G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
9 In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal
of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and
resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings
affirmed the February 26, 20044 and July 26, 20045 orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer
arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa
penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in
relation with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689. 7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where
Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s
advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of
return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan
Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an
incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return. 8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment
earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased
his investments through several checks he issued in the name of State
Resources.
earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One
Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and
Fourteen Centavos (₱114,286,086.14). All these checks10 were subsequently
dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo
already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he
confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that
Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s
husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never
returned Dy’s money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint
Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas
– all incorporators and/or directors of State Resources. 11
On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor
filed an information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-
accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to
respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the
other accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer
arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the
absence of probable cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review
with the Department of Justice (DOJ).15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin
motions.16 The petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied
this in its July 26, 2004 order. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion
to lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is
mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence.17 The CA noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest
after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the
judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to him.18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the
assertions in Dy’s affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple
estafa,not syndicated estafa. Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafato
exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or more persons, and the
fraud must be against the general public or at least a group of persons. In his
complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the petitioners’ false
representations and was defrauded into parting with his money, causing him
damage.19 Since there was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud
the public in general or that it was used to solicit money from other persons aside
from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for simple estafa. 20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still
probable cause to believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits shows inconsistencies in
his cited factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners,
negate the existence of probable cause against themfor the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend thatit was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money.
As early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus
negating the assertion that Dy advanced funds for this corporation. 22 They question
the fact that it took Dy almost five years to file his complaint despitehis allegation that
he lost almost ₱100,000,000.00.23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null
and void. Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the CA noted in the body of its
decision, that PD 1689 was inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to
show that State Resources was formed to solicit funds not only from Dy but also from
the general public. Since simple estafaand syndicated estafaare two distinct
offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners were erroneous because
these warrants pertained to two different crimes.24
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DENYthe petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the
petition for certiorarithe petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners
imputed grave abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denialof their twin
motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya
v. Transmed Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a
Rule 45 petition before us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this
cited case the kind of review that this Court should undertake given the
distinctionsbetween the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of the
decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on
jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the
petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the
CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the
basis of whether the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motions was strictly legally
correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’
motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is
mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after hispersonal
evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime
charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain from making a mindless
acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct his own examination of the
facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grantsthe trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal complaint orinformation. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause.28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners
and their co-accused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after
compliance with the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by
the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not conduct
a de novohearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial
determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence.29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners,
in fact, did not present any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its
February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in
the suspension of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing
of co-accused De Joya’s motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and
that of co-accused Spouses Hao’s own petition for review. This is not to mention the
delay in the resolutionby the Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused
DeJoya’s motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses Hao’s
motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic with the
issuance of warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination
of the facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that
they are guilty of the crime that in fact happened.30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only
issuedafter his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to
believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their
commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at
the executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at
the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of
probable cause. In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to
scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or through a
syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these
provisions, the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the
corresponding penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby
means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this particular crime is
perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
toor simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud; 3) the reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means, which induced him to part withhis money or property; and 4) as
a result, the offended party suffered damage.31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with
State Resources and promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good
business relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial
representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more
so that he eventually advanced almost ₱100,000,000.0033 with State Resources.
Gracia’s succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments, however,
were all dishonored upon deposit.34 He subsequently learned that the petitioners
used his money for Danny’s construction and realty business. 35 Despite repeated
demands and the petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s
invested money and its supposed earnings.36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit.
The petitioners inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But
unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in
Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more
blatant when they admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State
Resources had already been dissolved.37This admission strengthens the conclusion
that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources
in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent
corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. "Deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury."38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy
would not have placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These
allegations cannot but lead us to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis
to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a
syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements
are present: 1) estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of
the RPC was committed; 2) the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of
five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public.40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second
elements of syndicated estafaare present; there is probable cause for violation of
Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental
complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed,
not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of
State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated in
defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a
syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently
solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case,
no evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State
Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants
alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The
general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafaallegedly
took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial
court’s denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts
and circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was
committed.
Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believethat an offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested. 41 This
must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the
filing of the proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is
determined to address the necessity of placing the accused under custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds
of probable cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not
he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is
a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and
that the petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow
them to go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of
arrest, which is to put the accused in the court’s custodyto avoid his flight from the
clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely
different crimes. Simple estafais a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa.
An offense is necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest
issued against the petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for
simple estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be
suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending
at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension
should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November
21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their
arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not
an unqualified right.1âwphi1 In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while
the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment,
the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to
deny the motion to defer arraignment.48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving
the petitioners' petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the
suspension of the petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by
the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed
because of the petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their
erroneous invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the
petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so
that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties'
evidence and allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM
WITH MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners
Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The
warrants of arrest issued stand.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole
function of the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental
right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it
finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals'
decision2 dated January 14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's
dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft
and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its
representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa
against Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as
Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando
Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars
had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s
permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo
failed to remit the payments totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further alleged that while
there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further
investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai
Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the
unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a
total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to
prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported
unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a
Resolution7 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information
against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and
estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City.
On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable
cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer
arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February
4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory
hearing, for resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali,
issued an order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which
includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the
evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of
qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3,
2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of
probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court,
rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed the trial
court, and reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial
court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public
prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of
evidence and lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In
essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no
probable cause as shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial
determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of
probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable
cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and
arguments that were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by
the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its
comment24 that the appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his
findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should
respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while
not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition
of the issue on the existence of probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of the
trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely
reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the
prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference
between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the
determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two
concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under
Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified
theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be
conducted "to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the
public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient
basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information
with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether
there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial
determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not
he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is
a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns
itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and
the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or
not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the
function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of
the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable
cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the
prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that
case, Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy
Cerbo. An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of
Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy
Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information,
which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy
Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without
probable cause. The trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and
dismissed the case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This
court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the
amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or
innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a
general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor,
courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters
should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the
trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal
justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so
require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious
irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts
ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the
justice secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until
such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found
that the facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x
x x."37 There was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the
discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still
had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to
order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent
this, the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest
where the judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The
phrase "upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record fails to establish probable cause." Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. —
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable
cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory.1âwphi1 The court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause."
That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence
on record and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa."41Specifically, she found
that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to
have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that
these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of
qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the
exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been
removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found crucial to the
prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the
Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for
clarificatory hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged
and even directed the private complainant to bring documents relative to the
same/payment as well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying
itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case which private
complainant failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-
Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed
with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the
preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the
evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or
she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or
she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may
be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 July 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA, EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and
JOSEPH FABITO, accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by
Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and
dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the
jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road when the
jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he
sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro
Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril,
one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken
into police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and
Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead three days after the incident in
question, while the others have remained at large. Three separate criminal
complaints for murder,1 frustrated murder,2 and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti
Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended)3 were filed against them with the Municipal
Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter- affidavits,
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito and did not submit their counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order 4 declaring the accused "to
have waived their right to be heard in preliminary investigation"; finding a prima
facie case against the accused; recommending that they be charged with and
prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No.
6539, as amended; and ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations
for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, against the aforenamed persons. The informations were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The
first was later amended. The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting
upon him stab wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.5
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y
CASTAÑEDA inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, the accused having
then performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y
Castañeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.6
 CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with knives by means of violence against person by
stabbing to death TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep
bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely and thereafter with intent to
gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said
passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely owned and
driven by Teofilo Landingin without the latter's consent, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended.7
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by
Judge Crispin C. Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and
jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said court presided by Judge
Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence
in each case.
I while Benito said: "[N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic]." Another
THE CASE IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D
(Frustrated Murder) in the LARON court, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen Dominguillo Gulen and Bernardo Clemente,
Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas
was recalled as rebuttal witness. In their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan,
and Fabito took the witness stand. They also presented as additional witnesses
Roberto Lambot, Shirley Lomboy, Conrado Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente,
and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence in chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal
witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CSI
Supermarket in Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take him to his home at
Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying the Dagupan
City — Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo Landingin arrived. He boarded it and
occupied that portion of the passengers' seat behind the driver's seat. There were
already some passengers inside the jeepney, but they disembarked before the
jeepney reached the boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving behind
Landingin, Catugas, and two other passengers.8
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao, nine
persons flagged down the jeepney and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas
identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the driver; the rest took the
passenger seats behind the driver's seat. Catugas fully recognized Benito because
there was light at the ceiling of the jeepney and at the "signboard" portion of the
jeepney and the latter sometimes turned his face toward the back where Catugas
was seated. Catugas had further observed Benito's face, ears, and eyes.9 He also
recognized accused Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan.10
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan Village Inn
(PVI) in Bued, Calasiao. But when they reached PVI, one of them said that his
companions did not know where they were going, and informed Landingin that he
would take care of the fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching Nansangaan, one of the nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a
little farther. Later, Mejia asked Catugas whether he was Landingin's companion;
Catugas answered in the affirmative. Mejia then announced: "[T]his is a hold-up";
companion of Mejia said: "Proceed." All of the nine drew their daggers and stabbed
Landingin and Catugas.11
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an autopsy
on Landingin's cadaver, found three stab wounds — two of which were fatal.
According to him, the cause of Landingin's death was cardiorespiratory arrest
resulting from hypovolemic shock due to internal hemorrhage.12 Nora Landingin, wife
of Teofilo Landingin, spent P1,500 daily during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for
his burial; and P16,000 for the tomb. Nora felt sad because of his death.13
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed on the
road, was brought by some people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital.14 Dr. Roberto
Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory laparatomy debridement and found
three multi-lacerations in the right upper extremities and several others on the left
upper extremities which could have been caused by bladed instruments. 15 Catugas
survived and was confined for seven days. He spent more than P50,000 for his
hospitalization and medical expenses. The hospital billed him in the amount of
P44,667.25.16
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the
Mabini Police Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching his residence at
the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on board a police patrol car, he saw six men
walking in front of his house. When he stopped the car, the men ran away. He gave
chase and caught two of them, namely, accused Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought
that they belonged to an "akyat-bahay gang." When asked what they were doing, the
two answered that they were not doing anything and that they were not robbers.
They told Gulen that they were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even showed his driver's
license and told Gulen that he did not commit any crime and that he was willing to go
to the police station. Gulen then brought the two and turned them over to the police
station in Sual, Pangasinan.17
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March
1994, entered in the police blotter this turn-over and talked to the two. In the course
of their conversation, Benito reported that they rode on a jeepney, which was
abandoned somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to make a follow-up of this report.
With Benito as their guide, Clemente and three other policemen were able to find the
jeepney with the marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen, Sual,
Pangasinan. The jeepney had bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought
it to the police station and had the matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente
then instructed the radio operator to call the police station of Sta. Barbara and inform
it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March 1994, the PNP
elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the two, as well as the
passenger jeepney.18
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual
apprehended Joseph Fabito in Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect. He
was turned over to the Sual Police Station. After having been informed of this arrest,
the Sta. Barbara Police Station took him into its custody. These facts were entered in
the Sual Police Station blotter.19
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingin's jeepney that
fateful evening of 10 March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes. They
claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim and his companions who killed Landingin,
stabbed Catugas, and drove away the jeepney. The following is a summary of their
version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver
of the Elf truck of Lito Lomboy of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in
hauling sand and gravel. His co-accused Mejia Paraan and Fabito were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand and
gravel, the accused returned the truck and went to the house of Fabito's brother-in-
law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in vain for the brother-in-law,
Paraan suggested that they go to the house of his future brother-in-law in Bacayao
Norte, Calasiao. After some snacks they proceeded to the town proper and strolled
for a while. Then, Benito thought that it was time to go home to Sta. Barbara and
suggested that they should. They proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High
School to wait for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw
Romulo Calimquim with three other companions, who were also waiting for a
transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an approaching
passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did Benito and his
companions. Calimquim sat beside the driver. The rest took the back seat.20
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a "huge body," who sat
beside the driver.21
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and that
leading to the national highway, the man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim,
according to Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan) ordered the driver to proceed to
the national highway; the driver did. But after reaching the highway, in Ventinilla, Sta.
Barbara, the former ordered the latter to stop, announced that "this is a hold up," then
stabbed the driver several times, pulled his body out of the jeepney, took over the
wheel, and drove the jeepney.22 In the meantime, at the back seat, one of the
companions of Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito; while the others told Benito's
companions to lie on their belly. It was when Catugas attempted to fight back that he
was stabbed.23 Catugas was then thrown out of the jeepney.24
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from alighting
from the jeepney. Upon reaching a mountain in Sual,
Pangasinan, 25 the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito to
alight from the jeepney. The group of Calimquim pointed knives 26 and a
gun 27 at them. Then suddenly there was a light coming from below. They ran away
from the group of Calimquim. 28
Benito and Mejia were together.29 Later, a policeman saw them. The two told the
policeman that they are not "troublesome persons." The policeman brought them to
the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported what had happened and
accompanied the policemen to the place where the jeepney in question was
located.30 Afterwards, the two were detained at Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in
detention, they were informed that Calimquim was killed and his body was found in
Alaminos.31
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and went to
the house of Roland, his brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a
barangay councilman to accompany him to the police station. It was the barangay
captain who accompanied him the following day to the police station. There, the
police authorities told him that he was among the assailants of Landingin and that he
was the one who stabbed Catugas in the night of 10 March 1994 and one of the
suspects in the carnapping of the jeepney of Landingin.32 Paraan was forthwith
placed inside the jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he was by
the seashore. He stayed there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the
location of the police station. He went to that station which happened to be Sual
Police Station. There, he narrated to the policemen what had happened. When a
policeman asked him whether he was the killer, he answered in the negative. At
around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail, where he was
detained for three months. Then, he was committed to the Provincial Jail. 33
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already driving a
tricycle, the parents of the accused met with him and informed him that the accused
told them that they (the accused) did not commit any wrong. Catugas answered that
he had suffered several wounds and spent much for his hospitalization and that since
the accused were the ones apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could recover
the amounts he spent. Catugas then asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a
total of P80,000, and repeated this demand five to six times.34
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also proved
that Romulo Calimquim died due to a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994
in Barangay Paitan West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by Entry No. 4338 of
Page 260 of the Police Blotter.35
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed
Landingin and that accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who stabbed
him. He further declared that it was the parents of the accused who offered to pay
him, but he refused because such an offer could not "be accepted by [his]
conscience."36
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She denounced as
untrue the testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of accused were the
ones who offered to pay him money. Julia declared that they visited Catugas to ask
him whether it was true that their children committed the crime. On their first visit,
Catugas told them that he could not yet answer that question; but when they
returned, Catugas told them that they had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or
P20,000 per family of the accused.37
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on
the identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the
part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to compromise the
cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994,38 the LARON court convicted accused
Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the crime of murder and of frustrated murder,
with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and nighttime and band as aggravating
circumstances. Accordingly, it sentenced the first three accused to suffer the penalty
of death for the crime of murder; and ten years and one day of prision mayor to
seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal for the crime of
frustrated murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, he being only seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the
crimes charged; and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder, and six years
of prision correccional to ten years an one day of prision mayor for frustrated murder.
The Court also ordered the four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the
amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and
P12,000 for funeral expenses; and to pay Catugas the amount of P44,687.25 for
hospital expenses, plus costs.
II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the
CASTILLO Court, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas and
Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as rebuttal witness. The accused Mejia,
Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand and presented as additional
witnesses Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially
the same as those they made in the murder and frustrated murder cases in the
LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was
thrown out of the jeepney to the shoulder of the road and that one of the culprits took
the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove off.39 He further declared
that while he was confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated
him, showed him pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspect's names, 40 and took
his statement.41 After he was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the
father of accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization expenses and asked
P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an
agreed date; but before that date came, he had already testified against the
accused.42
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further testified that
her husband owned the passenger jeepney in question, as evidenced by Certificate
of Registration No. 19253856,43 and Official Receipt No. MVRR 91354948.44 The
jeepney was worth P140,000.45
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked
the version of the defense on account of the following "inculpating evidence," which,
according to it, bolstered its finding that the accused were the authors of the crime
charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and
Pedro Paraan speak of innocence and fear for their lives
during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never
sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt
anybody, they could not have concentrated on the persons
of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they
should have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their
persons (accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did
not do anything except to passively stay at the back seat of
the jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing incident in
Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual,
Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to
carnapp [sic] the passenger jeepney of Teofilo Landingin
then the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant
situation is for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all
passengers for that matter, including the four (4) accused to
eliminate the presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok
in going to Sual, Pangasinan without offering any slight
resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that,
Mok and company belonged to the group of the four (4)
accused who were responsible in perpetrating the offense
charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are
the real offenders, why is it that during the long span of
travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any
attempt to jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they
show positive signs to invite the attention of PNP members
stationed along the long route starting in Dagupan City,
Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly
claim innocence of the crime charged. In fact, they averred
that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the
responding peace officers what happened to them and that
their reports was recorded in the Police Blotter of Sual
Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with
absolute falsity and is debunked by the entry in the Police
 Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject
certification negates accused's statement of innocence. The
subject entry which is contained in the Book of Events of
Sual Police Station belies any complaint/report made by
accused Edwin Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were
kidnapped or deprived of their liberty with the use of guns
and bladed weapons. Upon the other hand, the Certification
squarely bespeaks of the incarceration/detention of said
accused (Mejia and Benito) at Sual Police Station for they
were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney
involved in the above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro
Paraan, they likewise vehemently denied the accusation
lodged against them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of
innocence crumbled when they joined the group from the
crime scene starting in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to their
destination in Sual, Pangasinan. In fact when they reached
Sual, Pangasinan they scampered and run away to different
directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making
any report to the nearest authority i.e. Barangay Captain of
the place they decided to escape which they did with
impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is
negatived (sic) of any entry about the whereabouts of
accused Paraan and Fabito.46
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and
Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended.
It sentenced the first three accused to death; and Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on
account of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to
pay the costs.
III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court is
automatic pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659,47 the convicted accused filed with
this Court their notices of appeal from the decision of the LARON court and of the
CASTILLO court on 18 November 1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court as
G.R. Nos. 118940-41, and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No.
119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellant's Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-
41 and in G.R. No. 119407, the appellants filed a motion for the consolidation of
these cases, which we granted on 27 February 1996.
In their Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon the trial
court the following errors: (a) in giving full faith and credence to the unsubstantiated
testimony of prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas relative to the incident in question;
(b) in holding them as the persons who stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio
Catugas in the evening of 10 March 1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing
evidence were proffered to point at the real culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his
companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of conviction notwithstanding the failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them
of the crimes charged instead of the crimes homicide and frustrated homicide — on
the assumption that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors. They
submit that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the
identification of the appellants leaves much to be desired. He
should not be believed, for he could not even remember who
among the appellants were wearing short pants, hat, and
shoes at that time. If policeman Gulen could not even
identify in court appellant Mejia whom he apprehended in the
evening of 10 March 1994 and brought to the Sual Police
Station, it was with more reason that Catugas could not have
identified the assailants since it was nighttime. The
possibility that Catugas got confused, if not mentally and
physically drained, as a result of the shocking incident is not
far-fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling
reason to believe that Catugas mistook the appellants as the
real hold-uppers.
 (2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that
their children did not commit any wrong, but Catugas
"vacillated and testified falsely against accused-appellants
when they were not able to produce the amount of
P20,000.00 each as earlier demanded from them." Catuga's
denial of their testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome
the positive testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin
Benito augurs well with their claim of innocence," when they
were apprehended. Benito readily showed his driver's
license, answered questions propounded by policeman
Clemente, and without hesitation he helped or guided the
policemen in locating the jeepney at the place where it was
abandoned. He did not try to hide or conceal anything when
he was confronted about the incident. Moreover, when
Benito and Mejia were picked up by a policeman on that
fateful night, they were not "tainted with blood."
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be
liable for homicide and frustrated homicide, since treachery
was not established.
In their Appellants' Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following assignment of
errors: (a) the facts charged in the information do not constitute violation of the crime
of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended; (b) The court a quo erred in convicting
them of the crime charged on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c) the
court a quoerred in convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution
and completely disregarding the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential
ingredient of the crime of carnapping, was not proved. They claim that from the
evidence adduced "it is very clear that the incident was only a hold-up and that the
jeepney was taken to Sual as escape vehicle."
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed jointly, the
appellants submit that:
(1) The trial court's conclusion on their culpability was based
on mere surmises and conjectures and contradicted by the
evidence on the record. The fact that the group of Calimqium
did not hurt any of the four appellants and that the latter
offered no resistance does not prove appellant's
membership in Calimquim's group. That they did not even
jump off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to
invite the attention of the PNP stationed along the route from
Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of fear since
Calimquim's group pointed knives at each of them and
ordered them to lie down in stooping position. The absence
of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after they
were released as hostages, they ran in separate directions
and did not join the group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that
Benito and Mejia were suspected of having carnapped the
passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it was made by a
police officer and was contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and
Fabito had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of
Catugas whose identification of the appellants was based
only on the pictures and on the information of the policemen.
It was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail the
participation of each accused, considering that the light in
the jeepney was dim and his principal attention was
concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellant's reporting of the incident disproved their
membership in the group of Calimquim. If they were
members, their natural course would have been to hide from
the authorities. Their voluntary submission to the police
immediately after the incident should have been given
credence as part of the res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges
us to affirm in toto the challenged decisions for failure of the appellants to show that
the trial court committed error in finding the prosecution evidence clear, sufficient,
and convincing to convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness account, had the
opportunity to observe the appellants during the commission of the crime and had no
ill-motive to implicate the appellants falsely. As to the charge that he perjured
because the appellants were not able to produce the amount of P80,000 which he
allegedly demanded from them, the same should not be believed. The truth is, it was
the parents of the appellants who approached Catugas and offered him P80,000 in
order that he would not testify against the appellants. Catugas did not accept the
offer, as it was against his principles to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial court
was correct in convicting the appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo Landingin
and frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their conviction for violation of
the Anti-Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main purpose was to get the
jeepney and they killed Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented to
evidence to prove that they ran away with the jeepney for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the identification
made by prosecution witness Catugas cannot be denominated as clear, positive, and
convincing; for, while it may be true that he "could have taken glimpse or glance at
the faces of all the accused-appellants, this fact alone is not adequate and fell short
of the required test of 'positive identification'." They strongly suggest that Catugas
had ill-motive to testify falsely against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he
demanded.
IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE
ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order. The
crimes charged in the informations filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO
court are irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They arose out of the
same incident, are founded on the same factual milieu, and would be proved by
testimonies of the same witnesses. The three cases then should have been
consolidated and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were
jointly tried were only the cases for murder and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule
119 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses
founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar
character may be tried jointly at the court's discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short, the attainment of justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants.48 In Raymundo v. Elipe,49 we held that although consolidation of several
cases involving the same parties and the same subject matter is one addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or
more cases are tried before the same judge, or even filed with the different branches
of the same court, provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court
nor any of the parties caused, or moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation
of the Anti-Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket number) with the cases for
murder and frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have lower docket
numbers). It was only after the filing of their separate Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos.
118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407 that the appellants moved to consolidate the
latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute
some difficulty in the appreciation of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the
parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of their testimony and
credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced by their testimonies in the case
before the CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness
Catugas was unclear in some details of the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court.
Upon the other hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the courts which were
not given in the other court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of
the appellants before both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the testimonies of
these witnesses in both cases, it would be quite difficult to avoid forming impressions
in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our minds and mental
processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on
evidence and the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants
dictate that we resolve the appeals in the cases before the LARON court and the
case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence presented
before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in
Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-
00619-D are absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act in Criminal Case
No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993 50 is applicable to these cases
because the crimes were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 and now imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. This Section, as amended, reads in full as
follows:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more
than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed
without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof .
(Emphasis supplied).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping. (emphasis supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life
imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of
the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." The latter makes clear the intention of
the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-
vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely
qualifies the crime of carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be
known as qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short,
considering the phraseology of the amended Section 14,51 the carnapping and the
killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special
complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words "IS KILLED," no distinction must
be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is
committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof" makes no
difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin — whether it be homicide
or murder — cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be considered
to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified carnapping
or carnapping in an aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove the essential
requisites of the homicide or murder of Landingin and that of carnapping. This should
have been another reason for the consolidation of the carnapping case in the
CASTILLO court with the cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little differently,
does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify carnapping if it is
committed "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof"? The answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said Section 14 of
the words "IS KILLED". The unmistakable import thereof is that it refers only to
the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof," then it must be deemed to
fall under the clause (of Section 14) "when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person."
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
the carnapping of Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle
under the definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539.52 The passenger jeepney was
taken, with intent of gain, from Landingin by means of violence against him which
caused his death and against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical
injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the appellants?
The LARON and the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved.53 To overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. 54Save in certain
circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts
alleged to constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden is
never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of his defense. Indeed,
unless the prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the accused need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.55
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the
accused is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the
State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken
into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason.
Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged.56 If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the
accused's right to be freed; it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to acquit
him.57
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the stenographic
notes of the testimonies of the witnesses in the cases before the LARON court and
the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced with moral certainty that the appellants
committed the crimes charged. Reasonable doubt burdens our conscience; our
minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the five
others, namely, Romulo Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain
Mondragon, and another described as John Doe. All nine were forthwith charged with
the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos.
3310,583313,59 3311,60 respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, and then in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,61 and
94-00619-D62 of the LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D63 of the
CASTILLO court, respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of Romulo
Calimquim. The prosecution has no proof to prove otherwise; but the LARON and the
CASTILLO courts, through inferences from certain facts, concluded that the
appellants were. The conclusion is rather tenuous. While the rigorous cross-
examination of the appellants in all these cases has established close relationship
among the appellants by reason of their residence and work, (Benito, as sand-and-
gravel truck driver and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed
to establish any relationship between them and the five others headed by Calimquim.
What then looms large in our minds is that the appellants and the five others
happened to be passengers of Landingin's jeepney by accident, not by design. If the
appellants were with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was because they were
intimidated and made to lie down on their belies inside the jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the group
of Calimquim. Upon arrival in the mountains of Sual, they fled from the Calimquim
group when the first opportunity to do so came. We find to be absolutely without
basis the statement of the CASTILLO court that the appellants abandoned
Landingin's jeepney in Sitio Nipa, Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, "upon seeing the
arrival of concerned citizens and members of the Sual Police Station; the responding
peace officers effected the recovery of the subject jeepney sans the
accused/culprits." No prosecution witness so testified. In the CASTILLO court, no
policeman was presented as witness for the prosecution. The evidence presented by
both the prosecution and the defense reveal that after appellants Benito and Mejia
were picked up by Policeman Gulen on the latter's suspicion that they were members
of an akyat-bahay gang, they voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual
Police Station of what happened. It was this information that brought the policemen
to where the subject jeepney was located. Benito even accompanied the policemen.
This resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen. Appellant Paraan also
presented himself later to the Police Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito,
although apprehended by concerned citizens of the place to where he had fled,
voluntarily reported what he knew to the police authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters can you tell this Court why these persons were written in
of the police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the your statement?
appellants had declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did not report
the incident to the police authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of A Because of the police investigation.
the entries. Entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or
probative value, for they are normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from
Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not
either partial suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries. 64 The entries in
able to identify the accused, is that correct?
question are sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they only
recorded the impression that the appellants were "suspects."
A I can recognize the others, sir.
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the
prosecution had to rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality of his Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize?
testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much to be desired. The
prosecutor who conducted the direct examination was unable to propound sensible A Three (3) of them, sir.
questions to elicit clear answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events
surrounding the commission of the alleged crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the COURT:
trial judge to ask more questions. Despite the latter's participation, the testimony of
Catugas fails to convince us that the appellants indeed participated in the Q What you do mean when you said that that you can
commission of the crimes. On cross-examination in the LARON court, Catugas recognize three (3) of them?
categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the appellants and that he
could recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus:
A I can remember those persons who sat near me.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?
Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you
A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the
mentioned the names of the person and I will now read:
four accused.
Q How about the true names of the suspect,
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] persons who
do you know them?
is [sic] wearing in [sic] red T-shirt?
A In fact I do not know, however, based on
A I saw his face, sir.
the police investigation of Sta. Barbara PNP,
they were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito,
Joseph Fabito, Pedro Paraan, Mok Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring
Calimquim, alyas Dennis, Alex Mamaril, to Edwin Benito)?
Dennis Abrigo alyas Mondragon and one
unidentified person. A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir.65
Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following
admissions on cross-examination:
Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat
besides [sic] the driver, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him?
A He was wearing a dark color.
Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?
A I cannot tell, sir.
Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you
pointed to this person wearing in red T-shirt?
A I can no longer remember, sir.
Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do
you remember his shirt?
A I don't know, sir.
Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q You can't remember also whether one of these accused
was wearing a hat at that time?
A I cannot remember, sir.
In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by the nine
persons. Thus:
COURT:
Q Who were involved in stabbing?
A All of them, sir.
Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?
A The 9 persons, sir.
Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who
participated in the stabbing incident and who were the
victims?
A Me and the driver, sir.
PROS. MARATA:
Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons,
four of whom were inside the courtroom?
A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed
wounds, sir.66
Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the appellants
inflicted any of the stab wounds on his body. Further compounding the uncertainty
and unreliability of Catuga's testimony, he candidly admitted on cross-examination
that only one person stabbed him. Thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q How many times were you stabbed by them?
A Twice, sir.
Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?
 A I can identify him, sir. COURT:

Q How many persons stabbed you then? Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you
anymore?
A Only one (1) person, sir.67
A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness
Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine stabbed showing his scar near the shoulder.)
him:
Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who
COURT: stabbed you among these nine (9) persons?

Q How many stab wounds did you sustain? A I could not remember anymore, sir.

A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir. Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this
Court whether it was one among the four (4) accused in this
Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab case who stabbed you on your right upper arm?
blows with respect to the other stab blow who delivered this
stab blow? A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my
shoulder because that is the last stab wound, sir.69
A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.
It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catuga's
testimony in the CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted any of the stab
COURT:
wounds on Catugas.
Proceed.
Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas
categorically admitted that none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of
ATTY. TAMINAYA: Landingin. Thus:

Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are COURT:
you referring to the five (5) other persons as the companions
of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you?
xxx xxx xxx
A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir.68
Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo
Landingin, can you inform the Court if the four (4) accused
He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, and now or these two persons are among the four (4) accused
then declined to point to anyone of the herein four appellants as the person who did now?
it. Thus:
A They are not here, sir.70
Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the Proceed.
appellants. He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the
appellants, but before they could give the money on the agreed date, he testified ATTY. TIMANAYA:
against the appellants in the LARON court. The following exchanges between him
and counsel for the defense before the CASTILLO court are revealing:
Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that
P80,000.00 because they are poor?
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able agreed of another date for them to pay, sir.
to talk with the father of Edwin Benito?
COURT:
A Yes, sir.
Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is
that correct?
A That is already their counter proposal, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you
agreed to pay you P80,000.00 but he cannot pay you at that
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that very moment?
correct?
A Yes, sir.
A I was asking P80,000.00, sir.
COURT:
COURT:
Proceed.
Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
A Because he pleaded to me, sir.
Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00?
Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are
settling the case with Edwin Benito the amount of
COURT:
P80,000.00?
That is the settlement money.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
COURT:
 Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you had spent. He then demanded P80,000, which he equally apportioned among the
should not have testified in this case? parents of the four appellants. Conrado Benito testified as follows:

A PROSECUTOR MARATA: Q What did you tell him?

Improper, your honor. A I told him that our children telling us that they did not
commit any wrong and I told them to tell the truth and we are
ATTY. TAMINAYA not consenting them to whatever they have done if they
done something wrong.
As follow-up question, you Honor.
Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
COURT:
A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so
much for his hospitalization, and he said also that they were
Sustained. Hypothetical.
the persons who were apprehended and so, I will just tell a
lie for the same because how could I collect for the amount I
ATTY. TAMINAYA: spent if I will not tell a lie?

Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened COURT:
on the agreed date?
Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a
A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, liar?
sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When you said you have already testified, you are
referring to your testimony in RTC Branch 44?
Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that
expenses?
A Yes, sir.71
A I said, "then we can at least help you", because he is
In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of saying that he suffered several wounds.
Catugas' demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his exculpatory
testimony. It wanted to prove that the parents of the appellants were in fact the ones
Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
who proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito, which the prosecution failed to
satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify whether their children
had indeed committed the crimes; but Catugas replied that since the appellants were A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give
the ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he P20,000.00 each.
 COURT:
Q How many times did he tell your?
A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him.72
But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could not
afford it. Conrado so declared, thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of
the appellants in the commission of the crimes charged.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (for
Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44 and
in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) of
Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-
appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are
ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt therefor has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Their immediate release from detention is
hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further detention exist.

Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can No costs.

you tell this court if he made mention to the wife of Teofilo
Landingin?
SO ORDERED.
A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us
that we would not tell the same to Mrs. Landingin.

Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?

A No sir, not even a single centavo.

Q Why?

A We cannot pay because even payment for attorney's fees,

we cannot afford.73

The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the
incident as offer of compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of
guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.74 There is
no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his parents to
approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were
to believe the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the
expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to
reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the
last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.
G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks a review of the Resolution1 dated October 10, 2005 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27789, dismissing the criminal complaint
against the respondents, and its Resolution2 dated January 18, 2006 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Complainant Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4502783 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite,
located in front of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is leased to Pepito B. Aquino and
Adriano G. Samoy who are in turn subleasing it to several stallholders.
In September 1999, respondent Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of
Bacoor, sent to the stallholders Notices of Violation4 of the National Building Code on
the grounds that the structures they were occupying were erected without building
permits and occupied by them without the necessary certificates of occupancy having
been first secured.
On January 17, 2000, Mejia’s office sent letters5 dated January 10, 2000 to the
stallholders informing them that because of their repeated failure to comply with the
National Building Code and its implementing rules and regulations and the Business
Permit and Licensing Office Requirements, their stalls will be closed down on
January 24, 2000.
On February 16, 2000, a task force from the Bacoor Municipal Hall effected the
closure of the stalls through the installation of galvanized iron fences.
Lessees Aquino and Samoy thereafter filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against respondent Jessie B. Castillo, in his capacity as Bacoor Municipal
Mayor, respondent Mejia and two other municipal officials for violation of Section 3(e)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended.6 The case was docketed as OMB-1-00-0537.
On October 20, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed OMB-1-00-0537,
ruling that the respondent local officials acted in good faith in effecting the closure of
the stalls.7
On September 6, 2001, Sarino filed a Complaint8 against respondents Castillo and
Mejia before the Office of the Ombudsman charging them criminally for violation of
Section 3(e) and (f) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Rep. Act No. 6713,9 and
administratively for oppression, grave misconduct and for committing acts contrary to
law. According to Sarino, the construction of the galvanized fence in February 2000 is
tantamount to an unlawful taking of their property causing them undue injury and that
despite his verbal and written demands, respondents refused to remove said fence.
Respondents countered that Sarino’s complaint was anchored on the same set of
facts that had been the subject of OMB-1-00-0537 that was dismissed by the
Ombudsman.
On March 10, 2003, the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative complaint for
being moot and academic due to Castillo’s re-election as mayor in the May 2001
elections and pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 677010because the act
complained of happened more than one year before the complaint was filed.11
On May 7, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an Information12against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 27789. The Information reads:
That in or about February 2000, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, JESSIE B. CASTILLO, a high ranking public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor, and FELICITO R. MEJIA, the Municipal Building Official, of
Bacoor, Cavite, as such taking advantage of their positions and committing the
offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating together, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to one CESAR SARINO by
blocking and fencing off the latter’s property by installing and erecting a galvanized
iron sheet fence on the front portion of the said property facing the SM Bacoor
thereby depriving him of the full use and enjoyment of his property, and despite
repeated demands from the said land owner, the accused, without valid justification,
refuse to remove the said fence to the damage and prejudice of said Cesar Sarino in
the amount of Seven Hundred Ninety Thousand and Nine Hundred Twenty Pesos
(Php 790,920.00), more or less, representing lost income from the rentals of the stalls
and parking fees derived therefrom.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
In a Resolution14 dated August 15, 2003, the Sandiganbayan declared that probable
cause exists against respondents for violation of Section 3(e). Accordingly, it directed
the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest and hold departure orders
against respondents.
On August 20, 2003, respondents voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and
posted their respective bonds for their provisional liberty. 15 Respondents moved for
the reinvestigation of the case which the Sandiganbayan gave due course.
After the reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, upon approval of the
Ombudsman, filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Amended Information.16 The
respondents then filed a Comment thereon with Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause.17
In a Resolution18 dated November 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Information which reads:
That in or about February 2000, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, JESSIE B. CASTILLO, a high ranking public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor, and FELICITO R. MEJIA, the Municipal Building Official, of
Bacoor, Cavite, as such taking advantage of their positions and committing the
offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating together, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to CESAR N. SARINO, EVELYN
S. MANIQUIS, FLORA JANET S. GARCIA, CLAUDETTE N. SARINO, STEPHEN N.
SARINO and PRISCILLA N. SARINO, by blocking and fencing
off their property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-450278, which was
then being leased by PEPITO B. AQUINO and ADRIANO G. SAMOY for TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) a month, by installing and erecting a galvanized
iron fence on the front portion of the said property facing the SM Bacoor, thereby
depriving them of the full use and enjoyment of their property and effectively
decreasing its value for commercial purposes, and despite lawful demand from
CESAR N. SARINO, the accused, without valid justification, refuse to remove the
said fence to the undue damage and prejudice of said landowners in the amount of
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND and NINE HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS
(Php 790,920.00), more or less, representing (1) lost rentals of said property, (2)
unpaid compensation for the portion of the property on which the fence was installed,
and (3) the decrease in value of the property for commercial purposes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
In a Resolution20 dated May 9, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied the respondents’
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.
On October 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, upon motion for reconsideration filed by
respondents, reversed its May 9, 2005 Resolution and dismissed the case. The
Sandiganbayan likewise set aside the arrest warrants it previously issued. It held that
the instant criminal case is a mere rehash of the previously dismissed criminal case
filed by complainant’s lessees against respondents. It also ruled that there was no
evident bad faith, manifest partiality or inexcusable negligence that can be attributed
to respondents. Neither did complainant’s claim of undue injury have any leg to stand
on.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied on January 18, 2006. Hence this petition, with the following issues:
I.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONDUCTING A SECOND JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27789, LONG
AFTER IT ISSUED THE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS.
II.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT CONSIDERED EVIDENTIARY
MATTERS SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE WHEN IT CONDUCTED
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
III.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE RESPONDENTS
ACTED IN GOOD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH RESPONDENTS HAD NO LEGAL
BASIS IN FENCING OFF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND
HIS SIBLINGS.
IV.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT IGNORED AND DID NOT DISCUSS
IN ITS RESOLUTIONS OF OCTOBER 10, 2005 AND JANUARY 18, 2006 THE
ISSUE RAISED BY THE PROSECUTION THAT COMPLAINANT AND HIS
SIBLINGS SUFFERED UNDUE INJURY BECAUSE, AMONG OTHERS, A
PORTION OF THEIR PROPERTY WAS EFFECTIVELY TAKEN BY THE
RESPONDENTS WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION AND THE VALUE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF COMMERCE WAS GREATLY
REDUCED IN VIEW OF THE HIGH GALVANIZED IRON FENCE THAT COVERED
AND HID THE PROPERTY FROM THE HIGHWAY AND THE PUBLIC.21
The foregoing issues simply boil down to whether the Sandiganbayan erred in
overturning the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause resulting in the
dismissal of the case against respondents.
Petitioner contends that after the Sandiganbayan issued the arrest warrants against
respondents, the responsibility of making a new determination of probable cause
shifted back to the Ombudsman as prosecutor when respondents moved for the
reinvestigation of the case and such motion was granted by the court. The
Ombudsman must then decide whether respondents shall continue to be held for trial
in light of any additional evidence presented during reinvestigation. This
responsibility, petitioner submits, belongs to the Ombudsman alone and the court is
bereft of authority to overturn the former’s findings as the judicial determination of
probable cause is only for the purpose of determining whether the arrest warrant
should be issued. Petitioner further argues that there are only two instances when
the court can intervene in the Ombudsman’s action – first, when the Ombudsman
acted with grave abuse of discretion; and second, when the prosecution makes
substantial amendments to the information – both of which are wanting in the instant
case.1avvphi1
Respondents counter that the amendments made to the information are substantial
in nature and not merely formal as they pertain to the inclusion of additional injured
parties and specification of the amount of damages. And even assuming the
amendments were merely formal, the Sandiganbayan was correct in exercising its
judicial prerogative when it determined for itself the existence of probable cause
considering the inconsistency of the positions taken by the Ombudsman in OMB-1-
00-0537 and the instant case.
After seriously considering the submission of the parties, we are in agreement that
the petition is meritorious.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.22 Whether or not
that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.23
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.24 If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.25
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of
arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in
turn should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to
hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate
the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our
criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must
respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person
charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed to the public prosecutor.26
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor
committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of
probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding
whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused.
In the instant case, there is no question that both the original27 and
amended28 Informations were valid on their face because they complied with Section
6,29 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Also, a scrutiny of the Resolution30 dated August
22, 2002 of the Ombudsman which precipitated the filing of the original Information
and the subsequent Memorandum dated August 4, 2004 recommending the
amendment of the Information would likewise show that the finding of probable cause
against the respondents were sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. As a
matter of fact, in the Resolution dated August 22, 2002, the Ombudsman took pains
to mention each element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019 and then one by one adequately explained how and why those elements were
satisfied. Hence, as the amended Information was valid on its face and there is no
manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan
erred in making an executive determination of probable cause when it overturned the
Ombudsman’s own determination. And this is true even if the Sandiganbayan was no
longer satisfied with the evidence presented to sustain the effectivity of the arrest
warrants previously issued for the original Information. The Sandiganbayan could
have just revoked the previously issued arrest warrants and required the
Ombudsman to submit additional evidence for the purpose of issuing the arrest
warrants based on the amended Information.
Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the Sandiganbayan to make a
determinative finding prior to the parties’ presentation of their respective evidence
that there was no bad faith and manifest partiality on the respondents’ part and
undue injury on the part of the complainant. In Go v. Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan,31 we held that "it is well established that the presence or absence of
the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."32 Also, it would be unfair to
expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of
the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found
in the nature and objective of a preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutors
do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.33
The Sandiganbayan and all courts for that matter should always remember the
judiciary’s standing policy on non-interference in the Office of the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. This policy is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well, considering that
otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions regarding complaints filed before it, and in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they were to be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the prosecutors each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan’s challenged

Resolutions dated October 10, 2005 and January 18, 2006 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Information against the respondents is hereby REINSTATED. Let the
records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as
Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his
capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185636
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed
to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this
Court’s jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners
have chosen to take recourse directly before us and that the cases are of significant
national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy,
this Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed
under the political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the orders
and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu
(Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated
letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action
on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with
several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of
the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio
Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site
were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation
VD.5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8
was immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation,
and to collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.6 Also, from 11-17
September 2006, an investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and
medico-legal and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from
alleged relatives of the victims DNA samples for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the
identities of the skeletal remains and even the length of time that they had been
buried. The report recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the identities
of the remains and the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the
Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the
names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and examination based on
testimonies of relatives and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation
VD. All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those discovered
at the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C.
Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P.
Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo
(Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and
Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement
Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on
suspected military spies and civilians who would not support the movement; (2) the
Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would
subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners"
of those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the
movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and
executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a
subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and
those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-
affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because
they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary investigation.26 However,
petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served
a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing
of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1)
Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5)
Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9)
Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13)
Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized
as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of the
prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge
Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-
1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution
recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their
temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R.
No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and
the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero. 35 The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition. 36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others
(including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC
Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues
that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime
of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in
furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition
and the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its
Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral
arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper
remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process
during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the
rebellion charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days.45 On
3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a
₱100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single
Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15
counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and
New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando
held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings
during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28
January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March
2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion. 51 Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but
before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June
2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution
dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice
Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge
Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-
262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of
the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to
Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment
of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge
Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional
and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration. 59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the
annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008
Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis. 61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009. 62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with
G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner
Echanis’s immediate release, to which the OSG did not interpose any objection on
these conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his
attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to
begin in August 2009; and that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6)
months.65 The latter condition was later modified, such that his temporary liberty shall
continue for the duration of his actual participation in the peace negotiations. 66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis
under a ₱100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace
negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner
Ladlad’s motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing
on the motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August
2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May
2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R.
Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment
thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos.
185636 and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December
201076 and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed
their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July
2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail. 80 The OSG
interposed no objection to the grant of a ₱100,000 cash bail to them considering that
they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding
negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord. 81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and
fixed their bail in the amount of ₱100,000, subject to the condition that their
temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the subpoena through his counsels’ addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the right to
peace negotiations.82 file counter-affidavits.

Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013. Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden
and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias
OUR RULING Piedad in the records of the case without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The
original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated that a meeting
Petitioners were accorded due presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation
process during preliminary VD was agreed upon.95Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit
investigation and in the issuance of dated 22 December 2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976
the warrants of arrest. until his escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias
Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in his original
affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June 1985. 97 Petitioner Ocampo
A. Preliminary Investigation argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by
not being furnished a copy thereof.
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. 85 While the Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying
administration of criminal justice.86 petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.98

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of
opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating
officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could
evidence in support of one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to
no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the
be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of
other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben
the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the appearance by their respective counsels.99
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that
he was not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 undated
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given
an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid.100The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a
respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas
on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due
process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last
known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53
Sct. Rallos St., QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time.103 In
connection with this claim, we take note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim,
petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she was among
those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a
formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason
to believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the subpoena and accordingly
instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to
participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not
expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their
case."106 Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary investigation,
petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since
their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to
surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records.
There was nothing surreptitious about the Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly
alludes to an earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed regarding the date of
the alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also
clearly stated. Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had
submitted his counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner
Ocampo with the opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias Piedad’s
Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to
be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a
copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire
case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted
that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of
several other witnesses107 attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of
the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is
clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/
reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12
March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion
for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice.
Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly
before this Court on 16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements
of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the
determination thereof.111 In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant
and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of
issuing a warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his
evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining
its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly
examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have
inevitably dismissed the charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo
alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that
were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial
judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the issuance
of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule,
be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will
not lie to cure errors in the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the
conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions
of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or
evidence appended to the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits
of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no
probable cause for petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of
warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the
evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the
requirement of personal determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the
documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused
is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged."118
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by
the following portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the
Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents:
Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent
documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and
Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court
has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused
of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and
issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily
questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition for
certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume
the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is
not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the
well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges,
including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it
becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind
the alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top
leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the
accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is
not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v.
CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19,
Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been
simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the
Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double
jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by
a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid
plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against
petitioners and several others.129

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-

944.1awp++i1 Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC
Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before
this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for
the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-
944.131We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that
a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.

Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000 cash bond
posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.1âwphi1

The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional
release from detention under the cash bond of ₱100,000 each shall continue under
the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual
participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government
or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is
sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the moment that
peace negotiations are concluded.

WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of

Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on
temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of
the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G.
Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail
granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the
peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the
termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 March 12, 2013
For Setting 5 - 5
(Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC)
For Preliminary Conference/Pre-trial 58 18 76
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs. For Compliance 38 8 46
HON. ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and MR. REYNALDO S. TEVES, Branch Clerk of With Pending Motions 5 2 7
Court, same court, Respondents.
On Trial/For Initial Trial 288 23 311
DECISION
Suspended Proceedings 24 3 27
PER CURIAM: Archived 131 1 132

The administrative matter stemmed from the Report of the Office of the Court Decided/Dismissed/Disposed 99 62 161
Administrator (OCA) Audit Team which conducted the judicial audit on June 16 to 28,
2008 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City, pursuant to TOTAL 4,466 654 5,120
Travel Order No. 45-2008 dated May 28, 2008, series of 2008.1
The Presiding Judge of the subject court is Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Judge
The team examined the records of 5,120 cases consisting of 4,466 criminal and 654 Tormis), while the Clerk of Court is Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves (Mr. Teves).3 Judge
civil cases. The examination yielded the following results: 2 Tormis took her oath and assumed office on June 22, 1999. Her service was,
however, interrupted because of the following administrative cases wherein she was
STATUS/STAGES OF PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL CIVIL TOTAL either suspended or preventively suspended, to wit:
CASES CASES
1. Decision dated September 20, 2005 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 (Abuse of
For Promulgation 12 0 12 Authority) wherein Judge Tormis was suspended from service for six (6)
months. In a subsequent resolution dated July 12, 2006, she was directed to
Submitted/Due for Decision 120 89 209 resume office immediately upon receipt of notice;

With Pending Incidents for Resolution 172 63 235 2. Resolution dated July 10, 2007 in A.M. No. 07-1691 (Judicial Audit on
Solemnization of Marriages) wherein she was placed under preventive
No Initial Action since Filing of Case 220 3 223
suspension effective immediately. The suspension was lifted per Resolution
dated December 11, 2007; and
No Further Action for Considerable Length of 3,179 312 3,491
Time
3. Resolution dated November 28, 2007 in A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692
With Warrant of Arrest/Summons 33 70 103 (Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct) wherein she was suspended for six (6)
months.4
For Arraignment 82 - 82
During the absence of Judge Tormis, Judge Carlos C. Fernando (Judge Fernando) of
the MTCC, Branch 2, Mandaue City was designated as Acting Presiding Judge
pursuant to Administrative Order Nos. 110-2007 and 2-2008 dated July 9, 2007 and
January 7, 2008, respectively.5
The report revealed that Branch 4 does not maintain a docket book or any similar
system of record-keeping and monitoring.6 Specifically, the Audit Team found the
following irregularities committed by Branch 4:
(1) There were decisions/judgments in eleven (11) criminal cases rendered
by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis which have not been promulgated despite the
lapse of considerable length of time;
(2) There were two (2) inherited cases which remained undecided for about
ten (10) years or more;
(3) There were one hundred twelve (112) criminal and eighty-three (83) civil
cases submitted for decision before Judge Tormis which have remained
undecided beyond the reglementary period to decide the same;
(4) There are six (6) criminal and six (6) civil undecided cases submitted for
decision before then Acting Presiding Judge Carlos C. Fernando;
(5) There are one hundred seventy-two (172) criminal and sixty-three (63)
civil cases that are with pending incidents for resolution;
(6) Of the 172 criminal cases referred to in the immediately preceding
paragraph, one hundred forty-five (145) cases involve violation of city
ordinances/traffic rules with pending motions to archive. The court therefore
failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993
relative to the guidelines in the Archiving of Cases;
(7) There are two hundred twenty (220) criminal and three (3) civil cases that
have no initial action/proceeding since their filing in court;
(8) There are three thousand one hundred seventy-nine (3,179) criminal and
three hundred twelve (312) civil cases without further action or proceedings
for a considerable length of time;
(9) There was an unreasonable delay in deciding Criminal Case No. 111373-
R entitled People vs. Roel Ricardel [Ricardel case] for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Double Homicide, since the trial ended on August 29, 2003 and
yet it was decided only on April 18, 2008 not by Judge Tormis but by Acting
Presiding Judge Fernando;
(10) It has been the practice of MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City not to
promulgate judgments in criminal cases in blatant violation of Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(11) It appears that the Decision dated June 4, 2007 in Criminal Case No.
72880-R to 83-R and 85346-R to 53-R entitled People vs. Evangeline Datan
[Datan case] for Violation of BP 22, was actually rendered by Judge Tormis
at the time when she was already suspended by the Court sometime in July
2007 and said decision has not been promulgated; and
(12) In Criminal Case No. 126542R to 49-R entitled People vs. Jasmin L.
Librando [Librando case] for Violation of BP 22 which is a case falling under
the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Tormis ordered the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.7
In a Resolution dated March 18, 2009, the Court directed Judge Tormis to
promulgate the decisions/judgments that have not been promulgated; decide with
dispatch the two (2) inherited cases that have remained undecided for ten years or
more; decide within a non-extendible period of four (4) months criminal and civil
cases which are already beyond the reglementary period to decide cases; to resolve
within a non-extendible period of four (4) months the pending incidents/motions in
criminal and civil cases which are beyond the reglementary period within which to
resolve the incidents; to immediately take appropriate action on 145 criminal cases
pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 7-92-A; to immediately take appropriate
action on criminal and civil cases which have no initial action since their filing in court
and those which have no further action for a considerable length of time; explain why
she failed to comply with her duty to conduct actual semestral physical inventory of
case records thereby submitting to the Court inaccurate reports; explain the delay in
deciding the Ricardel case; explain why she allowed the practice of not promulgating
decisions/judgments in criminal cases in violation of Section 6 of Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 17 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure; explain why she rendered the decision dated June 4, 2007 in
the Datan case at the time when she was already suspended by the Court; explain
why in Librando case, she ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest in violation of
Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; and submit to the Court her
compliance with the foregoing directives.8
In the same resolution, the Court directed Mr. Teves to explain why he failed to
comply with his duty to conduct actual semestral physical inventory of case records
thereby submitting inaccurate reports of cases; explain why he failed to keep a
General Docket Book pursuant to Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court; to
explain why he allowed the practice in their court of not promulgating
decisions/judgments in criminal cases in violation of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; and to submit to the Court a report of
compliance of the foregoing directives.9
In compliance with the Court’s directive, Judge Tormis explained the irregularities
that she allegedly committed. She claimed that she faithfully conducted semestral
physical inventory of case records except during the period comprising her three
suspensions as she was then denied access to her courtroom and case
records.10 She likewise cited the foregoing suspensions as the causes of the delay in
the disposition of cases then pending in her court.11 She also alleged that the delay in
the disposition of the Ricardel case was brought about by the parties’ request for time
to negotiate on the civil aspect of the case.12 She also denied the alleged practice of
her court of not promulgating judgments in criminal cases. She specifically cited the
Datan case and explained that she rendered the decision prior to her preventive
suspension and she filed it with Mr. Teves for the latter to calendar it for
promulgation, but instead of following her directive, Mr. Teves sent copies of the
decision to the parties of the case.13 Insofar as the Librando case is concerned, while
admitting having issued the warrant of arrest, she supposedly did so only because
the accused failed to appear during the arraignment despite notice. 14 Finally, she
claimed that she had satisfactorily complied with the directive to decide the cases
submitted for decision although beyond the period to decide; she had resolved the
incidents due for resolution and had archived all the cases due for archiving; and,
she had either disposed of or archived the inactive cases.151âwphi1
For his part, Mr. Teves explained that the alleged error in his reports can be
attributed to the discrepancy in procedure or appreciation in the preparation of the
reports.16 He claimed that their court indeed does not maintain a general docket
book, because they have not been provided by the Court with the needed
supplies.17 Lastly, on the alleged practice of non-promulgation of judgments, he
claimed that the Rules are not applicable because most of their cases were resolved
based on compromise agreement, plea of guilt and dismissal by reason of affidavit of
desistance, failure to prosecute, or violation of the right to speedy trial.18
Conclusions and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
While recognizing the suspensions of Judge Tormis as one of the reasons for the
delay in the disposition of cases, the OCA observed that several of the cases had
been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to her suspension. As such, she
should be held liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order, a violation of
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Considering that said offense is a less
serious charge, and taking into account the number of unresolved cases pending in
her sala, the OCA recommended that Judge Tormis be meted the penalty of fine of
₱80,000.00.19 For failure to comply with her duty to provide efficient court
management system in her court, which includes the preparation and use of docket
inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof, the OCA also found Judge
Tormis guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, another
less serious charge, warranting the penalty of fine of ₱20,000.00.20 The OCA,
however, exonerated Judge Tormis of the alleged practice of non-promulgation of
decisions/judgments as the same was just misunderstood.21Finally, in ordering the
arrest of the accused even before the latter was apprised of the charges against her,
the OCA found Judge Tormis liable for gross ignorance of the law, a serious charge
warranting the imposition of the penalty of fine of ₱20,000.00.22
As to Mr. Teves, the OCA found him guilty of mismanagement of the case records
leading to the court’s failure to dispose of many pending cases to the prejudice of the
litigants concerned. As such, he was found to be liable for simple neglect of
duty.23 Mr. Teves is likewise guilty of another simple neglect of duty in failing to set
for promulgation the decision in the Datan case.24 As such, the OCA recommended
that he be ordered to pay a fine in the amount equivalent to two (2) months of his
salary.25
The OCA’s recommendation is quoted hereunder for easy reference:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. The instant matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter
against Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;
 2. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis be found GUILTY OF (a) undue delay in
rendering a decision or order; (b) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives
and circulars resulting in the mismanagement of the court; and (c) gross
ignorance of the law for ordering the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case
Nos. 126542R to 49-R entitled People vs. Jasmin L. Librando without the
accused having been informed yet of the charge against her and accordingly
be FINED in the amounts of Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00), Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00),
respectively, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely;
3. Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and be
FINED in the amount equivalent to his two (2) months salary with the warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely;
and
4. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be DIRECTED to
hereceforth (a) submit accurate monthly reports of cases and docket
inventory reports; (b) strictly monitor the movement of all pending cases that
are active, being tried and until decided, dismissed or archived, as may be
warranted; (c) improve the system of serving court processes including the
return or proof of service; and (d) maintain a general docket book pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.26
The Court’s Ruling
1âwphi1
The present administrative case refers to not just one but several acts allegedly
committed by Judge Tormis and Mr. Teves said to be violative of the Rules of Court
and Supreme Court rules, regulations and directives. Judge Tormis is hereby
accused of committing the following irregularities:
(1) undue delay in the disposition of cases; (2) mismanagement of the court and case
records; (3) non-promulgation of decisions; and (4) issuing a warrant of arrest without
first apprising the accused of the charge against him. For his part, Mr. Teves is here
charged with (1) mismanagement of case records; and (2) failure to set case for
promulgation.
Undue Delay in the Disposition of Cases
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is
justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting
the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.27
In this case, Judge Tormis had been remiss in her duty to dispose of cases within the
mandatory period to do so. Two of such cases had in fact remained undecided for ten
(10) years; a total of one hundred ninety-five (195) cases had yet to be decided
despite having been submitted for decision for more than ninety (90) days; ninety
(90) cases had been submitted for resolution beyond the mandatory period but were
yet to be resolved; two hundred twenty-three (223) cases had been filed in court, but
Judge Tormis failed to make even just the initial action for a considerable period; and
three thousand four hundred ninety-one (3,491) cases had no further action for a
considerable length of time. When asked to explain such delay, Judge Tormis
claimed that it was the consequence of the three suspension orders issued against
her as she was suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six
months. Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in
cases (that will be discussed below) wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a
member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify
another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if we allow her to use
such an excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed
to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to her
suspension. Hence, she cannot be absolved from liability for her inaction. This
notwithstanding her later compliance with the Court’s resolution thereby making the
appropriate action on said cases.
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness
and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes
are resolved.28 The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period
constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness.29 Judge Tormis is thus
liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide cases within the reglementary
period.
Mismanagement of Court
As held by the Court in In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan:30
An orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in the
expeditious disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can the judges,
branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the civil and criminal dockets
ensure that the court records, which will be the bases for rendering the judgments
and dispositions, and the review of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any,
are intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a system necessarily includes the
regular and continuing physical inventory of cases to enable the judge to keep
abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the
court is in proper order. In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack
of periodic inventory definitely cause unwanted delays in litigations and inflict
unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.31
Here, the OCA found the court’s failure to maintain a general docket book. Although
the duty is vested with Mr. Teves, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the
members of her staff perform their duties. This failure contributed to their inability to
keep track of the number of cases assigned as well as to account for all the cases
and records assigned to the court. The OCA likewise found that Mr. Teves repeatedly
submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases pending with their
court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring
their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA
noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to
keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is
in proper order. If the same was conducted, she would have discovered that Mr.
Teves had been committing a mistake in the inventory of cases. As found by the
OCA, Judge Tormis is guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars for her failure to comply with her duty of providing an efficient court
management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of docket
inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof.
As for Mr. Teves, he admitted that:
He kept the records of dormant cases inside the storage room. Most of these cases
are violations of city ordinances, resisting arrest, vagrancy and collection of sum of
money with replevin filed by lending institutions and covered by the Rule on
Summary Proceudre. If there are no returns, or the returns were not duly served as
when the accused could not be found in the given address, and no party makes any
follow-up, they remain in the storage room. According to him, "(they) cannot
immediately act on these records unless a motion was filed either by the public
prosecutor or interested complainants, confer to this court and make a follow-up on
their cases." Thus, unless there is a follow up, he will not act on the case. Further, he
admitted that "except those with proper returns, hundreds of these returns were not
attached to the records because the respective clerk-in-charge cannot cope up with
over laden work."32
Moreover, Mr. Teves himself admitted that he failed to comply with Section 8, Rule
136 of the Rules of Court wherein he is mandated to keep a general docket, each
page of which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single
case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in the order in which
they were received, and, under the heading of each case and a complete title
thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered,
and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference to a single page the
history of the case may be seen.
With these infractions, Mr. Teves shall be liable for simple neglect of duty.
Non-promulgation of Judgment
The alleged practice of Branch 4, Cebu City of not promulgating judgments in
criminal cases was not substantiated except for the Datan case wherein Mr. Teves,
instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the accused a copy of the
unpromulgated decision at the time when
Judge Tormis was serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.
However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in
the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty.1âwphi1 It
is his duty to calendar the case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of
Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in fact, served copies of the decision
to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated first and at the time
when the judge who rendered the decision was serving her suspension. This
negligence on the part of Mr. Teves, does not, however, wholly exempt Judge Tormis
from administrative liability even if the same took place at the time when she was
prohibited access to her court. The Court cannot fathom how she failed to find out Mr.
Teves’ negligence. When she resumed her position, it was incumbent upon her to
check the status of the cases she left prior to her suspension. A judge cannot simply
take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of her court personnel, for the
latter are not the guardians of the former’s responsibility. 33
Unless the reins of control and supervision over the administrative aspect of the
adjudicatory process are tightened, the swift and efficient delivery of justice will be
impeded and rendered illusory.34
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest Without
Apprising the Accused of the Charge
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure,35 the general rule is
that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear
whenever required.36 In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando case was justified because of
the accused’s failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as
clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis’ order requiring the accused to appear and
submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of
the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In
doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against
him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing
evidence.37
As held in Tan v. Casuga-Tabin:38
While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous
order or decision they render, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent,
abusive and arbitrary in their prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers
vested in them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice
but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. While there
appears to be no malicious intent on the part of respondent, such lack of intent,
however, cannot completely free her from liability. When the law is sufficiently basic,
a judge owes it to her office to know and simply apply it.39
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15,
1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge
Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to
observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance
of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.40
Proper Penalty
on Judge Tormis
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated
September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and
gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the following
sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱20,000.00.41
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule
140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case,
include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of
more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis’ work
history which reflects how she performed her judicial functions.42 We find that there
are several administrative cases already filed against her, most of the cases have
been decided against her, the others have been dismissed and some are still
pending in Court. These cases show her inability to properly discharge her judicial
duties.43 Her suspensions had in fact been used by her as a defense in her failure to
resolve and decide cases and incidents pending in her court.
In Judge Navarro v. Judge Tormis,44 Judge Tormis was found guilty of improper
conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in
Criminal case No. 99796-12 pending with another court and was thus reprimanded
for the same with a warning that a repetition thereof shall be dealt with more
severely. She was, likewise, admonished for conduct unbecoming of a judge.
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili,
Cebu,45 Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross violation of Section 17, Rule 114 for
having approved the bail posted by the accused in Criminal Cases No. CEB-BRL-783
and 922 pending before RTC Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, considering that there was no
showing of the unavailability of all twenty-two RTC judges in Cebu City. With this
infraction, she was fined in the amount of ₱5,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Lachica v. Judge Tormis,46 Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross misconduct for
(1) having abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail
bond of the accused; and (2) for deliberately making untruthful statements in her
comment and during the investigation of the instant administrative case with intent to
mislead the Court. Here, it was established that the accused was released from
confinement after Judge Tormis called the police station informing the officer of the
receipt of the cash bail bond but without the issuance of the Release Order. In
determining the proper penalty, the Court took into account Judge Tormis’ past
infractions and concluded that she was not reformed despite being chastised thrice.
She was thus suspended from office for six (6) months without salary and other
benefits, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same and similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. On motion of Judge Tormis, the Court47 ordered a
reinvestigation of the case and to allow her to present additional evidence. Said order
was later clarified in a Resolution dated July 12, 2006 wherein she was directed to
resume office immediately upon receipt of the resolution and directed the Financial
Management Office of the OCA to immediately release all the salaries and benefits
which were withheld from her. However, after reinvestigation, on August 13, 2008,
she was severely reprimanded for the unauthorized receipt of cash bond and keeping
the same in her house.
In Antonina Y. Luib v. Hon. Rosabella Tormis,48 Judge Tormis was admonished and
reminded to be more circumspect in granting postponements.
In Visbal v. Tormis,49 Judge Tormis was found liable for gross misconduct for her
repeated defiance of the Court’s Order to furnish complainant (in another
administrative case) of her comment and/or to submit to the Court proof of such
service. She was thus suspended for six (6) months without salary, with a stern
warning that another repetition of a similar act will be dealt with most severely. In
imposing the penalty, the Court took into consideration eight other administrative
cases filed against her.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judges Anatalio S. Necesario, Br. 2, et
al.,50 Judge Tormis was one of the judges investigated, relative to the irregularities in
the solemnization of marriages. For this, she was preventively suspended. Although
the same was lifted in a Resolution dated December 11, 2007, she was prohibited
from solemnizing marriages until further orders from the Court.
The Court also notes that although dismissed by the Court, Judge Tormis was
involved in four other administrative cases. At present, there are still two pending
cases against her. Judge Tormis’ conduct as a repeat offender exhibits her
unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a sanction heavier than what is
provided by our rules and jurisprudence.51
Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities
she committed in this present case and as held by the Court in Inoturan v. Limsiaco,
Jr.,52 Judge Tormis should be dismissed from the service.
On Mr. Teves
As discussed above, Mr. Teves is here guilty of two counts of simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the "failure of an employee to give one's
attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.53 Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized
with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second.54
In the determination of the proper penalty, we look into Mr. Teves’ past administrative instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
cases. In Ramos v. Teves,55Mr. Teves was charged with arrogance and discourtesy corporations.
in refusing to receive a motion that allegedly does not conform with the requirements
of the Rules of Court. In deciding the case against Mr. Teves, the Court pointed out SO ORDERED.
that clerks of court have no authority to pass upon the substantive or formal
correctness of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Thus, in refusing
to receive the motion filed by complainant, the Court found Mr. Teves discourteous,
and in view of his past administrative cases, he was meted the penalty of a thirty-day
suspension, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. In the same case, the Court noted Mr. Teves’ past infractions:

The record shows that Teves had previously been administratively charged with
grave abuse of authority and gross discourtesy in OCA-IPI 08-2981-P. Although the
Court dismissed the charge for lack of merit on November 18, 2009, it reminded him
to be more circumspect in dealing with litigants and their counsel.

In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave misconduct and immorality
and the other for insubordination, the Court meted out on Teves the penalty of
suspension for six months in its resolution of October 5, 2011. x x x.56

Obviously, with his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves has not reformed. It
seems that he has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and he appears to be
unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received. 57 Mr. Teves’ repeated
infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service 58 which the
Court can no longer tolerate. Thus, the penalty of dismissal from the service is
proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency, Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and
Circulars and Gross Ignorance of the Law. She is ordered DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if
any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves is likewise found GUILTY of two counts of Simple Neglect of
Duty, and in view of his past infractions, he is meted the supreme penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
 September 2, 2015
G.R. No. 182534
ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Hadji Romar
(petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364.
These assailed CA rulings affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parafiaque City, Branch 259 in Criminal Case No. 02-0986 which convicted the
petitioner for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II2 of RA 9165. The
Information states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to
possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. The petitioner
pleaded not guilty during arraignment.3
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in the RTC
decision, he testified that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, their
Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald
Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to
the area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking"
portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at
the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him
resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search
on the petitioner’s body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what
he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the
incident.4
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.5 He testified that on August 20,
2002, he was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and
other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked him
despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being a holdupper, and
forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried
to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and
detained for one day. He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was
eventually acquitted.6
The RTC’s Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were
presumed to have performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a
search on the petitioner. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was straightforward
in giving his testimony and he did not show any ill motive in arresting the petitioner. 7
The RTC also did not believe the petitioner’s defense of denial and ruled that it is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases.
This defense is weak especially when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence as in this case.8
The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA’s ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC’s findings.
According to the CA, Section 5, paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is
legal, valid, and proper. One of these is when the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of a peace officer or a private person. In the present case, the petitioner
committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his
warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful.9
Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner’s body
which produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest allowed
under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 10
The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan11 clearly showed that the petitioner was caught
in flagrante delicto in possession of shabu.12
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
CA.13 Hence, this appeal.
The Petitioner’s Position
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the following
grounds:
First, the shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is inadmissible as
evidence because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of
his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The petitioner has not committed, was not committing and was not attempting to
commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact, no report or criminal charge was
filed against him for the alleged jaywalking.14
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest, Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a search that is
directed only upon dangerous weapons or "anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant." In the present
case, the offense, for which the petitioner was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto, is
jaywalking. The alleged confiscated drug has nothing to do with the offense of
jaywalking.15
Finally, the non-presentation of Tangcoy, who allegedly recovered the shabu from the
petitioner, renders the prosecution’s evidence weak and uncorroborated.
Consequently, the sole testimony of Tan cannot sustain the petitioner’s conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Respondent’s Position
In his Comment, the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was
conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt.16 He reiterates that the
warrantless frisking and search on the petitioner’s body was an incident to a lawful
warrantless arrest for jaywalking.17 The non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking
against the petitioner does not render his arrest invalid.18
The respondent also assails the petitioner’s defense that the shabu is inadmissible
as evidence. According to the respondent, the petitioner can no longer question his
arrest after voluntarily submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he
entered his plea of not guilty and when he testified in court.19
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search
conducted on the petitioner’s body.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any
evidence obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, the exercise of this power and the implementation of the law
should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens.20
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful.21 There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this purpose, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed.22
Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present
case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner’s warrantless arrest was due to his
commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and
Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer. 24
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from
which the corpus delicti of the crime - shabu- was obtained. For, without a valid
warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless
search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall be
inadmissible as evidence against him.
On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA
in its decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the
requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly,
the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly
crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the
respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner
crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. The petitioner was also not charged of
jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion
that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the
subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to prove this in the present case.
We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to
prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against an
accused, the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was
indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that produced the
corpus delicti of the crime.
Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty save the
prosecution’s lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This
presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an
accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence.
This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt; and the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.25
It may not be amiss to point out also the contrary observation of the Court as regards
the findings of the RTC when it held, rather hastily, that in the process of accosting
the petitioner for jaywalking, Tangcoy recovered from his possession a knife and a
small plastic sachet containing shabu.26 The testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA
decision, and the findings of the RTC, cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy
intended to arrest the petitioner for jaywalking.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary.27
The pertinent testimony28 of Tan, as quoted by the CA, is as follows:
Q: What happened after you obeyed the order of your immediate superior?
A: At 8:50 in the evening of August 20, 2002, we saw a male person crossed the
street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing.
Q: What did you do when you saw this person crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing?
A: We accosted him.
Q: How did you accost that person?
A: We accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. Pero napansin
namin siya na parang may kinukuha, so he was frisked by Ronald Tangcoy and a
knife was recovered from his possession.
Q: After a knife was recovered by your companions (sic) from that person who
allegedly crossed the wrong side of the street, what happened after that?
A: After recovering the knife, nakaalalay lang ako and he was frisked again by
Tangcoy and a plastic sachet was recovered from his possession.
Q: Did you know the contents of that plastic sachet which your companion recovered
from that person who crossed the wrong side of the street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the contents?
A: Suspected shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: After the drug was recovered from the possession of that man, what did you do?
A: We brought him to our precinct and informed him of his constitutional rights and
brought him to the Parañaque Community Hospital and the suspected shabu or
methylamphetamine was brought to the PNP Crime Lab at Fort Bonifacio.
Q: Did you come to know the name of that person whom you arrested in the morning
of August 20, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is his name?
A: Ongcoma Hadji Omar, sir.
Q: Is he the same Ongcoma Hadji Omar y Para, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir."
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Tan and
Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted
him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan
and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at] the designated
area."29
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his
liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no
criminal charge that was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking"
area.
From Tan’s testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly
confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his
constitutional rights and brought him to the police station.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines. 30 The
Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible
as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent
to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the
subsequent search was unlawful.
This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for
violating an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers.
In the light of the discussion above, the respondent’s argument that there was a
lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an
afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the
petitioner.1avvphi1 In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is further
highlighted when it was not recoveredimmediately after the alleged lawful arrest, if
there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of the knife.
Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of
the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the
petitioner's right to be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the
arresting police officers.31
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules.1âwphi1 In
addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.32

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence
precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364. Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR is
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205823, August 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REGIE BREIS Y ALVARADO AND
GARY YUMOL Y TUAZON,*Appellants.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 26 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916, affirming the Decision[2] dated 14 February 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. 30409-
R.
The Facts
Appellants Regie Breis y Alvarado (Breis) and Gary Yumol y Tuazon (Yumol) were
charged with violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) as follows:
That in the afternoon of February 10, 2010, at Gov. Pack Road, this City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have in their possession, custody and control marijuana with a recorded net weight of
8,181 grams of dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops wrapped in plastic and further
wrapped with brown packaging tape and placed inside a brown box, without the
authority of law and knowing fully well that said dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops
are dangerous drugs, in violation of the afore-cited provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW to Sec. 11 of RA 9165.[3]
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, where the prosecution
presented witnesses Intelligence Officers 1 Elizer Mangili (IO1 Mangili) and Ryan
Peralta (IO1 Peralta) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency - Cordillera
Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR); while the defense presented the testimonies of
appellants.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
Around 3:00 o'clock PM of February 10, 2009 (sic), an informant went to the PDEA-
CAR field office at Melvin Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City and offered the
information that the accused were bound to transport a box of marijuana from Baguio
City to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Mangili gathered that the accused have been
frequently traveling from Pampanga to Baguio to get marijuana bricks from their
supplier at La Trinidad, Benguet. Mangili referred the informant to Senior PDEJA
Officer Tacio for further interview and then the matter was referred to the PDEA
Officer-in-Charge Edgar Apalla, who after careful evaluation, ordered Agent Tacio to
form a team for the entrapment of the accused.
Agent Tacio created a team composed of Mangili and Peralta as arresting officer and
seizing officer, respectively, and briefed them on the operations to be conducted.
Tacio disclosed to the team that the accused were to transport by a public transport
bus from Baguio City to Dau, Pampanga bricks of marijuana packed in a carton and
that the departure from Baguio was scheduled at around 5:00 o'clock PM of that day.
The accused Breis would be in a white t-shirt with "Starbucks" logo and dark jeans
while accused Yumol would be wearing a black t-shirt with a white print and blue
jeans. Both the accused were described as standing about 5 feet and 5 inches, thin,
and dark complexion.
When the briefing was through, the team proceeded to the Genesis Bus terminal at
Governor Pack Road, Baguio City at around 4:30 o'clock PM. Due to time
constraints, the PDEA team chose not to secure any warrant nor coordinate with the
nearest police station.
Upon reaching the bus terminal, Mangili asked the bus conductor to identify the bus
which would leave at 5:00 o'clock PM. Mangili was directed to Genesis bus with plate
number TXX 890. Thus, pretending to be passengers, Mangili and Peralta boarded
the bus and they observed two male individuals whose physical appearances fitted
the descriptions given by the informant. Both agents likewise saw a box placed in
between the legs of accused Breis.
Mangili sat behind the accused while Peralta, stood near where the accused were
seated. In order to have a clearer view of the box tucked in between the feet of
accused Breis if the same fit the box described by informant, Mangili took the seat
opposite where the accused were seated and saw that the box was with the markings
"Ginebra San Miguel" and which was described by the informant. Mangili then
casually asked accused Yumol who owned the "Ginebra San Miguel" box, the
accused replied that it was theirs.
Accused Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave but before he could do so,
Peralta blocked his way while Mangili confronted accused Breis and asked what was
contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved Mangili and tried to flee but
Mangili was able to block his way as he was much larger than the accused Yumol
(sic). Mangili ordered him to sit down.
Agent Peralta then summoned the back-up officers to help secure the bus and
subdue the accused. After introducing themselves as PDEA agents, Mangili asked
the accused Breis to open the box but Breis ignored the request which made Mangili
lift and open the box. He took one brick and discovered it was marijuana. The
"Ginebra San Miguel" box yielded three more bricks of marijuana. Mangili then
marked the items on site.
Agent Peralta then informed the accused that they were being arrested for violation
of Rep. Act No. 9165 and then he read their constitutional rights in Pilipino to them.
Thereafter, the team returned to the PDEA-CAR office of Melvin Jones, Baguio City
for documentation such as the preparation of the affidavits of Agents Mangili and
Peralta, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of both accused, Request for Physical
Exam and Request for Laboratory Exam. Inventory likewise was done around 7:43
o'clock PM on February 10, 2010 at the said PDEA-CAR office.
After the documentation and inventory, the accused were brought to the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) and Medico-Legal Certificates were
issued showing that the accused had no external signs of physical injuries at the time
of their examination. Chemistry Report No. D-08-2010 indicates that the confiscated
items from the accused yielded positive to (sic) the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drugs (sic).[4]
Version of the Defense
The defense's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
Accused, both construction workers, left Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga for Baguio at
around 6:00 o'clock AM of February 9, 2010 to visit a certain Edwin Garcia, an
acquaintance and a resident of Loakan, Baguio City. Edwin Garcia had offered the
accused to be upholsterers in his upholstery business way back in December of
2008.
At around 11:00 o'clock AM, the accused arrived in Baguio City and because they did
not know the exact address and contact number of Edwin Garcia, they took a chance
and decided to take a cab to Loakan. However, they failed to find Garcia's house
despite asking the residents of Loakan. So, they decided to go back to the Genesis
bus terminal and go back home to Pampanga.
Upon reaching the terminal, they ate and took the 4:30 o'clock PM bus for
Pampanga. They were already boarded when accused Yumol stepped out to buy a
bottle of water. Thereafter, Mangili went near accused Breis and uttered something
inaudible, and thinking that the seat he was occupying was Mangili's, accused Breis
stood up to give up his seat but instead Mangili pushed him and accused Breis asked
what seems to be the problem. Mangili then asked if he owns the box under the seat
in front of his, Breis replied in the negative. Mangili then opened the box, got one of
the bricks contained therein, sliced the same and saw that it was marijuana. Accused
Breis, infuriated, retorted that the accusation is baseless and malicious.
Mangili then summoned his companions and they dragged accused Breis outside the
bus when suddenly, accused Yumol arrived and inquired what the commotion was all
about. The group then asked if he (Yumol) was a companion of accused Breis and
when he answered positively, Yumol was likewise apprehended.
Both the accused were then brought to the PDEA Office and were forced to admit
ownership of the box of marijuana, but they refused and thus they were hit with the
bricks of marijuana. One of the agents even squeezed the scrotum of accused Yumol
in the hope that he will admit ownership over the box of marijuana.[5]
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's version, upholding the presumption
of regularity in favor of the PDEA agents and finding no evil or ill-motive on their part.
On the other hand, the trial court found appellants' defense of frame-up too incredible
and outlandishly preposterous. The trial court also held that the warrantless search
and seizure and the warrantless arrest of appellants were valid. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Regie Breis y Alvarado and
Gary Yumol y Tuazon GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine of
P5,000,000.00.
Both the accused are immediately ORDERED TO BE TRANSFERRED to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The lone assignment of error in the Brief for the Accused-Appellants is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[8]
In their appeal, appellants argued that the PDEA agents did not comply with Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165, and that the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody over the seized items.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 were satisfied. Further, the Court of
Appeals found no break in the custody of the seized items that might compromise
their evidentiary integrity. The appellate court also upheld the legality of the
warrantless search and arrest of appellants. The dispositive portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appealed Decision dated
February 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 61, in
Criminal Case No. 30409-R, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In the present appeal, appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs [10] filed
before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.[11]
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
II of RA 9165, was not complied with. In support of this contention,
appellants state that: (1) the PDEA agents did not immediately conduct the inventory
at the place where the items were seized, and did so only at the PDEA-CAR field
office;[12] and (2) the representatives from the media, barangay and Department of
Justice (DOJ) were present during the inventory conducted at the field office, but not
at the place of the seizure during actual confiscation.[13]
Appellants are mistaken. The PDEA agents who apprehended appellants did not
deviate from the procedure prescribed by law and regulations. Section 21, paragraph
1, Article II of RA 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and
custody of dangerous drugs:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory' and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items; x x x. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Appellants insist that the PDEA agents should have conducted the inventory at the
place where the drugs were seized. However, the IRR clearly provides that in case of
warrantless seizures, the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team. The
physical inventory and photograph were conducted at the PDEA-CAR field office, a
fact that appellants themselves acknowledge[14] and testified to by IO1 Mangili[15] and
IO1 Peralta.[16]
The requirement of the presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official during the physical inventory and photograph was also
complied with. The representatives from the media and the DOJ and an elected
barangay official were present at the inventory conducted at the PDEA-CAR field
office, as evidenced by their signatures[17] on the Inventory of Seized Item [18]and
photographs taken during the inventory.[19] In fact, this is not contested by
appellants.[20]
Hence, we find no deviation from the procedure prescribed by Section 21, paragraph
1, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR.
Chain of Custody Established
What IO1 Mangili did in the bus upon seizure of the drugs was to mark the same,
which is not to be confused with taking the physical inventory. Marking is not a
requirement of RA 9165 or its IRR, but has been held to be an initial stage in the
chain of custody:
Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged the practical value of the process of
marking the confiscated contraband and considered it as an initial stage in the chain
of custody - a process preliminary and preparatory to the physical inventory and
photograph requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165:
This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 [of Republic act
No. 9165] and on allegations of robbery or theft.
"Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs with
his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous
drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to
inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station
or at some other practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency
with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the
ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Indeed, marking upon immediate
confiscation has been interpreted as to even include marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. In this case, the dangerous drugs taken
from accused-appellants were marked in his presence immediately upon confiscation
at the very venue of his arrest.[21] (Citations omitted)
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[22] What assumes primary
importance in drug cases is the prosecution's proof, to the point of moral certainty,
that the prohibited drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the
same item recovered from his possession.[23]
Appellants argue that the prosecution was not able to establish the chain of custody
over the seized drugs:
The irregularities in the handling procedure of the seized items are manifold. There is
no indication what steps were taken after the seizure, whether the items were turned
over to the investigator or to the desk officer before SPO4 Abordo allegedly delivered
it to the crime laboratory.
How can the trial court rule that the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved when
in fact, the prosecution failed to identify who was in possession of the marijuana from
the place of the seizure; to whom the same was turned over; and how it came to the
custody of SPO4 Abordo who allegedly delivered the seized items at (sic) the
laboratory. Nor was there any prosecution's evidence showing the identity of the
person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drug after its examination and
pending presentation in court.[24]
Appellants' argument fails to impress.
The links that the prosecution must endeavor to establish with respect to the chain of
custody are the following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.[25]
In this case, the prosecution adequately established the unbroken chain of custody
over the marijuana seized from appellants.
The records show that the seized drugs were marked immediately upon confiscation
by IO1 Mangili with his initials and signature, the date, and the letters A, B, C or D to
distinguish the bricks, in the presence of appellants.[26]
The seized drugs were brought, together with appellants, to the PDEA-CAR field
office. IO1 Mangili acted in both capacities of apprehending officer and investigating
officer. IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta testified that they conducted the investigation
and the inventory.[27]
IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta also testified that it was their evidence custodian, Senior
Police Officer 4 Abordo (SP04 Abordo), who brought the seized drugs to the Crime
Laboratory for examination.[28] A thorough review of the records reveals that
the Request for Laboratory Exam[29] shows that the seized drugs were delivered on
10 February 2010 by SP04 Abordo and received by Police Officer 2 Florendo and
Police Senior Inspector Rowena Fajardo Canlas (PSI Canlas). PSI Canlas was the
forensic chemist who conducted the examination on the seized drugs and
signed Chemistry Report No. D-08-2010[30] (chemistry report).
The chemistry report indicates that the "specimen submitted are retained in this
laboratory for future reference."[31] Through subpoena[32] upon PSI Canlas, the
marijuana was brought to court and marked during the preliminary conference held
on 7 April 2010.[33]
Appellants contend that the prosecution's failure to discuss in detail each link in the
chain of custody negated the integrity of the evidence. This is misplaced:
x x x It must be remembered that testimony about a perfect chain is not always
the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. As
such, what is of importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items. The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be
preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence
has been tampered.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Mali,[35] we held:
The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. To
sustain conviction, its identity must be established in that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The
chain of custody requirement performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[36]
In this case, the prosecution was able to show that the same drugs seized and
marked by IO1 Mangili were the same ones he identified at the trial.[37] Further, the
records consistently show that the markings on the bricks of marijuana consisted of
the initials and signature of IO1 Mangili, the date and A, B, C, or D, as evidenced by
the photograph[38] taken during the inventory and the chemistry report describing the
submitted specimen as follows:
A-One (1) carton knot tied with gray plastic straw labeled GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL
with markings '02-10-2010 ELM and signature', containing four (4) bricks of dried
suspected marijuana fruiting tops each wrapped with plastic and further wrapped with
brown packaging tape with the following markings and recorded net weights:
A-1 - [02-10-2010-A ELM and signature] = 2000.1 grams
A-2 = [02-10-2010-B ELM and signature] = 2158.3 grams
A-3 = [02-10-2010-C ELM and signature] = 2051.1 grams
A-4 = [02-10-2010-D ELM and signature] = 1971.5 grams[39]
(Emphasis supplied)

The presumption is that the PDEA agents performed their duties regularly. There
being no evidence showing bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been
tampered, we find that the prosecution sufficiently established the chain of custody.
Consequently, the corpus delicti was also established.
Warrantless Search and Seizure and Arrest
Although it was not raised as an error, it is imperative that we rule on the validity of
the warrantless search and seizure and the subsequent warrantless arrest of
appellants.
It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. No less than the Constitution
guarantees this right -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.[40]
Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.[41] However, the rule against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of exceptions, such as the search of moving vehicles. In People v.
Libnao,[42] the Court held:
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains a[n] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction.[43]
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.[44] The determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the
facts of each case.[45]
The Court has ruled in several dangerous drug cases[46] that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. In People v. Mariacos,[47] the
police received at dawn information that a baggage of marijuna was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. There, the informant described
the bag containing the prohibited drugs. The Court held that the police had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.[48]
In the present case, the vehicle that carried the prohibited drugs was about to leave.
The PDEA agents made a judgment call to act fast, as time was of the essence. The
team arrived at the terminal around 15 minutes[49] before the bus was scheduled to
depart. Upon boarding the bus, IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta identified two men fitting
the description given by the informant in possession of a box described [50]by the
informant to contain marijuana.
Moreover, the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion based on appellants' behavior
that the latter were probably committing a crime. IO1 Mangili casually asked
appellant Yumol who owned the box at their (appellants') feet. After answering that it
belonged to them (appellants), Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave. IO1
Peralta prevented him from getting off the bus. Then IO1 Mangili asked appellant
Breis what was contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved IO1 Mangili
and tried to flee. It must be noted that IO1 Mangili identified himself as a PDEA agent
before either appellant tried to leave the bus:
And you wanted to confirm your suspicion by asking from Gary Yumol who
Q
owns the box?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Gary Yumol, of course, did not give you any answer?
A He said that it is theirs.
Q Did you also talk to the companion of Gary Yumol?
A After Gary stood up suddenly I also spoke to Regie Breis.
Q And did he also give you any answer?
A He just pushed me and tried to leave the bus.
xxxx
Before you talked to Gary Yumol did you identify yourself as PDEA
Q
agents?
A When I asked him who owns the box, I then identified myself.
Q Did you ask them if you can see the contents of the box?
I told Regie to open the box but he did not want that's why I was the one who
A
opened it.
Q Gary Yumol according to you stood up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he stood up, he was held by Agent Peralta?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Regie Breis also stood up after you talked to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q But he was also held by Agent Peralta?
A I was the one who told him to sit down.
Before you told him to sit down did you introduce yourself as a PDEA
Q
agent?
A Yes, sir.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants' act of standing up to leave the bus under different circumstances may be
natural; but it is not so in this case. In People v. Aminnudin,[52] the warrantless arrest
of Aminnudin based on an informant's tip that he was carrying marijuana was
declared unconstitutional because there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. There, the Court found that "[t]o all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel."[53]
In contrast to the instant case, appellants were attempting to get out of a bus that
was about to leave the terminal, and not one that had just arrived, where the other
passengers were, as can be expected, seated in preparation for departure. It is
unnatural for passengers to abruptly disembark from a departing bus, leaving their
belongings behind. Any reasonable observer would be put on suspicion that such
persons are probably up to no good. To a trained law enforcement agent, it signaled
the probability that appellants were committing an offense and that the objects left
behind might be contraband or even dangerous articles.
Indeed, as observed by the PDEA agents, appellants were not simply passengers
carrying a box in a bus. They engaged in suspicious behavior when they tried to flee
after IO1 Mangili showed interest in their box and identified himself as a PDEA agent.
Worse, in his attempt at flight, Breis pushed IO1 Mangili, already knowing that the
latter was a PDEA agent. This brazen act on the part of Breis only cemented the
belief that appellants were likely hiding a wrongdoing and avoiding capture by law
enforcers.
The act of Breis in physically pushing IO1 Mangili and attempting to flee constitutes
resistance defined under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Cjode (RPC).[54] Before a
person can be held guilty of the crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in
authority, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the
person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or the agent of such person
who is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.[55]
As a PDEA agent, IO1 Mangili is a law enforcement agent and as such is an agent of
a person in authority as defined in the RPC.[56] IO1 Mangili was in the act of
investigating a lead, and possibly apprehending violators of RA 9165, in accordance
with the mandate of the PDEA.[57] He announced his identity as such agent to
appellants. It may even be gleaned that knowing that IO1 Mangili was a PDEA agent
was precisely the cause of the attempted flight of appellants.
The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority
when not serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151,
and not direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC.[58] This is because the gravity of
the disobedience to an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by the
circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real importance
of the transgression, rather than the source of the order disobeyed.[59] The pushing of
IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be considered direct assault, but is
resistance nonetheless.
The Court has held justified resistance to illegal or abusive acts of agents of persons
in authority. In Chan Fook,[60] the Court quoted Groizard:
A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power can not be
said to be in the exercise of the functions of his office. The law that defines and
establishes his powers does not protect him for anything that has not been provided
for.

The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fixed. If they
go beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may
resist the invasion, specially when it is clear and manifest. The resistance must be
coextensive with the excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary to
repel the aggression.
The invasion of the prerogatives or rights of another and the excess in the functions
of an office, are the sources that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far
as it is necessary for the defense of the persons or their rights in the manner
provided for in article 8 of the Penal Code.[61]
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the
performance of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on
Breis or Yumol. Neither did his presence in the bus constitute an excess of authority.
The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation of privacy
in relation to the constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is
not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus
was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving
vehicles has been upheld.
Moreover, appellants are not in any position to claim protection of the right against
unreasonable searches as to the warrantless search of the bus. The pronouncement
of the United States Supreme Court (USSC) in Rakas v. Illinois[62] regarding the
Fourth Amendment rights[63] is instructive:
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which, like some other constitutional
rights, may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal
search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a
search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to
effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit only
defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the
rule's protections.[64] (Citations omitted)
It being established that IO1 Mangili was not in violation of Yumol's or Breis' rights as
he was searching the bus, there is no excess of authority, clear and manifest or
otherwise, for either Yumol or Breis to lawfully resist. Hence, the act of Breis in
pushing IO1 Mangili was an unlawful resistance to an agent of a person in authority,
contrary to Article 151 of the RPC.
Breis' commission of a crime in view of, and against IO1 Mangili, and proclivity for
resorting to acts of violence further justify the warrantless search of appellants.
A further point. Appellants each attempted to alight from a departing bus, leaving
behind their belongings. They may be deemed to have abandoned the box in their
flight. A thing is considered abandoned and possession thereof lost if the spes
recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi (the intention
of returning) is finally given up.[65] That appellants got up to leave a departing bus
without bringing their box points to the absence of both spes recuperandi and animus
revertendi. Indeed, although their flight was thwarted by the PDEA agents, both
appellants intended to leave the box behind without returning for it. Abandonment
has the effect of converting a thing into res nullius.[66]
In the United States, abandoned articles, such as those thrown away, are considered
bona vacantia, and may be lawfully searched and seized by law enforcement
authorities.[67] Put to question in Abel v. United States[68] was the admissibility of
incriminating articles, which had been thrown away, that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation recovered without warrant. The USSC held that the articles were
abandoned and that there was nothing unlawful in the government's appropriation of
such abandoned property.[69] In Hester v. United States,[70] defendants and his
associates ran away from officers, and in the process discarded a jar and a jug. The
USSC held no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when officers examined the
contents of the discarded items without warrant.[71] In California v. Hodari,[12] police
officers, without warrant, pursued defendant who threw a rock of cocaine into an alley
as he was running. The USSC upheld the admissibility of the abandoned cocaine.[73]
Applied analogously, there is no objectionable warrantless search and seizure of the
box of marijuana abandoned in the bus by appellants.
Given the above discussion, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid.
Having been found with prohibited drugs in their possession, appellants were clearly
committing a criminal offense in the presence of IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta. The
subsequent warrantless arrest falls under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: xxxx

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually 7) 500 grams or more of marijuana;
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxxx
xxxx
The penalty imposed upon appellants is in order.
Hence, the warrantless arrest of appellants is lawful.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 26 June 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916, affirming the Decision dated 14
Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up February 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City in Criminal Case
No. 30409-R, isAFFIRMED.
Appellants' defenses of denial and frame-up were disbelieved by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of SO ORDERED.
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[74] We find no reason to
deviate from this rule.

The defenses of denial and frame-up cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
assertions of the PDEA agents who were strangers to appellants and against whom
no ill-motive was established.[75] Further, such defenses failed to overcome the
documentary and physical evidence presented by the prosecution.

In light of the foregoing, appellants' conviction for illegal possession of dangerous

drugs is in order.

Penalty for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs

The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs is provided in Section of RA

9165:

SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to

death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law/, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AGPANGA LIBNAO y
KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, Accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-
accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 For their conviction, each
was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
two million pesos.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following
Information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 o’clock dawn, in the Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping with one
another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a
transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is in violation of
Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996,
intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac,
Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the
area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big
bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin
Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office
received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery
that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay
Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3
Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3
Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside,
who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused
Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and
the two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers
invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the same barangay. They brought
with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to
witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag
were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the
barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant,
her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of
leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were
suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the
two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn,
disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt
without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have
one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were
present.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando,
Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a
laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana
leaves weighing eight kilos. 4

For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga
testified that in the evening of October 19, 1996, she went to buy medicine for her
ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering
from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded
a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle
she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay
Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan
Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing
eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its
contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passenger’s seat inside
the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her
lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one
Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The
sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio
arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their Bus No.
983. The incident was recorded in the company’s logbook. Gannod, however, was
not presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was
the Appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two
million pesos.
SO ORDERED." 5
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she
assigned the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the
defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search
was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the
right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the peace
officers who apprehended and investigated the accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses which inconsistencies cast doubt and
make incredible the contention and version of the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and
considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally
offered amounting to ignorance of the law." 6
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a
warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the
police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle.
In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it
was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is
permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against
her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted
by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." 7
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches
and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the
search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
search warrants and warrants of arrest. 8

Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the
carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar
exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. 9
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
10 Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. 11 When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction. 12
In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by
the accused; 13 (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was
observed to be acting suspiciously; 14 (c) where the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; 15 (d)
where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge
in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so; 16 (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on
the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration
agent or spy — one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate
to which the accused belong — that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into
the country; 17 (g) where the arresting officers had received a confidential
information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in
a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably
carrying shabu with him; 18 (h) where police officers received an information that the
accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport
marijuana in a bag to Manila; 19 and (i) where the appearance of the accused and
the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. 20
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The
Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month,
appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm
of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs
that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a
tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the
drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both
became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of
appellant’s bag was not illegal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal
offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances
a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be
arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
x x x." 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when
police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her
right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she
argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered
inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession
during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her co-
accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant
portion of its decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel
Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt
signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is inadmissible because they were not assisted
by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the postulate to rest on
good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from
both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any
answer given by both accused as a result of the police interrogation while in their
custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be resolved by the court is
whether or not, based on the prosecution’s evidence, both accused can be
convicted." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object
and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally
offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed
inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the
court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and
they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. 23 All the
documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented
and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. 24 Even without
their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because
witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. 25
Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who
testified on the exhibits. 26
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
She first cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea,
who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag containing the
marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was already open
when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police officers’
failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly
rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellant’s arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions
refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of
the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused
were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each
other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. 27 The
identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the
appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the
same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may
have different recollections of the same incident. 28
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and
remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for
them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in complicity with the appellant
and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify
falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. 29 In this
case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of
the police enforcers in arresting the Appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s
defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and
is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. 31 The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support
her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on
the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article
II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby
AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.