(33) Navarro v. Domagtoy, AM MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996 (34) Aranes v. Judge Occiano, AM MTJ-02-1390, Apr.
Judge Occiano, AM MTJ-02-1390, Apr. 11, 2002 (35) Beso v. Judge Daguman, AM MTJ-99-1211, Jan. 28, 2000
ISSUE:
1. WON the judge has authority to solemnize the marriage
FACTS:
Judge Hernando Domagtoy is the designated judge and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
Judge Domagtoy was charged with 2 administrative case. First, Judge
Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga,
despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
According to Judge Domagtoy, he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his
first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years, and thereby giving rise to
the presumption that she is already dead. Second, it is alleged that he performed a
marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa.
RULING:
2. Yes, judge has authority to solemnize the marriage provided
that the solemnization is within the court’s jurisdiction except in cases
provided by the code.
The court ruled that according to by Articles 7 and 8 of the
Family Code, thus: "Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction. Art.
8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Therefore, Judge Domagtoy is authorize to solemnize
marriage but he performed the solemnization outside his jurisdiction,
hence the marriage of Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario is invalid.
ISSUE:
WON solemnizing marriage outside of the judge’s jurisdiction invalidates the
marriage.
FACTS:
Judge Salvador M. Occiano was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on
15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of Mercedita Mata Araes and to the
late Dominador B. Orobia. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000,
Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if Judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded. Before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him. Judge Occiano found out that the
requisite marriage license is not present. However, due to insist and earnest pleas of
Merceditas and Dominador, Judge Occiano proceeded to solemnize the marriage out
of human compassion. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render
the marriage void. When the parties failed to submit the required documents, Judge
Occiano followed it up but no response from them.
RULING:
Yes, solemnizing marriage outside of the judge’s jurisdiction invalidates
the marriage.
The court ruled that under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or
B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts
to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.
In the case at bar, Judge Occiano solemnized the marriage of Mercedita
Mata Araes and to the late Dominador B. Orobia in Nabua, a place which he has no
jurisdiction. Hence, marriage of Araes and Orobia is invalid.
ISSUE:
WON the solemnization falls within the exceptions under Art. 8
FACTS:
Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. is a judge of MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar. Judge Daguman solemnized marriage of Bernardito A. Yman
and Zenaida S. Beso in his residence in J.P.R Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar.
The case arises when Zenaida S. Beso abandoned by her husband right after their
marriage without any reason at all. (Zenaida went to the Civil Regisrar General of
Calbayog City to inquire regarding their marriage contract. To her surprise, their
marriage was not registered in the CRG. She then sent a letter to Judge Daguman to
inquire regarding the said marriage contract. That the reply of Judge Daguman to
her was all the copies of the marriage contract were taken by Bernardito and that no
copy of marriage contract was retained in his office. Zenaida then filed a case
against the Judge committed acts prejudicial to her interest, first, Solemnizing our
marriage outside his jurisdiction and second, Negligence in not retaining a copy and
not registering our marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Judge filed his Comment. In his Comment, the marriage was solemnized due to the
parties went directly to the residence of the judge urgently requesting the celebration
of the marriage right then and there. Also, they said that if they failed to marry that
day, Zenaida will be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license
would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice, etc. After the marriage, as
per the comment of Judge, all the documents pertaining to the marriage of the two
has been lost but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files,
all the three last copies of the certificate were missing. Hence, the marriage was not
filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General Calbayog City.
RULING:
No, the solemnization falls within the exceptions under Art. 8.
The court ruled that according to ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: 1.) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. In relation thereto,
Article 8 of the same statute mandates that the marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere also a marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote
places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In the case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman
was at the point of death or in a remote place. Therefore, the solemnization did not
fall within the exceptions under Art. 8
(36) Van Dorn v. Romillo, GR L-68470, Oct. 8, 1985
ISSUE:
WON the divorce obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines
FACTS:
Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972, that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that Van Dorn has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 8, 1983, Upton filed a suit against Van Dorn stating that Van Dorn’s
business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and asking that Upton be declared
with a right to manage the conjugal property. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein Upton had acknowledged that he and
Van Dorn had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Hence, this
petition.
RULING:
Yes, the divorce obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines on the
ground that Upton is an American citizen when the decree was obtained.
The cured ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Pursuant to
his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the provision of the validity of the divorce
wherein if a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Therefore, the divorce obtained abroad is valid.
(37) Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, GR 80116, June 30, 1989
ISSUE:
WON the divorce obtained by the alien spouse severed the marriage with the
Filipino spouse
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila with their only child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling.
On January 1983, Geiling filed for a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany
for such connubial disharmony and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On the other hand, on January 23, 1983, Pilapil file for a legal separation, support
and separation of property before RTC of Manila. On January 15, 1986, the
Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to Geiling.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two criminal case against Pilapil, alleging that while still married to
him Pilapil had an affair with 2 men sometime in 1983.
Pilapil filed for a petition for review to Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed.
The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief of State Prosecutor, inform the Fiscal
Prosecutor to inform his office, “if the accused have already been arraigned and if
not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. Sec. of Justice, Sedfrey A. Ordoñez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against Pilapil.
RULING:
Yes, the divorce obtained by the alien spouses severed the marriage with the Filipino
spouse. The court ruled that the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce
in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned. In the court
precedence in the Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., - It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Thus, pursuant to Geiling national law, he is no longer the husband of Pilapil. He
would have no standing to sue in the case against Pilapil.
(38) Garcia v. Recio, GR 138322, Oct. 2, 2001
ISSUE:
WON the divorce decree obtained capacitated Recio to remarry?
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, ]a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, the the Australian government issued a certificate to Recio for his
Australian citizen. On his subsequent marriage, Recio married Grace Garcia on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
They lived together in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, Garciar filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, allegedly Recio had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned about
the marriage of Recio with Samson on November 1997. Recio contented that he told
Garcia about his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had
irretrievably broken down.
RULING:
No, the divorce decree obtained did not capacitated Recio to remarry. The court
ruled that before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself, the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country. However appearance of the issued
divorce decree is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated, which contained restriction. That restriction did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Therefore, the divorce decree obtained did not capacitated Recio to remarry.
(39) Roehr v. Rodriguez, GR 142820, June 20, 2003
ISSUE:
WON a divorce decree obtained abroad settles issue on property and custody
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental. They have 2 children.
On August 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before RTC of Makati City. Roehr filed for a motion to dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration but the two motions were denied by the trial court. Then, Roehr
filed for petition for certiorari in CA. However, on 1998, the CA remanded the case
to the RTC.
On December 1997, Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997 and granted
the parental custody for their children to Roehr. Roehr filed for a Second Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as a
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving their marriage. Judge
Guevarra-Salonga granted the motion. Rodriquez filed for MR for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between Roehr and Rodriguez. However, Judge Guevarra-Salonga issued an order
partially setting aside her order for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
RULING:
No, divorce decree obtained abroad did not settles issue on property and custody.
The court ruled that it is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine
its efficacy. The court said that Rodriguez was not given enough representation in
the case in Germany, unlike Roehr, who were assisted by his 2 lawyers while
Rodriguez had none.
On the matter of custody of the children, the court ruled that as a general rule,
divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts. The parties must given ample
opportunity to do so on the grounds allowed down by Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
On the matter of property relations, both Roehr and Rodriguez have not acquired
any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage. This was admitted thru their pleadings submitted. Therefore, court has no
basis to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
(40) Amor Catalan v. CA, GR 167109, Feb. 6, 2007
ISSUE:
WON Orlando is capacitated to remarry
FACTS:
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan.Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16,
1988, Orlando married Merope Braganza in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol, Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
Orlando filed for a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as
Felicitas was not a real party-in-interest but it was denied. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Felicitas Orlando appealed before CA which reversed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition in SC.
RULING:
In this case, the divorce decree obtained by Felicitas and Orlando is lacking of
relevant information to prove their naturalization and divorce. The court stated that
there are two kinds of divorce decree that may be obtained abroad, the absolute
divorce and the limited divorce. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The court ruled that without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the
evidence, the court cannot rule on the issue of whether Felicidad has the personality
to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the
personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute. In such case, RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, one in Mabini, Pangasinan and Calasiao, Pangasinan between
Orlando.
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage. Therefore, the SC ruled that the case be remanded to trial
court for its proper disposition.
(41) Republic v. Iyoy, GR 152577, Sept. 21, 2005
ISSUE:
WON Fely was psychologically incapacitated to marry Crasus
FACTS:
On December 16, 1961, Crasus married Fely at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children who are now all
of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely
was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for
the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of Crasus. Barely a year after
Fely left for the U.S.A., Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Crasus learned, through
the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with
whom she eventually had a child. On 25 March 1997, a Complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage by Crasus filed before RTC. Crasus filed a complaint against
Fely for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger
and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC rendered judgment that the
marriage of Crasus and Fely is null and void. However, the OSG contended that the
decision promulgated by the trial court is contrary to law and evidence. Hence, OSG
filed an appeal with the CA. CA affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. Hence, this petition for certiorari in SC.
RULING:
No, Fely was no psychologically incapacitated to marry Crasus. The
court ruled that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Because the only substantial evidence
presented by Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving. The evidences presented by Crasus in court is
insufficient to satisfactorily established the alleged psychological incapacity of Fely.
Therefore, the SC finds Fely is psychological capacitated to marry Crasus on the
date of their marriage on December 16, 1961.
(42) Republic v. Orbecido, GR, 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
Republic v. Orbecido, GR, 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
WON Filipino spouse who later became naturalized can validly divorce the other
Filipino spouse
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady left for
the United States bringing along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley
and her child by him currently live in California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed then RTC granted the petition. Republic of the Philippines thru OSG filed for
reconsideration but it was denied. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a
valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and
not of judicial determination. But Cipriano insisted when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, hence he also can
remarry. Hence, this petition for review.
RULING:
Yes, a Filipino spouse who later became naturalized can validly divorce
the other Filipino spouse. The court ruled that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. That the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus, Filipino spouse who later became naturalized can validly divorce the
other Filipino spouse.
(44) Republic v. CA, GR 108763, Feb. 13, 1997
(43) Santos v. CA, GR 112019, Jan. 4, 1995
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
WON Reynaldo was psychologically incapacitated to marry Roridel
WON Julia was psychologically incapacitated to marry Leouel
FACTS:
FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Leouel and Julia first met in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be an eventful Church in Manila. That out of their marriage, they have a child named Albert Andre
day and that On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before MTC Judge Olaviano Molina . That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child; that the common child of
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Iloilo City. They have one child, name Leouel, Jr.
On August 16, 1990, Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for
However, the relationship of the two did not last long well, because of the frequent declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina on the ground of
interference of Julia’s parent in their family. On 18 May 1988, Julia left for the psychological incapacity; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. That Reynaldo had thus
Julia promised to get home after the expiration of her contract, but she never did. shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
When Leouel got a chance to go to US for the training of the Armed Forces of the obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who
Philippines, he desperately locate and get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were thought of himself as a king to be served.
of no avail.
On August 28, 1989, Reynaldo thru his Answer, admitted that he and Roridel
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the RTC of could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, and a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article misunderstandings and frequent quarrels.
36 of the Family Code". Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental. Julia thru her counsel opposed the complaint. On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
In court Julia manifested that she neither will appear nor submit evidence. The RTC void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
dismissed the case for insufficiency of non-forum shopping and its lack of merit. toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
But Leouel filed an appeal to CA. However, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The
petition was dismissed for RULING:
RULING: The court ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity. That this condition is the most serious cases of
No, Julia was psychologically capacitated to marry Leouel. The Family Code personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
Revision Committee interpret the provision of Article 36 of the Family Code on a give meaning and significance to the marriage This psychologic condition must
case-to-case basis. The court ruled that the deliberations of the Family Code exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. On the other hand, in the present case,
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity.
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such The court finds the petition as a mere showing of irreconciliable differences and
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Therefore,
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Reynaldo was psychologically capacitated to marry Roridel.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code which include
their mutual obligations to live together. Also, this pschologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Also, the court stated that Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
That our Constitution recognized marriage as a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law and that the state
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Hence, mere
allegations of Leouel against Julia cannot be allowed to null the marriage.
Therefore, Julia was psychologically capacitated to marry Leouel.
(45) Suazo v. Suazo, GR 164493, Mar. 10, 2010
ISSUE:
WON violence constitutes psychological incapacity
FACTS:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985. Soon
thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married
on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Binan. Without any
means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents
after their marriage. They stopped their schooling, then later Jocelyn took work for
Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work
and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another
woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
On October 8, 1997, ten years after their separation, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. Angelito did not answer the
petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination
with psychologist Nedy Tayag. The trial ensued. Thereafter, the petition of Jocelyn
is granted. However, People in behalf of the People of the Philippines, appealed to
CA. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision laid down by the RTC.
Hence, this petition to SC.
RULING:
No, violence does not constitute psychological incapacity. The court ruled that that
the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
is about to assume. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform
marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to
be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36.
(46) Alcazar v. Alcazar, GR 174451, Oct. 13, 2009
ISSUE:
WON sexual infidelity constitutes psychological incapacity
FACTS:
Veronica was married to Rey on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, Veronica and Rey lived for
five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of Rey
parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but Rey did not live with
Veronica at the latters abode in Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, Rey left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a
furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, he did not communicate with Veronica by
phone or by letter. When Rey came back from Riyadh, he did not come home to
Veronica’s house in Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parent’s
house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Then , Veronica traveled to Mindoro, where
she was informed that Rey had been living with his parents since his arrival in
March 2002. Veronica alleged that from the time Rey came back, the latter never
contacted her.
On 22 August 2002, Veronmica filed a Complaint against Rey for the annulment of
her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar invoking paragraph 5, Article 45 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). Trieal ensued in RTC. The trial court
dismissed the petition. Aggrieved Veronica field for an appeal in CA. However, CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, aggrieved Veronica filed for a
Petition for Certiorari in SC.
RULING:
The court ruled that Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to
copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of
the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. No evidence was
presented in the case at bar to establish that Rey was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica, where in fact, Veronica
admitted in the during the cross-examination that she and Rey had sexual
intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There
obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground
for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Hence, sexual infidelity does not
constitutes psychological incapacity.
(47) Go Tan v. Tan, GR 168852, Sept. 30, 2008
ISSUE:
WON parents-in-law may be included in a petition for TPO
FACTS:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.
[3]
Out of this union, two female children were born. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO), against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, [8] otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On On February 7, 2005, SPS. Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
covered by R.A. No. 9262. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of
the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-
known rule of law expressio unius est exclusioalterius.
RULING:
Yes, the parents-in-law may be included in a petition for TPO. The court ruled that the
principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said
law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily. Also, it must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another. Moreover, that the intention of R.A No. 9262 is the protection and safety
of victims of violence against women and children.
Therefore, the parents-in-law may be included in a petition for TPO.
(48) Ang v. CA, GR 182835, Apr. 20, 2010
ISSUE:
WON a dating relationship exists ?
FACTS:
Irish Sagud (Irish) and Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora
Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards
the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in
partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince
her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry.
Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other
woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone
numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish
replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
On June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a
picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on
the figure. The alleged number was one of the numbers used by Rustan. Irish got
another text message from Rustan, threatening the former to spread the picture he
sent through internet. Then, Irish sought the help of Vice Mayor who referred her to
the Police. Under Police supervision, Irish sent text messages to Rustan to meet her.
And he did. After parking the motorcycle, policemen intercept and arrested Rustan.
Policemen search him and seized his cellphone. The trial ensued.
RULING:
The court ruled that according to Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262, it provides that violence
against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he
has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating
relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over
time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus: "Dating
relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. In this case, Rustan claims
that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended
woman have or had sexual relations. Also, the dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved.
Therefore, a dating relationship exists.
(49) Ninal v. Bayadog, GR 133778, Mar. 14, 2000
ISSUE:
WON the five-year common-law cohabitation period should be without any legal
impediment to marry each other
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born namely the petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights.
Norma contended that the children of Pepito have no cause of action since they are
not among the party involved. The case was dismissed but the children of Pepito
filed motion for reconsiderations. Then the SC, reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the case because it grounded on a pure question of law.
RULING:
The court ruled that since the marriages of the two has been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. That a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 while Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and Norma’s marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. In this case, the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day, because Pepito was still married to Teodulfa and died,
only about for just 20 months. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. With the foregoing, that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
(50) De Castro v. De Castro, GR 160172, Feb. 13, 2008
ISSUE:
WON the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked
FACTS:
Reinnel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. Then, they
went back to Office of the Civil Registrar but the marriage license was already
expired. In order to go through with the plan, on March 13, 1995, they executed and
affidavit that they already living together as husband and wife for five years. Thus,
on the same date they got married with RTC Judge of Pasig City. Nevertheless, after
the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting Reinna. On 4
June 1998, Annabelle filed a complaint for support against Reinnel before RTC
Pasig City. In her complaint, Annabelle alleged that she is married to Reinnel and
that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her
as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.
However, Reinnel denied that he is married to Annabelle claiming that their
marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit. And
that he only signed the affidavit to save Annabelle from embarrassment because of
her pregnancy, and that he wasn’t able to get parental advice before he got married.
He also averred that they never lived as husband and wife and that he never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
RULING:
The trial court ruled that marriage of Reinnel and Annabelle is invalid because it
was solemnized without a valid marriage license, however, he is the real father of
the child Reinna Tricia, thus he is obliged to give her support. Reinnel elevated the
case to CA. CA declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity
of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon Reinnel
refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, Moreover, the
Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner,
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Hence, Reinnel filed for Petition for Review in
SC.
Yes, the court ruled that the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
In Ninal v. Bayadog the court held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
(51) Carlos v. Sandoval, GR 179922, Dec. 16, 2008
ISSUE:
WON nullity and annulment of a marriage can be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment or confession of judgment.
FACTS:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, TeofiloCarlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan DeDios Carlos.
The 3 parcels of land were transferred in the name of Teofilo Carlos. The 4 th parcel
of land in the name of Juan De Dios Carlos.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo’s
death, the 5th and 6th parcel of land were transferred in the name of wife, Felicidad
and their son Teofilo Carlos II.
In 1994, Juan De Dios Carlos instituted a suit against Felicidad before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. On September 17, 1994, the parties
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, Felicidad moved for summary
judgment. Juan De Dios Carlos opposed the Motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
Juan De Dios Carlos lodged his own motion for summary judgment. RTC denied the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Felicidad, but granted the Motion for Summary
Judgement of Juan Carlos.
Felicidad filed for an appeal in the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of
the CA. Hence, this petition.
RULING:
The court ruled that under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on March 15,
2003, the grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage. Therefore, the nullity and annulment
of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment
or confession of judgment.
(52) Braza v. Civil Registrar, GR 181174, Dec. 4, 2009 ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether prescription commences to run on the date of actual notice or from the
time marriage was registered with civil registry consistent with the rule on
WON the validity of marriage can be attacked in an action to correct entries in the constructive notice.
birth certificate
Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo),
also known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married. The union bore 3 children. On
April 15, 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina inquired for the
information made by Lucille. She found out that Patrick Alvin is the child of Pablo
with Lucille, also she found out that there was a marriage between Pablo and Lucille
on April 22, 1998. Ma. Cristina filed COE in the RTC of Negros Occidental.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid
and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo. On Patricks Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order [9] of September 6, 2007,
dismissed the petition without prejudice. Baza’s MR having denied by the Order,
she appealed the CA subsequently to SC. Hence, this petition for review.
RULING:
The validity of marriage cannot be attacked in an action to correct entries in the
birth certificate. The court ruled that in a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the
trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation. Further, the petition for nullity of marriage should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo. Hence, the validity of marriage
cannot be attacked in an action to correct entries in the birth certificate
(53) Sermonia v. CA, GR 109454, June 14, 1994