Mustang Lumber V. Ca: Issue

MUSTANG LUMBER v.
CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.
FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.. Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber
HELD:
No
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."
Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court
held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to
seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended.
Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.
The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done
lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of
the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore,
such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit
to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the
area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said
purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,
one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion
received, petitioner appealed the order.then TO petition to certiorari to CFI negros occidental ,
petitioner asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the
order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition, no capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts
in a special civil action.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.
Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the
President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:
SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:
(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. UP
August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J
Luciano, Noel Christian O.
SUMMARY: International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961,
Proc. 791 segregates from the public domain parcels of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land
subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said Proclamation. On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted
fully ceding ownership over the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry charges
from Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and supervision of UP. Hardwood
resisted and filed a petition for declaratory relief.
The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those
established by law. In this case, that exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the
concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay
the forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP. Thus, UP became the
owner of the land, subject only to existing concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing
concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or
diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P
Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in
effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area
and to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.
FACTS: International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing, and exportation of plywood. It
was granted by the Government an exclusive license for 25 years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and
remove timber from a timber land in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna.
Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the President issued Executive
Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation, certain parcels of land of the public domain in Quezon and
Laguna were withdrawn from sale or settlement and were reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as
experiment station for the college.
On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was enacted establishing a central
experiment station for UP for the colleges of agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA
3990 the land described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:

1. Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License Agreement to UP, instead of the
BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land described in RA 3990 be
performed by UP personnel
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s demands.
International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that UP
does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from Hardwood and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession covered by a
License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to UP by RA 3990
Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.
UP filed its Answer:

1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the petition states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the
area ceded to UP under RA 3990
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:

1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut by International Hardwood
within the tract of land and collect the corresponding charges prescribed by NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal questions.
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut by Hardwood and collect
forestry charges thereon.
HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.
I. Arguments of the Parties

A. UP asserts that:
1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through UP because
the License Agreement does not expressly provide that they be paid to the BIR
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over and has ownership over the land in
question. Thus, it acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources in the
area
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it by RA 3990
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central experiment station
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of Hardwood by UP was intended by RA 3990
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to
collect royalties and charges
B. Hardwood contends:
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority
to supervise the operation of the timber concession
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to any concession, if any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and
control of the Bureau of Forestry
II. Discussion on the effect of the laws

A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public domain was withdrawn from sale or
settlement and was reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment station, subject
to private rights, if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in Proc. 791 was ceded fully to UP, subject to
any existing concessions, if any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the Philippines completely removed it from the
public domain and segregated the areas covered by the timber license from the public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP
a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession
3. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means that the right of
Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be
respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a
public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority
and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.
III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those
concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until February 1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties
to the new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial court. Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License Agreement
within the area ceded and transferred to UP pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of
timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located
in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels
of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to
the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind
nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or
timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of
the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired
by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
REPUBLIC V CELESTINA NAGUIAT
Facts:
Celestina Naguiat, an Filipino citizen, resident of Angeles City Pampanga,

applied for registration before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan Zambales.
She alleges to be the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from an entity who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30)
years that had not suffered from any mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor
is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application assailing the
ownership of the respondent on the grounds of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question by the predecessors-in-
interest that is an ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant that is no
longer applicable; the subject properties are part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
The trial court adjudicated the land to the respondent and affirmed by the appellate
court, hence the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the areas in question still part of public domain?
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the areas are still part of the public domain. The respondent
failed to present the required certification from the proper government agency or
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belongs to the State. Accordingly public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Anent thereto, under the Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying and reclassifying lands of the public domain belongs to the Executive Branch
and not with the court. The lower court and the appellate court erred in deciding in
favor of the respondent with subsisting matters that rest in the powers of the Executive
Branch of government.
Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession unless until

determined by the proper government agency or proclamation reclassifying the land
agricultural thus alienable and disposable. The Court properly REVERSED and SET ASIDE
the decisions of the lower court and appellate court and the application of the
respondent DENIED.
SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP
G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008
Facts
The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for
declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land
they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them. Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
Issue
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
Ruling
The SC ruled against Yap et al. and DR,. ORLANDO Sacay et al.
REPORT THIS AD
Yes, because the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural
land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must
fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present
Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.
It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
Tan vs. Director of Forestry (2009)
Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olangapo, Zambales. One of the bidders is petitioner Tan who was
later then awarded such lot. On April 22, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64, in the name
of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6,
1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It was not signed by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60. And
because of this, that Timber license was declared void ab initio and directed to stop the logging
operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan. Petitioner averred that the respondents-appellees
unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license
without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by
depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by
impairing the obligation of contracts.
Issue: Whether or not the timber license was valid or not.
Held: No. Court fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber
license was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal
of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in general memorandum order No.
46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber
license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of
public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420. In the second place, at the time it was
released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any
license. However, granting that the timber license was valid, still respondents-appellees can
validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out, the rules and regulations included in the
ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at
the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an
earlier date, when public interests so require". A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case.
Tan vs. Director of Forestry

On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the
license of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
1. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M.
Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to
grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for
areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
2. On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting
secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally
was the same date the license for petitioner was signed.
3. Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the
license
Held:
1. Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was
ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry
was revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the
licensee.
c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority
to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not
acquired any legal right under such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this ceise.
Petition denied.
Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational
Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation
and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged
that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of
the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations
is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.
Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994

DOCTRINE:
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping
with the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
FACTS
In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the
hearing in Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction, i.e.,
"restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the
Forestry Code and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches
. . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."
Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of
Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since
it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner
of Customs v. Alikpala.
Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code.
The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be
enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over
seizure and forfeiture cases and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited
importations.
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the
Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner insisted,
is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a
judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the
importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other
words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by
private respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs.
ISSUE
w/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation
HELD
Petitioner’s position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject
matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of
Customs has the power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs)
Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance."
Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by
an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from
interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. BATARIO
FACTS: Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It

grows gubas trees in its plantations which it supplies to a local match manufacturer
solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage
qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised
Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a
qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC)
imported 4 containers of matches from Indonesia and 2 or more containers of matches
from Singapore. On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Factoran of the
DENR issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the
Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." In light of this, PTFI filed with
the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a TRO
against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from
importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from
allowing and releasing the importations. The case was raffled to respondent Judge
Demetrio M. Batario. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, stating that it had "no
jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations."
ISSUE: W/N The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs
Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an
importation, and other incidental matters relating to such. – YES.
RATIO: The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct
recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of
Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. An order of a judge to
impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration
of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality
of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the
pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
Momongan v. Judge Omipon (CHECK FULL TEXT )
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874, March 14, 1995, 242 SCRA 332
Syllabus:
The confiscation proceedings under AO No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code,
which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be
seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the truckowner/driver, as co-accused,
which complainant has done as manifested before the lower court or by enforcing AO No. 59. Section 12 thereof
categorically states that “[t]he confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to
any criminal action which shall be filed against theowner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the
commission of the offense.”
Facts:
Dionisio Golpe was apprehended by police officers while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cutlumber. It
was later found that a certain Basilio Cabig owned the logs, thus, a complaint was filed against him. Judge Rafael
Omipon, the respondent in this case, “found that a prima facie case exists againstCabig but he ordered the release of
the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Golpe, was not charged inthe complaint.”
Augustus Momongan, the Regional Director of the DENR, filed the present complaint against Judge Omipon alleging
that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products violated Section 68 and 68-A of
PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, Series of 1990. Momongan further claims that Judge Omipon is devoid of authority to
release the truck despite the non-inclusion of Golpe in the complaint.
Issue:
Whether Judge Omipon had authority to release the assailed truck and thus be free from any disciplinary sanction.
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Omipon had the authority to order the release of the truck.
Although the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives have the power to confiscate any illegally
obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense, based on Section
68-A of PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR. The act of
Judge Omipon of releasing the truck did not violate PD No. 705 and AO No. 59 because his act did not render
nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. “The confiscation proceedings under Administrative
Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed
in the event of conviction.”
Momongan assails that Judge Omipon should have turned over the truck to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO). Judge Omipon however had no mandatory duty to do so, and should therefore not be
visited with disciplinary action.
MOMONGAN V OMIPON
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874March 14, 1995
FACTS: On November 14, 1992, police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern
Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut
lumber. The truck and logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the
alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge
Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the
release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the DENR filed the complaint against respondent
Judge alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest
products violated PD 705 and AO 59 S.1990 claiming that respondent Judge has no authority to
order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck
should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office for
appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge violated PD 705 by releasing the owner of the truck used
in transporting illegally cut lumbers.
RULING: The respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio
Golpe legally justifiable because there is no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to
turn over the truck, The Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed
for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and
the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such
proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense." In
this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and
forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio
Golpe was not indicted.
When respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation and
satisfied himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he did not violate Pres.
Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the
administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings under Adm.
Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code. Despite the order
of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion
to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12
thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations
shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or
any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."
NOTE: Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field
offices, deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs
and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and
turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition.
MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
ISSUE:
HELD:
No
meaning.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
applications.

August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J

BIR


IV. Arguments of the Parties

C. UP asserts that:
area
D. Hardwood contends:
V. Discussion on the effect of the laws

C. The laws:
D. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
b. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession
respected
c. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a
d. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
VI. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those
D. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties
E. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
F. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
ISSUE:
public domain?
HELD:
Facts:

Issue:
Ruling:

respondent DENIED.
G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008
Facts
disposable).
Issue
Ruling
REPORT THIS AD



Issue:
license
Held:
2. Yes.
was revoked.
licensee.
Petition denied.
Oposa vs Factoran
Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:


ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUES:

RULING:
said right.
granted.
ASIDE.

DOCTRINE:
FACTS
importations.
Customs.
ISSUE
HELD

Syllabus:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
MOMONGAN V OMIPON
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874March 14, 1995
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
ISSUE:
HELD:
No
meaning.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
applications.
August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J

BIR


VII. Arguments of the Parties

E. UP asserts that:
area
F. Hardwood contends:
VIII.Discussion on the effect of the laws

E. The laws:
F. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
c. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession
respected
e. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a
f. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
IX. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those
G. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties
H. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
I. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
ISSUE:
public domain?
HELD:
Facts:

Issue:
Ruling:

respondent DENIED.
G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008
Facts
disposable).
Issue
Ruling
REPORT THIS AD



Issue:
license
Held:
3. Yes.
was revoked.
licensee.
Petition denied.
Oposa vs Factoran
Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:


ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUES:

RULING:
said right.
granted.
ASIDE.

DOCTRINE:
FACTS
importations.
Customs.
ISSUE
HELD

Syllabus:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
MOMONGAN V OMIPON
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874March 14, 1995
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
ISSUE:
HELD:
No
meaning.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
applications.

August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J

BIR


X. Arguments of the Parties

G. UP asserts that:
area
H. Hardwood contends:
XI. Discussion on the effect of the laws

G. The laws:
H. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
d. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession
respected
g. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a
h. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
XII. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those
J. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties
K. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to UP.
L. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
ISSUE:
public domain?
HELD:
Facts:

Issue:
Ruling:

respondent DENIED.
G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008
Facts
disposable).
Issue
Ruling
REPORT THIS AD



Issue:
license
Held:
4. Yes.
was revoked.
licensee.
Petition denied.
Oposa vs Factoran
Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:


ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUES:

RULING:
said right.
granted.
ASIDE.

DOCTRINE:
FACTS
importations.
Customs.
ISSUE
HELD

Syllabus:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
MOMONGAN V OMIPON
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874March 14, 1995

Mustang Lumber V. Ca: Issue

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MUSTANG LUMBER v.

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:

However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s demands.

Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.

UP filed its Answer:

CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:

HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.

I. Arguments of the Parties

II. Discussion on the effect of the laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC V CELESTINA NAGUIAT

Celestina Naguiat, an Filipino citizen, resident of Angeles City Pampanga,

Whether the areas in question still part of public domain?

Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession unless until

SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP

G.R. No. 173775, 8 October 2008

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

Tan vs. Director of Forestry (2009)

Tan vs. Director of Forestry

1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. BATARIO

FACTS: Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It

Momongan v. Judge Omipon (CHECK FULL TEXT )

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874, March 14, 1995, 242 SCRA 332

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874March 14, 1995

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER

On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:

However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s demands.

Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.

UP filed its Answer:

CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:

HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.

IV. Arguments of the Parties

V. Discussion on the effect of the laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC V CELESTINA NAGUIAT

Celestina Naguiat, an Filipino citizen, resident of Angeles City Pampanga,

Whether the areas in question still part of public domain?

Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession unless until

SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP