People v. Perfecto, G.R. No.
L-18463, October 4, 1922 Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the
Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that
the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the
convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited
by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto
was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults
the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case
at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish
Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to
protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case,
we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated.’Hence, Article 256 of the
SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be
applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was
acquitted.
MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION114 SCRA 77FACTS:
1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil
Case No. 3010 forpartition.2. Among the parties thereto
was Bernardita R. Macariola.3. On June 8, 1863
respondent Judge rendered a decision, which
becamefinal for lack of an appeal.4. On October 16,
1963 a project of partition was submitted to
JudgeAsuncion which he approved in an Order dated
October 23, 1963, lateramended on November 11,
1963.5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one
of the properties subject topartition under Civil Case
No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by
respondentMacariola and his wife, who were major
stockholders of TradersManufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc.,6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged
Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, nowAssociate
of a judge.”7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated ,
among others, Art. 1491, par. 5of the New Civil
Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.
ISSUE:
Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by
purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously
handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?
HELD:
Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only
to the sale orassignment of the property which is the
subject of litigation to the personsdisqualified therein.
The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition
tooperate, the sale or assignment must take place
during the pendency of thelitigation involving the
property.In the case at bar, when respondent Judge
purchased on March 6, 1965 aportion of lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he renderedon
June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the
parties filed an appealwithin the reglementary period
hence, the lot in question was no longersubject of
litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6,
1965,respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and
the amended order datedNovember 11, 1963 approving
the October 16, 1963 project of partition
Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982,
114 SCRA 77
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI
Leyte
A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a
dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land
located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola,
after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit
rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the
counsels of the parties submitted a project partition
reflecting the preference of the parties. The project
partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her
lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by
Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the
project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as
well.
Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio
Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion
in 1965.
On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against
Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on the
ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by
Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by
him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be
against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which
provides:
"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession".
Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his
earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project
partition was unsigned by her and that what was given
to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the
parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.
HELD:
No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under
pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 – 2
years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion
did not buy the property directly from any of the parties
since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who
then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no
showing that Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion.
Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a
gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got
were insignificant portions of the land.
The Supreme Court however admonished Judge
Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal
transactions.
Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion
rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an
appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only
by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner
Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his
order dated October 23, 1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184,
which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot
1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on
July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of
Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing
Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his
wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and
Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with
"Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code,
Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3
par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D.
Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the
mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned
provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the
plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March
6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the
decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
No 3010 and his two orders dated October and
November, 1963. The said property was no longer the
subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has
no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the
US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this
Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish
Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated
because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty,
political laws of the former sovereign are automatically
abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act
of the New Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H,
Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot
partake in any business in connection with this office, or
intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge
and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from
the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd
parties, and it appears that the corporation did not
benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there
was no case filed in the different branches of the Court
of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the
Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March
12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The
Judge realized early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes against Canon 25.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
FACTS
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against
Macariola, concerning the properties left by their
common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the
judge who rendered the decision, which became final
for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the
decision. This project of partition was only signed by the
counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they
were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot
1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these
lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of
the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr.
Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses
Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares
over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and
his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as
President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC,
Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion
alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of
those properties involved in the partition case; and •
that he violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of
Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private
company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This
case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation. After
hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended
that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned
in connection with the complaints filed against him.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5)
of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot 1184-E, which was among those properties involved
in the partition case.
2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and
5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself
with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.,
as stockholder and a ranking officer
HELD
1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits
justices, judges among others from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court, the SC has ruled,
however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this
case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already
final because none of the parties filed an appeal within
the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was
no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge
Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs
in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier
purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent
sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a
scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of
said lot as a consideration for the approval of the
project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating
Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that
Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion.
In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable
citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the subject
lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without
any intervention of Judge Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have
acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics requires that judges’ official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It
was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge
Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or
had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife
were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His
actuations must not cause doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce
prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of the
department of public prosecution in active
service from engaging in commerce, either in person or
proxy or from holding any office or have an direct,
administrative or financial intervention
in commercial or industrial companies within the limits
of the territory in which they discharge their duties.
However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal
Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to
be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of
said provision.
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public
officers are considered to have committed corrupt
practices, which include having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said
provision because there is no showing that he
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In
this case, the business of the corporation in which he
participated has obviously no relation to his judicial
office.
Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does
NOT apply to members of the Judiciary, who
are covered under RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) and
Art X (7) of the 1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA
296, the power to remove or dismiss judges is vested in
the President of the Philippines, not in the CSC, and only
on 2 grounds—serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Under the 1973 Constitution, only the SC can discipline
judges of the inferior courts as well as other personnel
of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered as
subordinate civil service officers or employees because
the Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the
Judiciary department. Moreover, only permanent
officers in the classified service are subject to the
jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges, however, are not within
this classification, as they are considered to be non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government
as a Presidential appointee.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds
judges to abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises, which are apt to be involved in litigation in
his court. Judge Asuncion and his wife, however, had
withdrawn from the corporation and sold their shares
to third parties only 22 days after its incorporation,
which indicates that Judge Asuncion realized that their
interest in the corporation contravenes said Canon.
The Court even commended the spouses for such act.
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. VS. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Ccarpio Morales, j.:
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted
a Resolution which directed theCommittee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursementsand expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).Then on June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed
and was referred tothe House Committee in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The
House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was"sufficient in
form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance.On October 23,
2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned HouseResolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense?2. Whether or not
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12thCongress are
unconstitutional.3. Whether or not the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of theConstitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the
sounddiscretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six groundsfor
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precisedefinition.2.
Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules contraveneSection 3 (5)
of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."3. Yes. Having concluded that the
initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaintand referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoingmanner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following
Article XI,Section 3(5) of the Constitution.In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed on June 2, 2003 and the secondimpeachment
complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the
constitutional prohibition against theinitiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period
RANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House
of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding
the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by
the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted
a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same
on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of
Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations
on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need
of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS (DIGEST)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS,
respondent (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing
Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC
sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent
letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October
1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February
3, 1997
I. THE FACTS
1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way
as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws
to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing
Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in
nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
measures to encourage the formation and operation of
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
than the bid of petitioner.
regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the
compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong
second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in
not by its language require any legislation in order to
§10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights,
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
to qualified Filipinos.”
executing in another.

II. THE ISSUES

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
or implementing laws or rules for its
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
nation;
concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,”
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2,
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
Article XII of the Constitution; and
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation,
may be maintained to enforce such right
over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
Corporation.
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
III. THE RULING
puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with
our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents’ claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is
mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state
action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered
“state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore
the transaction, although entered into by respondent
GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not
only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in
the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to
enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing
the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f
for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself
is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact,
we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have
to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if
we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
Pamatong V. Comelec G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004.
FAC !"
• legislation since its effecti%e meansand reach are not
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for President. RespondentCOMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates ho
could not age a nation ide campaign and!or not
nominated "y a political party or are notsupported "y
registered political party ith a national constituency.
• intention of the framers to inflict on the people
Pamatong filed a Petition for #rit of Certioari ith the
$upreme Court claiming that theCOMELEC %iolated his
right to &e'ual access to opportunities for pu"lic
ser%ice under$ection *+ ,rticle -- of the
/01 constitution+ "y limiting the num"er of
'ualifiedcandidates only to those ho can afford to age
a nation ide campaign and!or arenominated "y political
parties. 2he COMELEC supposedly erred in dis'ualifying
himsince he is the most 'ualified among all the
presidential candidates (he possesses all
theconstitutional and legal 'ualifications for the office of
the president+ he is capa"le of aging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organi ation
under hisleadership+ he also has the capacity to age
an international campaign since he haspracticed la in
the other countries+ and he has a platform of
go%ernment.
#!!$%"
#hether or not+ the petitioners interpretation of
the Constitutional pro%ision under $ection *+ ,rticle --
gi%es him a constitutional right to run or hold for pu"lic
office4
R$&#NG"
o. #hat is recogni ed in $ection *+ ,rticle -- of the
Constitution is merely a pri%ilege su"6ect tolimitations
imposed "y la . -t neither "esto s such a right nor
ele%ates the pri%ilege to the le%el ofan enforcea"le
right. 2here is nothing in the plain language of the
pro%ision+ hich suggests sucha thrust or 6ustifies
an interpretation of the sort.2he 7e'ual access7
pro%ision is a su"sumed part of ,rticle -- of the
Constitution+ entitled78eclaration of Principles and
$tate Policies.7 2he pro%isions under the ,rticle
are generallyconsidered not self9e:ecuting+ and there is
no plausi"le reason for according a different
treatmentto the 7e'ual access7 pro%ision. Li;e the rest
of the policies enumerated in ,rticle --+ the
pro%isiondoes not contain any 6udicially enforcea"le
constitutional right "ut merely specifies a guideline
forlegislati%e or e:ecuti%e action. 2he disregard of the
pro%ision does not gi%e rise to any cause ofaction
"efore the courts.O"%iously+ the pro%ision is not
intended to compel the $tate to enact positi%e
measures that ould accommodate as many people as
possi"le into pu"lic office. Moreo%er+ the pro%ision
as ritten lea%es much to "e desired if it is to "e
regarded as the source of positi%e rights. -t isdifficult to
interpret the clause as operati%e in the a"sence of
properly defined. <roadly ritten+ the myriad of claims
that can "e su"sumedunder this ru"ric appear to "e
entirely open9ended. #ords and phrases such as
7e'ual access+77opportunities+7 and 7pu"lic ser%ice7
are suscepti"le to countless interpretations o ing to
theirinherent impreciseness. Certainly+ it as not the
anoperati%e "ut amorphous foundation from hich
innately unenforcea"le rights may "e sourced.2he
pri%ilege of e'ual access to opportunities to pu"lic office
may "e su"6ected to limitations.$ome %alid limitations
specifically on the pri%ilege to see; electi%e office are
found in thepro%isions of the Omni"us Election Code
on 7 uisance Candidates. ,s long as the
limitationsapply to e%ery"ody e'ually ithout
discrimination+ ho e%er+ the e'ual access clause is
not%iolated. E'uality is not sacrificed as long as the
"urdens engendered "y the limitations aremeant to "e
"orne "y any one ho is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. -n the case at "ar+there is no sho ing that
any person is e:empt from the limitations or the
"urdens hich theycreate
Mabanag vs. Vito Case Digest (Consti-1)
Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate
opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate
opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission
on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives
since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted
upon definitely by the House when the petition for
prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three
senators and eight representatives did not take part in
the passage of the congressional resolution, designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought
to prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution.
The members of the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and
the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made
defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the
presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front
and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need
citation of authorities that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also
too well known to require elucidation or citation of
authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government. If a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The
two steps complement each other in a scheme intended
to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section I of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two
distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no
logic in attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If
on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the
judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there
is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a
proposal then into that of ratification.
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Case Digest
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
78 Phil 1
Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez
Facts:
This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the
congressional resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto. Petitioners are 8 senators, 17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth
Party. Petitioners allege that the resolution is contrary
to the Constitution.
The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec as
having been elected senators and representatives in the
elections held on April 23, 1946. The 3 senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of
the first session of Congress due to alleged irregularities
in their election. The 8 representatives since their
election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House,
except to take part in the election of the Speaker,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in
the House of Representatives, but that resolution had
not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
petition was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators and 8
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary ¾
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to
the Constitution. If the petitioners had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary ¾
vote in either House of Congress.
Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction,
relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of the
enrolled bill/resolution.
Petitioners contend that respondents are confusing
jurisdiction (substantive law) with conclusiveness of an
enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).
Issue:
WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.
WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
Ruling:
No. Political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutional or statutory provisions. The
difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. However, in Coleman v.
Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of
a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question and hence not justiciable. If a
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a
highly political function performed by Congress. If a
political question conslusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law
or resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled
bill” rule born of that respect.
Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as
amended by Act No. 220, provides two methods of
proving legislative proceedings:
By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions,
or copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by
their order; and
In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.
In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals
because those were the documents offered in evidence.
It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the
Act was in existence or was placed before the Court;
and it had not been shown that if that had been done,
this Court would not have held the copy conclusive
proof of the due enactment of the law.
Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the
Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the 2
ways specified in Section 313 of The Code of Civil
Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the 2 documents and the court did not say or
so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
Mabangag case
acts:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the
enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto."... that three of the... plaintiff
senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission
on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate...
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives
since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended.
s a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Issues:
he validity of the above-mentioned resolution is
attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
uestion of the jurisdiction of this Court.
he respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction,
relying on the collusiveness on the courts of an enrolled
bill or resolution.
Ruling:
hat political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory... provision. (16 C. J.
S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of
the separation of powers,... If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The
two steps complement each other in a scheme intended
to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in... section 1 of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two
distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no
logic in attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly... political function
performed by the "Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even
independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive.
If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention... of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest,
there is leas reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal than into that of a ratification.
we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of
whether the senators and representatives who were
ignored in the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote Mere members of Congress within the
meaning of section 1 of Article XV of... the Philippine
Constitution.
Principles:
MICHAEL F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et
al.
484 SCRA 529 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a case where
there is already a valid proclamation of a candidate.
FACTS: A Petition to Deny Due Course and/or
Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of
Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan was
filed by a registered voter of Quezon City before the
Commission on Elections National Capital Region
(COMELEC NCR), alleging that Cabochan's certificate
suffered from a serious and material defect as it was
notarized by a Notary Public whose commission had
already expired. Consequently, Cabochan withdrew her
certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr. filed
his in substitution of Cabochan.
Herein petitioner Michael F. Planas (Planas), also a
candidate for the same position, filed before the
Quezon City Board of Canvassers a Petition for the
Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor of
Defensor who appeared to be leading the congressional
race, citing the memorandum-recommendation of the
NCR Acting Director directing that the certificate of
Cabochan be denied due course and that the
substitution of Defensor for Cabochan be accordingly
declared invalid. Defensor was proclaimed as the
winning candidate for the congressional seat of the
Third District of Quezon City.
On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
challenged Resolution ruling that the COMELEC is
already ousted with jurisdiction over the case thus, the
same is already under the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that the
certificate of candidacy of Cabonchan is valid, and the
subsequent substitution by Defensor is legal. Hence, the
present petition of Planas.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC was divested of
its jurisdiction by virtue of Defensor's proclamation and
assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives
HELD: The general rule is that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
in favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without
exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,
the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election
is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only
on the assumption that there has been a valid
proclamation. Where the proclamation itself is illegal,
the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the
basic issues.
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of
Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes,
the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point
in time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation
was valid or legal.
Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor‘s
proclamation the denial of his COC due course was not
yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in
fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties
as representative, the COMELEC had been effectively
divested of jurisdiction over the case.
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SANIDAD vs. COMELEC Case Digest
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for
an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region)
was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30
January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election
laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio
Midland Courier” assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides
“During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day
before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues.”
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from
expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec
regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what
was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise
and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a
candidate for any elective office is required to take a
leave of absence from his work during the campaign
period”) can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves
of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are
no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory
basis.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
August 28, 2018Gracezyl
Blancojusticiability, justiciable question, political law
cases, sanidad vs comelec
PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS &
HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. NO. L-44640
OCTOBER 12, 1976
FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the
so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary
purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its
existence and length of effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another
proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that
are to be asked during the referendum on October 16.
The first question is whether or not the citizen wants
martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the
approval on several proposed amendments to the
existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision
and control of the national referendum in October 16.
Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force
and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that
the power to propose amendments or revisions of the
Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo
Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that
the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent
assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution
and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such a
short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President
need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an
amendment of the Constitution, which confines the
right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18
years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no
standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political in
nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court.
The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of
the transition period, only the incumbent President has
the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question
(specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).
HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a
justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of
political nature and thus not justiciable.
The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s
contention that the issue is a political one. This is
because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that
the power to propose amendments to the constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of
transition.
After that transition period, and when the regular
National Assembly is in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The
normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute
itself into a constituent assembly, the president
undertook the proposal of amendments through
Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a
contestable issue.
Javellana v. Executive Secretary
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition
case to restrain respondents from implementing any of
the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in
the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the
respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and
that the president is without power to proclaim the
ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were
filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others.
Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation
1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and
proclamation which are similar in their objectives.
ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliance
with applicable laws?
3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the
people?
4. Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to an existing constitution
is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has
been amended in the manner required by the
constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which
provides only one way for ratification (election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with
qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social
conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law), the Court
cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the
proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss
the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution
is the basic issue posed by the cases which
considerations other than judicial are relevant and
unavoidable. The new constitution is in force as there
are not enough votes to say otherwise.
JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973
JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed
Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No.
4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented
by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970,
pursuant to the provisions of which the election of
delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on June 1,
1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21,
1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081
placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its
Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree
No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification
or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well
as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection
of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
“respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that
said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law
because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of
guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription
of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public
funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution
set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
thereof.”
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an
order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and
open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action
to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when
General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be
postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No.
20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order
of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free
and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
Because of these events relative to the postponement
of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it
fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held
were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution,
scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22,
1973, and since the main objection to Presidential
Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate
funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could
do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of
the plebiscite by the President reportedly after
consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court
deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on
these cases.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in
Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying
that said case be decided “as soon as possible,
preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday,
the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents
in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent
motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday
noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January
15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said
Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for
issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional
respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be
issued enjoining and restraining respondent
Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of
Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño;
the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head,
Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de
Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and
all other officials and persons who may be assigned
such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing
and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies
referendum results allegedly obtained when they were
supposed to have met during the period comprised
between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two
questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion.”
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a
resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R.
No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion
not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and
setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at
9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date
last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice
called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon
instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of
Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of
Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by
the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the
Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in
G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection
therewith was still going on and the public there
present that the President had, according to
information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice,
signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that
morning.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme
Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana
filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them
from implementing any of the provisions of the
proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino
citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the
President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify
the proposed constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and
objective.
Issues:
Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 is a justiciable question.
Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been
acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the
1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
Rulings:
It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
To determine whether or not the new constitution is in
force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of
the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has
been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six
(6) members of the court.
The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody
else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render
the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified
voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must
be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is
void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with
the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not
orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the
early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics,
namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished
by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial
inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been
conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were
held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of
the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein
mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended,
to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of
the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same
are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution
No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no
free expression, and there has even been no expression,
by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines,
of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed
Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states
that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some
American decisions to the effect that independently of
the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared
to state that such doctrine calls for application in view
of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the
difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people
in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a
concomitant feature of martial law.”
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of
knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of
martial law, with the free expression of opinions
through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty,
whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”
The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the
officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line
with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its
own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.
Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress
do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the
members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.
The compliance by the people with the orders of martial
law government does not constitute acquiescence to
the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as
regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance
with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly
had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto,
amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the
“enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same
refers to a document certified to the President for his
action under the Constitution by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to
by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said
Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of
the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the
proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the
1935 Constitution denies the executive department of
the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other
respondent in said case, petitions therein should be
given due course, there being more than prima facie
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that
said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental
Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of
said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite
for its ratification or rejection in accordance with
Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the
provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the
time of such plebiscite.
Being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is
in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon
on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty
whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted that
the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is
not in force.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in
that it allows the President to continue holding office
after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of
conditional “resignation” did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier
than the regular elections for such positions in 1987.
The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably
vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when
the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed
and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten
(10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers
have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his
office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme
Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the
prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as
the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the
purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual
vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly
decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity
at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more
political than the election. The Court cannot stand in
the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.
. COMELEC
June 28, 2013
140 SCRA 455, January 7, 1986
FACTS:
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883,
calling a special election for President and Vice-
President on February 7, 1986.
The law was enacted following the letter of President
Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably vacating the
position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days after his
proclamation."
The principal ground for the challenge to the validity of
the statute was that the conditional resignation of the
President did not create a vacancy required by Article
VII, Sec. 9 which authorized the calling of a special
election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow
incumbent President Marcos to run on that said special
election.
HELD:
After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the
other hand, 5 Justices voted to declare the statute
unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, of the view that as there were less
than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional.
The petitions should be dismissed.
On the second issue, it turned out to be a political
question. It can only be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. Thus, it is
outside the ambit of the courts.
The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people
decide through their ballot, either to the give the
incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new
president.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986
Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano, petitioner
vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new
government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal
because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to
sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a
party must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy
of the provisional It was the people that made the
judgement and accepted the new government. Thus,
the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
Rulings:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. The holding that
petitioners did not have standing followed from the
finding that they did not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations
has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.
In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )
Posted: August 10, 2011 in Political Law
Tags: Immunity from Suits
0 1986 after the infamous People Power Revolution. The
Immunity from Suits
Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the
petitioner Bermudez seeking for the clarification of Sec.
5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as
to whom between the incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP
Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the
said provision refers to.
Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition
for declaratory relief?
Held:
It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory relief.(Note: ROC provides
that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is
with the RTC )
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a
suit against the incumbent President of the Republic,
President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally
elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure.
It being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers
therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization
of election
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents,
petitioner asked the court if the provision of the Section
5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The six-
year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the then-
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos
and Tolentino were declared the winners, Aquino and
Laurel were installed into the position last February 25,
next regular election for the President and Vice-
President was held last May 2, 1992.
Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-
incumbent President and Vice-President, or the
previously elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over
petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court states that
it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also,
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner.
Petitioner had no personality to use, and his allegation
was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge, and the people have made
judgment.
aturnino Bermudez, petitioner
FACTS:
Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before
the SC, asking the same Court to clarify exactly who
were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution. Said provision reads in
part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992."
ISSUE:
Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution pertain to incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected
President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-President Arturo
Tolentino?
HELD:
Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright
for the following reasons:
petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the SC;
petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
although no respondent is impleaded, the instant
petition amounts to a suit against incumbent President
Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her
incumbency;
it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there
should be no question -- that the aforecited provision
pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador Laurel. The Aquino
administration is legitimately recognized by other
nations, and all eleven members of the SC have sworn
to uphold the fundamental law of the land under her
government; and
the people of the Philippines have accepted her
government as the one in effective control of the
country, such that it is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government.
___
De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de
facto government is one that exercises power as if
legally constituted even though it is not formally
recognized. De jure means "by right" or something that
is based on laws or actions of the State.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN et al.
492 SCRA 747 (2006), EN BANC
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for
Certiorari against the respondent Sandiganbayan
challenging the denial by the Sandiganbayan, of its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Solicitor
General alleges that its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment must first be resolved, as a continuation of
the proceedings in the civil case by the Sandiganbayan
might be rendered unnecessary in the event that its
petition before the Supreme Court is resolved in its
favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of preliminary injuction can
be granted during the pendency of the Petition for
Certiorari against the Sandiganbayan
HELD:
The mere elevation of an interlocutory matter to
this Court through a petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, like in the present case, does
not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings
before a public respondent, unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent.
The burden is thus on the petitioner in a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to show that
there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of suspending the
proceedings before the public respondent. Essential for
granting injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent
necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious
damage.The Court finds that petitioner has failed
to discharge the burden. The groundon which
it bases its urgent motion is the alleged futility of
proceeding with the trial of the case. This assertion,
however, is speculative, anchored on the mere
supposition that the petition would be decided in its
favor. There is thus, in this case, a marked absence of
any urgent necessity for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court takes notice that in most cases
where its interlocutory orders are challenged before
this Court, Sandiganbayan, suspends proceedings in the
cases in which these assailed interlocutory orders are
issued despite the non-issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction and the absence of a strong probability that
the issues raised before this Court would be rendered
moot by a continuation of the proceedings before it.
Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following
the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1")
creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the
PCGG to recover all... ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this... order"
and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through
its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate
reports of... unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.
. On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on
its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of
Ramas.
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the
owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La
Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and
lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327
square meters.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit,
Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed
at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the
alleged house... of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives,
Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent.
That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car
went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four
(4) attache cases filled with money and... owned by
MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that
Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and
is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere
secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could
not have used the military equipment/items seized in
her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to... claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00
and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of
income.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379")
[4] against Ramas.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986.
On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of
the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a
clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978
to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged
that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army
officer and his other income from legitimately acquired
property by taking undue advantage of his public office
and/or... using his power, authority and influence as
such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos."
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP
Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA
No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents'
properties,... funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative
Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended
that his property consisted only of a residential house at
La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000,
which was not out... of proportion to his salary and
other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any
mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house
of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended
Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978
only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the
Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked
for a postponement of the trial.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already
delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its
many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would
want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in
fact the case had long been ready for trial. The
Sandiganbayan... ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again
admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving
petitioner one more chance to present further evidence
or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence,
the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was
without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss
based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of
mere position... held without a showing that they are
"subordinates" of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to
costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack
of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
ordered... returned to Elizabeth Dimaano
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint
on the following grounds:
(1.)
The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance
with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which
involve the same issues.
(2.)
No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations
in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and
Dimaano.
(3.)
The evidence adduced against Ramas does not
constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.)
There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated.
The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite
rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of
P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Issues:
The Issues
PCGG's Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Ruling:
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG
has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of
a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[15]
The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government
agencies... on the action to be taken based on its
findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board
pursuant to the PCGG's power under Section 3 of EO
No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of
this... order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific
responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task
of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:
(a)
The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover and sequestration of all business...
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.
(b)
The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption
as the President may assign to the Commission from
time to time.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate
the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the... administration of former President Marcos
by being the latter's immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage
of their public office or using their powers, influence x x
x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in other... cases of
graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG.[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President
assigned Ramas' case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas'
case should fall under the first category of AFP
personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was
undoubtedly a... subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that
Ramas' position enabled him to receive orders directly
from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President
Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO
No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not
automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that
he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this... wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders
will readily show what is contemplated within the term
`subordinate.' The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express
the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,... his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates both
here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes `all assets and properties in the
Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.'
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis that is-
`[W]here general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
to persons or things of the same kind or class as... those
specifically mentioned
T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers
to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close associate
in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,...
dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of
his close... association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife.
Ramas' position alone as Commanding General of the
Philippine Army with the rank of Major General[19]
does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its
amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima... facie
showing that Ramas was a close associate of former
President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former
President Marcos were close to him. Such close
association is manifested either by Ramas' complicity
with former
President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth by the deposed President or by former President
Marcos' acquiescence in Ramas' own accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioner's attempt to differentiate the instant case
from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues
that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the
instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the
investigation pursuant to EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner
asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was
acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-
related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas
was truly a subordinate of the former President.
However, the... same AFP Board Resolution belies this
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such
statement, it ends with the following recommendation:
V.
RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus
Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of
RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully
Acquired Property."[20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and
prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of
Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation
to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to
EO No. 1... and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioner's case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a
specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited
purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the
Amended Complaint do not show that the properties
Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his
capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-in-chief.
Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas
allegedly owned... and suggested that these properties
were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate
income without showing that Ramas amassed them
because of his close association with former President
Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board
resolution does... not contain a finding that Ramas
accumulated his wealth because of his close association
with former President Marcos
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is
precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO
No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation... of the PCGG
on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the
PCGG.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
categories, require a previous authority of the President
for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order
No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested
in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor
and his assistants and the state prosecutors.
(Emphasis... supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG,
should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions
not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the
PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a
prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of
former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture
filed with the Sandiganbayan should be... dismissed for
lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate
respondents since there is no prima facie showing that
EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The
AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint
state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and
Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas' case
to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained
wealth and graft cases.
Petitioner's argument that private respondents have
waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition
by submitting their respective Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents.
Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the
proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No.
1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file
the... forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.[32]
The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches
or estoppel.[33]
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the
records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation
of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four
years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.
Petitioner... filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August
1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April
1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its
evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its
evidence by filing... numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date
set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed,
on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.
The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner's... delays and
yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the
filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only
prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino
and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute the case against private respondents.
This alone would have been sufficient... legal basis for
the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against
private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner's evidence.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that
the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on
March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution."[39] Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time... by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino
and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the
name and by the will of the Filipino people."[40]
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of... the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents'
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right
arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under
the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic...
stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items taken
from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her
since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
did not enjoy any constitutio
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February
1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino's
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution."[41] The resulting government
was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as the
de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international... law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary
government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the
actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the... cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded
to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration")
remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of
such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there
was no... municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders
issued by the Philippine Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration... orders,
which direct the freezing and even the take-over of
private property by mere executive issuance without
judicial action, would violate the due process and
search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon... the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies
assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill
of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would
clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as
the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect...
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in
the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty
to insure that "[n]o one shall be... subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a
signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.
Suffice it to... say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with
its treaty obligations under international law.
uring the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers
did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items
not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioner's
witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not
included in the warrant, thus:
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian
that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that
the raiding team confiscated.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and
unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from
whom the raiding seized them.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated
18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037, remanding the records of this case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence may... warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon
was elected Barangay Captain together with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a
Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg.
222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of
1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed
by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and
the other respondents as members of Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the
subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that respondents be prohibited by
taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence
on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified.
It was also their position that with the ratification of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the
terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution
and not because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of
the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents
to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda
issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987
designating respondents as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on
Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely
on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to
the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been
determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982
should still govern.
De Leon v. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602
FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the
elections on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987,
petitioner received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986, but signed by OIC Governor Esguerra
on February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay, Rizal.
Petitioners pray that the memorandum is null and void
in accordance with Section 3 of Barangay Election Act of
1982. Petitioner further that with the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, respondent OIC governor no longer
has authority to designate successors and replace them.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent
OIC Governor valid?
HELD:
The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February
2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution has
been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said
Constitution. The Memoranda was declared to be of no
legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining
respondents from proceeding with the take-over was
granted
De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602
Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other
petitioners won as councilmen of barangay dolores,
taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received
memo antedated december 1, 1986 signed by OIC Gov.
Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating
Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of
minister of local government and similar memo signed
february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.
Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.
Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the
date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and not
December 1, 1986.
2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But
provisional constitution was no longer in efffect then
because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its
transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all
previous constitution were suspended.
3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it
was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now acquired
security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay
officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not
inconsistent with constitution.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9,
1967
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed three resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives
from 120 to 180 members (First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of
the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their
seats (Third Resolution).
Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913,
which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act
submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the
Congress in the First and Third Resolutions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and
allegedly in representation thru class suit of all citizens
of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from
implementing Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-
partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not
only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third
Resolutions.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.
2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the
people of the Philippines violate the spirit of the
Constitution – NO.
RATIO:
1. RA 4913 is constitutional.
The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the
populace about the amendments are sufficient under
the Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the
submission of proposals for amendment to the people
except under certain conditions.
2. The submission of the amendments to the
people of the Philippines do not violate the
spirit of the Constitution.
People may not be really interested on how the
representatives are apportioned among the provinces
of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are
interested to know the full details may enlighten
themselves by reading copies of the amendments
readily available in the polling places. On the matter of
Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats
as legislators, even if they should run for and assume
the functions of delegates to the Convention.
NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA
4913 were unconstitutional but they did not reach
specific number of votes to invalidate these
congressional acts under the 1935 Constitution, which is
two-thirds of the Supreme Court.
Gonzales Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Gonzales Vs. Comelec
27 SCRA 835
G.R. L-27833
April 18, 1969
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and
limiting the period of election campaign or partisan
political activity was challenged on constitutional
grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on
the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter
in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. There was the further allegation that the
nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of
election campaign are matters of political expediency
and convenience which only political parties can
regulate or curtail by and among themselves through
self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement
and that the regulation and limitation of these political
matters invoking the police power, in the absence of
clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and
without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to
appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No.
4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under
the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, whether for national or
local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The
Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the
U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle
were requested to give their opinions. Respondents
contend that the act was based on the police power of
the state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are
the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive
evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision a definite
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be publicly established. The
"dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.”
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms.
Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly
drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as
to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be
part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but
to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of
excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as
well as violence that of late has invariably marred
election campaigns and partisan political activities in
this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form,
implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case
of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public
office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, against
the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly,
or the undertaking of any campaign literature or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command.
Raul L. Lambino
Erico B. Aumentado... gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution.
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and
(c)[2] and Section 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum
Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The
Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
Lambino petition - proposal
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the
1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4 of Article
VII (Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article
XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."... shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government... the COMELEC should submit the...
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters'
ratification:
The Ruling of the COMELEC
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to
the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on
Elections[8] declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.
Issues:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative;
Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
Ruling:
There is no merit to the petition.
failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that
the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before"
they sign such proposal.
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the
person supplying the signature has not first seen what it
is that he or she is signing.
The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide
sufficient information so that registered voters can
intelligently evaluate whether... to sign the initiative
petition."
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant
American... jurisprudence on people's initiative.
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the
framers intended that the people must first see the full
text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and
that the people must sign... on a petition containing
such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the
Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition contained,...
or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of
the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature
sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the
text of the proposed changes is attached to it. P
The signature sheet does not show to the people the
draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign... the signature sheet.
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to
the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra
had... pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes... they
circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to
mention the amended petition.
"a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on
the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act."
Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signature-
gathering period, the Lambino Group... admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner
Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of
100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."[25]
This... admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group
failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to
the great majority of the people who signed the
signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000
signatories could have received with certainty one copy
each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent
distribution with no wastage
The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group
failed to... show to the 6.3 million signatories the full
text of the proposed changes.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during... the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino
Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of
the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
These three specific amendments are not stated or
even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets.
The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea
that they were proposing these amendments.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino
stated that he and his group assured the people during
the signature-gathering that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local
elections if the proposed changes were ratified before
the
2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for
the election of the members of Parliament, which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the
regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the
2007 local elections. This section merely requires that
the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without...
specifying the year.
the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal...
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because
the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on
the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that
the proposed changes would require the... holding in
2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system.
he Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4)
to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise
again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification
of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007
elections. In the absence of the proposed
Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion
whether to amend or revise again the Constitution.
With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
The signature sheets do not also explain what specific
amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want
the interim Parliament to make, and why... there is a
need for such further amendments or revisions. The
people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature
and effect of the proposed changes.
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in
2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will
remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the
House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end
on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of
the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of
the House will remain members of the interim
Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June
2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the
powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does
not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30
June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the...
present members of the House of Representatives to
the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination
against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their
signatures... would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010,
the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only
to members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people
without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and
can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
However, this trust emanates from a... fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is
first shown to the people before they sign the petition,
not after they have signed the petition.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited
to the matter of amendment and should not expand
into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of
the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed... by the Committee.
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose... revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution.
The initiative power reserved by the people by
amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the
proposing and the adopting or rejecting of "laws and
amendments to the Constitution" and does not purport
to extend to a constitutional... revision.
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only
be revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in
the instrument is almost invariably treated... as extra-
constitutional and revolutionary.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -
affecting a... total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially
the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of
the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers
in the Constitution.
A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from
a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.
On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will
radically alter the framework of government as set forth
in the Constitution
Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because
of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system
to... a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.
Thus, the difference between the words
"revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process
or procedure of coming up with the corrections,...
Stated otherwise, the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change
the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this
Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of
RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA
6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x
x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of
25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August
2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty.
Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels
for
"Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners."
In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act
"together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely
attached the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended
petition... filed with the COMELEC did not even comply
with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino
Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted
to the electorate; x x x." T
The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
174153.
Principles:
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the... entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text
of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative...
upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen...
the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions
of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
unbending requirement is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign to signify their assent, and that the people must
sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of
the proposed... amendments... two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change... is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions.
qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of
the proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision."...
alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry
"a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or
the fundamental powers of its Branches.
A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan
also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional
form of government and the system of check and
balances