Galo vs. Monge, G. R. No.

170308

Facts:

On July 20, 1994, Monge(petitioner) and Potencio were found by the barangay tannods in possession of and
transporting 3 pieces of mahogany lumber in Iriga City. Monge and Potencio were not able to show any documents or the
requisite permit from DENR. The trial court found Monge guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O.
No. 277 while Potencio was discharged because he was used as a state witness.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the
ground that there is no absolute necessity for his testimony. Monge contested that it was Potencio who owned the lumbers
and not him, that he was only hired by Potencio to transport the lumbers to a sawmill. The appellate court dismissed his
petition, hence, he filed a review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Monge was guilty of the offense charged?

Held:

Yes.

The contention of Monge is unavailing.

Under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate offences namely;

a. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and

b. The possession of timber or other forest products without legal documents required under the existing laws and
regulations.

In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. The second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not
the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest
products without the requisite documents consummates the crime.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor his
claim that he was merely hired by Potencio to provide the latter with assistance in transporting the said lumber. PD 705 is a
penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent is illegal.

PALLADA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000

FACTS:

DENR officers, assisted by the PNP, raided the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation. The company is
engaged in rice milling and trading. They found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that
the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of
Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts
considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber
were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. Accordingly, all the lumber in the
warehouse had been seized and the petitioner was charged with violation of §68 of P.D.No. 705, as amended.

RTC convicted the petitioner. The trial court did not give credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by
petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. His conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. 2. Whether the presence of erasures in the
certificate of timber origin render them valueless as evidence.

HELD:
 Different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. The issuance of a separate
certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . .
and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in
the documents presented by the latter. The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not
only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. The presence of such
glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION as to the penalty.

ALVAREZ VS PICOP
G.R. No. 162243 November 29, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
PICOP was granted Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 covering an area of 75,545 hectares in Surigao del Sur, Agusan
del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental, to "terminate on April 25, 2002." On 23 December 1999, DENR promulgated
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 mandating the conversion of the TLA into IFMA that is primarily aimed at
sustaining the raw materials for the continuous operation of the integrated wood processing plant of the company. Pursuant to
this, PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA).

A Performance Evaluation Team was created to conduct performance evaluation indicating violations by PICOP of
such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required by the DENR
rules and regulations. Also there are alleged unpaid and overdue forest charges of PICOP. It was the position of the DENR
members that PICOP’s application for the IFMA conversion should undergo the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP
representative Atty. Caingat, however, claimed that "the conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been completed"
and indicated that they had "no choice except to decline participation in the ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the proper
public and legal forum."

Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOP’s application for the conversion of TLA
No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements. Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been
completed, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez before the RTC of Quezon City. The
RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Hence,
this petition by the DENR assailing that the mandamus filed by PICOP should be out rightly dismissed on the ground that RTC
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since the acts questioned herein are related to the licensing regulation and
management of forest resources. Furthermore, RTC is prohibited to issue TRO, writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction as provided by PD605 and RA8975.

ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE BECAUSE THE
SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF THE DENR
SECRETARY

HELD: YES. The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages. Specifically, it sought to compel the DENR Secretary to: (1) sign, execute
and deliver the IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve the
harvesting of timber by PICOP from the area of TLA No. 43. In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that "DENR
Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to perform his ministerial duty
to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the corresponding IFMA number to it." What is at stake is not the
scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it exercises or refuses to exercise that jurisdiction.

The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. Since PICOP alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR Secretary, it behooves the court to
determine the same. An outright dismissal of the case would have prevented such determination.

it is argued that PICOP’s immediate resort to the trial court was precipitate based on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This holds no water. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is disregarded when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, which are averred to be extant in this case, citing PICOP’s
employment of a sizable number of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to the government. Moreover, contrary to [the
DENR Secretary’s] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA conversion is not purely discretionary on the part of the
DENR Secretary since the approval of an IFMA conversion depends upon compliance with the requirements provided under
DAO No. 99-53. Even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of an IFMA conversion involves the exercise of discretion by the
DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown that
there was grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.

DENR Sec is wrong in invoking the provisions of PD605 and RA8975. These statutes merely proscribe the issuance
of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under
pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action,
as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction.

Hence, the outright dismissal of the mandamus prayed for by DENR herein is hereby denied.

SOLEDAD DY v. CA, GR No. 121587, 1999-03-09

Facts:

On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat
"illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other
forest products" in that... city.

On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber
would be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area.

Forester Resurreccion Maxilom of the DENR issued a temporary seizure order and a seizure receipt for the two vehicles and
their cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber of different sizes and dimensions, but Lucero, the caretaker of the
compound where they were seized,... refused to accept them. The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken to the City
motorpool and placed in the custody of respondent Lausa.

For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue recommended to the Secretary on July 29, 1993
the forfeiture of the lumber and the two vehicles.

On October 20, 1993, more than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the
lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) for its recovery.

Before the court could act on his motion, he moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber
in question, having been seized and forfeited by the DENR... pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended (Revised Forestry Code),
was under its custody and, therefore, resort should first be made to the DENR.

Issues:

WITH DUE RESPECT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE VERIFICATION MADE
BY LORENCIO DY AND NOT BY PETITIONER SOLEDAD Y. DY WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
ISSUANCE OF THE REPLEVIN WRIT.

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A COUNTERBOND IN REPLEVIN WHICH IS
EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY ONE YEAR IS VALID TO CAUSE THE RETURN OF THE PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT.

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

The appeal is without merit. The threshold question is whether the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the
replevin suit, considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the
DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705

(Revised Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277.

Ruling:

The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such... remedy should be exhausted first before
a court's judicial power can be sought.

As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed
orders of the trial court granting petitioner's application for a replevin writ and denying private respondent's motion to
dismiss.

Having been... forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and
all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 19, 1995, and its Resolution, dated July 26, 1995, in CA-
G.R. SP 33099 are AFFIRMED with the modification that the complaint for recovery of personal property is DISMISSED.

Principles:

Section 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

SEC. 8. Review. ¾ All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days
from... receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order
No. 19, series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special
civil action for certiorari or... prohibition.

TIGOY vs. CA Case Digest

RODOLFO TIGOY vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 144640. June 26, 2006
FACTS:
Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend
Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials
from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and
Bertodazo.In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy to bring
the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan
for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and
petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o'clock in themorning the next day. When they arrived, the
trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas. That same morning of October 4, 1993, the
Ozamis City police received a report that two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, did not stop at the checkpoint.
Thus, some police officers boarded their patrol vehicle to intercept the two trucks. Upon inspection, the police officers
discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks. The police officers inquired if the drivers had a
permit for the lumber but the latter could not produce any. After an investigation was held by the police and the DENR office
in the city, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of
forest products without legal permit in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas
of not guilty during the arraignment. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found both Ong and Tigoy guilty. On appeal, Ong
was acquitted while Tigoy’s conviction was upheld.

ISSUE:
Is Tigoy guilty of possession of forest products without permit?

HELD:
Yes. There are two ways of violating the said Section 68: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest
products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of
the Code. The appellant, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante
delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City. Tigoy contends that he did not know that
the truck was loaded with timber without the necessary permit. However, the circumstances shows otherwise. Why would the
drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is
grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions is that the
drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber. In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act
is prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and
consciously. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may
be proven by circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. It is not even required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence
it.

AQUINO v. PEOPLE GR No. 165448 July 27, 2009

FACTS:

The Teacherâs Camp filed with the DENR an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within their area in Baguio
City. The trees were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp. After the inspection of the trees to be cut, the Executive
Director of the DENR issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees. Thereafter, a group of forest rangers received
information that pine trees were being cut without proper authority at the Teacherâs Camp. They went to the site where they
found petitioner Aquino, a forest ranger from CENRO, another forest ranger, two supervisors, and two sawyers. The forest
rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. An information was then filed against the
five individuals for cutting without permit the nine (9) pine trees in conspiracy. The trial court ruled that despite the existence
of a permit, the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut and that the cutting of trees went
beyond the period stated in the permit. Nonetheless, all of the accused have been acquitted in the trial court and on appeal,
except for the petitioner. Petitionerâs defense was that he was merely sent to supervise the cutting of trees at the Teacherâs
Camp and he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without
procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone and that he feared one of the sawyers, Santiago.

ISSUE: WoN petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705

HELD: NO. Section 68 of PD 705 punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this
case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered,
collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut
trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to
commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them. Petitioner may have been remiss in
his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the CA
ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-46772. February 13, 1992.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH
VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J p:

Doctrine:

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec.
2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law.

***The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or
other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government
or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license
agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
Facts:

This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon dismissing the information filed therein.

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which
read:

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
The Trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and the reconsideration sought was denied.

Hence this petition.

Issue: WoN the information charged an offense.

Held:

YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of
qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege
that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that
the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can
grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in
the information that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit,
is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117,
Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law.

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. The fact that only the
state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products
produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. While it is only the state which can grant a license
or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the
just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that
ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the
information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was
without any authority or license from the government.

Dispositive Portion:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the information is SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.

Atok Big Wedge Mining Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

Private respondents are in an open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land; Petitioner Atok alleges otherwise due to
supposed mining claim

Held:

Mere recording of a mining claim, without performing annual work obligation, does not convert the land into mineral land.
The recording only operates as reservation to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities. Thus, if no
minerals are extracted therefrom, the land is not mineral land and registration is not precluded by such recorded claim.

The respondent appellate court, on its part, correctly considered inadequate, however, the mere recording of petitioners
mining claims in the Mining Recorder of Benguet and the corresponding, albeit religious, payment of annual assessment fees
therefor, to vest in petitioner ownership rights over the land in question. Truly, under Executive Order No. 141, the payment
of annual assessment fees is only proof of compliance with the charges imposed by law and does not constitute proof of
actual assessment work on the mining land concerned.
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the mining claim holder, upon locating and recording of his claim, has the right to acquire
for himself all mineral deposits found within his claim to the exclusion of everyone, including the Government. Such rights
are necessarily possessory as they are essentially utilitarian and exploitative. Such rights accruing to the mining claim locator
are personal to him in the sense that no conclusion as to the nature of the land may definitively be made based solely on the
fact that a mining claim has been recorded as regards a particular land. However, insofar as his rights are exclusive and no
other person may undertake mining activities on a recorded mining claim, unless the same has been abandoned or the works
thereon not done, the mining locators rights are also protected against adverse mining claims of third persons. He also has the
right to immediately or eventually secure a patent on his mining claim and in the event that he postpones securing a patent,
his rights to exclusive possession and exploitation of his mining claim subsist for as long as he complies with the continuing
requirement of annually performing work or undertaking improvements at the mine site. Insofar as the Philippine Bill of 1902
does not provide a specific time within which the mining claim holder must secure a patent, his rights to possession and use
of the mining land appear to be unconditional, the option not at all to secure a patent being available to him in the absence of
a deadline or ultimatum therefor. The Philippine Bill of 1902, however, did not foreclose a subsequent act on the part of the
State to limit the time within which the said patent must be secured under threat of forfeiture of rights provided for under the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Thus, in the sense that the rights of a mining claim holder may in the future be curtailed by failure to
obtain a patent, especially if we recall that Section 36 of the said Bill itself foretold the subsequent promulgation of
regulations regarding mining claims, such rights cannot also be said to be truly unconditional or absolute.

The process of recording mining claims could not have been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral
lands. The recording of a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining
activities upon the land subject of the claim. The power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. In fact, this strengthens our holding
that the rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in
exclusion of any or all other persons whose claims are subsequent to the original mining locator. Thus, if no minerals are
extracted therefrom, notwithstanding the recording of the claim, the land is not mineral land and registration thereof
is not precluded by such recorded claim. Thus, in the case at bench, the mining claimant, who had failed to comply with
the annual minimum labor requirement, could not, all the more, be expected to have extracted minerals from the mining
location. Utter lack of proof of even its potential deposits on the part of the petitioner, thus, does not surprise us at all.

Thus, it can be said (1) that the rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 of a mining claim holder over his claim has been
made subject by the said Bill itself to the strict requirement that he actually performs work or undertakes improvements on
the mine every year and does not merely file his affidavit of annual assessment, which requirement was correctly identified
and declared in E.O. No. 141; and (2) that the same rights have been terminated by P.D. No. 1214, a police power enactment,
under which non-application for mining lease amounts to waiver of all rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
application for mining lease amounts to waiver of the right under said Bill to apply for patent. In the light of these substantial
conditions upon the rights of a mining claim holder under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there should remain no doubt now that
such rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the nature of ownership, and neither were they intended to be so.

Republic vs. CA and De La Rosa

Republic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs. Court of Appeals & De La Rosa
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988

Cruz, J.:

FACTS: These consolidated cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965,
by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated
in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application,
Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to
Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development,
as to lots 1-9.

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of
prescription; Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the “June Bug” mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934,
by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909.
From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining
recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims,
such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered
by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its
nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership
of the land sought to be registered.

The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPLICANTS ALL SURNAMED DELA ROSA HAVE SUPERIOR RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SURFACE RIGHTS OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION WHILE OPPOSITORS BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED, INC. AND ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY ARE RESERVED OF THEIR SUB-SURFACE
RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THEIR MINING CLAIM AS DECIDED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT.

HELD: NO. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of
the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and
could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property
was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already
vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then
in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land
had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The
Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the owners of the surface rights and the
owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land
has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

The Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule
simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without
the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining
and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land,
whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and
may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein. The Regalian doctrine then extends not only to land but also to “all natural
wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth.”