Conceptualising Future Change in Corporate Sustainability Reporting

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AAAJ
22,1 Conceptualising future change in
corporate sustainability reporting
Carol A. Adams
118 La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, and
Glen Whelan
Nottingham University Business School, Nottingham, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to conceptualise how future changes in corporate social
disclosure (CSD), aimed at improving accountability for corporate performance to key stakeholder
groups, might be brought about.
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on the work of the Austrian economist Ludwig von
Mises with respect to human (and organisational) action and the work of Leon Festinger and Kurt
Lewin with respect to human (and organisational) change, the paper examines how academics and
other corporate stakeholders might effect changes in CSD.
Findings – Managers act in a way which maximises their formal happiness (from von Mises) and
change occurs following the creation of cognitive dissonance (Festinger) which leads to “unfreezing”
(Lewin). Stakeholders can effect change by creating cognitive dissonance. With specific reference to
Anglo-American limited liability and publicly traded corporations, such cognitive dissonance and
unfreezing normally involves a perceived threat to profitability.
Research limitations/implications – Research and theorising in corporate social disclosure
patterns should take as given: that the managers of Anglo-American limited liability and publicly
traded corporations continue to be strongly encouraged, via both legal and remunerative means, to
maximize shareholder wealth; and that this state of affairs significantly influences the information
which management choose to disclose. Future research might instead examine and consider means of
creating sources of dissonance significant enough to result in managerial concern for change within
the constraints imposed on managers of Anglo-American corporations. Such research might be
conducted by engaging with organisations and their stakeholders.
Practical implications – The findings have implications for the manner in which corporate
stakeholders act and interrelate with others in order to effect change towards more complete and
credible sustainability reports which demonstrate accountability for material impacts to key
stakeholder groups.
Originality/value – The paper focuses on how change in corporate behaviour might be brought
about given the personal motivations and institutional constraints imposed on the behaviour of
corporate actors.
Keywords Stakeholder analysis, Disclosure, Organizational change, Financial reporting
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Parker (2005) has described the scholarly literature concerned with corporate social
disclosure (CSD) as “voluminous, disparate, eclectic”, and as existing “without
Accounting, Auditing & commonly agreed philosophies or standpoints” (p. 844) (see also Deegan, 2000, 2002;
Accountability Journal Gray, 2002; Gray et al., 1995, 1996; Mathews, 1993, 1997; Parker, 2005). While diversity
Vol. 22 No. 1, 2009
pp. 118-143
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0951-3574
The authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers and to Lee Parker for their comments on
DOI 10.1108/09513570910923033 this paper.
in these regards is often valuable, it can sometimes conceal both theoretical overlap Future change in
and, where one standpoint is promoted, the explanatory power of other perspectives. corporate
For example, the failure to recognise that stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory
cover similar ground can result in the corresponding failure to realise that they are reporting
complementary rather than opposed (e.g. Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al.,
1995, p. 5; Gray et al., 1996, p. 52).
In addition to the complexities surrounding the proliferation of theoretical 119
perspectives, scholars of corporate social disclosure are also confronted with complex
social, political and economic contexts that differ from Nation-State to Nation-State.
Failure to acknowledge these differing contexts can mask the complexity of drivers for
both disclosure and corporate silence (see Adams and Harte, 1998; Adams and
McPhail, 2004; Burchell et al., 1980; Guthrie and Parker, 1989a, b; Tinker and Neimark,
1987). And, further to this “macro” or “political economic’ level of complexity, scholars
of corporate social disclosure also face complexity at the more “meso” or
“organisational” level: for internal reporting processes, corporate cultures, power
structures, and institutional influences, also impact on our ability to understand how
change might occur (see Adams, 2002; Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007; Adams
and McNicholas, 2007; Albelda-Pérez et al., 2007; Belal and Owen, 2007; Dey, 2007;
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007 for insights into the change process).
In light of the previously mentioned complexities – and in light of Parker’s (2005,
p. 849) suggestion that “pluralism in theoretical lenses and methodologies applied to
common research problems can yield incremental and accumulating insights that are
enriched by both commonality and difference” – the present paper draws on a number
of scholarly traditions that have yet to be utilised within the corporate social disclosure
literature, and provides a theoretical perspective that can further interrelate, and more
clearly orientate, at least some of the field’s multitude of interests and perspectives.
In completing this task, we utilise a specific conception of human (and
organisational) action, and a specific conception of human (and organisational)
change. The conception of human (and organisational) action draws on the work of the
“Austrian” economist Ludwig von Mises, and is outlined in section 2. Section 3 then
outlines the conception of human (and organisational) change with reference to
Festinger’s idea of cognitive dissonance, and Lewin’s three step model of change.
Following this, and in building on the discussions of the sections 2 and 3, section 4
clarifies the importance of identifying the personal motivations and political-economic
structures that tend to limit the ways in which patterns of CSD might be changed. In
specific regard to Anglo-American countries, section 4 emphasises:
.
that the managers of corporations continue to be strongly encouraged, via both
legal and remunerative means, to try to maximize shareholder wealth; and
.
that this state of affairs significantly influences the information management
decide to disclose.
Section 5 then identifies five corporate stakeholders – i.e. governments, academia,
non-government organisations (NGOs), the media, and the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) industry – and the sources of corporate cognitive dissonance,
which they can create. We argue that these five sources of dissonance can potentially
lead to the managers of Anglo-American corporations feeling motivated to initiate a
change in patterns of CSD. In doing so, section 5 highlights how the theoretical
AAAJ discussions of sections 2 and 3 combine to suggest that scholars of CSD need to
22,1 acknowledge the institutional realities that encourage managers of Anglo-American
limited liability and publicly traded corporations to try to maximise shareholder
wealth (as outlined in section 4). Furthermore, section 5 highlights that these
institutional realities result in their being limited means by which to encourage
managers to change patterns of CSD and improve accountability.
120 In concluding, we suggest that future research into changing patterns of CSD needs to:
.
be more concerned with the interrelationship of multiple factors that could
potentially give rise to change;
.
identify and understand the ways in which different managerial attitudes and
cultures will result in different factors being more likely to give rise to a felt need
for change;
.
identify how corporate actors go about changing patterns of CSD on realising a
felt need for change;
.
identify and understand the attitudes, institutions and priorities of non-corporate
actors concerned to give rise to change in patterns of CSD, and how they impact
on their choice of strategies; and
.
be more nuanced and sophisticated in regard to understanding the political
realities that potentially limit change.
This future research could be conducted using methods which engage with
organisations and organisational stakeholders, and, by utilising theories that allow
change at the individual, organisational and institutional level, to be examined (see
Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007).
2. Conceiving human (and organisational) action

Much of the literature seeking to explain patterns of CSD has done so without reference
to either the organisational actors involved in disclosure decisions (Adams, 2002), or
the way in which the actions of corporate stakeholders interrelate to influence those
decisions. Yet, the notion of human action is of obvious importance to understanding
organisational action in that it is exceedingly difficult to deny that, in the last instance,
it is always individuals, or a given number of individuals, that decide to act in a certain
way (von Mises, 1963, p. 43). Accordingly – and in explicitly noting that we do not
wish to rankly dismiss the impact of biology, culture and/or institutions on the actions
of human beings (von Mises, 1963, p. 46) – we write of human (and organisational)
action as opposed to simply “organisational” action. In adopting this perspective, we
draw on the work of the Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises.
Von Mises was an economist and social (and political) philosopher. He is often
credited with revitalizing the “Austrian” school of economics in the twentieth century,
and as having provided the “most conscientious and extensive development” of the
school’s “methodological doctrines” (Selgin, 1988, p. 20). This school-of-thought, which
originated with the publication of Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics in 1871 (e.g.
Menger, 2004), has two distinguishing features. First, it is characterised by a
deep-seated subjectivism that results in scholars aligned with the school continually
emphasising that people are able to choose, decide, create and act, in a manner that is
more or less free (e.g. Oakley, 1999). Second, the school is characterised by its
adherence to the precepts of rationalism: i.e. the belief in the existence of abstract Future change in
universal principles (e.g. Smith, 1996, Chapter 10). In regard to rationalism, it is corporate
important to note that certain scholars aligned with the Austrian perspective –
Lachmann (1976, 1986) for example – have sometimes divorced themselves from the reporting
precepts thereof in favour of empiricism (i.e. the belief that knowledge is entirely
derived from experience) and historicism (i.e. the belief that there are no universal laws;
only theories and ideas of varying utility in regard to certain times and places). 121
Authors that do this are commonly and correctly considered “un-Austrian” (e.g. Hoppe,
1997; Rothbard, 1992; Selgin, 1988).
In returning to the work of von Mises, it must be emphasized that, in reinvigorating
the Austrian tradition, he built his deductive science of human action on the
fundamental axiom that human beings act purposefully to try to achieve a desired end
(e.g. von Mises 1962, 1963, 1969). This axiom renders the regulative framework of the
human/social sciences different from the regulative framework that is utilised for
understanding the remainder of one’s existence. The regulative frameworks are
different in that the specifically human/social realm cannot, as the rest of nature can, be
conceived in simple mechanistic terms of cause and effect. Rather, the human/social
realm must be conceived in terms of (more or less) consciously chosen and purposively
directed behaviour (see, for example, von Mises, 1962, pp. 2-5; 1963, pp. 24-25; 1969,
pp. 4-13). Thus, and while we can ask “how” something occurs in regard to nature; we
must, in regard to the specifically human realm, ask “why an event occurred in the
sense of for what humanly attributable reason?” (Oakley, 1993, p. 224, emphasis in
original).
The point to emphasize is that, according to von Mises, 1969, a person only ever acts
to attain:
. . . a state of affairs that suits him better than the alternatives. Philosophers and economists
describe this undeniable fact by declaring that man prefers what makes him happier to what
makes him less happy, that he aims at happiness. Happiness – in the purely formal sense in
which ethical theory applies the term – is the only ultimate end . . . (pp. 12-13) (emphasis in
original, male pronoun in original).
When von Mises writes of happiness in the purely formal sense as being the ultimate
end of all human endeavour, what he means is that people can only ever be understood
to act in an effort to “improve” their present situation. In short, no experienced human
action can be made sense of minus the recognition that the person acting believes
(whether rightly or wrongly) that the action will make them “happier” or “better off”.
As a purely formal notion, the idea of “happiness” makes no claims as to what will
actually make a particular person “better off” or “happier” in a particular instance. Nor
does it make any claim about the actual levels of “happiness” that people achieve. The
reason it does neither of these things is because, as a purely formal notion, it is only
concerned to highlight the similarity inherent in the immense diversity of substantive
and particular means by which people try to achieve happiness in their day to day lives
(e.g. romantic love, environmental activism, pursuit of monetary wealth, academic
endeavour).
As this suggests, the idea of purely formal happiness is – like the notion of cause
and effect with reference to existence more generally – “an essential structural element
in any conception of experience” involving other humans that we can “make intelligible
to ourselves” (Strawson, 1966, p. 68). In other words, any specifically human actions
AAAJ that we observe or experience – i.e. those actions that result in people being different
22,1 from the rest of experienced existence – cannot be understood minus the notion of
purely formal happiness. In this way, the notion of purely formal happiness is inherent
to our conceptual framework.
The meaning of all this can be further illustrated with reference to a public relations
expert who might determine to voluntarily disclose different pieces of information for
122 any given number of reasons. For example, information might be voluntarily disclosed
due to a belief that it is ethically right and correct to inform the public of the measures
the company is (or is not) taking to reduce harmful environmental impacts; or, because
it is thought ethically right and correct to protect the company’s reputation by not
disclosing negative impacts; or, because it is believed necessary in order to maintain
employment and continue earning a salary.
Importantly, all of these sorts of “micro” or “personal” motivations will be closely
related to environmental and institutional factors. Thus, it is difficult to deny that,
where disclosure is mandatory, disclosure is likely to be made in an effort to avoid
certain negative consequences (e.g. fines) that are commonly attached to
non-compliance for the corporation in question. Furthermore, and even more
importantly given the present concern to illustrate the difference between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge, it must also be emphasized that all of these different “micro”,
“personal” and a posteriori motivations are the same in that they only make sense
given the a priori truth that the public relations expert acts in an effort to improve their
state of affairs.
The point being made is that: the idea that humans always act in an effort to
improve their state of affairs (i.e. humans always pursue happiness in its purely formal
sense) is a priori to any a posteriori experience of human beings that one might have.
As the term itself indicates, and as Kant famously outlined in his Critique of Pure
Reason (e.g. Kant, 1998), an a priori notion is something we know to be true prior to any
experience, or, is something that is essential to all of our experiences. An a posteriori
notion, on the other hand, is something we can only know to be true following the
experience thereof. For example, the public relations expert may not want to disclose
certain information because they think it will likely result in their being sacked. This
fact could be different (e.g. they might also decide not to disclose information because
they believe that, by doing so, they will offend God and go to Hell), and, furthermore,
cannot be known until those concerned have been informed as to her motivations for
disclosing the information. In this way, such knowledge is a posteriori knowledge: i.e.
knowledge, which is contingent (i.e. experienced reality is imaginable even if a
particular piece of a posteriori knowledge were proven false).
While a great deal of knowledge is a posteriori, it must also be noted that von Mises
considered it possible to derive a number of universal truths from the a priori truth of
human action. For example, von Mises (1963, p. 124) considered the law of marginal
utility universally true. He also considered it universally true that both parties have to
benefit from a commercial interaction (i.e. voluntary exchange); and, “that if there is
any money in use at all, an increase in its supply must lead to a reduction in its
purchasing power” (Hoppe, 1997, pp. 65, 68).
Further to these a priori truths, von Mises also considered that there are a number of
a posteriori phenomena that occur so consistently as to be approaching universality
(Rothbard, 1957, pp. 3-4). The most relevant of these to our discussion, is the idea that
the owners of businesses commonly engage in commercial activities in an effort to Future change in
maximize profits (e.g. von Mises 1957, p. 291). In noting this however, it must also be corporate
emphasized that von Mises recognized that human beings are creative actors who can
value the same experiences differently and choose between differing value systems. reporting
Indeed, von Mises can be found explicitly stating that:
Economics does not assume or postulate that men [sic ] aim only or first of all at
what is called material well-being. Economics, as a branch of the more general theory 123
of human action, deals with all human action, i.e. with man’s [sic ] purposive aiming at
the attainment of ends chosen, whatever these ends may be. To apply the concept
rational or irrational to the ultimate ends chosen is nonsensical . . . It is neither more
nor less rational to aim at riches like Croseus than to aim at poverty like a Buddhist
monk. (von Mises, 1963, p. 884, emphasis in original).
Accordingly, and while acknowledging (a posteriori ) that a vast number of people
are interested in improving their levels of material well being or financial status, von
Mises in no way suggests that people are – obviously, always, and/or necessarily –
versions of what Jensen and Meckling (1994) would classify as “money maximizers”:
i.e. people narrowly interested in money at the expense of art, other people, culture,
sport, and so on. In short, when it comes to “the profit motive”, von Mises
acknowledges:
.
that this motivation (i.e. to improve one’s material well being) is commonly
tempered by other motivations (e.g. the motivation to be a loving parent, or the
motivation to be an honest and respected professional); and
. that while this motivation is fairly widespread, existence is imaginable even if
this were not the case.
What this second point means is that existence would still be imaginable if all who are
currently strongly motivated by financial concerns were to be motivated by something
else (e.g. the desire to bring about gender and racial equality or protect the
environment). In this way, the recognition of the profit motive is not an a priori piece of
knowledge, but rather an a posteriori piece of knowledge: for it is non-essential to
experienced reality and thus, capable of being otherwise. The idea of purely formal
happiness on the other hand, is a priori for the simple reason that no specifically
human experience is imaginable minus the idea that people consciously act to improve
their state of affairs.
To provide an extreme example, it is immediately obvious, and undeniable, that the
conscious actions of a “self-harmer” only make sense given the fact that the person in
question chooses to harm themselves because they believe that to do so is better than not
doing so. Thus, and while it can be difficult for those unacquainted with “self-harmers”
to understand, many people that have engaged in the “self-harm” of “cutting” (i.e.
slashing one’s forearms with a razor) do so because they have a strong desire to “see” an
emotional pain they are suffering in a manifest form, and/or, because they have a desire
to “release” the pain they feel inside them. In other words, they feel it is better to “see”
and/or “release” this pain than not “see” and/or “release” it. Accordingly, and as von
Mises tirelessly emphasized, it must be acknowledged that one cannot even begin to
understand such actions minus the a priori truth of human action.
In bringing this section to a close, it can be stated that von Mises’ work, while
emphasising universal principles (e.g. formal happiness), was far from reductive of
AAAJ human diversity. These two factors – combined with the more general manner in
22,1 which his work is based on the idea that it is the actions, beliefs and desires of
individuals that we ultimately need to understand if we are to comprehend (let alone
create) changes in society and/or organisations more generally – means that von
Mises’ work provides a solid foundation on which to represent the diverse interests
that exist, and sometimes collide, within the contested, complex, and constantly
124 changing terrain of CSD in a systematic manner. For example, von Mises work is in no
way troubled by the fact that various people are concerned to hold corporations to
account for their activities in regard to the environment, gender, “third-world” poverty,
or malfeasance more generally. Nor is it overwhelmed by the fact that different
scholars of CSD consider various theoretical lenses better or more appropriate than
other theoretical lenses for the study of corporate and managerial activities. For these
sorts of reasons then, the present paper suggests that von Mises’ work, in emphasising
the importance of individual motivations and individual ideas of happiness, provides a
solid foundation from which to conceptualise future change in patterns of CSD.
3. Conceiving human (and organisational) change

In the preceding section it was noted that human (and organisational) action can only
be understood in terms of purely formal happiness. Central to this idea is the notion
that human beings are not omnipotent and that there is an external reality that resists
one’s efforts to achieve a particular end. If human beings were omnipotent, then it
would be pointless to talk of human desire or human (or organisational) action, for
people (or organisations) would never be without what they wanted. The reason we are
not omnipotent is that there is an external or real world that resists our efforts at
achieving our ends (von Mises, 1962, p. 6). For example, corporate stakeholders may
take action which differs from that expected by the public relations expert previously
mentioned, and which, subsequently, causes the public relations expert to come to a
different decision about how to disclose a company’s environmental performance. This
unexpected development only makes sense given that the public relations expert is not
omnipotent, and thus, could not control, or perfectly foresee, the future actions of the
corporation’s stakeholders.
The basic importance of this lack of omnipotence – i.e. the existence of an external
and real world – is that we can be wrong (Sayer, 2000, p. 2). When we experience
ourselves as being wrong – i.e. when our ideas about a given state of affairs do not
match up with the actual state of affairs in question – we experience what Festinger
termed a “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger, 1957). This idea of cognitive dissonance is
a very powerful one when trying to understand a change in the behaviour of a person
or an organisation. In Festinger’s (1957) conception, the idea of “dissonance” refers to
“the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” and the idea of “cognition”
refers to “any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or
about one’s behaviour” (p. 3). Basically, a cognitive dissonance occurs when two or
more cognitions about the “same” thing, are “out-of-sync”. This dissonance is posited
as being a source of psychological discomfort for the person experiencing the
dissonance. For obvious reasons (i.e. discomfort is “bad”), it is further presumed that
the person experiencing the dissonance will seek to remove this discomfort by
returning their cognitions to a state of consonance.
The helpful example Festinger gives in this regard is of a smoker who, having Future change in
believed that cigarettes are of no negative consequence for one’s health (with health
being something the smoker values), subsequently finds out that this is not true. If the
corporate
smoker is to remove this dissonance and return his cognitions to a level of consonance, reporting
he can, according to Festinger (1957, p. 6), either:
(1) Change his actions (i.e. give up smoking).
(2) Change his thoughts (e.g. he might try to find a lot of information that dismisses 125
the negatives of smoking).
In this second regard, a further course of action the smoker could take, would be to
diminish the importance he places on good health (e.g. he might come to think that he is
“here for a good time, not a long time”, with this being one way in which the smoker
would change his substantive conception of happiness). Whatever the case, cognitive
dissonance is discomforting. To briefly mention the public relations expert once again,
it can be stated that the unexpected actions of the NGO created a cognitive dissonance
that they attempted to remove through changing patterns of CSD. Such actions,
furthermore, can only ever be understood in terms of the public relations expert
pursuing happiness in the purely formal sense described previously.
When one experiences a cognitive dissonance, one experiences a change in what
Lewin (1959, p. 57) terms one’s “life space”. A person’s life space:
. . . consists of the needs of the person and his psychological environment. All psychological
events occur within the life space . . . [It ] includes all facts, which have existence for the
person and excludes those, which do not. It embraces needs, goals, unconscious influences,
memories, beliefs, events of a political, economic, and social nature, and anything else that
might have direct effect on behavior (Marrow, 1969, pp. 34-5, emphasis added).
In regard to Festinger’s (1957) smoker, the cognitive dissonance arose as a result of a
piece of information (which spelt out the health dangers of smoking) entering the
smoker’s life space. Previously, this information existed outside the smoker’s life space
and was of no psychological importance to the smoker, for (in effect) it did not exist.
Similarly, the cognitive dissonance of the public relations expert began when she
became aware of the NGOs campaign. Importantly, it should be noted that this basic
idea – that to “describe a situation ‘objectively’ in psychology actually means to
describe the situation as a totality of those facts and of only those facts which make up
the field of that individual” (p. 62) – influenced all of Lewin’s work, including his work
on the “ice-cube” or “3-step” model of change (see Lewin, 1959, pp. 228-9; or Lewin,
1947).
Basically, Lewin held that “the process of change . . . occurs over time and consists
of several successive stages or steps” that can “be labelled unfreezing, changing, and
refreezing” (Schein, 1961, p. 119). The basic presupposition of this model is that human
behaviour is more or less stable, which, in more technical language, means that human
behaviour is “based on a quasi-stationary equilibrium supported by a complex field of
forces” (Burnes, 2004, p. 313). For this “quasi-stationary equilibrium” to be unfrozen, a
cognitive dissonance of sufficient force needs to arise and induce a “need or a motive to
change” (Schein, 1961, p. 119). According to Schein, this need or motive will often
manifest itself as some sort of “anxiety” about achieving goals or maintaining
standards (Schein, 2002, p. 36). To put it colloquially, one might say that unfreezing
occurs when one is “shocked into action”.
AAAJ Adams and McNicholas (2007) have suggested that a stakeholder engagement
22,1 process designed to challenge the perceptions of organisational participants may
facilitate the unfreezing process. Indeed, they suggest that unfreezing:
is most likely to occur in a situation where stakeholders can express their views without fear
of reprisals . . . [and ] where stakeholders take radical action, such as a consumer boycott or
industrial action . . . (p. 386, emphasis added).
126
In effect, Adams and McNicholas (2007) suggest that unfreezing is likely to occur when
stakeholder engagements follow something like the approach recommended by
AccountAbility (AccountAbility, 1999; AccountAbility and Utopies, 2007). Such a
dialogic approach (see Bebbington et al., 2007), Adams and McNicholas (2007) have
suggested, can force managers to confront their lack of knowledge and expertise,
which, in turn, can result in an unfreezing of the status quo.
Once unfreezing has occurred, the person or people involved can obviously begin to
change. At the start of the change process, the now unfrozen person or group will often:
.
scan the environment in an effort to find a new kind of behaviour that can solve
the cognitive dissonance at hand; and/or
.
try to find a role model from whom they can learn a new “viewpoint” via a
process of “psychological ‘identification’” (Schein, 2002, p. 39).
Thus, once the person or group in question has suffered a cognitive dissonance and
become unfrozen, they will try to find, and then apply, a new cognitive framework that
can bring their cognitions back into consonance. In the government organisation
studied by Adams and McNicholas (2007) this was achieved by the managers’
studying best practice sustainability reports, by the managers becoming involved in an
industry association sustainability task force, and by the managers studying the
Global Reporting Initiative’s (2002) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, the AA1000
framework (AccountAbility, 1999), and the criteria of awards schemes such as the
ACCA Sustainability Reporting Awards.
The final step in this change process is that of refreezing. The stage of refreezing
can only occur once “the person or group has achieved a new set of cognitions and
attitudes, and has begun to express these in new daily behaviour” (Schein, 2002, p. 39).
The subsequent integration of key sustainability performance indicators into the
decision making process of the government organisation researched by Adams and
McNicholas (2007) served to refreeze the managers’ cognitive attitudes. Perhaps the
main point to make regarding refreezing is that the “new behavior must be, to some
degree, congruent with the rest of the behavior and personality of the learner or it will
simply set off new rounds of disconfirmation that often lead to unlearning the very
thing one has learned” (Schein, 1999, p. 63). Importantly, this three-step process can
occur again and again over varying periods of time.
Whenever an organisation or a corporation changes their patterns of reporting or
disclosure, a particular person or group of people within that organisation can be said
to have gone through something like the stages of Lewin’s “3-Step” model of change.
Furthermore, and given the preceding discussion of von Mises’ work on human (and
organisational) action, we can understand that the corporation or organisation in
question will only make such a change because the people “in-charge” think that such a
change is for the best. In reference to the governmental organisation discussed by
Adams and McNicholas (2007), the CEO, in addition to other important staff members, Future change in
considered the need for change both important, and consistent with the organisation’s corporate
goals more generally (which were not limited to maximizing profits for shareholders).
In specific regard to goals of publicly traded and limited liability “Anglo-American” reporting
corporations, and as both instrumental stakeholder theory and organisation centred
legitimacy theory have recognised, the maximisation of shareholder wealth is
fundamental. The empirical work of O’Dwyer (2003) – which found that 29 senior 127
executives from Irish PLCs tended to interpret corporate social responsibility in a
manner consistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximisation – reaches a
similar conclusion. The importance of noting this – given the discussions of this and
preceding section more generally – is that the managers of limited liability and
publicly traded Anglo-American corporations need to experience a cognitive
dissonance that makes them feel that they will fail to maximize shareholder wealth
if they do not change their patterns of CSD in some way. For illustrative purposes, five
stakeholders likely to create such a cognitive dissonance are discussed in section 5. But
before this discussion can occur, the institutional framework that strongly encourages
corporate managers to try to maximize shareholder wealth within the Anglo-American
world must be explicated.
4. “Anglo-American”, or “shareholder-corporate”, capitalism

Whenever “Anglo-American” corporations – e.g. companies listed in, for example, the
UK, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand – are being considered from a scholarly
perspective, the first point that needs to be made is that the directors/senior
management of such publicly listed companies are legally required to try to maximise
shareholder wealth (see, for example: Beerworth, 2004/2005; Bostock, 2004/2005;
Collison, 2003; Cragg, 2002; Deakin, 2005; Kit-Wye, 2004; Owen, 2005a). Furthermore,
the senior management of such companies are commonly encouraged to try to
maximise shareholder wealth through having a significant proportion of their
remuneration tied to the company’s share price (Coffee, 2004; Cragg, 2002).
While these factors, and others, do not always result in directors/senior
management trying to maximise shareholder wealth, e.g. directors/senior
management will often expropriate funds (Coffee, 2004), a situation that can be
understood in terms of the “agency” problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); or, certain
managers may feel ethically obliged to act in a way that they know is likely to diminish
shareholder value; or, certain managers may derive a public notoriety that they crave
via an action that will diminish shareholder value – it can nevertheless be presumed,
on three grounds, that the directors/senior management of Anglo-American
corporations will at least tend to try to do so.
The first presumption is that managers generally enjoy the financial benefits they
personally derive, along with the status and prestige they might personally derive,
from maximising shareholder wealth. The second presupposition is that many
managers feel it right and correct that they obey the law in such matters (and indeed, in
matters more generally). The third presupposition is that many managers do not wish
to pay the consequences of having broken the law, or of being labelled a criminal.
Importantly, we are not arguing that these three presuppositions hold fast in each and
every instance. Rather, we are arguing that these presuppositions hold fast in most
AAAJ instances. In short, the idea that managers of Anglo-American corporations are
22,1 commonly concerned to maximise shareholder returns is a far from fanciful one.
When managers are concerned to maximise shareholder wealth, they can be said to
be practising a version of “shareholder-corporate” capitalism. In the language of Gray
et al. (1996, pp. 56-7), this means that such companies will be run in a manner that
roughly accords with the views of “pristine capitalists”. In effect, this means that
128 companies will be run in accord with Friedman’s (1997) famous statement that:
In a free enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the
owners of the business. He [sic ] has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility
is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as
much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society . . . (p. 56-7,
originally published in the New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970).
That Anglo-American corporations are (meant to be) run in an effort to maximise
shareholder profits can be considered of central importance for those studying patterns
of CSD. Importantly, this does not mean that we should view all (or any) patterns of
CSD as being explicitly “concerned with maintaining the legitimacy of . . . the capitalist
system” (Gray et al., 1996 p. 66). While this might be true in some instances, it seems a
stretch to imagine that it is true in all instances. Furthermore, and very importantly, we
contend that the patterns of CSD required to maximise shareholder wealth are not
static.
The basic idea being articulated is that, when there is a change in a pattern of CSD,
we more or less have to assume that the directors/senior management of the company
in question thought/think that, by making this change, they were/are most likely to
maximise shareholder wealth. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that “the basic
rules of society” referred to by Friedman play at least some role in the decisions
managers make regarding CSD. Rather obviously, these “rules” can change. Indeed,
they can be changed by conscious action. For example, academics can potentially
change societal views by consciously engaging in public debates, through being
involved in non governmental organisations, by advising governments, and so on (e.g.
Bebbington et al., 2007; Cooper, 2005) The media and scientific community are
similarly capable of changing societal views on such matters.
In specific regard to the scientific community, it can be suggested that the evidence
they have provided about climate change and its causes has been a powerful driver of
supranational and government initiatives to change behaviour. These more general
types of events can influence corporate perceptions regarding the “basic rules of
society”, and, as such, can impact on corporate social disclosure as Adams (2004, p. 747)
has demonstrated with reference to Alpha[1]. Furthermore, research has also
demonstrated that corporations themselves can (attempt to) change the “basic rules of
society”, and, that corporate social disclosure is used as a means of influencing
attitudes (see, for example, Adams and Harte, 1998; Burchell et al., 1980). Indeed this is
one of the disclosure strategies, which Lindblom (1993) suggested is used to legitimise
corporate behaviour.
While all this is of more general importance and interest, what must be emphasised
is that, given the motivations of a great deal of managers, and given the existing
corporate governance legislation: it can be more or less presumed that the vast
majority of managers working within publicly listed and limited liability
Anglo-American corporations are concerned to maximise shareholder wealth. von
Mises’ work, which emphasises that no human action can be understood minus the end Future change in
the person is aiming at, necessitates that one be clear about motivations as we are here corporate
trying to be. And in a fashion that is consistent with this fundamental insight, the work
of Festinger, Lewin and Schein, when taken along with the discussion of the present reporting
section, suggests that patterns of corporate social disclosure are only likely to change
when the managers of Anglo-American companies experience a cognitive dissonance
which suggests that their current patterns of CSD are unlikely to continue to maximise 129
shareholder wealth. The paper now turns to a discussion of five potential sources of
such dissonance.
5. Five potential sources of corporate cognitive dissonance

This section identifies five corporate stakeholders and their potential to give rise to a
cognitive dissonance that would result in managers altering patterns of CSD. The
stakeholders identified are governments, academia, non-government organisations
(NGOs), the media, and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) industry. This is not
so much an exhaustive list of corporate stakeholders, as it is a selection of stakeholders
that have the potential to create a cognitive dissonance among Anglo-American
corporate managers. Importantly, the form and extent of any change in patterns of CSD
that such dissonance gives rise to can vary considerably. For example, certain
cognitive dissonances that management experience might result in only superficial
changes, while others could result in a fundamental change to the processes and
outputs of CSD.
Given this last point, it must be emphasised that the present discussion is not
expressly concerned to fully explain why the form and extent of change in patterns of
CSD varies. Rather, it is simply concerned to identify a number of potential and
interrelated sources of dissonance that could spark the perceived need for change. To
put the matter in Lewin’s terms, we are most concerned with identifying potential
sources of unfreezing, and not the subsequent changes and refreezings that occur. Nor
are we concerned to identify the whole set of forces that can act to resist change (see
Adams and McNicholas, 2007 for a discussion of some of these).
Governments
Those countries previously described as Anglo-American can be considered liberal
democracies. As the descriptor suggests, such countries tend to be governed in the
name of the people, and tend to operate along lines that are more or less consistent with
some form of liberalism. For the present purpose, there are two fundamental points
that need to be made in regard to such societies. First, it must be noted that such
societies have systems of government in which the citizens of that society determine,
via periodical voting and majority rule, which people or which political party will be
responsible for governing them over a given period of time. In this way, it is thought
that politicians can be held accountable to the citizens in whose name they are meant to
govern (see Held, 1993, 1995 more generally).
Second, it must be noted that such societies have, while championing liberty and
freedom to some extent, never fully recognized the deontological arguments of
libertarians (e.g. Nozick, 1974; Rothbard, 1978). In regard to the commercial sphere for
instance, such societies have, while protecting the right of business people to profit,
simultaneously taxed, controlled and directed their activities in the name of certain
AAAJ equalities and the “social good”. In doing so, such societies have similarly refused to
22,1 fully accept the various utilitarian arguments commonly made in favour of free
markets, e.g. that free markets tend to maximize overall social welfare by linking the
capacity to personally prosper with the satisfaction of the wants and desires of others,
or, that free markets tend not to misallocate productive resources in the same way as
governments – and which, are often associated with Adam Smith’s The Wealth of
130 Nations (1986). The reasons why Anglo-American countries have not fully accepted the
various utilitarian arguments that can be made for free markets are commonly related
to the belief that free markets fail to provide various public goods, and, that free
markets commonly result in excessively high levels of negative externalities being
produced.
The importance of making the previous two points is that liberally-democratic
governments already have significant regulatory control over existing patterns of CSD
and corporate behaviour more generally. Furthermore, the recognition of such is
important because, should politicians consider a potential change in the regulatory
framework as being politically popular and feasible, then they will likely be concerned
to try to change the regulatory frameworks accordingly. Whenever this occurs, and
whenever financial costs are associated with the failure of corporate compliance, then
managers are likely to be concerned to change patterns of CSD.
Many academics, NGOs, and people more generally, have argued in favour of
making corporate reporting of social and environmental impacts mandatory (Hess and
Dunfee, 2007; O’Dwyer et al., 2005). However, legislation, while being an important
catalyst for change, will not necessarily diminish the corporate concern to maximize
shareholder wealth so long as the institutional pressures and remunerative
mechanisms mentioned previously remain intact (CORE, 2003; Owen et al., 2000;
2001; Owen 2005a, b) and/or, legislated reporting requirements are not enforced
(Adams et al., 1995). Furthermore, it must also be noted that governments are often
considered somewhat restricted when it comes to issuing regulations that will result in,
or are perceived as potentially resulting in, decreased returns on invested monies due
to the possibility of “capital flight” and the purported existence of a “race to the
bottom”.
The importance of mentioning the idea of “capital flight”, and the idea of a “race to
the bottom”, is that the supposed existence thereof is commonly considered to diminish
the extent to which governments can regulate capital in a globalised world. This
assumption is one that is commonly made by both populist writers (e.g. Friedman,
1999) and academics (e.g. Detomasi, 2007; Matten and Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006;
Scherer and Smid, 2000; van Oosterhout, forthcoming). Thus – and given that this
sub-section of the paper is concerned to argue that government legislation and
regulation is an important source of potential cognitive dissonance for managers – it
must be noted that it is increasingly recognized that, at worst, such ideas are a fiction,
and that at best, the importance of such phenomena are significantly overstated. The
likes of Görg et al. (2007) and Jensen (2006) for example, have convincingly argued that,
rather than being attracted to countries with minimal regulative and fiscal regimes,
multinational corporations are actually attracted to countries characterized by
democratic institutions with redistributive social welfare policies (among other things).
The point to note then, is that governments can still regulate the activities of
corporations in our presently “globalized” world.
Academia Future change in
Academics are, through their research and teaching, a potential source of cognitive corporate
dissonance for managers concerned with CSD. Cooper (2005) makes a strong case for a
greater role for academics in the promotion of the public interest though involvement reporting
in social movements. Bebbington et al. (2007) consider a variety of modes of
engagement, which might lead to an improvement in the sustainability performance of
organisations, and Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007) advocate direct engagement 131
with companies and other organisations aimed (directly or indirectly) at improving
organisational sustainability performance and/or accountability for it. Adams (2002),
Adams and McNicholas (2007), Albelda-Pérez et al. (2007), Belal and Owen (2007), Dey
(2007) Larrinaga-Gonzalez et al. (2001); O’Dwyer (2002, 2003), and O’Dwyer and
Unerman (2007) are examples of this type of research which gives insights into
organisational (change) processes.
Research and teaching that is critical of CSD patterns could give rise to a perceived
need to change patterns of CSD. Adams (2004), for example, details the manner in
which one company’s patterns of disclosure regarding ethical, social and
environmental impacts were at best inconsistent with a great deal of other
information available in the public domain, and, at worst, deliberately misleading
resulting in a reporting-performance portrayal gap which would not be tolerated in
financial reporting. In much the same fashion, Beder (1997), Bruno (2007), Dey (2004)
and Laufer (2003) have noted that a great deal of information released by corporations
is, more or less, disinformation. Such research could potentially encourage a more
honest corporate concern with issues of CSD and accountability for fear of corporate
reputations being tarnished. Furthermore, such research could be used to bolster
arguments suggesting the need for mandatory reporting, and the policing of reporting
practices, something corporate managers at least occasionally resist.
In reference to the potential impact academics might have on patterns of CSD, it is
necessary to make brief reference to the system of constraints and incentives that has
come to guide much of academia. For example, and as Parker et al. (1998) and Parker
and Guthrie (2005) have noted, academics who wish to succeed (through promotion to
professorial positions for example), are increasingly having to concern themselves with
publication in “leading” journals. However, many of the “leading” journals in the
spheres of accounting and management research are not necessarily interested in
publishing work that is “excessively” critical of corporate practices. Getting published
in leading journals often necessitates that academics pursue more short term, and
“neat” research (Parker and Guthrie, 2005, p. 7).
Further, there is the potential for academics who concentrate on publication in
leading journals neglecting, or “having” to neglect, other roles that have traditionally
been considered important. For example, publications in professional journals – which
might be considered an important site of academic communication with the world more
generally – are of little or no value in the current academic market place (Parker et al.,
1998, pp. 387-9). The need to generate multiple revenue streams has also resulted in
universities increasingly having to increase student numbers and look to the
commercial sector for funding (Parker and Guthrie, 2005). This can serve to decrease
the time which academics have to devote to research and advocacy, particularly in
disciplines where suitably qualified staff are in short supply.
AAAJ As all this suggests, there are certain institutional forces – which importantly,
22,1 academics often help to create – that place limits on the potential of academics to
engage in long term critical projects, and which, place a limit on the extent to which
academics might communicate their critical perspectives with society more generally.
Nevertheless, academic research and teaching can:
.
influence students who then become employees and who, in most instances, are
132 already voting citizens;
.
influence the media;
.
influence NGOs;
.
influence governments and their policies; and
.
influence corporations more directly (though consulting for example).
Each of these actions can potentially create cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and
unfreezing (Lewin, 1947) within the managerial mindset, and, as a result, potentially
give rise to the belief that patterns of CSD need to change (whether for reasons of
“profitability”, or, in an effort to comply with the “general rules of society”).
NGOs
While NGOs are difficult to define (see, for example, Gray et al., 2006, pp. 324-7;
Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006, pp. 307-9), it will suffice for our purposes to mention that
they often engage in campaigning and/or advocacy activities:, e.g. NGOs often
campaign in the name of the environment and human rights (Unerman and O’Dwyer,
2006, p. 312). In other words, NGOs are often concerned to shape both the formal and
informal rules that govern one aspect of social life or another, and thus, can be
considered civil society actors (Scholte, 2002, p. 283).
In their campaigning and/or advocacy activities, NGOs often try to:
.
indirectly impact on the activities of corporations through encouraging
governments and multi-lateral organisations around the world to change their
regulative and legislative structures; and
.
directly impact on corporate activities.
As has already been noted previously, CORE, 2003) have been concerned to get the
regulations surrounding corporate governance changed so as to ensure that the
management of corporations manage in the name of all stakeholders. The World
Wildlife Fund, on the other hand, have engaged with the Australian mining industry
and managed to give rise to at least some change in patterns of CSD (Deegan and
Blomquist, 2006). More generally in this second regard, it is difficult to imagine that the
activities of groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) (2007)
and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have not been the source of at least some
cognitive dissonance within the fast food industry. For example, the Kentucky Fried
Cruelty campaign of PETA – www.kfccruelty.com/ – will have probably played at
least some minimal role in KFC’s (2007) decision to publish information about their
Animal Welfare Program on the internet: www.kfc.com/about/animalwelfare.asp.
Further to these activities, campaigning and/or advocacy NGOs are also commonly
involved in Global Public Policy Networks (GPPN). Such networks come into being
when corporations, NGOs and governments are, more or less simultaneously and
equally, involved in the formation of various institutions (Detomasi, 2007). The Global Future change in
Reporting Initiative (GRI) is one illustration of a GPPN that has recently emerged and corporate
which is specifically concerned with patterns of CSD (e.g. Detomasi, 2007, p. 330; Hess
and Dunfee, 2007, pp. 24-8; Willis, 2003). reporting
As all these examples highlight, NGOs often play a role in unfreezing, though the
funder-led social accountability initiative studied by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007)
aimed at embedding a social accountability focus in the Irish (development NGO 133
(NGDO) sector itself failed. O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) found that the initiative’s
adoption was seen as superficial and unsatisfactory by the primary funder and was
viewed by the NGDOs as “just another funding mechanism”.
Media
In their paper on the CSD patterns of BHP, Deegan et al. (2002) have suggested
that the media has a more or less clear and direct impact on what corporations do
and do not disclose in regard to their activities. More particularly, they suggest
that corporations will often try to defend the legitimacy of their activities in light
of such legitimacy being called into question via various means. In other words,
Deegan et al. (2002) suggest that corporations will often change their patterns of
CSD in light of media reports, which might potentially damage their corporate
reputation. One particularly clear example of a corporation changing their patterns
of CSD in light of media attention is McDonald’s. McDonald’s (2007a) corporate
reputation has been under attack for quite some time. Given both the size of the
business and the business they are in, it is, among other things, unsurprising that
they have been a figure of hate for those championing animal rights (e.g. PETA,
ALF). Recently this more general hatred has manifested itself in a number of films
of moderate success.
In the McLibel film– which was originally released in 1998 and subsequently
re-released in 2005 – the story is told of two anarchist activists who take on the legal
might of McDonald’s and, for all intents and purposes, win. Basically, the film tells the
story of the two activists and the manner in which they were taken to court for handing
out some leaflets in front of one of McDonald’s stores in London. Among other things,
the leaflets suggested that McDonald’s were not really being nice to animals; that they
were producing food that was not necessarily that nutritious; and, that they were
responsible for some considerable amount of environmental destruction. McDonald’s
objected to this information being distributed in front of one of their London stores and
took the “The McLibel Two” to court (with little or no success). The story is a classic
David vs Goliath battle in which McDonald’s and its corporate executives are painted
in a poor light. The case itself, and the release of the two films, have received massive
media attention over the years, and have generated a similarly large anti-McDonald’s
web-presence (e.g. www.mcspotlight.org).
The other film of recent date to specifically target McDonald’s is Super Size Me
(2004). In this film, the filmmaker Morgan Spurlock embarks on an experiment that
requires him to eat three meals a day at McDonald’s for a month. In the process,
Spurlock has periodic health check-ups that suggest the food he is eating is having a
significant negative impact on his overall health, e.g. he gets fatter, his blood pressure
goes up, and so on. McDonald’s in the UK have countered the claims of Super Size Me
with a web site (McDonald’s, 2007b). And, given more general concerns about their
AAAJ activities, McDonald’s in the UK are currently maintaining another web site with the
22,1 following URL: www.makeupyourownmind.co.uk/ As both URLs suggest, McDonald’s
patterns of CSD have been influenced to at least a minimal extent by much of the
negative sentiments about the company one can find in the media. Much like NGOs
then, these filmmakers, producers and directors can be considered civil society actors
in that their aim is to impact on both the formal and informal rules governing social life
134 and the actions required by McDonald’s to maximise shareholder wealth.
The corporate social responsibility (CSR) industry

Owen (2005b) has used the notion of a CSR industry to refer to a whole host of people
and organizations – e.g. various consultants, NGOs, professional bodies, governmental
bodies, and public relations experts – who are selling the idea that socially responsible
behaviour, and in turn, socially responsible CSD, will enhance shareholder value. This
growing industry arguably has its roots in that body of academic literature concerned
to link what can be termed corporate social performance (CSP) with corporate financial
performance (CFP). This literature, which can be traced at least as far back as 1972,
when Bragdon and Marlin (1972) and Moskowitz (1972) both published studies, was, in
its turn, largely driven by the pragmatic recognition that:
.
corporations are more or less required to maximize profits in Anglo-American
countries; and that
.
this meant that if corporations were to legitimately engage in activities
concerned with the social good, then such activities had to be profitable
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003).
From 1972 to 2002, Margolis and Walsh (2003) identified 127 such studies. They
suggest that, when one conducts a simple compilation of these studies, one finds
reasonable evidence of a positive correlation between CSP and CFP (2003, p. 277).
Nevertheless, as Margolis and Walsh (2003, p. 278) go on to note, there are numerous
methodological problems undermining such studies, e.g. establishing the direction of
causation. Not only that, but it is patently obvious to anyone with even the most
limited experience in the business world that the “ethics pays” credo is far from being
universally true (e.g. Paine, 2000; Spurgin, 2004; Toenjes, 2002;).
In addition to the empirical literature that can be understood as “supporting” the
CSR industry, there is also the theoretical literature. This literature, which has often
revolved around Freeman’s seminal work (1984), has tended to justify concerns of
stakeholders on the basis that such concern will result in benefits accruing to the firm
in question (Margolis and Walsh, 2003, p. 279; Walsh, 2005). In other words,
stakeholder theory, when conceived instrumentally, does not really amount to
anything more than the idea of enlightened self-interest. Conceived as such,
stakeholder theory, and other such ideas of CSR, are consistent with the existing
concern to maximise shareholder wealth; they simply offer (what is arguably) a
different way by which to go about it. Accordingly, and given the undoubted strategic
utility of the stakeholder perspective, it is not surprising that the CSR industry is
enjoying its time in the spotlight and creating some sort of cognitive dissonance in
regard to the thoughts managers have about CSR and CSD: for even if it cannot
guarantee to increase shareholder returns, the ideas of instrumental CSR are beneficial
in their ability to help maintain shareholder returns.
6. Conclusion Future change in
This paper has conceptualised changes in CSD in a way which can be used to corporate
interrelate existing streams of research, and orientate future streams of research,
concerned with understanding changing patterns of CSD. In doing so, the paper has reporting
emphasised that human (and organisational) action can only ever be understood in
terms of the pursuit of purely formal happiness (von Mises, 1962, 1963), and that
human (and organisational) change can only be understood in terms of something 135
entering a person’s life space which creates a dissonance in their understanding about
how to best achieve a given end (Festinger, 1957). More specifically in this second
regard, the paper has non-exhaustively suggested that governments, academics,
NGOs, the media, and the CSR industry are all potential sources of cognitive
dissonance for managers of Anglo-American limited liability and publicly traded
corporations. All five of these corporate stakeholders can act in such a way as to
suggest to corporate actors that they need to change their patterns of CSD if they are to
continue to maximise shareholder returns, or comply with the “basic rules of society”.
In making these contributions to the literature, the paper suggests five concerns that
need to increasingly inform the work of those interested in further understanding
changing patterns of CSD. Understanding what actions result in changes in CSD is an
important step in changing social and environmental performance because, when it
comes to performance management, companies focus their attention on indicators that
are disclosed.
First, the paper suggests that researchers need to concern themselves with the
manner in which multiple and interrelated factors will often be the source of a
dissonance significant enough to change the perceived “basic rules of society” and
result in a managerial concern for change. For example, a manager might need to read
a critical paper by an academic, note various actions by NGOs and see evidence that
the media is turning against their company prior to feeling the need to change their
patterns of CSD.
Accordingly, we suggest that there is a need for a greater understanding of how
these various factors interrelate to impact on managerial thinking. The potential
capacity of academics to give rise to change in patterns of CSD, not to mention the
potential capacity of other actors, will not be achieved without a better understanding
of how to create a web of factors that could give rise to significant dissonance in the
thinking of corporate management. This necessitates some form of engagement. This
may be in the form suggested by Cooper (2005), or, as Adams and Larrinaga-González
(2007) suggest, it could take the form of academics trying to directly and/or indirectly
influence change by gaining a greater understanding of how organisations and
institutions change.
Second, the paper suggests that there is a need to further identify and understand
the ways in which different managerial attitudes and cultures will result in different
interrelationships of factors being more likely to give rise to cognitive dissonance, and
thus, a felt need for change. For example, the work of Tetlock (2000), when read in
conjunction with the present paper, suggests that different managers will be more
concerned by negative media portrayals than they will by NGO campaigning and vice
versa. Furthermore, such works also begin to suggest that different managers will be
likely to completely discount the work of academics, while others will be likely to see
the work of academics as being at the vanguard of coming trends (though this is
AAAJ perhaps aspirational with respect to the field of social and environmental accounting).
22,1 The work of Deegan and Blomquist (2006), which highlights that the management of
corporations will be more concerned to interact with those NGOs they believe to be
representative of society’s concerns, has already begun to expand our understanding in
this general regard. Further work is thus needed to identify what is most likely to give
rise to cognitive dissonance given differing institutional arrangements and the
136 differing beliefs and values of managers.
Third, the paper suggests that there is a need for further research into the steps
management take once they are convinced of the need for change. For example, and as
the work of Lewin (1947, 1959) and Schein (1961, 2002) suggests, managers will, having
felt a cognitive dissonance, be likely to scan their environment for patterns of
behaviour they can copy, or look for a role model from whom they can learn, so as to
end the discomfort created. In this regard, the CSR industry and global public policy
networks – e.g. the GRI – obviously play an important role. This search for role
models or existing patterns of behaviour would seem closely related to the institutional
isomorphism that Cormier et al. (2005) have noted as characterising patterns of
environmental disclosure among German companies. Importantly, this process of
scanning the environment or looking for role models will also be influenced by
managerial attitudes.
Fourth, the paper suggests that there is a need to further understand the actions of
those stakeholder actors concerned to consciously give rise to cognitive dissonance and
organisational change (e.g. Georgakopoulos and Thomson, forthcoming). For example,
some actors will be inclined to see legislation or, alternatively, soft government
regulation, as the answer to all ills that exist in regard to existing patterns of CSD;
while other actors will be likely to see governments as being of no help as a result of
them being slow to move and excessively constrained by political pressures. These
differing viewpoints will have a major influence on the strategies employed by various
actors as they try to achieve their desired ends. Further case study, interview and
action research, which examines how corporate stakeholders effect change, is needed.
Finally, we suggest that there is a need for researchers to be more nuanced with
regard to the political realities that impact on the potential for change in patterns of
CSD. For example, research which emphasises that current changes in patterns of CSD
among Anglo-American corporations are driven by a concern with shareholder return
or a proxy for shareholder return such as reputation risk management (see Bebbington
et al., 2008), seem somewhat pointless. Indeed, we suggest that any research into
changing patterns of CSD among Anglo-American corporations has to begin with the
presupposition that such changes are governed by a concern with profit maximization.
Importantly, the fact that the managers of Anglo-American corporations are
encouraged – via both legal and remunerative means – to try to maximise shareholder
wealth is underpinned and supported by a vast realm of theorising (e.g. Friedman,
1982; Smith, 1986). Such theorising, it might be suggested, is, as evidenced by the
continued existence of the shareholder focused corporation in Anglo-American
countries, broadly agreed with by the ruling (often passive and arguably unthinking)
majorities of Anglo-American societies. On this basis, it is suggested that those who
consider the existing state of affairs unjustified, need to consider ways in which the
changing patterns of CSD might, or might not (in addition to a great many other
things) give rise to a cognitive dissonance in the minds of the ruling majorities of
liberal democracies that could, potentially, lead to a change in how corporations are Future change in
governed. corporate
What the present paper suggests then, is that the academic field of corporate social
disclosure, or social and environmental accounting, needs to move beyond the simple reporting
concern to identify the fundamental drivers of CSD patterns (such as shareholder
wealth maximisation, reputation risk management and maintaining organisational
legitimacy). We argue that these fundamental drivers are obvious in many given 137
instances. For example, and as section four of this paper has clearly illustrated, the
managers of Anglo-American corporations are legally obliged and remuneratively
encouraged to try to maximize shareholder wealth. This fact can thus be taken, more or
less, as a given. Accordingly, scholars of CSD are encouraged to take this as a starting
point of their research, rather than assuming that it is something that needs to be
continuously rediscovered or proven. Once this change in mindset occurs, scholars of
CSD are freed to engage with a whole host of other topics, a number of which have just
been outlined. Among other things then, it is hoped that the present paper makes a
small contribution to bringing about this change in mindset.
Note
1. This is not the real name of the company. It was not named by Adams (2004).
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Corresponding author
Carol A. Adams can be contacted at: c.adams@latrobe.edu.au
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2. Conceiving human (and organisational) action

3. Conceiving human (and organisational) change

4. “Anglo-American”, or “shareholder-corporate”, capitalism

5. Five potential sources of corporate cognitive dissonance

The corporate social responsibility (CSR) industry

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