Aguirre vs Rana

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those

who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant
charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of
the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not
yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection
to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself
as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George
Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty
candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed
the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice
mayoralty candidate.
 In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that
he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as
a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent
had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the
government.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine
Bar
.
RULING: Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for
Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers
oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayordated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George
Bunan.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001,
Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and
the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on
14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA
LM-PPC.On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-
Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having
held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is

a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an
[4]

officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license. [5]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
[8]

that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be

performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law

does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any
court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine
Bar.
 Cayetano vs Monsod

FACTS:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day,
he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In
the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform
bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission,
a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD: The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing,
the petition is DISMISSED.

Cruz vs Cabrera

In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz

charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the
latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors;
he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent
who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January
14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange
transpired:

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?

The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the
case, replied:

You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his
appearance xxx xxx.

Thereafter, the respondent said:

 Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is
misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!

To this the complainant remarked:

Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.

Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:

Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.

Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of

compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not
was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent
knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his
behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of
complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to
discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear
anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance,
tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and
humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before
the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude,
arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties
both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court,
was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate
penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be
imposed on the respondent.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the
respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not
refuted by him that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner
it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of
law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility

We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa

ka muna does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when
respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer
to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch
as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant
is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a
product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be
held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court
to condone even contemptuous language.[5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not
precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right to conduct
litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually

holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of
law.[7]

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are
licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute
and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar
imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the
dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably
and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic,
it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley
Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however,
admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as
an officer of the court.

Santiago vs Sagucio

FACTS: Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of

timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal

complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No.
97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over
the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of
their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month
of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law
while working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from
Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided
loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not
file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead
complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal
complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was
still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to
file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal
complaint was dismissed. 35

ISSUE: W/N respondent was engaged in private practice while being in public office

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not
[to] represent conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists,
when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no
true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x
conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented

conflicting interests

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the
criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15
July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since
he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be

presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential
information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation
respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted
the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with
complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a
sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations.
Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government

prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and
he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while
working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments
by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while
serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of
Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when
respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and
indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name
removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and
in his dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one
year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of
this Decision.

Alawi vs Alauya

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales

Facts:
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for
the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my

intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds
that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made
said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such
illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract
prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic

language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa &
Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform
you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract
**. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous
and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa &
Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing
it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at
the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words,
"Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15,
1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of
the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
Postage PD 26." In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
[1]

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,

forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with
the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined (sic) ** "
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it
is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which
Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor,"
"konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
 He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." He claims he was
[10]

manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and

friend. He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance
[11]

that she would show the completed document to him later for correction,
but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-
ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his
supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is
situated; He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife,
[12]

and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which
he ever saw. [13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant
Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and
his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which
he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5,
1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator
for evaluation, report and recommendation. [14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he

made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in
"undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts **
** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled
him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with

Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without
** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he

was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60
had been deducted from his salary. [15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting
a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
[16]

employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." More than once has this
[17]

Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." [18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals,
good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to
couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be
deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting
or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of
action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right
with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort
[19]

to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the

Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a
man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee,
[20]

it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted
[21]

to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it
is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of
the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Banongan vs Zerna
Facts: It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral
court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision
was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition
for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957.
On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The
petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied
on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and
lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on
the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was
held, had operated against the petitioners. 3

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory
because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.
The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to
enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.4

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became
final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during
that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to
question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest,
Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit
to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for review. 5

While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet
become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered,
the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the
case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied
this remedy before the decree is issued? 6

Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend
that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been registered and the
one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine
they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for
thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is
clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:

"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is

assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
 are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them."8

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of
the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or
frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a
decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the
clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite
obvious and indisputable. 9

This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial

objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity
to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have
left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is
to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily,
therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. 10

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By
doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the
legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong
interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors,
this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed
precisely to circumvent or violate it.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately
executory. It is so ordered.

Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the
sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent
Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because
the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a
grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired
of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with
conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he
did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as
Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76,
February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of
an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully
informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs.
Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a
counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)

In re edilon
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of Edillon from its Roll
of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP
notwithstanding multiple due notices sent to him.

ISSUES:
1. W HETHER T HE COURT IS W ITHOUT POW ER TO CO MPEL HIM TO
BECOME A MEMBER OF T HE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

2. W HETHER T HE PROVISION OF THE COU RT RULE REQUIRING

PAYMENT OF A MEMBERSHIP FEE IS VOID.

3. W HETHER T HE ENFORCEM ENT OF THE PENALT Y P ROVISIONS

W OULD AMOUNT TO A DE PRIVATION OF PROPERT Y W ITHOUT DUE
PROCESS AND HENCE INFRINGES ON ONE OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT S.

4. W HETHER T HE POW ER OF SC TO STRIKE T HE NAM E OF A LAW YER

FROM ITS ROLL OF ATTORNEYS IS VALID.

HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State.

2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such
as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes
of integration.

3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike
the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Arevalo

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his
IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amountof P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to
the Bar he worked at the Civil Service Commission then migrated to the US until his
retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to
practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US.
The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an
inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the
same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issues:

1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and
he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property

without due process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated
Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no

one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of
them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

Santos Jr vs Llamas

FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of

bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings.
If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using
this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 &
1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since
then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least
for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such
was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in
which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that
he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under
R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.
Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying
his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a
senior citizen.

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and

thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid
his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant
suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name
from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover,
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include
payment of membershipor association dues.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in

the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice
of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority
to do so, conditioned on:
the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
the payment of professional tax;
the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

Pentecostes vs Marasigan

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn

affidavit-complaint filed by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki
motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the PNP of M’lang, North
Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for
carnapping, was lodged at RTC.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North
Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged
receipt thereof.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the

motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to

him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly
from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.
Issue:

On the topic of good moral character

Ruling:

,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk shall safely keep all record,
papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge,
including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to
his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC,
Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of
Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case,
barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and
upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the

motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to
secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and
ranking officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital
to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duties include
the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as
previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property
committed to their charge.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of

action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

Aquino vs Pascua
 Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty.
Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified
that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of
Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on
December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized
Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999,

Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10,
1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight
of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his
comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were

filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as
respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants. They filed with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and
Reply to Respondents Comment. They maintain that Atty. Pascuasomission
was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.[1]

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in

his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject

documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded
in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional

but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case,
Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into
his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is
a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is
bound by the acts of his staff.
 The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is
far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last

entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No.
1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-
complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are
Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243,
Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are,
therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear
dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a
member of the Bar.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit

of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingos
affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative
case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the
CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of
herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December
10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer
coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10,
1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public,

Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred

for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The
Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who
were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the
performance of their duties.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a

suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
may be considered enough penalty for him as a
lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully
recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V.
PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.[3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt

the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of
his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-
complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense,
we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice
of law upon him is in order.Likewise, since his offense is a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon
him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of

misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months with a STERN WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still
existing, is ordered REVOKED.

Judge Quitain

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17,
2003.[1] Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges
were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional
Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there
were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813,
and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all
dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his
PDS.

In a letter[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished

the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183
showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for
Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in
disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of
expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:

In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge

Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He
alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about
the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before
the Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case simultaneously
filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of
the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the
service.

In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent
explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the
NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that
if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted;
that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from
NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993[11] which was immediately accepted by the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did
not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he
had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that
his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative
case considering that the issues raised therein became moot and academic;
and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he
should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would
never be appointed.

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did

not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data
Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of
the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order
No. 183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on
the certified documents secured from the Office of the
NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:

On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain

misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he
had a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His
prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on his
record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because
of his concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it
could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted
on his application. His act of dishonesty renders him unfit to join
the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears
that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and
dishonesty.

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was

administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave
misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the
former President of the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or
before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of his application
for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was
denied due process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed
against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and
considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had
become moot and academic.

Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge

Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this
information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is
belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the

JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,[23] this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty

to inform the appointing authority and this Court of the
pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position
he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not
contain the important information in question because he
deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of
candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such
a vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into
account against him if it had been disclosed.

Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means

disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.[24]

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of

grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.
 However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge
Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his
irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, the
Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V.
Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the
administrative case.[29]

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the

Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance without
prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of
this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official
innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.[30] Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he
has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.[31]

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V.

QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his
dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this
case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing
that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if
any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment
to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
 Bernardo vs Meija

The antecedent facts that led to Mejias disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained

attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank,

in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount
of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.[1]

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be

allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the
Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the
petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of
Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of
law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.[2]

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a

great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on
whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with
the applicants reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will
take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.[3]
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law
profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejias name was
dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging
for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has
long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he
wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they
have suffered due to his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication

containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious
organization and named it El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of
Heart and Mind.

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed
since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although
the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also
cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years.
While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a
petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long
enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its
erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a

privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing
requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.[4]