 1. Adminstrative Case: CHREA vs CHR G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs. COMMISSION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.

FACTS:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR,
in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated
from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR “collapsed”
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing
modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one
Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR
forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In light of the
DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of
the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate
authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading,
as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution
and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading,

reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the
prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

HELD:

CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning
the CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the
approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the
CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as
financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of
positions therein. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not
included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as
the law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, we echoed the basic rule that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.

2. Cariño vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case brief summary

Cariño vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case brief summary

December 2, 1991

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT undertook
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary
of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly. Secretary of Education issued a return to
work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing the DECS officials and to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply. After failure to heed the order, the
CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively
suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an
injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent staged a
walkout. The case was eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of
others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme
Court was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they
were denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to
Cariño to appear and enlighten the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter.
Cariño filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission
has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether
or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.

Issue: Does the Commission on have jurisdiction to adjudicate, try and hear the issue?

Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power. The most
that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The Constitution clearly and
categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It does not however grant it the power to resolve
issues. The Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" of the matters involved. These are matters within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission and lastly, the Supreme Court.

3. EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights (G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 )
Facts: PD 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and
General Trias Cavite and was divided for land development. Petitioner, Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before
petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and
planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil.
EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims.
Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later,
respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their
complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their
human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing
such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private
respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in
the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her
first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the
contractors, and their subordinates. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction
for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was
denied by the Commission (CHR). Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari
and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist
from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. In its comment on the
petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that
it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere
investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for
the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection. Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to
issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to
compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. Held: Petition for
certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent
Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued
is made PERMANENT. In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we
held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. “The most that may be
conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.” The constitutional
provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be
granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending
in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose.

4.