REMEDIAL LAW (Outline Reviewer)

HARMLESS ERROR RULE

R51 S6 (Harmless Error) – No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial
or for setting aside, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error
or defect which does not affect substantial rights of the parties.
The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the
court examines its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against
the prejudiced party (People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995)

SILENT ESCAPE THEORY

HARMLESS REMEDY

LADDER LIKE THEORY (Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts)

Principle of Judicial Hierarchy

(1) The judicial system follows a ladderized scheme which in essence requires that lower courts initially decide on a
case before it is considered by a higher court. Specifically, under the judicial policy recognizing hierarchy of courts, a
higher court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts. [Riano
citing Santiago v. Vasquez (1993)]

(2) The principle is an established policy necessary to avoid inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the
Court’s docket [Lim v. Vianzon (2006)].

(3) When the doctrine/principle may be disregarded: A direct recourse of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs (referring to the writs of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus) should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. [Mangahas v. Paredes (2007)]. The
Supreme Court may disregard the principle of hierarchy of courts if warranted by the nature and importance of the
issues raised in the interest of speedy justice and avoid future litigations [Riano].
(4) This is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest,
on to the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and is
likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. This is an established policy necessary
to avoid inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the Court’s docket (Sec. 9[1], BP 129; Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines).

(5) A higher court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts.
The SC is a court of last resort. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of deciding cases in the first
instances. Its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist.

(6) Petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the RTC and those
against the latter with the CA. a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

(7) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be disregarded if warranted by the nature and importance of the issues
raised in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations, or in cases of national interest and of serious
implications. Under the principle of liberal interpretations, for example, it may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
directly filed before it.

2 STAGES OF LITIGATION PROCESS

SLIP RULE (When judgment becomes final and executory)

A Slip rule refers to a rule permitting the correction of any accidental slip or omission in judgments or orders. Correction
can be made only of typographical errors or matters that were genuine slips or mistakes. Such errors can be corrected
at any time by the court on application without an appeal. The rule cannot be used to correct errors of substance, nor
in an attempt to add to or detract from the original order made.

Clarificatory Judgment
One rendered to clarify an ambiguous judgment or one difficult to comply with. Where the judgment is difficult to execute
because of ambiguity in its terms, the remedy is to fila a motion for clarificatory judgment and not to assail the judgment
as void. It is allowed when what is involved is a clerical error, or not a correction of an erroneous judgment, or dispositive
portion of the Decision.
Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, the court may clarify such
ambiguity, mistake, or omission by an amendment; and in so doing, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties,
the courts findings of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision (Sps. Mahusay vs. B.E.
San Diego, Inc., G.R. No. 179675, June 8, 2011).
DUAL FUNCTION OF APPELATE COURT (A.M. No. CA-13-51-J July 2, 2013)
An appellate court serves a dual function. The first is the review for correctness function, whereby the case is
reviewed on appeal to assure that substantial justice has been done. The second is the institutional function, which
refers to the progressive development of the law for general application in the judicial system.

Differently stated, the review for correctness function is concerned with the justice of the particular case while the
institutional function is concerned with the articulation and application of constitutional principles, the authoritative
interpretation of statutes, and the formulation of policy within the proper sphere of the judicial function.

The duality also relates to the dual function of all adjudication in the common law system. The first pertains to the
doctrine of res judicata, which decides the case and settles the controversy; the second is the doctrine of stare decisis,
which pertains to the precedential value of the case which assists in deciding future similar cases by the application of
the rule or principle derived from the earlier case.

With each level of the appellate structure, the review for correctness function diminishes and the institutional function,
which concerns itself with uniformity of judicial administration and the progressive development of the law, increases.24
In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on
the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation should be
made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory policy eliminates conflicting
results concerning similar or like issues between the same parties or interests even as it enhances the administration
of justice.

ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN PRE-TRIAL

Role of the Judge

During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues raised therein and all questions or comments
by counsel or parties must be directed to the judge to avoid hostilities between the parties. [SC AM 03-1-09-SC]

Nature and purpose

(1) The conduct of a pre-trial is mandatory. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues
between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. Its main objective is to
simplify, abbreviate and expedite trial, or totally dispense with it (Abubakar vs. Abubakar, 317 SCRA 264). It is a basic
precept that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations made during the pre-trial (Interlining Corp. vs. Phil. Trust
Co., GR 144190, March 6, 2002).

(2) Pre-trial is a procedural device held prior to the trial for the court to consider the following purposes:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
(b) Simplification of issues;
(c) Necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) Possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) Limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) Advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) Propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action
should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) Advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action (Sec. 2, Rule 18).
ERROR OF JUDGMENT vs. ERROR OF JURISDICTION
(1) An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction.
It occurs when the court exercises a jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law, or when the court or tribunal although
with jurisdiction, acts in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or jurisdiction.

(2) An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than
mere errors of judgment. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings.

(3) Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal; errors of jurisdiction are correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Any judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on
appeal; the only exception is when the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.

(4) When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision
on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the
exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors
of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.

REVERSE ORDER OF TRIAL

R30 S5 provides that unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall proceed in the order set forth
therein. Clearly the trial court is given the authority to change the order of trial as in the case of a reverse order of trial.
Reverse order of Trial: In this situation, the defendant presents evidence ahead of the plaintiff.
When proper: If the defendant alleges only affirmative defenses, e.g. fraud, prescription, estoppel, payment in his
answer, a reverse order of trial is proper.
Reason: By alleging affirmative defenses, the defendant hypothetically admits the material allegations in the complaint
(R6 S5); thus, the plaintiff need not present evidence to prove or establish his claims. The burden of evidence shifts to
the defendant who must prove his affirmative defenses in order to prevent or bar recovery from him by the plaintiff.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT vs. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34)

(1) Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation (or for unliquidated damages, or admission of the truth of
allegation of adverse party), the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved (Sec. 1).

Summary judgments (Rule 35)

(1) A summary judgment or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the
facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, of for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved
in a trial. Its object is to separate what is formal or pretended denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial
so that only the latter may subject a party-in-interest to the burden of trial. Moreover, said summary judgment must be
premised on the absence of any other triable genuine issues of fact. Otherwise, the movants cannot be allowed to
obtain immediate relief. A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires presentation of evidence as distinguished
from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim (Monterey Foods Corp. vs. Eserjose, GR 153126, Sept. 11, 2003).

(2) The requisites are: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages;
and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Judgments on the Pleadings vs. Summary Judgments

(1) In the judgment on the pleadings, the answer does not tender an issue; in summary judgment, there is an issue
tendered in the answer, but it is not genuine or real issue as may be shown by affidavits and depositions that there is
no real issue and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of right;

(2) In judgment on the pleadings, the movants must give a 3-day notice of hearing; while in summary judgment, the
opposing party is given 10 days notice;

(3) In judgment on the pleadings, the entire case may be terminated; while in summary judgment, it may only be partial;

(4) In judgment on the pleadings, only the plaintiff or the defendants as far as the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint is concerned can file the same; while in summary judgment, either the plaintiff or the defendant may
file it.

NEYPES RULE APPLICABLE ONLY TO RULES 40 & 41 BUT NOT IN 42, 43 AND 45
Neypes elucidates that the "fresh period rule" applies to appeals under Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the RTC) and Rule 41 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA or this Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA);
Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to this Court). A scrutiny
of the said rules, however, reveals that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes need NOT apply to Rules 42, 43
and 45 as there is no interruption in the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. It is explicit in Rules 42, 43 and 45 that
the appellant or petitioner is accorded a fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision, award, judgment, final
order or resolution or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed (Rolex Rodriguez vs.
Peopl, G.R. No. 192799, October 24, 2012).

Applicability of the Neypes Doctrine to Criminal Cases

It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused
files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The
accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of
appeal (Rolex Rodriguez vs. Peopl, G.R. No. 192799, October 24, 2012).

Non-applicability of the Neypes Doctrine to Administrative Cases

The subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President,
is not judicial but administrative in nature, thus, the “fresh period rule” in Neypes does not apply (San Lorenzo Ruiz
Builders & Developers Group, Inc. vs. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015)