PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v.

DRILON
G.R. No. 81958; June 30, 1988

Facts:

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas placement, challenges the constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment. The
measure is assailed for discrimination against males or females that it does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is
violative of the right to travel. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the POEA, invokes the police power of the State.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the enactment of D.O. No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or not D.O. No.1 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. Police power is the
domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) No. D.O. No. 1 applies only to female contract workers, but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance
the protection for Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.
 ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995; May 31, 1957

Facts:

Republic Act 1180 or An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides
for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging
from retail trade in our country. Lao Ichong filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law, on the grounds that it violated several treaties which under the rule of
pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by
the Court in good faith, it denied to alien residents the equal protection of the laws, and it
deprived of their liberty and property without due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No. The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, through which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement.
 LUTZ v. ARANETA
G.R. No. L-7859; December 22, 1955

Facts:

Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Antonio Ledesma,
sought to recover from the CIR a certain sum of money paid by the estate as taxes, under
section 3 of the CA 567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it
provided for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such
enactment is not being levied for a public purpose but solely and exclusively for the aid and
support of the sugar industry thus making it void and unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling:

Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of
the police power. The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the
state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of
the population of the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be within the
police power of the sovereign.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742; July 14, 1989

Facts: Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. In these
cases, petitioners primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No.
131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. The respondent invokes the police power of the State.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise of police
power.

Ruling: No. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise
of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
LOZANO v. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
Law punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment." Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that it offends the
constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt and it contravenes the equal protection
clause.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling: Yes. While it may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a
person for nonpayment of a debt ex contractu, certainly it is within the prerogative of the
lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts
mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on
the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can
do this in the exercise of its police power. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS v. SAN DIEGO
G.R. No. 89572; December 21, 1989

FACTS: The petitioner disqualified the private respondent who had actually taken and failed
four times the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) from taking it again on the basis of the
NMAT rule that A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY THREE (3) CHANCES TO TAKE
THE NMAT. AFTER THREE (3) SUCCESSIVE FAILURES, A STUDENT SHALL NOT BE
ALLOWED TO TAKE THE NMAT FOR THE FOURTH TIME. But the private respondent
squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the
said rule based on constitutional grounds: right to academic freedom and quality education, due
process and equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING: Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the subject of the challenged
regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. While every person is entitled to
aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.
YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT
GR No. L-74457; March 20, 1987

Facts: President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626, which prohibits the transport of
carabaos or carabeefs from one province to another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate
slaughter of these animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo
where they were confiscated for violation of the said order. He sued for recovery and challenges
the constitutionality of the said order. The lower court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos. He appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which upheld the lower
court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling: No. E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as
cited in Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The Court does not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to
it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the
animal. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, Series of 1964, requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of its total area for the
burial of paupers, on the ground that it is contrary to the Constitution. The petitioner contends
that the said order was a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The
respondent court declared the said order null and void.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling: No. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are duties of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries. As defined, police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD
G.R. No. 175356; December 3, 2013

FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20%
discount on certain establishments. To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary
of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but
only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 as it
contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution. Respondents invoke the legitimate exercise
of the State’s police power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police
power.

RULING: Yes. The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at
their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities,
and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens
who presumably spent their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation.
In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally
regarded as police power measures.