PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE ABOLIDOR, CLAUDIO BARCIMO, JR.

and FRANCISCO COMODA

G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .

Facts:

Thelma Subosa, was the mother of 14 children with her deceased husband, Primo Subosa. Subsequently, she cohabited
with her common-law husband Warlito Huesca and lived together with some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New
Lucena, Ilo-ilo. Thereafter, Warlito Huesca also died.

In morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was buried, the victim, Thelma and her children namely, Ellyn, Roselyn,
Evelyn, Manilyn, Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and Milagros Huesca, the younger sister of Warlito Huesca, were awakened by the
forcible opening of the door of their house. Four men entered the house and declared a hold up. Ronnie Abolidor tied her mouth
with a handkerchief to silence her. Then Claudio Barcimo, Jr. shot the victim several times causing her instantaneous death.
Witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn testified that they knew Ronnie Abolidor because he was their neighbor for several years,
and Claudio Barcimo, Jr. because he was a friend of their deceased stepfather. Francisco Comoda was later identified by the
witnesses at the police station.
Claudio Barcimo, Jr. denied any participation in the killing of Thelma Subosa and claimed that he could not have done it
because he was a good friend of Warlito Huesca; that on June 13, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he was with Brgy. Capt. Buol in a
celebration at the house of Brgy. Capt. Gerardo Paniza at Brgy. Dawis. He had dinner and watched game of mahjong; that at
around 10:00 p.m., he went to sleep on the sofa near the mahjong table; that the mahjong game lasted until 4:00 a.m. the
following day; that he and Capt. Buol went back to New Lucena at about 6:00 a.m. of June 14, 1993; and on the next day, he left
for Manila for treatment of tuberculosis.[8]
After trial, the trial court convicted the three accused of the offense of murder on January 31, 2000.
Only Claudio Barcimo, Jr. appealed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Held:
To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must
be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed since the incident and in
order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor
intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of
his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. [24] Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Thus, appellant is guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of Thelma Sobusa. Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Murder.

INTOD ET. AL. v CA (215 SCRA 52) G.R. No. 103119

Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was not present in his
room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar presents an
inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount
to a crime.

PEOPLE v PANCHO (416 SCRA 506) November 27, 2003 G.R. 136592-93

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. There is no
attempted rape in this case because the accused just dragged the victim and held her
feet, which are not indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.

PEOPLE v CASTROMERO (280 SCRA 421) G.R. No. 118992

The rape victim jumped from a window of her house to escape from the accused; as a
result, she suffered serious physical injuries specifically a broken vertebra which
required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. Here, the rape was
complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with the settled
principle that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger
that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the other
person may consequently suffer.

PEOPLE v APOLINAR C.A., 38 O.G. 2870

The accused, while looking over his land and believing that the victim had stolen his
palay, shouted for the latter to stop, fired his gun in the air and then at the victim,
causing the latter’s death. Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to
life and it can be invoked only as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled with an
attack on the person of the one entrusted with the said property.

PEOPLE v PEREZ (83 PHIL 314)

7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting, apprehending and
commandeering numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using
them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that
his "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to
enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women
and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost
their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if
they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment.

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PEOPLE v ADRIANO (78 PHIL 561)

Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason for being a member of the Makapili, a
military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese
Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against
the United States and the Philippines. The Supreme Court in upholding the conviction
held that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort and that being a Makapili is in
itself constitutive of an overt act. Hence, it is not necessary, except for the purpose of
increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen.

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PEOPLE v MANAYAO (78 PHIL 721)

Manayao argues that he cannot be charged with treason because he had already lost
his Filipino citizenship when he joined the Makapili, having considered himself a
member of the Japanese armed forces. Manayao cannot divest himself of his Philippine
citizenship, otherwise, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from
punishment and would essentially place himself beyond the arm of our treason law.

Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

Spanish Code of Commerce Provision Disqualifying Judges from Engaging in Commerce is Part of Spanish Political
Law Abrogated by Change of Sovereignty

FACTS:

The complainant alleged that respondent judge of the CFI violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article. 14 of the Code of
Commerce (w/c prohibited judges, among others, from engaging in commerce, either in person or in proxy or in
the financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies w/in the limits of the districts) when he
associated himself w/ the Traders Manufacturing. & Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and pres., said corp.
having been organized to engage in business.

HELD:

Although this provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce w/c is part of the commercial laws of the Phils, it
partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges. Political law has been defined as that branch of
public law w/c deals w/ the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and
defines the relations of the state w/ the inhabitants of its territory . Specifically, Art. 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law bec. it regulates the conduct of certain
public officers and employees w/ respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, and later on from US to the Republic of the Philippines.,
Article 14 of the said Code must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not w/ those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
There appears to be no enabling or affirmative act. Consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to respondent Judge.