G.R. No.

166414, October 22, 2014

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners, v. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G.
CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR. 1)
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

A mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18, 2003

outside the house of the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan,
MeycauayanBulacan gave rise to the issue subject of the said appeal. Claiming
themselves to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina GuintoMorano, Rommel Morano
and Perla Beltran Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile.

The MTC issued its joint resolution whereby it found probable cause and set the
arraignment against the petitioners for less serious physical injuries. The petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the joint resolution arguing that the complainants
had not presented proof of their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or
longer, thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible;
and that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to
the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
should not be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. However, the MTC
denied it. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation to file a motion to
quash.

The MTC denied the motion to quash.Still, the petitioners sought

reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but it was likewise
denied.Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certioraribefore
the RTC. However, the RTC dismissed the petition. The petitioners next went to the CA
via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders issued by the RTC. CA
promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal.

Hence, this petition before the Court.

In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the
"complaints do not provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show
that the medical attendance rendered on private complainants actually and in fact
lasted for a period exceeding ten (10) days;" and the medical certificates attached
merely stated that "the probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for
Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15 days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the
healing periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures. "They insist that
the "private complainants should have presented medical certificates that would show
the number of days rendered for medication considering that they filed their complaint
on March 15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the alleged incident."

HELD:
the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint
or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face.

Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or
information, as follows:

(a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed
by law;

(g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and

(i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is,
therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense.

By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for lack of one of
the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that the facts
charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer to
the law defining the offense charged, which, in this case, is Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which
pertinently states:

Article 265. Less serious physical injuries – Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require
medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely:

(1) that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and

(2) that the physical injuries inflicted either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the
injuries required medical assistance for more than 10 days.

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged the
petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate
facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to
undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the
complaints were not quashable.

In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the “complaints do not
provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show that the medical attendance rendered
on private complainants actually and in fact lasted for a period exceeding ten (10) days;” and the medical
certificates attached merely stated that “the probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for
Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15 days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the healing periods
were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures.” They insist that the “private complainants should
have presented medical certificates that would show the number of days rendered for medication
considering that they filed their complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the alleged
incident.”

As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the
victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before
or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan, the preliminary
investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the parties’ respective affidavits, counter-
affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare the information. It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the
court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the
accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be
removed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY

G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B.
OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
 [G.R. No. 174786]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO

G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

FACTS: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete
the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,”

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of . Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge the following as
principals to the crime of hazing: Alvarez ET AL ,

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the
finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing:
Bayabos ET The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper
administrative proceedings against respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging
Bayabos et alas accomplices to the crime of hazing.

the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against

the principal accused, Alvarez et al.

argument of BAYABOS FOR QUASHAL

Bayabos et al filed a Motion to Quash the Information. They argued that the Information did not
contain all the essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no
allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA,
especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they
stressed that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a
sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the Information of any
assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the “physical, mental, and psychological testing
and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members.” Furthermore, they emphasized that there
was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had
permitted the activity.

As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could
have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must
be dismissed.

PROSECUTOR’s CONTENTION
The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information
alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential
ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the
law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the
accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the
issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the supposed hazing had been
made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the academy was considered an
“organization” within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
SANDIGANBAYAN DECISION ON QUASHAL
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against
them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et
al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as
accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that
before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter
being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators
to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have cooperated in the
execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against the principals, the
court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand on
its own.

Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with
this Court on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October
2006, another Petition challenging SB Resolution II.

HELD:

Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole
ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled
rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even
the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
In People v. Rafael, the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: “The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long
as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.”
Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those
charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of
the alleged principal.

as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against

respondents. resolution of the sandiganbayan

Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional
right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be
“sufficient.” One of the key components of a “sufficient information” is the statement of the acts
or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint. The information must
also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to enable persons of common
understanding to know the offense being charged against them. This approach is intended to
allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed. The
information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied upon.

At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is
the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an
information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test 30 is to determine if the facts averred
would establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. The
information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as
these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the
information, matters aliunde are not taken into account

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSEPH ASILAN Y TABORNAL,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION