LADISLAO ESPINOSA, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent

G.R. No. 181071 | 2010-03-15

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The Case

This case comes before this Court as an appeal, by way of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals affirming the conviction of herein petitioner, Ladislao Espinosa, for the crime of
Serious Physical Injuries under the third paragraph of Article 263 of the Revised Penal
Code.[2] The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71
dated 30 March 2005, finding appellant Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that he will suffer the straight penalty of six (6) months of Arresto
Mayor and pay the amount of P54,925.50 as actual damages.

With costs against accused-appellant.

The Facts

The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Regional Trial Court, and as
confirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal, may be so summarized:

On 6 August 2000, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, private complainant Andy Merto,
bearing a grudge against the petitioner, went to the house of the latter in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside the house, private
complainant Merto shouted violent threats, challenging the petitioner to face him
outside.

Sensing the private complainant's agitated state and fearing for the safety of his family,
petitioner went out of his house to reason with and pacify Merto. However, as soon as
he drew near the private complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the petitioner. The
petitioner was able to duck just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated
by hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. The private
complainant fell to the ground. Petitioner then continuously mauled the private
complainant with a bolo scabbard, until the latter's cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained
him.[3]

As a consequence of the incident, private complainant Merto sustained two (2) bone
fractures, one in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months
for these injuries to completely heal.[4]

On 22 September 2000, petitioner was originally charged with Frustrated Homicide,

under an Information[5] which reads as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August 2006 at about 10 o'clock in the evening, at
Brgy. Pagatpat, in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with treachery,
evide[nt] premeditation and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and hack several times one Andy Merto, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following physical injuries, to wit:

1. Fracture open III A P/3 Tibia left secondary to Hacking Wound;

2. Incised wound, wrist joint with Incised Extensor Pollicis Brevis Tendon, Left S/P F
Debridement Right Wrist S/P Long Circular Cast, Left

thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Andy Merto
which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued.

On 14 December 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, convicted
petitioner only of Serious Physical Injuries under the third paragraph of Article 263 of
the Revised Penal Code, noting that the prosecution had failed to prove the element of
"intent to kill," which is necessary to a conviction for Frustrated Homicide. The
dispositive[6] portion of the ruling reads:

WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Ladislao

Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries
defined and penalized under Art. 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced [to] suffer the penalty of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as
minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional
as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay private complainant Andy Merto the amount of
P54,925.50 as and by way of actual damages.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 February 2005, before
the trial court, invoking for the first time complete self-defense, under the first
paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. In a Resolution[7] dated 30 March
2005, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that self-
defense cannot be appreciated to justify the act of petitioner. The trial court cites the
means adopted by the petitioner in repelling the attack as not reasonably necessary in
view of the surrounding circumstances and the severity of the victim's injuries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the
modification that the penalty imposed by the trial court should be lowered by one
degree in accordance with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense under Article 69[8] of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the Motion for
Reconsideration[9] filed by the petitioner was also denied by the Court of Appeals via a
Resolution[10] dated 4 January 2008.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether under the set of facts given in this case,
complete self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court rules in the negative.

The requirements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance are found in the first

paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
requisites concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

In their decisions, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the first and
third elements of self-defense are present in the case at bar. This finding was never
questioned by either of the parties and, as such, may be taken as established for
purposes of this appeal. Nonetheless, to dispel any doubts, the Court hereby affirms the
existence of the first and third elements of self-defense, based on the following
reasons:

First, unlawful aggression on the part of private complainant Merto was manifested by
his attack upon the person of the petitioner in throwing a stone at the latter. This
sudden and unexpected assault posed actual danger on the life or limb of the
petitioner, prompting the latter to take steps in his defense. To the mind of the Court,
this is an offensive positively strong enough to be the basis for a defensive action.

Second, there is lack of sufficient, if not total absence of, provocation on the part of the
petitioner. The facts are clear that it is private complainant Merto who invited the
confrontation with petitioner-by shouting violent threats at the latter.

The argumentation is on the existence of the second element, i.e., reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals were in agreement that the means employed by the petitioner in
conducting his defense is disproportionate to what was necessary to prevent or deter
the attack of private complainant Merto.

In arguing that the means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression,
the petitioner invokes the application of the "doctrine of rational equivalence,"
delineated in People v. Gutual,[11] to wit:

x x x It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal
factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed,
and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury. (Emphasis supplied)

Tersely put, petitioner contends that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
citing the severity of the injuries sustained by private complainant Merto, as an
indicator that belies the reasonableness of the means adopted by the former to repel
the attack of the latter. Instead, petitioner wants to place emphasis on the fact that he
merely acted out of instinct and that he used a bolo scabbard-as opposed to using the
bolo itself-in incapacitating the private complainant.

The Court is not impressed.

The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the petitioner,
militates against his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the
consideration not only of the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender
and the assailant-but of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis-á -
vis, the unlawful aggression.

Significantly, a perusal of the facts shows that after petitioner was successful in taking
down private complainant Merto-the former continued to hack the latter, who was, by
then, already neutralized by the blow. This fact was clearly established by the testimony
of Rodolfo Muya, who recounted having seen the petitioner continuously hacking the
private complainant with the bolo scabbard, even as the latter lay almost motionless
upon the muddy ground.[12] Clearly, this "continuous hacking" by the petitioner
constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant's
attack-and is therefore unjustified.

People v. Beltran, Jr.,[13] which also involves repetitious hacking by the accused even
after the aggressor had been neutralized, is especially instructive:

The act of appellant in repeatedly hacking Norman on his head and neck was not a
reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the
latter. As stated earlier, no convincing evidence was presented to show that Norman
was armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in
the crime scene or in the body of the victim. There was also no proof showing that
Norman attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house. Granting
arguendo that Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the repeated hackings were not
necessary since he can overpower or disable Norman by a single blow on non-vital
portion/s of his body.

Again, as correctly observed by the OSG, had the appellant merely wanted to protect
himself from what he perceived as an unlawful aggression of Norman, he could have
just disabled Norman. When Norman fell on the ground, appellant should have ceased
hacking the former since the alleged aggression or danger no longer exists. By
appellant's own testimony, however, he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the
latter was already lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the means used by
appellant, which were simultaneous and repeated hackings, were adopted by him not
only to repel the aggression of Norman but to ensure the latter's death. In sum, such
act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or
repelling an unlawful aggression. (Emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the
unlawful aggression-the totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor
was taken down to the ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated with the lawful
desire of defending himself. He was, by then, acting with intent to harm the private
complainant whose aggression had already ceased.

Finally, in trying to disprove the testimony of Rodolfo Muya that there was "continuous
hacking," the petitioner also posits that the injuries sustained by the private
complainant could not have been serious enough to be the product of repeated hacks,
and claims that the same are merely a product of a single blow. This contention has
had ample study and consideration in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. It
deserves no further ado.

As to whether the fractures suffered by the private complainant resulted from a single
blow or a product of multiple hackings is a question of fact best left to the judgment of
the trial court. It is a well-settled principle that factual findings of the trial court-
especially if already affirmed by an appellate court-are binding and conclusive upon this
Court, save only for certain compelling reasons which are absent in this case.[14]
Hence, the Court refuses to disturb the facts, and defers to the determination of the
Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 25 September 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29633 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso concurring. Rollo, pp. 28-48.

[2] Act No. 3185, as amended.

[3] Rollo, pp. 32-33.

[4] Id. at 30-31.

[5] Id. at 52-53.

[6] Id. at 76.

[7] Id. at 77-81.

[8] Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. -
A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if
the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in Articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed
proper, in view of the number of the nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.

[9] Filed on 15 October 2007. Rollo, pp. 110-118.

[10] Id. at 50-51.

[11] 324 Phil. 244, 259-260 (1996).

[12] Rollo, pp. 32-33.

[13] G.R. No. 168051, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 734.

[14] Republic v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 166139, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 499, 523.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRVING FLORES y
DICHOSO, accused-appellant.

G.R. Nos. 103801-02 | 1994-10-19

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Irving Flores y Dichoso was charged in two (2) separate Informations
with Murder and violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm) before the
Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172. 1

The Information for Murder reads:

"That on or about the 6th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with an unlicensed
handgun one EDWIN ALBERTO y BAYLON, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
physical injuries, which directly caused his death.

"Contrary to Law." (Rollo, p. 3)

The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm, on the other hand, reads:

"That on or about the 6th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being a private person without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession and control one (1) .38 cal. rev. mark(ed)
Taurus Brasil, with Serial No. 2140012 with two (2) spent shells of .38 cal. rev. and one
(1) black holster of .38 cal. rev., without any purpose and intent of surrendering the
same to the proper authority.

"Contrary to Law." (Rollo, p. 2)

As the two (2) cases arose out of the same incident, both were tried jointly.
During the trial, the prosecution established the following:

On July 6, 1991, at around 11:45 p.m., Edwin Alberto and Demetrio Mendoza, both
residents of #3 Silverio Domingo Apartment, Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
took out the garbage from their house. They walked towards the dumpsite ---- a vacant
lot near the Mariposa Bed Factory also located in Lawang-Bato. 2 After disposing of the
garbage and while enroute home, accused-appellant Irving Flores, a security guard of
the Mariposa Bed Factory, emerged from the factory. Accused-appellant, apparently
drunk, was carrying a gun. Suddenly and for no apparent reason, accused-appellant
fired at them. Sensing danger, Alberto and Mendoza ran for their lives. Accused-
appellant chased them. At a distance of about fifteen (15) meters, accused-appellant
again fired at them. Alberto, who was hit at the back, exclaimed: "Demet, I was hit."
Mendoza ran to Alberto's succor and immediately brought his wounded friend to the
hospital. It was too late, though, for Alberto was pronounced dead upon arrival. 3 The
cause of death was hemorrhage resulting from the gunshot which lacerated his lungs.
4

Mendoza was interviewed by the police. In his sworn statement, 5 he narrated the
shooting incident and identified accused-appellant as the person responsible for the
death of Alberto. 6

Approximately two (2) hours after the incident, at about 1:35 a.m., after receiving a
report about the shooting incident, Patrolmen Federico Patag and Reynaldo Tapar
proceeded to the scene of the crime. They received information from the residents in
the area that the person involved in the shooting incident went inside the Mariposa Bed
Factory compound. They went to the factory and inquired from security guard Eman
about the identity of the person who fired the gun. Eman pointed to accused-appellant.
As they were approaching accused-appellant, the latter, who was drunk, was also
coming towards them. Accused-appellant handed to Pat. Patag a .38 caliber revolver
with serial number 2140012. The license covering said gun was handed by security
guard Eman to Pat. Patag. From the license, they discovered that the subject firearm
was regularly issued in the name of the security agency employing accused-appellant.
7

For his defense, accused-appellant presented an entirely different version of the

incident. He testified that as a security guard of the Kossaks Investigation, Security and
Detective Agency, he was designated as officer-in-charge of the four (4) security guards
assigned at the Mariposa Bed Factory, namely: Danilo Eman, Rey Nargatan, Edwin Goto
and Rex dela Cruz. 8

On said date and time, he conducted a roving inspection of the factory premises. He
was accompanied by security guards Danilo Eman and Rey Nargatan. Both he and
Eman were armed with a .38 caliber revolver while Nargatan was armed with a
shotgun.

While conducting their inspection, Eman informed accused-appellant that there (3)
unidentified men were roaming in front of the factory gate. Accused-appellant went out
to verify the identity of these men. Upon inquiry, the three (3) men represented to him
that they were relatives of the factory owner. Noting that it was almost midnight,
accused-appellant informed them that the owner was not around and instructed them
to return the next day. However, the three (3) still insisted on entering the factory.
Accused-appellant adamantly refused to let them in. One of the men cursed him:
"Putang-ina mo, guwardiya ka lang." In the meantime, the two (2) other men started
scaling the factory fence. Accused-appellant then instructed Eman to go to the
guardhouse on top of the factory gate and assist him. Still standing outside the gate,
accused-appellant fired two (2) successive warning shots in the air. Frightened, the two
(2) men immediately climbed down the fence, then fled swiftly.

A few hours after the incident, when the police authorities arrived at the factory,
accused-appellant alleged that he voluntarily surrendered himself to them, including his
service firearm. 9

After trial, a decision was rendered by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong 10 acquitting

accused-appellant from the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The trial court found
that the subject firearm was properly licensed and that accused-appellant, as officer-in-
charge of the security agency, had authority to possess the same at the time of the
shooting incident. However, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder for the death of Edwin Alberto. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Edwin Alberto in the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs.

Hence this appeal where accused-appellant ascribed the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY ONLY OF THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE WITH THE PRIVILEGED (sic) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 13, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AND GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.

In his first assigned error, accused-appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to
the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Mendoza. He points that the statement was
taken almost three (3) hours after the incident, at which time, Mendoza allegedly has
had more than enough time to compose himself and narrate an entirely different story.
Accused-appellant also stresses that the prosecution failed to show that he has any
motive or reason to shoot at Mendoza and Alberto.

We find no merit in these contentions.

It is incorrect to argue that accused-appellant was convicted solely on the basis of the
sworn statement of prosecution witness Mendoza. More accurately, the trial court
examined the testimony of Mendoza in open court where he unfailingly recounted in
detail the confluence of events leading to the death of the victim. The records will bear
that his testimony is substantially congruent with his sworn statement and no material
inconsistency emanated therefrom. Truth to tell, his testimony withstood rigid cross-
examination.

The fact that accused-appellant had no motive to kill the victim is of no moment. It is a
settled rule in criminal law that proof of motive is crucial only where the identity of an
accused is not sufficiently established. 11 In the case at bench, the identity of accused-
appellant as the author of the crime has been positively and categorically established by
the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Mendoza who was himself a survivor of
accused-appellant's belligerent assault.

Accused-appellant would cast doubt on Mendoza's identification of him as the assailant.

He claims that at the time of the shooting incident, there was no light at the scene of
the crime which could have aided Mendoza in identifying him as the culprit.

A perusal of the records reveals otherwise. As per the testimony of Mendoza, the crime
scene was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamp post near the gate of the factory
where accused-appellant started his aggression. 12 Mendoza, who was not shown to be
biased, even described accused-appellant as wearing a light blue uniform at the time of
the attack and that the latter retreated to the factory immediately after shooting the
victim.

Coming now to the second assigned error, accused-appellant proposes that, assuming
arguendo that he should be held liable for the death of Alberto, he should have been
found guilty of the lesser crime of homicide. He maintains that the killing of the victim is
not qualified by treachery.

We agree. The mere fact that the victim was shot at the back while attempting to run
away from his assailant would not per se qualify the crime to murder. In the case at
bench, the evidence established that accused-appellant, apparently drunk, emerged
from the factory and fired upon the victim and his companion who were just innocently
passing by. Sensing an imminent danger to their lives, the two started to run. However,
the next gunshot hit the victim at the back and caused his death. Clearly then, with the
first gunshot, the victim has been placed on guard and has, in fact, attempted to flee.
There could thus be no treachery since, prior to the attack, the victim has been
forewarned of the danger to his life and has even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to
escape. Moreover, there was absolutely no evidence to show that accused-appellant
consciously and deliberately employed a specific form of attack which would specially
and directly ensure its commission without impunity. 13

We come now to the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances. Accused-appellant

claims that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of the
property or rights of a stranger. He maintains that in shooting the victim, he acted in
the performance of his duty as a security guard since he was trying to prevent the
victim and his companions from scaling the wall of the factory. He further claims that
he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender for when the police
authorities went to the factory looking for him, he allegedly approached them and
voluntarily surrendered himself.

We find that none of the mitigating circumstances alleged by accused-appellant

attended the commission of the crime.

The justifying circumstance of defense of property or rights of a stranger requires the

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) the person defending is
not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. 14 Absent either or both of
the last two (2) requisites, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of
stranger may be appreciated. However, in either case, unlawful aggression is always an
essential element. It has been held that without unlawful aggression, there could never
be a defense, complete or incomplete. 15

In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt that it was accused-appellant who was the aggressor. Indeed, appreciation of the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of property or rights of a stranger would
require that we accept as true the defense's version of the incident. Accused-appellant
failed to convince the trial court of his innocence. He remains unsuccessful before this
Court.

Accused-appellant's uncorroborated and self-serving testimony runs contrary to ordinary

human experience. First, we find it inconceivable that the victim and his two (2) other
alleged companions would claim to be relatives of the factory owner and insist on
entering the factory premises at an unholy hour of 11:45 p.m. Second, it is unthinkable
that, having been informed of the absence of the owner, the three (3) would still insist
on entering the premises. Finally, having been refused entry, accused-appellant would
have us believe that the three (3) men would desperately insist on entering the
premises even to the extent of climbing the fence. What is more, all these were
allegedly done in clear view and in the presence of two (2) armed security guards. On
the whole, his testimony simply does not inspire credence.

A contrario, we are satisfied that the prosecution, through its eyewitness, sufficiently
proved the culpability of accused-appellant. The evidence shows that accused-appelant,
then under the influence of liquor, emerged from the factory and recklessly fired at the
first people he saw who, unfortunately, happened to be the victim and his companion
Mendoza. The fact that it does not appear on the record that bad blood existed
between the parties prior to the incident which might have impelled him to shoot the
victim does not affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence. Indeed, we have
taken judicial notice of the fact that inebriated persons are inclined to be pugnacious,
irrational and quarrelsome for no sensible reason. 16 From the unbiased and credible
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Mendoza, we sustain the trial court's finding that
the unlawful aggression originated from accused-appellant himself.

Neither can we accept accused-appellant's plea of voluntary surrender. He did not

surrender to the police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows that it was the police
authorities who came to the factory looking for him. It was there that accused-appellant
was pointed to them. Seeing that the police were already approaching him, accused-
appellant did not offer any resistance and peacefully when with them. With the police
closing in, accused-appellant actually had no choice but to go with them. To be sure, no
surrender was made by accused-appellant.

In sum, we find that the guilt of accused-appellant for the death of the victim has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Homicide carries with it the penalty of reclusion
temporal. 17 There being neither mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime, the impossable penalty is the medium period of reclusion
temporal. 18 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be
meted the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum penalty.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, accused-appellant IRVING FLORES y DICHOSO is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum
penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum penalty, and indemnify the heirs of Edwin Alberto in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00). No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Chairman, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

---------------
Footnotes

1. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 368-V-91 and 367-V-91, respectively.

2. The lot is a private property directly opposite the factory compound but it was not
owned by the Mariposa Bed Factory.
3. TSN, August 12, 1991, pp. 3-12.
4. Exhibit "F", Folder of Exhibits, p. 6.
5. Dated July 7, 1991, Exhibit "A", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-2.
6. TSN, August 12, 1991, pp. 14-18.
7. TSN, September 16, 1991, pp. 7-13; TSN, September 30, 1991, pp. 3-4; TSN,
October 7, 1991, pp. 3-4.
8. TSN, November 6, 1991, pp. 3-6.
9. Id., pp. 8-12; TSN, November 15, 1991, p. 4.
10. Original Record, pp. 89-97.
11. People v. Canceran, G.R. No. 104866, January 31, 1994, 229 SCRA 581; People v.
Javar, G.R. No. 82769, September 6, 1993, 226 SCRA 103.
12. TSN, August 12, 1991, p. 11.
13. Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code; People v. Ocaña, G.R. No. 63009, January 19,
1994, 229 SCRA 341; People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, January 10, 1994.
14. Article 11, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code.
15. People v. Layam, G.R. No. 102308, July 25, 1994.
16. People v. Aguiluz, G.R. No. 91662, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 187.
17. Article 249, Revised Penal Code.
18. Article 64 (1), supra.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT, Accused-Appeellant.

G.R. No. 172606 | 2011-11-23

View Summary

A discussion citing this case or law is available.

Criminal Law; Mitigating Circumstance; Sufficient Provocation or Threat

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Self-defense is often readily claimed by an accused even if false. It is time, then, to

remind the Defense about the requisites of the justifying circumstance and about the
duty of the Defense to establish the requisites by credible, clear and convincing
evidence.

Melanio Nugas y Mapait appeals the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006,[1] whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder under the decision
rendered on August 17, 2000 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, in Antipolo City
(RTC).

Antecedents

On June 25, 1997, the Office of Provincial Prosecutor in Antipolo City charged Jonie
Araneta y Nugas (Araneta) with murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of March 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating
with an unidentified male person, whose true identity and present whereabout is still
unknown, with treachery and taking advantage of their superior strength, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed
weapon one Glen Remigio y Santos hitting the latter on the left neck, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal stab wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

On April 7, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, learning of the identity of the
unidentified male co-conspirator of Araneta as Melanio Nugas y Mapait (Nugas),
amended the information to include Nugas as a co-principal, to wit:

That on or about the 26th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon one
Glen Remegio y Santos hitting the latter on the left neck, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal stab wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Upon arraignment on June 9, 1998, Araneta and Nugas, both assisted by counsel de
officio, voluntarily and spontaneously pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[4]

In the course of the presentation of evidence for the Defense, Araneta manifested his
willingness to change his plea, and to enter a plea of guilty as an accomplice in
homicide. On July 19, 1999, the RTC approved his offer to change plea. The plea
bargaining was with the conformity of the State Prosecutor and the heirs of the victim.
Thus, after ensuring that Araneta had understood the consequences of his new plea
of guilty, the RTC allowed him to enter a new plea. He was subsequently duly convicted
as an accomplice in homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two
years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.[5]
The trial proceeded against Nugas.

Evidence of the Prosecution

On March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the evening, Glen Remigio (Glen), his wife, Nila
Remigio (Nila), and their two children, Raymond and Genevieve, then 11- and 6-years
old, respectively, were traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along
Marcos Highway in COGEO, Antipolo, Rizal. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his
extreme right because their children sat between them. While they were passing along
Carolina Village, two men waved at them signalling their request to hitch a ride. Glen
accommodated the two men, one of whom was carrying a maroon plastic bag, allowing
them to board the vehicle at the rear. When the vehicle neared Masinag Market, the
two men suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glen’s and Nila’s necks,
warning them not to make any wrong move if they did not want to be harmed.
Considering that the two men demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia Mall, Glen
continued driving the vehicle. Upon the vehicle reaching Kingsville Village, the man
behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men alighted and
fled. Glen pulled the knife from his neck and handed it to Nila. He drove to the nearest
hospital, but he collapsed on the way and lost control of the vehicle, causing it to run
over two pedestrians, one of whom died and the other suffered a broken arm. Once
the vehicle hit the railings of a gas station, Nila cried for help. Concerned citizens
immediately rushed Glen to the nearest hospital, which was about 50 to 60 meters
away. Nila stayed behind to look after their children. When she checked the vehicle, she
found the knife, its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag left by the assailants at the
rear of the vehicle. She gathered the articles and later turned them over to the police
officer in charge of the investigation. The maroon plastic bag was found to contain the
following items: a National Bureau of Investigation clearance,[6] a police
clearance,[7] Social Security System papers,[8] and official receipts,[9] all issued in the
name of Araneta, a stainless fork knuckle, and a bunch of keys.

Despite undergoing treatment, Glen succumbed,[10] and his body was brought for
autopsy to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. The autopsy revealed that
Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on the left side of his neck originating from the
front and going towards the back and downwards towards the center of his body,
piercing the apex of the left lung and transecting the left common carotid artery; that
the stab wound had been inflicted by a single bladed weapon; and that the immediate
cause of his death was the hemorrhage resulting from the stab wound.[11] It was opined
that the position of the stab wound would suggest that had the assailant used his left
hand, he was probably directly behind the victim; but had he used his right hand, he
had to be somewhere to the extreme left of the victim.

During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her husband and
who had stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta as the person who had sat
behind her and who had carried the maroon plastic bag that she had later recovered
from the backseat.

Other witnesses presented were the investigating police officer, the medico-legal officer
who had performed the autopsy, and Atty. Jose S. Diloy, the lawyer who had assisted
Araneta in executing a sworn statement pointing to Nugas, his own uncle, as the person
who had stabbed the driver of the vehicle they were riding on March 26, 1997.

The State adduced object and documentary evidence, including the knife, the maroon
plastic bag and all its contents, Medico Legal Report No. M-0406-97,[12] and the sworn
statement of Araneta.[13]

Evidence of Nugas

Albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he did so in self-defense.
He claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family
vehicle; that when he and Araneta boarded the vehicle at Gate 1 in COGEO, Antipolo,
about four other passengers were already on board; that he argued with Glen about the
fare, because Glen was overcharging; that when he was about to alight in front of
Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get something
from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was reaching for
a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand from where he was
seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that when asked why he
carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection because he was living
in a squatter’s area.

Ruling of the RTC

On August 17, 2000, the RTC convicted Nugas of murder, ruling that his guilt had been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC accorded greater credence to the testimony of Nila because she had
consistently narrated the incident. It observed that although Nila had initially made a
mistake in identifying who, as between Nugas and Araneta, had stabbed her husband,
she had rectified her error upon seeing the two accused together in person; that
despite the resemblance of Nugas and Araneta to each other, she had firmly pointed to
Nugas as the person who had stabbed Glen; that even granting to be true Nugas’
version that Glen had pushed and punched him, his stabbing of Glen could not be a
reasonable and necessary means to repel the attack, for, by all standards, fists were no
match to knives; that treachery had been duly proved beyond reasonable doubt,
because Nugas’ position inside the vehicle in relation to Glen, who had sat on the
driver’s seat, and Nugas’ manner of inflicting the fatal blow from behind warranted the
inference that Nugas had taken advantage of his position to specially ensure the
execution of the felony, without risk to himself arising from any defense that Glen might
make.

The RTC disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused MELANIO NUGAS is hereby found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

Nugas is hereby further ordered to pay to heirs of Glen Remigio the amount of
P80,000.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses and P50,000 as death
indemnity.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Ruling of the CA

Upon review,[15] the CA affirmed the factual and legal conclusions of the RTC, and
declared that Nugas’ invoking of self-defense shifted the burden to him to prove the
attendance of the elements of self-defense, but he failed to discharge such burden.
Issue

Nugas has now come to the Court to reverse his conviction, and begs us to delve into
whether the affirmance by the CA was proper, and whether the attendant circumstance
of treachery was duly proven.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing,[16] and thereby assumes the
burden to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, his conviction will follow from his admission of killing the victim. Self-defense
cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and
competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused
must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not
on the weakness of the State’s evidence,[17] because the existence of self-defense is a
separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-defense does not
require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.[18]

To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-
defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.[19]

The RTC found that Nugas did not establish the requisites of self-defense. The CA
concurred.

The Court upholds both lower courts.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified
killing in defense of oneself. [20] The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under
the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat.[21]Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material
attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.[22]

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an
attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where
a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to
throw a pot.[23]

Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached for
his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. For
one, as the CA pointed out, Nugas admitted not actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his
clutch bag.[24] And, secondly, the CA correctly found and declared Nugas’ testimony
about Glen punching him to be improbable, viz:[25]

It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-appellant Nugas

position, can launch an attack against the latter. First, the victim was at the driver’s
seat and seated between him were his wife and two children. Second, the victim was
driving the FX vehicle. Third, accused-appellant Nugas was seated directly behind the
victim. All things considered, it is highly improbable, nay risky for the victim’s family, for
him to launch an attack.

Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he had
not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to
prevent or to repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards
him.

With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having been
established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the remaining
requisites of self-defense were attendant. As the Court made clear in People v.
Carrero:[26]

Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the
theory of self-defense and the complete or incomplete exemption from
criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain
that a person acted in self-defense within the terms under which unlawful
aggression is subordinate to the other two conditions named in article 8, No.
4, of the Penal Code.[27] When an act of aggression is in response to an insult,
affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as the punishment which
the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the courts
can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason for
exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)

Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (a) that the means, methods
and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.[28]

The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack
is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the
risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate. Treachery may also be appreciated when the victim, although
warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace.[29]

The CA exhaustively discussed and rightly determined the presence of treachery as a

circumstance attendant in the killing of Glen and the improbability of Glen launching an
attack against or defending himself from Nugas by reason of their relative positions. We
affirm the CA, because there was nothing adduced by Nugas that refuted how the
relative positions of Glen and Nugas had left the former defenseless and unable to parry
or to avoid the fatal blow of the latter. Verily, Nugas stabbed Glen from behind with
suddenness, thereby deliberately ensuring the execution of the killing without any risk
to himself from any defense that Glen might make.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006
finding MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAITguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

__________________________

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-21; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with
Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
(now a Member of the Court) concurring.

[2]
Records, p. 1.

[3]
Id., p. 47.

[4]
Id., p. 67.

[5]
Id., pp. 144-145.

[6]
Records, pp. 196-203 (one original and eight photocopies).

[7]
Id., pp. 213-221 (one original and eight photocopies).

[8]
Id., pp. 204-212 (one original and eight photocopies).

[9]
Id., p. 222 (police clearance and NBI clearance).

[10]
Id., p. 228.
[11]
Id., p. 226.

[12]
Id., pp. 226-227.

[13]
Id., pp. 223-224.

[14]
Id., p. 170.

[15]
Nugas appealed directly to this Court because of the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
but the Court referred the appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo (G.R. Nos.
147678-87, July 7, 2004).

[16]
People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 463.

[17]
Razon v. People, G.R. No. 158053, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 284, 297; People v.
Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 634; Marzonia v. People, G.R.
No. 153794, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 627, 634.

[18]
40 Corpus Juris Secundum, Homicide, § 113, p. 514.

[19]
People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 634-635.

[20]
Feria and Gregorio, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, Volume I, 1958 First
Edition, Central Book Supply, Inc., p. 124.

[21]
People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366; People v. Pletado, G.R. No. 98432, July 1, 1992,
210 SCRA 634; People v. Bausing, G.R. No. 64965, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 355.

[22]
Id.

[23]
Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1997 Ninth Edition, pp. 55-56.

[24]
Supra, note 1 (at p. 19).

[25]
Id.

[26]
9 Phil. 544,546.

[27]
Now Article 11, 1, Revised Penal Code.
[28]
Luces v. People, G.R. No. 149492, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 524, 532-533.

[29]
People v. Sison, G.R. No. 172752, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 156, 172.

People vs. Nugas y Mapait (2011)

G.R. No. 172606 | 2011-11-23

Subject: A claim of self-defense shifts the burden of evidence to the accused to prove
the elements thereof; Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense;
Nugas failed to show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, hence, plea of self-
defense must fail; Treachery was present

Facts:

Jonie Araneta y Nugas (Araneta) and his uncle Melanio Nugas y Mapait were charged
with conspiring to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of
superior strength, one Glen Remegio by hitting the latter on the left neck with a bladed
weapon, causing the latter's death.

Araneta and Nugas, initially pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Araneta later
entered into a plea bargain with the State and plead guilty as an accomplice in
homicide. The trial proceeded against Nugas.

It was established by the prosecution that on March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the
evening, Glen Remigio, his wife Nila and their two young children (Raymond and
Genevieve) were traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along Marcos
Highway. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his extreme right because their children sat
between them. They passed two men who waved at them signalling their request to
hitch a ride. Glen allowed the two men, one of whom was carrying a maroon plastic
bag, to board the vehicle at the rear. When the vehicle neared Masinag Market, the two
men suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glen’s and Nila’s necks and
demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia Mall. Upon the vehicle reaching Kingsville Village,
the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men
alighted and fled. Glen pulled the knife from his neck and handed it to Nila. He drove to
the nearest hospital, but he collapsed on the way and lost control of the vehicle. Once
the vehicle hit the railings of a gas station, Nila cried for help. Concerned citizens
immediately rushed Glen to the nearest hospital but the latter died despite treatment,

During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her husband and
who had stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta as the person who had sat
behind her and who had carried the maroon plastic bag that she had later recovered
from the backseat.

Nugas maintained that stabbed Glen in self-defense. He claimed that the Tamaraw FX
driven by Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that he argued with Glen
about the fare, because Glen was overcharging; that when he was about to alight in
front of Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get
something from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard. Thinking that Glen was
reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand from where
he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya). When asked why he
carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection because he was living
in a squatter’s area.

The RTC convicted Nugas of murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Hence, the present appeal.

Held:

A claim of self-defense shifts the burden of evidence to the accused to prove

the elements thereof

1. By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing, and thereby assumes the
burden to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, his conviction will follow from his admission of killing the victim.

2. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by

independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed,
the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of the State’s evidence, because the existence of self-
defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-
defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense
itself.

3. To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that:

(a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent

threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense;
(b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and
(c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-
defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was
not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense

4. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression
under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the
life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat.
5. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely:

(a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault;

(b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

6. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:

(a) Actual or material unlawful aggression which means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor
to cause the injury.

(b) Imminent unlawful aggression which means an attack that is impending or at the
point of happening. It must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied
by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

7. Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of
self-defense and the complete or incomplete exemption from criminal liability; without
such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain that a person acted in self-
defense within the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other
two conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code. When an act of aggression
is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but
as the punishment which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and
in such a case the courts can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but
never as a reason for exemption,

Nugas failed to show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, hence,
plea of self-defense must fail

8. Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached
for his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. For
one, Nugas admitted not actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag. And,
secondly, it highly improbable that the victim, in relation to Nugas' position, can launch
an attack against the latter. The victim was at the driver’s seat and seated between him
were his wife and two children. Nugas was seated directly behind the victim. It is highly
improbable, nay risky, for the victim’s family, for him to launch an attack.

9. Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he had not been
subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to
repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards him.
Treachery was present

10. Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely:

(a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person.

11. The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the
attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment
without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery may also be appreciated when the
victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable to flee at
the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.

12. The CA rightly determined the presence of treachery as a circumstance attendant

in the killing of Glen and the improbability of Glen launching an attack against or
defending himself from Nugas by reason of their relative positions. Verily, Nugas
stabbed Glen from behind with suddenness, thereby deliberately ensuring the execution
of the killing without any risk to himself from any defense that Glen might make.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CRISTINA SAMSON,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 214883 | 2015-09-02

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For review in this appeal is the May 6, 2014 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, which affirmed the September 27, 2012 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12285,
convicting accused-appellant Cristina Samson (Cristina) for parricide committed against
her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The Antecedents

On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information
articulates the following criminal charges, viz:

That on or about the 27th day of June, 2002 in Tarlac City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with intent to kill her husband Gerry Delmar, with whom she was united in lawful
wedlock, armed herself with a deadly weapon, a knife, and stabbed said Gerry Delmar
on his chest, which resulted to his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned almost four (4) years later, Cristina entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the parties agreeing to a reverse trial on
account of her invocation of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Version of the Defense

The version of Cristina appears in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant[4] as follows:

On June 27, 2002, CRISTINA SAMSON (Cristina) was in their house watching television
together with her children when her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), who was drunk at
that time, arrived. Gerry asked Cristina if she had cooked food already but the latter
answered in the negative because she had no money to buy food. Gerry scolded and
uttered words against her, and then slapped her. They had an altercation for about ten
(10) minutes when Cristina's father arrived and pacified them. Gerry left but after thirty
(30) minutes, he returned. He pointed a knife at Cristina's neck. The latter begged
Gerry not to hurt her and to pity their children if something happens to her. Gerry
continued pointing the knife and told Cristina to stop talking or otherwise, he will put a
hole in her neck. Then, Gerry slapped Cristina's face twice. While Gerry was still holding
the knife, Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the knife which Gerry
was holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her
chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the
knife went in contact with his chest. When she saw her husband bloodied, she shouted
for help and her father (Rodolfo Samson) and brother (Allan Samson) came and
brought Gerry to the hospital. Her relatives told her that Gerry died in the hospital.
(TSN, September 6, 2006, pp. 14-27)

On June 27, 2002, ALLAN SAMSON (Allan) was at home watching television with his
father. He heard yelling and shouting from the house of his sister Cristina and brother-
in-law Gerry. Since it was just ordinary for him to hear his sister and brother-in-law
fight, he and his father just ignored it. After fifteen (15) minutes of listening to their
quarrel, they heard Cristina cry for help. Upon hearing this, he immediately went to the
house of his sister and saw her holding Gerry and she requested him and his father to
bring Gerry to the hospital. They called a tricycle and he, together with his father,
brought Gerry to Talon General Hospital. The doctor, however, declared that Gerry was
already dead. Then, the tanod arrives and Allan instructed the tanod to call the siblings
and relatives of Gerry. When the relatives arrived, they went home. (TSN, November
18, 2006, pp. 4-6)[5]
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief for the Appellee,[6] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) provided the
following as its Counter-Statement of Facts:

On January 25, 1994, appellant Cristina Samson and victim Jerry Delmar were married.
They were blessed with two (2) daughters namely Christine and Cherrie Lou. The
couple lived in their own house which is just adjacent to the house of appellant's family.
The union of the two was never a peaceful one. Constant quarrels filled their household
and occurred in front of their children and other relatives.

On June 27, 2002, appellant and the victim had one of their usual fights. As testified by
appellant herself, she and her two children were watching television in their home when
the victim arrived drunk. Victim asked for his dinner but appellant was not able to cook
food which led to the fight. Christine, the youngest daughter of the appellant and the
victim, narrated that she witnessed the fight between her parents, that as the fight
escalated, appellant was able to get hold of the knife which was placed on the roof and
stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and crawled until he reached the door.
Cristine remembered that people arrived in their home, helped the victim board a
tricycle and brought him to the hospital. Appellant, on the other hand, ran out and went
to her father and asked for money and left. That was the last night that Christine and
Cherry Lou saw their mother.[7]

The Ruling of the RTC

In its September 27, 2012 Decision, the RTC found the proffered self-defense of
Cristina to be untenable. In its view, there was no longer any threat to her life before
she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though there was an existent danger as there was an
altercation before the stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when, as
admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even concluded that it was
she who provoked him when she suddenly pushed him to the ground. She then took
the knife and told him not to come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed him.
After she took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak
of that would necessitate the need to kill Gerry.[8] Thus, the decretal portion of the RTC
decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused CRISTINA SAMSON guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the felony of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, accused CRISTINA SAMSON is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
"Reclusion Perpetua" pursuant to R.A. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines).

Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Christine S. Delmar and
Cherrie Lo S. Delmar the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It stated that although there could have been an
unlawful aggression at the start when Gerry repeatedly slapped Cristina and held a
knife at her throat, it already disappeared when he put down the knife. According to the
CA, it was this precise act that gave Cristina the opportunity to push her husband and
gain control of the knife. Moreover, the fact that she fled and evaded arrest for four (4)
years contradicted her claim of innocence.[10] The CA disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 2012 of the RTC, Branch 65, Tarlac
City in Criminal Case No. 12285, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing her toreclusion perpetua and to pay
damages and the cost of suit, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of Cristina.

Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for
review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.[12] Considering that
what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, this Court has
meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds
that there is merit in her appeal.

There appears to be a conflict between the testimony of Cristina and her daughter,
Christine Delmar (Christine). Cristina claimed that she got the knife from her husband
who fell down after she pushed him. After taking possession of the deadly weapon, she
told her husband not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest and
pointed towards him when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the
knife went in contact with her husband's chest.

Christine, however, perceived it differently. According to her, she witnessed the fight
between her parents. She narrated that as the fight escalated, her mother was able to
get hold of a knife, which was inserted in the roof, and used it in stabbing her father.

Both the RTC and the CA believed the version of Cristina, but both were of the view
that before she stabbed her husband, there was no more imminent danger to her life.
For said reason, her fatal stabbing of her husband was not justified.

The Court's Ruling

Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the

accused that he committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than
upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however, admits
killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying circumstance
by clear and convincing evidence.[13] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[14]

To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the

accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[15]

Presence of Unlawful Aggression even if Aggressor was Disarmed

Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important that needs to be proved by
the accused, for it to prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression. It must be proven
first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense.[16] When the Court speaks of unlawful
aggression, it is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when
he puts the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense in actual or imminent
danger. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is present
only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. It must be
continuous, otherwise, it does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.[17]

The question now is: was there unlawful aggression when Cristina killed her husband?

The Court answers in the affirmative.

The Court hesitates to share the observation of the RTC and the CA that Cristina failed
to discharge the burden of proving that unlawful aggression was present when she
killed her husband.

Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry's aggression had already ceased when
he was disarmed, it is the Court's view that the aggression still continued. Her
perceived peril to her life continued and persisted until she put an end to it.

It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from her husband, he
did not stand down but, instead, continued to move towards her despite her plea that
he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated
her well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest the
weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that, being stronger, he could have
easily overpowered her and eventually killed her.

A similar situation was presented in the case of People v.

Rabandaban[18] (Rabandaban), wherein the Court ruled that despite the fact that the
accused succeeded in wresting the bolo from his wife, he was still justified in using the
weapon against her because his life was still in danger. The Court explained:

xxx When appellant got possession of the bolo he already must have been in a
precarious condition because of his wounds, one of which was described by the sanitary
inspector as "fatal" since the large intestine came out of it. And appellant, we think,
was justified in believing that his wife wanted to finish him off because,
according to the evidence, she struggled to regain possession of the bolo
after he had succeeded in wresting it from her. With the aggressor still
unsubdued and showing determination to fight to the finish, it would have
been folly on the part of appellant, who must already have been losing
strength due to loss of blood, to throw away the bolo and thus give his
adversary a chance to pick it up and again use it against him. Having the right
to protect his life, appellant was not in duty bound to expose himself to such a
contingency.[19]

[Emphases Supplied]

In Rabandaban, the victim, instead of running away from the accused husband after
the bolo was wrested from her, continued to struggle with him to regain possession of
the bolo. This fact, together with her husband's compromised condition, being already
badly wounded, justified him in finally neutralizing his wife who was then determined in
putting an end to his life. In the case at bench, the unlawful aggression would have
ceased if he just walked away from the scene considering that Cristina had gained the
upper hand, being the one in possession of the knife. Instead, Gerry chose to ignore
her plea not to come near her and continued moving towards her without regard to his
safety despite the fact that the knife was pointed towards his direction.

In both Rabandaban and the present case, the victims, despite having been disarmed,
still posed a threat to the lives of the accused. The danger to their lives persisted
leaving them with no other choice but to defend themselves lest they be the ones to be
victimized.

In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in danger. It is to
be noted that before she was able to take hold of the weapon, her husband held the
same knife and pointed it at her throat. So when he, who was taller and stronger,
approached her and grabbed her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the
extreme precautionary measure by stabbing him before he could get back the knife and
make good his earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat.

Contrary to the trial court's assessment, she did not show aggression towards her
husband when she pushed him after he pointed the knife away from her. She was, in
fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards him when she just stood her ground, with
the knife in hand, asking him not to come near her.[20]

It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife, walked away and
Cristina still went after him. If that were the case, she could not assert self-defense.
She was no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation for the earlier aggression.
Retaliation is inconsistent with self-defense and in fact belies it. In retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was
injured by the accused.[21]

Now that unlawful aggression has already been established, it is well to consider the
other two requisites in order to determine whether the self-defense is complete or
incomplete.

Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed

The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met if the person
invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner equivalent to the means of attack
used by the aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the self-defense utilized by an
accused is to defend himself "depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the
physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as
well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the
occasion of the assault."[22] Moreover, the nature and location of wounds are considered
important indicators whether or not to disprove a plea of self-defense.[23]

In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victim's chest supports the
argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by
stabbing him. It was a reasonable means chosen by her in view of the attending
circumstances, to wit: that her stronger husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife
to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain
from coming near her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly
weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She did not have the time
or sufficient tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used.
In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation.[24] When it is apparent that
a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction
that act or to mitigate his liability.[25]

Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not negate the reasonableness
of the means employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the weapon used by the
one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required.[26] What the law
requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal
factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the accused is exposed, and the
instinct more than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and the proportionateness
thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such
injury.[27]

Lack of Sufficient Provocation

The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. The Court cannot sustain the trial court's observation that it
was Cristina who provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving
him cannot be considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of
aggression.[28] She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband
removed the knife away from her throat, to save herself from what she had perceived
to be a danger to her life. Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same
reasonable way.

Flight as an Indication of Guilt or Non-guilt

The CA took the fact of Cristina's flight and evasion of arrest for four (4) years against
her. To the appellate court, it belied her claim of innocence.

Under the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot subscribe to that view.

Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance

from which an inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person would
normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence.[29] It has been held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an
indication of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is
proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after
a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee.[30] In Cristina's case, she explained
that she took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her
husband's siblings.[31] The Court finds such reason for her choice to flee acceptable. She
did not hide from the law but from those who would possibly do her harm.

The RTC and the CA might have some hesitation in accepting her explanation for her
choice of action. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, a cloud of uncertainty lingers.
In such a case, it is the duty of the Court to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.

Considering that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under Article 11, paragraph
1 of the RPC, she should be exonerated of the crime charged. For the same reason, the
Court finds no act or omission from which a civil liability may arise.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The May 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-
appellant, Cristina Samson, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for
Women, Mandaluyong City. The Superintendent is DIRECTED to cause the immediate
release of appellant, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause and to report
the action she has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

__________________________________

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Nina G.
Antonio-Valenzuela and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-9.

[2]
Penned by Judge Ma. Magdalena A. Balderama. CA rollo, pp. 10-15.

[3]
Id., as quoted in the RTC Decision, p. 47.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 33-45.

[5]
Id. at 37-38.

[6]
Id. at 62.

[7]
Id. at 67-68.

[8]
Id. at 51.

[9]
Id. at 52.

[10]
Id. at 7-8.

[11]
Id. at 9.

[12]
People v. Balagat, 604 Phil. 529, 534 (2009).

[13]
People v. Debs Santos, G.R. No. 207818, July 23, 2014.

[14]
People v. Genosa, 464 Phil. 680, 714 (2004).

[15]
People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625, 635.

[16]
Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384, 396-397.

[17]
People v. Camilla, Jr., 620 Phil. 775, 796 (2009).

[18]
85 Phil. 636 (1950).

[19]
Id. at 637-638.

[20]
TSN, September 6, 2006, p. 9.

[21]
People v. Gamez, supra note 15, at 636.

[22]
Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 846, 857.

[23]
People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 197546, March 23, 2015.
[24]
Jayme v. People, 372 Phil. 796, 804 (1999).

[25]
Rimano v. People, 462 Phil. 272, 289 (2003).

[26]
People v. Padua, C.A., 40 O.G. 998, as cited in Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal,
Book One, Seventeenth Ed. 180 (2008).

[27]
People v. Rabanal, 436 Phil. 519, 532 (2002).

[28]
People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366, 373 (1947).

[29]
People v. Beriber, G.R. No. 195243, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 528, 543-544.

[30]
People v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 89-90 (2003).

[31]
TSN, October 4, 2006, p. 15.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO DULIN Y
NARAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 171284 | 2015-06-29

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record
does not substantiate the attendance of treachery. But he may not benefit from the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense if there was no unlawful
aggression from the victim.

The Case

Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26, 2005,[1] whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification his conviction for the murder of
Francisco Batulan rendered on December 29, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.[2] In convicting him, the RTC had appreciated the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and had then sentenced
him to “suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment
ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.” On appeal, the CA
prescribed reclusion perpetua.

Antecedents

The information filed on January 7, 1991 averred as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Alfredo
Dulin y Narag alias Freddie, armed with a sharp blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him
several stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.[3]

During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr. Nelson
Macaraniag, (b) Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita Batulan. Their
version follows.

Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock
in the evening of August 22, 1990 when a young man came running from the house of
Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan)
had been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30
meters from his own house, and there he saw Dulin stabbing Batulan who was already
prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot
touching the ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and
thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards
Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the
incident. He went home afterwards.

Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of
seeing them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will
soon have his day and I will kill him.[4]

Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 22, 1990 when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his
house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter, screaming for help. He thus sought out a
fellow barangay tanod. On his return to the scene, he found Batulan at the door of
Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long.
Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin
Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig,
Tuguegarao.[5]

Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 22, 1990 to inform her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in Danao’s house.
She rushed to Danao’s house but fainted on the way. Upon regaining consciousness,
she learned that her husband had been rushed to the hospital. On her way to the
hospital, she met Barangay Captain Loreto Meman, who told her: Finally, Freddie Dulin
killed your husband as he vowed to do. At the hospital, she was told that her husband
had sustained two wounds in the back and several stab wounds in the front, and was
being attended to at the hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.

Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated
what he had said to her about Dulin. But when she later on sought out Barangay
Captain Meman to ask him to confirm what he had told her about Dulin’s vowing to kill
her husband, Barangay Captain Meman’s response was: I’m sorry I cannot go and
declare what I have stated because I am afraid of FREDDIE and he will kill all those
persons who will testify in their favor.[6]

Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew,
Seong Bancud, in front of Danao’s house in April 1990. On that occasion, Dulin wielded
a knife with which he tried to stab her husband. Dulin was pacified only when she went
to the aid of her husband, but she then heard Dulin saying: You will soon have your
day, I will kill you.[7]

Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22, 1990 by
Dr. Macaraniag, who said that the victim was in a state of shock from his 12 stab
wounds. Dr. Macaraniag was part of the three teams that conducted the surgery on
Batulan. He issued the Medico-Legal Certificate[8] attesting that Batulan died on August
24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; and that Batulan had sustained several injuries, as follows:

Multiple stab wounds #12

(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.

(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL

(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line

(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula

(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand

(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand

(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left

(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm

(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist

(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot

(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh

(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x.[9]

Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be “Hypovolemic shock secondary to

Massive Hemothorax secondary to Multiple stab wounds.”[10] He clarified in court that
there were clerical errors in the preparation of the Medico-Legal Certificate because his
handwritten records indicated that Batulan had sustained stab instead of lacerated
wounds. He surmised that one of the clerks could have misread his handwriting in the
process of transcription.[11]

Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs, deriving a
monthly income of P8,000.00; that their marriage bore only one child; that she spent
more or less P6,500.00 for Batulan’s hospitalization, including his medicines, and
P36,000.00 for Batulan’s 10-day wake, his burial attire and his coffin; that during the
wake she butchered one cow worth P6,800.00 and six pigs worth P15,000.00; that his
death caused her and her family so much pain; and that she and her family expended a
total of P70,000.00, plus the P20,000.00 for the counsel’s services in bringing the
criminal charge against Dulin.[12]

In his defense, Dulin testified that in the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his
house in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun
Danao, Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag; that Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano
arrived at his house to see the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto);
that Alberto was not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to
talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their
transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao
thereafter accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but
on their way, they passed Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked
the others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as he (Dulin)
approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right
side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle, you hit me
(Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the
upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again
several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it
from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled
until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he (Dulin) regained
consciousness only the next day at the hospital.
Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that
the barangay captain would summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter
got drunk at night.

Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, authenticated the hospital records showing that Dulin had also been
injured.[13]

Judgment of the RTC

On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder,[14] to
wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and appreciating the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and no aggravating circumstance,
this Court hereby lowers the penalty of said crime by two degrees and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of
imprisonment ranging from 17 years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay actual
damages in the amount of P36,000.00 and moral damages for P40,000.00.

Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without pronouncement as

to costs.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Decision of the CA
In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder,
considering the RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating
circumstance; and that even if self-defense should be unavailing, he could be found
guilty only of homicide because it was the victim who had first attacked by stabbing
him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not mean that he had not
been justified in killing the victim. He argued that the penalty imposed on him was
incorrect considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the
civil liability, decreeing:

The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires
modification. The Court a quo committed error in the imposition of the proper penalty.
The crime committed by appellant in the case at bench is murder qualified by treachery.
There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is
reclusion perpetua, should be imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the

modification of the penalty and awards of damages. Appellant ALFREDO DULIN y
NARAG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of
P36,000 actual damages is DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Francisco
Batulan P20,000 as temperate damages and P50,000 by way of moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[16]

On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.[17]

Issues
In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to
wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE

PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-

DEFENSE AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE
APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IS UNAVAILING.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF FRANCISCO.[18]

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

I.

There was no self-defense

The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of
proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and
convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely:
(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[19] The most important of all the elements is unlawful
aggression,[20] which is the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a
justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the
accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be appreciated, for
the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases
without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.

Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly
described in People v. Nugas,[21] as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified
killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material
attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an
attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where
a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to
throw a pot.

Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in his favor because all its elements had been present in the commission of the
crime.
In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the
attack against Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin
had wrested the weapon from the latter. The CA thus found and held in its assailed
decision:

Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take
possession of the weapon and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente
Danao, away from FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him
effectively ceased. When FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of
the weapon, appellant now became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of
trying to wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that
moment, appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and
limb from FRANCISCO.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be considered
as unlawful aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, appellant’s theory
that he was merely defending himself when he killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. A
fortiori, there would be no basis for the second requisite of self-defense.[22]

We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor
against Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the
weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the house
of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the
weapon did not amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held
control of the weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing
Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this regard,
retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the
victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the
aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor.[23] As such,
there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by
Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not
cease because the latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of
ending his life; and that there was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.[24]

The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and
then running away from him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he
did not anymore pose any imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not
committing any aggression when Dulin fatally stabbed him.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to
have sustained twelve stab wounds[25] confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan.
The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his
determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not defending himself.[26]

II.

Incomplete self-defense was not proved

Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused must prove the existence of the
majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful aggression, being an
indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the other requisites may be
absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, or
the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[27]

Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted
incomplete self-defense, and must be appreciated as a privileged mitigating
circumstance.[28]
Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the
elements of incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already
ceased from the moment that Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be
any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several
times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to
inflict injury on Batulan.

III.

The RTC and CA erred in appreciating the attendance of treachery

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Treachery, which was alleged in the information,
is one such qualifying circumstance.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.[29] Two conditions must concur in order for
treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.[30] Treachery,
whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the
killing and raises it to the category of murder.[31]

Based on the established facts, Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of the weapon
Batulan had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran with it
into the house of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit. They continued to grapple
for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin stabbed
Batulan several times. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated in
the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise
due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault,[32] and
being thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover
control of the weapon from Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes
without warning, or is done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[33] The mode of attack must not spring
from the unexpected turn of events.

Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is
reclusion temporal.[34] There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, eight months and one day to 17
years and four months). The indeterminate sentence of Dulin is, therefore, eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, with full credit of his preventive imprisonment, if any.

Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan
P20,000.00 as temperate damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We modify the
awards, and grant to the heirs of Batulan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Indeed, the current judicial
policy sets the civil indemnity for death caused by a crime at P50,000.00. In addition,
the heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00. The civil indemnity
and moral damages are allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a certainty
that the victim’s heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate damages of
P25,000.00 should further be granted to the heirs of the victim for they were presumed
to have spent for his interment. It would be unjust to deny them this amount for th

e reason that they were not able to establish the actual expenditure for his interment
with certainty.[35]

In line with recent jurisprudence,[36] interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all
the items of the civil liability fixed and imposed herein, computed from the date of the
finality of this decision until the items of the civil liability shall be fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005
by finding ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate sentence of EIGHT
YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS,
EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of his
preventive imprisonment; ORDERShim to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each item reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

________________________________________

Footnotes

[1] Rollo, pp. 33-56; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (retired) and Associate Justice
Edgardo F. Sundiam (retired/deceased).

[2] CA rollo, pp. 21-30; penned by Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan.

[3] Rollo, pp. 33-34.

[4] Id. at 35-36.

[5] Id. at 36.

[6] Id. at 37.

[7] Id.

[8] Records, p. 8.

[9] Records, pp. 8-11.

[10] Records, p. 213.

[11] Rollo, p. 35.

[12] Id. at 37.

[13] Id. at 39.

[14] Supra note 2.

[15] Id. at 30.

[16] Rollo, p. 55.

[17] Id. at 57-58.

[18] Id. at 13-14.

[19] Rimano v. People, G.R. No. 156567, November 27, 2003, 416 SCRA 569, 576.

[20] People v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496, 503.

[21] G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 167-168.

[22] Supra note 1, at 41-44.

[23] People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625, 636.

[24] Rollo, p. 20.

[25] Id. at 121.

[26] Sienes v. People, G.R. No. 132925, December 13, 2006, 511 SCRA 13, 25.

[27] Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 139759, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 158, 161-162.

[28] Rollo, p. 26.

[29] Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.

[30] People v. Flores, G.R. No. 137497, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 91, 97.
[31] People v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 106102, October 29, 1999, 317 SCRA 684, 694.

[32] People v. Placer, G.R. No. 181753, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 199, 210.

[33] People v. Warriner, G.R. No. 208678, June 16, 2014, 726 SCRA 470, 479.

[34] Article 249, Revised Penal Code.

[35] See People v. Isla, G.R. No. 199875, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 267, 283.

[36] Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645, 667.
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, IN BEHALF OF HIS DECEASED BROTHER,
JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 189405 | 2014-11-19

Tagged under keywords

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009 Resolution2 denying his motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2,
2005, which alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y
LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and moral gunshot wound
which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon,
petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson's
Summit Center, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the
building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L.
Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eyewitness Antonette
Managbanag's sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards
the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding
a gun pointed at the back of Jeffrey's head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to
deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession
of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of
the said gun.

Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey's face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the
fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually
killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.

The defense recounted a different version of the facts.

Petitioner claimed that on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or
less, petitioner, together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his
wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinson's Summit
Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and
celebrate together the New Year's Day.

Before entering the Robinson's Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular
security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main
entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his possession. He registered his
name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.

Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the
entrance once again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession;
hence, he was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also
pointed to him the direction towards his wife's table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man
and asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom
petitioner had talked to was the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing
himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si
Darlene?" to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin." The response given by
Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo
mo pa!"

Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey
who he was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up
something in his chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner's
face followed by a clicking sound. The gun, however, did not fire.

Seeing imminent danger to his life, petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession
of the gun. While grappling, the gun clicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again,
the gun did not fire.

Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid
any further confrontation with the latter. However, Jeffrey immediately blocked
petitioner's path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold of a
big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the same on petitioner's head.

Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the
act of parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that
his parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged
hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.

Petitioner left the gun and went out of the premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded
towards the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin
anong nangyari? ", but he was not able to answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2)
young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit
relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005,
sent by his friend.

During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pre-trial conference was conducted on
even date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie
Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos
Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gomales), respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered
several pieces of documentary evidence to support its claim.

For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon
Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and
Managbanag, who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the defense.

On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147,
rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
the fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as
Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y
Lim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount of P1 Million, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6

On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent,
through the private prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the
sentence rendered against petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision with modification on the civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the
Decision7 reads:

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y
Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Raised are the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-

DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE PRESENT
IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS
DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING
THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING
HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED
VICTIM.

3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.

4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS

APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH

OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9

There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey.
What is left for determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defense
exist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.10 In other words, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to
inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the
attack.11

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability,
it is well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of
himself.12 The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution
evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the
killing.14

Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting.
Hence, his petition must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful
aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes

actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and
intimidating action.15 There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than petitioner's testimony,
the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded
to petitioner's questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that
Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault
which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation
transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that
danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by
wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there
was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the
need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to
run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused
admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the
victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no
unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to
run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun
initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun
was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when
unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the
former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs.
Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack
an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (Peo Vs. Pateo, 430
SCRA 609).

Accused alleged that the victim was about to smash the fire extinguisher on his
(accused's) head but he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as
nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it. In contrast, the two
(2)Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached, both gave
the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shield himself from
the accused who was then already in possession of the gun.18

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who
resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be
sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent
that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful
aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the
offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he
proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the
allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.

More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if
there was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from
petitioner, thus:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Atty. Mariano:

Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incidenthappen?
A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment
and I was standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he
pointed a gun at the back of the head of Jeff.

Q: And then what happened?

A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the
gun.

Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.

Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off
the gun, they started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?

A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get
hold of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.

Q: And who was holding the gun?

A: Sherwin was holding the gun.

(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14)

CROSS-EXAMINATION:

Atty. Agoot:

Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the
other side?
Atty. Mariano:

Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.

Atty. Agoot:

I am on cross examination, your Honor.

COURT

You didn't not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the
gun at the back of Jeff and he didnot come from my side so that means...

COURT

No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?

A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.

Atty. Agoot

He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?

A: Yes, Sir.

(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun
from his chair and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent
evidence. Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and
Pelaez, it pales in comparison and loses probative value. We have, on more than one
occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is
not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but also extremely
doubtful in itself.22

In addition, other than petitioner's testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that
the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the
path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with
Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing
that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioner's head.
Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the
same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly
weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the
person who was holding the gun already?

Witness:

A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.

COURT

For the record.

Atty. Mariano:

Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire
extinguisher upright with his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his
left hand below the fire extinguisher.

Witness:

The left hand would support the weight basically.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the
slapping of that person who was in possession of the gun?

Witness

A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?

Witness

A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was stillholding the fire
extinguisher at that time. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi
pumutok" Do you affirm and confirm this statement?

Witness

A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to
point the gun at Jeffrey and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire
extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?
Witness

A: Three (3) times, sir.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did notfire?

Witness

A: They were still pushing each other at that time.

Atty. Agoot

Q: Using the fire extinguisher, he used that to push against the person...

Witness

A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who
was pointing the gun at him.

Atty. Agoot

Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?

Witness

A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw
what was going on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04
September 2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23

Petitioner's contention that Jeffrey's unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent
is, therefore, devoid of merit.

Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case,
the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore,
cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased
victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to
the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the
Court in People v. Obordo:24

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's
punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get
something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting
knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of
the victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by
accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally

necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however,
employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The
gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to
repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that
the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA
98).

It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a
gun, as against the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire
extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accused's
alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined
impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It
is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted
by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26

If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have
just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the
gun. He could have also immediately sought help from the people around him,
specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. In
fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had
opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet,
petitioner never did any of that.

We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and
hassling with Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only
once, but four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt
Jeffrey. Thus:

Moreover, the Prosecution's eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there
was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was
holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005;
TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim
(Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher, and the accused were pushing
each other, accused pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks
and on the 4th, the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the
circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been
fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which led to the victim's death
was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the
possession of the gun27

The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot
accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune
of sorts. While petitioner may not have intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time
he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was
too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the past that the nature and number of
wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a
plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioner's contention that an accident simultaneously
occurred while he was in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at
best. There could not have been an accident because the victim herein suffered a
gunshot wound on his head, a vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal
mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

Besides, petitioner's failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part
of Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his
claim of self-defense.29

In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-
defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for
upholding the justifying circumstance of sell-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or
repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.31 Hence, there is no
basis to entertain petitioner's argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of self-
defense is applicable in this case, because unless the victim has committed unlawful
aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on
the part of the latter.32

Anent petitioner's argument that the RTC erred when it failed to consider as
suppression of evidence the prosecution's alleged deliberate omission to present the
testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at the time of the shooting incident, the
same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of the CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-
defense, shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the
latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility
for the killing.

The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of
both the prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the
prosecution prevented the security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis
for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence.

The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the
opinion that their [the security guards] testimonies were vital and material
to the case of the defense. It could have compelled the security guards on duty to
appear before the court, xxx.33

It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is

essentially a question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine
the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of its superior
advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.35 This
being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to appreciate
facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited
petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the
CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense.36

In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner's contention that since the incident
transpired in Jeffrey's office, and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known
officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and
against petitioner. As correctly pointed out by respondent, there appears no motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner.37 The fact that
they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and
Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favor of Jeffrey for the mere purpose of
implicating petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying
under oath.

All told, we find no basis to doubt or dispute, much less overturn, the findings of the
RTC and the C A that the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply
shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute
sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.

Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of

an unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the
Information will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the
killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was further proved during trial by the presentation of
the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, dated November 11,
2005, certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind
and calibre, per verification from the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under
Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance, to wit:

xxxx

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

x x x x.

Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There
being an aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable
on petitioner should be in its maximum period.38 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum,
as the maximum penalty.

As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning
capacity in favor of private respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as
they are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of
exemplary damages in the present case in order, since the presence of special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been established.39 Based on
current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is P30,000.00.40

Finally, pursuant to this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and
damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed, computed from the time of
finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the
maximum penalty;

(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to ORDERED pay the heirs of the victim the
following:

a. the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d. the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;
f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of
six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until
full payment thereof; and
g. the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

________________________________________

December 11, 2014

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Madams:

Please take notice that on ___November 19, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of
which was received by this Office on December 11, 2014 at 9:30 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

________________________________________

Footnotes
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Isaias P. Dicdican, concurring;

Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 55-74.

[2] Id. at 75-76.

[3] Annex "C" to Petition, id. at 114.

[4] Emphasis supplied.

[5] Annex "P" to Petition, rollo, pp. 236-242.

[6] Id at 242.

[7] Supra note 1.

[8] Id. at 73.

[9] Id. at 24.

[10] People v. Escalios, 457 Phil. 580, 595 (2003).

[11] Id. at 594-595.

[12] Jacobo v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 7, 18 (1997).

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Supra note 10, at 596.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Supra note 5, at 240-241. (Emphasis supplied)

[19] Supra note 10, at 597.

[20] Id.

[21] Comment on Petition, id. at 385-386. (Emphasis supplied)

[22] Supra note 12, at 22.

[23] Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, pp. 172-173.

[24] 431 Phil. 691 (2002).

[25] People v. Obordo, supra, at 712.

[26] Supra note 5, at 241. (Emphasis supplied)

[27] Id. at 240. (Emphasis supplied)

[28] People v. Figuracion, 415 Phil. 12, 26 (2001).

[29] Id. at 28.

[30] Supra note 12, at 598.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Supra note 1, at 69. (Emphasis supplied)

[34] Supra note 12, at 22.

[35] Id. at 18.

[36] Id. at 22-23.

[37] Supra note 21, at 390.

[38] Revised Penal Code, Art. 64, par. 3.

[39] Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 198 (2006).

[40] Id.

[41] G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 7903 SCRA 439 (2013).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMBROSIO
GUTIERREZ, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 31010 | 1929-09-26

DECISION

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

This appeal is taken from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding
the accused guilty of homicide, and sentencing him to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The appeal is based upon the following three assignments of error: (1) In considering
only the testimony of the two interested witnesses for the prosecution, Rivero and
Pantangco; (2) in not sustaining the plea of self-defense of the accused; and (3) in
finding the accused guilty of the crime of homicide.
The accused does not deny having killed the deceased Emilio Paat. It is therefore
incumbent upon him, for his acquittal, to show satisfactorily that he committed the act
with complete justification.
He alleges self-defense; but upon a careful study of the evidence both for the
prosecution and the defense, and considering it as a whole, it cannot be held that the
accused's plea of complete self- defense has been sufficiently proven.
The plea of self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must be established by the
accused with sufficient and convincing evidence (U. S. vs. Coronel, 30 Phil., 112; and
People vs. Baguio, 43 Phil., 683).
The only thing disclosed by the evidence resulting from our examination thereof, is that
the accused actually tried to defend his brother-in-law Alberto Martin, who was attacked
by the deceased, which clearly shows that there was no sufficient provocation on the
part of the accused. Although we also believe, as was proven, that the accused was
unlawfully attacked, nevertheless, the aggressor was not the deceased but another
person named Joven. Consequently, this unlawful aggression cannot be considered in
this case as an element of self- defense; because, in order to constitute an element of
self-defense, the unlawful aggression to which the law refers must come, directly or
indirectly, from the person who was subsequently attacked by the accused. It has been
so held by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of May 6, 1907; nor can such
element of unlawful aggression be considered present when the author thereof is
unknown as was held in the decision of February 27, 1895, of said Supreme Court.
Only one of the three elements of self-defense can therefore be considered in the
present case, that is, the lack of provocation on the part of the accused, which we shall
consider as a mitigating circumstance (article 9, No. 1, Penal Code), not compensated
by any aggravating circumstance, for we find none in the record. Article 86 of the said
Code is not applicable to this case because most of the elements of complete exemption
provided in said Code are not present. Wherefore, the minimum penalty for homicide
must be imposed.
By virtue of the foregoing, and with the modification of the judgment appealed from as
to the principal penalty, the accused is hereby sentenced to twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, said judgment being affirmed in all other respects, with costs of
both instances against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
NICOLAS VELASQUEZ AND VICTOR VELASQUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 195021 | 2017-03-15

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code[1] admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal
liability. However, he asserts that he is justified in committing the acts. In the process
of proving a justifying circumstance, the accused risks admitting the imputed acts,
which may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating facts.
Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of
justifying circumstances.

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
accused petitioners pray that the assailed March 17, 2010 Decision[3] and December 10,
2010 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333 be reversed and
set aside, and that they be absolved of any criminal liability.

The Court of Appeals' assailed rulings sustained the July 25, 2007 Decision[5] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, which found petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder.

In an Information, petitioners Nicolas Velasquez (Nicolas) and Victor Velasquez (Victor),

along with four (4) others - Felix Caballeda (Felix), Jojo Del Mundo (Jojo), Sonny Boy
Velasquez (Sonny), and Ampong Ocumen (Ampong) - were charged with attempted
murder under Article 248,[6] in relation to Article 6,[7] of the Revised Penal Code, as
follows:

That on May 24, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Palua, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused while armed with
stones and wooden poles, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit JESUS DEL MUNDO inflicting
upon him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus
commenced a felony directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution
which could have produced the crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of some causes or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to his
damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code.[8]

All accused, except Ampong, who remained at large, pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment.[9] Trial then ensued.[10]

According to the prosecution, on May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus
and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut,
which was about 100 meters away.[11] Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses
saw Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having sex.[12] Aghast at what he
perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted
invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away.[13] Jesus decided to pursue
Ampong and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch their son, who was then
elsewhere.[14] Jesus went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora
was there.[15] He began making his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong
and his fellow accused.[16]

Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone.
Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone.[17] Accused Felix did the
same, hitting Jesus above his left ear.[18] Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo,
hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder.[19] Ampong punched Jesus on his left
cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid
behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got up and
staggered his way back to their house.[20]

Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the
prosecution also presented the testimony of Maria Teresita Viado (Maria Teresita).
Maria Teresita was initially approached by Jesus' wife, Ana, when Jesus failed to
immediately return home.[21] She and Ana embarked on a search for Jesus but were
separated.[22]At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid behind some
bamboos.[23] From that vantage point, she saw the accused mauling Jesus.[24] The
prosecution noted that about four (4) or five (5) meters away was a lamp post, which
illuminated the scene.[25]

At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she had
witnessed (Jesus had managed to return home by then).[26] Ana and Maria Teresita
then brought Jesus to Barangay Captain Pilita Villanueva, who assisted them in bringing
Jesus to the hospital.[27]

After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in
his skull.[28] Dr. Jose D. De Guzman (Dr. De Guzman) issued a medico-legal certificate
indicating the following findings:

x.x. Positive Alcoholic Breath

3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left

1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.

x.x.[29]

Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required medical attention for four (4) to six
(6) weeks.[30] Jesus was also advised to undergo surgery.[31] He was, however, unable
to avail of the required medical procedure due to shortage of funds.[32]

The defense offered a different version of events.

According to the accused, in the evening of May 24, 2003, petitioner Nicolas was
roused in his sleep by his wife, Mercedes Velasquez (Mercedes), as the nearby house of
petitioner Victor was being stoned.[33]

Nicolas made his way to Victor's place, where he saw Jesus hacking Victor's door.
Several neighbors - the other accused - allegedly tried to pacify Jesus.[34] Jesus, who
was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well
as on Mercedes.[35] The accused thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks, leading
to his injuries.[36]

In its July 25, 2007 Decision,[37] the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City
found petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder.[38] The court also found Sonny Boy Velasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of less serious physical injuries.[39] He was found to have hit Jesus on the back with a
bamboo rod. Jojo Del Mundo was acquitted.[40] The case was archived with respect to
Ampong, as he remained at large.[41]

The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

NICOLAS VELASQUEZ, VICTOR VELASQUEZ and FELIX CABALLEDA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Articles 6, paragraph 3 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code, and
pursuant to the law, sentences each of them to suffer on (sic) indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and one (1) day of Arrested (sic) Mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to eight (8) years of Prison (sic) Correctional (sic) in its maximum period to
Prison (sic) Mayor in its medium period as maximum and to pay proportionately to
private complainant Jesus del Mundo the amount of Php55,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the cost of suit.

The Court likewise finds the accused SONNY BOY VELASQUEZ [guilty] beyond
reasonable doubt of the [crime] of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized
under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and pursuant thereto, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Arresto Mayor on one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months.

Accused JOJO DEL MUNDO is hereby acquitted on the ground of absence of evidence.

With respect to accused AMPONG OCUMEN, the case against him is archived without
prejudice to its revival as soon as he is arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this
Court.[42]

Petitioners and Felix Caballeda filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Regional
Trial Court denied.[43]
On petitioners' and Caballeda's appeal, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners and
Caballeda were only liable for serious physical injuries because "first, intent to kill was
not attendant inasmuch as the accused-appellants, despite their superiority in numbers
and strength, left the victim alive and, second, none of [the] injuries or wounds inflicted
upon the victim was fatal."[44] The Court of Appeals thus modified the sentence imposed
on petitioners and Caballeda.

The dispositive portion of its assailed March 17, 2010 Decision[45] read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 25, 2007 Decision of Branch 41, Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City is hereby MODIFIED. Instead, accused-appellants are
found guilty of Serious Physical Injuries and each of them is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[46] (Emphasis in the original)

Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present
Petition.[47] They insist on their version of events, particularly on how they and their co-
accused allegedly merely acted in response to Jesus Del Mundo's aggressive behavior.

For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners may be held criminally liable for the
physical harm inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo. More specifically, this Court is asked to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence: first, to prove that justifying
circumstances existed, and second, to convict the petitioners.

Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves,
and also in defense of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother. Thus, they invoke
the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree,
provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm
upon another person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against
Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional,
defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted harm, he or she
nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own
person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an
erstwhile aggressor.

The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its
burden of proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis
of criminal liability. All that remains to be established is whether the accused were
justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own
merits:
It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense
to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by
credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated
when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted
and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution.[48]

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish:

"(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and

(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense."[49] Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in
case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the
defense had no part therein."[50]

The first requisite - unlawful aggression - is the condition sine qua non of self-defense
and defense of a relative:

At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression

committed against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a
leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated,
even if the other elements are present. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack
amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-
defense.[51]

The second requisite - reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the aggression - requires a reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression
and the defensive response: "[t]he means employed by the person invoking self-
defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense."[52] This is a matter that depends on the circumstances:

Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency,
the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more
than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof
does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury . . . As WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this kind,
human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted
upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act
irresponsible in law for the consequences.[53] (Citations omitted)

The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting a
defense to be reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited
the attacker into launching an assault. This also requires a consideration of
proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-Caballero,[54] "[p]rovocation is
sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel
one to attack the person claiming self-defense."[55]

II

We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be

sorely wanting.

Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by
barging into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and
threatening physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful
aggression originated from Jesus.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative

requires, petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim
that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They
failed to present independent and credible proof to back up their assertions. The
Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the way to
petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason.[56]

The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that
Jesus launched an assault despite the presence of at least seven (7) antagonists:
petitioners, Mercedes, and the four (4) other accused. They further assert that Jesus
persisted on his assault despite being outnumbered, and also despite their and their co-
accused's bodily efforts to restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly so likely to
harm them that, to neutralize him, they had no other recourse but to hit him on the
head with stones for at least three (3) times, and to hit him on the back with a bamboo
rod, aside from dealing him with less severe blows.[57]

As the Regional Trial Court noted, however:

The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the private
complainant and accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and
Jojo del Mundo, private complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the
accused. The said accused could have had easily held the private complainant, who was
heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of hitting him.[58]

The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:

3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left

1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.[59]

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to
him by petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have
sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his
supposed aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-
defense and of defense of a relative.

III

In addition to their tale of self-defense, petitioners insist that the testimony of Maria
Teresita is not worthy of trust because she parted ways with Ana while searching for
Jesus.[60] They characterize Maria Teresita as the prosecution's "lone
eyewitness."[61] They make it appear that its entire case hinges on her. Thus, they
theorize that with the shattering of her credibility comes the complete and utter ruin of
the prosecution's case.[62] Petitioners claim that Maria Teresita is the prosecution's lone
eyewitness at the same time that they aclmowledge Jesus' testimony, which they
dismissed as laden with inconsistencies.[63]

These contentions no longer merit consideration.

Petitioners' averment of justifying circumstances was dispensed with the need for even
passing upon their assertions against Maria Teresita's and Jesus' testimonies. Upon
their mere invocation of self-defense and defense of a relative, they relieved the
prosecution of its burden of proving the acts constitutive of the offense. They took upon
themselves the burden of establishing their innocence, and cast their lot on their
capacity to prove their own affirmative allegations. Unfortunately for them, they failed.

Even if we were to extend them a measure of consideration, their contentions fail to

impress.

Petitioners' primordial characterization of Maria Teresita as the "lone eyewitness," upon

whose testimony the prosecution's case was to rise or fall, is plainly erroneous. Apart
from her, Jesus testified about his own experience of being mauled by petitioners and
their co-accused. Maria Teresita's testimony was only in support of what Jesus
recounted.

Moreover, we fail to see how the mere fact of Maria Teresita's having parted ways with
Ana while searching for Jesus diminishes her credibility. No extraordinary explanation is
necessary for this. Their having proceeded separately may be accounted for simply by
the wisdom of how independent searches enabled them to cover more ground in less
time.
Regarding Jesus' recollection of events, petitioners' contention centers on Jesus'
supposedly flawed recollection of who among the six (6) accused dealt him, which
specific blow, and using which specific weapon.[64] These contentions are too trivial to
even warrant an independent, point by point audit by this Court.

Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of crime need not
be foolproof: "Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude every minute
detail of an event. This is especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which
transpired in rapid succession, attended by flurry and excitement."[65] This is especially
true of a victim's recollection of his or her own harrowing ordeal. One who has
undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience "cannot be expected to mechanically
keep and then give an accurate account"[66] of every minutiae.

Certainly, Jesus' supposed inconsistencies on the intricacies of who struck him which
specific blow can be forgiven. The merit of Jesus' testimony does not depend on
whether he has an extraordinary memory despite being hit on the head multiple times.
Rather, it is in his credible narration of his entire ordeal, and how petitioners and their
co-accused were its authors. On this, his testimony was unequivocal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 31333 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.

_______________

[1]
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 11 provides:

Article 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree,
provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the
first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present
and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present:

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office.

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 24-40.

[3]
Id. at 49-59. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-
Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Mario V.
Lopez of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4]
Id. at 60-62. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and
concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
of the Special Former Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[5]
No copy annexed to any of the parties' submissions.

[6]
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 248 provides:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of

an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public
calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim,
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

[7]
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 6 provides:

Article 6. Consummated, Frustrated, and Attempted Felonies. — Consummated felonies,

as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

[8]
Rollo, pp. 187-188. Memorandum.

[9]
Id. at 188.

[10]
Id.

[11]
Id. at 136. Comment.

[12]
Id. at 136-137. Comment.

[13]
Id. at 137.

[14]
Id.

[15]
Id.

[16]
Id.

[17]
Id.

[18]
Id.

[19]
Id.

[20]
Id. at 137-138.

[21]
Id. at 138.

[22]
Id.

[23]
Id.
[24]
Id.

[25]
Id.

[26]
Id.

[27]
Id. at 138-139.

[28]
Id. at 139.

[29]
Id.

[30]
Id. at 140.

[31]
Id. at 139.

[32]
Id.

[33]
Id. at 27.

[34]
Id.

[35]
Id.

[36]
Id.

[37]
No copy annexed to any of the parties' submissions.

[38]
Id. at 28.

[39]
Id.

[40]
Id.

[41]
Id. at 28-29.

[42]
Id. at 28.
[43]
Id. at 189. Memorandum.

[44]
Id. at 56.

[45]
Id. at 49-59.

[46]
Id. at 59.

[47]
Id. at 24-40.

[48]
Belbis v. People, 698 Phil. 706, 719 (2012) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division],
citing People v. Tagana, 468 Phil. 784, 800 (2004) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second
Division]; and Marzonia v. People, 525 Phil. 693, 702-703 (2006) [Per J. Quisumbing,
Third Division].

[49]
Id. at 719-720, citing People v. Silvano, 403 Phil. 598, 606 (2001) [Per J. De Leon,
Jr., Second Division]; People v. Plazo, 403 Phil. 347, 357 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division]; Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 335 (2001) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].

[50]
People v. Eduarte, 265 Phil. 304, 309 (1990) [Per J. Guttierez, Jr., Third Division].

[51]
People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, 602 (2003) [Per J. Azcuna, First Division],
citing People v. Saure, 428 Phil. 916, 928 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division];
and People v. Enfectana, et al., 431 Phil. 64, 77 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].

[52]
People v. Obordo, 431 Phil. 691, 712 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division],
citing People vs. Encomienda, 150-B Phil. 419, 433 (1972) [Per J. Makasiar, First
Division].

[53]
People v. Encomienda, 150-B Phil. 419, 433-434 (1972), citing People vs. Lara, 48
Phil. 153 , 159 (1925) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; People vs. Paras, 9 Phil. 367, 370
(1907) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division].

[54]
158 Phil. 827 (1974) [Per J. Muñoz-Palma, First Division].

[55]
Id. at 845.
[56]
Rollo, p. 196. Memorandum.

[57]
Id. at 27.

[58]
Id. at 196.

[59]
Id.

[60]
Id. at 34-37.

[61]
Id. at 34.

[62]
Id. at 34-37.

[63]
Id. at 37-38.

[64]
Id.

[65]
People v. Alolod, 334 Phil. 135, 141 (1997) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

[66]
People v. Rabosa, 339 Phil. 339, 346 (1997) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division],
citing People v Ching, 310 Phil. 269, 286 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 115233 February 22, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILSON GUTUAL Y REMOLLENA and JOAQUIN NADERA Y APOSTOL, accused.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On 26 June 1991, an information1 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum, Davao del Norte, Branch 1, charging Wilson Gutual and Joaquin Nadera with
the crime of murder (Criminal Case No. 7851). The accusatory portion thereof read:

That on or about December 29, 1990, in the Municipality of San Vicente, Province of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, armed with [a] garand rifle and
[an] M14 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Celestino Maglinte, thereby inflicting upon him wounds which caused his
death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the
victim.

Contrary to law.

The accused, members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographic Unit (CAFGU) in the
Municipality of San Vicente, Davao,2 pleaded not guilty on arraignment.3 Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

Judge Marcial Fernandez received the testimonies of all the witnesses except that of the
surrebuttal witness, which was received by his successor, Judge Bernardo V.
Saludares.4

At trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses, five of whom were related to the
victim by affinity. The defense, in turn, presented nine witnesses, including the two
accused and two barangay council officers. As might be expected, the prosecution and
defense had conflicting versions of the event.
According to the prosecution, on 29 December 1990, at around 1:30 p.m., the victim
Celestino Maglinte was walking along the barangay road of Belmonte in San Vicente,
Davao, carrying his four-year old child. The victim had just come from his farm and had
a bolo with him, which was placed in its scabbard. Maglinte was then surprised by the
sound of an exploding firecracker; thus, he left his child by the road and ran towards
the store of Barangay Captain Wayne Gutual, calling to the latter, who did not,
however, cone out of the store. Maglinte headed for the nearby basketball court,
apparently still searching for the Barangay Captain. All the while the bolo remained in
its scabbard. Suddenly, accused Wilson Gutual and Joaquin Nadera appeared, armed
with a Garand rifle and an M-14 rifle, respectively. Gutual fired around three warning
shots into the air and Maglinte dropped to the ground. Gutual then went near Maglinte
and shouted "surrender," thus Maglinte raised his right arm as a sign of submission. At
that time, Gutual fired some five shots at Maglinte. Although already injured, Maglinte
managed to stand. Thus, Gutual and Nadera fired again, and the victim toppled over,
mortally wounded. Gutual and Nadera left the scene at once. Immediately the following
morning, the victim was buried upon the Barangay Captain's order.5

The defense claims that the killing was committed in self-defense or defense of a
relative or stranger. It tried to prove that on the aforementioned date and time, the
victim was running amuck or berserk,6 chasing Barangay Captain Wayne Gutual in front
of the latter's house. Drawn by shouts for help from onlookers, accused Gutual and
Nadera rushed to the scene, with Gutual firing warning shots into the air. Maglinte
stopped pursuing the barangay captain, turned towards the accused, then started
approaching them. Although Gutual continued to fire warning shots, Maglinte kept
walking towards him, while Gutual kept retreating to put some distance between him
and the victim. The two moved some ten meters, crossed the road in front of the
barangay captain's house, and ended up near the barangay hall. Finally, Gutual was,
pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall. Maglinte was now about one to three
meters from Gutual and pressing on, unceasingly hacking away at Gutual, who,
however, managed to evade the blows. Nadera fired warning shots into the air, but
Maglinte continued his attack. Gutual then fired at the victim's hand to disarm him, but
unfortunately the bullet pierced Maglinte's bolo-wielding arm, went through his chest,
and came out his back.

Gutual and Nadera were arrested on 29 January 1991.7 Nearly two months after the
killing, some 200 residents of Barangay Belmonte held a rally in front of the police
station to demand the release of the two accused.8 The rallyists brought with them a
"manifesto"9 signed by barangay council officials and members which stated, among
other matters, that they knew Celestino Maglinte to be a dangerous person and that the
accused fired at the victim only after knowing that he would be killed by the latter.

On 2 January 1994, the trial court, per Judge Saludares, promulgated its
decision 10 acquitting Nadera but convicting Gutual. The dispositive portion of the
decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Wilson Gutual y
Remollena, 43 years of age, married, and a resident of Belmonte, San Vicente, Davao,
farmer by occupation, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information,
and is therefore hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law, and jointly and severally with his co-accused
Joaquin Nadera y Apostol, 42 years of age, married and a resident of Belmonte, San
Vicente, Davao, and a farmer by occupation, who is hereby acquitted of the criminal
charge on the ground of reasonable doubt, is/are hereby ordered to indemnify the
widow, Virginia Ayendo Vda. de Maglinte, and heirs of the victim, Celestino Maglinte, in
the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos by way of compensatory damages for
such death, Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos by way of moral damages, Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos by way of exemplary damages, and Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos as funeral and burial expenses. 11

Gutual (hereinafter, accused-appellant) seasonably appealed from the decision and

alleges that the lower court committed the following errors:

. . . IN FINDING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ACCUSED WILSON GUTUAL GUILTY

FOR MURDER AND IN IMPOSING CIVIL LIABILITY ON ACCUSED JOAQUIN NADERA.

II

. . . IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED WILSON GUTUAL ON GROUNDS OF EITHER SELF-

DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE, OR IN NOT CONSIDERING IN FAVOR OF
ACCUSED WILSON GUTUAL [THE] INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF [A] STRANGER.

III

. . . IN IMPOSING CIVIL LIABILITY ON ACCUSED JOAQUIN NADERA INSPITE OF HIS

ACQUITTAL.

IV
. . . IN NOT HOLDING THAT SELF-DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF [A] RELATIVE HAS BEEN
PROVEN BY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY ENOUGH TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
MORAL CERTAINTY. 12

These assigned errors may be reduced to two issues:

I. Whether or not Joaquin Nadera should be held civilly liable despite his acquittal; and

II. Whether or not Wilson Gutual has sufficiently proved self-defense or defense of a
relative or of a stranger, or, at the very least, the incomplete justifying circumstance of
self-defense or defense of a stranger.

In the alternative, the accused-appellant contends that should he be convicted of any

crime, it should be of homicide only, as the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. 13Moreover, the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense or defense of a relative should be considered in
the imposition of the penalty. 14

As to the first issue, the Office of the Solicitor General correctly points out that the
"[a]ppellant lacks the standing to question the court's decision as it is Nadera who is
affected thereby,"' and Nadera did not appeal from the said decision. 15 Section 11(a),
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not join in the appeal.

The second issue involves a question of fact.

Since the judge who penned the questioned decision, Judge Saludares, heard only one
of the witnesses and only at the surrebuttal stage, the respect ordinarily accorded the
trial court's findings of fact does not apply in this instance. 16 We are thus compelled to
sift through the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses.

After a painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find the version of the prosecution
unworthy of credence. First, it is scarcely believable for the victim who was already
thirty-two years of age to be "afraid of" the mere sound of an exploding firecracker, as
the prosecution witness intimated. 17 New Year's Day was then only two days away,
such that people, even those in the provinces, were already accustomed to hearing
such sound.

Second, it likewise seems unusual for the victim to leave his four-year old daughter by
the road; 18 if he was really afraid of the sound of a firecracker, he would have probably
thought that his child likewise was, and should have therefore put her in a safe place
before searching for the barangay captain.

Third, if the deceased's bolo was indeed in its scabbard, there was no reason then for
the two accused to fire three warning shots into the air. Having allegedly laid flat on the
ground with his right arm raised, 19 the victim posed no threat to the accused as would
prompt the latter to fire at him. Besides, it was only around half past one o'clock in the
afternoon, and a lot of people were in the vicinity. 20

Fourth, if it were true that what transpired was a cold-blooded murder, the family or
relatives of the victim would have insisted that the victim's corpse be autopsied.
Instead, they buried him immediately the following morning. 21

Finally, the Death Certificate dated 17 January 1991 22 belies the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that the accused was shot several times. 23 Although the doctor
who signed the death certificate did not actually examine the victim's corpse, the entry
regarding the cause of the victim's death, i.e., "Hypovolemia secondary to gunshot
wond, anterior chest, R forearm per informant's report," may be deemed conclusive,
since it was admittedly supplied by a relative of the deceased. Esmeraldo Miñoza, a first
cousin of the victim's wife, whose name and signature appears in the said certificate as
the informant, was presented by the defense as a hostile witness. He admitted to
having signed the certificate on behalf of Mrs. Virginia Maglinte, the victim's wife. 24 He,
howver, stated that the ones who gave the information regarding the injuries sustained
by the victim were the witnesses themselves, namely, "Eutiquio Iyana and Jose de
Leon, the one who cleaned up the wounds of victim Celestino Meglinte and some BHW
(Barangay Health Workers] of Barangay Belmonte." 25

At the rebuttal stage, Eutiquio Iyana, the husband of a first cousin of Mrs. Maglinte,
admitted to having given the doctor the information anent the wounds suffered by the
victim and seen the doctor write down the said information. 26 In fact, the victim's wife
was concededly present when the doctor filled up and signed the death certificate, and
she was even the one who secured that document . 27 If the entry made by the doctor
was different from what the informant reported, then it should have been questioned
right then and there by either Mr. Iyana or Mrs. Maglinte.

At any rate, since the accused-appellant owned up to killing the victim, the burden of
evidence shifted to him. He must then show by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in self-defense or in defense of a relative or a stranger. For that purpose,
he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. 28
As correctly posited by the Appellee, the defense of a relative or a stranger is unavailing
in this case. The accused-appellant shot the victim while the latter, after having stopped
chasing the barangay captain, was approaching the former. At that instance then, the
barangay captain's life was no longer in danger as the accused-appellant admitted.
Thus, on questions proposed by the court, the accused-appellant responded:

Q When Maglinte was chasing the barangay captain, you said that you were
concentrating on him alone. Is that correct?

A I was looking at Maglinte and I ordered him to stop, Your Honor.

Q What were the exact words you used?

A I told him "pare, stop. Do not bring a bolo with you because the people are afraid
of you."

Q Did Maglinte obey you?

A No, Your Honor. He did not speak and he did not put down the bolo.

Q What did he do after you cautioned him or warned him?

A After he stopped, he faced me and he slowly went towards me.

Q So, he discontinued chasing the barangay captain?

A Yes. He discontinued chasing the barangay captain and he slowly went towards
me, Your Honor.

Q At that time, the barangay captain's life was no longer in danger?

A Yes, because he already ceased chasing him.

Q And you insisted he approached you. Did Maglinte approach you?

A Yes, while he was going towards me, I was also stepping backward.

Q Did you warn him while he was chasing you?

A When he was slowly going towards me, I fired a warning shot, Your
Honor. 29 (emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, what might have been unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
against the barangay captain had ceased, and there was nothing more to prevent or
repel. Hence, the second requisite of the defense of a relative or a stranger under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz., reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, cannot be present.

Consequently, the accused-appellant has to rely solely on the justifying circumstance of

self-defense.

The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. 30

It was sufficiently established that the unlawful aggression came from the victim.
Indeed, since he was running amuck, he did not care anymore whom to attack or
whether the person to be attacked was unarmed or armed with a high-powered rifle.
Significantly, the entry in the Death Certificate corroborates the theory of the defense
that the victim was in the act of hacking the accused-appellant when the latter "shot
deceased's right hand for the purpose only of throwing the bolo out of his hand, but the
bullet pierced through and hit the deceased's breast. 31

There can be, as well, no doubt in the mind of the Court that there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused-appellant.

Whether the means employed by the accused-appellant were reasonable depends on

the circumstances of this case.

The trial court observed that a bolo-wielder did not stand a chance against a CAFGU
member "trained in the art of self-defense and close-in fighting [and] armed with a
Garand rifle." 32 As observed by the trial court, the accused-appellant.

[C]ould just have easily parried the alleged bolo-hacking of Celestino Maglinte, if ever
such version was true, with the use of his Garand Rifle, and could have applied close
fighting techniques which he was trained to do as a CAFGU member, and disarm
Maglinte of his bolo instead of shooting the victim. 33

It has, however, been duly established that the victim had a predilection for
violence. 34 Barangay Captain Wayne Gutual testified that on at least three previous
occasions, he had disarmed the victim:

Q Now, Mr. witness, may we know from you if you know the reason why the
deceased Celestino Maglinte would take your life?

A Regarding Celestino Maglinte, we have no grudge with each other. But because I
am the barangay captain, there were times that his wife Virginia will not yield to carnal
relation, that is why he would be violent and threaten her with bolo. That is why I
disarmed him three times already.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What did you disarm from Celestino?

A First, I was able to disarm him with hunting knife; second with bolo; and third
with a piece of hard wood. 35

The accused-appellant became the target of the victim's violent nature when, after the
victim stopped chasing the barangay captain, he turned to and vented his ire against
the accused-appellant. The victim menacingly walked towards the latter who, in turn,
kept walking backwards until he was pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall.
At that point, the victim unceasingly hacked away at the accused-appellant and
continued to move closer to him. When the victim was then only one meter away, he
raised the bolo, ready to strike the accused-appellant.

Plainly, the accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the
victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-
appellant, was poised to kill the latter. The danger to the accused-appellant's life was
clearly imminent. It would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should
have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which,
without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural than to
use the weapon he had to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the
instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense. 36 It is
settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires
is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the
emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the
instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury. 37

The accused-appellant has convincingly and sufficiently shown that he killed the victim
in the legitimate exercise of self-defense, a justifying circumstance. Pursuant to
paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant incurred no
criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. That portion of the challenged decision of
Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao in Criminal Case No. 7851 finding
accused-appellant WILSON GUTUAL Y REMOLLENA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the civil liabilities therein mentioned is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is
hereby entered ACQUITTING him of the charge. He should forthwith be released from
detention, unless his further detention is warranted for any other legal or valid ground.

Costs de oficio.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Original Records (OR), 1; Rollo, 4.
2
Counter-Affidavits of Joaquin Nadera and Wilson Gutual; OR, 22 and 23, respectively.
3
Id., 103.
4
Id., 252-253.
5
TSN, 4 December 1991, 30-37.
6
Huramentado, according to Joaquin Nadera (TSN, 16 December 1991, 15).
7
TSN, 6 September 1993, 11.
8
Id., 14.
9
Exhibit "3"; OR, 26.
10
Id., 252-289; Rollo, 16-53.
11
OR, 289.
12
Rollo, 71-72.
13
Rollo, 74.
14
Id.; 75.
15
Brief for the Appellee, 20.
16
See People vs. Bautista, 236 SCRA 102 [1994]. See also People vs. Pido, 200 SCRA 45
[1991]; People vs. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117 [1994]; People vs. Escalante, 238 SCRA 554
[1994].
17
TSN, 5 December 1991, 5.
18
TSN, 4 December 1991, 31-32; Id., 12-13.
19
Id., 33-34; Id., 6-7.
20
TSN, 4 December 1991, 19.
21
TSN, 5 December 1991, 23; TSN, 3 February 1993, 11, 20-21.
22
OR, 15.
23
TSN, 4 December 1991, 10, 16, 20-21; TSN, 5 December 1991, 7.
24
TSN, 15 September 1992, 7.
25
Id., 8.
26
TSN, 3 February 1993, 17, 27-28.
27
TSN, 5 December 1991, 27; Id., 22-24.
28
People vs. De La Cruz, 207 SCRA 632, 646 [1992]; People vs. Ybeas, 213 SCRA 793,
801 [1992]; People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653, 666 [1993]; People vs. Gomez, 235
SCRA 444, 451 [1994]; People vs. Albarico,238 SCRA 203, 211 [1994]; People vs.
Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558, 569 [1995]; People vs. Rivero, 242 SCRA 354, 358
[1995]; People vs. Aliviado, G.R. Nos. 113782-84, 14 August 1995.
29
TSN, 10 August 1992, 34-35.
30
Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code.
31
Rollo, 70.
32
OR, 34; Id., 49.
33
Id., 35; Id., 50.
34
See Section 34, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
35
TSN, 9 January 1992, 62-63.
36
U.S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. 367, 370 [1907].
37
People vs. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522, 534 [1972].
ROMEL JAYME y REFE, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

G.R. No. 124506 | 1999-09-09

A discussion citing this case or law is available.

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals1 [In CA-G.R. No. 16607, promulgated on January 31, 1996.] affirming, with
modification as to the penalty, that of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila,2
[In Crim. Case No. 92745.] convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide. He claimed self-
defense.

We sustain the appeal. Petitioner acted in legitimate self-defense. We acquit him of the
charge of frustrated homicide.

The Court of Appeals related both the prosecution and the defense version of the event,
as follows:

"The prosecution's version is that on May 25, 1992 at about 6:30 in the evening, Ramil
Cruz was on his way from his house to the Torres Store to buy ice when he saw the
accused Romel Jayme from distance of thirty meters walking towards him. Romel
passed by, and without provocation, suddenly stabbed him, hitting the left side of the
stomach. He thought he was boxed, and when he faced Romel, he was stabbed for the
second time, also on the left side (tsn, November 25, 1992). Edwin Cruz, a tricycle
driver, brother of Ramil, was then at the other aside of the street, and saw the stabbing
from a distance of about three (3) meters; he rushed towards his brother to help, and
was able to hold the right hand of Romel. Romel managed to free himself and turned
his ire at Edwin hitting the latter on the right arm. Edwin went to his house to call his
brother, Mario. Edwin and Mario picked up stones to throw at Romel, who was with two
other companions but Romel ran away (tsn, May 19, 1993). Ramil was brought to the
Polymedic Hospital where he was hospitalized for six (6) days, spending a total of
P27,276.20 in medical expenses. Dr. Agaton Manimtim testified that Ramil was treated
for two "perforating and penetrating" stab wounds, any of which could have caused the
victim's death if unattended (tsn, March 23, 1993).

"The version of the accused Romel Jayme is that on May 25, 1992, at about 5:45 in the
afternoon, he was fetching Nawasa water at Bautista Street, when his way was blocked
by a man, who said "Pare ito ba? Alalayan nyo ako" and then suddenly pulled a knife
from his right waist and thrust it on him. The accused twisted the hand of his assailant
and wrestled with the latter for possession of the knife. While he was twisting the hand
of his attacker, several persons were boxing him at the back. He was able to get hold of
the knife, and he swung it right and left; somebody hit him at the back of his head and
he fell; he dropped the knife in the process. He suffered a lacerated wound in the head.
He recognized his attackers only by face (tsn, June 30, 1993).

"Edmund Villanueva was presented by the defense. He testified that earlier in the
afternoon of the day, at about 5:00 o'clock, he met Edwin Cruz. The latter told him that
they had an enemy and were asking for help, and were waiting for someone. He
refused to give help and proceeded to the basketball court. After playing for fifteen
minutes, he was on his way home when Ramil Cruz suddenly appeared and boxed
Romel Jayme. He also testified that he saw Ramil Cruz coming from the house of Celso
Ramirez, where there was drinking session (tsn, Aug. 4, 1993)."3 [Decision, CA-G.R. CR
No. 16607, Rollo, pp. 25-32, 26-27.]

Then, the Court of Appeals concluded, going along with the trial court, that:

"x x x

"x x x Ramil Cruz was in a drinking session before the incident and was under the
influence of liquor when he boxed the accused without provocation. Surprised at the
sudden attack, Jayme drew a knife and used it against Ramil. When Edwin arrived to
come to the assistance of his brother Ramil, Edwin succeeded in wresting the knife
from the accused who ran away."

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals found that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim Ramil Cruz. He attacked the accused suddenly and
boxed him. There was no provocation on the part of the accused.

Accordingly, on January 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
affirming that of the trial court convicting accused-appellant of frustrated homicide, but
credited him with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Hence, this appeal.

On July 10, 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice.4 [Rollo, p. 36.] On September 10,1996, the Solicitor General
filed his comment. On November 18, 1996, petitioner filed a reply to comment,5 [Rollo,
pp. 51-57.] as required in the Court's resolution of October 2, 1996.6 [Rollo, p. 50.]

The Court of Appeals held that "there was no reasonable necessity for appellant to draw
a knife and stab the victim, inflicting upon the latter two stab wounds which could have
caused his death."

In his comment, the Solicitor General Agreed that there was attendant the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. He submitted that there was no
reasonable necessity for the accused to use a knife to repel the attack.

We disagree with both the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals found that "the evidence established the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
appellant."

In making such finding, the appellate court recognized that the complainant was the
aggressor, that the aggression was real and imminent, not merely imaginary.7 [People
vs. Francisco de la Cruz, 61, Phil. 422, 427 (1935)] "The aggression must be of such a
nature as to have placed in real peril the life or the personal safety or the rights of the
accused."8 [Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed. Vol 1, p. 136.] "In
other words, there must have been an outward and material attack upon the person
defending himself or a wrongful act showing the aggressor's wrongful intent, not
merely a threatening attitude."9 [Ibid., at p. 137.]

"Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or

imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude; there
has to exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-
defense."10 [People vs. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474, 488 (1998), citing People vs. Boniao,
217 SCRA 653, 667 (1993); People vs. Talinting, G.R. No. 107747, October 20, 1997;
People vs. Villamor 292 SCRA 384,396 (1998); People vs. Panes, 278 SCRA 357 (1997);
People vs. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472 (1997); Escoto vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 752
(1997)]
The remaining question is whether there was reasonable necessity for the means
employed by petitioner to repel the attack.

Consider the factual situation at the time, as found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. It was about 7:00 in the evening of May 25, 1992. Petitioner was walking
along Bautista St., Pasig City on the way home. He was carrying a pail of water he had
fetched from the public faucet when suddenly complainant Ramil Cruz blocked his way
and attacked him with fist blows. Ramil Cruz was in a drinking session before the
incident and was under the influence of liquor when he boxed the accused without
provocation. He was with his brothers and three other persons. Surprised at the sudden
attack, accused drew a knife and used it against complainant. His brother Edwin came
to his immediate succor and succeeded in wresting the knife. Under that situation, in
the darkness of the night, with the element of surprise in the assault, and his
perception that the aggressor was armed with a knife and together with three or more
persons was ganging up on him, it was reasonable for petitioner to use a knife to
disable his adversary. "His knife was his only means of defense, and under the
circumstances of the case there was clearly a reasonable necessity for him to make use
of it. It cannot be said with any certainty that his life was not in danger. When a
highwayman brutally assault one in the dark and tries to take away one's only means of
defense, it is reasonable to believe that one's life is endangered."11 [People vs. Reyes,
60 Phil. 858, 861 (1934)] According to the accused , three other persons joined Ramil in
attacking him, one hitting him on his head, causing him to drop the knife. He then ran
away. His head injury is duly proved.12 [Exhs. 1, 1-a, Annex "B", Petition, Rollo, p.24.]

To support its decision, the Court of Appeals cited the cases of People vs. Montalbo;13
[56 Phil. 443 (1931)] People vs. Gutierrez;14 [209 SCRA 206 (1992)] and People vs.
Madali.15 [188 SCRA 69 (1990)] None of these case is applicable.

In Montalbo, the factual situation was different. There, the trial court found that the
deceased attacked the accused with his fist. However, there was no sufficient proof that
the attack took place before the accused used his knife. The court did not accept the
version of the defense. Rather, the court found that he deceased being wounded in the
chest could not have attacked the accused. In other words, unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim was not proved, aside from which the court ruled that the accused
was not justified in mortally wounding his assailant with fan knife.16 [At p. 445.]

In Gutierrez, the court ruled that first, the accused has not proved the first requirement
of self-defense, which is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim against his killer.
This is a condition sine qua non.17 [At p. 208.] In the second place, the accused
claimed that he accidentally stabbed the victim while parrying his attack. This does not
square with his subsequent testimony that it was the deceased who grabbed the knife
and that the accused stabbed the older man during their struggle.18 [At p. 212.]

In Madali, the court ruled that for self-defense to prosper, it must be positively shown
that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the accused's life
in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant,
employing therefor reasonable means to resist the attack. The court ruled that the
allegation that accused's residence was hurled with stones before he confronted the
Gasang group was not credibly established. It was not shown that the victims were
armed with clubs and knife and even if it is were so, the accused's means of resisting
them was unreasonable under the circumstance. The accused, a policeman, fired at the
victims with his service revolver and all four shots hit their targets.

The circumstances in the three cited cases are totally different from the case at bar,
and consequently, none of them is applicable herein.

Consequently, we rule that petitioner employed reasonable means to repel the sudden
unprovoked attack he was the victim.19 [See People vs. Ignacio, 58 Phil. 858 (1933);
Cf. People vs. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522 (1972); People vs. Viernes, 262 SCRA 641
(1996)]

"Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one
who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make
comparisons which can easily be made in the calmness of the home. It is not the
indispensable need but the rational necessity which the law requires. In each particular
case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in
accordance with the rules of rational logic. The defendant may be given the benefit of
any reasonable doubt as to whether he employed rational means to repel the
aggression."20 [Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, op cit. At pp. 145-146,
citing People vs. Amante, 47 Phil. 8 (1924)]

"The rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application; it depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case. One who is assaulted does not have the time nor
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. The
reason is obvious, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon
processes of formal reason but obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when
it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the
court to sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the
consequences."21 [Ibid, at pp. 149-150; People vs. Viernes, supra.]

In light of the foregoing, petitioner has duly proved all the essential elements of self-
defense, namely, unlawful aggression on the part of the complainant; reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused.22 [Article 11, (1), Revised Penal Code; People
vs. Galapin, supra, at p. 488; People vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349, 356 (1998); People vs.
Villamor, 292 SCRA 384, 395 (1998); People vs. Viernes, supra.] He is entitled to an
acquittal.

WHEREFORE, THE Court hereby REVERSES and SET ASIDE the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 16607, promulgated on January 31, 1996, and
ACQUITS the accused-appellant Romel Jayme y Refe, with cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno,(Acting Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.