Marcelo Dascal

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Types of Polemics and Types of

Polemical Moves

In the spiritual Warfare, where our Adversary is the old Serpent,

Stratagems are as lawful as Expedient.

*Robert Boyle*

The man who is seeking to convert another in the proper manner should do
so in a dialectical and not in a contentious way ... he who asks
questions in a contentious spirit and he who in replying refuses to
admit what is apparent ... are both of them bad dialecticians.

*Aristotle*

Even more precious perhaps is the tradition that works against the
ambivalence connected with the argumentation function of language, the
tradition that works against that misuse of language which consists in
pseudo-arguments and propaganda. This is the tradition and discipline of
clear speaking and clear thinking; it is the critical tradition -- the
tradition of reason.

*Karl Popper*

1. Motivation <#mot>
2. Methdological remarks <#met>
3. Three ideal types of polemical exchanges <#exc>
4. Three ideal types of moves <#mov>
5. Concluding remarks <#con>
Notes <#not>
References <#ref>

1. Motivation

My first objective in this paper is to persuade dialogue analysts of all

persuasions of the importance of polemical exchanges, and thereby to
prompt them to apply to this kind of "dialogues" their analytical tools
and skills. My second objective is to pre sent a number of distinctions
I have developed in the course of my research on polemical exchanges, in
the hope that they provide a useful framework for further research on
this topic. My third objective -- in fact, my "hidden agenda" -- is to
propose ne w grounds and new objectives upon which a fruitful
interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophical and empirical
approaches to the study of dialogue can be reinstated.

1.1 Is it really necessary to persuade anyone that polemical discourse

occupies a central place in our public and private discursive lives?
Hardly so. Whichever way we look, we are entangled in endless
polemicizing: from daily domestic quarrels, through d isputes over
parking places or office space, to political dissension; from talk-show
discussions, through labor conflicts, to policy decisions; from mild
disagreement, through bitter bickering, to schism; from critical book
reviews, through congress round -tables, to scientific controversies; in
matters of literary taste, in the courtrooms, in the workplace, in
parliaments, and at home.

No doubt social and cultural (as well as individual) variation obtains

here as elsewhere in communicative practices, and one may distinguish,
as suggested by Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1994, 82ff.), between those
societies driven by an ethos confronta tionnel (the example she gives is
Israeli society) and those whose regulatve ethos is rather consensuel
(like the Japanese society). Nevertheless, even in the latter, the
elaborate politeness devices used to prevent explicit polemical
confrontations that might harm one's face suggest that they do not
overlook the importance of polemics but rather conduct them in a covert
rather than overt way. It would seem, then, that in one way or another
people everywhere are constantly engaed in either defending them selves,
attacking somebody else, or avoiding open confrontation. So much so that
it makes sense to argue, with McEvoy (1995), that "defensive invention"
is a basic and universal communicative skill. No wonder that several
cultural traditions assigned so m uch importance to developing,
imparting and employing this skill: recall the importance of rhetoric in
ancient and medieval education, the reliance on disputationes up to the
seventeenth century and on their equivalents (oposiciones in Spain,
defense de t hese in France) in order to grant university degrees, the
Talmudic detailed record of the sages' discussions in establishing the
halakha, the immense popularity of the Chan-kuo Tse in ancient China,
even though the stratagems it teaches were considered un ethical, etc.

And yet, despite the obvious importance of polemical exchanges, dialogue

analysts have not so far devoted to them the special attention they
deserve. So much so that as recently as 1989 Roulet rightly pointed out
that controversy was a "little studied" kind of "agonal exchange". Of
course there are welcome exceptions. Prompted largely by Perelman's
rehabilitation of rhetoric (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970),
"argumentation" studies have flourished (see, e.g., Lempereur, 1991; and
many articles in the journal Argumentation). The philosophy, sociology
and history of science have recently turned their attention to
scientific controversies (e.g., Engelhardt Jr. and Caplan (eds.), 1987;
Gil (ed.), 1990; Gil, 1985; Granger, 1985), and it is hoped that the
newly created "rhetoric of science" (e.g., McCloskey, 1984, 1995; Gross
1990; Pera 1991) will soon follow suit. But these studies have not, for
the most part, been concerned with the dialogical characteristics of
polemical exchanges, and co nsequently have not employed the conceptual
tools of dialogue analysis and pragmatics. Noteworthy exceptions are
attempts to chart the dialogical field to which controversy belongs
(e.g., Jacques 1991), and the use of speech act theory (e.g., van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 19..), pragmatics (e.g., Dascal 1989, 1990a),
rhetoric (Pera 1991), and related conceptual tools in the study of
controversies. By and large, however, the theme of polemical exchanges
is still awaiting for a concerted research effort by the dialogue
research community.

1.2 Polemical exchanges are especially important in epistemology -- to

wit the centrality of dialectics in Western thought, from Plato and
Aristotle, through Kant and Hegel, to Popper and Kuhn. For these and
many other thinkers, knowledge is achieved thro ugh the exercise of
critical reason. No doubt many philosophers and scientists prefer to
exercise criticism in the inner fore of their thoughts, or in
monological discussions of others' texts, or else in fictive dialogues
they write so as to be in full co ntrol of the opponents' replies. These
preferences notwithstanding, criticism is primarily a form of dialogical
activity, which manifests itself most naturally in polemical exchanges
of various sorts. Furthermore, such a critical activity constitutes the
most immediately relevant context both for understanding the meaning of
a theory and for accounting for conceptual change in any domain.

With their professional bias towards abstraction, philosophers and

historians of ideas have not showed particular interest for the
empirical study of critical activity as it deploys itself in dialogical
praxis. It is up to pragmatics, conversat ional and dialogue analysis,
rhetoric, and related disciplines concerned with the study of language
use, to take up this challenge, and to help epistemologists to flesh out
their abstract models of criticism with fresh and insightful empirical
evidence.

Belonging as I do to these two communities, it is only too natural that,

lest I relished in a split self, I should try to harmonize them, by
somehow making the toils of each of them useful for the other. In fact,
there is also a bit of nostalg y in this endeavor. Once upon a time
philosophy and rhetoric, logic and dialectics, and pragmatics and the
philosophy of language were happily married. Wittgenstein, Grice, and
Austin, each in his own way, raised the problems that opened a
theoretical spa ce for pragmatics, and provided some of this
discipline's foundational concepts, by way of pursuing typical
philosophical inquiries (cf. Dascal, 1994).

But there is more to it than sheer saudades of the happy time of the
pioneers, which may not have been, after all, so harmonious. Current
debates about the "foundations" of speech act theory (e.g., Tsohatzidis
(ed.), 1994 and its critique by W eigand, 1996) and of pragmatics in
general (e.g., the special issue (in volume 17, 1992) of the Journal of
Pragmatics devoted to this topic), about how to develop an action-based
dynamic and dialogical grounding of the study of language use (e.g.,
Vernan t 1996), about the universality or culture-specific character of
communicative competence and practice (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1993;
Blum-Kulka, 1992), about the "correct" number of the conversational
maxims (e.g., Rolf, 1989) and the (in)sufficiency of the pr inciple of
cooperation (e.g., Attardo, 1997) -- all this shows that the field of
research created by the pioneers is far from having secured sound
philosophical foundations. Progress towards this aim requires further
dialogue between dialogue researchers and philosophers.

But philosophy too -- in particular epistemology -- has much to gain

from such a dialogue. It is no big news that, for quite a while, the
"modern" notion of rationality has come under heavy "post-modern" fire
(cf. Cohen and Dascal (eds.), 1989 ). Nor is it big news that the split
between normativist and descriptivist approaches within epistemology in
general and the philosophy of science in partiular -- a split that,
among other things, touches upon the question whether one can speak of
the "gr owth of knowledge" in terms of rational criteria or not --
rather than subsiding has been increasing, leading the field to a true
impasse (cf. Dascal, 1995c). And it is also well-known that
philosophers, who for some time have discussed the issue of "cult ural
relativism" as if it did not affect the very nature of philosophy
itself, are now aware that this is not the case (cf. Dascal (ed.),
1991).What is at stake, in all these crucial issues of present-day
philosophy, is the very issue of the possibility o f communication --
between radically opposed "paradigms", between deeply different
"conceptual schemes", between apparently irreconcilable conceptions of
rationality and of its role in our knowing, acting, and communicating.

Under these circumstances, it is no longer possible to base one's theory

of communication -- as both Grice and Searle did, and as action-based
theories of dialogue do -- upon an unexamined principle of
(instrumental) rationality and upon the pr esumption that successful
communication and understanding are the rule and misunderstanding and
miscommunication the exception. Nor is it possible anymore to sit back
and wait until philosophy disentangles itself by its own means, so as to
finally -- once more -- clear the conceptual ground for empirical
research to proceed. The "hidden agenda" I suggest consists in
emphasizing the importance of the opposite direction. I am convinced
that, by studying empirically those cases -- such as polemical exchanges
-- where communication seems to be at odds with the old comfortable
notions of cooperation and rationality, and yet still to be possible, we
may contribute to the solution of the philosophical impasses alluded to
above. We may find out, for example, that controversies display a
special kind of "rationality" and "normativity" which cannot be reduced
neither to the strictures of idealized logic nor to the sheer exercise
of power in what amounts to no more than conflicts of interests (cf.
Dascal, 1996). Wha tever we find out, it is sure to be exciting and
important: exciting because the dialogue with empiria, in order to be
worth its while, must be open to surprises, to imprevisibility, just
like the dispute with a real opponent always is; important because it
will be relevant to some of the major intellectual (and practical)
issues of our time, as well as to the conceptual foundations of the
empirical study of dialogue.

2. Methodological remarks

I have been arguing for an empirical study of polemical exchanges as a

means to solve certain acute philosophical problems -- in particular, as
a way to address the problem of "rationality" by examining critical
activity as it is displayed in polemical ex changes. But -- the reader
might justly complain -- my argumentation here, and perhaps my
methodology in general, is all but "empirical". In fact, it seems to be
a classical example of a "top-down" strategy: I begin with providing a
"philosophical" motiva tion for studying a certain kind of phenomena; I
go on by anticipating the kinds of conclusions I expect from such a
study; and, as will be clear in what follows, I propose a typology for
the phenomena to be studied consisting in quite abstract "ideal typ es".
I even dismiss in advance possible counter-examples to this typology
(e.g., cases that do not fit any of the ideal types proposed) by
claiming that "real cases" are always "impure", for they involve a
mixture of the three ideal types -- a claim typic al of all those who
favor theoretical elegance over a close fit to the data.[1] <#1>

So, I have to explain my apparently self-contradictory methodological

stance. The explanation is that it is neither strictly top-down nor
strictly bottom-up. In fact, when I began to study actual controversies,
my main methodological assumption was that the conceptual tools of
pragmatics could be applied to them -- a rather harmless top-down
assumption (see Dascal, 1989, 1990a). I was surprised to discover a
correlation between the contenders' preferred use of certain
argumentative patterns and their epistemological conceptions about the
nature of knowledge and of its production. It was only in the light of
further studies of actual controversies that the typology presented
below gradually emerged, and its correlation with epistemological issue
s was further explored.[2] <#2> At present, I view my proposal as a
general hypothesis, which I want to be put to test by further empirical
studies of a broad range of polemical exhanges.

This sounds like a perfectly run-of-the-mill application of the

"hypothetico-deductive method". I mention it because it highlights the
fact that we never begin either at the "top" or at the "bottom", but
rather somewhere in the middle, for t he simple reason that we don't
know what is the top and what is the bottom -- both being relative to
the current state of research. Progress is made by moving both "upwards"
and "downwards", by treating "analysis" and "synthesis" (in Leibniz's
sense) as a lways going hand in hand, and thereby by actually treating
knowledge as both "bottomless" and "topless". This is, anyhow, my
methodological stance.

A further methodological clarification is in order. There are many

"levels of organization of dialogue", many ways of distinguishing
between these levels, and many ways of analyzing their structure.[3]
<#3> Polemical exchanges sh ould be studied at all of this levels, of
course. Here, I will focus on two "macro" levels of organization, which
might be called, respectively, "strategical" and "tactical". The former,
which is akin to what Jacques (1991) calls "discursive strategies", has
to do with the global pattern of a polemical exchange -- its overall
aims, its general thematic and hierarchical structure, and the
corresponding assumptions about its "rules" (if any) and its mode of
resolution. The latter has to do with the nature o f the moves and
countermoves employed at specific points in the exchange, in the light
of the varying contingencies or "demands" (cf. Dascal, 1977) of the
polemics as it unfolds; this "tactical" level is part and parcel of a
polemical dialogue's "pragmati c structure" (cf. Dascal,1992) or
sequential organization. In both, its strategical and its tactical
level, polemical exchanges share much with other forms of dialogue, but
I will naturally focus on their peculiarities, which I will present in
terms of tw o sets of ideal types. The study of these "macro" levels
does not preclude the need for a detailed analysis of of their "micro"
components. Quite on the contrary, it should be complemented and
supported by such an analysis. Once more, I am here beginning in the
"middle" (with a slight tendency towards the "top"), relying on others
to continue upwards and downwards.

3. Three types of polemical exchanges

A polemical exchange involves at least two persons who employ language

to address each other, in a confrontation of attitudes, opinions,
arguments, theories, and so forth. The important expressions in this
definition are address each other and confrontati on. The former
stresses the interactive aspect ("exchange", "dialogue") and the latter,
the content of the interaction, as perceived by the participants. Both
expressions require clarification, which is best achieved by pointing
out how they determine the extension of the field of "polemical exchanges".

3.1 The address-each-other requirement excludes from this field all

sorts of polemical discourse in which one of the "participants" is
unable to actually participate, i.e. all those polemics where there is
no real dialogue. For example, the "critical rece ption" of a (deceased)
author's work -- e.g., Popper's diatribes against Marx, Hegel, and
Plato, in his The Open Society and its Enemies. Similarly, it excludes
the literary and philosophical genre "dialogue", where one of the
parties is not the actual pr oducer of his interventions -- e.g.,
Plato's, Leibniz's, Hume's "dialogues". Although such works may echo
polemical exchanges that really took place (and may thus help to
reconstruct them), they cannot be taken as reliable records of such
exchanges. The r eason for excluding these cases has to do with my
insistence on viewing polemics as an activity, and -- more importantly
-- an activity that always involves an element of uncertainty regarding
the opponent's reactions. The amount of uncertainty varies wit h the
type of polemical exchange (ritualized forms, such as the obligatio,
allow for little inventiveness). Nevertheless, a live, real, and active
(i.e., neither dead, nor imaginary, nor silent) opponent is
unpredictable in his/her reactions. Although we may anticipate to some
extent our opponent's reactions, and even undertake to manoeuver her to
react in a certain way, polemics is essentially a game where our
capacity for predicting the adversary's move is limited. For this to be
possible, each contende r must be able to exercise the right to contest
not only the opponent's views but also the latter's renderings (quotes,
summaries, interpretations) of his [the former's] positions. Since this
right can be put to use either privately or publicly, either or ally or
in written form, either directly or indirectly (e.g., through
intermediaries), all of these forms of confrontational interaction
should be considered "polemical exchanges".

The second requirement amounts to the acknowledgment of the fact that

every polemical exchange involves "opposed views" regarding some
"content". Both of these notions shoud be conceived broadly, for both
the nature of the content and of the op position leading to a polemical
exchange may vary considerably. The latter may range from logical
contradiction or weaker forms of logical contrariness, through
differences in semantic or pragmatic presuppositions, up to
pragmatically construed contrasts (such as those implicit in most uses
of but (cf. Dascal and Katriel, 1977), etc. The opposed "contents", in
turn, refer not only to specific propositional contents on a variety of
matters (factual, methodological, evaluative, etc.), but also to
illocutio nary force, attitudes, preferences, emphasis, judgments of
appropriateness and relevance, etc. All these may give rise to polemical
exchanges, regardless of whether they are "truly" opposed. What matters
is that the contenders perceive them as being oppos ed and consequently
engage in a debate having such contents as its explicit or implicit object.

As an object of study, polemical exchange thus consists primarily in

those texts or utterances directly addressed by each disputant to the
other (or others), privately or publicly. In addition to this "primary
text", there is in general a va st "secondary text" which, at least
partially, belongs to the exchange. It includes, for instance, works or
other exchanges by the disputants where the polemics is reflected
directly or indirectly, as well as letters to third parties where
allusion is mad e to it. A broader circle of texts that are pertinent
form its "co-text" which includes, for example, works or exchanges by
prior or contemporary authors quoted and relied upon by both disputants.
Finally, every polemics unfolds within a nondiscursive "co ntext', whose
various aspects and levels have always a more or less important role in
their content and development.[4] <#4>

3.2 The family of polemical exchanges thus described includes, among its
many members, verbal quarrels between couples, political debates, round
tables in scientific congresses, critical reviews of books and replies
to them, medieval disputationes, etc. W ithin this family, I propose to
characterize three ideal types, which I will call -- for the sake of
having a handy terminology -- discussion, dispute, and controversy. The
main criteria for this typology are: the scope of the disagreement, the
kind of co ntent involved in it, the presumed means for solving the
disagreement, and the ends pursued by the contenders. These differences
belong to the "strategical" macro level in so far as they refer
primarily to the overall structure of the exchange, the assump tion
being that such a structure reflects (at least to some extent) the
contenders' planning and performing its "larger ... movements and
operations".[5] <#5> Although each of these types allows for the
occasional use of the three types of "ta ctical" moves to be described
in the next section, each has an inherent affinity with one of the types
of moves.

* A discussion is a polemical exchange whose object is a

well-circumscribed topic or problem. As the discussion develops, the
contenders tend to acknowledge that the root of the problem is a
mistake relating to some important concept or procedure within a
well-defined field (even though they disagree regarding the nature
of the mistake in question and about who commits it). Discussions
allow for solutions, which consist in correcting the mistake thanks
to the application of procedures accepted in the fi eld (e.g.,
proof, computation, repetition of experiments, etc.).
* A dispute is a polemical exchange which also seems to have as its
object a well-defined divergence. But at no point do the contenders
accept its definition as grounded in some mistake. Rather, it is
rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or pref erences. There
are no mutually accepted procedures for deciding the dispute, that
is, a dispute has no solution; at most it can dissolve or be
dissolved.[6] <#6> Since "dissolution" is a form of closure that,
ultimately, remains "external" bot h to the topic under dispute and
to the participants' beliefs and attitudes, the underlying
divergences tend to recur either in disputes over other versions of
the same topic or in disputes over other topics. Some contenders see
in the position held by th eir opponents and in their "stubborn
imperviousness to rational argument" symptoms of an illness against
which the only reasonable action to take is punishment or therapy,
or disregard.[7] <#7>
* A controversy is a polemical exchange that occupies an intermediate
position between discussion and dispute. It can begin with a
specific problem, but it spreads quickly to other problems and
reveals profound divergences. These involve both opposed at titudes
and preferences and disagreements about the extant methods for
problem solving. For this reason, the oppositions in question are
not perceived simply as a matter of mistakes to be corrected, nor
are there accepted procedures for deciding them -- w hich causes the
continuation of controversies and sometimes their recurrence.
However, they do not reduce to mere unsolvable conflicts of
preferences. The contenders pile up arguments they believe increase
the weight of their positions vis a vis the adver saries'
objections, thereby leading, if not to deciding the matter in
question, at least to tilting the "balance of reason" in their
favor. Controversies are neither solved nor dissolved; they are, at
best, resolved. Their resolution may consist in the a cknowledgment
(by the contenders or by their community of reference) that enough
 weight has been accumulated in favor of one of the conflicting
positions, or in the emergence (thanks to the controversy) of
modified positions acceptable to the contenders, or simply in the
mutual clarification of the nature of the differences at stake.

Viewed from point of view of their ends, discussions are basically

concerned with the establishmet of the truth, disputes with winning, and
controversies with persuading the adversary and/or a competent audience
to accept one's position. In discu ssions, the opposition between the
theses in conflict is mostly perceived as purely logical, in disputes as
mostly "ideological" (i.e., attitudinal and evaluative), and in
controversies as involving a broad range of divergences regarding the
interpretatio n and relevance of facts, evaluations, attitudes, goals,
and methods. Viewed procedurally, we might say that discussions follow a
"problem-solving" model, disputes a "contest" model, and controversies a
"deliberative" model. A discussant seeks to apply de cision-procedures
that provide knock-down arguments proving the truth of her position or
the falsity of her adversary's position (which amounts to proving the
truth of her position, on the presumption that tertium non datur); a
disputant seeks to be ackno wledged as the winner, regardless of whether
his position is true or not; and a controversialist seeks to provide
reasons for believing in the superiority of her position, even though
such reasons do not conclusively prove it. Whereas a discussant is prep
ared to admit defeat if the adversary provides a knock-down argument
against her position and a controversialist is prepared to acknowledge
the weight of the opponent's reasons, a disputant begins and ends the
dispute (whatever its "external" outcome) con vinced he is right.

3.3 As mentioned above, actual polemical exchanges are rarely "pure"

examples of one of these three types. One of the reasons for that is
that the contenders' ways of perceiving and conducting a given exchange
need not be identical. For example, in the co ntroversy about Newton's
account of whiteness as a mixture of the other colors,[8] <#8> Newton's
attitude was to consider it as a discussion, by asking his opponents to
perform cautiously and without mistakes the experiment upon which he had
b ased his account, as a way of solving the problem and finding the
truth: "For this is to be decided not by discourse, but by new tryal of
the Experiment" (Cohen, 1978, 153); "But this, I conceive, is enough to
enforce it, and so to decide the controversy" (ibid., p. 131); "There
are yet other Circumstances [i.e., other experiments, M.D.], by which
the Truth might have been decided" (ibid., p. 130). However, his
opponents -- especially Hooke and Huyghens -- refuse to see in Newton's
experiment an experimen tum crucis, and consider the debate more as a
controversy, for they reject the assumptions underlying Newton's
hypothesis, and propose alternative hypotheses of their own, grounded on
a different theoretical framework and supported by other experiments, a
s capable to explain Newton's experimental results. Here is what Hooke
says: "But, how certain soever I think myself of my hypothesis (which I
did not take up without first trying some hundreds of experiments) yet I
should be very glad to meet with one ex perimentum crucis from Mr.
Newton, that should divorce me from it. But it is not that, which he so
calls, will do the turn; for the same phaenmenon will be solved by my
hypothesis, as well as by his, without any manner of difficulty or
straining: nay, I w ill undertake to shew another hypothesis, differing
from both his and mine, that shall do the same thing" (Cohen, 1978, 111).

Another example is the different attitudes of Searle and Derrida in

their well-known debate. In this case, the contenders' attitudes seem to
evolve in the course of the debate. As pointed out by Potte-Bonneville
(1991, 231), at first both seem to be engaged in a controversy about the
best way to interpret and pursue the philosophical project of Austin.
From the outset it is clear that this topic should engender a
controversy rather than a discussion, since the contenders are well
aware that they belong to radically different philosophical paradigms,
which question each other's most basic assumptions and methods. Searle,
however, opts to treat the debate as a discussion, by attempting to show
that Derrida's reading of Austin is simply mistaken, an d therefore
refutable. He assumes thereby that the interpretation of a
(philosophical) text is a decidable matter, and that his own
decision-procedure is the one that must be applied in order to settle
the issue. Derrida's response, in turn, consists in q uestioning the
assumptions underlying Searle's decision-procedure, which -- according
to him --need to be set aside in order to allow for a deeper
understanding of Austin. At this point Derrida, although ostensively
relying upon the "obvious" controversia l character of the opposition at
stake, may be simply trying to impose upon his opponent the "rules" of
his own (Derrida's) "language game". In other words, he too may be
treating the debate, at this stage, as a discussion. When, finally, both
contenders' attempts to transform the debate into a discussion abiding
by each one's rules fail, both seem to shift to its perception as rather
a hopeless dispute.

Just as participants in polemical exchanges often tend to perceive them

as either dicussions or disputes, so too this dichotomy seems to
exercise a powerful attraction upon theoreticians, leaving no room for
the middle term -- controversy -- i n their accounts. Thus, in Kuhn's
(1962) well-known schema, in periods of "normal science" disagreements
between scientists are intra-paradigmatic, i.e., they arise against a
background of shared decision procedures that regulate their "problem
solving" a ctivity -- i.e., such disagreements instantiate our
"discussion" category; the inter-paradigmatic conflicts, characteristic
of periods of "extraordinary science", on the other hand, are often
depicted as typical "disputes", in so far as their conduct and
resolution depends, ultimately, upon preferences, public relations,
interests, and power, rather than upon rational persuasion. At the other
extreme (as far as positions in the philosophy of science are
concerned), a similar dichotomic tendency to exclude the possibility of
controversies can be found in Popper's (1991) attempt to sort out, in
the polemics conducted by scientists involved in "scientific
revolutions", between an "ideological" and a properly "scientific"
component: the former clearly belongs to the category of "dispute",
while the latter instantiates "discussion". Needless to say that, for
Popper only the latter is of any value in an account of the "growth of
knowledge".

I am persuaded that the neglect of the category "controversy" as a third

alternative, between the strict rule-based notion of rationality that
characterizes "discussion" and the conception of "dispute" as governed
by extra-rational factors, ha s been a major setback for the history of
ideas and for epistemology, depriving these (and other) disciplines from
the possibility of identifying and developing an alternative model of
rationality. This is why I recommend this category for special attenti
on and careful empirical study.[9] <#9>

4. Three types of moves

Turning now to the "tactical" level, I will distinguish between three

ideal types of moves employed in polemical exchanges. If "tactics" is
related to "strategy" as means to ends, the question of the
(in)dependence of the former vis-a-vis the latter arise s: Can any of
the types of tactical moves be freely used in each of the three ideal
types of polemical exchanges? Philosophy -- especially, but not only,
ethics -- has devoted much effort to the analysis of the means-ends
relationship. Personally, I am no t in favor of either strict dependence
or strict independence, but rather of "relative (in)dependence", which
might be described in terms of the existence of a "natural affinity"
between certain types of means and certain types of ends. This is the
kind o f conceptual relation I think obtains between the types of moves
and of polemical exchanges discussed in this paper. Whether or not this
is empirically the case is a task left for further empirical research

4.1 Like the typology presented in the preceding section, the present
one does not purport to be neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Moves can
been classified, for example, according to their "functional" roles,
e.g., as "initiative" and "reactive" interven tions, and, within such
broad classes, as "elaborations", "repairs", "digressions", "replicas",
"counter-replicas", etc.[10] <#10> Or, in the medieval theory of
disputations, a respondent's permissible moves are classified in terms
of their se mantic relationship with the opponent's claims as
"conceding", "denying", or "distinguishing". I do not dispute the
usefulness of such levels of analysis. The typology here proposed,
however, addresses another level of conceptualization, which captures p
roperties of moves that apply across their "functional" and "semantic"
roles. The main criteria employed in the present typology have to do
with the immediate goal of the move, the nature of the means it employs
to achieve its goal, the kind of "mechanism " it relies upon, the
"force" with which it is supposed to achieve its goal, and its
relationship with the "current state" of the (polemical) exchange.

* A proof is a move that purports to establish the truth of a

proposition beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose, it employs
some inference rule that explicitly and recognizably leads from
other propositions (i.e., the evidence -- which includes Toul min's
 (1962) "data" and "warrants") to the proposition to be proved. Both
the validity of the inference rule and the truth of the evidence are
assumed to be established, and therefore to be accepted by the
addressee. The addressee is compelled (in so far as he behaves
rationally) to accept also the conclusion. The possibility of
proving a proposition is taken to show that it has successfully
withstood a decisive test that guarantees its truth (or its high
degree of probability).
* A stratagem is a move that purports to cause a relevant audience to
(re)act in a certain way, by inducing it to believe that a
proposition is true. It may make use of inference, but need not do
so. If it does, neither the inference pattern is assumed to be valid
nor the evidence true, but only "effective" vis-a-vis the intended
addresse and audience. It may involve deception and dissimulation --
e.g., by manipulating the "current state" and "current demands" of
the exchange. The causation involved nee d not be explicit and
recognizable by the audience, provided it achieves its intended
effect, namely to let its user "win the day" (at least momentarily)
in the eyes of the relevant audience (which may or may not include
the interlocutor). Hence the curr ent meaning of this word as "any
artifice or trick; a device or scheme for obtaining an advantage"
(OED). The particular kind of "force" of this move lies not in
compelling the addressee to hold the intended belief or to perform
the desired action, but ra ther in rendering him "speechless", i.e.,
unable to react with a satisfactory counter-move.
* An argument is a move that purports to persuade the addressee to
believe that a proposition is true. Like stratagems and unlike
proofs, arguments are not directly concerned with truth, but with
belief. Unlike stratagems, arguments seek to achieve thei r effect
by providing recognizable reasons for inducing in the addressee the
desired belief. Unlike proofs, however, these reasons need not be
based on valid inference patterns and truthful evidence, which are
presumed to be accepted by the addressee; the y must take into
account which propositions the addressee actually accepts (or is
likely to accept) as evidence, and which inference patterns are
likely to persuade her. Arguments, although not compelling the
addressee to accept their conclusion, put her under some sort of
obligation to do so -- an obligation that presumably stems from
social norms, e.g., those of communicative cooperation.

4.2 Obviously, clarification and exemplification of the above

descriptions are needed, especially in the light of possible
terminological confusion and of the difficulties in identifying "pure"
examples of these types of moves in actual polemical exchange s.

4.2.1 The term proof, as employed here, does not refer only to formal
deductive demonstrations, as in logic and (parts of) mathematics. It
applies also to the use of other forms of inference (e.g., inductive,
non-monotonic, presumptive) that are supposed to establish the truth (or
the high degree of probability) of a statement. Nor does a proof -- in
the present sense -- necessarily rely on evidence that has been itself
proved: the appeal to experiment, observation, testimony, common sense,
etc., wheneve r these are presented as directly relevant to establishing
the truth of a statement, counts as a move pertaining to the category
"proof". What is important in this kind of move is the ostensive
reliance upon a procedural process of justification whose "ob jectivity"
resides in its being procedural, i.e., "neutral" vis-a-vis the beliefs
and interests of the contenders. This is why proof is deemed able to
bypass such beliefs and address truth, so to speak, "directly".
Furthermore, it acquires additional pole mical weight thanks to the
presumption that truth must be the decisive factor in determining
belief. The most efficient countermoves to proofs are "counter-proofs"
that question either the reliability of the evidence presented (e.g., by
pointing out incon sistencies in a testimony) or of the inferential
procedure employed (e.g., the method of counter-examples in logic). The
use of both kinds of moves in polemical exchanges is widespread.
Nevertheless, they are only decisive -- as their users expect them to be
-- in the context of "discussions", where a decision procedure which is
assumed not to be questionable gives them the necessary "backing" (to
use another of Toulmin's concepts). Hence the special affinity between
proofs and discussions.

4.2.2 I have borrowed the term stratagem (Ger. Kunstgriff) from

Schopenhauer (1942),[11] <#11> who has a thoroughly negative view of
this kind of move. He compares stratagems to feints in fencing, and
describes them as the dishonest "tricks, dogdges, and chicanery" to
which contenders resort with the sole purpose of "being right",
regardless of whether their thesis is true or false. When arguing with
an opponent that makes use of such tricks, he says, one "no longer has
to deal with his intel lect, but with the radical part of the man, his
will, to which the only thing that matters is that he ultimately
triumphs either per fas or per nefas [by hook or by crook]" (1974, 25).
In providing a formal anatomy of these moves, which should serve as th e
backbone of "the science of [eristic] Dialectic", and in exemplifying 38
stratagems -- many of which are described in Aristotle's Topica
(especially in Book VIII) -- along with appropriate
"counter-stratagems", Schopenhauer's aim is to grant the (honest )
debater a tool for easily recognising and defeating such tricks (1942,
10-11). Among his 38 stratagems, we find, along with well-known
fallacies, moves that are supposed to have, say, a direct and explicit
causal effect upon the opponent's beliefs, such as:

Extension. "This consists in carrying your opponent's proposition beyond

its natural limits; in giving it as general a signification ... as
possible, so as to exaggerate it; and, on the other hand, in giving your
own proposition as restricted a sense ... as you can, because the more
general a statement becomes, the more numerous are the objections to
which it is open." (Schopenhauer, 1942, 13);

Diversion. "If you find that you are being worsted ... you can suddenly
begin to talk of something else, as though it had a bearing on the
matter in dispute, and afforded an argument against your opponent"
(Schopenhauer, 1942, 29-30);[12] <#12 >
as well as moves that are intended to provoke certain reactions, which
will then make the opponent's position (and beliefs) vulnerable, e.g.:

[Irritation]. "Contradiction and contention irritate a man into

exaggerating his statement. By contradicting your opponent you may drive
him into extending beyond its proper limits a statement which, at all
events within those limits and in itself, is true" (Schopenhauer, 1942,
26).

To the latter kind, we might add Aristotle's

[Confidence building]. "You should also, yourself sometimes, bring an

objection against yourself; for answerers are unsuspicious when dealing
with those who appear to them to be arguing fairly" (Aristotle, 1976,
156b 17),

as well as Leibniz's

[Compensation]. "Il est quelquefois utile que nous souffrions qu'on nous
fasse quelque tort dans une matiere de peu de consequence, car si
quelque grand y a trempe, cela luy donnera quelque penchant (s'il est
d'un bon naturel) a nous f aire du bien dans quelque autre rencontre, et
on peut menager la chose en sorte, que la seconde soit plus importante a
nous, que la premiere" [GRUA, 701-702].[13] <#13>

Stratagems of the latter type are mainly "offensive" moves, "traps" of

sorts, quite similar to those described in game theory as "strategic
moves", namely "moves that induce the other player to choose in one's
favor" (Schelling 1960, 2 2). But they can also be used, like those of
the former type, defensively. Both of these, as well as other types of
stratagems abound in polemical exchanges (see Dascal and Cremaschi,
forthcoming, for a sample). Empirical research should find out whether
they are more frequent in the exchanges belonging to the category
"dispute", with which they seem to have a natural affinity, in so far as
they share the goal of winning per fas or per nefas.

4.2.3 The term argument, finally, is here employed in the sense it has
in Perelman's nouvelle rhetorique, namely as a kind of move intended to
modify beliefs by means of reasons which are neither logically
compelling nor impersonal.[14]Arguments, in this sense, differ from
proofs in that they may be logically invalid (e.g., the slippery slope,
the ad verecundiam) or else may consist in showing the insufficiency of
logical validity (e.g., the petitio principii). A "slippery slope" argu
ment consists in pointing out that A would lead to B, and then to C, D,
... N, through a causal chain, and to claim that one should prevent A,
because N is an undesireble consequence. In politics, this argument is
known as the "domino effect". Logically i t is invalid, because the
causal chain can be interrupted anywhere, not just at its initial point,
as the argument presupposes. The Vietnam war is a counter-example to
this argument. Nevertheless, it is a rationally persuasive argument,
which is regularly used in deliberations, and whose persuasive weight
depends upon the addressee's estimate of the cost of interrupting the
causal chain at different points. A petitio principii charge, on the
other hand, does not question the logical validity of the oppone nt's
move (what could be more valid than "p, therore p). It simply points out
the uselessness of such a move in order to establish the truth of a
proposition. <#14>[15] <#15> A petitio charge is, in a sense, an example
of an ad hominem argument, bel onging to the subset of tu quoque
arguments. Though generally (though by no means universally) considered
fallacious on the grounds that the (circumstances of the) person making
a claim are not relevant to the truth of that claim, ad hominem
arguments can be (rationally) persuasive: if you wouldn't trust a man to
buy a car from him, it is reasonable for you to see in this a reason not
to vote for him for president, if you think honesty is a quality a
president should have.

The affinity between the "argument" type of move and the "controversy"
type of polemical exchange lies in the fact that the former fits the
latter's most typical features. First, the controversy's openness,
namely, the fact that in a controvers y everything is up for grabs, no
"sacred" assumptions or methods being preserved from unlimited mutual
questioning. Arguments are both good tools for that purpose (since they
go beyond purely logical considerations, and thus allow to question what
the for mer take for granted) and also excellent targets (in so far as,
when used by the adversary to ground her position, their
"quasi-validity" makes them easy prey to orthodox logical hunting
practices). Second, the fact that, even though in a controversy all is
up for grabs, not "anything goes", i.e., some norms are respected and
the ways of acting upon the opponent's beliefs are constrained.

4.3 The identification of a move performed in a polemical exchange as

belonging to a given ideal type is no easy matter, especially due to
co-text dependency. One might think that a proof is a proof, an argument
an argument, and a stratagem a stratagem re gardless of the "polemical
demand" to which they respond and of their influence upon the ensuing
interventions. But this is not the case. In the case of moves, as in the
case of the interpretation of other linguistic elements, we may have to
distinguish b etween, say, the "literal" and the "actual". Just as an
utterance which has the syntactic form of a question and, thus, whose
sentence-meaning is that of a question, may serve to perform other
speech acts, so too a move that is "literally" a proof may be actually
used as a diversion stratagem or as a non-compelling argument.[16] <#16>
Consequently, the empirical study of these moves requires both a
syntactic-semantic and a pragmatic component. The problem of
identification is compounded by the fact that, whereas proofs and
arguments "advertise" themselves as such by the use of explicit
linguistic markers, stratagems rather "disguise" themselves as proofs or
arguments.

5. Concluding remarks

I have presented my two trichotomies on the assumption that it is

possible to distinguish clearly between their respective levels of
analysis. I do believe that such a distinction is necessary and
fruitful, although certainly not easy to pinpoint. Aristot le, for one,
was aware of the need to make the distinction and proposed trichotomies
quite similar to those developed here. On the one hand, he distinguished
three types of polemical exchanges,[17] <#17> "demonstrative",
"dialectical", and "co ntentious" (Aristotle, 1976, 100a 25 - 101a 5).
On the other, he coined special terms for characterizing the moves
typical of each of these exchanges, namely "philosopheme", "epichireme"
and "sophism", respectively (ibid., 162a 15). But he did not make cl ear
the relationship between the two levels. For he apparently didn't take
into account the fact that none of the types of exchanges neither
consists nor can consist exclusively of the types of moves to which they
bear the closest "affinity". No wonder th at many of the moves that he
lists under "dialectical" exchanges turn out to be stratagems.
Unfortunately, I cannot pretend to have been more successful than
Aristotle, in this respect, and instead of attempting to solve this
problem here, I will add a fu rther source of difficulty for its solution.

We have already noticed that contenders often tend to conduct and

interpret the polemical exchanges in which they are involved as
belonging to one of the ideal types (usually limiting their choice to
two of them, discussions and disputes). Such interpretations -- as many
other meta-discursive claims and attitudes -- may reflect "tactical"
choices of a "macro" arena: a contender may choose, say, the
"discussion" arena in order to take (local or global) advantage of his
mastery of this special kind of battle and weaponry. On the other hand,
"micro" can also become "macro", and "tactics" can become "strategy".
For example, a repeatedly used stratagem may become definitory of a
contender's goal in an exchange, thereby acquiring strategic import.
Thus, the counterpart of the "extension" stratagem, namely, restricting
the scope of one's claim so as to make it invulnerable to a given
objection, may become what I have called the "insulation strategy" (cf.
Dascal 1990b), when used, e.g., to protect on e's claims to knowledge
from every possible sceptical objection.

This last example permits me to conclude by alluding once more to my

hidden agenda. One of the strongest manifestations of scepticism against
the existence of controversies as here defined, is Schopenhauer's. For
him there cannot really be a "g ood" dialectic, for as soon as the best
intentioned person engages in a debate, his will takes over his
intellect, and all he cares for is to win at any cost. But even
Schopenhauer acknowledges that this "natural baseness of human nature",
this "innate va nity ... which will not suffer us to allow that our
first position was wrong and our adversary's right" (Schopenhauer, 1942,
4), has a positive contribution vis-a-vis the discovery and preservation
of truth: "Should we abandon our position at once, we may discover later
on that we were right after all" (ibid., p. 5). He also admits that we
cannot, in studying debates, assume that we are able to "separate actual
from apparent truth, since even the disputants are not certain about it
beforehand" (ibid., p. 13). Together, these two remarks suggest that, in
spite of his stern scepticism, he acknowledges that there are polemics
which can contribute to the "growth of knowledge", at least as their
unintended effect. Contra Schopenhauer, and along with Aristotle and
Perelman, I believe this is not an unintended effect, but the result of
the special kind of rationality inherent to "controversy", which makes
it different from both "discussion" and "dispute". Unlike them, however,
I think controversy and its typical move, argument, have not been
sufficiently studied as an empirical dialogical phenomenon, so as to
reveal the precise nature of the rationality embedded in their use.
Without such empirical support, the debate between optimists like
Perelman and pessimi sts like Schopenhauer will remain a mere dispute;
with empirical support, it stands a chance of becoming a rewarding
controversy.

Notes

1. The opposition between these two kinds of methodological preferences

often underlies historically important controversies (see Cremaschi and
Dascal, 1996, 1998; Dascal and Cremaschi, forthcoming; Gil, 1985). In
dialogue studies, this o pposition is most evident in the ongoing
dispute between ethnomedologists and speech act theorists (see, for
instance, Schegloff's article and Searle's rejoinder in Searle et al.,
1992).

2. Mainly in interaction with the members of the research group "Leibniz

the Polemicist", in a very fruitful year (1994/5)at the Institute for
Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Sergio
Cremaschi, Gideon Freude nthal, Fernando Gil, Alan Gross, Massimo
Mugnai, Carl Posy, Quintin Racionero, Elhanan Yakira, and all those who
attended our seminars have contributed graciously to both the insights
and mistakes you may find in what follows . For some initial results of
our work, see Dascal, 1995b, 1995c; Cremaschi and Dascal, 1996, 1998;
Dascal and Cremaschi, forthcoming; Dascal and Gross, forthcoming.

3. A conference on this topic was held in Geneva in 1995. For how some
of these levels bear on the topic of controversies, see Dascal, 1995b.
For other relevant material, see Fritz, 1994, 1995; Jacques, 1991; Mann
and Thompson, 19 88; Dascal, 1992; Roulet, 1995.

4. For the types and uses of co-text and context, see Dascal and
Weizman, 1987. For descriptions of such types and uses in controversies,
see Dascal, 1990a; Cremaschi and Dascal, 1998; Dascal and Cremaschi,
forthcoming.

5. "Strategy - The art of the commander-in-chief; the art of projecting

and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campain.
Generally distinguished from tactics, which is the art of handling
forces in battle o n in the immediate presence of the enemy" (Oxford
English Dictionary). "Strategie: umfassende [vorbereitende] Plannung
eines Krieges unter Einbeziehung aller wesentlichen Faktoren" (Der
Grosse Duden, Bd. 10). "Stratégie: partie de l'art militaire qui trai te
de la direction d'ensemble ... dans la conduite de la guerre" (Nouveau
Petit Larousse).
6. A dispute can be referred to some instituted authority, such as a
tribunal, which may decide in favor of one of the parties. But in these
cases, the conflict of opinions or attitudes is not resolved but merely
subdued, since, a s pointed out by Leibniz, no one has the power to
force the other to forget or to attend -- both indispensable conditions
for having the power to make the other change her opinion (VOR, p. 19).

7. "It is not necessary to examine every problem and every thesis but
only one about which doubt might be felt by the kind of person who
requires to be argued with and does not need castigation or lack
perception. For those who fe el doubt whether or not the gods ought to
be honoured and parents loved, need castigation, while those who doubt
whether snow is white or not, lack perception" (Aristotle, 1976, 105a
3). It is possible to read this passage as suggesting that debates about
both kinds of questions are useless -- the former because it can only be
a "dispute" with an obvious "external" solution, and the latter because
it is a "discussion" with an obvious "internal" decision procedure.

8. I am grateful to Alan Gross for bringing this controversy to my

attention.

9. In Dascal (1995), in addition to having argued at length this point,

I have tried to single out some of the most important epistemologically
relevant characteristics of controversies. An English version of the
paper in question can be read in my website:
http://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/hci/vip/index.htmll.

10. Functional characterizations of this type are shared by a wide range

of approaches to dialogue analysis: ethnometodology, speech acts theory,
action theory, rhetorical structure theory, the Geneva approach,
dialogical logic, etc.

11. Around 1830, Schopenhauer wrote a little treatise, without title,

which he never published. This treatise was posthumously published in
1864 and, more recently, in 1983, with the title Eristische Dialektik
oder Die Kunst, Rec ht zu behalten, in 38 Kunstgriffen dargestellt
(Zurich). My references are to the 1942 English translation.The
introductory passages and some of the stratagems are reproduced in the
chapter "Logic and dialectics" of his Parerga and Paralipomena. I am
grat eful to Massimo Mugnai for having called my attention to
Schopenhauer's little treatise and to have presented me with a copy of
the Italian translation, which contains an excellent essay by Franco
Volpi (Milano, 1991).

12. Diversion is, in a sense, a form of digression. But in order to be

effective, it should not contain explicit "digression markers", which
would enable the opponent to dismiss easily their relevance (on
different types of digre ssions, see Dascal and Katriel, 1979).

13. Leibniz himself employed this stratagem in his correspondence avec

Arnauld (cf. Dascal 1995a).
14. Perelman extends the scope of his theory of argumentation beyond the
field of dialogical exchanges, as defined here, for he says that it will
study even arguments one addresses oneself, in silent deliberation
(Perelman 1977, 19). I do agree with him that there is room and need for
research on, say, "polemical soliloquy", which would, among other
things, take into account the polemical nature of the "polyphony" not
only of our speech, but also of our thought. It would be inter esting to
find out, among other things, whether the three ideal types of moves
here distinguished could occur in inner polemics with oneself. Can one,
for example, apply stratagems to oneself? In so far as there is such a
thing as self-deception, apparent ly the answer must be yes (see, in
this connection, the interesting collection of essays compiled by Elster
(ed.), 1985). With all its interest, that part of the study of inner
argumentation that involves language use belongs to the domain of what I
have proposed to call "psychopragmatics", rather than to
"sociopragmatics", which deals with the outer uses of language (cf.
Dascal 1983), to which our present topic belongs.

15. Passmore (1961) argues that most philosophical arguments are of this
sort, namely, that they are not strictly formal, but at most
"quasi-formal".

16. It is more difficult to imagine the converse. If a stratagem is

successfully "used" in a given context as a proof, it does not thereby
become a proof, but remains a (successful) stratagem. There seems to be
a presumption abou t the scalar ordering of the "forces" of the three
types, which constrains their interchangeability in use.

17. He calls them "reasonings", but in the context of this passage, this
term refers to ways of conducting a debate, where "questions" and
"answers" are exchanged.

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