statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income
statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity
within a specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors who
are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited
financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as general
rule, private documents.[27] However, once financial statements are filed with a
government office pursuant to a provision of law,[28] they become public
documents.[29]
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its
admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness. [30] On the other hand, private
documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated.[31]
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
19. How should execution of private document be proven? (Lee vs People)
Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure
on how the authenticity and due execution of a private document which is offered as
authentic may be proved:
Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document
must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the
person whose name is subscribed thereto.45 The admission of that party against
whom the document is offered, of the authenticity and due execution thereof, is
admissible in evidence to prove the existence, authenticity and due execution of such
document.
20. What does it mean when a person admits of the genuineness and due execution
of the document he executed?(Simon vs Canlas)
Additional cases for Evidence 5
 As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real
estate mortgage during the pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in Benguet
Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document simply means that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by
another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words
and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. However, it
does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration.
Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence regarding their claim of
want of consideration.
21. What is the evidentiary value of a public document? (Angeles vs Angeles)
urisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father
and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.[26] Dr. Arturo
Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth,
wrote:
xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth
certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the
signature of the alleged father is necessary.
22. How may official records of Philippines be proved? (Heirs of Gabatan vs CA)
Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation
since the assessor’s office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of
sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is
the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could
have produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of
Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to
be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her
testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified
true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy
of Exhibit H from the assessor’s office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective
manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was
offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
23. What is the effect of notarization of document? Does the allegation that the party
who supposedly acknowledged the document did not appear before the notary public
render the document inadmissible?
Tigno vs Sps Aquino
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having
been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from
the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to
notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as
unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be
prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary
public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render
merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer
may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a
document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect as one
accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.[40] Thus,
notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who
are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public
and the courts and administrative offices generally
St. Mary’s Farm vs Prima Real Property
Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the
Secretary’s Certification, petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on
the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization.
We do not agree, because in the past, we have already held that the non-appearance
of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily
nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.10 However, the non-
appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability which
warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the
respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness
of the statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption,
there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable
controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.11 In the absence of such proof, the
document must be upheld. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
24. What is the effect of using “jurat” instead of acknowledgment when document is
required by law to be acknowledged?
Additional cases for Evidence 6
Pan Pacific vs CA
The use of a jurat, instead of an acknowledgement does not elevate the
Marital Consent to the level of a public document but instead consigns it to the status
of a private writing.45 The lack of acknowledgment, however, does not render a deed
invalid. The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish
real rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is
only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability.46
From the perspective of the law on evidence, however, the presumption of
regularity does not hold true with respect to the Marital Consent which is a private
writing. It is subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.- Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed
to be.
Tigno vs Sps. Aquino
A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment
is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit
where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before him.[25] Under Section 127
of the Land Registration Act,[26] which has been replicated in Section 112 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529,[27] the Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged
before a notary public
The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cariño and De Francia that would taint the
document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and
substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-
assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null
and ineffective.[21] It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the
presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the
same.
25. Is it necessary that a notarized document be presented to Office of Clerk of Court
for its admissibility in evidence? (Deztreza vs Rinoza-Plazo)
Indeed, the notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite
the failure of the Notary Public in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section
of the RTC Manila. It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the
latter’s act of signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the
submission of the notarial report.
26. May documents not formally offered during trial be considered evidence on
appeal? (Spouses Ragudo vs Fabella)
With the reality that those documents were never presented and formally
offered during the trial of the main case, their belated admission for purposes of
having them duly considered in the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 would
certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. (Emphasis supplied).
To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution pending
appeal that said documents were presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial
court admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose for which they were
offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETA’s motion for execution pending appeal.
It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall consider evidence solely for the
purpose for which it was offered.[23]
While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the
case for purposes of the incidental issue of execution pending appeal, they do not
have that same right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and ought not be
considered in the resolution thereof.
27. What is the effect of a party’s failure to offer its evidence? (Heirs of Pasag vs.
Parocha)
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered."9 A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to
rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial.10 Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the
purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence.11 On the
other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
Additional cases for Evidence 7
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required
to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.12

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v.
Court of Appeals13 ruled that the formal offer of one’s evidence is deemed waived
after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court
cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to
do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order
which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy
administration of justice."14

Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had
reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal
offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make
their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed
almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners’ failure to comply
with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and
expeditious dispensation of justice.

28. When should the court rule on the admissibility of documentary evidence?(Yu vs
CA)

It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the

evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer
of evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified and presented before
the court. While private respondent made a “Tender of Excluded Evidence,” such is
not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance
policy and application were not formally offered much less presented before the trial
court. At most, said “Tender of Excluded Evidence” was a manifestation of an
undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial
court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain,
speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could have resorted to
instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in
any way render the said petition moot.

Additional cases for Evidence 8