G.R. No.

213027, January 18, 2017

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 213253

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:
The Partial Summary Judgment and the Resolution were rendered by the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, in Civil Case No.
0141. Civil Case No. 0141 is a forfeiture case entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, (represented by his
Estate/Heirs) and Imelda R. Marcos. It emanated from the 1991 Petition filed by the Republic through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 13797 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,8 2,9 1410 and 14-A.11

In the said Judgment and Resolution, the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection, were labeled as ill-gotten and
were consequently forfeited in favor of the Republic. The 1991 Petition sought the recovery of the assets and properties
pertaining to the Marcoses, who acquired them directly or indirectly through, or as a result of, the improper or illegal use of
funds or properties owned by the government. The properties, subject of other pending forfeiture cases before the
Sandiganbayan, were excluded; and the properties, subject of the 1991 Petition, were specifically listed and accordingly
clustered into 18 categories. Some of the properties listed in the 1991 Petition were already adjudged as ill-gotten wealth and
consequently forfeited in favor of the government. The Republic argued that the letter sent to the PCGG by Imelda Marcos
deemed to have admitted the allegations regarding the pieces of jewelry and that the words or stock phrases they used in their
Answer had been declared in the Swiss deposits case as a "negative pregnant" and, as such, amounted to an admission if not
squarely denied. Finally, it contended that "the lawful income of the Marcoses during their incumbencies as public officials was
grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of jewelry.

Thereafter, the Republic filed a Request for Admission addressed to the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc, and Irene Marcos Araneta. The Republic also submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment which restated that the object of the motion covered only the Malacañang Collection.

Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta subsequently filed their Manifestation and Preliminary Comments. The Marcoses
further stated that the Request for Admission was inconsistent with the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the
Supplement thereto. Subsequently, they filed a Manifestation and Motion to Expunge. In their Manifestation and Motion to
Expunge, they claimed that the filing of the Request for Admission was tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position of
the Republic that the case was ripe for summary judgment. They argued that the Request for Admission entertained a possibly
genuine issue as to a material fact, which was needed for the grant of the motion for summary judgment. They further argued
that the filing of the Request for Admission was rather late, considering that it was done after the Republic had filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment. They then requested that all pleadings, motions and requests filed after the termination of the case in
2004 be expunged. Pending a resolution of the motion to expunge, they simultaneously asked for additional time to answer the
Request for Admission and for permission to conduct an ocular inspection of the subject jewelry, which had been in the
Republic's possession for the past 22 years. Meanwhile, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. filed a Manifestation adopting the Manifestation
of his sisters.

In a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the Marcoses' Manifestation, Preliminary Comments, and Motion to Expunge. It
ruled that (1) the proceedings in this case had not been terminated; (2) in filing their objection, respondents were not deemed
to have admitted the matters in the Request for Admission; and (3) the Republic's Request for Admission was not inconsistent
with the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Sandiganbayan further directed the Marcoses to file and serve within 15 days
their sworn answer to the Request for Admission,but they failed to comply with the directive.

Hence, the Sandiganbayan issued a Partial Summary Judgment ruling that (1) the Malacañang Collection was part and subject
of the forfeiture petition;(2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper; and (3) the forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection
was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379.
Motions for Reconsideration were filed by the Estate of Marcos but the Sandiganbayan denied the Motions for Reconsideration
for being mere rehashes of the arguments of the Marcoses in their Comments and Opposition to the Republic's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Within the 15-day period to file a petition, they submitted a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance and
Motion for Extension of Time, asking that they be given until 09 August 2014 to file their petition. Meanwhile, the Estate of
Marcos filed a Motion for Extension of Time on 09 July 2014 and a Manifestation on 8 August 2014, saying that its other
executor in solidum was no longer filing a separate petition for review, but was adopting that which was filed by Imelda
Marcos. Therafter, a Resolution was issued granting the Motion for Extension and noting the Manifestation of the Estate of
Marcos that the latter was adopting the petition for review filed by Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta. in G.R. No.
213253. This Court thereafter consolidated the petitions.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the properties; (2) whether the Malacañang Collection can be the subject
of the forfeiture case; (3) whether forfeiture is justified under R.A. 1379; (4) whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was not inconsistent with the Request for Admission; and (5) whether the
Sandiganbayan correctly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation of petitioners' right to due process of law.

RULING:

The Sandiganbayan conectly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The properties are included in the 1991 Petition which
categorically alleged that the Malacañang Collection was included in the assets, monies and properties sought to be recovered.
With respect to the manner of making allegations in pleadings, the Rules of Court simply provides as follows:

"Section 1. In general. - Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts. If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him
shall be clearly and concisely stated."

With respect to the determination of whether an initiatory pleading sufficiently states a cause of action, the test is as follows:
admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? To be taken into
account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are
not considered. The court may consider - in addition to the complaint - the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings
of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records. The 1991 Petition is compliant with the requirements stated in law and
jurisprudence. The sufficiency of its allegations is thus established with respect to the pieces of jewelry. The 1991 Petition is
more than enough fulfillment of the requirement provided under Section 3135(d) of R.A. 1379.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the forfeiture was justified and that the Malacañang Collection was subject
to forfeiture. In Republic v Sandiganbayan it states that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired." Petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully acquired; hence, the
prima facie presumption that they were unlawfully acquired prevails.

The Sandiganbayan also properly ruled that there was no inconsistency or incongruity between Republic's Request for
Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, a request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary
judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by the party and is
requested as a result of that party's failure to respond to the court's directive to state what specifically happened in the case.
The resort to such a request as a mode of discovery rendered all the matters contained therein as matters that have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On the basis of respondent Imelda Marcos, respondents' Answer to the 1991 Petition, which was considered to be a "negative
pregnant" in Republic v. Sandiganbayan; and respondents' failure to timely respond to petitioner's Request for Admission, the
Sandiganbayan thus correctly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Republic.
The Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, afterwhich it filed and served a Request for Admission. Afterwards,
it submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, then the Marcoses filed their Manifestation and
Preliminary Comments. The Sandiganbayan noted the objection they had raised in their Manifestation and Preliminary
Comments. In that manner, rather than declaring that the matters raised in the Request for Admission were deemed admitted,
the Sandiganbayan instead ruled on the objection raised by the Marcoses. In short, it ruled that the Request for Admission was
not inconsistent with the motion for summary judgment. The Sandiganbayan reasoned that there was no inconsistency
between the two. It said that a request for admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the request for
admission may be used as basis for filing a motion for summary judgment. It then denied the Manifestation and Preliminary
Comments and Manifestation and Motion to Expunge filed by the Marcoses relative to the Republic's Request for Admission.
Thereafter, it required the Marcoses to file and serve their sworn answer to the Request for Admission. The Marcoses filed
numerous pleadings, but none of these was made in response to the Request for Admission as required by Rule 26, Section
2149 of the Rules of Court until the Sandiganbayan eventually issued the Partial Summary Judgment.

As regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a
written request that he admit: (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is bound within the
period designated in the request, to file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10)
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of the
matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.

The third case demonstrates how failure to answer the request for admission within the period resulted in the admission of
the matters stated therein. The Court, in that case, specifically ruled:

The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon the party
seeking the admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has
the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.

Petitioners claim that there has been a lack of observance of due process; that "there has been no trial or hearing"; and that
"petitioners were shamefully never given an opportunity to show that the questioned properties may have been lawfully
acquired through other means. They allege that they were denied due process by not being given any opportunity to prove
their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang Collection. This allegation cannot be given credence for being utterly baseless.
G.R. No. 217617, April 05, 2017

CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, PETITIONER, VS. BANCO DE ORO (FORMERLY EQUITABLE PCI BANK), RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 218540

ELISEO C. BORLONGAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. BDO UNIBANK, INC. (FORMERLY EQUITABLE PCI BANK), RESPONDENT.

VELASCO JR., J.:

FACTS:

Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property located at Valle Verde II, Pasig City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy
of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an
annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in Civil Case pending before Branch
134 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Makati RTC). When they procured a copy of the case, they found out that
respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation,
the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons, including
Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.

Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and, on January 21, 2013,
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents, with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Pasig RTC), alleging that the subject property is a family home that belongs to the
conjugal partnership of gains he established with his wife. He further averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which
the attachment of the property was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did not redound to benefit their
family. Thus, he prayed that the surety agreements and all other documents and processes, including the ensuing attachment,
levy and execution sale, based thereon be nullified.
BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's
Complaint, the case was barred by res judicata given the Decision and orders of the Makati RTC, and, finally, the
Complaint failed to state a cause of action. Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that it
could not pass upon matters already brought before the RTC Makati and, citing Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, the husband
of a judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a separate and independent action to determine the validity of the
levy and sale of a property. On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification,
it held that since majority of Eliseo's causes of action were premised on a claim that the obligation contracted by his wife has
not redounded to their family, and, thus, the levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate action is not an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment and execution in the first place. The Pasig
RTC clarified, however, that it cannot annul the surety agreements supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not a party
to those agreements and the validity and efficacy of these contracts had already been decided by the Makati RTC.

Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). BDO contended that it was an error
for the Pasig RTC to apply Buado as it does not apply squarely to the circumstances of the case and has not superseded Ching.
BDO maintained that by reinstating the complaint, Pasig RTC has violated the rule prohibiting non-interference by one court
with the orders of a co--equal court. The appellate court granted BDO's petition and ordered the Pasig RTC to cease from
hearing the case commenced by Eliseo. In so ruling, the CA held that Eliseo is not a stranger who can initiate an action
independent from the case where the attachment and execution sale were ordered. Thus, the CA concluded that in opting to
review the validity of the levy and execution sale of the subject property pursuant to the judgment of the Makati RTC, the Pasig
RTC acted without jurisdiction. Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence, he filed a
petition to the Supreme Court but was denied.

Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession
and the issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the respondent bank. Arguing that the Makati
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the service of the summons and the other processes of the court was
defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA but it was denied. Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the
reconsideration of the CA's Resolution however, the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration, holding that "upon
the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute."

Subsequently, Carmelita filed a Petition for Review, ascribing to the appellate court the commission of serious
reversible errors. The Supreme Court denied the petition, hence, Carmelita interposed a Motion for Reconsideration
urging the Supreme Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case and reconsider its stance. Considering that
both cases originated from the same facts and involved interrelated issues, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 218540
with G.R. No. 217617.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the consolidation of BDO's ownership over the
subject property and whether or not the Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case filed by the non-debtor husband
to annul the levy and execution sale of the subject property ordered by the Makati RTC against his wife.

RULING:

The Issuance of a TRO/WPI is not a prejudgment of the main case. On the propriety of CA's refusal to issue a TRO/WPI, it is
worthy to note that Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
viz:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a
limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an established right. Otherwise
stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two
things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. Notably, the primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the appellate court is the
declaration of the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC, it is not merely confined to the prevention of the issuance of the writ of
possession and the consolidation of the ownership of the subject property in BDO's name—the concerns of the prayer for the
TRO and/or WPI.

Indeed, the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was intended to preserve the status quo ante,and not to
pre-empt the appellate court's decision on the merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of
the CA to deny her of this provisional remedy. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent bank from continuing in
the possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject property, petitioner's right to be afforded due process will
unceasingly be violated. It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights is by itself a grave and
irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.

The subject property was not foreclosed by the respondent bank; right of BDO to the possession of the subject property is
questionable. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the subject property was never mortgaged to, much less foreclosed by,
the respondent bank. Thus, it was error for the CA to refer to the subject property as "foreclosed property." Rather, as
disclosed by the records, the possession of the subject property was acquired by BDO through attachment and later by
execution sale. However, it is presumptive to state that the right of BDO over the possession of the subject property is now
absolute considering that there is an action that questions the validity of the bank's acquisition over the same property. Thus,
even given the expiration of the redemption period, a TRO and/or WPI is still obtainable and warranted where the validity of
the acquisition of the possession is afflicted by Constitutional and procedural infirmities.

2. Eliseo can file an independent action for the annulment of the attachment of their conjugal property
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of properties under execution to vindicate their claims to
the property in a separate action with another court. It states, thus:

SECTION 16. Proceedings Where Property Claimed by Third Person. — If the property levied on is claimed by any person
other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon
the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the
officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action
therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is
filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a
separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. Clearly, the availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing
provision requires only that that the claim is a third-party or a "stranger" to the case. Is the husband, who was not a party to
the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered
a "stranger?" There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.