HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v.
REPUBLIC Land belonging to the State that is not of such
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013 Possession,
Property Registration Decree, Regalia Doctrine
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering the property he
purchased from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that
the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land
for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to
the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC.
However, the OSG for the Republic appealed
the judgment to the CA, which reversed the
RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during
the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said
decision to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. What are the classifications of public
lands?
1. Whether or not petitioners were able to
prove that the property was an
alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
RULING:
1.Classifications of land according to
ownership. Land, which is an immovable
property, may be classified as either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Land is
considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property
of the State. Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
cities and municipalities is of private ownership
if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura
Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into
the country from the West by Spain through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. This means that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land, and
is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under
private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary
to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts. If, however,
public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of
public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus,
until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or
until Congress or the President declares that
the State no longer intends the land to be used
for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.
2. Petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession – possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier –
the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the
State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the
land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281
SCRA 639
FACTS:
Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land
located in Calauag, Quezon, which was
approved, provided that the land shall not be
encumbered or alienated within a period of five
years from the date of the issuance of the
patent. Later on, the land was established to be
a portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six
feet deep during high tides and three feet deep
on low tides. The water level rose because of
the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the
storms that frequently passed through the area.
Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of
Lands from his investigation, that the land of
Morato was leased to Advincula for P100 per
month and it was also mortgaged to Co for
P10,000. The Director of Lands filed a suit with
the contention that Morato violated the 5-year
prohibitory period and thus the patent should
be cancelled and the land should revert back to
the State.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of
the prohibition of the patent, and thus, the
subject land should revert back to the
ownership of the State.
HELD: Yes. The lease was an encumbrance
included in the prohibitions of the patent
because it impairs the use of the land by
Morato herself. As for the mortgage, it is a legal
limit on the title and if there will be foreclosure
because Morato was not able to pay her debts,
the property will be auctioned. It is also a
limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and
possess the land for herself. Encumbrance, as
defined, is an impairment on the use or transfer
of property, or a claim or lien on the property
where there is a burden on the title. Thus,
Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent
on these points. Moreover, the property
became a foreshore land because it turned into
a portion of land which was covered most of
the time with water, whether it was low or high
tide. Foreshore is defined as land between high
and low waters which is dry depending on the
reflux or ebb of the tides. In accordance with
this land reclassification, the land can no longer
be subject to a pending patent application and
must be returned to the State.
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. VS.
BERCILLES (GR NO. L-40474)
Facts: In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in
Cebu was excluded in the city’s development
plan hence the council declared it as abandoned
and was subsequently opened for public
bidding. Cebu Oxygen was the highest bidder
@P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the
land’s registration before CFI Cebu but the
provincial fiscal denied it, so did the court later,
alleging that the road is part of the public
domain hence beyond the commerce of man.
32 PROPERTY - CASE DIGESTS
Issue: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly
own said land.
Held: Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the
city council “may close any city road, street or
alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square.
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that
portion of the city street subject of Cebu
Oxygen’s application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that “Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.”
LAUREL VS. GARCIA (GR NO. 92013)
Facts:
The subject property in this case is one of the
four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
1956; The properties and the capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects
are part of the indemnification to the Filipino
people for their losses in life and property and
their suffering during World War II. The
Roponggi property consists of the land and
building "for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy". As intended, it became the site of
the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when
the Roppongi building needed major repairs.
Due to the failure of our government to provide
necessary funds, the Roppongi property has
remained undeveloped since that time. 33
PROPERTY - CASE DIGESTS A proposal was
presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by
former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos
J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a
lease agreement with a Japanese firm —
Kajima.
At the end of the lease period, all the three
leased buildings shall be occupied and used by
the Philippine government. No change of
ownership or title shall occur. The Philippine
government retains the title all throughout the
lease period and thereafter. However, the
government has not acted favorably on this
proposal which is pending approval and
ratification between the parties.
On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization
of Philippine government properties in Tokyo
and Kobe, Japan.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive
Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of reparations' capital goods
and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The four properties in Japan
including the Roppongi were specifically
mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the
Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot.
Issue: WON the subject property can be
alienated
Held:
• The Roppongi site and the three related
properties were acquired through reparations
agreements and the Poppongi site was
specifically designated under the Reparations
Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for
public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine
government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that
the property has become patrimonial
• As property of public dominion, the Roppongi
lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot
be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
"ART. 419.Property is either of public dominion
or of private ownership. "
ART. 420.The following things are property of
public dominion:
"(1)Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2)Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the
national wealth. "
ART. 421.All other property of the State, which
is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property."
• The Roppongi property is correctly classified
under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service. The fact that
the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial
property.
Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu
Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA
481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of
the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership "until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]).
• The respondents enumerate various
pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We
emphasize, however, that an abandonment of
the intention to use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code
must be definite.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-
use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the
property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment
must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
Dacanay v. Asistio
[G.R. No. 93654. May 6, 1992.]
En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 13 concur, 1 took no
part
Facts: On 5 January 1979, MMC Ordinance 79-
02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, designating certain city and
municipal streets, roads and open spaces as
sites for flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the
Caloocan City mayor opened up 7 flea markets
in that city. One of those streets was the
"Heroes del '96" where the Francisco Dacanay
lives. Upon application of vendors Rodolfo
Teope, Mila Pastrana, Carmen Barbosa, Merle
Castillo, Bienvenido Menes, Nancy Bugarin, Jose
Manuel, Crisaldo Paguirigan, Alejandro Castron,
Ruben Araneta, Juanita and Rafael Malibaran,
and others, the city mayor and city engineer,
issued them licenses to conduct vending
activities on said street. In 1987, Antonio
Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City,
caused the demolition of the market stalls on
Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets.
To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city
streets, Teope, Pastrana and other stallowners
filed an action for prohibition against the City of
Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City
Engineer and/or their deputies before the RTC
Caloocan City (Branch 122, Civil Case C-12921),
praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering these city officials to
discontinue the demolition of their stalls during
the pendency of the action. The court issued
the writ prayed for. However, on 20 December
1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction which it had
earlier issued. However, shortly after the
decision came out, the city administration in
Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor
Macario Asistio, Jr. did not pursue the latter's
policy of clearing and cleaning up the city
streets. Invoking the trial court’s decision,
Francisco Dacanay wrote a letter to Mayor
Asistio calling his attention to the illegally-
constructed stalls on Heroes del ’96 street and
asked for demolition on 7 March 1988, wrote a
follow-up letter to the mayor and the city
engineer on 7 April 1988, and without receiving
any response, sought the intervention of
President Aquino through a letter. These letter
was referred to the city mayor for appropriate
action.
On 3 April 1989, Dacanay filed a complaint
against Mayor Asistio and Engineer Sarne
(OMB-0-89-0146) in the Office of the
Ombudsman. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, the Ombudsman rendered a final
evaluation and report on 28 August 1989,
finding that the Mayor’s and the City Engineer's
inaction is purely motivated by their perceived
moral and social responsibility toward their
constituents, but "the fact remains that there is
an omission of an act which ought to be
performed, in clear violation of Sections 3(e)
and (f) of RA 3019." The Ombudsman
recommended the filing of the corresponding
information in court.
As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes
del '96 Street, through the tolerance of the city
officials, and in clear violation of the decision in
Civil Case C-12921, Dacanay filed a petition for
mandamus on 19 June 1990, praying that the
city officials be ordered to enforce the final
decision in Civil Case C-12921 which upheld the
city mayor's authority to order the demolition
of market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and
Heroes del '96 Streets and to enforce PD 772
and other pertinent laws.
The Supreme Court established that Dacanay
and the general public have a legal right to the
relief demanded and that the city officials have
the corresponding duty, arising from public
office, to clear the city streets and restore them
to their specific public purpose (Enriquez vs.
Bidin, 47 SCRA 183; City of Manila vs. Garcia et
al., 19 SCRA 413 citing Unson vs. Lacson, 100
Phil. 695), and thus ordered the City Mayor and
City Engineer of Caloocan City or their
successors in office to immediately enforce and
implement the decision in Civil Case C-1292
declaring that Heroes del '96, V. Gozon, and
Gonzales Streets are public streets for public
use, and they are ordered to remove or
demolish, or cause to be removed or
demolished, the market stalls occupying said
city streets with utmost dispatch within 30 days
from notice of the decision; the decision being
immediately executory.
1. Jurisprudence applicable to property of
public dominion
The streets, being of public dominion must be
outside of the commerce of man. Considering
the nature of the subject premises, the
following jurisprudence co/principles are
applicable on the matter: (1) They cannot be
alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject
matter of contracts. (Municipality of Cavite vs.
Rojas, 30 Phil. 602); (2) They cannot be acquired
by prescription against the state (Insular
Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even
municipalities can not acquire them for use as
communal lands against the state (City of
Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327); (3)
They are not subject to attachment and
execution (Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of
Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52); (4) They cannot be burdened
by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain
520; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. Vol. II,
1983 Ed. pp. 29-30).
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA (GR NO. L-24440)
FACTS:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the
Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth
Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga
City.
Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that buildings
and properties which the province shall
abandon, upon the transfer of the capital to
another place, will be acquired and paid for by
the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by
the Auditor General. The properties and
buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and
some buildings constructed thereon, located in
the City of Zamboanga and covered individually
by Torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province.
Based on the records, such properties were
being utilized as capitol site, school site,
hospital site, leprosarium, highschool
playground and hydroelectric site, among
others. The Appraisal Committee formed by the
Auditor General, pursuant to CA 39, fixed the
value of the properties and buildings in
question left by Zamboanga Province in
Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was
approved dividing the province of Zamboanga
into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and
obligations of the old province were to be
divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
the law provided that the funds, assets and
other properties and the obligations of the
province of Zamboanga shall be divided
equitably between the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon
the recommendation of the Auditor General.
Pursuant to such provision, the Auditor General,
on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets
and obligations of the defunct Province of
Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga
del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.
Zamboanga del Norte therefore became
entitled to 54,39% of P1,294,244.00, the total
value of the lots and buildings in question, or
P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to
deduct from the regular internal revenue
allotment for the City of Zamboanga for several
fiscal quarters totaling P57,373.46, which was
credited to the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05
due it. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act
3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that all
buildings, properties and assets belonging to
the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said
City of Zamboanga.”
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered
the CIR to stop from effecting further payments
to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum paid and taken from
the internal revenue allotment of the latter. Of
the total amount paid by Zamboanga City, a
total of P43,030.11 has already been returned
to it.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Republic Act 3039 is
unconstitutional.
RULING: The validity of the law ultimately
depends on the nature of the properties in
question. If the property is owned by the
municipality in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress
has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control; the
municipality cannot be deprived of it without
due process and payment of just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is,
however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. In this case, the Court
applied the norm obtaining under the principles
constituting the law of Municipal Corporations,
which states that, to be considered public, it is
enough that the property be held and devoted
for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health,
etc. Thus, all those of the 50 properties in
question, which are devoted to public service
are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial.
Following such classification, the Court upheld
the validity of Republic Act 3039 insofar as it
affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites
and the high school playground sites, or a total
of 24 lots, since these were held by the former
Zamboanga province in its governmental
capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress.
However, Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied
to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in
the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots
which are patrimonial properties since they are
not being utilized for distinctly governmental
purposes. It results then that Zamboanga del
Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of
Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26
properties which are patrimonial in nature, said
share to be computed on the basis of the
valuation of said 26 properties as contained in
Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor
General.
Petitioner's share, however, cannot be paid in
lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already
returned to defendant City. The return of said
amount to defendant was without legal basis.
Republic Act 3039 took effect only on June 17,
1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had
already been made. Since the law did not
provide for retroactivity, it could not have
validly affected a completed act. Hence, the
amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately
returned by defendant City to petitioner
province. The remaining balance, if any, in the
amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots
should then be paid by defendant City in the
same manner originally adopted by the
Secretary of Finance and the CIR, and not in
lump sum.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY (GR NO. 164527)
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as
taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) between the NHA and
R-II Builder’s Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional
and invalid, and to enjoin respondents —
particularly respondent NHA– from
implementing and/ or enforcing the said project
and other agreements related thereto. On
March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161
(MO 161) approving and directing the
implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste
Management Plan.
Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to
“conduct feasibility studies and develop low-
cost housing projects at the dumpsite and
absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-
cost housing projects.” Pursuant to MO 161-A,
NHA prepared the feasibility studies which
resulted in the formulation of the Smokey
Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation
of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP).
SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain
dumpsite into a habitable housing project,
inclusive of the reclamation of the area across
R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the
enabling component of the project. Once
finalized, the Plan was submitted to President
Aquino for her approval.
On January 17, 1992, President Aquino
proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing
the implementation of the SMDRP through a
private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated
that the land area covered by the Smokey
Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as
well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10. In
the same MO 415, President Aquino created an
Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the
implementation of the Plan and an inter-agency
technical committee (TECHCOM) was created
composed of the technical representatives of
the EXECOM.
Based on the evaluation of the pre-qualification
documents, the EXECOM declared the New San
Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two
contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted
its recommendation to the EXECOM to approve
the RBI proposal which garnered the highest
score.
On October 7, 1992, President Ramos
authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI.
Afterwards, President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed
area for reclamation across R-10 from 40
hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR
issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in
favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters
covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. The
land reclamation was completed in August
1996.
Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to
Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special
Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an
additional 390,000 square meter area. After
some time, the JVA was terminated. RBI
demanded the payment of just compensation
for all accomplishments and costs incurred in
developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of
return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
executed by NHA and RBI, both parties agreed
to terminate the JVA and other subsequent
agreements, which stipulated, among others,
that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds
or through the conveyance of properties or any
combination thereof.
Issues:
1. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore
and submerged land areas because they are
allegedly inalienable lands of the public domain
2. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed lands
when there was no declaration that said lands
are no longer needed for public use.
3. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is
barred from the Constitution to acquire lands of
the public domain.
Held:
1. Yes. The reclaimed lands across R-10
were classified alienable and disposable
lands of public domain of the State.
First, there were three presidential
proclamations classifying the reclaimed
lands across R-10 as alienable or
disposable hence open to disposition or
concession. These were MO 415 issued
by President Aquino, Proclamation No.
39 and Proclamation No. 465 both
issued by President Ramos. Secondly,
Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and
3598 issued by the DENR classified the
reclaimed areas as alienable and
disposable. Admittedly, it cannot be
said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos.
39 and 465 are explicit declarations that
the lands to be reclaimed are classified
as alienable and disposable. We find
however that such conclusion is derived
and implicit from the authority given to
the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands
to qualified beneficiaries.
In line with the ruling in Chavez v. PEA, the
court held that MO 415 and Proclamations
Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly
taken together with Special Patent Nos.
3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the
requirement in PEA that “[t]here must be a
law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession.”
2. Yes. Even if it is conceded that there
was no explicit declaration that the
lands are no longer needed for public
use or public service, there was
however an implicit executive
declaration that the reclaimed areas R-
10 are not necessary anymore for public
use or public service. President Aquino
through MO 415 conveyed the same to
the NHA partly for housing project and
related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition
to and enjoyment of certain
beneficiaries and not the public in
general and partly as enabling
component to finance the project. Also,
President Ramos, in issuing
Proclamation No. 39, declared, though
indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of
the Smokey Mountain project are no
longer required for public use or
service. In addition, President Ramos
issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing
the area to be reclaimed from forty (40)
hectares to seventynine (79) hectares,
elucidating that said lands are
undoubtedly set aside for the
beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the
public.
MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465
are declarations that proclaimed the non-
use of the reclaimed areas for public use or
service as the SMDRP cannot be
successfully implemented without the
withdrawal of said lands from public use or
service.
3. Yes. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and
465 were issued, inalienable lands
covered by said proclamations were
converted to alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. When the titles
to the reclaimed lands were transferred
to the NHA, said alienable and
disposable lands of public domain were
automatically classified as lands of the
private domain or patrimonial
properties of the State because the
NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose
of alienable or disposable lands of
public domain. The only way it can
transfer the reclaimed land in
conjunction with its projects and to 62
PROPERTY - CASE DIGESTS attain its
goals is when it is automatically
converted to patrimonial properties of
the State. Being patrimonial or private
properties of the State, then it has the
power to sell the same to any qualified
person—under the Constitution,
Filipino citizens as private corporations,
60% of which is owned by Filipino
citizens like RBI.