War of The Handbags - The Takeover Battle For Gucci Group N.V.

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“WAR OF THE HANDBAGS”: THE TAKEOVER

BATTLE FOR GUCCI GROUP N.V.
At three o’clock in the morning of September 10, 2001, Thierry Hautillac, senior
manager of the merger-arbitrage/event-driven portfolio of Geneva-based hedge fund Suisse
Financière SA, received a call from his senior analyst that the battle for Gucci Group N.V. had
ended. After two and a half years of bitterness and uncertainty, the two titans of European luxury
had finally hammered out the details of a deal that would hand over one of the most storied
names in haute couture to a French timber, construction, and retailing conglomerate.
Gucci Group N.V.—based in Amsterdam but managed from Florence, where it was
founded in 1921—had entered the new millennium as one of the hottest and most successful
fashion brands in the world. Domenico De Sole, chairman and chief executive, and Tom Ford,
creative director, had revitalized a company that had been moribund after years of family
squabbling and mismanagement. Under Ford and De Sole’s managerial and creative leadership,
Gucci underwent a dramatic turnaround, as revenues expanded from under $200 million, in
1990, to $2.3 billion, in 2000.1
Gucci had caught the attention of two legendary and acquisitive French businessmen,
François Pinault and Bernard Arnault, described by the Economist as “France’s two most
famously self-made men.” Arnault was chairman of LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA
(LVMH), the largest luxury-goods company in the world, with 15% of the global $80-billion
luxury-goods market. Pinault was the architect of Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA (PPR), a
broadly diversified French conglomerate with significant holdings in mass retailing. Both men
had personal fortunes of more than $6 billion. Their mutual interest in Gucci had begun in early
1999, when PPR emerged as Gucci’s white knight following LVMH’s hostile bid for the fashion
house. Undeterred, Arnault filed multiple lawsuits and made subsequent counteroffers, leading to
a bitter and public dispute between Arnault and Pinault and causing lingering uncertainty over
the future of Gucci.
1
Gucci Group N.V. reported its financial results in U.S. dollars.
This case was prepared from public information by Sean D. Carr (’03), under the supervision of Robert F. Bruner,
Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, and Professor Laurie Simon Hodrick, Columbia Business
School. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an
administrative situation. The representations of Thierry Hautillac and Suisse Financière are fictional. Copyright 
2005 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order
copies, send an e-mail to sales@dardenpublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation.
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Hautillac had been hearing rumors for the past week that a deal was nigh. Now Hautillac,
who had amassed a 2% stake in Gucci Group,2 needed an immediate assessment of the deal and a
recommendation for the disposition of his holdings. His analyst explained the tripartite terms of
the deal: (1) PPR would pay LVMH $94 a share for about half of LVMH’s Gucci holdings; (2)
Gucci would issue a special dividend of $7 a share to all of its shareholders, except PPR; and (3)
PPR would offer $101.50 a share to all remaining Gucci shareholders in March 2004.
How should Hautillac evaluate the PPR offer? Was it a fair price for Gucci? Should he
sell now, continue to hold the shares, or consider buying more Gucci stock?
Gucci Group N.V.
Guccio Gucci started a leather-goods business in Florence, Italy, in 1921, after

fabricating a pedigree that his family had once been saddlemakers to Florentine aristocrats.3 By
the 1950s, such luminaries as Grace Kelly, Elizabeth Taylor, and Queen Elizabeth were Gucci
patrons, and by 1953, Gucci had opened his first American shop in New York. Following Guccio
Gucci’s death that year, the company’s reins passed to son Aldo, who successfully turned the
Gucci name into a global fashion brand. Through licensing, Aldo put his family’s moniker on
thousands of items, and in 1974, the company launched its first men and women’s ready-to-wear
lines.
But by the mid-1980s, Gucci was struggling, and brewing family tensions ended with one
faction selling its half to Bahrain-based Investcorp. Maurizio, grandson of the founder, took
Gucci’s helm in 1989. To give Gucci’s goods more cachet, he reined in the rampant licensing of
the Gucci name—it had appeared on everything from key fobs to scotch—and reduced the
number of outlets selling Gucci items. But much-needed cash flow dwindled and amid a global
recession, Gucci lost money. In 1993, Investcorp bought out Maurizio, the last remaining Gucci
involved in the company.
In 1994, Investcorp named Domenico De Sole its new president. De Sole, an Italian-born
lawyer, had previously been a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Patton Boggs before
joining Gucci in 1984 as president and CEO of Gucci America. Upon taking command of Gucci,
De Sole found a company so troubled that he personally met with suppliers to encourage them to
continue working with the firm and negotiated incentive-based bonuses for union workers to
help keep the company afloat.4
De Sole’s turnaround of Gucci could not have occurred without the help of Tom Ford, a
dynamic, young designer from Texas who had joined Gucci in 1990. In early 1995, Ford’s
collections transformed the very essence of Gucci as he combined Italian quality with a sex-
2
Hautillac had purchased his entire Gucci share position on January 6, 1999.
3
Gucci Group N.V., company history, Hoover’s, Inc., (accessed February 2005).
4
Dana L. Telsey and James Hurley, Luxury Goods: Value in the Magnetism of Brands (Bear Stearns, June
2001), 119.
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inspired look. Ford consistently introduced designs that gave Gucci a racier, sexier edge and
generated both attention and sales. Women’s Wear Daily called Ford “one of the most influential
and exciting designers of the last decade.”5
Ford maintained a keen interest in how his designs were selling, and he pored over sales
reports from Gucci’s worldwide network of stores. But his greatest talent was his intuitive
understanding of what luxury consumers wanted.
No one in our society really needs anything we make. Nobody needs another pair
of $500 Gucci shoes and nobody needs another pair of $3,295 beaded, torn and
ripped jeans. We have to make fashion aspirational. We have to make that girl
believe that it’s going to make her life better and she’s going to get the job and the
boyfriend if she buys that pair of shoes. We have to make people want things.6
De Sole and Ford became the heart and soul of Gucci, a team that financial analysts said
was “crucial” to the company’s value.7 Together, De Sole and Ford had masterminded a strategy
that recaptured Gucci’s exclusivity and profitability by, primarily, reducing the number of
franchisees, eliminating the overlicensing of the Gucci name and logo, exerting tighter control
over the group’s directly owned stores, and providing a single, creative vision for Gucci, or what
the company called “the absolute coherence of the brand.”
In July 1995, Investcorp appointed Domenico De Sole president and managing director
of the holding company Gucci Group N.V.8 That same year, Investcorp took Gucci public; it sold
the rest of its stake in 1996.9 From then on, De Sole and Ford pursued an aggressive acquisition
strategy in order to diversify the company’s portfolio of luxury labels. “A multibrand group is
the logic of our structure,” De Sole said.10 De Sole developed so-called centers of expertise in
product design, marketing, and promotion.11 Gucci Timepieces, for instance, supplied and
distributed watches for YSL, Boucheron, and Bédat & Co., while Sergio Rossi produced shoes
for Yves Saint Laurent and Alexander McQueen.
The company’s activities were divided into five segments: Gucci Fashion and
Accessories; Luxury Timepieces; YSL Beauté; Yves Saint Laurent; and Other Operations, which
included Sergio Rossi, Boucheron, Bédat & Co., Alexander McQueen, Stella McCartney, Ltd.,
Balenciaga, and Bottega Veneta. Gucci operated 183 stores in major markets throughout the
world, and sold its products through franchise stores, duty-free boutiques, and leading
5
James Fallon, “Tom Ford Doesn’t Believe in Fairy Tales,” Women’s Wear Daily, 5 June 2001.
6
Miles Socha, “Keynote: Tom Ford,” Women’s Wear Daily, 24 May 1999.
7
Samantha Conti, “De Sole: A Formidable Foe,” Women’s Wear Daily, 22 March 1999.
8
Sara Gay Forden, “Gucci on Wall Street: Launching Pad for Worldwide Growth,” Women’s Wear Daily, 2
November 1995.
9
Gucci Group’s public offering occurred on October 23, 1995, when the company offered 24,500,000 shares on
the New York Stock Exchange at $22 a share; Gucci’s implied total market capitalization at that time was
$1,287,002,178.
10
Gucci Group N.V., 2000 Annual Report (Amsterdam: Gucci Group N.V., 2002).
11
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, 1999 Annual Report (Paris: Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, 2000), 68.
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department and specialty stores. Gucci Group’s shares were listed on both the New York Stock
Exchange and the Euronext Amsterdam Stock Exchange.12
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA13
Sixteen-year-old François Pinault dropped out of school in 1952 to join his family’s
small, but prosperous, timber business.14 Assuming control of the firm after his father’s death in
1963, Pinault diversified the company into wood importing and retailing, eventually building a
flourishing enterprise. In 1973, sensing the demand for timber was peaking, Pinault sold 80% of
the business, only to buy it back two years later at an 85% discount. During the 1970s and ’80s,
Pinault bought several struggling timber businesses and turned them around as well. By 1988,
when it filed to go public on the Paris exchange, the Pinault Group was a vertically integrated
timber-manufacturing, -trading, and -distribution company.
Pinault, once known as “le roi du bois,”15 claimed his business strategy was inspired by
the words of the French poet René Char: “Think strategically, act primitively.”16 Following that
philosophy, Pinault transformed his family’s single lumber mill into a multi-million dollar
lumber-distribution network, largely through serial acquisitions. In the 1990s, Pinault
aggressively diversified his company outside the timber industry by acquiring electrical-
equipment distributor CFAO (Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale) in 1990, the
Conforama furniture chain in 1991, and Au Printemps department stores in 1992. The firm then
became the Pinault-Printemps Group.
In 1993, Pinault reorganized the group into four divisions: Retail, Business-to-Business,
Financial Services, and International Trade. That year, Pinault-Printemps bought a majority stake
in Groupelec and merged it with the electrical-equipment subsidiary CDME, forming Rexel. In
1994, the company completed its acquisition of Redoute, a major French mail-order retailer.
After renaming itself Pinault-Printemps-Redoute (PPR), the company continued its

aggressive acquisition efforts, taking majority stakes in Fnac (book and music retailer), SCOA
(pharmaceuticals distributor), Orcanta (a chain of women’s lingerie stores), Becob (building-
materials distributor), Guilbert (office supplies and furniture), and Brylane (mail order). By
2000, PPR had become the leading French specialized distributor and retailer, progressively
expanding into the retail sector and generating sales of (euro) €24.8 billion.
Pinault consistently built up his operating divisions around leading companies and
recognized brands: Retail included Printemps, Conforama, Redcats, and Fnac; Credit and
Financial Services included Finaref; and Business-to-Business included Rexel, Pinault Bois &
12
Gucci Group N.V., press release, September 10, 2001.
13
“Purse Strings,” Wall Street Journal, 12 February 2003.
14
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA company history, Hoover’s, Inc., (accessed February 2005).
15
“Creative Businessman,” Economist, 19 February 2000.
16
Dana Thomas and Rana Dogar, “Brawling for Beauty,” Newsweek, 5 April 1999.
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Matériaux, Guilbert, and CFAO. PPR employed 110,000 people in more than 60 countries, and
had 50 million wholesale and retail customers worldwide.
LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA
Woodworker Louis Vuitton started his Paris career in 1854 by packing dresses for French
Empress Eugénie and designing new types of luggage. By 1896, Vuitton had opened his own
stores and had introduced the LV-monogrammed canvas that the company has used ever since.
By 1900, Louis Vuitton had stores in the United States and England, and by the First World War
Louis’ son, Georges, had built the world’s largest retail store for travel goods.
In 1977, Henry Racamier, a former steel executive who had married into the Vuitton
family, took charge of the company, repositioning Vuitton’s goods from esoteric status symbols
to designer must-haves. Sales soared from $20 million to nearly $2.5 billion within a decade. In
1987, concerned about being a takeover target, Racamier merged Louis Vuitton with Moët
Hennessy (maker of wines, spirits, and fragrances), naming the new company LVMH Moët
Hennessy Louis Vuitton.
Around that time, Racamier invited outside investor Bernard Arnault to increase his
interest in the burgeoning luxury-goods conglomerate. Arnault, whose family owned a
construction concern in northern France, quickly gained control of LVMH and became its
chairman in 1989. “I have always been interested in creativity,” Arnault told the New York
Times. “Even when I was working in construction, what I liked was to work with architects. I
have always liked very much creators, and in luxury you are in a sense working with artists,
those who have the capacity to transform creative ideas into reality.”17
Arnault, known among the European press as a “wolf in cashmere clothing” for his
acquisitive tendencies, bought up top brands in fashion, leather, perfume, champagne, watches,
and jewelry, thereby transforming his $15-million investment into an $8-billion luxury-brands
empire.18 “It’s a unique situation,” Arnault said in late 1999. “No other group in luxury goods
ever will be able to cover this entire spectrum—champagne, watches, fashion. It’s really what
distinguishes us from every other group.”19 Arnault and his family owned 48% of LVMH.
The company controlled as much of its distribution as possible. LVMH had more than
1,500 retail outlets, including more than 280 Louis Vuitton stores, some 150 DFS Group (duty-
free shops), Le Bon Marché, and hundreds of designer boutiques. Its Sephora self-serve
cosmetics and fragrance chain had nearly 500 stores worldwide. By 2000, LVMH owned 46
different luxury brands, whose sales represented 15% of the global luxury-goods market, against
17
“Bernard Arnault,” Newsmakers 2000 4 (Gale Group, 2000).
18
Sarah Raper, “LVMH’s Arnault: The Tower and the Glory,” Women’s Wear Daily, 6 December 1999.
19
Raper, “LVMH’s Arnault.”
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6% for Switzerland-based Richemont, the next largest.20 “What I like most is the idea of
transforming creativity into profitability,” Arnault said. “I see new ideas and the way we are
going to make them real products that will work on a worldwide scale.”21
LVMH had holdings in wines and spirits (Dom Pérignon, Moët & Chandon, Veuve
Clicquot, and Hennessy), perfumes (Christian Dior, Guerlain, and Givenchy), cosmetics (Bliss,
Fresh, and BeneFit), fashion and leather goods (Donna Karan, Givenchy, Kenzo, and Louis
Vuitton), and watches and jewelry (TAG Heuer, Ebel, Chaumet, and Fred). LVMH’s retail
division included Sephora cosmetics stores, Le Bon Marché department stores, and 61% of DFS
Group (duty-free shops).
The Luxury-Goods Market
The global market for luxury goods—encompassing premium jewelry and watches,
leather goods and shoes, wines and champagne, apparel, fragrances and cosmetics, and home
accessories—stood at roughly $80 billion in 2001. Over the previous 10 years, it had grown at an
estimated compound annual rate of 6%, and at 8% following the 1997–1998 Asian financial
crisis.22
A leading luxury-goods analyst with Morgan Stanley observed:
There is a combination of factors driving this sector, which has been booming
since mid-1999. The recovery in the Asian markets is by far the most important,
as this is a crucial area for a lot of these brands, and a stronger yen has also
increased the spending power of Asian tourists. Lastly, there is generally a lot of
new wealth, generated by the strength of the stock market and the e-economy.23
About one-third of industry sales were concentrated in Europe, while Asia and North America
represented 45% and 20%, respectively. Historically, the demand for luxury goods in each of
those three key regions (the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific) had grown faster than the
growth in the corresponding countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). The companies in the
luxury-goods sector typically achieved gross- and operating-profit margins of more than 60%
and 18%, respectively, compared with 40%–50% gross margins and 9%–12% operating margins
for more mainstream brands.24 Exhibits 1 and 2 provide financial data on comparable luxury-
goods firms; Exhibit 3 provides information on recent transactions in the luxury-goods industry.
While luxury consumption had been generally resilient to economic cycles, the luxury-
goods business remained particularly sensitive to broad, short-term trends in global consumer
20
Yancine Aït-Sahalia, Jonathan A. Parker, and Motohiro Yogo, “Luxury Goods and the Equity Premium,”
Journal of Finance 59 (December 2004): 2960.
21
Raper, “LVMH’s Arnault.”
22
Telsey and Hurley, Luxury Goods, 1.
23
James Curtis, “Not Taking Luxury for Granted,” Marketing, 24 August 2000.
24
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spending, stock-market performance, exchange-rate fluctuations, ongoing industry consolidation,

and the all-important variable of product image and identity.25 The primary luxury-goods
consumers were the 7.2 million individuals in the world who had more than $1 million in liquid
assets. Collectively, they possessed a total wealth of $27 trillion. This figure grew at an average
rate of 12% between 1998 and 2001, and was forecast to advance at an 8% annual pace over the
following five years.26
Although the merchandise was priced to be exclusive, luxury-goods customers spanned a

broad spectrum. Age and income were not necessarily predictive indicators of luxury
consumption because, for many consumers, the motivation for luxury purchases was aspirational.
Thus, other psychographic and sociological determinants were important, such as custom,
nationality, gender, and profession. Nonetheless, the truly very rich were a generally
homogeneous group. As luxury-goods companies catered primarily to the world’s wealthiest
consumers, sales to this group tended to be less erratic or sensitive to changes in the
macroeconomic environment than were the sales of other consumer goods.27
Movements in the world’s equities markets had become increasingly important to sales of
luxury goods because more individuals had money invested in the stock market. Recent studies
had shown that, over time, there was a close relationship between excess stock returns and sales
growth for luxury retailers.28 Luxury-goods sales in the United States, in particular, tended to
follow stock-market trends, much more so than in Japan or Europe. This was largely because
more than 50% of U.S. households were invested in the stock market.29
Foreign-exchange movements were especially relevant to the luxury-goods sector,

because most firms’ sales were derived principally from exports.30 For the group as a whole,
product design and manufacturing activities were based in Europe, leading to a concentration of
costs in euros. The relative strength of the Japanese yen also had a particularly strong influence
on demand because Japanese consumers accounted for a disproportionately large share of global
luxury-goods sales. On average, the core luxury-goods companies realized more than 30% of
their consolidated revenues in Japan, and another 10%–15% of sales were purchases made by
Japanese people traveling abroad. By the late 1990s, Japanese tourists were the world’s top
spenders on international trips, spending $1,823 per trip on average.31
With the exception of Richemont, the leading companies in this sector, including LVMH
and Gucci, engaged in hedging activities to manage the risk from short-term exchange-rate
fluctuations. In addition, most luxury-goods companies actively managed operating exposure by
25
Elena Mills and Robin Seydoux, European Luxury Goods (Credit Suisse First Boston [Europe] Ltd., 9 March
2001), 20.
26
27
28
Aït-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo, “Luxury Goods,” 2960.
29
30
Mills and Seydoux, European Luxury Goods, 20.
31
Claire Kent, Living Legends: Luxury Goods Industry Overview (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 6 March 2001),
7.
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adjusting pricing strategies during periods of material foreign-exchange fluctuations. Thus,

substantial regional price differences existed (U.S. prices tended to be 10%–15% higher than
prices in Europe, while Asian prices were 25%–35% higher).32
The luxury-goods marketplace was highly fragmented and comprised numerous, small
boutique brands that were often privately held by members of the founding family (e.g., Etro,
Ferragamo, St. John’s Knits, Versace, Harry Winston). Given their own capital constraints, those
small companies found it necessary to seek partners with deeper resources or they chose to be
bought out altogether. Explained one analyst with UBS Warburg:
Luxury sector consolidation … [attempts] to fulfill the need of its players to find
alternative sources of growth by buying under-represented, local brands and
exploiting the international distribution network (back-office, warehouses, etc.)
already set up. The stronger financial resources of large groups create an
increasingly competitive environment, particularly with reference to the search for
the all-important [retail] location (at an increasingly higher price).33
Between 2000 and 2001, consolidation in the industry had become de rigueur.34 Gucci Group,
LVMH, Prada, and Richemont, in particular, were by far the most acquisitive buyers of luxury
brands. Driving those acquisition efforts was a desire to build multibrand portfolios. Seeking
growth through brand diversification was not without its risks, however. “The multibrand
business model is not easy to apply to the luxury-goods sector as the group must integrate new
brands without jeopardizing their identity, thus protecting brand image,” said one Wall Street
analyst.35 Generating expense savings or production efficiencies presented a significant challenge
where maintaining brand integrity and authenticity were critical success factors.
Tradition and heritage played a large role in creating the appeal of luxury brands, helping
to ensure that a brand never went out of style.36 In the competitive arena of luxury goods, certain
labels had an inherent advantage in terms of their home country’s traditional association with
luxury. Italy and France, for example, were often associated with art and culture; Germany, with
efficiency and engineering; Switzerland, with quality. Nearly all European luxury-goods
companies still produced their goods in Europe, despite the much-higher production costs in
Europe than in other parts of the world. While that was partly due to (higher) quality and control
issues, companies also wanted (as did most consumers) the “Made in Italy” or “Made in France”
labels. For example, while LVMH had established some production facilities in the United States
(partly as a way to avoid certain tariffs), the company went out of its way not to publicize the
fact that some Louis Vuitton bags were not being made in France.
32
Mills and Seydoux, European Luxury Goods, 27.
33
Chiara Trioni, Gucci: Safety Net against Further De-rating? (Giubergia UBS Warburg, 24 September 2001),
12.
34
35
Florence Hernandez, Gucci: Hunted or Hunter? (ING Barings, 19 October 2001), 3.
36
Kent, Living Legends, 17 and 32.
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Heritage—or history—was also an important factor for a luxury brand; it had the
potential to give the brand authenticity and could contribute to a company’s legend. Among the
top 25 luxury brands in 2001, 10 could trace their heritage to before 1925; while 7 predated
1900. Only one of the top U.S. brands—Tiffany & Co.—existed before 1950. Furthermore,
while it was usual in the fashion world that certain brands were more popular than others at any
given time (i.e., fads), only a truly legendary brand was timeless and durable (e.g., Chanel,
Gucci, Rolex, Hermès).
While the luxury-goods business was somewhat more immune to macroeconomic

gyrations than were the more mass-oriented consumer goods, several luxury-goods analysts
expressed caution regarding the sector following the deflation of the Internet bubble in the
United States in 2000 and the general softening of the global economy. “We definitely think the
1999–2000 period was a one-off boom for the luxury sector,” said one leading analyst at Morgan
Stanley. “Going forward, we expect luxury companies to be in a low-growth environment, with
sales in low- to mid-single digits.”37 Another analyst with a consumer-trends research group was
slightly less cautious: “The luxury market is shrinking, but it’ll take some time. The dot-com
millionaires and paper-rich investors are going to slowly come to the realization that they don’t
have the money they used to. But it’s hard to break the luxury habit.”38
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Netherlands39
Public offers in the Netherlands were primarily regulated by the Dutch Securities Act and
were supervised by the Financial Markets Authority (Autoritreit Financiële Markten or AFM).
The AFM had to be notified of any transactions in the shares of a target company after the day of
the first public announcement. In the event of a breach of the Securities Act, the AFM was
authorized to impose a range of sanctions.
The primary means of obtaining control of a public company in the Netherlands was a
public offer. There were three types of public offer:
 Firm offer: a public offer to acquire all the share capital of the target company at a
specified offer price.
 Partial offer: an offer made for no more than 30% of the target company at a specified
offer price.
 Tender offer: a public offer inviting holders of no more than 30% of the share capital of
the target company to tender shares to the offer and state the consideration they would
like to receive (a tender offer was always for cash consideration).
37
Samantha Conti, “Luxe’s Wonder Years,” Women’s Wear Daily, 25 November 2002.
38
Bob Francis, “Luxury for the Masses,” Brandweek, 25 June 2001.
39
Practical Law Company, “Mergers and Acquisitions (public): The Netherlands,”
http://www.practicallaw.com/7-102-7255 (accessed February 2005).
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A bidder had to notify the target and the AFM upon reaching the following shareholder
thresholds: 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, and 66⅔ percent. In other European countries (e.g., England,
France, and Italy), any party that accumulated a controlling interest in a target company had to
make a tender offer for the rest of the company’s stock. Dutch law imposed no such restriction.40
Hostile bids were permitted under Dutch securities law. It was impossible, however, to
make a surprise bid because a bidder was required to notify the target company’s managing
board before making a public announcement. The bidder was permitted to build up a stake in the
target before announcing any intention to make a bid so long as it did not have any price-
sensitive or inside information.
The bidder was under no obligation to try to reach an agreement with the target (though
case law indicated that the bidder had to state its intentions); nor was there, in principle, a duty
on the part of the target to negotiate with a hostile bidder (though case law indicated that the
target had to give proper consideration to a bidder’s proposals). In a hostile-bid situation, the
target’s board was required to publish a memorandum explaining its position with regard to the
bid. There were no restrictions on a bidder’s making a subsequent bid if its initial bid failed.
In general, both the management board and the supervisory board of a target had to act in
accordance with the “interests of the company,” which included the interests of all stakeholders,
including shareholders, employees, creditors, and business partners. When faced with a public
bid, the directors had to consider the interests of all stakeholders and did not owe any overriding
fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
Dutch corporations did not enjoy as many statutory protections against takeovers as did
companies elsewhere in Europe or the United States, but they were free to employ a range of
defenses. For instance, a company could issue common shares to a “foundation” affiliated with
the company (similar to a trust) so that a hostile bidder could not obtain a controlling stake. Or
the company could cap voting rights so that a bidder with a majority of shares could not gain
control. Moreover, companies could issue new stock to dilute a bidder’s stake, with relatively
few limitations.41
Other antitakeover devices commonly used by Dutch companies included protective

preference shares, depositary receipts, and priority shares. All those devices were shares with
special voting privileges that could dilute a predator’s ownership. U.S.-style “poison pills” were
rarely used. A typical response to a takeover threat was to issue protective preference shares,
though other tactics could be employed (e.g., finding a “white knight”). Given the available
options for takeover targets, there had been few hostile attempts in the Netherlands, and there
was little Dutch law on the subject.42
40
John E. Morris, “The Handbag Wars,” American Lawyer (May 1999).
41
Morris, “Handbag Wars.”
42
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The bidder was free to choose the form of consideration it offered for the target shares. It
could offer cash or shares, or a combination of both (with the exception of a tender bid, where
the consideration could only be cash). Typically, a bidder would choose a consideration based on
the effect of the proposed acquisition on its financial ratios. The bidder could offer the target
shareholders the opportunity to elect the consideration they preferred.
Notification of the Dutch Competition Authority was mandatory when worldwide

revenues of both the acquiring and target companies exceeded $143.2 million. This notification
triggered an automatic investigation. There were no restrictions on foreign ownership of the
shares of Dutch companies, except for the legal form in which the business had to be conducted.
LVMH’s Creeping Acquisition
On January 6, 1999, lawyers for LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton contacted the
Gucci Group to say that LVMH had become the owner of more than 5% of Gucci’s outstanding
common shares. (Exhibit 4 provides a timeline of the key events for Gucci.) Because Gucci was
listed on both the New York and the Amsterdam exchanges, LVMH had to abide by both
American and Dutch disclosure rules, which required that a company that amassed more than 5%
of a listed company’s capital to inform the regulatory authorities and the target of its motives
within 10 calendar days of breaching the 5% threshold. “The move was widely interpreted as the
first step by the luxury-goods conglomerate to take over its Italian archrival,” according to
Women’s Wear Daily.43
In its filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, LVMH characterized its
interest in Gucci as a “strategic investment,” but indicated no imminent plans to make a tender
offer. In a further attempt to dispel rumors, LVMH issued the following statement: “LVMH does
not plan on launching a public tender offer for all of Gucci’s capital under the present
circumstances.” And LVMH’s Arnault told the French newspaper Le Monde, “Our entry into
[Gucci’s] capital is a sign of the confidence the LVMH group has in Gucci, in its management,
and its designer. We totally support the team in place.”44
But at the Giorgio Armani men’s show in Milan, Arnault also told reporters, “I have no
intention of making a full bid for Gucci in the present circumstances,” adding coyly, “I think
highly of Domenico De Sole and Tom Ford, and I hope to have them both at my side.”45 At the
time, an analyst observed, “Arnault’s purpose is transparent: to delay a takeover until he has
managed to convince the two men who are widely thought to be the key to the Gucci brand’s
revival to stay on.”46
43
Sarah Raper, “Arnault says no Gucci Takeover Planned ‘now,’” Women’s Wear Daily, 14 January 1999.
44
“LVMH’s Arnault Begins Bid to Woo Gucci’s Crack Duo,” Dow Jones Newswires, 13 January 1999.
45
Raper, “No Gucci Takeover Planned.”
46
“Gucci’s Crack Duo.”
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Between January 6 and January 22, LVMH acquired 17,317,685 Gucci shares in open-
market purchases and privately negotiated transactions, bringing its total stake in Gucci Group to
34.4%. Over the next several weeks, senior managers from Gucci and LVMH held discussions
during which LVMH told Gucci it would limit its ownership to 35% and that it had no plans for
a full takeover. But LVMH made one request: an expansion of Gucci’s supervisory board to
include three members of LVMH’s choosing. Gucci’s management strongly objected, fearing the
loss of its independence. “Because of our relatively small turnout at shareholder meetings,
[LVMH] had a pretty good shot at controlling the company,” said Gucci’s general counsel. “We
became very concerned about having our principal competitor on board.”47
Gucci’s Antitakeover Measures
On February 18, 1999, Gucci’s supervisory board approved the creation of an employee
stock ownership plan (ESOP).48 The company granted the ESOP an option for 37,000,000 new
Gucci common shares, of which the ESOP immediately exercised 20,154,985 (an amount equal
to the number of shares then owned by LVMH). As a result, LVMH’s 34.4% stake in Gucci was
automatically diluted to 26%. If LVMH increased its stake, Gucci would issue more stock to the
ESOP on a share-for-share basis, thereby freezing LVMH’s stake in Gucci.
Commenting on the justification for the move, Domenico De Sole said, “[Bernard
Arnault] wants to take control of the whole company without paying the full price and, as the
chairman, my job is to look after the interest of shareholders and employees and get the best deal
possible for Gucci.”49 Tom Ford echoed De Sole’s sentiment: “The key to Gucci’s success has
been the independence that Domenico De Sole and I have enjoyed, and the rare partnership we
have built.… I fully support the action the board has taken to safeguard this independence.”
It was also disclosed that Ford and De Sole, whose contracts with Gucci Group would
expire in March 2004, had special exit terms in their employment agreements (so-called
scorched-earth clauses). (Exhibit 5 provides a summary of the options granted to Ford and De
Sole through Gucci Group’s Key Employee Incentive Plan.) The clauses permitted them to
exercise millions of dollars’ worth of stock options and leave the company if any hostile
investor’s stake in Gucci exceeded 35%.
47
48
An ESOP created a trust for the benefit of company employees. Usually, the trust borrowed money,
purchased shares of the company, and repaid the borrowings from annual cash contributions by the company over
time. Thus, an ESOP might complement, or be a substitute for, an employee pension plan. In the case of Gucci, the
company made a no-interest loan to the ESOP, which would use the dividends it received from the company to
repay the principal. The whole transaction had no impact on earnings per share or on Gucci’s balance sheet. For
Gucci, the shares did not represent additional capital, only voting rights. But in the event of a successful tender offer
for Gucci’s remaining shares, Gucci could buy back the ESOP shares at a small, fixed premium. The Gucci board
had structured the ESOP that way because it wanted to preserve the possibility of a bid for the whole company.
49
Katherine Weisman, “It’s War,” Women’s Wear Daily, 19 February 1999.
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Adrian Bellamy, chairman of Gucci’s supervisory board, said:
One of the board’s concerns with LVMH’s aggressive stake-building has been
that Domenico and Tom, both of whom have long-standing “change of control”
clauses in their employment agreements, might leave the company. By preventing
LVMH from gaining control, the ESOP will preserve the integrity of our dynamic
and highly successful team.50
On February 25, 1999, LVMH filed a petition with the Enterprise Chamber of the Court
of Appeals in Amsterdam51 challenging the implementation of Gucci’s ESOP and the financing
by Gucci for the purchase of the new shares. LVMH asked the court to institute an investigation
into Gucci’s management practices, accusing Gucci management of abusing its rights, diluting
shareholders’ voting rights, and possibly violating SEC rules.
An attorney for LVMH explained:
In court, we argued that the ESOP was a sham. We said the intention of the ESOP
was not to serve the interests of employees but to neutralize the voting rights
acquired by LVMH. It is noteworthy that the number of shares issued to [the
ESOP] was exactly the same number then owned by LVMH.52
Gucci’s White Knight
On March 19, 1999, negotiators for LVMH and Gucci were scheduled to meet in
Amsterdam at 11 a.m. to discuss a standstill agreement whereby LVMH would formally commit
to freezing its stake in the company. But at 8 a.m., Gucci management made the surprise
announcement that it had found a white knight. The French retailing giant Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute SA had agreed to invest $2.9 billion in Gucci in exchange for more than 40% of the
company, making it impossible for LVMH to gain control. “When the people from LVMH came,
they were pretty agitated,” said one of Gucci’s lawyers. “The meeting was not very cordial.”53
Gucci Group had issued 39,007,133 new common shares to PPR, at a per-share price of
$75.54 The stock represented 40.2% of Gucci’s outstanding share capital (excluding the shares
issued to the ESOP), and the voting rights attached to the newly issued stock gave PPR effective
control of the Gucci Group. The immediate effect of the issuance was to dilute LVMH’s position
in Gucci to 20.1%.
50
Weisman, “It’s War.”
51
The Enterprise Chamber was a Dutch law court specializing in complex commercial litigation; unlike
American courts, the Enterprise Chamber followed in the European tradition of weighing the interests of all
stakeholders, including employees and the community, and not just shareholders.
52
“The Price of Luxury,” Lawyer, 2 April 2001.
53
54
On March 18, 1999, Gucci Group shares closed at $70 a share; on March 19, 1999, Gucci closed at $81 a
share.
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The agreement also included assurances of Gucci’s independence and an expansion of

Gucci’s supervisory board from eight members to nine, with four members nominated by PPR.
“They [PPR] are not a competitor and they are true believers in trust and confidence,” De Sole
said. “They support the management of Gucci to become a force in the luxury arena. They offer
us the independence we need to grow.”55 Analysts said that De Sole had turned to François
Pinault to fight off LVMH’s Bernard Arnault because Pinault had a reputation for leaving the
companies in his portfolio alone. Moreover, the cash infusion gave Gucci the capital that it
needed to expand its portfolio of luxury brands.
On the same morning of the PPR–Gucci announcement, François Pinault also acquired
Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) fashion and fragrances for $1 billion in cash from the French
pharmaceuticals group Sanofi SA. Pinault said that he planned to resell YSL and the other Sanofí
brands to Gucci on similar terms.56 After the press conference announcing the deal, Tom Ford
said, “If you gave me a piece of white paper and told me to map out the dream scenario, this
would be it—we maintain control and our independence, yet we have cash to make investments
we’re interested in.” See Exhibit 6 for a summary of Gucci Group’s acquisitions.
LVMH quickly attacked the arrangement. “It’s one thing to invest in what Ford and De
Sole have built,” observed an internal adviser at LVMH. “It’s another to invest in Gucci to be
run by a guy in the supermarket business who also overpaid for Sanofí. The PPR deal is a threat
to our investment.”57 A separate statement from LVMH said, “LVMH can only express its
serious doubts as to the creation of shareholder value through any synergies between Gucci and
the Pinault Group.”58
LVMH’s Tender Offers
Not to be outdone, Bernard Arnault authorized a 100% takeover bid for Gucci—its first
since the company began acquiring Gucci shares—late in the day on March 19. Although it was
not made public at the time, LVMH planned to make a full tender offer of $81 per share for all
the shares, including the 39,000,000 shares recently issued to Pinault, or $85 per share for all the
shares if the shares issued to PPR were rescinded. (See Exhibits 7 and 8 for a history of Gucci,
LVMH, and PPR stock prices during this period.) Some analysts saw this development as a big
win for Gucci management, whose efforts had forced LVMH to put a full offer on the table.
The following Monday, March 22, 1999, with its alternate tender offers still pending
before Gucci’s supervisory board, LVMH petitioned the Enterprise Chamber to challenge the
PPR–Gucci agreement, suspend PPR’s voting rights in Gucci, launch an inquiry into Gucci’s
55
Glenn Hall, “De Sole Stands Firm in his Guccis,” Financial Post, 22 March 1999.
56
On March 19, 1999, Pinault acquired Sanofi Beauté through his family’s holding company, Artemis SA, for
$1.007 billion in cash; on May 29, 1999, Artemis SA announced the sale of Sanofi Beauté to Gucci Group N.V. for
$966 million in cash plus the assumption of $267 million in liabilities.
57
Sarah Raper and Katherine Weisman, “C’est La Guerre: Part Two,” Women’s Wear Daily, 22 March 1999.
58
“LVMH Offers to buy all of Gucci,” DNR, 22 March 1999.
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management practices, block Gucci’s planned acquisition of YSL, and appoint a neutral overseer
for Gucci. The Dutch court postponed judgment on most of those issues, and refused to appoint
an independent overseer.
Meanwhile, De Sole, Gucci’s chairman and CEO, declared he would leave Gucci if
LVMH’s Arnault were to take control of the company. In an interview with CNBC Europe on
March 24, De Sole said, “I will not stay [should LVMH succeed in gaining control of Gucci.]
Arnault has said businessmen are a dime a dozen, so I’m sure that he doesn’t care if I stay or
not.”59
Nevertheless, the companies met repeatedly in late March and early April to discuss
LVMH’s proposed bid. During the week of April 5, LVMH increased its offer to $85 if Gucci’s
board would agree to issue enough new shares for LVMH to attain control, or $91 if Gucci
would rescind its March 19 alliance with PPR. Gucci management rejected outright the condition
that Gucci undo its previous deal with PPR, and on April 7, it formally rejected LVMH’s bid.
But Gucci’s supervisory board indicated it would still consider an unconditional offer. “If they
want to make an offer without conditions, we would give serious consideration to that,” a Gucci
spokesperson said.60
This state of affairs left Arnault and Pinault in a tense standoff—each had enormous
investments in Gucci, but neither had full control. Some analysts were skeptical of LVMH’s
chances of success at this point. “The game is over and PPR has won,” said one observer. “Now
LVMH must find a way to get out at the best possible price.”61
On April 19, Gucci again rejected any conditional tender offers from LVMH, but
suggested an unconditional offer for all shares at $88 a share. LVMH dismissed that idea
outright. Then, on May 26, Tom Ford announced that he, too, would leave Gucci if LVMH took
control. “One can never say never in an absolute and definite way, but I think I will not stay with
Gucci if Bernard Arnault achieves final victory,” Ford said.62 “I don’t want to sound arrogant.
But at this stage in my career, I don’t need someone else’s opinions and help in running the
business. I’m confident about what I can do, and I don’t need outside help.”63
Over the course of the next 18 months, lawyers for LVMH, Gucci, and PPR fought a
fierce battle in the Dutch courts over the ESOP and the agreement with PPR. On May 27, 1999,
the Enterprise Chamber determined that Gucci was entitled to implement measures to prevent
LVMH from gaining a controlling or significant say in its affairs, denied any relief with respect
to the PPR transaction, and dismissed the complaint. But the court questioned the propriety of
Gucci’s issuing shares to the ESOP, and stripped the ESOP shares of their voting rights. Gucci
59
Samantha Conti, “De Sole says he’ll Leave if LVMH Controls Gucci,” Women’s Wear Daily, 24 March
1999.
60
Reuters, “LVMH Spurned again by Gucci, but still Open,” 8 April 1999.
61
Sarah Raper and Samantha Conti, “The LVMH–Gucci Standoff,” Women’s Wear Daily, 9 April 1999.
62
Agence France-Presse, “Tom Ford says he will Leave Gucci if LVMH Takes Over,” 26 May 1999.
63
Conti, “Tom Ford: A Sigh of Relief,” Women’s Wear Daily, 28 May 1999.
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eventually repurchased those shares and unwound the ESOP. The court did not order any further
inquiry into Gucci’s arrangement with PPR at that time.
Following the Enterprise Chamber’s ruling, LVMH withdrew its takeover offer and
stated that it would remain committed as a passive investor in Gucci Group. Observed an internal
adviser at LVMH:
We’re the world’s largest luxury-goods group and we’re a 20% shareholder. Now
we’ll sit back and see if they can deliver on their promises to create value. We’ll
be there to see if De Sole can become a multibrand manager rather than a single-
brand manager. We’ll be there to see if they have staying power. In the end, we
may be there longer than either PPR or De Sole.64
LVMH continued to pursue its case in the Dutch appeals court, and then in the Supreme Court of
the Netherlands. On September 27, 2000, the Dutch supreme court handed down a shocking
decision: it vacated the decision of the Enterprise Chamber on procedural grounds, and remanded
the case for a new trial. LVMH then renewed its claims against the ESOP and Gucci’s agreement
with PPR, filing a new complaint with the Enterprise Chamber on November 27, 2000. On
March 6, 2001, the Enterprise Chamber issued an interim decision in which it ordered an inquiry
into the establishment of the ESOP and the timing and substance of the PPR transaction. Gucci
immediately appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.
Meanwhile, the personal barbs flew between Arnault and Pinault, leading them to file
competing libel suits against one another. Arnault asserted:
Before [the Gucci dispute] I had a very friendly relationship with [François
Pinault]. We were on very good terms. He came to our home with his wife.…
And my wife, for instance, was seated next to him at the wedding of his son. So
it’s not my way of doing things to put business before a relationship, and that’s
why I was upset. I am in the business of running a luxury company. I think,
frankly, he’s doing something else.65
Final Agreement
By early 2000, it was widely known that LVMH wanted to rid itself of its minority stake
in Gucci; Arnault had now labeled the investment “nonstrategic.”66 But after all the acrimony,
finding a face-saving and profitable alternative proved elusive. In March and April 2000, in an
effort to end the litigation among the parties, PPR and LVMH entered into discussions to
64
Raper and Conti, “Gucci’s the Victor in the Takeover War; LVMH may Appeal,” Women’s Wear Daily, 28
May 1999.
65
“Arnault: In his own Words,” Women’s Wear Daily, 6 December 1999.
66
Robert Murphy and Miles Socha, “LVMH, PPR, Gucci Talks Break Down,” Women’s Wear Daily, 21 June
2000.
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facilitate LVMH’s exit from its investment. What emerged from the talks was a two-part
arrangement: (1) an immediate offer of $100 a share for LVMH’s holdings and (2) PPR would
make a second premium offer to all Gucci shareholders to take full control of the company 18
months to 4 years later.
At the eleventh-hour, however, Gucci’s supervisory board issued a statement saying it

would not support the $100-a-share offer, believing that it was below Gucci’s future market
value and that De Sole and Ford would not agree to that price. Dismayed by the board’s position
and saying that it undermined the deal, LVMH walked away.
In January 2001, still searching for an acceptable exit strategy, LVMH said it would
accept the two-step offer that PPR had previously proposed. PPR stated that it would like to
reach a settlement with LVMH, but in light of market conditions, it was no longer prepared to
make that two-step offer. In February and March 2001, Gucci and PPR continued discussing
settlement alternatives, again involving a purchase of shares from LVMH alone. The parties
terminated the negotiations because an acceptable structure could not be created.
Finally, in June 2001, the parties began discussing a new settlement structure. During the
first week of September, rumors began to swirl that an acceptable deal had been put together, one
that effectively gave full control of Gucci to PPR. It was the announcement of that deal that
awakened Thierry Hautillac at 3 a.m. on September 10, 2001.
 PPR agreed to purchase from LVMH 8,579,337 common shares at a price of $94 a share
on the agreed-upon closing date of October 22, 2001.
 Gucci would declare a special cash dividend of $7 per common share to all shareholders
of record as of December 15, 2001, including LVMH but excluding PPR, and would pay
the dividend on December 15, 2001.
 PPR agreed to commence a cash public offer on March 22, 2004, to all holders of Gucci
common stock (including LVMH with respect to any shares it held at that time) at a price
of $101.50 a share, with payment to be made on or before April 30, 2004, for any and all
common shares tendered pursuant to the offer.67
 LVMH announced an intention to monetize its remaining stake in Gucci by the end of
2001.
Exhibit 9 provides a complete summary of the final terms proposed. Exhibit 10 offers a
snapshot of the share ownership of Gucci Group N.V. immediately before the announcement.
LVMH would be prohibited from acquiring any additional Gucci shares, except by means
of a tender offer for 100% of the company’s shares. LVMH would also be prohibited from taking
67
There would be no adjustment of the put-exercise price for ordinary dividends declared and paid by Gucci
before the put-exercise date. In the event of a special dividend beyond the special dividend to be paid on December
15, 2001, an appropriate adjustment would be made to the put-exercise price, provided that the put-exercise price
was not to be reduced by more than the present value of the special dividend.
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any actions to interfere with the management of the company. Before December 31, 2004, PPR
could not sell or transfer any shares except with the prior consent of a majority of the supervisory
board’s independent directors, except in connection with a public offer from a third party for
100% of Gucci’s common shares that had been recommended by Gucci’s supervisory board.
The agreement also included noncompetition provisions, assurances of the Gucci’s

independence, and a commitment to support existing manufacturing operations and the employee
base. Significantly, all pending litigation, claims, and actions would be immediately dismissed.
“This is peace,” said Serge Weinberg, chief executive officer of PPR, at a news
conference after the deal was signed. “This is the settlement to end the animosity. Now we can
concentrate on fortifying our multibrand strategy.”68 An analyst in Paris concurred, saying, “The
market was sick and tired of this dispute. It was time for a settlement. Certainly compromises
were made, like in every dispute, but it is largely a good deal all around.”69
“PPR made it very clear that they want to run Gucci as an independent company,” De
Sole said.70 Weinberg agreed, saying, “We would not have entered into this transaction if we
were not confident in our position in terms of the balance of power.”71
But not all observers were so sanguine. “Did LVMH smell a maturation of the Gucci
brand?” asked Rita Clifton, chief executive of Interbrand, a London consulting firm. “Certainly it
would be extremely difficult for Gucci to replicate the kind of growth they’ve had the past few
years.”72 An analyst with Lehman Brothers in London observed, “Gucci has been able to play
PPR against LVMH and basically operate independently, which is an environment they thrive in.
Now that Gucci’s relationship with PPR has changed, there is a question going forward as to the
extent that the relationship will be hands-off.”73
Hautillac’s Considerations74
As Hautillac thought about the news of the deal, several considerations came to mind.
First, Hautillac was concerned that there had been no explicit mention of synergies between PPR
and Gucci, even in the months leading up to the formal alliance. At times, there had been vague
references to potential cost savings by centralizing back-office administration, standardizing
computer and accounting systems, and achieving efficiencies through PPR’s vast distribution
network. But Hautillac’s experience and instincts told him that the luxury-goods business was a
challenging environment in which to achieve meaningful synergistic benefits.
68
Samantha Conti and Robert Murphy, “Paris Peace Talks: War Over, Suits Nixed in Gucci Imbroglio,”
Women’s Wear Daily, 11 September 2001.
69
Conti and Murphy, “Paris Peace Talks.”
70
Suzanne Kapner, “Pinault Wins Long Battle to Control Gucci Group,” New York Times, 11 September 2001.
71
Kapner, “Pinault Wins Long Battle.”
72
73
74
Kent, Living Legends, 37.
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“Cost savings in a takeover in this industry are spurious,” said Claire Kent, luxury-goods
analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, who explained that the two biggest luxury-goods
conglomerates, LVMH and Richemont, had so far found few synergies.75 “There is surprisingly
little scope for squeezing more money out of luxury brands. Going down-market can bring in
more customers in the short term, but discounts can cheapen a brand,” Kent opined.76 In 1999, an
editorial in the Economist made a similar observation:
Nobody has yet found synergy between things whose charm comes mainly from
the distinctive way in which they are designed, made, and marketed. If LVMH
buys Gucci, it may be able to share know-how in, say, leather sourcing; but the
idea that a single factory might churn out both Gucci and Louis Vuitton handbags
to reap efficiencies is anathema. Hermès boasts that it takes 17 hours to make a
Kelly handbag, longer than it does to assemble a BMW.77
Hautillac was left, then, to ponder the merits of the deal. Was PPR’s cash offer for LVMH’s
Gucci shares a fair price?78 (Exhibits 11 and 12 provide a forecast of financial performance for
Gucci Group. Capital-market information appears in Exhibits 13 and 14. Information on Gucci’s
share-price volatility is given in Exhibits 15.) How should Hautillac interpret the special
dividend?79 What would be the impact of the other offer of $101.50? How would the markets
react when they opened, and what would happen to Gucci’s share price? Was this really the final
deal, or could PPR be persuaded to raise its bid one more time? After two and a half years of
missed opportunities, it was hard to believe it had come to this. The stock market in Amsterdam
would open in six hours. Hautillac would need to develop a view about the deal before then.
75
“LVMH and Gucci: Don’t Mix your Designers,” Economist, 16 January 1999.
76
“Don’t Mix your Designers.”
77
“Don’t Mix your Designers.”
78
As of December 31, 2000, the weighted-average number of PPR shares issued and outstanding was
118,898,861.
79
Hautillac assumed that PPR’s debt was rated BBB.
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Exhibit 1
Comparable Luxury-Goods Firms
MV Equity as
as of December 31, 2000 Enterprise Value As Multiple of Multiple of
Beta Shares Av. Price Div. S&P Total Total Net Net Book
(Levered)1 O/S (m) Q3 '00 00/01 Rating Assets Liabilities Net Debt Rev EBITDA EBIT Income MV Equity Ent. Value Book Value EPS Rev EBIT EBITDA Income 2000 EPS Value
Bulgari S.p.A. 0.69 292.67 € 13.79 € 0.09 na € 865 € 460 € 209 € 676 € 152 € 123 € 96 € 4,036 € 4,245 € 405 € 0.33 6.28 34.57 27.95 44.45 42.26 9.97
2
C.F. Richemont 0.90 561.50 € 31.78 € 0.24 na € 8,987 € 2,128 € 334 € 2,928 NA € 454 € 2,986 € 17,843 € 18,177 € 6,859 € 5 6.21 40.03 NA 6.09 5.98 2.60
Donna Karan Int'l. 0.59 22.13 $ 5.94 $ - na $ 324 $ 171 $ (7) $ 663 $ 41 $ 25 $ 19 $ 132 $ 124 $ 153 $ 0.87 0.19 5.02 3.03 6.47 6.85 0.86
Escada AG 0.49 7.74 € 24.44 € 1.60 na € 578 € 412 € 274 € 814 € 63 € 36 € 2 € 189 € 463 € 165 € 0 0.57 12.82 7.40 231.40 94.58 1.14
Gucci Group 0.67 99.75 $ 80.55 $ 0.45 na $ 5,552 $ 1,685 $ (2,262) $ 1,236 $ 315 $ 264 $ 330 $ 8,035 $ 5,773 $ 3,867 $ 3.31 4.67 21.89 18.33 17.48 24.32 2.08
Hermes Int'l. 0.67 36.73 € 161.15 € 0.92 na € 1,373 € 576 € (245) € 1,159 € 324 € 288 € 175 € 5,920 € 5,674 € 797 € 4.76 4.90 19.71 17.49 32.42 33.83 7.43
LVMH 0.87 457.20 € 81.21 € 0.68 BBB+ € 21,747 € 14,680 € 7,391 € 11,581 € 2,359 € 1,818 € 722 € 37,127 € 44,518 € 7,067 € 1.58 3.84 24.49 18.87 61.66 51.42 5.25
Polo Ralph Lauren 0.92 97.43 $ 20.09 $ - BBB $ 1,621 $ 848 $ 264 $ 1,956 $ 330 $ 264 $ 144 $ 1,957 $ 2,221 $ 772 $ 1.47 1.14 8.42 6.73 15.48 13.64 2.53
Median 0.68 4.26 20.80 17.49 24.95 29.07 2.57

Mean 0.73 3.47 20.87 14.26 51.93 34.11 3.98
Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream, and casewriter's analysis

1
Adjusted betas, based on weekly data. Indices used are as follows: Bulgari SpA - S&P/MIB, C.F. Richemont - Swiss Market Index, Donna Karan - S&P 500 Index, Escada AG - DAX Index,
Gucci Group NV - S&P 500 Index, Hermes Int'l. - CAC 40 Index, LVMH - CAC 40 Index, Polo Ralp Lauren - S&P 500 Index.
2 C.F. Richemont's Net Income appears higher than EBIT because of an extraordinary gain arising from the merger of Rothman International and British American Tobacco.
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Exhibit 2
Revenue Comparisons of Peer Firms
Gross Cosmetics/
Margin Apparel Accessories1 Fragrances Other America Europe Asia Other
Bulgari S.p.A. 65% - 77% 17% 6% 23% 36% 22% 19%

Cie Financiere Richemont 66% 5% 76% - 19% 21% 39% 38% 2%
2
Donna Karan Int'l. Inc. 33% na na na na 66% - 3% 31%
Escada AG 62% 86% - 11% 3% 27% 59% 9% 5%
Gucci Group N.V. 67% 15% 77% - 8% 28% 30% 39% 3%
Hermes Int'l. 62% 31% 38% 6% 25% 15% 42% 38% 5%
3
LVMH Moet Hennesy Louis Vuitton 64% 6% 33% 30% 31% 22% 37% 33% 8%
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. 49% 74% 9% 8% 8% 70% 13% 14% 4%
4
Global luxury goods market 59% 31% 8% 2% 21% 35% 41% 3%
1
Includes: Leather goods, shoes, watches, and jewelry. Sources: Company data, Bloomberg, analyst reports, and casewriter's analysis
2
Donna Karan does not break out non-US sales, except for Japan..
3
For LVMH, this includes wines and spirits.
4
ABN AMRO estimates.
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Exhibit 3
Comparable Luxury-Goods Transactions
Enterprise Value As Multiple Of: Stock Premium (%)
Trans- Target
Announce- action Shares Per Share Enterprise Net 1 Day 1 Wk 4 Wks Consider-
ment Date Target Name Acquirer Name Value ($mil) O/S (mil) Offer Value ($mil) Net Sales EBIT EBITDA Income Prior Prior Prior ation
Cash or
11/3/95 Asprey PLC Amedeo UK $ 308 80.14 $ 3.83 $ 442 1.53 10.68 9.61 14.13 92.31 127.27 168.82 loan notes
Cash and
12/29/95 New Look Group PLC Vallsar $ 264 na na na na na na na na na na stock
11/28/97 Vendome Luxury Group PLC Richemont AG $ 1,729 697.67 $ 8.35 $ 5,184 2.11 12.70 10.99 16.63 26.92 43.9 36.36 Cash
3/19/99 Sanofi SA-Beauty Products Artemis SA $ 1,007 na na na na na na na na na na Cash
Cash plus
5/28/99 Sanofi Beaute (Artemis SA) Gucci Group NV $ 966 na na na na na na na na na na liabilities
9/13/99 TAG Heuer Int'l. SA LVMH Holding SA $ 747 5.38 $ 138.74 $ 825 2.81 16.90 15.62 23.77 8.59 9.55 40.07 Cash
10/11/99 Fendi Srl LVMH and Prada Holding $ 425 na na na na na na na na na na Cash
7/20/00 Les Manufactures Horlogeres Richemont AG $ 1,684 na na na na na na na na na na Cash
12/18/00 Gabrielle Studio Inc. LVMH Holding SA $ 450 na na na na na na na na na na Cash
5/16/01 Mexx Group BV Liz Claiborne Inc. $ 263 na na na na na na na na na na Cash
Source: Securities Data Corporation
-23- UV1364
Exhibit 4
Timeline of Key Events for Gucci Group N.V.

LVMH's PPR's
% of % of
Gucci Gucci
Date Event Description (cumul.) (cumul.)
6-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton ("LVMH") acquires initial stake in Gucci 5.0%
12-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH Holding SA acquires 5.645 million Gucci shares held by Prada B.V. for $70.50 per share 14.6%
13-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH buys 500,000 Gucci shares for $69.90 per shares through a privately negotiated block transaction 15.3%
15-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH acquires 2,802,000 Gucci shares through multiple open market transactions ($55.84 - $72.00) 20.1%
15-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH acquires 3,850,000 Gucci shares from Harris Associated Investment Trust for $77 per share 26.7%
22-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH acquires 966,000 Gucci shares through multiple open market transactions ($69.02 - $70.03) 28.4%
22-Jan-99 LVMH purchase LVMH acquires 3,553,000 Gucci shares from Capital Research and Management Co. for $76 per share 34.4%
18-Feb-99 Gucci Establishes Gucci establishes an ESOP to purchase up to 37 million new shares, of which 20.2 million are exercised 26.4%
ESOP immediately; diluting LVMH's Gucci holdings by 8%
25-Feb-99 LVMH sues LVMH files suit in the Enterprise Chamber, seeking to challenge Gucci's ESOP
19-Mar-99 Gucci's white knight PPR acquires 39 million newly-issued Gucci shares for $75 per share, diluting LVMH's Gucci stake 20.1% 40.2%
19-Mar-99 LVMH tender offer LVMH announces tender offer for Gucci for $81 per share, including PPR's shares, or $85 per share,
excluding PPR's shares
19-Mar-99 PPR purchases PPR acquires additional shares of Gucci through multiple open market transactions 44.6%
19-Mar-99 Pinault buys YSL Artemis SA, Pinault's holding company, purchases Sanofi Beauté (YSL Brands) for $1 bn
22-Mar-99 LVMH petitions LVMH petitions the Enterprise Chamber to challnge the PPR agreement, seeking to suspend the voting
rights of shares granted to PPR
24-Mar-99 De Sole's threat De Sole threatens to leave Gucci Group if LVMH's Arnault wins control of the company
7-Apr-99 Gucci rejects LVMH Gucci's supervisory board formally rejects LVMH's tender offers
26-May-99 Ford's threat Ford threatens to leave Gucci Group if LVMH's Arnault wins control of the company
27-May-99 Court ruling Dutch court rejects challenge to PPR agreement, but strips voting rights from the shares issued to the Gucci
ESOP
15-Nov-99 Gucci buys YSL Gucci announces acquisition of Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) from Artemis SA, Francois Pinault's holding
company for $966 million in cash plus $267 million in liabilities
13-Dec-99 Gucci earnings up Gucci Group posts net revenues of $306 million, the highest in the company's history
-24- UV1364
Exhibit 4 (continued)
LVMH's PPR's
% of % of
Gucci Gucci
Date Event Description (cumul.) (cumul.)
7-Jan-00 Stock downgrade Lehman Bros. downgrades Gucci stock from "outperfrom" to "neutral", citing increased risk from Gucci's
transformation to a holding company for luxury brands
15-Mar-00 LVMH lawsuit LVMH askes Dutch court to compel PPR to make an offer for all Gucci shares
27-Sep-00 Court decision over- Dutch Supreme Court overturns the Enterprise Chamber's decision on the ESOP
turned
8-Nov-00 ESOP unwound Gucci decides to terminate the ESOP
27-Nov-00 LVMH lawsuit LVMH renews its challenge to the ESOP and the PPR agreement, and alleged that De Sole and Ford were
secretly granted options for eight million shares in exchange for agreeing to PPR’s 1999 bid
6-Mar-01 Court-ordered inquiry Dutch court appoints a panel of business experts to decide whether Gucci's deal with Pinault "ignored the
legitimate interests of its shareholders, including LVMH"
22-Mar-01 Settlement talks Rumors of a settlement between LVMH and PPR circulate
19-Jun-01 Gucci Profits Down Gucci reports disappointing quarterly profits and lowers outlook for 2001
10-Sep-01 PPR's final bid for PPR and LVMH reach final agreement
Gucci
-25- UV1364
Exhibit 5
Gucci Group N.V.: Key Employee Incentive Option Grants
Quantity Strike
Name Vesting Date (000) Price
Mr. T. Ford Dec-00 1,000 $ 68.00
Dec-01 1,000 $ 83.00
Dec-02 1,000 $ 103.00
Dec-03 1,000 $ 128.00
Mr. D. De Sole Dec-00 300 $ 68.00

Dec-01 250 $ 83.00
Dec-02 225 $ 103.00
Dec-03 225 $ 128.00
Dec-04
(1) 250 $ 128.00
(1)
Optional to the company upon extension of the employment contract to March 2004.
Source: Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, “Gucci Group: A 2004 Scenario Analysis,” 5 August 2002, pp.7-8.
-26- UV1364
Exhibit 6
Acquisition History of Gucci Group N.V.
November 1999 - August 2001

Deal Size Sales (US$
Dates Stake Target Company (US$ m) m)2 Country Product/Activity Major Brands
May-99 70.0% Sergio Rossi, S.p.A. 96.0 60.0 Italy Footwear Sergio Rossi
May-99 100.0% Sanofi Beaute1 1,045.0 696.0 France Cosmetics/fashion Yves Saint Laurent,
Rive Gauche, et al.
1999 Total investments (1999) 1,141.0
Feb-00 66.7% Mendes (YSL franchisee) na I, F, D 9 YSL stores. YSL owned the remaining 33.3%
May-00 100.0% License of YSL watches na Watch production and distribution

from Cartier
May-00 100.0% License of YSL shoes na Shoe production and distribution
May-00 65.0% FJ Benjamin 13.0 Asia 10 stores in Singapore, Malaysia, Australia
May-00 100.0% Boucheron 300.0 85.0 Swiss Perfume and jewlery
Oct-00 100.0% Zamasport 25.0 Italy Mfg licensee of Gucci ready-to-wear (RTW)
Nov-00 100.0% Japanese franchisee na Japan 5 YSL stores
Dec-00 51.0% Alexander Mcqueen na UK New luxury designer label Alexander Mcqueen
Dec-00 85.0% Bedat & Co. 50.0 12.0 Timepieces Bedat & Co.
2000 Total investments (2000) 419.8
Feb-01 70.0% Bottega Veneta 157.0 51.0 Italy Leather acessories Bottega Veneta
Feb-01 100.0% Spanish franchisee 5.0 Spain 3 Gucci franchised stores
Mar-01 100.0% Di Modolo 10.0 Swiss Watch design and production facilities
Apr-01 51.0% Stella McCartney 10.0 New luxury designer label, RTW, accessory Stella McCartney
Jul-01 91.0% Balenciaga 60.0 20.0 Spain Fashion/perfumes Balenciaga
Jul-01 35.0% FJ Benjamin Australia na Australia Australian distribution
Jul-01 51.0% Caravel Pelli na Italy Precious skins tannery (Gucci 20% sales)
Aug-01 70.0% Calzaturificio Regain na Italy Shoes (70,000 units prodcued)
2001E Total investments (2001E) 242.0
1
Included Yves Saint Laurent couture and YSL Beaute. Sources: Gucci Group NV, ING Barings and UBS Warburg
2
Sales are historical at the time of acquisition, when available.
-27- UV1364
Exhibit 7
Historical Stock Prices: Gucci, PPR, and LVMH

(September 7, 1998, to September 7, 2001)
MSCI EURO TO
LVMH - LVMH - LVMH - PINAULT WORLD - US $
Unadj. Adj. Adjusted PRINTEMPS GUCCI PRICE EXCHANGE
Price Factor Price REDOUTE GROUP INDEX RATE
Date Euro (€) Euro (€) Euro (€) USD ($) USD ($) € to US$
7-Sep-98 143.61 0.18 26.11 148.03 32.00 968.17 N/A
8-Sep-98 143.61 0.18 26.11 150.77 35.25 996.11 N/A
9-Sep-98 139.64 0.18 25.39 153.36 38.44 978.99 N/A
10-Sep-98 132.63 0.18 24.11 147.11 36.44 958.24 N/A
11-Sep-98 130.34 0.18 23.70 144.98 37.31 968.29 N/A
14-Sep-98 132.48 0.18 24.08 156.26 40.56 985.80 N/A
15-Sep-98 136.75 0.18 24.86 156.72 40.00 990.32 N/A
16-Sep-98 140.41 0.18 25.53 160.83 39.69 994.99 N/A
17-Sep-98 134.16 0.18 24.39 150.31 38.00 970.68 N/A
18-Sep-98 134.16 0.18 24.39 144.83 37.94 964.26 N/A
21-Sep-98 130.50 0.18 23.72 144.83 39.06 953.40 N/A
22-Sep-98 135.53 0.18 24.64 147.57 40.25 962.64 N/A
23-Sep-98 133.39 0.18 24.25 146.35 39.50 987.33 N/A
24-Sep-98 126.38 0.18 22.98 140.56 35.06 978.36 N/A
25-Sep-98 120.28 0.18 21.87 138.42 36.50 972.74 N/A
28-Sep-98 120.13 0.18 21.84 135.68 36.13 978.68 N/A
29-Sep-98 121.20 0.18 22.03 134.61 36.06 979.27 N/A
30-Sep-98 116.62 0.18 21.20 123.48 36.13 952.39 N/A
1-Oct-98 110.53 0.18 20.09 115.10 35.19 923.44 N/A
2-Oct-98 114.64 0.18 20.84 121.96 35.94 922.99 N/A
5-Oct-98 110.68 0.18 20.12 117.54 34.88 908.27 N/A
6-Oct-98 117.69 0.18 21.40 127.60 34.13 920.74 N/A
7-Oct-98 119.37 0.18 21.70 128.82 33.13 928.90 N/A
8-Oct-98 121.65 0.18 22.12 120.74 32.38 913.78 N/A
9-Oct-98 131.11 0.18 23.84 128.82 32.50 929.03 N/A
12-Oct-98 137.97 0.18 25.08 137.36 33.44 953.30 N/A
13-Oct-98 135.83 0.18 24.69 141.93 33.19 952.01 N/A
14-Oct-98 139.03 0.18 25.28 143.30 33.31 961.35 N/A
15-Oct-98 139.49 0.18 25.36 141.32 34.75 988.52 N/A
16-Oct-98 137.20 0.18 24.94 144.52 35.88 1,004.85 N/A
19-Oct-98 134.16 0.18 24.39 141.63 34.94 1,007.33 N/A
20-Oct-98 141.02 0.18 25.64 140.25 34.81 1,016.09 N/A
21-Oct-98 143.76 0.18 26.14 139.95 33.88 1,016.59 N/A
22-Oct-98 148.03 0.18 26.91 144.06 34.63 1,020.43 N/A
23-Oct-98 144.06 0.18 26.19 137.20 34.50 1,016.83 N/A
26-Oct-98 143.76 0.18 26.14 136.90 35.56 1,016.51 N/A
27-Oct-98 148.94 0.18 27.08 140.56 35.44 1,017.43 N/A
28-Oct-98 144.52 0.18 26.27 137.20 34.88 1,012.67 N/A
29-Oct-98 147.27 0.18 26.77 136.44 36.31 1,026.28 N/A
30-Oct-98 157.02 0.18 28.55 141.78 38.13 1,037.21 N/A
-28- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
2-Nov-98 162.66 0.18 29.57 143.61 40.19 1,057.61 N/A
3-Nov-98 159.61 0.18 29.02 146.05 39.50 1,054.22 N/A
4-Nov-98 167.69 0.18 30.49 154.43 41.75 1,068.26 N/A
5-Nov-98 163.43 0.18 29.71 145.59 43.38 1,071.41 N/A
6-Nov-98 162.36 0.18 29.52 144.67 45.69 1,071.78 N/A
9-Nov-98 159.46 0.18 28.99 142.54 45.88 1,055.46 N/A
10-Nov-98 154.28 0.18 28.05 144.37 43.44 1,049.08 N/A
11-Nov-98 154.28 0.18 28.05 144.37 42.63 1,052.33 N/A
12-Nov-98 154.28 0.18 28.05 139.95 42.00 1,042.56 N/A
13-Nov-98 154.74 0.18 28.13 138.73 42.25 1,050.57 N/A
16-Nov-98 162.36 0.18 29.52 139.64 41.31 1,068.99 N/A
17-Nov-98 159.61 0.18 29.02 141.78 40.63 1,067.53 N/A
18-Nov-98 157.02 0.18 28.55 140.25 41.38 1,071.11 N/A
19-Nov-98 166.32 0.18 30.24 146.50 42.06 1,082.39 N/A
20-Nov-98 169.22 0.18 30.76 151.69 44.31 1,095.06 N/A
23-Nov-98 175.32 0.18 31.87 146.20 47.25 1,112.38 N/A
24-Nov-98 171.51 0.18 31.18 146.20 46.31 1,111.02 N/A
25-Nov-98 171.35 0.18 31.15 147.42 46.13 1,109.53 N/A
26-Nov-98 175.62 0.18 31.93 149.40 46.13 1,117.13 N/A
27-Nov-98 174.55 0.18 31.73 149.40 45.00 1,119.40 N/A
30-Nov-98 167.54 0.18 30.46 147.88 45.00 1,097.62 N/A
1-Dec-98 160.22 0.18 29.13 142.54 43.50 1,091.40 N/A
2-Dec-98 156.57 0.18 28.46 138.88 42.38 1,090.03 N/A
3-Dec-98 159.16 0.18 28.94 146.35 41.94 1,083.00 N/A
4-Dec-98 160.68 0.18 29.21 149.40 42.25 1,096.26 N/A
7-Dec-98 158.55 0.18 28.82 149.40 42.25 1,101.23 N/A
8-Dec-98 156.41 0.18 28.44 153.36 45.06 1,101.58 N/A
9-Dec-98 157.02 0.18 28.55 153.82 46.00 1,107.71 N/A
10-Dec-98 162.82 0.18 29.60 150.62 51.50 1,098.13 N/A
11-Dec-98 163.27 0.18 29.68 147.72 51.50 1,092.19 N/A
14-Dec-98 154.74 0.18 28.13 144.83 49.38 1,078.40 N/A
15-Dec-98 151.69 0.18 27.58 146.05 49.25 1,088.31 N/A
16-Dec-98 156.26 0.18 28.41 143.30 48.81 1,091.89 N/A
17-Dec-98 156.57 0.18 28.46 152.30 49.00 1,105.33 N/A
18-Dec-98 150.62 0.18 27.38 143.30 47.50 1,110.86 N/A
21-Dec-98 159.00 0.18 28.91 152.91 49.25 1,125.27 N/A
22-Dec-98 161.60 0.18 29.38 151.99 49.75 1,123.19 N/A
23-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 155.19 49.56 1,142.69 N/A
24-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 155.19 49.13 1,138.87 N/A
25-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 155.19 49.13 1,139.77 N/A
28-Dec-98 163.12 0.18 29.66 154.74 48.56 1,142.95 N/A
29-Dec-98 165.41 0.18 30.07 156.11 47.94 1,155.48 N/A
30-Dec-98 168.61 0.18 30.65 162.82 47.69 1,148.20 N/A
31-Dec-98 168.61 0.18 30.65 162.82 48.63 1,149.95 N/A
-29- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Jan-99 168.61 0.18 30.65 162.82 48.63 1,149.95 N/A
4-Jan-99 178.50 0.18 32.45 170.30 53.00 1,161.52 N/A
5-Jan-99 187.00 0.18 34.00 168.80 55.81 1,173.34 0.8491
6-Jan-99 200.00 0.18 36.36 171.70 68.63 1,195.45 0.8601
7-Jan-99 205.00 0.18 37.27 170.00 67.44 1,191.63 0.8538
8-Jan-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 175.00 74.88 1,190.77 0.8636
11-Jan-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 173.50 71.06 1,180.41 0.8698
12-Jan-99 206.40 0.18 37.52 172.50 70.06 1,160.45 0.8647
13-Jan-99 193.00 0.18 35.09 169.00 70.00 1,144.76 0.8574
14-Jan-99 198.00 0.18 36.00 165.90 72.00 1,136.86 0.8546
15-Jan-99 209.00 0.18 38.00 169.50 72.63 1,154.06 0.8645
18-Jan-99 213.00 0.18 38.72 162.00 72.63 1,163.95 0.8622
19-Jan-99 213.00 0.18 38.72 156.00 70.00 1,166.88 0.8617
20-Jan-99 213.00 0.18 38.72 155.50 69.25 1,173.63 0.8649
21-Jan-99 217.50 0.18 39.54 153.90 69.81 1,160.00 0.8624
22-Jan-99 203.20 0.18 36.94 148.00 72.88 1,142.25 0.8627
25-Jan-99 200.50 0.18 36.45 148.00 71.00 1,147.78 0.8656
26-Jan-99 207.00 0.18 37.63 156.00 71.88 1,159.55 0.8651
27-Jan-99 210.00 0.18 38.18 163.00 70.25 1,154.44 0.8743
28-Jan-99 220.00 0.18 40.00 160.90 69.50 1,164.80 0.876
29-Jan-99 214.00 0.18 38.91 161.10 68.81 1,173.84 0.8803
1-Feb-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 160.00 68.56 1,175.22 0.8846
2-Feb-99 218.20 0.18 39.67 166.20 68.94 1,170.28 0.8818
3-Feb-99 218.00 0.18 39.63 165.80 69.06 1,168.90 0.8846
4-Feb-99 212.00 0.18 38.54 166.00 68.81 1,155.37 0.8821
5-Feb-99 214.90 0.18 39.07 160.90 70.06 1,147.14 0.8881
8-Feb-99 220.00 0.18 40.00 156.20 69.50 1,144.99 0.8828
9-Feb-99 219.50 0.18 39.91 152.00 68.88 1,123.73 0.8846
10-Feb-99 211.10 0.18 38.38 152.10 68.31 1,124.51 0.8826
11-Feb-99 204.10 0.18 37.11 155.00 66.25 1,144.02 0.8904
12-Feb-99 206.00 0.18 37.45 154.50 66.00 1,137.65 0.8856
15-Feb-99 213.50 0.18 38.81 152.00 66.00 1,137.70 0.8856
16-Feb-99 215.00 0.18 39.09 153.50 65.13 1,141.10 0.8926
17-Feb-99 212.50 0.18 38.63 149.10 66.63 1,130.62 0.889
18-Feb-99 200.70 0.18 36.49 151.70 64.31 1,136.00 0.893
19-Feb-99 200.00 0.18 36.36 155.00 68.13 1,134.80 0.9035
22-Feb-99 197.00 0.18 35.81 157.00 70.56 1,154.13 0.9062
23-Feb-99 197.00 0.18 35.81 160.20 70.50 1,157.91 0.9084
24-Feb-99 198.00 0.18 36.00 161.00 69.88 1,151.82 0.9091
25-Feb-99 198.00 0.18 36.00 158.00 69.88 1,146.95 0.9057
26-Feb-99 194.00 0.18 35.27 151.10 70.00 1,141.33 0.907
-30- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Mar-99 195.30 0.18 35.51 150.80 68.88 1,132.39 0.918
2-Mar-99 194.10 0.18 35.29 149.00 68.25 1,126.57 0.9145
3-Mar-99 192.00 0.18 34.91 151.20 67.06 1,123.46 0.9184
4-Mar-99 200.00 0.18 36.36 154.80 67.13 1,131.53 0.9249
5-Mar-99 205.00 0.18 37.27 158.80 67.69 1,159.85 0.9231
8-Mar-99 202.90 0.18 36.89 157.00 67.00 1,163.30 0.9187
9-Mar-99 208.50 0.18 37.91 157.00 65.00 1,166.19 0.9184
10-Mar-99 210.00 0.18 38.18 156.50 68.50 1,175.70 0.9134
11-Mar-99 210.20 0.18 38.21 157.00 66.25 1,183.27 0.9065
12-Mar-99 223.20 0.18 40.58 156.00 65.00 1,187.06 0.9162
15-Mar-99 223.10 0.18 40.56 156.00 63.81 1,194.80 0.9145
16-Mar-99 226.00 0.18 41.09 150.20 65.25 1,197.56 0.9097
17-Mar-99 220.50 0.18 40.09 149.80 65.63 1,195.04 0.9095
18-Mar-99 231.20 0.18 42.03 145.70 70.00 1,199.03 0.9115
19-Mar-99 234.20 0.18 42.58 150.00 81.00 1,198.60 0.9178
22-Mar-99 234.00 0.18 42.54 144.00 83.13 1,193.97 0.9168
23-Mar-99 235.20 0.18 42.76 140.40 80.13 1,169.62 0.9162
24-Mar-99 242.00 0.18 44.00 139.80 82.00 1,166.57 0.9187
25-Mar-99 241.20 0.18 43.85 140.50 83.00 1,183.61 0.9229
26-Mar-99 241.60 0.18 43.92 139.60 84.56 1,174.09 0.9287
29-Mar-99 243.00 0.18 44.18 139.80 82.44 1,192.06 0.9315
30-Mar-99 233.50 0.18 42.45 140.90 81.69 1,188.22 0.933
31-Mar-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 147.80 80.50 1,187.55 0.9285
1-Apr-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 151.90 80.50 1,195.05 0.9268
2-Apr-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 151.90 80.50 1,193.58 0.9274
5-Apr-99 229.50 0.18 41.72 151.90 81.00 1,204.22 0.9337
6-Apr-99 233.00 0.18 42.36 153.00 79.88 1,211.39 0.9219
7-Apr-99 227.60 0.18 41.38 154.00 78.00 1,219.70 0.9281
8-Apr-99 232.00 0.18 42.18 157.00 78.00 1,233.93 0.9304
9-Apr-99 236.10 0.18 42.92 160.60 76.00 1,235.37 0.9264
12-Apr-99 234.80 0.18 42.69 158.50 75.44 1,240.06 0.9249
13-Apr-99 236.80 0.18 43.05 156.40 77.19 1,240.48 0.9281
14-Apr-99 234.80 0.18 42.69 153.20 76.25 1,232.56 0.9255
15-Apr-99 230.00 0.18 41.81 145.90 76.13 1,223.20 0.9341
16-Apr-99 215.00 0.18 39.09 146.50 75.50 1,221.60 0.9345
19-Apr-99 236.50 0.18 43.00 148.50 78.19 1,209.93 0.9378
20-Apr-99 234.00 0.18 42.54 145.80 76.75 1,208.76 0.9406
21-Apr-99 238.00 0.18 43.27 149.50 78.50 1,221.82 0.9427
22-Apr-99 245.00 0.18 44.54 150.30 76.88 1,236.30 0.94
23-Apr-99 242.00 0.18 44.00 148.50 77.13 1,238.96 0.9421
26-Apr-99 245.00 0.18 44.54 147.90 76.38 1,243.68 0.9446
27-Apr-99 253.50 0.18 46.09 152.70 76.38 1,252.10 0.9376
28-Apr-99 253.90 0.18 46.16 155.50 76.13 1,244.93 0.94
29-Apr-99 252.30 0.18 45.87 156.60 75.88 1,237.11 0.9438
30-Apr-99 253.80 0.18 46.14 157.00 75.44 1,233.06 0.9452
-31- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
3-May-99 255.00 0.18 46.36 157.00 75.44 1,242.97 0.9457
4-May-99 259.00 0.18 47.09 155.00 75.31 1,232.99 0.9413
5-May-99 260.00 0.18 47.27 151.80 75.31 1,236.96 0.9295
6-May-99 255.90 0.18 46.52 149.80 74.63 1,236.76 0.9258
7-May-99 255.20 0.18 46.40 151.70 73.63 1,237.43 0.929282
10-May-99 257.00 0.18 46.72 150.00 73.56 1,236.90 0.9271
11-May-99 258.90 0.18 47.07 148.50 73.63 1,239.79 0.9332
12-May-99 271.40 0.18 49.34 148.90 73.50 1,240.02 0.9387
13-May-99 275.00 0.18 50.00 151.30 73.06 1,241.95 0.9378
14-May-99 268.50 0.18 48.81 155.50 72.75 1,220.96 0.9377
17-May-99 261.00 0.18 47.45 152.50 73.13 1,210.73 0.9372
18-May-99 265.50 0.18 48.27 155.50 73.38 1,212.20 0.9367
19-May-99 267.00 0.18 48.54 156.20 73.50 1,217.53 0.9382
20-May-99 265.00 0.18 48.18 163.70 74.63 1,218.26 0.9408
21-May-99 260.20 0.18 47.30 165.00 74.69 1,212.00 0.9453
24-May-99 260.20 0.18 47.30 165.00 74.50 1,200.10 0.9437
25-May-99 262.10 0.18 47.65 164.20 73.56 1,185.38 0.9422
26-May-99 265.00 0.18 48.18 164.00 70.50 1,191.73 0.9565
27-May-99 264.40 0.18 48.07 167.00 65.94 1,175.70 0.958
28-May-99 267.10 0.18 48.56 163.30 66.13 1,186.47 0.9596
31-May-99 269.00 0.18 48.90 170.20 66.13 1,186.70 0.9596
1-Jun-99 261.00 0.18 47.45 169.00 65.69 1,186.63 0.9568
2-Jun-99 262.80 0.18 47.78 169.80 65.00 1,188.60 0.9654
3-Jun-99 269.00 0.18 48.90 171.60 64.44 1,192.06 0.9683
4-Jun-99 276.00 0.18 50.18 171.80 62.31 1,207.79 0.9639
7-Jun-99 285.00 0.18 51.81 168.10 62.75 1,215.79 0.9719
8-Jun-99 284.40 0.18 51.70 164.30 62.94 1,214.13 0.9557
9-Jun-99 285.20 0.18 51.85 164.90 65.00 1,217.77 0.9548
10-Jun-99 282.60 0.18 51.38 163.90 67.81 1,210.15 0.9542
11-Jun-99 288.40 0.18 52.43 163.50 68.63 1,212.40 0.9498
14-Jun-99 289.60 0.18 52.65 166.00 69.56 1,205.17 0.9594
15-Jun-99 292.00 0.18 53.09 158.10 68.00 1,209.11 0.959
16-Jun-99 297.60 0.18 54.10 158.50 69.44 1,224.08 0.9703
17-Jun-99 298.60 0.18 54.29 159.00 69.75 1,232.85 0.9672
18-Jun-99 302.00 0.18 54.90 158.50 69.63 1,236.00 0.9624
21-Jun-99 285.00 0.20 57.00 156.00 69.00 1,241.39 0.9661
N.B.
22-Jun-99 291.00 0.20 58.20 154.50 69.19 1,234.34 0.9685
LVMH
23-Jun-99 291.00 0.20 58.20 159.00 69.31 1,226.01 0.9678
1.1-for-1
stock split 24-Jun-99 282.50 0.20 56.50 159.00 69.63 1,214.90 0.9602
25-Jun-99 277.10 0.20 55.42 159.30 72.88 1,217.92 0.9588
28-Jun-99 280.00 0.20 56.00 162.10 73.88 1,224.86 0.966
29-Jun-99 282.80 0.20 56.56 163.80 71.75 1,234.29 0.9681
30-Jun-99 283.90 0.20 56.78 166.40 70.00 1,240.75 0.9669
-32- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Jul-99 284.10 0.20 56.82 169.40 70.88 1,255.69 0.9772
2-Jul-99 286.90 0.20 57.38 165.40 70.94 1,264.82 0.9768
5-Jul-99 283.50 0.20 56.70 166.00 70.94 1,273.37 0.9768
6-Jul-99 284.50 0.20 56.90 165.90 70.75 1,269.73 0.9768
7-Jul-99 283.70 0.20 56.74 167.50 72.19 1,267.55 0.9782
8-Jul-99 279.40 0.20 55.88 168.50 71.00 1,263.49 0.9785
9-Jul-99 283.60 0.20 56.72 163.50 72.25 1,267.78 0.9823
12-Jul-99 286.40 0.20 57.28 165.00 73.44 1,266.61 0.9854
13-Jul-99 283.30 0.20 56.66 163.00 73.19 1,260.53 0.9829
14-Jul-99 283.30 0.20 56.66 163.00 73.88 1,267.29 0.9799
15-Jul-99 283.70 0.20 56.74 158.60 74.06 1,280.40 0.9809
16-Jul-99 284.10 0.20 56.82 162.00 75.06 1,281.04 0.9807
19-Jul-99 282.00 0.20 56.40 162.00 75.19 1,276.75 0.9712
20-Jul-99 278.00 0.20 55.60 159.60 74.88 1,261.65 0.9603
21-Jul-99 275.50 0.20 55.10 157.80 73.63 1,259.44 0.949
22-Jul-99 274.20 0.20 54.84 158.00 72.75 1,244.95 0.9508
23-Jul-99 272.50 0.20 54.50 155.40 73.00 1,235.57 0.9521
26-Jul-99 271.80 0.20 54.36 154.00 73.06 1,232.35 0.9387
27-Jul-99 272.50 0.20 54.50 157.90 73.19 1,240.96 0.9413
28-Jul-99 272.10 0.20 54.42 157.00 73.06 1,245.88 0.9378
29-Jul-99 265.10 0.20 53.02 152.50 72.00 1,232.56 0.9326
30-Jul-99 265.50 0.20 53.10 156.00 73.31 1,235.70 0.9337
2-Aug-99 265.90 0.20 53.18 155.00 73.06 1,232.70 0.9349
3-Aug-99 268.00 0.20 53.60 151.10 74.00 1,229.54 0.9363
4-Aug-99 268.30 0.20 53.66 149.80 73.50 1,221.81 0.9279
5-Aug-99 267.90 0.20 53.58 152.60 72.00 1,215.72 0.9295
6-Aug-99 269.70 0.20 53.94 153.00 72.44 1,206.85 0.9295
9-Aug-99 276.00 0.20 55.20 153.10 72.81 1,203.81 0.933
10-Aug-99 273.90 0.20 54.78 152.50 73.06 1,191.55 0.9336
11-Aug-99 274.00 0.20 54.80 154.00 73.19 1,199.96 0.9385
12-Aug-99 278.90 0.20 55.78 156.90 73.06 1,207.63 0.9373
13-Aug-99 279.50 0.20 55.90 158.50 74.19 1,225.20 0.9465
16-Aug-99 279.00 0.20 55.80 161.00 74.50 1,233.12 0.9455
17-Aug-99 280.00 0.20 56.00 161.70 75.06 1,238.22 0.951
18-Aug-99 282.90 0.20 56.58 161.50 75.50 1,236.42 0.9504
19-Aug-99 280.00 0.20 56.00 159.50 77.06 1,231.58 0.94
20-Aug-99 285.40 0.20 57.08 164.30 78.00 1,246.37 0.9369
23-Aug-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 167.00 77.81 1,263.89 0.953
24-Aug-99 292.50 0.20 58.50 167.80 78.63 1,262.79 0.9488
25-Aug-99 297.00 0.20 59.40 165.50 85.50 1,271.83 0.9601
26-Aug-99 293.40 0.20 58.68 167.00 83.63 1,259.31 0.9572
27-Aug-99 293.50 0.20 58.70 168.80 84.50 1,253.20 0.9556
30-Aug-99 293.00 0.20 58.60 168.40 84.38 1,243.74 0.9549
31-Aug-99 288.10 0.20 57.62 164.00 83.75 1,232.16 0.9458
-33- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Sep-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 165.00 85.13 1,245.55 0.9454
2-Sep-99 284.20 0.20 56.84 165.40 84.38 1,238.01 0.9355
3-Sep-99 285.40 0.20 57.08 172.00 84.19 1,260.55 0.9422
6-Sep-99 281.70 0.20 56.34 173.00 84.19 1,265.64 0.9422
7-Sep-99 279.80 0.20 55.96 175.90 84.06 1,258.79 0.9446
8-Sep-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 172.10 84.56 1,255.02 0.9435
9-Sep-99 289.90 0.20 57.98 176.90 85.94 1,264.33 0.9483
10-Sep-99 287.60 0.20 57.52 178.40 85.69 1,264.00 0.9646
13-Sep-99 283.50 0.20 56.70 175.00 84.50 1,259.83 0.9594
14-Sep-99 283.00 0.20 56.60 176.20 85.13 1,254.82 0.9657
15-Sep-99 283.20 0.20 56.64 176.00 87.56 1,244.12 0.9606
16-Sep-99 283.50 0.20 56.70 172.10 89.38 1,237.62 0.9648
17-Sep-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 170.50 89.00 1,243.91 0.9602
20-Sep-99 293.20 0.20 58.64 177.80 88.75 1,247.96 0.9654
21-Sep-99 289.30 0.20 57.86 172.00 87.63 1,237.17 0.9526
22-Sep-99 287.10 0.20 57.42 171.50 85.44 1,231.33 0.9574
23-Sep-99 289.90 0.20 57.98 171.50 84.94 1,217.66 0.952
24-Sep-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 171.20 83.69 1,207.60 0.9572
27-Sep-99 288.10 0.20 57.62 174.20 82.13 1,211.34 0.9557
28-Sep-99 284.50 0.20 56.90 173.60 82.06 1,213.25 0.9496
29-Sep-99 281.30 0.20 56.26 170.80 81.94 1,205.69 0.9391
30-Sep-99 281.50 0.20 56.30 178.00 83.50 1,218.90 0.9355
1-Oct-99 277.00 0.20 55.40 175.90 82.38 1,220.45 0.9326
4-Oct-99 276.50 0.20 55.30 178.00 83.00 1,233.85 0.9313
5-Oct-99 278.80 0.20 55.76 178.40 83.06 1,233.40 0.9315
6-Oct-99 288.40 0.20 57.68 178.00 84.56 1,246.98 0.9356
7-Oct-99 299.00 0.20 59.80 185.10 87.13 1,249.57 0.9334
8-Oct-99 297.50 0.20 59.50 179.10 85.50 1,255.99 0.9409
11-Oct-99 296.00 0.20 59.20 175.50 86.88 1,257.98 0.9409
12-Oct-99 293.00 0.20 58.60 175.50 85.75 1,246.41 0.9292
13-Oct-99 290.00 0.20 58.00 171.00 83.25 1,225.69 0.925
14-Oct-99 285.00 0.20 57.00 169.00 82.19 1,226.16 0.9276
15-Oct-99 282.00 0.20 56.40 167.50 80.50 1,203.51 0.9179
18-Oct-99 285.70 0.20 57.14 167.00 79.50 1,197.40 0.924
19-Oct-99 287.80 0.20 57.56 162.70 80.19 1,208.33 0.9231
20-Oct-99 289.50 0.20 57.90 163.00 79.13 1,224.05 0.9305
21-Oct-99 289.00 0.20 57.80 169.20 79.69 1,221.39 0.9254
22-Oct-99 289.70 0.20 57.94 169.00 79.44 1,234.74 0.9353
25-Oct-99 288.00 0.20 57.60 170.00 78.25 1,231.31 0.9368
26-Oct-99 288.70 0.20 57.74 171.00 76.25 1,228.61 0.9438
27-Oct-99 286.50 0.20 57.30 171.80 76.63 1,230.60 0.9517
28-Oct-99 276.60 0.20 55.32 178.00 78.00 1,257.36 0.951
29-Oct-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 181.30 80.75 1,280.94 0.948
-34- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Nov-99 287.00 0.20 57.40 181.30 80.75 1,276.34 0.9508
2-Nov-99 299.50 0.20 59.90 184.10 81.75 1,273.58 0.9505
3-Nov-99 308.00 0.20 61.60 185.20 77.75 1,276.99 0.9537
4-Nov-99 313.20 0.20 62.64 183.50 79.00 1,286.29 0.9637
5-Nov-99 319.00 0.20 63.80 184.50 80.00 1,286.96 0.9601
8-Nov-99 317.70 0.20 63.54 186.50 78.63 1,288.73 0.9623
9-Nov-99 314.80 0.20 62.96 187.50 79.75 1,286.64 0.9612
10-Nov-99 314.70 0.20 62.94 188.00 79.44 1,296.32 0.957
11-Nov-99 315.50 0.20 63.10 195.00 78.38 1,303.93 0.9609
12-Nov-99 315.60 0.20 63.12 196.50 78.69 1,308.16 0.9692
15-Nov-99 316.50 0.20 63.30 198.50 81.38 1,310.42 0.9678
16-Nov-99 322.20 0.20 64.44 194.00 86.88 1,322.90 0.9692
17-Nov-99 327.50 0.20 65.50 189.50 87.50 1,323.27 0.9608
18-Nov-99 328.10 0.20 65.62 188.00 85.50 1,333.91 0.9713
19-Nov-99 332.10 0.20 66.42 189.50 84.75 1,332.78 0.9701
22-Nov-99 326.90 0.20 65.38 192.00 83.69 1,333.18 0.9691
23-Nov-99 326.50 0.20 65.30 191.00 82.25 1,329.19 0.9728
24-Nov-99 327.20 0.20 65.44 195.20 82.00 1,330.22 0.9814
25-Nov-99 328.20 0.20 65.64 203.80 82.00 1,336.96 0.9814
26-Nov-99 328.30 0.20 65.66 212.90 84.19 1,341.77 0.9847
29-Nov-99 326.30 0.20 65.26 210.00 85.38 1,336.00 0.9901
30-Nov-99 322.20 0.20 64.44 207.00 83.25 1,315.68 0.991
1-Dec-99 331.50 0.20 66.30 207.50 84.75 1,324.35 0.9917
2-Dec-99 330.10 0.20 66.02 206.10 86.88 1,330.20 0.9981
3-Dec-99 334.40 0.20 66.88 213.00 88.00 1,350.78 0.9978
6-Dec-99 340.20 0.20 68.04 221.00 90.50 1,355.20 0.9778
7-Dec-99 342.00 0.20 68.40 228.00 92.63 1,353.63 0.9752
8-Dec-99 341.00 0.20 68.20 239.00 95.00 1,348.39 0.973
9-Dec-99 344.00 0.20 68.80 237.00 95.50 1,352.66 0.9795
10-Dec-99 340.00 0.20 68.00 232.00 94.00 1,356.69 0.9876
13-Dec-99 342.00 0.20 68.40 233.90 94.00 1,354.65 0.986
14-Dec-99 339.00 0.20 67.80 242.50 98.31 1,345.89 0.995
15-Dec-99 341.50 0.20 68.30 234.00 111.38 1,347.09 0.9935
16-Dec-99 342.00 0.20 68.40 227.50 114.06 1,358.41 0.9838
17-Dec-99 375.20 0.20 75.04 228.70 111.31 1,362.31 0.9912
20-Dec-99 370.00 0.20 74.00 220.70 118.31 1,365.97 0.9862
21-Dec-99 387.00 0.20 77.40 232.00 113.94 1,370.74 0.99
22-Dec-99 401.00 0.20 80.20 249.00 113.13 1,381.00 0.9908
23-Dec-99 414.10 0.20 82.82 251.40 116.75 1,401.23 0.9846
24-Dec-99 425.00 0.20 85.00 262.50 116.75 1,405.08 0.9846
27-Dec-99 424.10 0.20 84.82 259.30 116.00 1,402.09 0.987
28-Dec-99 430.00 0.20 86.00 257.00 114.81 1,406.64 0.9931
29-Dec-99 436.00 0.20 87.20 254.30 113.88 1,412.61 0.9953
30-Dec-99 444.70 0.20 88.94 262.00 114.44 1,419.18 0.9923
31-Dec-99 444.70 0.20 88.94 262.00 114.50 1,420.89 0.9932
-35- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
3-Jan-00 444.00 0.20 88.80 257.30 114.75 1,422.19 0.9739
4-Jan-00 402.00 0.20 80.40 246.00 111.06 1,378.31 0.9696
5-Jan-00 388.40 0.20 77.68 233.50 109.00 1,359.54 0.9693
6-Jan-00 384.00 0.20 76.80 223.00 107.00 1,344.06 0.9688
7-Jan-00 384.00 0.20 76.80 219.30 110.50 1,375.88 0.9713
10-Jan-00 400.20 0.20 80.04 230.00 111.38 1,391.11 0.9748
11-Jan-00 408.00 0.20 81.60 236.00 114.50 1,386.34 0.9678
12-Jan-00 426.00 0.20 85.20 240.00 115.13 1,377.98 0.9699
13-Jan-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 239.00 119.06 1,390.30 0.9748
14-Jan-00 470.00 0.20 94.00 238.50 119.69 1,402.14 0.9858
17-Jan-00 465.00 0.20 93.00 240.50 119.69 1,408.31 0.9886
18-Jan-00 446.00 0.20 89.20 234.50 115.56 1,391.60 0.9866
19-Jan-00 440.00 0.20 88.00 228.30 113.00 1,386.18 0.9876
20-Jan-00 443.00 0.20 88.60 226.20 113.56 1,380.78 0.983
21-Jan-00 433.00 0.20 86.60 223.00 116.00 1,376.52 0.9916
24-Jan-00 429.00 0.20 85.80 222.50 114.75 1,357.16 0.993
25-Jan-00 420.00 0.20 84.00 201.90 114.88 1,352.80 0.999
26-Jan-00 420.00 0.20 84.00 203.50 115.56 1,355.46 0.9982
27-Jan-00 421.00 0.20 84.20 204.40 112.94 1,357.12 1.0118
28-Jan-00 422.00 0.20 84.40 209.40 111.31 1,334.47 1.0252
31-Jan-00 411.00 0.20 82.20 204.10 106.81 1,338.25 1.030398
1-Feb-00 411.00 0.20 82.20 204.00 109.50 1,348.85 1.028998
2-Feb-00 429.00 0.20 85.80 203.90 112.50 1,356.33 1.023998
3-Feb-00 440.90 0.20 88.18 216.00 116.00 1,378.74 1.0097
4-Feb-00 441.00 0.20 88.20 219.30 110.13 1,380.88 1.017598
7-Feb-00 437.50 0.20 87.50 208.00 107.00 1,374.92 1.02
8-Feb-00 448.00 0.20 89.60 202.10 99.63 1,391.96 1.0139
9-Feb-00 429.90 0.20 85.98 200.10 97.50 1,381.36 1.0068
10-Feb-00 392.20 0.20 78.44 192.60 103.00 1,379.69 1.0153
11-Feb-00 409.30 0.20 81.86 191.50 96.69 1,365.00 1.013498
14-Feb-00 408.50 0.20 81.70 198.90 94.75 1,359.94 1.021098
15-Feb-00 397.70 0.20 79.54 207.00 93.31 1,353.77 1.0193
16-Feb-00 401.00 0.20 80.20 199.00 96.00 1,350.40 1.013498
17-Feb-00 395.00 0.20 79.00 198.00 98.13 1,356.94 1.0118
18-Feb-00 376.20 0.20 75.24 192.00 90.00 1,333.48 1.014898
21-Feb-00 366.00 0.20 73.20 192.90 90.00 1,323.54 1.014898
22-Feb-00 362.50 0.20 72.50 202.20 89.88 1,330.40 0.9969
23-Feb-00 364.00 0.20 72.80 203.00 90.00 1,342.00 0.9968
24-Feb-00 373.80 0.20 74.76 206.50 89.00 1,337.98 1.007198
25-Feb-00 393.70 0.20 78.74 213.00 86.94 1,332.04 1.0264
28-Feb-00 385.10 0.20 77.02 208.00 81.63 1,330.35 1.028798
29-Feb-00 385.50 0.20 77.10 209.10 87.44 1,340.58 1.0358
-36- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Mar-00 383.70 0.20 76.74 211.40 85.88 1,359.03 1.028
2-Mar-00 379.00 0.20 75.80 213.90 86.19 1,370.66 1.0363
3-Mar-00 365.00 0.20 73.00 221.10 85.50 1,383.94 1.040298
6-Mar-00 356.50 0.20 71.30 223.40 85.75 1,375.61 1.0428
7-Mar-00 375.00 0.20 75.00 216.30 85.94 1,356.14 1.042198
8-Mar-00 371.70 0.20 74.34 206.00 86.00 1,354.19 1.040798
9-Mar-00 382.90 0.20 76.58 208.60 91.19 1,375.57 1.0349
10-Mar-00 417.00 0.20 83.40 204.70 91.31 1,373.68 1.0376
13-Mar-00 438.00 0.20 87.60 204.10 89.06 1,353.89 1.0365
14-Mar-00 444.20 0.20 88.84 202.00 88.00 1,342.83 1.033199
15-Mar-00 435.00 0.20 87.00 194.30 89.50 1,348.61 1.0327
16-Mar-00 435.50 0.20 87.10 196.30 96.31 1,392.79 1.0293
17-Mar-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 202.10 98.38 1,399.44 1.028799
20-Mar-00 415.90 0.20 83.18 201.20 97.13 1,402.37 1.0279
21-Mar-00 406.00 0.20 81.20 200.00 95.00 1,421.68 1.0371
22-Mar-00 409.00 0.20 81.80 199.70 89.13 1,421.47 1.0404
23-Mar-00 407.50 0.20 81.50 199.50 83.94 1,436.53 1.028999
24-Mar-00 428.00 0.20 85.60 198.50 84.56 1,447.93 1.023199
27-Mar-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 200.30 83.25 1,448.76 1.0344
28-Mar-00 431.40 0.20 86.28 200.40 85.00 1,445.78 1.040999
29-Mar-00 432.20 0.20 86.44 200.10 89.44 1,443.74 1.050599
30-Mar-00 420.00 0.20 84.00 199.00 89.94 1,419.58 1.0407
31-Mar-00 437.20 0.20 87.44 193.60 88.94 1,431.94 1.045899
3-Apr-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 198.70 88.38 1,426.94 1.0447
4-Apr-00 440.00 0.20 88.00 198.80 87.00 1,420.99 1.038899
5-Apr-00 431.00 0.20 86.20 195.20 87.50 1,411.03 1.0365
6-Apr-00 431.20 0.20 86.24 202.50 86.50 1,421.05 1.0435
7-Apr-00 432.00 0.20 86.40 203.60 85.44 1,432.62 1.0474
10-Apr-00 428.00 0.20 85.60 201.70 86.63 1,429.58 1.0392
11-Apr-00 428.80 0.20 85.76 199.80 86.00 1,417.99 1.042899
12-Apr-00 434.00 0.20 86.80 199.90 88.06 1,402.15 1.043699
13-Apr-00 432.50 0.20 86.50 200.80 87.25 1,384.06 1.047899
14-Apr-00 430.00 0.20 86.00 199.90 73.25 1,329.98 1.0404
17-Apr-00 429.80 0.20 85.96 201.00 82.81 1,333.90 1.049899
18-Apr-00 430.20 0.20 86.04 199.80 85.06 1,360.99 1.055499
19-Apr-00 426.50 0.20 85.30 197.50 85.56 1,357.04 1.0632
20-Apr-00 439.00 0.20 87.80 207.70 84.81 1,362.99 1.0667
21-Apr-00 439.00 0.20 87.80 207.70 84.81 1,362.52 1.066
24-Apr-00 439.00 0.20 87.80 207.70 85.50 1,363.39 1.0667
25-Apr-00 448.50 0.20 89.70 216.20 86.63 1,384.11 1.085199
26-Apr-00 476.00 0.20 95.20 224.90 88.00 1,379.56 1.0827
27-Apr-00 454.00 0.20 90.80 219.00 88.13 1,369.97 1.099
28-Apr-00 461.60 0.20 92.32 221.90 87.63 1,370.11 1.096999
-37- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-May-00 461.60 0.20 92.32 221.90 87.94 1,379.51 1.092099
2-May-00 470.80 0.20 94.16 221.90 87.31 1,378.14 1.100499
3-May-00 458.00 0.20 91.60 216.60 83.81 1,348.08 1.116899
4-May-00 459.60 0.20 91.92 216.50 85.50 1,345.10 1.123099
5-May-00 457.60 0.20 91.52 217.50 86.38 1,355.94 1.1143
8-May-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 212.90 85.94 1,348.43 1.1137
9-May-00 455.00 0.20 91.00 211.50 86.94 1,335.83 1.1017
10-May-00 453.40 0.20 90.68 203.00 86.81 1,317.04 1.1029
11-May-00 451.00 0.20 90.20 208.00 87.00 1,327.87 1.1094
12-May-00 461.20 0.20 92.24 211.00 87.06 1,344.75 1.087899
15-May-00 457.20 0.20 91.44 210.70 86.94 1,352.21 1.0967
16-May-00 472.90 0.20 94.58 209.50 87.00 1,369.78 1.1101
17-May-00 473.10 0.20 94.62 210.10 81.81 1,345.57 1.1177
18-May-00 469.30 0.20 93.86 219.00 80.44 1,340.34 1.118799
19-May-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 221.00 79.81 1,314.59 1.1123
22-May-00 446.00 0.20 89.20 216.60 79.75 1,302.55 1.1072
23-May-00 449.10 0.20 89.82 218.80 81.00 1,295.39 1.102799
24-May-00 447.00 0.20 89.40 219.10 82.00 1,300.42 1.1036
25-May-00 447.00 0.20 89.40 220.90 86.13 1,301.02 1.095799
26-May-00 447.60 0.20 89.52 220.40 85.75 1,302.29 1.0734
29-May-00 445.30 0.20 89.06 220.40 85.75 1,307.96 1.0734
30-May-00 439.80 0.20 87.96 228.70 86.38 1,337.95 1.075
31-May-00 437.20 0.20 87.44 230.70 85.63 1,334.14 1.066299
1-Jun-00 439.50 0.20 87.90 232.10 85.38 1,356.12 1.073099
2-Jun-00 453.00 0.20 90.60 238.20 86.00 1,390.18 1.059699
5-Jun-00 452.00 0.20 90.40 238.10 85.13 1,388.46 1.0545
6-Jun-00 450.00 0.20 90.00 233.60 85.88 1,390.11 1.0481
7-Jun-00 452.90 0.20 90.58 232.00 85.88 1,391.89 1.038899
8-Jun-00 440.00 0.20 88.00 228.50 85.25 1,385.37 1.0453
9-Jun-00 439.70 0.20 87.94 228.10 83.75 1,379.61 1.0491
12-Jun-00 439.70 0.20 87.94 228.10 84.50 1,376.86 1.049299
13-Jun-00 435.50 0.20 87.10 230.20 85.00 1,387.10 1.0407
14-Jun-00 435.60 0.20 87.12 232.50 87.50 1,390.05 1.044
15-Jun-00 434.40 0.20 86.88 231.20 88.13 1,385.13 1.048499
16-Jun-00 429.50 0.20 85.90 229.20 92.56 1,380.48 1.036099
19-Jun-00 426.00 0.20 85.20 229.10 92.88 1,392.61 1.0404
20-Jun-00 425.80 0.20 85.16 233.50 91.50 1,394.38 1.046499
21-Jun-00 425.00 0.20 85.00 230.00 97.13 1,390.58 1.057099
22-Jun-00 434.90 0.20 86.98 228.00 97.00 1,374.65 1.0632
23-Jun-00 447.50 0.20 89.50 230.00 97.06 1,365.73 1.0678
26-Jun-00 454.80 0.20 90.96 235.60 93.88 1,368.01 1.065
27-Jun-00 451.80 0.20 90.36 235.00 94.56 1,369.55 1.0588
28-Jun-00 454.40 0.20 90.88 235.00 95.63 1,376.13 1.0587
29-Jun-00 446.00 0.20 89.20 233.40 95.00 1,366.25 1.0512
30-Jun-00 431.90 0.20 86.38 232.70 94.75 1,377.72 1.047299
-38- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
N.B. 3-Jul-00 87.15 1.00 87.15 232.00 95.25 1,388.85 1.0503
LVMH 4-Jul-00 85.95 1.00 85.95 225.00 95.25 1,388.26 1.0518
5-for-1 5-Jul-00 86.80 1.00 86.80 222.00 94.06 1,376.18 1.0475
stock split 6-Jul-00 86.40 1.00 86.40 220.80 95.00 1,378.76 1.049399
7-Jul-00 88.20 1.00 88.20 223.00 96.06 1,394.35 1.055499
10-Jul-00 87.90 1.00 87.90 219.30 96.69 1,395.88 1.050099
11-Jul-00 89.70 1.00 89.70 225.00 97.38 1,396.12 1.0531
12-Jul-00 89.85 1.00 89.85 222.50 97.88 1,400.19 1.063399
13-Jul-00 89.80 1.00 89.80 220.00 99.19 1,395.93 1.0695
14-Jul-00 89.80 1.00 89.80 220.00 99.75 1,404.51 1.0666
17-Jul-00 91.00 1.00 91.00 219.00 99.75 1,405.83 1.069599
18-Jul-00 89.70 1.00 89.70 216.90 98.88 1,389.23 1.071699
19-Jul-00 88.75 1.00 88.75 217.60 99.19 1,381.31 1.0825
20-Jul-00 91.60 1.00 91.60 227.50 100.00 1,391.49 1.075399
21-Jul-00 91.00 1.00 91.00 226.70 98.94 1,377.75 1.066799
24-Jul-00 91.50 1.00 91.50 229.30 99.00 1,369.57 1.0727
25-Jul-00 92.00 1.00 92.00 224.00 99.75 1,374.14 1.0651
26-Jul-00 91.80 1.00 91.80 221.90 100.00 1,364.08 1.0624
27-Jul-00 94.85 1.00 94.85 220.00 99.50 1,353.73 1.0715
28-Jul-00 92.35 1.00 92.35 219.80 97.50 1,329.38 1.0825
31-Jul-00 93.85 1.00 93.85 224.20 95.69 1,337.65 1.0784
1-Aug-00 94.80 1.00 94.80 224.20 97.00 1,343.45 1.0918
2-Aug-00 96.00 1.00 96.00 223.70 99.31 1,341.13 1.0946
3-Aug-00 93.60 1.00 93.60 217.60 95.81 1,336.49 1.103
4-Aug-00 92.95 1.00 92.95 222.00 96.88 1,345.52 1.103
7-Aug-00 94.60 1.00 94.60 222.80 97.88 1,357.17 1.099
8-Aug-00 96.50 1.00 96.50 220.20 98.19 1,356.30 1.1093
9-Aug-00 96.20 1.00 96.20 216.00 100.00 1,356.35 1.1122
10-Aug-00 96.45 1.00 96.45 215.50 99.75 1,353.64 1.1017
11-Aug-00 95.55 1.00 95.55 216.00 99.25 1,357.52 1.107499
14-Aug-00 95.70 1.00 95.70 215.70 99.00 1,369.14 1.1066
15-Aug-00 95.20 1.00 95.20 214.90 99.50 1,370.86 1.094199
16-Aug-00 96.10 1.00 96.10 218.50 99.50 1,371.31 1.093699
17-Aug-00 94.50 1.00 94.50 214.90 99.75 1,374.48 1.0924
18-Aug-00 92.60 1.00 92.60 210.10 99.13 1,370.69 1.103399
21-Aug-00 89.75 1.00 89.75 209.20 99.13 1,370.97 1.1074
22-Aug-00 89.60 1.00 89.60 204.50 99.50 1,371.26 1.115
23-Aug-00 90.00 1.00 90.00 207.00 100.00 1,374.60 1.115399
24-Aug-00 89.50 1.00 89.50 202.60 102.06 1,378.79 1.107499
25-Aug-00 91.45 1.00 91.45 205.00 103.75 1,383.45 1.108399
28-Aug-00 90.65 1.00 90.65 206.60 103.50 1,388.21 1.1108
29-Aug-00 90.20 1.00 90.20 209.00 103.06 1,383.41 1.115299
30-Aug-00 88.40 1.00 88.40 210.70 103.50 1,374.85 1.120399
31-Aug-00 87.40 1.00 87.40 212.90 102.81 1,379.87 1.1269
-39- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Sep-00 90.20 1.00 90.20 218.60 103.38 1,395.15 1.1109
4-Sep-00 89.30 1.00 89.30 212.20 103.38 1,398.42 1.114499
5-Sep-00 90.75 1.00 90.75 213.30 101.56 1,380.38 1.127
6-Sep-00 88.05 1.00 88.05 217.40 96.63 1,364.40 1.148199
7-Sep-00 89.15 1.00 89.15 218.00 96.50 1,365.52 1.142699
8-Sep-00 87.00 1.00 87.00 216.50 96.31 1,353.77 1.151799
11-Sep-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 213.20 96.19 1,345.15 1.1608
12-Sep-00 89.40 1.00 89.40 212.80 94.63 1,336.41 1.1612
13-Sep-00 88.00 1.00 88.00 205.00 94.94 1,335.75 1.1573
14-Sep-00 89.00 1.00 89.00 207.10 96.63 1,336.42 1.1607
15-Sep-00 86.05 1.00 86.05 204.40 95.88 1,326.19 1.170699
18-Sep-00 84.00 1.00 84.00 204.50 95.88 1,307.98 1.1727
19-Sep-00 85.40 1.00 85.40 201.50 101.25 1,316.40 1.176299
20-Sep-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 205.40 103.25 1,308.38 1.1824
21-Sep-00 84.00 1.00 84.00 204.60 103.31 1,303.03 1.1656
22-Sep-00 84.55 1.00 84.55 207.50 104.38 1,309.53 1.138399
25-Sep-00 83.40 1.00 83.40 203.10 102.25 1,308.01 1.1445
26-Sep-00 83.15 1.00 83.15 203.40 100.25 1,299.70 1.136
27-Sep-00 85.10 1.00 85.10 199.50 101.63 1,297.53 1.1346
28-Sep-00 85.30 1.00 85.30 199.50 102.50 1,312.46 1.132299
29-Sep-00 85.55 1.00 85.55 199.50 100.88 1,305.25 1.130799
2-Oct-00 85.55 1.00 85.55 199.00 99.44 1,307.24 1.137199
3-Oct-00 86.30 1.00 86.30 196.60 100.13 1,302.84 1.1437
4-Oct-00 85.10 1.00 85.10 193.10 98.56 1,304.13 1.145499
5-Oct-00 85.15 1.00 85.15 194.00 97.88 1,305.72 1.148199
6-Oct-00 84.15 1.00 84.15 191.90 98.31 1,289.48 1.1516
9-Oct-00 81.10 1.00 81.10 188.00 100.00 1,276.51 1.153
10-Oct-00 83.40 1.00 83.40 189.70 102.19 1,269.42 1.150399
11-Oct-00 82.20 1.00 82.20 193.90 101.63 1,247.31 1.148899
12-Oct-00 83.30 1.00 83.30 194.80 98.00 1,226.49 1.156799
13-Oct-00 81.50 1.00 81.50 194.40 96.13 1,247.98 1.1677
16-Oct-00 81.60 1.00 81.60 195.70 95.88 1,245.87 1.1776
17-Oct-00 80.35 1.00 80.35 192.60 97.75 1,228.02 1.175699
18-Oct-00 79.00 1.00 79.00 194.00 93.81 1,217.00 1.193
19-Oct-00 80.40 1.00 80.40 196.20 94.06 1,244.27 1.188399
20-Oct-00 81.40 1.00 81.40 201.50 93.25 1,252.56 1.1893
23-Oct-00 81.20 1.00 81.20 200.00 93.00 1,255.08 1.196699
24-Oct-00 83.80 1.00 83.80 200.90 93.94 1,264.39 1.195
25-Oct-00 83.05 1.00 83.05 203.50 93.38 1,240.83 1.187599
26-Oct-00 83.25 1.00 83.25 203.50 93.69 1,238.11 1.2057
27-Oct-00 84.45 1.00 84.45 207.00 94.00 1,253.73 1.1896
30-Oct-00 84.90 1.00 84.90 207.70 95.69 1,261.50 1.189099
31-Oct-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 210.30 97.75 1,282.14 1.1774
-40- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Nov-00 86.60 1.00 86.60 213.10 99.06 1,288.21 1.160999

2-Nov-00 85.35 1.00 85.35 212.10 100.38 1,293.27 1.1641
3-Nov-00 86.50 1.00 86.50 215.50 100.63 1,295.78 1.153299
6-Nov-00 87.05 1.00 87.05 208.50 100.63 1,300.05 1.1606
7-Nov-00 85.80 1.00 85.80 208.80 100.50 1,299.05 1.162
8-Nov-00 86.00 1.00 86.00 207.00 100.50 1,284.65 1.1689
9-Nov-00 85.20 1.00 85.20 209.10 100.88 1,274.76 1.153899
10-Nov-00 83.60 1.00 83.60 206.10 103.50 1,252.45 1.163099
13-Nov-00 80.50 1.00 80.50 201.60 101.13 1,235.31 1.1627
14-Nov-00 81.35 1.00 81.35 205.30 101.00 1,258.67 1.1655
15-Nov-00 82.00 1.00 82.00 204.70 101.63 1,264.26 1.1663
16-Nov-00 81.50 1.00 81.50 206.30 101.25 1,248.52 1.1734
17-Nov-00 80.50 1.00 80.50 203.60 100.94 1,243.87 1.178399
20-Nov-00 79.15 1.00 79.15 200.20 99.00 1,221.84 1.1738
21-Nov-00 81.00 1.00 81.00 206.70 99.00 1,222.02 1.184999
22-Nov-00 80.50 1.00 80.50 204.10 94.00 1,198.67 1.185699
23-Nov-00 78.15 1.00 78.15 203.50 94.00 1,200.92 1.185699
24-Nov-00 79.00 1.00 79.00 205.30 93.44 1,214.76 1.1916
27-Nov-00 81.00 1.00 81.00 210.20 96.50 1,227.60 1.174
28-Nov-00 80.10 1.00 80.10 208.20 94.94 1,217.80 1.1671
29-Nov-00 79.50 1.00 79.50 209.20 94.75 1,218.67 1.165995
30-Nov-00 76.00 1.00 76.00 208.00 92.94 1,203.05 1.14652
1-Dec-00 73.00 1.00 73.00 208.80 91.50 1,210.53 1.138109
4-Dec-00 70.85 1.00 70.85 206.20 88.13 1,216.20 1.128634
5-Dec-00 72.00 1.00 72.00 212.80 86.75 1,248.26 1.13643
6-Dec-00 72.60 1.00 72.60 210.90 88.94 1,236.41 1.12183
7-Dec-00 72.20 1.00 72.20 214.60 87.63 1,230.66 1.123824
8-Dec-00 73.50 1.00 73.50 214.10 89.94 1,245.37 1.13456
11-Dec-00 76.60 1.00 76.60 225.20 92.00 1,259.10 1.141299
12-Dec-00 77.00 1.00 77.00 222.50 91.69 1,253.39 1.138009
13-Dec-00 74.10 1.00 74.10 217.30 88.56 1,245.03 1.139605
14-Dec-00 72.55 1.00 72.55 212.70 86.75 1,233.08 1.13622
15-Dec-00 69.85 1.00 69.85 215.70 82.50 1,211.47 1.13622
18-Dec-00 73.25 1.00 73.25 224.20 83.63 1,216.82 1.116605
19-Dec-00 74.00 1.00 74.00 221.00 86.44 1,207.50 1.122535
20-Dec-00 69.10 1.00 69.10 215.30 81.75 1,178.16 1.099955
21-Dec-00 67.30 1.00 67.30 224.00 84.00 1,179.30 1.092165
22-Dec-00 67.50 1.00 67.50 220.00 87.50 1,197.95 1.081969
25-Dec-00 67.50 1.00 67.50 220.00 87.50 1,201.88 1.081969
26-Dec-00 67.50 1.00 67.50 220.00 88.69 1,206.91 1.081969
27-Dec-00 71.45 1.00 71.45 225.00 89.88 1,219.15 1.081969
28-Dec-00 71.10 1.00 71.10 225.90 89.00 1,222.04 1.081969
29-Dec-00 70.50 1.00 70.50 228.90 88.50 1,221.25 1.061344
-41- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Jan-01 70.50 1.00 70.50 228.90 88.50 1,221.25 1.061344
2-Jan-01 69.60 1.00 69.60 226.10 85.06 1,201.87 1.052094
3-Jan-01 68.50 1.00 68.50 228.00 88.44 1,227.49 1.076614
4-Jan-01 68.50 1.00 68.50 222.00 87.50 1,227.17 1.05252
5-Jan-01 66.05 1.00 66.05 219.90 86.25 1,211.43 1.044
8-Jan-01 65.00 1.00 65.00 226.50 82.94 1,206.86 1.053579
9-Jan-01 64.65 1.00 64.65 229.00 81.81 1,200.30 1.058095
10-Jan-01 62.75 1.00 62.75 228.60 80.88 1,202.42 1.066955
11-Jan-01 64.10 1.00 64.10 231.50 82.81 1,213.19 1.05022
12-Jan-01 67.50 1.00 67.50 233.00 81.06 1,211.98 1.05157
15-Jan-01 67.65 1.00 67.65 230.90 81.06 1,210.64 1.061049
16-Jan-01 68.25 1.00 68.25 227.90 80.06 1,212.34 1.062719
17-Jan-01 71.85 1.00 71.85 228.90 83.31 1,219.39 1.067599
18-Jan-01 72.30 1.00 72.30 229.30 85.31 1,233.70 1.060905
19-Jan-01 72.50 1.00 72.50 232.50 86.81 1,229.60 1.070285
22-Jan-01 71.70 1.00 71.70 230.70 89.31 1,229.82 1.065245
23-Jan-01 72.90 1.00 72.90 232.00 89.69 1,238.20 1.069815
24-Jan-01 69.50 1.00 69.50 226.00 88.81 1,236.39 1.082074
25-Jan-01 71.50 1.00 71.50 222.60 90.75 1,233.86 1.081155
26-Jan-01 69.70 1.00 69.70 223.30 90.25 1,231.86 1.081294
29-Jan-01 71.60 1.00 71.60 223.00 89.65 1,236.39 1.090039
30-Jan-01 71.45 1.00 71.45 224.10 91.20 1,243.55 1.079675
31-Jan-01 70.30 1.00 70.30 225.10 91.10 1,244.22 1.066489
1-Feb-01 70.00 1.00 70.00 229.00 90.50 1,249.18 1.062189
2-Feb-01 68.30 1.00 68.30 226.60 90.69 1,229.95 1.068074
5-Feb-01 68.30 1.00 68.30 228.00 90.20 1,232.54 1.065994
6-Feb-01 68.20 1.00 68.20 228.30 89.30 1,230.11 1.074485
7-Feb-01 68.25 1.00 68.25 227.50 93.65 1,219.20 1.076509
8-Feb-01 67.70 1.00 67.70 228.50 89.00 1,207.95 1.08917
9-Feb-01 66.85 1.00 66.85 228.50 88.15 1,194.63 1.082694
12-Feb-01 67.75 1.00 67.75 231.50 88.35 1,207.96 1.072379
13-Feb-01 67.30 1.00 67.30 230.40 85.95 1,198.79 1.086195
14-Feb-01 66.30 1.00 66.30 227.00 85.25 1,191.44 1.089234
15-Feb-01 69.85 1.00 69.85 227.00 85.35 1,196.28 1.105064
16-Feb-01 67.00 1.00 67.00 223.90 85.25 1,180.34 1.093104
19-Feb-01 68.00 1.00 68.00 222.20 85.25 1,179.56 1.093104
20-Feb-01 67.20 1.00 67.20 220.20 86.10 1,162.40 1.097955
21-Feb-01 66.35 1.00 66.35 219.80 85.75 1,146.80 1.099609
22-Feb-01 66.35 1.00 66.35 223.10 85.70 1,142.87 1.107265
23-Feb-01 65.55 1.00 65.55 219.30 86.50 1,134.80 1.090059
26-Feb-01 67.35 1.00 67.35 226.00 87.70 1,150.12 1.098479
27-Feb-01 68.00 1.00 68.00 224.50 87.71 1,149.08 1.088614
28-Feb-01 66.75 1.00 66.75 219.10 87.87 1,137.88 1.083329
-42- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-Mar-01 65.10 1.00 65.10 211.50 87.50 1,137.19 1.074804
2-Mar-01 64.05 1.00 64.05 205.60 88.50 1,130.22 1.066569
5-Mar-01 63.50 1.00 63.50 207.30 87.84 1,135.52 1.07922
6-Mar-01 64.20 1.00 64.20 211.20 89.94 1,149.10 1.070729
7-Mar-01 63.20 1.00 63.20 217.50 90.00 1,152.02 1.07601
8-Mar-01 64.10 1.00 64.10 212.00 88.15 1,152.92 1.072524
9-Mar-01 61.85 1.00 61.85 207.00 87.05 1,133.75 1.0713
12-Mar-01 58.50 1.00 58.50 205.30 84.35 1,093.10 1.07578
13-Mar-01 57.50 1.00 57.50 205.10 82.25 1,090.84 1.092935
14-Mar-01 56.25 1.00 56.25 198.00 78.50 1,066.23 1.096749
15-Mar-01 55.70 1.00 55.70 196.00 79.65 1,075.17 1.11399
16-Mar-01 55.55 1.00 55.55 192.50 77.40 1,050.53 1.112875
19-Mar-01 53.60 1.00 53.60 196.00 76.10 1,059.48 1.112965
20-Mar-01 56.65 1.00 56.65 204.00 78.65 1,052.21 1.109605
21-Mar-01 55.50 1.00 55.50 195.00 75.45 1,039.60 1.114143
22-Mar-01 52.70 1.00 52.70 187.90 76.00 1,014.63 1.125574
23-Mar-01 53.75 1.00 53.75 188.80 81.00 1,039.65 1.124619
26-Mar-01 56.30 1.00 56.30 203.80 87.50 1,063.74 1.11552
27-Mar-01 59.40 1.00 59.40 202.00 88.30 1,086.02 1.11928
28-Mar-01 57.90 1.00 57.90 199.30 86.75 1,065.40 1.128195
29-Mar-01 58.00 1.00 58.00 196.50 86.75 1,055.21 1.13215
30-Mar-01 57.00 1.00 57.00 195.00 83.65 1,061.26 1.140175
2-Apr-01 57.75 1.00 57.75 199.90 83.96 1,050.52 1.13692
3-Apr-01 55.05 1.00 55.05 189.90 81.75 1,024.60 1.114164
4-Apr-01 56.00 1.00 56.00 189.20 78.99 1,031.47 1.109705
5-Apr-01 56.90 1.00 56.90 194.70 81.55 1,062.65 1.114454
6-Apr-01 57.40 1.00 57.40 192.60 83.60 1,053.08 1.10574
9-Apr-01 59.00 1.00 59.00 193.60 82.35 1,057.97 1.11554
10-Apr-01 60.85 1.00 60.85 199.50 81.95 1,075.24 1.12513
11-Apr-01 60.65 1.00 60.65 204.00 81.30 1,075.41 1.125825
12-Apr-01 59.35 1.00 59.35 199.00 80.10 1,088.62 1.120754
13-Apr-01 59.35 1.00 59.35 199.00 80.10 1,088.11 1.120754
16-Apr-01 59.35 1.00 59.35 199.00 80.10 1,082.29 1.120754
17-Apr-01 59.20 1.00 59.20 197.10 79.08 1,085.90 1.131804
18-Apr-01 63.00 1.00 63.00 200.40 83.40 1,118.76 1.130879
19-Apr-01 62.00 1.00 62.00 198.00 82.01 1,135.06 1.113859
20-Apr-01 60.95 1.00 60.95 195.00 84.69 1,130.58 1.108205
23-Apr-01 60.50 1.00 60.50 193.90 87.55 1,117.04 1.115054
24-Apr-01 61.50 1.00 61.50 191.90 85.90 1,108.90 1.11803
25-Apr-01 62.15 1.00 62.15 190.00 87.80 1,120.20 1.1136
26-Apr-01 65.00 1.00 65.00 191.20 88.15 1,128.38 1.10646
27-Apr-01 68.15 1.00 68.15 195.40 89.85 1,137.86 1.12109
30-Apr-01 69.60 1.00 69.60 194.10 91.05 1,138.09 1.124595
-43- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
1-May-01 69.60 1.00 69.60 194.10 92.00 1,153.09 1.119354
2-May-01 68.65 1.00 68.65 195.60 91.30 1,153.80 1.11899
3-May-01 66.40 1.00 66.40 191.00 89.85 1,139.21 1.124174
4-May-01 67.55 1.00 67.55 194.50 90.88 1,150.75 1.120395
7-May-01 68.85 1.00 68.85 193.50 89.80 1,151.14 1.121641
8-May-01 68.45 1.00 68.45 194.00 89.46 1,144.19 1.129624
9-May-01 68.20 1.00 68.20 196.60 90.70 1,137.11 1.128465
10-May-01 70.60 1.00 70.60 203.00 90.90 1,141.98 1.133835
11-May-01 69.50 1.00 69.50 203.50 90.76 1,132.91 1.141161
14-May-01 64.90 1.00 64.90 199.80 89.55 1,125.21 1.143905
15-May-01 64.50 1.00 64.50 203.60 89.22 1,131.69 1.138209
16-May-01 63.90 1.00 63.90 200.00 87.50 1,148.86 1.13308
17-May-01 65.90 1.00 65.90 203.00 89.50 1,155.64 1.132805
18-May-01 67.00 1.00 67.00 209.30 90.80 1,155.99 1.134404
21-May-01 67.05 1.00 67.05 208.60 90.80 1,168.50 1.140835
22-May-01 69.90 1.00 69.90 211.80 93.01 1,166.37 1.155464
23-May-01 68.55 1.00 68.55 210.30 92.91 1,153.57 1.168839
24-May-01 68.55 1.00 68.55 210.00 91.15 1,154.27 1.167504
25-May-01 67.80 1.00 67.80 208.70 90.50 1,143.75 1.161144
28-May-01 68.25 1.00 68.25 209.50 90.50 1,143.95 1.162504
29-May-01 67.25 1.00 67.25 208.50 90.05 1,136.42 1.168429
30-May-01 67.30 1.00 67.30 206.10 89.35 1,120.56 1.169385
31-May-01 67.00 1.00 67.00 205.00 90.33 1,121.09 1.18415
1-Jun-01 65.95 1.00 65.95 205.00 90.80 1,122.64 1.180204
4-Jun-01 65.95 1.00 65.95 205.00 90.90 1,127.68 1.181945
5-Jun-01 66.70 1.00 66.70 206.90 91.90 1,137.82 1.170309
6-Jun-01 66.50 1.00 66.50 206.00 91.01 1,128.34 1.180329
7-Jun-01 65.55 1.00 65.55 203.40 91.20 1,132.69 1.174279
8-Jun-01 65.60 1.00 65.60 200.20 91.75 1,125.45 1.175639
11-Jun-01 65.85 1.00 65.85 199.30 88.85 1,113.11 1.18444
12-Jun-01 64.15 1.00 64.15 195.10 89.01 1,106.23 1.172025
13-Jun-01 65.05 1.00 65.05 198.40 88.10 1,103.44 1.169149
14-Jun-01 63.60 1.00 63.60 195.00 86.50 1,091.97 1.158955
15-Jun-01 61.90 1.00 61.90 190.50 86.50 1,085.37 1.161024
18-Jun-01 61.00 1.00 61.00 187.10 84.86 1,077.86 1.162004
19-Jun-01 61.35 1.00 61.35 185.50 82.21 1,079.16 1.171314
20-Jun-01 59.95 1.00 59.95 172.30 81.29 1,081.70 1.168819
21-Jun-01 59.20 1.00 59.20 174.00 82.40 1,090.43 1.170005
22-Jun-01 59.90 1.00 59.90 172.00 82.52 1,087.42 1.166184
25-Jun-01 59.95 1.00 59.95 171.50 83.65 1,085.17 1.163824
26-Jun-01 58.95 1.00 58.95 172.10 83.90 1,078.83 1.160965
27-Jun-01 59.70 1.00 59.70 170.00 84.40 1,074.66 1.163304
28-Jun-01 60.00 1.00 60.00 167.60 83.45 1,080.88 1.183925
29-Jun-01 59.50 1.00 59.50 171.00 82.65 1,084.79 1.177204
-44- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
2-Jul-01 59.00 1.00 59.00 175.00 82.56 1,095.41 1.17962
3-Jul-01 59.00 1.00 59.00 174.50 82.90 1,090.63 1.179595
4-Jul-01 56.00 1.00 56.00 170.70 82.90 1,086.94 1.179595
5-Jul-01 56.45 1.00 56.45 167.50 80.10 1,071.72 1.193415
6-Jul-01 53.00 1.00 53.00 165.10 78.45 1,050.75 1.178425
9-Jul-01 57.00 1.00 57.00 164.80 80.35 1,056.09 1.176744
10-Jul-01 55.60 1.00 55.60 160.90 81.01 1,049.79 1.168755
11-Jul-01 55.70 1.00 55.70 158.80 80.76 1,045.70 1.165839
12-Jul-01 57.10 1.00 57.10 161.40 81.00 1,062.59 1.173684
13-Jul-01 57.80 1.00 57.80 161.30 80.00 1,066.91 1.170375
16-Jul-01 58.15 1.00 58.15 165.30 78.85 1,060.29 1.17367
17-Jul-01 57.40 1.00 57.40 166.20 79.25 1,060.60 1.163875
18-Jul-01 56.45 1.00 56.45 167.60 80.70 1,058.78 1.144674
19-Jul-01 57.60 1.00 57.60 170.10 81.25 1,066.98 1.146805
20-Jul-01 57.20 1.00 57.20 167.10 80.75 1,063.46 1.147625
23-Jul-01 57.10 1.00 57.10 168.10 80.95 1,049.46 1.150914
24-Jul-01 56.20 1.00 56.20 166.70 81.45 1,039.12 1.145115
25-Jul-01 55.80 1.00 55.80 163.70 80.85 1,046.54 1.13641
26-Jul-01 56.50 1.00 56.50 163.50 82.09 1,053.15 1.139625
27-Jul-01 57.30 1.00 57.30 169.10 83.43 1,058.54 1.139649
30-Jul-01 60.15 1.00 60.15 169.50 85.80 1,060.17 1.143715
31-Jul-01 60.50 1.00 60.50 168.90 85.27 1,069.67 1.14067
1-Aug-01 58.40 1.00 58.40 169.50 86.20 1,075.67 1.135969
2-Aug-01 59.10 1.00 59.10 169.20 86.50 1,082.97 1.132054
3-Aug-01 58.10 1.00 58.10 166.80 85.90 1,076.81 1.131104
6-Aug-01 58.50 1.00 58.50 164.60 85.50 1,068.05 1.13435
7-Aug-01 58.95 1.00 58.95 161.80 85.20 1,070.44 1.139339
8-Aug-01 57.50 1.00 57.50 162.20 83.30 1,055.56 1.135915
9-Aug-01 56.10 1.00 56.10 159.40 84.50 1,050.24 1.12148
10-Aug-01 55.65 1.00 55.65 159.00 84.91 1,053.90 1.1198
13-Aug-01 56.05 1.00 56.05 163.00 85.06 1,054.73 1.119249
14-Aug-01 57.25 1.00 57.25 162.50 84.92 1,059.30 1.107389
15-Aug-01 56.80 1.00 56.80 161.50 86.49 1,059.08 1.095369
16-Aug-01 55.65 1.00 55.65 159.80 85.72 1,055.82 1.095469
17-Aug-01 55.00 1.00 55.00 157.40 84.41 1,041.46 1.089265
20-Aug-01 55.15 1.00 55.15 157.00 82.56 1,042.75 1.09301
21-Aug-01 55.10 1.00 55.10 156.50 80.94 1,040.49 1.095229
22-Aug-01 55.75 1.00 55.75 156.60 80.00 1,047.20 1.08272
23-Aug-01 55.70 1.00 55.70 158.20 81.25 1,042.02 1.093254
24-Aug-01 57.55 1.00 57.55 160.50 83.55 1,057.95 1.093254
27-Aug-01 57.20 1.00 57.20 159.20 82.53 1,055.32 1.096715
28-Aug-01 56.05 1.00 56.05 156.00 81.35 1,041.83 1.09586
29-Aug-01 56.70 1.00 56.70 155.20 78.84 1,033.20 1.100875
30-Aug-01 54.20 1.00 54.20 150.30 77.39 1,014.60 1.091465
31-Aug-01 53.45 1.00 53.45 148.20 78.48 1,016.73 1.0973
-45- UV1364
MSCI EURO TO
3-Sep-01 52.60 1.00 52.60 146.30 78.48 1,009.94 1.0973
4-Sep-01 54.00 1.00 54.00 146.50 78.47 1,012.49 1.125645
5-Sep-01 52.65 1.00 52.65 142.50 85.35 1,004.78 1.128164
6-Sep-01 50.85 1.00 50.85 141.20 84.75 985.59 1.116819
7-Sep-01 49.15 1.00 49.15 140.40 85.00 971.41 1.102819
Source: Thomson Datastream.

-46- UV1364
Exhibit 8
Historical Price Patterns: Gucci, PPR and LVMH

September 7, 1998 - September 7, 2001
4
DeSole Gucci Terminates Court Orders
Gucci
Threatens to the ESOP Inquiry into Gucci
Posts Best-
Leave Gucci Lehman PPR Deal
Ever Net
Downgrades Gucci Earnings
Gucci Revenues
Ford Gucci Stock Down
Establishes Threatens
3
ESOP to Leave
LVMH
Acquires Gucci
5% in
Gucci GUCG
LVMH
2 Stock LVMH
U.S. Stock Split
Price Index
LVMH Market LVMH Renews PPR
(9/7/98 = 1.00)
Stock Decline Lawsuit Against PPR
Split MSCI
Settlement Rumors
Global
1
LVMH PPR Gucci

Announces Emerges Announces
Tender As White Acquisition
Offer Knight of YSL
0
O
Jul
Jul
Jul
Ma
Ma
Ma
Ma
c
Oc
No
No
Sep
Sep
Sep
Sep
r-9
r-0
r-0
-9
r-9
-99
r-0
-00
r-0
-01
t-9
t-9
t-0
c-9
c-9
c-0
-99
y-9
-00
y-0
-01
y-0
v-9
v-9
v-0
-99
-00
-01
Ma 9
0
Ma 1
-98
Oc 9
-00
-01
Ap 9
A 0
Ap 1
8
9
No 0
Jan 8
Jan 9
Jan 0
Jun 9
Jun 0
Jun 1
De 8
De 9
De 0
Source: Thomson Datastream (graphical representation by case writer).

-47- UV1364
Exhibit 9
Summary of Final Terms Announced on September 10, 2001
Terms
PPR agreed to purchase from LVMH 8,579,337 common shares at a price of $94 per
share on the agreed upon closing date of October 22, 2001
Gucci would declare a special cash dividend of $7 per common share to all
shareholders of record as of December 15, 2001, including LVMH but excluding
PPR, and would pay the dividend on December 15, 2001
PPR agreed to commence a cash public offer commencing on March 22, 2004 to all
holders of Gucci common stock (including LVMH with respect to any shares it held
at that time) at a price of $101.50 per share with payment to be made on or before
April 30, 2004
LVMH announced an intention to monetize its remaining stake in Gucci by the end
of 2001 (although LVMH retained the right to put those shares to PPR)
PPR could not sell its Gucci shares without written consent of a majority of
independent Gucci directors until December 31, 2004.
All litigation among LVMH, PPR, and Gucci would cease and outstanding claims
would be withdrawn
LVMH or its affiliates would be restricted from purchasing further Gucci shares
until December 31, 2009.
PPR could buy Gucci shares in open market transactions, but must maintain at least
30% as “free float” (not held by PPR or other long-term investors).
Gucci supervisory board members would increase from 9 to 10, of which PPR
would nominate five; remainder would be independent, from which the chairman
would be chosen (after 2004, PPR would have the right to assume a majority of
directors and could choose the chairman of the board).
If PPR would fail to honor its commitment to pay $101.50 per share in March 2004,
then a capital increase would occur in the form of a stock dividend given to all
shareholders (except PPR), reducing PPR's stake to 42%of the outstanding common
shares; PPR would also lose its board representation.
Dutch securities authority requested that Gucci arrange for a US$230 million letter
of credit to guarantee the payment of the $7 dividend.
In a side agreement, in an effort to give the deal with the PPR their blessing, Gucci's
Tom Ford and Domenico DeSole agreed not to exercise their options until 2004,
when their employment contracts with Gucci would expire
-48- UV1364
Exhibit 10
Share Ownership of Gucci Group N.V.

(before agreement of September 10, 2001)
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA 44,699,124 44.6%

LVMH Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy SA 20,144,985 20.1%
Investment advisors (44) 12,990,831 13.0%
Mutual funds (44) 2,406,397 2.4%
Banks (12) 100,000 0.1%
Other investors 19,801,799 19.8%
Total shares outstanding 100,143,136 100.0%
N.B.: Between September 2000 and September 2001, the average daily
trading volume for Gucci Group shares was 154,444.
Source: Institutional Services, Datagraph, analyst reports, SEC filings.
-49- UV1364
Exhibit 11
Gucci Group N.V.: Pro Forma Modeling Assumptions
Modeling Assumptions, Historical and Projected Financial Statements

US$ values in millions, as reported By Gucci Group NV Actual Forecast
1998 1999 2000 2001E 2002E 2003E 2004E 2005E
INPUTS
Revenue Growth 7.4% 18.6% 82.7% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4%
Costs and Expenses

1
Cost of goods sold 30.0% 33.5% 32.8% 30.5% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0%
1
Selling, general & admin. 42.0% 42.8% 45.1% 51.4% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0%
2
Goodwill/trademark amort. $ 115.0 $ 6.4 $ 9.5 $ 83.2 $ 115.0 $ 115.0 $ 115.0 $ 115.0 $ 115.0
Depreciation % Gross PPE 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0%
3
Interest rate 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9%
Effective tax rate 16.3% 17.5% 15.9% 11.6% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3%
4
Marginal tax rate 35.0%
Risk-free rate 5.44% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
Balance sheet items

5
Cash required for opns. 16.0% 16.2% 238.5% 137.8% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
1
Trade receivables, net 11.0% 7.7% 20.7% 11.1% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0%
1
Inventories, net 15.0% 15.1% 20.3% 14.6% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
1
Other Current assets 14.5% 12.8% 17.3% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5%
1
PPE, gross 28% 25.9% 33.2% 26.3% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0%
1
Other Non-Current Assets 4.5% 4.3% 5.7% 4.6% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
1
Current Liabilities 35.0% 26.8% 84.1% 36.1% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
Weighted avg common 100.1 59.5 94.9 101.6 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.1 100.1
shares - diluted
6
Annual dividend increase $ 0.05 0.40 0.45 0.50 7.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Performance ratios
Gross margin 66.5% 67.2% 69.5% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0%
Operating margin before goodwill and 23.7% 22.1% 18.1% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0%
trademark amortization (EBITA)
Operating margin (EBIT) 23.0% 21.3% 14.4% 23.3% 23.6% 23.9% 24.2% 24.4%
Net Income 18.7% 26.7% 14.9% 15.7% 16.3% 17.8% 19.3% 24.6%
Net income per share - diluted 3.28 3.48 3.31 3.80 4.25 4.98 5.79 7.91
1
Percent of sales estimate.
2
Management predicted goodwill amortizations would increase to $115m from recent and pending acqusitions.
3
U.S. Retail (BBB+) 10-Year.
4
Statutory tax rate in The Netherlands (2001). NOTE: These base case assumptions are drawn from analysts' forecasts and casewriter's
5
Percent of Cost of Goods Sold assumptions. They reflect the outlook for Gucci at September 2001.
6
Assumes payment of extraordinary dividend in 2001.
-50- UV1364
Exhibit 12
Gucci Group N.V.: Pro Forma Financial Statements
INCOME STATEMENT Actual Forecast

1998 1999 2000 2001e 2002e 2003e 2004e 2005e
Net revenues $ 1,042.5 $ 1,236.1 $ 2,258.5 $ 2,425.6 $ 2,605.1 $ 2,797.9 $ 3,005.0 $ 3,227.3
Cost of goods sold 349.5 405.1 689.9 727.7 781.5 839.4 901.5 968.2
Gross profit 693.0 831.1 1568.7 1697.9 1823.6 1958.5 2103.5 2259.1
Selling, general & admin. expenses 446.5 557.9 1160.3 1018.8 1094.2 1175.1 1262.1 1355.5
Operating profit before goodwill 246.5 273.2 408.4 679.2 729.4 783.4 841.4 903.7
and trademark amort. (EBITA)
Goodwill and trademark amort. 6.4 9.5 83.2 115.0 115.0 115.0 115.0 115.0
Operating profit (EBIT) 240.1 263.7 325.2 564.2 614.4 668.4 726.4 788.7
1
Restructuring charge (88.7)
Interest income (expense) 0.3 133.6 147.1 (104.9) (101.3) (67.7) (29.3) 162.8
Other income (expense) (2.5) (2.6) 1.9
Income Before Taxes 238.0 394.7 385.4 459.2 513.1 600.7 697.1 951.5
& Minority Interests
Income tax expense 41.6 62.8 44.8 74.9 83.6 97.9 113.6 155.1
Minority interests 1.3 1.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Net Income 195.0 330.3 336.7 380.4 425.5 498.8 579.5 792.5
Dividends 23.8 42.7 50.8 756.1 60.1 65.1 70.1 75.1
Addition to Retained Earnings 171.2 287.6 285.9 (375.6) 365.4 433.8 509.4 717.4
BALANCE SHEET ABSTRACT 1998 1999 2000 2001e 2002e 2003e 2004e 2005e
Current Assets $ 539.2 $ 3,669.0 $ 4,021.5 $ 4,098.8 $ 4,180.1 $ 4,267.5 $ 4,361.2 $ 4,462.0
2
Cash and cash equivalents 168.5 2,948.3 3,113.2
Cash required for operations 116.4 125.0 134.3 144.2 154.9
3
Cash retained for strategic investments 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,000.0
Trade receivables, net 80.5 255.9 250.7 266.8 286.6 307.8 330.5 355.0
Inventories, net 157.2 250.7 330.6 363.8 390.8 419.7 450.7 484.1
Other current assets 133.1 214.0 327.0 351.7 377.7 405.7 435.7 468.0
Property, plant & equipment, gross 269.8 409.8 592.9 $ 679.2 $ 729.4 $ 783.4 $ 841.4 $ 903.7
Accumulated Depreciation 96.9 94.9 118.9 $ 166.4 $ 217.5 $ 272.3 $ 331.2 $ 394.5
Property, plant & equipment, net 172.9 314.9 474.0 512.7 511.9 511.1 510.2 509.2
4
Goodwill, trademarks & other intang. 157.6 1497.2 1700.6 1585.6 1470.6 1355.6 1240.6 1125.6
Other Non-current Assets 44.4 70.6 102.9 109.2 117.2 125.9 135.2 145.2
Total Assets 914.1 5551.7 6299.1 6306.3 6279.9 6260.0 6247.2 6241.9
5
Current Liabilities $ 279.4 $ 1,039.6 $ 816.0 $ 849.0 $ 911.8 $ 979.3 $ 1,051.7 $ 1,129.6
Long Term Liabilities (plug after 2000) 54.2 645.2 1348.0 1697.9 1243.2 722.2 127.4 (673.0)
Minority interests 3.3 5.5 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
Shareholders' equity 577.2 3861.4 4113.0 3737.35 4102.8 4536.6 5046.0 5763.4
Total Liabilities &
Shareholders Equity 914.1 5551.7 6299.1 6306.3 6279.9 6260.0 6247.2 6241.9
1
Charges associated with YSL restructuring. Sources: Financial statements, 10-K, casewriter analysis
2
The increase in Cash and Cash Equivalents in 1999 results from PPR's investment in Gucci Group
3
Hautillac assumed the level of cash retained for strategic investments would be maintained; he planned to revisit this assumption in subsequent analysis.
4 The decline in accumulated depreciation between 1998 and 1999 resulted from unusually large asset disposals relating to the demolition of Gucci Group's New York Fifth Avenue property. Refurbishment of the Fifth
Avenue New York building (which housed a flagship store and Gucci America headquarters) was scheduled to continue through 2001 and its effects are included in these forecasts.
5
Hautillac assumed the increase in current liabilities in 1999 implied that Gucci's acquistions that year were partly financed with debt.
-51- UV1364
Exhibit 13
Yield Curve for U.S. Government Bonds
(as of 9/10/01)
3-month 3.259%
6-month 3.202%
2-year 3.500%
3-year 3.879%
5-year 4.318%
10-year 4.833%
30-year 5.436%
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
-52- UV1364
Exhibit 14
Yield Curve for U.S. Corporate (Retail) Bonds
US Retail
US Retail US Retail BBB+/ US Retail
Term (AA) A+/A BBB BB+/BB
3 months 3.577% 4.030% 4.500% 7.320%
6 months 3.590% 4.010% 4.520% 7.350%
1 year 3.720% 4.080% 4.680% 7.620%
2 years 4.070% 4.400% 5.050% 7.900%
3 years 4.600% 4.850% 5.470% 8.160%
4 years 4.880% 5.180% 5.840% 8.470%
5 years 5.120% 5.440% 6.170% 8.660%
7 years 5.630% 5.910% 6.670% 8.910%
8 years 5.800% 6.020% 6.810% 8.990%
9 years 5.780% 6.100% 6.820% 9.010%
10 years 5.800% 6.120% 6.890% 9.100%
15 years 6.040% 6.440% 7.380% 9.540%
20 years 6.340% 6.950% 7.640% 9.730%
Note: These are all-in spreads, and not spreads to U.S. Treasuries or LIBOR.
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
-53- UV1364
Exhibit 15
Gucci Group N.V.: Option Prices and Implied Volatilities

(standard American options as of September 10, 2001)
L a s t D a te C a ll/ H ig h e s t L ow est I m p lie d
D a te E x - D a te T ra d e d Put S trik e P ric e C lo s in g B id C lo s in g A s k V o lu m e V o la tility
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 C $ 7 5 .0 0 $ 1 1 .4 0 $ 1 3 .8 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 7 -S e p -0 1 P $ 7 5 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 6 6 .0 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 8 0 .0 0 $ 6 .9 0 $ 8 .4 0 60 2 6 .3 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 5 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 4 4 .3 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 2 .2 5 $ 3 .4 0 282 1 7 .0 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 0 .1 5 $ 0 .7 5 10 2 3 .1 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 9 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 320 1 9 .6 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 2 -S e p -0 1 2 9 -A u g -0 1 P $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 2 .1 0 $ 3 .2 0 0 1 6 .8 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 9 -Ju n -0 1 C $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 1 6 .6 0 $ 1 9 .0 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 8 -M a y -0 1 P $ 7 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 4 7 .1 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 C $ 7 5 .0 0 $ 1 1 .6 0 $ 1 4 .0 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 7 5 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 2 3 5 .5 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 8 0 .0 0 $ 7 .3 0 $ 8 .8 0 50 2 0 .9 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 4 2 4 .0 1 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 3 .2 0 $ 4 .4 0 155 1 8 .5 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 0 .5 0 $ 1 .2 5 65 1 7 .5 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 0 .4 0 $ 1 .0 0 2 ,2 5 1 1 3 .3 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 2 .5 5 $ 3 .7 0 5 1 5 .5 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 9 5 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 3 2 0 .6 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -O c t-0 1 1 3 -A u g -0 1 P $ 9 5 .0 0 $ 6 .7 0 $ 8 .2 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 2 -M a r-0 1 C $ 3 0 .0 0 $ 5 6 .3 0 $ 5 9 .3 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 P $ 3 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 9 8 .6 1 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 C $ 3 5 .0 0 $ 5 1 .3 0 $ 5 4 .3 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 2 6 -A p r-0 1 P $ 3 5 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 8 5 .6 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 2 4 -M a y -0 1 C $ 4 0 .0 0 $ 4 6 .4 0 $ 4 9 .4 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 6 -A p r-0 1 P $ 4 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 7 4 .3 8 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 C $ 4 5 .0 0 $ 4 1 .4 0 $ 4 4 .4 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 8 -M a y -0 1 P $ 4 5 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 6 4 .4 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 C $ 5 0 .0 0 $ 3 6 .4 0 $ 3 9 .4 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 5 -S e p -0 1 P $ 5 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .5 0 0 5 1 .6 5 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 C $ 6 0 .0 0 $ 2 6 .5 0 $ 2 9 .5 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 5 -A u g -0 1 P $ 6 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 4 0 .1 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 6 -Ju l-0 1 C $ 7 0 .0 0 $ 1 6 .9 0 $ 1 9 .3 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 7 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 10 2 6 .5 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 C $ 7 5 .0 0 $ 1 2 .0 0 $ 1 4 .4 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 7 5 .0 0 $ 0 .2 5 $ 1 .0 0 30 2 3 .1 5 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 C $ 8 0 .0 0 $ 7 .7 0 $ 9 .2 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 0 .0 0 $ 1 .6 5 $ 2 .4 0 10 2 6 .1 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 6 -S e p -0 1 C $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 3 .8 0 $ 5 .0 0 0 1 0 .7 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 5 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 3 .9 0 $ 5 .1 0 0 2 9 .6 5 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 C $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 1 .2 5 $ 2 .0 0 1 ,0 0 0 1 0 .7 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 7 .5 0 $ 9 .0 0 1 3 5 .4 0 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 C $ 9 5 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 1 0 .4 8 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 P $ 9 5 .0 0 $ 1 1 .5 0 $ 1 3 .9 0 0 4 1 .9 4 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 2 4 -Ju l-0 1 C $ 1 0 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 1 5 .4 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 2 0 -A u g -0 1 P $ 1 0 0 .0 0 $ 1 6 .3 0 $ 1 8 .7 0 0 4 8 .6 7 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 7 -S e p -0 1 C $ 1 1 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 2 3 .6 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 P $ 1 1 0 .0 0 $ 2 5 .9 0 $ 2 8 .9 0 0 6 0 .9 9 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 9 -M a y -0 1 C $ 1 2 0 .0 0 $ - $ 0 .7 5 0 3 0 .6 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 1 9 -J a n -0 2 P $ 1 2 0 .0 0 $ 3 5 .8 0 $ 3 8 .8 0 0 7 1 .0 8 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 C $ 7 5 .0 0 $ 1 2 .0 0 $ 1 4 .4 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 2 9 -A u g -0 1 P $ 7 5 .0 0 $ 1 .1 0 $ 1 .8 0 0 2 4 .1 2 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 2 2 -A u g -0 1 C $ 8 0 .0 0 $ 7 .8 0 $ 9 .3 0 0
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 0 .0 0 $ 2 .3 5 $ 3 .5 0 24 2 5 .0 1 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 C $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 4 .1 0 $ 5 .3 0 0 7 .0 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 1 0 -S e p -0 1 P $ 8 5 .0 0 $ 4 .7 0 $ 5 .9 0 10 2 6 .8 3 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 5 -S e p -0 1 C $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 1 .8 0 $ 2 .4 5 0 8 .9 6 %
1 0 -S e p -0 1 2 0 -A p r-0 2 P $ 9 0 .0 0 $ 8 .0 0 $ 9 .5 0 0 3 0 .2 1 %

War of The Handbags - The Takeover Battle For Gucci Group N.V.

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“WAR OF THE HANDBAGS”: THE TAKEOVER

Gucci Group N.V.

Guccio Gucci started a leather-goods business in Florence, Italy, in 1921, after

After renaming itself Pinault-Printemps-Redoute (PPR), the company continued its

LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA

The Luxury-Goods Market

spending, stock-market performance, exchange-rate fluctuations, ongoing industry consolidation,

Although the merchandise was priced to be exclusive, luxury-goods customers spanned a

Foreign-exchange movements were especially relevant to the luxury-goods sector,

adjusting pricing strategies during periods of material foreign-exchange fluctuations. Thus,

While the luxury-goods business was somewhat more immune to macroeconomic

Mergers and Acquisitions: The Netherlands39

Other antitakeover devices commonly used by Dutch companies included protective

Notification of the Dutch Competition Authority was mandatory when worldwide

LVMH’s Creeping Acquisition

Gucci’s Antitakeover Measures

Adrian Bellamy, chairman of Gucci’s supervisory board, said:

An attorney for LVMH explained:

Gucci’s White Knight

The agreement also included assurances of Gucci’s independence and an expansion of

LVMH’s Tender Offers

At the eleventh-hour, however, Gucci’s supervisory board issued a statement saying it

The agreement also included noncompetition provisions, assurances of the Gucci’s

Comparable Luxury-Goods Firms

Median 0.68 4.26 20.80 17.49 24.95 29.07 2.57

Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream, and casewriter's analysis

Revenue Comparisons of Peer Firms

Bulgari S.p.A. 65% - 77% 17% 6% 23% 36% 22% 19%

Comparable Luxury-Goods Transactions

Enterprise Value As Multiple Of: Stock Premium (%)

Timeline of Key Events for Gucci Group N.V.

Gucci Group N.V.: Key Employee Incentive Option Grants

Mr. D. De Sole Dec-00 300 $ 68.00

Acquisition History of Gucci Group N.V.

November 1999 - August 2001

May-00 100.0% License of YSL watches na Watch production and distribution

Historical Stock Prices: Gucci, PPR, and LVMH

1-Nov-00 86.60 1.00 86.60 213.10 99.06 1,288.21 1.160999

Source: Thomson Datastream.

Historical Price Patterns: Gucci, PPR and LVMH

LVMH PPR Gucci

Source: Thomson Datastream (graphical representation by case writer).

Summary of Final Terms Announced on September 10, 2001

Share Ownership of Gucci Group N.V.

Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA 44,699,124 44.6%

Gucci Group N.V.: Pro Forma Modeling Assumptions

Modeling Assumptions, Historical and Projected Financial Statements

Costs and Expenses

Balance sheet items

Gucci Group N.V.: Pro Forma Financial Statements

INCOME STATEMENT Actual Forecast

Dividends 23.8 42.7 50.8 756.1 60.1 65.1 70.1 75.1

Yield Curve for U.S. Government Bonds

Yield Curve for U.S. Corporate (Retail) Bonds

Gucci Group N.V.: Option Prices and Implied Volatilities

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