G.R. Nos.

L-10837-38 May 30, 1958

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE and SURETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff,

vs.
ISABEL IYA, ADRIANO VALINO and LUCIA VALINO, defendants.
Facts:
Valino & Valino were the owners and possessors of a house of strong materials in Rizal, which they purchased on
installment basis. To enable her to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, Valino filed a bond (P11,000) subscribed by
Associated Insurance and Surety Co Inc, and as a counter-guaranty, Valino executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the
aforementioned house in favour of the surety company. At the same time, the parcel of land which the house was erected
was registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation.
Valino, to secure payment of an indebtedness (P12,000) executed a real estate mortgage over the lot and the house in
favour of Iya.

Valino failed to satisfy her obligation to NARIC, so the surety company was compelled to pay the same pursuant to the
undertaking of the bond. In turn, surety company demanded reimbursement from Valino, and as they failed to do so, the
company foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the house. As a result, public sale was conducted and the property was
awarded to the surety company.

The surety company then learned of the existence of the real estate mortgage over the lot and the improvements thereon;
thus, they prayed for the exclusion of the residential house from the real estate mortgage and the declaration of its
ownership in virtue of the award given during bidding.

Iya alleged that she acquired a real right over the lot and the house constructed thereon, and that the auction sale
resulting from the foreclosure of chattel mortgage was null and void.
Surety company argued that as the lot on which the house was constructed did not belong to the spouses at the time the
chattel mortgage was executed, the house might be considered as personal property, and they prayed that the said building
be excluded from the real estate mortgage.
Issue:
There is no question over Iya’s right over the land by real estate mortgage; however, as the building instructed thereon has
been the subject of two mortgages, controversy arise as to which of these encumbrances should receive preference over
the other.
Held:
The building is subject to the real estate mortgage, in favour of Iya. Iya’s right to foreclose not only the land but also the
building erected thereon is recognised.
While it is true that real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Article 415), could
only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in view of the absence of any specific provision to
the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.

A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed
belongs to another.
In the case at bar, as personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage and as obviously the structure in
question is not one, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is clearly invalid and a nullity. While it is
true that said document was correspondingly registered in Chattel Mortgage Registry of Rizal, this act produced no effect
whatsoever, for where the interest conveyed is in the nature of real property, the registration of the document in the
registry of chattels is merely a futile act. Thus, the registration of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong materials
produced no effect as far as the building is concerned.

DAVAO SAW MILL vs. APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935

Facts:
Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands. However, the
land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a
building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the
conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between
the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the following provision: That on the expiration of the period
agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the party of the second part shall pass to the
exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings;
which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements.

In another action wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the
defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against the defendant; a writ of execution issued
thereon, and the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for
such properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff herein

It must be noted also that on number of occasion, Davao Sawmill treated the machinery as personal property by executing
chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such is the appellee by assignment from the original mortgages.

The lower court rendered decision in favor of the defendants herein. Hence, this instant appeal.

Issue:
whether or not the machineries and equipments were personal in nature.

Ruling/ Rationale:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner.

MCIAA vs Hrs. of Sero (551 SCRA 633)

This petition assails the May 12, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159, which reversed the June 14,
2001 and August 10, 2001 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. CEB-24012. Also
assailed is the September 12, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:

On July 6, 1999, respondents, through their attorney-in-fact Anecito Invento, filed a complaint against several defendants
for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of several Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), four of which are
registered in the names of the petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and the Republic. They
alleged that the subject properties were owned by their predecessor Ysabel Limbaga, but the Original Certificates of Title
were lost during the Second World War. Respondents alleged that the mother of therein defendants Ricardo Inocian, Emilia
I. Bacalla, Olympia I. Esteves and Restituta I. Montana pretended to be "Isabel Limbaga" and fraudulently succeeded in
reconstituting the titles over the subject properties to her name and in selling some of them to the other defendants. 2

It will be recalled that the subject properties were acquired by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) through
expropriation proceedings for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport,3 which was granted by the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. R-1881, on December 29, 1961. Subsequently, however, Lahug
airport was ordered closed on November 29, 1989,4and all its functions and operations were transferred to petitioner
MCIAA5 after its creation in 1990 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, otherwise known as the Charter of the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority.

In its Answer, petitioner denied the allegations in the complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses moved for
the dismissal of the complaint. Likewise, defendants Ricardo Inocian, Haide Sun and spouses Victor Arcinas and Marilyn
Dueñas filed their separate motions to dismiss.

On June 14, 2001, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the respondents had no cause of action, and that the
action was barred by prescription and laches.6 Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied; hence,
they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the Orders of the RTC. The appellate court held that the
complaint alleged "ultimate facts" constituting respondents' cause of action; that the respondents cannot be faulted for not
including therein "evidentiary facts," thus causing confusion or doubt as to the existence of a cause of action; and assuming
the complaint lacked some definitive statements, the proper remedy for the petitioner and other defendants should have
been a motion for bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss. Further, the determination of whether respondents have a
right to recover the ownership of the subject properties, or whether their action is barred by prescription
or laches requires evidentiary proof which can be threshed out, not in a motion to dismiss, but in a full-blown trial.7 The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders dated 14 June 2001 and 10 August 2001, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings. We are also directing the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 8 to REINSTATE the case, and to
conduct a TRIAL ON THE MERITS and thereafter render a decision.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 2006. 9Hence, this
Petition for Review based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER IN
CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-24012.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
LACHES AND THAT THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, HAS PRESCRIBED. 10

Respondents argue that the properties which were expropriated in connection with the operation of the Lahug Airport
should be reconveyed to the real owners considering that the purpose for which the properties were expropriated is no
longer relevant in view of the closure of the Lahug Airport.11

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its elements are the following:
(1) the legal right of plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right.12 The existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 13 Thus, in
the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint
must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based
upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally
partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.14

However, while a trial court focuses on the factual allegations in a complaint, it cannot disregard statutes and decisions
material and relevant to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court
must take judicial notice of decisions this Court has rendered as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,15 to
wit:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the decision of this Court in Mactan-Cebu
International Airport v. Court of Appeals ,16 rendered on November 27, 2000, which settled the issue of whether the
properties expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881 will be reconveyed to the original owners if the purpose for which it
was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than the expansion or improvement of the
Lahug airport.

In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 were clear and unequivocal. It granted
title over the expropriated land to the Republic of the Philippines in fee simple without any condition that it would be
returned to the owners or that the owners had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated
is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport. 17 When land has been acquired for
public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. 18

Had the appellate court considered the import of the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court of Appeals , it
would have found that respondents can invoke no right against the petitioner since the subject lands were acquired by the
State in fee simple. Thus, the first element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff's legal right, is not present in the instant case.
We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,19 concerning
still another set of owners of lands which were declared expropriated in the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881, but were
ordered by the Court to be reconveyed to their previous owners because there was preponderant proof of the existence of
the right of repurchase. However, we qualified our Decision in that case, thus:

We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and do not
overrule them. Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as regards the properties of respondent
Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, must be commensurate to the facts that were established
therein as distinguished from those extant in the case at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence,
while in the instant case we have preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase
in favor of petitioners.20 (Emphasis provided)

Thus, the determination of the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated but the public
purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsist, must rest on the character by which the titles thereof
were acquired by the government. If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition that it will be
returned to its former owner once that purpose is ended or abandoned, then the property shall be reconveyed to its
former owner when the purpose is terminated or abandoned. If, on the contrary, the decree of expropriation gives to the
entity a fee simple title, as in this case, then the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. Non-use of the
property for the purpose by which it was acquired does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired in the
expropriation proceedings.21

Even assuming that respondents have a right to the subject properties being the heirs of the alleged real owner Ysabel
Limbaga, they still do not have a cause of action against the petitioner because such right has been foreclosed by
prescription, if not by laches. Respondents failed to take the necessary steps within a reasonable period to recover the
properties from the parties who caused the alleged fraudulent reconstitution of titles.

Respondents' action in the court below is one for reconveyance based on fraud committed by Isabel Limbaga in
reconstituting the titles to her name. It was filed on July 6, 1999, or 38 years after the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881
granted the expropriation, or even longer if we reckon from the time of the fraudulent reconstitution of titles, which date is
not stated in the complaint but presumably before the complaint for expropriation was filed by CAA on April 16, 1952. 22

An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name.23 However, such action must be filed within 10 years from the issuance of the title since the
issuance operates as a constructive notice.24 Thus, the cause of action which respondents may have against the petitioner
is definitely barred by prescription.

Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
action is already barred by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Further, contrary to respondents' claim
that a complaint may not be dismissed based on prescription without trial, an allegation of prescription can effectively be
used in a motion to dismiss when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has prescribed 25 at the time it was
filed.

Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato:26

We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the
parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to
dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment
on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to
repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily
apparent on the record: either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence.27 (Citations omitted) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, although the complaint did not state the date when the alleged fraud in the reconstitution of titles was
perpetuated, it is however clear from the allegations in the complaint that the properties sought to be recovered were
acquired by the petitioner in Civil Case No. R-1881 which was granted by the trial court on December 29, 1961. Clearly, the
filing of the action in 1999 is way beyond the ten 10 year prescriptive period.

Further, while it is by express provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may
be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.28 The negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned it or declined to assert
it also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a
court of equity.29

Respondents' inaction for a period of 38 years to vindicate their alleged rights had converted their claim into a stale
demand. The allegation that petitioner employed threat or intimidation is an afterthought belatedly raised only in the Court
of Appeals. As such it deserves scant attention.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The May 12, 2006 Decision and September 12,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 dated June 14, 2001 and August 10, 2001 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, dismissing
respondent's complaint for reconveyance on grounds of lack of cause of action, prescription and laches and denying the
motion for reconsideration, respectively, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake
and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such
municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
 Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within
their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay
was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives
a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
“foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of
the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually
at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp
or berm.(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen
the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That
Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and
null and void.

Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the
properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the
commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in
Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property
has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation
arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation
and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted
to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And
the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not
apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The
opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body
of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of
lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

G.R. No. L-17985 September 29, 1962

GIL SAN DIEGO and RUFINA SAN DIEGO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et al., respondents.
Isidro T. Almeda for petitioners.
Jose P. Osorio for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Presented before us in this petition for mandamus is the peculiar case of party-defendants insisting on, and prevailing
party-plaintiffs resisting, the execution of a final and executory decision.

To understand this peculiarity, we will state briefly facts leading to the controversy.

After trial in Civil Case No. 770 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on complaint of Jose, Maria and Urbano all
surnamed "de la Cruz", to recover a parcel of land and damages from Gil San Diego and Rufino San Diego, the Court (Hon.
Jesus Y. Perez, presiding) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby rendered considers judgment as follows:

(a) Declaring the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, null and void;

(b) Ordering the defendants and third-party plaintiffs to vacate the land in question upon payment to them by the
plaintiffs and third-party defendants, within thirty (30) days after this decision has become final, of the sum of
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00);

(c) Dismissing the counterclaim of the third-party defendants; and

(d) No pronouncement as to costs.

The court found that the disputed portion of a parcel of land belonged to the plaintiffs through hereditary succession; that
the defendants built a house on the land in good faith, having acquired the land from Catalina Anastacio, mother of the
plaintiffs, by purchase for P1,000.00. During the proceedings, the defendants filed a third-party complaint against said
vendor. The vendor (mother of plaintiffs) subsequently died; hence, herein respondent who were the plaintiffs, became at
the same time third-party defendants in substitution of their deceased mother. The court voided the sale on the ground
that the vendor had no right to the land, but upheld the defense of defendants as builders in good faith.

On appeal by the plaintiffs and third-party defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the lower court's decision, and
the same, thereafter, became final and executory. Over two years later, the defendants and third party plaintiffs, who were
in possession of the parcel of land in litigation, moved to execute paragraph (b) of the aforequoted dispositive portion of
the decision in order to collect the sum of P3,500.00 and thereafter to vacate the premises. The motion was denied by the
court (Hon. Agustin P. Montesa presiding), and a motion for reconsideration was likewise of no avail Hence, the instant
petition for mandamus was filed to compel the respondent judge to issue the writ applied for. 1awphîl.nèt

Petitioners' argument is that the pertinent part of the dispositive portion of the decision ordains, first, that they vacate the
land, and second, that the plaintiffs pay P3,500.00 within 30 days after this decision becomes final,
 with the connecting preposition "upon" unmistakably denoting that the second (payment of indemnity) is a
condition precedent to the first (vacation of the premises). (Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 5)

They hold the view that the respondents should pay them first before they vacate, and not vice-versa; and that they are
entitled now to insist on the payment through a writ of execution.

Respondents, upon the other hand, contend:

(1) That petitioners have no right to the writ of execution, because as absolute owners of the land, the
respondents have the right, under Article 448, to exercise the option to either pay the value of improvements or
demand reasonable rent if respondents do not choose to appropriate the building;

(2) That in fact respondents have elected to demand payment of rentals on land actually occupied by petitioners'
building at TEN PESOS a month, and made a demand therefor immediately after the finality of the Court of Appeals
decision, because the amount of P3,500.00 is exorbitant, so that the land owners choose to allow petitioners to
remain on the land;

(3) That respondents have long suggested to petition that a commissioner be appointed to assess the present fair
market value of the building, taking depreciation into account; and

(4) That the denial of the motion for execution is justified because it is premature and has no legal basis.

We find the petition meritorious. The judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and now final, explicitly ordains the
payment by the respondents de la Cruz of the amount of P3,500.00 "within 30 days after this decision becomes final" to
petitioners San Diego. If it also orders petitioners to vacate only upon the payment, it did so in recognition of the right of
retention granted to possessor in good faith by Article 546 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This provision is expressly
made applicable to builders in good faith (Article 448). The right of retention thus granted is merely a security for the
enforcement of the possessor's right to indemnity for the improvement comments made by him. As a result, the possessor
in good faith, in retaining the land and its improvements pending reimbursement of his useful expenditures, is not bound
pay any rental during the period of retention; otherwise the value of his security would be impaired (cf. Tufexis vs. Chunaco
(C.A.), 36 O.G. 2455).

Normally, of course, the landowner has the option to either appropriate the improvement or to sell the land to the
possessor. This option is no longer open to the respondent landowners because the decision in the former suit limits them
to the first alternative by requiring t petitioner's to vacate the land (and surrender the improved comments) upon payment
of P3,500.00. Evidently, the Courts of First Instance and of Appeals opined that the respondents suit to recover the
property was an exercise their right to choose to appropriate the improvements and pay the indemnity fixed by law. The
respondents acquiesced in this view, since they did not ask for a modification of the judgment, and allowed it to become
final. Consequently, they can no longer insist on selecting another alternative; nor can they be heard now to urge that the
value of the indemnity, set at P3,500.00, is exorbitant for the same reason that the judgment fixing that amount is no
longer subject to alteration.

The judgment ordering payment to petitioners of P3,500.00, by way of indemnity, having become final, and the 30 days for
its payment having elapsed, the court of first instance has the ministerial duty to order its execution (Zulueta vs. Paredes,
62 Phil. 5; Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. 759; Amor vs. Jugo, 17 Phil. 703; Viquiera vs. Baraña 78 Phil. 456). That duty is
compellable by mandamus; and the execution is leviable on any property of respondents de la Cruz, including the land now
in question and its improvements.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is ordered to issue the writ of
execution in favor of petitioners. Costs against respondent de la Cruz.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

BALLATAN v. CA

-Land Owner in Good faith, Builder in Good faith scenario -The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or
selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the owner.
-If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.

FACTS:

Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 24. Respondent Winston Go is
living in and registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao is living in and the registered owner of Lot. 27. The
Lots are adjacent to each other.

When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining
house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. She was informed by
her contractor of this discrepancy, who then told respondent Go of the same. Respondent, however, claims that his house
was built within the parameters of his father’s lot; and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized
surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA). Petitioner called the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter
authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey twice which led to the
conclusion that Lots Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go) and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao) moved westward to the eastern
boundary of Lot 24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.) –(it was later on discovered by the courts that Go encroached 42 square
meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of which were in GOOD
FAITH) Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their improvements and since the latter
wasn’t answering the petitioner filed accion publiciana in court. Go’s filed their “Answer with Third-Party Complaint”
impleading as third party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to demolish their improvements and pay damages to Petitioner
but dismissing the third-party complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third party-complaint as to AIA but reinstated the
the complaint against Yao and the Engineer. CA also affirmed the demolition and damages awarded to petitioner and added
that Yao should also pay respondent for his encroachment of respondent Go’s property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to
pay attorney’s fees for his negligence which caused all this fuzz.

ISSUE: What is the proper remedy in this situation (everyone was in good faith)?

RULING:

Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages). It was established in the case that the
parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of them were builders in Good faith. In that
scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the land owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige
the builders to buy the land given that the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings or tree; other wise
the owner may remove the improvements thereon.

The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the
building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the
parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose
between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower
stands, is given to the owner. If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value
at the time of payment.

Petitioner was given by SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which right to exercise. Likewise, Go was also given time to
do the regarding Yao’s encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay attorney’s fees.

TUATIS V. ESCOL (2009)

G.R. No. 175399
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Tuatis filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against herein respondent Visminda Escol (Visminda).
Tuatis alleged in her Complaint that sometime in November 1989, Visminda, SELLER, and Tuatis, BUYER, entered into a Deed
of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment (Deed of Sale by Installment) . The subject matter of said Deed was a
piece of real property, A 300 sq. m more or less situated in Poblacion, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte . The significant
portions of the Deed of Sale by Installment stated that the BUYER shall pay the SELLER the amount of P 3,000 as
downpayment, P 4,000 on or before December 31, 1989, remaining balance of P 3,000 shall be paid on or before January 31,
1990 and that the failure of the BUYER to pay the remaining balance within the period stipulated , the BUYER shall return the
subject of the contract to the SELLER and the SELLER shall likewise return all the amount paid by the BUYER.

Tuatis claimed that of the entire purchase price of P10,000.00, she had paid Visminda P3,000.00 as downpayment. The
exact date of said payment was not, however, specified. In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject
property and constructed a residential building thereon amounting to P502,073.00

Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject property, but the latter refused,
contending that the purchase price had not yet been fully paid.
Visminda countered that, except for the P3,000.00 downpayment and P1,000.00 installment paid by Tuatis on 19 December
1989 and 17 February 1990, respectively, Tuatis made no other payment to Visminda. Despite repeated verbal demands,
Tuatis failed to comply with the conditions that she and Visminda agreed upon in the Deed of Sale by Installment for the
payment of the balance of the purchase price for the subject property. Visminda asked the court to dismiss Tuatis'
Complaint, or in the alternative, order Tuatis to return the subject property to Visminda after Visminda's reimbursement of
the P4,000.00 she had received from Tuatis.

ISSUES:

WHETHER SELLER CAN BE COMPELLED TO EXECUTE A DEED OF CONVEYANCE FOR THE PORTION OF LAND ENTERED INTO A
CONTRACT OF SALE ON INSTALLMENT BY THE BUYER

WHETHER THE SELLER HAS AN OPTION TO BE APPROPRIATE THE BUILDING THAT THE BUYER BUILT ON THE LAND OF THE SELLER
OR TO BE INDEMNIFIED OF THE VALUE OF THE LAND WHERE THE BUILDING IS BUILT BY THE SELLER

HELD:

1.No, There is breach of the contract of sale on installment entered between the parties. The SELLER cannot be compelled to
execute the Deed of Conveyance to the BUYER since the SELLER is still the absolute owner of the property and she is not
indemnified of the exact payment from the BUYER.

2. Yes the SELLER has the option to be appropriate the building or to be indemnified of the value of the land provided such
value is not more than the value of the building. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because
his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing . BUYER
constructed the building in bad faith for, she had knowledge of the fact that the SELLER is still the absolute owner of the
subject land. There was bad faith also on the part of SELLER in accordance with the express provisions of Article 454 since
she allowed BUYER to construct the building without any opposition on her part and so occupy it. The rights of the parties
must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code will apply. The owner of
the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder
or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.

LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ
GR L-12486 31 AUG 1960

Facts:

The herein Petitioners were sued by Bongato and Sanchez for the recovery of 87 square meters of residential land which
they have inherited as the children of the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia. The former were ordered by the to vacate
and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually
vacate the same, plus attorney's fees and costs.

The Petitioners alleged that the said property became a subject of a cadastral survey due to conflicts and overlapping of
boundaries. In that survey, Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and that of Isidaria
Trillo, their predecessor in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138) covers
295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only
230 square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the latter area properly belongs to respondents and that the land in
question is part of the adjoining land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their predecessor in interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contiguous land of petitioners' predecessor in
interest?

Held:

Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous or that it included part
of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as part of the lot now covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-72 (138). Note that the difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the resurvey plan
is 65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And what is more, the alleged sketch plan of
the resurvey was not presented in evidence.

Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the Torrens title issued way
back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. Said title has not been contested up to the present, and,
therefore, has become inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a
Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be
impugned (Reyes, et al. vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs. Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Court of
Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article
448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as
his own faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary and
useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the
price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of
petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that
part of their land on which stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents
to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the
whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to
petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or
unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige
petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be
the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the
lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448 of the new).

DEPRA v. DUMLAO

FACTS:

Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao built his house on his own
land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depra’s property. Upon finding this, Depra’s mom ordered Dumlao to
move back from his encroachment, then subsequently filed an action for unlawful detainer against Dumlao.

The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay rent (PhP5.00/month) – forced
lease between the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals so Dumlao deposited this with the MTC. Neither party
appealed judgment so this became final and executory.

1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this, stating that the suit is barred by
res judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real property –
only the CFI has jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to the case at bar?

2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments by the court (with both LO and BPS being in
good faith)?

HELD:

In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first case be one for ejectment and the other for quieting of title.
Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the land owner has 2 options – to buy the building or to sell/rent his land. This is
so because the rights of the owner of the land is older, and by the principle of accession, he also has a right to the
accessories.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of the land, the expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao),
the increase in value of the land, and whether the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the kitchen built
on it. The RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to exercise such option.

FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.

[G.R. No. L-1281, September 29, 1959]
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Maniladated May 10, 1957 (a) declaring the Sheriff’s
certificate of sale covering aschool building sold at public auction null and void unless within 15
daysfrom notice of said order the successful bidders, defendants-appellantsspouses Maria Garcia Timbang and Marcelino
Timbang, shall pay to, appelleeMaria Gervacio Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum of P5,750.00 that the
spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the
Sheriff'ssale; (b) declaring the other appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. owner of 24,500/3,285,934 undivided interest in Lot
No. 2-a covered by certificate of tile No 45970, on which the building sold in the auction sale is situated; and© ordering the
sale in public auction of the said undivided interest of theFilipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a aforementioned to satisfy the
unpaidportion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and against FilipinasColleges, Inc. in the amount of P8,200.00 minus
the sum of P5,750.00mentioned in (a) above. The order appealed from is the result of threemotions filed in the court a
quo in the course of the execution of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2 cases appealed to it in whichthe
spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blaswere the parties. The Timbang spouses presented
their opposition to eachand all of this motion. In assailing the order of the court a quo directing theappellants to pay
appellee Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00) made
atthe public auction, appellants' counsel has presented a novel, albeitingenious, argument. They contend that since the
builder in good faith hasfailed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised theiroption under Article 448
of the Civil Code, the builder has lost his right andthe appellants as owners of the land automatically became the
owners ipsofacto.
ISSUE/S:
1.Whether or not the contention of the appellants is valid. If not, whatare the remedies left to the owner of the land if the
builder fails topay?2.Whether or not the appellants, as owner of the land, may seekrecovery of the value of their land by a
writ of execution; levy thehouse of the builder and sell it in public auction.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS.
There is nothingin the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify theconclusion of appellants that,
upon the failure of the builder to pay the valueof the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter
becomesautomatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. Although it istrue, it was declared therein that in
the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, thebuilder’s right
of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless therewas nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder
loses entirely allrights over his own building. The remedy left to the parties in sucheventuality where the builder fails to pay
the value of the land, though the Code is silent on this Court, a builder in good faith not be required to payrentals. He has
right to retain the land on which he has built in good faithuntil he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him.
Possibly he might bemade to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not toappropriate the improvement and
requires the builder in good faithto pay for the land but that the builder is unwilling or unable to
paythe land, and then they decide to leave things as they are andassume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they
disagreeas to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix thatamount.
This was ruled in the case of
Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil.,801. A further remedy is indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan,supra, where
this Court approved the sale of the land and the improvementin a public auction applying the proceeds thereof first to the
payment of thevalue of the land and the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of thehouse in payment thereof.
The second contention was without merit.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appelleeBlas is entitled to the payment of the
unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. With respect to the order of the court declaring
appelleeFilipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land to the extent of the value of itspersonal properties sold at public
auction in favor of the Timbang, this Courtlikewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents, in effect,
apartial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses topay to the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas
said sum of P5,750.00 withinfifteen (15) days from notice of the final judgment, an order of executionshall issue in favor of
Maria Gervasio Blas to be levied upon all properties of the Timbang spouses not exempt from execution for the satisfaction
of thesaid amount.

DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA

When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated, Article 448 governs in case real property (like a
house) encroaches the land of another. This is provided that good faith exists.

FACTS:

The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City. Plaintiff
owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square meters (which is about the
size of a typical Starbux café)

Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square meters went to the plaintiffs and
15 square meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the house of the defendants
occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate
who should take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for
the portion of defendant’s house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of
the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership should govern, and not that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching
the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family home, hence they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.

ISSUE:

w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that used to be co-owned, but was subdivided.

HELD:

The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448 therefore
governs. The house of Defendant overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence, the plaintiffs have the
right to choose one of two options

> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after indemnifying the Defendants; or
> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home rested. ( or they can rent it)

TECHNOGAS PHIL. v. CA

FACTS

Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and improvements including the wall which encroached that of the
defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment, petitioner offered to buy the land but defendant refused.

After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the wall (but the case did not state what happened to
this agreement, my assumption is that it did not happen due to conflicts that arose after)
Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint re
the action and a separate criminal action of malicious mischief (which the wife was convicted of)

RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that respondent wants to have the wall demolished.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because it is 'presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.'
B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a proper remedy
C. Whether or not respondent can opt to demolish the structure without exercising the option to sell the land to the
petitioner and the latter cannot do buy the same

RULING: Petition was granted.

Good faith or Bad Faith – No such doctrinal statement that supports that the knowledge of metes and bounds of a land due
to the Torrens system would amount to bad faith if there was encroachment on the land of another.

A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even the respondent did not knew about the
encroachment until he has hired a surveyor.

B. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the
title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. And possession in good faith does not lose this character
except when the possessor is aware of this impropriety.

C. The encroachment was very narrow which can be considered as a mere error. Remedy – the petitioner, despite being a
purchaser of the original builder, can compel the landowner to either buy the property or sell the piece of land because:

1. He was really unaware of the encroachment basing on the fact presented by both sides.
2. When the petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the rights of the original owner (hence, the right to compel
the LO to buy or sell is also transferred)

Estoppel – Petitioner is not considered in estoppel only because it has previously agreed to demolish a part of the wall.
Rather, it was to be negotiated by the parties concern. In the meantime, petitioner has to pay the rent for the property
occupied by its building only up to the date when respondent serves notice of their option. Case remanded back to the trial
court for determination of the value of the land and the number of days to allot for the respondent to choose an option.

SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.

500 SCRA 406 (2006)

That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the
preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.

Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to
certain lots registered in its name. It eventually withdrew the applicationand filed a petition for registration over the same
foreshore land with the then Court of First Instanceof Iloilo. The case was, however, archived as WESVICO‘s representative
could no longer be contacted, and later on, WESVICO has ceased operations.

F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City a foreshore lease application over a foreshore land, a
portion of which is adjacent to the lot previously occupied by WESVICO. Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN) purchased the
properties previously owned by WESVICO from the Development Bank of the Philippines. It subsequently filed a foreshore
lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP.

Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore lease application overlapped
that covered by its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of
the property adjoining the overlapping area, it should be given preference in its lease.

F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given preferential right since the area in dispute is classified as ―reclaimed‖ and
that the ownership was not by means of accretion. This argument has been sustained by the Land Management Bureau.

Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN was upheld, declaring that there was no basis to declare the area as
―reclaimed‖. F.F. Cruz however appealed to the Office of the President which overturned the decision of the DENR
Secretary and found that the area is reclaimed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, the present
petition. SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is foreshore land and not
reclaimed land which thus entitles it preferential rights over the

ISSUES:

Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or ―reclaimed‖ area

HELD:

That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the
preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.
It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed foreshore area into existence. Such foreshore
area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the
action of the sea.‖ Following Santulan, the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same.

Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the appellate court, littoral owner WESVICO cannot be
considered to have waived or abandoned its preferential right to lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed
an application for registration thereover. For being a part of the public domain, ownership of the area could not be
acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right remained, however. Its move to have the contested land titled in its name, albeit
a faux pas, in fact more than proves its interest to utilize it.

As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO‘s petition for registration which, as stated earlier, was archived by the trial
court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would not have been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease application.
Parenthetically, the petition for registration of WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest but because it
ceased operations due to financial reasons.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC

Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain, even if the accretion results from rivers emptying into the
sea. It cannot be registered.

FACTS:

Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on
the northern section of his existing property. His current registered property is bounded on the east by Talisay River, on
the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of
constantly flowing water, extra land of about 17hectares (that’s about the size of Disney Park!) formed in the northern most
section of the property. It is this property he sought to register.

The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of public domain (remember, accretion
formedby the sea is public dominion). His Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted registry again,
claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian
owner. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.

Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the same application, stating the he leased
part of the property sought to be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso
was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a
portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his original land registration
case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.

On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed
the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request. Pascual’s heirs
appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted petition for registration! The reason? The
accretion was caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies in the fact
that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry moved for
reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and hence, public domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the
Director and the Government.

The matter went to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be registered under the Torrens system.

HELD:

It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying
that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457:
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If there’s any land to be claimed, it
should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river bank
may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as it
remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and declared as private property capable of
alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or
for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be allowed.

IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO

108 SCRA 335

FACTS

Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of
accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application
holding that said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain

HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea
form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the
legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said land is no longer necessary
for public use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.

SIARI VALLEY ESTATE INC. V. FILEMON LUCASAN

If the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share.

FACTS:

Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven from its lands to that of Lucasan’s. Lucasan
however argued that although there was commixtion of cattle, Siari already retrieved its animals. The CFI of Zamboanga
decided in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucasan was in bad faith thus should lose his share in the commixtion

HELD: YES

Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing animals were taken by Lucasan or his men, on 2 occasions
however, his men drove away 30 heads of cattle. It is not erroneous to believe that the others must have also been driven
away applying by analogy the principle that one who stole a part of the stolen money must have taken also the larger sum
lost by the offended party.

Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that “if the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it
will lose his share” thus since Lucasan is in bad faith, he should lose his share in the commixtion.

> The SC ordered Lucasan to deliver the 321 heads that had been entrusted to his care to Siari; pay damages for the 400
heads he sold since 1946; ordered to allow Siari to round up all the buffaloes that may be found on its cattle ranch

HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC

FACTS:
 At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children Esteban, Balbina
and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the said Lot to his name alone without regards to the other predecessors-in-
interests. The respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they as well as their predecessors-in-
interests had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
According to the appellate court, “the fact that petitioners have in their possession certificates of title which apparently
bear out that it was Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein has no discrediting effect
upon plaintiffs’ claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of
the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in the
names of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco.
2. Whether or not laches has set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666.
RULING:
First Issue:
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on
tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac. The
credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by
the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court. Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove
ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is
legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of
ownership.
Second Issue:
Petitioners aver that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter
57 years to bring the present action. When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a
constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the
present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held
the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to
enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe. Because laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud and injustice. Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has
been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

VDA. DE AVILES v. CA

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.

FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands from their
parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square
meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo
Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.

Defendant’s land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square
meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.

The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo
Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square
meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the
peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant said that he merely
reconstructed the same.

Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action

RULING:

No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet
the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein.

Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a “cloud” to
their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and
in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were
properly measured.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners
should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed
in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in
which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

HULST VS. PR BUILDERS

Petitioner: Jacobus Bernhard Hulst

Respondents: PR Builders

FACTS:
a) Jacobus Bernhard and his wife, both Dutch nationals entered into a contract to sell with PR Builders for the
purchase of 210 sq m residential unit in Laurel, Batangas. b) PR Builders failed to comply with their verbal promise
to complete the project by June, and the petitioner filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages, and attorney's fees. c) The HLURB Arbiter
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Ex-Officio Sheriff of Batangas to execute his judgment. d) They require the
Sheriff to levy first on respondents personal property but unsatisfied so the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15
parcel of land. e) The respondent filed an urgent motion to Quash the Writ of levy on the ground that the Sheriff
made an overlevy since the aggregate value of the property at 6500/sqm is P83,616,000 which was over and
above the judgment award. f) The Sheriff continue the auction and the 15 parcel of land was sold to Holly
Properties Realty Corporation for the amount of 5,450,653. g) The sum 5,313,040 was turned to petitioner in
satisfaction of his judgment award after deducting all the legal fees. h) The HLURB Arbiter and Director authorized
the Sheriff to set aside the levy of the said property because of its inadequacy of the price.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the contract to sell between Hulst and PR Builders is valid. 2) Whether or not the Sheriff made a
mistake in valuing the said properties in a public auction. 3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in affirming the HLURB order in setting aside the levy made by Sheriff on the said property.

RULING OF SUPREME COURT:

1) No. The contract to sell between Hulst and PR Builders is NULL and VOID. According to Sec.7 Art. XII of 1987
Constitution, "no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of public domain". Since the petitioner and his wife are Dutch
nationals, they are disqualified to acquire private lands. The petitioner is entitled only to recover what he has paid
so he must return to respondent the amount P2,125,540 without interest in excess to the proceeds of the auction
sale. A void contract is equivalent to nothing, it produces no civil effect.
2) No. The Sheriff was left to his own judgment. Art.1470 states that, "Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a
contract of sale", but where the price is so low as to be shocking to the conscience of man, the levy on said
property made by Sheriff was hereby set aside by the Court.

3) Yes. Gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale when the law gives the owner the right to
redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the
owner to effect redemption. Thus, the respondent stood to gain rather than to be harmed by the low sale of
property. Also the Sheriff complied with the requisites given by the court to "sell only a sufficient portion of levied
properties as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees" which was satisfied in the auction. The
HLURB had no factual basis to determine the value of levied property and the Sheriff was left to his own judgment.
He exercise it with care to satisfy the purposes of writ. The Court of Appeals decided that the petition against the
setting aside of Sheriff's levy by HLURB Arbiter and Director was NULL and VOID and they are directed to issue the
certificates of sale in favor with the winning bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation.

MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO GR NO. 120864 October 8, 2003

Facts: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by PrimitivaLejano and LorenzaAraniego. The one
half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later purchased by plaintiff from his father TeofiloAbejo, the only
heir of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by the heirs
of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to
possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein despite the expiration of the lease contract and several
demands to vacate by TeofiloAbejo and by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo.Abejo filed a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence of the judicial or
extrajudicial partition of the fishpond.

Issue: Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner?Whether Abejo was entitled to rent?

Held: Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Article
487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds
of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a
third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership
of the property. However, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff
cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as a co-owner he has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease
agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to
lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The Lejano Heirs and TeofiloAbejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired
in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO
vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADAFacts:
The heirs of Enrique Santos filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or
AccionReinvindicatoria
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City againstthe
Iglesia Ni Cristo
(INC). They allege that during his lifetime of Enrique Santos, hewas the owner of a 936-square-meter parcel of land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon
City.He had been in possession of the owner’s duplicate of said title and had been in
continuous, open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property. When he died, theycontinued to be in possession of the property.Sometime in
February 1996, heirs of santos learned that INC was claimingownership over the property. They alleged that Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, andhis
heirs, after his death, never encumbered or disposed the property.In 1996, Santos had the property fenced but Iglesia ni Cristo deprived them of the
finaluse and enjoyment of their property.Only one of co-owners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or AccionPubliciana before the RTC, Quezon City.
A motion to dismiss was filed alleging thatthere was no showing that he was authorized to do so by the other co-owners and theaction had already
prescribed.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BYENRIQUE G. SANTOS ALONE IS SUBSTANTIAL2. WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF
RESPONDENT ENRIQUE G. SANTOS TOREPRESENT HIS CO-HEIRS IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT ISNEEDED3. WHETHER THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE AND/OR ACCIONREINVINDICATORIA HAS PRESCRIBED.
HELD:
1. YES.Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petitionhave been made in good faith or are true and correct, not
merely speculative. The Court appliedthe rule on substantial compliance because of the commonality of interest of all the parties withrespect to the
subject of the controversy. As such heirs, they are considered co-owners proindiviso of the whole property since no specific portion yet has been
adjudicated to any of theheirs. Consequently, as one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G.Santos in the verification and
certification is sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance of thecase.2. NO. SC ruled that on the issue of the authority of Enrique G. Santos to represent
hisco-heirs/co-plaintiffs, it finds no necessity to show such authority. Respondents herein areco-owners of the subject property. As such co-owners,
each of the heirs may properlybring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for therecovery of possession of the subject
properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such anaction, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit isdeemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.3. NO. Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property whenthey filed their complaint against
petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive periodfor the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was ableto secure
TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984.

G.R. No. 156402 February 13, 2006

SPS. ALFREDO MENDOZA and ROSARIO F. MENDOZA, Petitioners,

vs.
MARIA CORONEL, represented by JUANITO CORONEL, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

On appeal are the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) May 30, 2002 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and November 12, 2002
Resolution,2 reversing the September 17, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case
No. 458-M-2001. The RTC of Malolos ruled that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hagonoy, Bulacan, before which
respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners, had no jurisdiction to decide the case for failure of respondent to
implead her co-owners of the disputed property, the latter being indispensable parties to the ejectment suit.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Maria Coronel is one of the co-owners of Lots 3250 and 3251 located at Sagrada Familia, Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Petitioners, spouses Alfredo and Rosario Mendoza, occupied said lots upon tolerance of respondent and her co-owners
without paying any rent. When respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, the latter refused. Thus, on
December 27, 2000, respondent filed a case before the MTC of Hagonoy, Bulacan for unlawful detainer against petitioners.
The MTC ruled in favor of respondent, ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed lots. The dispositive portion of its May 29,
2001 Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all those claiming rights
under them:

(1) to vacate the subject premises (lots 3250 and 3251) and to surrender possession of the same to plaintiff[;]

(2) to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and to pay a monthly
rental of ₱500 from receipt of this decision until they shall have vacated the subject premises; and

(3) to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan which ruled in their favor. It annulled and set aside the appealed
decision for want of jurisdiction of the MTC. It held that the co-owners of the subject lot should have been impleaded as
indispensable parties.

On appeal to the CA, respondent was successful as the appellate court reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and
revived the decision of the MTC dated May 29, 2001. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this appeal.5

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. The lower court erred in ruling that a co-owner can bring an action in ejectment without impleading his co-
owners, relying on an "Errata for pages 38-39 of Volume 280 SCRA," which appears to alter the original tenor of
the ruling in Arcelona vs. CA that co-owners are indispensable parties.

II. The lower court erred in not taking into account that the complaint was filed by an attorney-in-fact authorized
by only one of the co-owners to file the ejectment suit.

III. The lower court erred in allowing the petition for review despite the fact that the certification against forum-
shopping was executed by an attorney-in-fact, in violation of the requirement that parties must personally sign
the same.
The main issue in the case at bar is whether any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

The CA is correct in overruling the RTC. The latter court held that in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,6 we held that a co-
owner cannot maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners, the latter being indispensable parties.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA pointed out that the RTC relied on the uncorrected Arcelona decision.The RTC
overlooked the fact that the decision has been corrected by an "ERRATA for pages 38-39" appearing on the second leaf of
volume 280 of the SCRA. Thus, the CA held:

Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It
was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners.

The foregoing statement was deleted and replaced with the following:

In the past, a co-owner could not even maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. . .

While Article 487 of the Civil Code now provides that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," former
Chief Justice Moran also stressed that all of them are necessary and proper parties . . .

We reiterate the Arcelona ruling that the controlling law is Article 487 of the Civil Code which categorically states:

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi7 which held that an action for
ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. As explained by Tolentino, the law now allows a co-owner to bring an
action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.8

We also reject petitioners’ second and third assignment of errors. Petitioners claim that Juanito Coronel, attorney-in-fact
of Maria Coronel, one of the co-owners of the lots in dispute is not authorized to file the ejectment suit. They insist that he
should have obtained the authority and consent of all the co-owners. But since Article 487 of the Civil Code authorizes any
one of the co-owners to bring an action for ejectment and the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all, without
the other co-owners actually giving consent to the suit, it follows that an attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff co-owner does not
need authority from all the co-owners. He needs authority only from the co-owner instituting the ejectment suit.

We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is
not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority
to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of
Attorney, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court9 includes the representative of the
owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners’ appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 30, 2002 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and
November 12, 2002 Resolution, reversing the September 17, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
Civil Case No. 458-M-2001 and reviving the May 29, 2001 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 1308, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz vs Catapang GR No. 164110, 2008-02-12

Facts:
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435
square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.[5] With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
aforementioned... co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel
of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.[6]
She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to... vacate the portion
encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.[7]... petitioner filed a
complaint[8] for forcible entry against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas.
MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not... sufficient to justify defendant's
construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question.
The Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondent's entry... into
the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through
strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.
petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry
since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any... definite portion of
the land or thing owned in common until partition.
respondent in her memorandum[17] counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into
the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT
TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R]
CO-OWNER[.]
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT
SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNE... main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner of
a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case
filed by another co-owner against that person.
Ruling:
we have held that a co-owner cannot devote... common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership.[18] In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property,
which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her... exclusive use.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their... rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property
will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their
rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent
to the making of an alteration by... another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include
any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration.[19] The construction of a house on the... co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration
falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct
her house on the co-owned property.

Pardell vs Bartolome

Plaintiff Vicenta Pardell and respondent Matilde Bartolome are the natural daughters of Calixta Felin. Since the properties
were physically indivisible, they were considered pro indiviso ("for an undivided part"). Pro indiviso properties, due to their
indivisibility, bring about co-ownership between or among the owners. Matilde and her husband Gaspar took over the
administration and enjoyment of the properties without judicial authorization or extrajudicial agreement. They collected the
rents, fruits and products of the said properties. Vicenta wanted the rent.

Vicenta is not entitled to rental fees from Matilde. However, she is entitled to rental fees from Matilde's husband Gaspar
because the latter is not a co-owner. As co-owner of the house, Matilde had every right to occupy the upper storey without
having to pay rent to her sister. There is no evidence that shows that she caused any detriment to the interest of the co-
owned property. However, Gaspar must pay rent (P16) to Vicenta because he used a room on the lower floor of the house
as an office for the justice of the peace, to the detriment of the latter's interest.

Adille vs CA G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988

FACTS:

The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa Alzul who got married twice. Her child in the first marriage was
petitioner Rustico Adile and her children in the second marriage were respondents Emetria Asejo et al.

During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sodl the property in pacto de retro with a three-year repurchase period.

Felisa died before she could repurchase the property.

During the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the property by himself alone at his own expense, and after that,
he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa.
Consequently, he was able to secure title in his name alone.
His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a case for partition and accounting claiming that Rustico was only a trustee on
an implied trust when he redeemed the property, and thus, he cannot claim exclusive ownership of the entire property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common.
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor

HELD: No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone. Although Rustico Adille
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses did not make him the owner of all of it.

Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a
negotiorum gestor under Art 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and
must act as trustee, the respondents being the beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.

Tan v. CA - Rescission of the contract of insurance

174 SCRA 403

Facts:

> Tan Lee Siong was issued a policy by Philamlife on Nov. 6, 1973.

> On Aprl 26, 1975, Tan died of hepatoma. His beneficiaries then filed a claim with Philamlife for the proceeds of the
insurance.

> Philamlife wrote the beneficiaries in Sep. 1975 denying their claim and rescinding the contract on the ground of
misrepresentation. The beneficiaries contend that Philamlife can no longer rescind the contract on the ground of
misrepresentation as rescission must allegedly be done “during the lifetime of the insured” within two years and prior to
the commencement of the action following the wording of Sec. 48, par. 2.

Issue:

Whether or not Philamlife can rescind the contract.

Held:

YES.

The phrase “during the lifetime” found in Sec. 48 simply means that the policy is no longer in force after the insured has
died. The key phrase in the second paragraph is “for a period of two years”.
What is a simpler illustration of the ruling in Tan v. CA?

The period to consider in a life insurance poiicy is “two years” from the date of issue or of the last reinstatement. So if for
example the policy was issued/reinstated on Jan 1, 2000, the insurer can still exercise his right to rescind up to Jan. 1,
2003 or two years from the date of issue/reinstatement, REGARDLESS of whether the insured died before or after Jan. 1,
2003.

G.R. No. 128004. September 25, 1998

MARCELINO TAN, LUZ S. BRIONES, CARLOS D. BRIONES, CONRADO BRIONES, FELICISIMO BRIONES, & FLORA BRIONES
JOVELLANOS, Petitioners, v. JOSE RENATO LIM, CYNTHIA GO, ADORACION REYES, PURIF'ICACION REYES, OSCAR
REYES, LILIA REYES, IMELDA REYES, ANTONIO BRIONES, AMBROCIO BRIONES, FELISA BRIONES, JUANITO BRIONES,
ARTURO BRIONES, TEOFILA BRIONES, & VIRGINIA BRIONES, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

This petition for review assails the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated September 26, 1996, 1 which set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 64, in Civil Cases Nos. 6518 and 6521.

Civil Case No. 65182 is a case for injunction and damages. In his complaint, petitioner Marcelino Tan alleged that he is the
lessee of the western portion of the land covered by TCT No. 95314 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac, Tarlac under a
contract of lease executed between him and Luz, Carlos, Conrado, Felicisimo and Flora, all surnamed Briones.

Sometime in July and August 1983, the other co-owners of the lessors of petitioner sold the northeast portion of the land
abutting Ancheta Street to private respondent Lim which the latter thereafter caused to be annotated at the back of
Original Certificate of Title No. 95314. Petitioner alleged that his only means of ingress and egress to the leased portion of
the land from Ancheta Street and vice-versa, is through the north-east portion of the land, a fact known to private
respondent Jose Renato Lim. Sometime in the last week of August 1983, respondent Lim padlocked the gate of the portion
he purchased from the other coowners of the land which is fronting Ancheta Street, thereby preventing and depriving
petitioner his only means of ingress and egress from the property leased to him. Then, from the last week of August 1983
and first week of September 1983, respondent Lim demolished all the existing wall enclosing the leased property and began
constructing a building on the leased premises to the damage and prejudice of petitioner. Petitioner Tanprayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary and/or mandatory injunction to prevent private respondent Renato Lim from committing
further acts of dispossession and to allow him to have means of ingress and egress to the property leased to him.
Petitioner further seeks from respondent Lim the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's
fees.

Civil Case No. 65213 is a case for Legal Redemption. Th0e plaintiffs are petitioners Luz, Carlos, Conrado, Felicisimo, all
surnamed Briones and Flora Briones Jovellanos, who alleged in their complaint that they, together with the herein private
respondents Adoracion, Purificacion, Oscar and Imelda, all surnamed Reyes, Antonio, Ambrocio, Felisa, Juanito, Arturo,
Teofila and Virginia, all surnamed Briones, are coowners in pro-diviso shares of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 95314
of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac, Tarlac. They further alleged that on July 15 and August 25, 1983, herein private
respondents sold and conveyed their shares in that parcel of land to their co-respondents, the spouses Renato Lim and
Cynthia Go, as evidenced by deeds of absolute sale which are subject to the provision of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code
on Legal Redemption, Petitioners, as co-owners, desire to exercise their right of legal redemption and are willing to deliver
to respondents-spouses Lim the amount representing the aggregate sum that they paid to their co-respondents upon the
execution by the said spouses of the corresponding deeds of sale in petitioners' favor. Thus, petitioners pray that
respondent Lim pay them attorney's fees in addition to every appearance of their counsel in court.

The issues in the two (2) abovementioned cases being, interrelated, the two (2) cases were jointly heard. In a decision
dated June 15, 1992, the court a quo disposed of both cases as follows:

"In Civil Case No. 6518:

1. Defendants to open the gate of the property leased by plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6521 to the plaintiff Marcelino Tan in Civil
Case No. 6518, which serves as a means of egress and ingress of said plaintiff to the portion of the land lease (sic) to him,
and said defendants to remove whatever they have already constructed thereon; and to refrain/desist from making any
construction of whatever nature on the same leased property: these preliminary and Mandatory injunction shall be and to
(sic) remain permanent;

2. Defendants to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P119,990.00:

3. Defendants to pay plaintiff moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00;

4. Defendants to pay plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00;

5. Defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00as and for Attorney's fees plus P500.00 for plaintiff's counsel's per
appearance fee for every actual hearing of the case in court; and

6. Defendants to pay the costs of suit."

"In Civil Case No. 6521:

1. Defendants Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go to resell to the plaintiffs all the undivided shares in the parcel of land
covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 95314, described in paragraph 4 of the complaint, that were
sold to them by their codefendants, upon payment to them by plaintiffs the amount of P144,000.00; and

2. Defendants Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and the
sum of P500.00for every appearance in court; and

3. Defendants Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go to pay the costs of this suit. 4cräläwvirtualibräry

Aggrieved by the aforecited decision, private respondents Renato Lim and Cynthia Go appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals, which, as aforestated, reversed the decision of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decision dated June 15, 1992 in Civil Case No. 6518 and 6521
and dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiffs-appellees therein."5cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the filing of this petition for review.

As culled from the record, the facts in the legal redemption case are as follows:

The property in question, with an area of 488 square meters covered by TCT No. 95314, was formerly owned by the
brothers Victoriano (married to Emilia Sto. Domingo de Briones) and Joaquin Briones (married to Maria Abello), who are
both dead. Victoriano's one-half (1/2) share of the property was inherited by his children, Flora Briones Jovellanos, Carlos,
Felicisimo, Luz and Rosita, all surnamed Briones. These members of the Victoriano side of the Briones family except Rosita,
who had already died, are the plaintiffs in this case. The other plaintiff, Conrado Briones, is the son of Rosita. These
plaintiffs will hereinafter be collectively referred to as petitioners Flora, et al.

The other half of the 488 sq.m. property was inherited by the Joaquin side of the Briones family. Ambrocio, Antonio, Felisa,
Jose, Arturo, Virginia, Juanito and Teofilo, are Joaquin's children, while Adoracion, Purificacion, Oscar, Imelda and Lilia, all
surnamed Reyes are children of Salud, the deceased daughter of Joaquin. They are the defendants in this case and shall
hereinafter be collectively referred to as private respondents Ambrocio, et al. The other defendants, spouses Jose Renato
Lim and Cynthia Go, who shall hereinafter be referred to as respondent Lim, are the successors-in-interest of respondents
Ambrocio, et al.

In several deeds of sale, the respondents Ambrocio, et al. (heirs of Joaquin) sold their interest in the property, consisting
of 244 square meters, to Jose Renato Lim. Some of the deeds of absolute sale6 described their interest sold as "the
undivided 1/8th share, southeastern portion" while the others referred to an attached sketch to indicate the specific 1/18th
portion sold.7 On the other hand, petitioners Flora, et al. (heirs of Victoriano) leased to co-petitioner Marcelino Tan the
remaining one-half (1/2) portion of the property, for a period of three (3) years beginning January 1, 1983 to December 31,
1985.8cräläwvirtualibräry

It is at this point where the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent court do not jibe in
certain crucial issues.

According to the trial court, respondents Ambrocio, et al., failed to comply with Article 1620 of the Civil Code when they did
not give a written notice to petitioners Flora, et al. of the sale of their respective undivided interest on the property before
and at the time the deeds of sale were executed in favor of their co-respondents Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go. The trial
court also found that at the time of the sale, coownership existed between respondents Ambrocio, et al. and petitioners
Flora, et al. The trial court said this is borne out by the language of the deeds of absolute sale which states that what were
sold were the vendors' (Ambrocio, et al.) undivided interest on the same property and because the said interest of the
vendors were not yet titled or registered in their respective names. The trial court then concluded that it was necessary
for respondents Ambrocio, et al. to have notified the other-coowners of the sale as prescribe under Article 1620 of the Civil
Code.9cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, the respondent court was of the view that after respondents Ambrocio, et al. and petitioners Flora, et al.
were ableto secure the issuance of TCT No. 95314 intheir names, they agreed to partition the property with respondents
Ambrocio, et al. getting the interior half of the property and the petitioners Flora, et al. getting the anterior portion. No
document was drawn up to embody and evidence the oral partition by petitioners Flora, et al., who later leased exactly one-
half of the property (244 square meters) to petitioner Marcelino Tan while respondents Ambrocio, et al., thereafter sold the
other half to respondents Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go. Thus, the respondent court concluded that the oral agreement
of partition, coupled with its actual implementation, effectively ended the co-ownership between the two sets of Briones
heirs at the time of the sale of the interior portion of the property to respondents Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go. There
was, consequently, no necessity to notify petitioners Flora, et al. of the sale. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

In Civil Case No. 6518, the trial court refused to consider respondent Jose Renato Lim's evidence citing as reason therefor
the failure of his counsel to file a formal offer of evidence. Thus, on the sole basis of petitioner Marcelino Tan's evidence,
the trial court found the following facts as duly established:

"There was a gate infront of the lot he is leasing and fronting the Ancheta Street. This was the gate he used to pass through
in entering the premises. From the said gate, there was a right of way leading to the back portion of the lot in question.

"After the contract of lease was executed, he started constructing a warehouse on the portion of the lot he is leasing,
where he was to store construction materials as it was near his store at F. Taedo Street, the La Suerte Hardware.

"The construction materials that he brought into the ]eased premises for the construction of his warehouse were cement,
steels, galvanized iron sheets, nails; wires, gravel and sand and lumber.

"He was not able to finish the construction of the warehouse. He was only able to construct the walls and has just started
the layout of the warehouse because in August 1983, defendant Jose Renato Lim caused to be demolished by his men what
he has already constructed. After the wall was demolished, his gate in front of the lot where he used to pass was padlocked
by them and where they constructed a wall made of hallow blocks and he cannot enter anymore.

"After Renato Lim demolished the wallings of his (witness') intended warehouse and erected a concrete wall at the gate in
August 1983, since then up to the present, it has been defendant Jose Renato Lim who is occupying the premises. He
constructed thereon an extension of his store, the J, Mart. as indicated by an arrow in his Sketch (Exhibit "B").

"He did not see the aforesaid construction materials anymore after Jose Renato Lim demolished the wall and closed the
gate and occupied the same premises. He was not able to recover them anymore because the gate was already barricated
with a concrete wall.

"The construction materials that he placed inside the premises and for labor that he already spent so far for the
construction of his proposed warehouse were all in the total amount of P120,000.00, ( P119,990.00as per Exhibit "C")."11

The respondent court, however, disagreed with the trial court. The respondent court ruled that the formal offer of evidence
is not necessary and that the trial court erred in excluding respondent Lim's countervailing evidence in Civil Case No.
6518.12

After reviewing respondent Lim's evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 and the evidence in Civil Case No. 6521, both cases having
been heard jointly, the respondent court found the following facts as established: that petitioners Flora, et al. and
respondents Ambrocio, et al. agreed to partition the property with the front portion given to the former and the back
portion given to the latter. The respondents Ambrocio, et al. were to be given a right of way towards Ancheta Street. It was
the back portion of the property that respondent Lim purchased from Ambrocio, et al. and he received no complaint about
this at the time of the sale. And, even before respondent Lim purchased the rear portion of the property, petitioner Flora
Briones had already offered to sell to him the front portion of the property. Moreover, petitioner Marcelino Tan did not
erect a warehouse and bunkhouse on the property or leave construction materials thereat. Respondent Lim could not have
barricaded the front portion of the property as what he purchased was the interior portion owned by respondents
Ambrocio, et al. while petitioner Marcelino Tan leased the front portion. Petitioner Marcelino Tan's right to occupy the
premises had long expired, thus, rendering his cause of action for mandatory injunction moot and academic. Finally
petitioner Marcelino Tan had no legal easement in his favor to demand a right of way.13

The respondent court set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6518 and
6521.

After petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision was denied,14they filed this petition for review contending that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred: (1) in concluding that there was a partition; (2) in not concluding that by the mere fact
that the deed of sale used the word undivided is already indicative of the existence of co-ownership; (3) in not concluding
that the private respondents have no evidence in Civil Case No. 6518; (4) and concluding that the complaint was rendered
moot and academic; and, (5) in denying the award for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.15

From the assigned errors, we synthesize the issues raised by the petitioners as follows:

1. Was there an oral partition between the heirs of Joaquin and the heirs of Victoriano on the property covered by TCT
No. 95314 ; and if so, is the oral partition valid;
2. Was the respondent court correct when it held that respondent Jose Renato Lim's formal offer of evidence in
Civil Case No. 6518 (Injunction and damages) was unnecessary; and,
3. Was petitioner Marcelino Tan's cause of action in Civil Case No. 6518 rendered moot and academic.

Petitioners urge us to review the factual findings of the respondent Court of Appeals relative to its conclusion that the
partition of the property had taken place on the groud that this finding is allegedly "not accord (sic) with the facts and
evidence, and it also overlooked the rule that the findings of the trial court are to be given weight and with the highest
degree of respect x x x."16 The review is sought by petittioners given the conflicting findings of the Court of Appeals and the
Trial Court, and they pray that the trial court's findings be upheld over that of the Court of Appeals.

The Court does not, in all cases of disagreement of facts between the Court of Appeals and the trial court, automatically
delve into the record to determine the facts for itself.17 Admittedly, there have been instances when this Court made
independent findings of fact on the points that the trial court and appellate court disagreed but we did not do so as a
matter of course. When the dispute between the two courts are merely onprobative value, we limit our review of the
evidence, ascertaining if the finding of the said court are consistent with or are not palpably contrary to, the evidence on
record, we decline to make areview on the probative value of the evidence.18 In Hermo v. Court of Appeals,19 we ruled
that it is the findings of the Court of Appeals, and not those of the trial court, which are final and conclusive even on this
Court.

The record reveals that the findings of the respondent court are supported by substantial evidence that the co-ownership
between petitioners and private respondents had been terminated by oral partition. Additionally, we glean from the record
that there was a clear, unequivocal and direct admission by petitioners Flora, et al. of the partition, aside from their
conclusive acts of ownership over the leased portion of the property.
We quote with approval the well-reasoned discussion of respondent court on its finding that there was an oral partition of
the property, thus:

"Defendant-appellant Ambrocio Briones testified that, sometime in 1972, he and plaintiff-appellee Flora Jovellanos, in
representation of their respective sides of the Briones family were able to secure the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 95314 in the names of all the co-owners of the property; that, after the issuance of the title, plaintiff-appellee Flora
suggested to him that the property be partitioned with the frontal portion of the property to be given to her side of the
Briones family while the back or interior portion to be given to Ambrocio's side; that defendant-appellant Ambrocio Briones
agreed to the partition provided that they be given a right of way from the front to the back exiting to Ancheta Street; that
thereafter, plaintiffs-appellees Flora, et. al., leased a portion of their specific share to certain Pangasinenses and to
plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan, the plaintiff in the Injunction Case; that these Pangasinenses constructed houses thereon.

"Defendant-appellee Ambrocio Briones' testimony is supported by equally convincing and independent evidence.

"On paragraph 2 of the complaint in the Injunction Case, plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan alleged that:

'2. The plaintiff is the lessee of the western portion of the parcel of land described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 95314 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac under a contract of lease executed by and between him and
Luz, Carlos, Conrado Felicisimo and Flora all surnamed BRIONES x x x.' (p. 1, Complaint of CV-6518)

"Plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan confirmed on the witness stand that it was only with plaintiffs-appellees Luz, Carlos,
Conrado, Felicisimo, all surnamed Briones, and Flora Jovellanos that he negotiated with for the lease of a specific portion of
the property and that he never talked to the defendants about the lease (pp. 23-24, TSN July 30, 1986).

"The execution by the plaintiffs-appellees Flora, et. al. of a lease contract over a specific portion of the property without the
participation of defendants-appellants Ambrocio, et. al., who were the co-owners is glaring evidence that there had already
been an actual partition of the property once owned in common and that in this partition, the plaintiffs-appellees Flora, et.
al. were given exclusive dominion over that specific portion leased by them to plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan. This is
because leasing real property for more than one year, as in this case which involved a lease of five (5) years and six (6)
months, is an act of strict ownership or dominion (Article 1878 (8), Civil Code).20

Furthermore, there was a Judicial admission by petitioners Flora, et al. that there was indeed a partition of the property.
Petitioner Flora Briones Jovellanos categorically admitted that she and her co-heirs owned a definite portion of the
property while the respondents Briones owned the other half. Thus, the respondent court said:

"At the same hearing, also under cross-examination, plaintiff-appellee Flora Jovellanos admitted under oath that the
property formerly owned in common had already been actually partitioned and that each side of the Briones family had
already taken their own specific portion allotted to them under the partition agreement:

'ATTY. LIM

Q The portion which you leased to Marcelino Tan is the southwestern portion of the land in question?

A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know the exact area of this portion which you leased to him?

A More or less 244 square meters.

Q In this... And this southwestern portion which You lease(sic) to Marcelino Tan, this is owned by you and your co plaintiffs?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the other portion is owned by the defendant ; Adoracion Reyes, Purificacion Reyes, Oscar Reyes, Lilia Reyes, lmelda
Reyes, Antonio Briones, Ambrocio Briones, Felisa Briones, Juanito Briones, Arturo Briones, Teofila Briones and Virginia
Briones?

A Yes, sir.' (pp. 3-4, TSN, February 27, 1985)

"This testimony is a judicial admission that is conclusive on plaintiffs-appellees Flora, et. al., and cannot be contradicted
unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake (Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court). That this admission was
elicited on cross-examination further strengthens what is already aconclusive and firmly binding admission."21

Noticeably, the contract of lease between petitioners Flora, et al, and petitioner Tan covered exactly one-half (1/2) of the
disputed lot. This would clearly indicate that there was an oral partition of the property between the petitioners Flora, et al.
and respondents Ambrocio, et al. Thus, the respondent court said:

"It is not denied that the original owners of the property, Victoriano and Joaquin owned the property in equal shares.
Significantly, the portion of the property leased to plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan by plaintiffs-appellees Flora, et. al.
covering 244 square meters of the property is exactly one-half of the total area of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 95314 corresponding exactly to the share of Victoriano, the father of plaintiffs-appellees Flora, et. al.
Defendants-appellants Ambrocio et. al., never complained about this lease of said portion of the property. This give rise to
the ineluctable conclusion that the property had already been partitioned and that what was leased by the plaintiffs-
appellees Flora, et. al. was the portion of the property allotted to them under the partition .22

The fact that petitioners Flora, et al. alone leased to petitioner Marcelino Tan one-half of the portion of the property
unerringly point to the fact that they exercised the right of ownership over the said portion, to the exclusion of the
respondents Ambrocio, et al., considering that the lease agreement was executed without the consent of the latter. Notably,
the lease of the specific portion of the property is for a period of more than one (1) year, which is an act of strict
ownership. Petitioner Flora Briones-Jovellanos likewise candidly admitted that the lease rentals were paid exclusively to
petitioners.

Petitioners, however, argue that there isno note or memorandum or any deed of partition offered in evidence by
respondents Ambrocio, et. al. to substantiate the claim of partition. We find this argument to be flawed. Petitioners failed to
cite any provision of law requiring a note or memorandum for a contract of partition to be valid. Contracts are obigatory in
whatever form they may have been entered into provided all essential requirements are present.23 Thus, in Limketkai Sons
Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,24 we held:

"x x x. A sale of land is valid regardless of the form it may have been entered into (Claudel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113,
119 (1991) . The requisite form under Article 1458 of the Civil Code is merely for greater efficacy or convenience and the
failure to comply therewith does not affect the validity and binding effect of the act between the
parties (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Revised Edition, p. 552). If the law requires a document or
other special form, as in the sale of real property, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form,
once the contract has been perfected. Their right may be exercised simultaneously with action upon the contract (Article
1359, Civil Code)."

Neither is a note or memorandum necessary for the enforceability of a contract of partition. Article 1403 of the Civil Code
enumerates the limited instances when written proof of a contract is essential for enforceability. A contract of partition is
not one of the contracts mentioned.25

Given that the oral partition in question had already been fully consummated except for the issuance of separate titles to
each respective side of the Briones family, this Court's ruling in Hernandez vs. Andal26 which has been correctly relied
upon by the respondent court, finds relevance to the present case:

"On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when
it has been completely or partly performed.

'Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper
cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise
of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the
rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under
which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition
agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the
parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in
severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement
and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold
their respective parts in severalty.

'A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition
by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition.

'A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is
necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a
partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce
such partition agreed to by the parties.' (40 Amer. Jur. 15-18.)"

The case of Duque vs. Domingo27 cited by petitioners is not applicable to this case. We did not say in Duque that an oral
partition is void. We ruled that since the oral partition in that case was not proven by any credible evidence, then the
existence of the oral partition was merely "improbable." This presupposes that the contract would have been valid if proven
to exist if it was not put down in writing. This is not the case here.
The evidence that the partition took place among the co-owners of the property is convincing. Petitioner Flora Jovellanos
admitted that the south-western portion of the property which was leased to petitioner Marcelino Tan was owned by her
side of the Briones family, while the other portion of the property which was sold to Jose Renato Lim and Cynthia Go, was
owned by her side of the Briones family. Flora, et. al. leased exactly 1/2 of the property to co-petitioner Marcelino Tan and
appropriated the lease rentals for themselves. In other words, the writing of the contract of partition is not constitutive of
its validity but merely evidential. As we held in Hernandez vs. Andal, supra:

"Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words, is writing the act that confers
legal validity upon the agreements There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative
answer to these questions. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transaction, it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as
originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words 'utterly void' with reference to certain
transactions. Under the terms of such statute transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely
voidable if not made in the manner indicated. x x x."

Petitioners, however assevarates that the evidence of partition cannot prevail over Transfer Certificate of Title No. 95314
showing the two (2) sides of the Briones family to be co-owners indiviso. It is petitioners' submission that the subdivision
plan showing the metes and bounds of their respective portions of the property is indispensable and that a mereoral
agreement between co-owners to partition a property has no effect.

As earlier stated, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into provided all the essential
requisites are present.28 The essential requisites of contracts being consent, object certain and cause of the
obligation,29 thus, neither a transfer certificate of title nor a subdivision plan is essential to validity of an oral contract of
partition. A transfer certificate of title merely evidences and is not constitutive of title.30 A transfer certificate of title
cannot confer title where no title had been vested by some of the means provided by law. A transfer certificate of title is
not one of the means of acquiring ownership of the property31.

The trial court seized upon the use of the word "undivided" in the Deed of Sale from Ambrocio, et, al. to Jose Renato Lim
and Cynthia Go as an indication of the existence of co-ownership. But the deeds of absolute sale separately executed by
Ambrocio, Felisa, Juanito, Arturo and Teofila, all surnamed Briones and attached to the complaint in Civil Case No. 6511
(Exhibits C, D, E, F and G), specifically point to the portion of the property which has been sold to co-respondents Renato
Lim as "undivided 1/18 shares/ southeastern portion x x x." This world undeniably indicate that there was a partition of
the subject land between petitioners and private respondent Ambrocio, et al. or else the latter could not have been able to
specify the portion of the property being ceded to the vendee.

On the other hand, the deeds of sale (Exhs. H, I & G) executed by private respondents Virginia Briones (Exh. H), Arturo
Briones (Exh.I) and Adoracion, Oscar, Lilia, Purificacion and Imelda, all surnamed Reyes (Exh. J), were more specific in
describing the portion sold to private respondents Jose Renato Lim, thus:

"x x x do hereby TRANSFER and CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale unto the said Renato Lim 1/18 share of the parcel of
registered land, more particularly describe as follows:

xxxx
of which 1/18 share, I am the absolute owner, free from all liens and encumbrances. Said 1/18 share herein sold is to be
taken from te shaded portion indicated in the sketch attached hereto and made an integral part hereof, and is the share
which pertained top me pursuant to an agreement of all the co-owners of said parcel of land. x x x"

The deeds of sale indicate clearly that what was being sold was not an aliquot or spiritual portion but a definite portion of
the property. While they do not contain the descriptive word "southeastern portion," there is, however, an attached sketch
thereto which delineates the specific portion of the property to be sold.

All told, like respondent court, we are convinced, based on the evidence on record, that the disputed property was already
partitioned between the petitioners Flora, et al. and respondents Ambrocio, et al., at the time the latter sold the
"southeastern portion" to co-respondents Renato Lim.

We now go examine the injunction case. Anent the exclusion by the trial court of Jose Renato Lim's the trial court stated:

"On March 16, 1992 the Court issued an order which is hereunder quoted for ready reference as follows:

'Acting on the 'Urgent Motion For Extension of Time To File Offer of Evidence' on the ground therein cited found by the
Court be tenable, the same is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, defendant, thru counsel, is hereby granted and extension of fifteen (15) days from March 13, 1992, to file
his offer of evidence, furnishing copy thereof to Atty. Manuel D. Reyes, Counsel for the Plaintiff, who is likewise given a
period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his comment/objection thereto.

After the lapse of which period, the formal offer of evidence for dependant shall then be deemed as submitted for
resolution. And after which, the parties are hereby granted thirty (30) days within which to file their simultaneous
memoranda after the lapse of said period, this case shall then be considered as finally submitted for decision. This is
reiteration of the second paragraph of the order of this Court dated February 28, 1992.'

Up to the present, however, after the lapse of almost three (3) months, defendant in this Civil Case No. 6518 has not
filed his announced Formal Offer of Evidence.

Threfore, no evidence, testimonial and documentary, for said defendant can be considered and evaluated by the Court
in said Civil Case No. 6518.

'Offer of Evidence - The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered by him.' (De Castro v. Court of Appeals, et. al., 75 Phil. 834). Underscoring supplied.

'Any evidence which the party desires to submit to the consideration of the Court must formally be offered by him.'
(De Castro v. The Court of Appeals, et al., 75 Phil. 834).

'The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgement only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.' (U.S. v. Solano, 33 Phil. 582; Dayrit v. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182).

DISCUSSION
 "As aforesaid, no evidence, testimonial and documentary for the defendant Jose Renato Lim can be considered by the
Court in Civil Case no. 6518, for failure on his part to offer any evidence in his defense. It follows, therefore, that the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff Marcelino Tan, particularly his testimony in open Court in the same case, is
uncontroverted, hence, it is deemed conclusive.

'The testimony which stands uncontroverted is deemed conclusive.' (Dela Cruz vs. Associacion Zanjera Casilian, 83
Phil. 214-215)."

The respondent court was the contrary view. It disregarded the failure of respondent Jose Lim to formally offer his
evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 since the said respondent offered his evidence in Civil Case 6521 which was jointly heard
with Civil Case No. 6518. The respondent court rules that was offered in the legal redemption case also constituted
evidence that was offered in the legal redemption case also constituted evidence in the injunction case, in the wise:

"Going to the Injunction Case, the trial court found for the plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan because because his
evidence is uncontroverted, appellant Jose Renato Lim not having offered any testimonial and documentary evidence in his
defense.

"Under ordinary circumstances, the posture taken by the trial court would have been correct. In this case, however
the absence of any formal offer of evidence cannot be equated with lack of evidence.

"The Injunction and Legal Redemption Cases were jointly heard, this much is clear not from the very first sentence of
the Decision but also from the statements of the trial court at the hearing on June 21, 1984 that 'this is a joint trial of the
two civil cases that we make it a joint hearing but separate trial.', and that 'some testimony of this witness may have a
bearing on the other case,' (pp. 2, 11-14, TSN June 21, 1984).

"In accordance with this express ruling of the trial court and the agreement of the parties, the proceedings that were
taken were deemed joint proceedings for the two (2) cases and any evidence introduced in any of this cases is deemed
evidence for both cases. This was clarified by the trial court to counsel for defendant-appellant Jose Renato Lim on April
25, 1986 when it stated that the cases are heard jointly and that it will even motu propio consider the evidence in one case
as evidence in the other:

'ATTY. LIM

I would x x x just like to seek a clarification because whenever these two cases are set for hearing, they are set on
the same date, your honor. But it is my understanding, your Honor, that these cases are not to be jointly tried, because they
involve different parties.

'COURT

Joint but separate trial. So whatever is required in the other case, we can take from the other case.

'ATTY.LIM

Subject to the manifestation of the parties, your Honor.

 'COURT

But there was already an understanding.

'ATTY. LIM

There is x x x no understanding, your Honor.

'COURT

But whatever testimony of the witness that nay be applicable to the other case, the Court will take that into account.
If there is any relevance to the other, without the necessity of calling again the witness...

'ATTY. LIM

If the counsel adopts the testimony of the witness in one case to the other case. Because when we cross-examine, I
cross-examine for that particular case. So to x x x avoid x x x surprise to the counsel for the plaintiff I would like to make
that clear, your Honor.

'COURT

Because I understand that the outcome of the case will have a material bearing on the material issue in the other
case.

'ATTY. LIM

But the counsel should make that manifestation clear so that . . . for the other party to consider in the light of the
cross examination, your Honor.

'COURT

Because I think during the previous hearings you already informed the parties that it will be a jointly but separate
trial considering that the issue in these case (sic) in these case (sic) are intermably linked with each other.

'ATTY. LIM

So if they jointly but separate, it would be necessary for the parties to manifest whatever evidence in one case they
are adopting.

'COURT

That would be up for the Court. It does'nt even have to wait fro the manifestation of the counsels.

'ATTY. LIM
 I was only saying that since these cases are to be heard separately there should be at least a manifestation.

'COURT

I believe that the Court on its own motion can do the . . . ' (pp. 51-55, TSN, April 25, 1986)

Notwithstanding the clarifications made by the trial court that the evidence in one case may be utilized by the trial
court in the other whenever relevant and even on its own motion, counsel for the defendant-appellant Jose-Renato Lim
nevertheless declared at the hearing held on November 26, 1987 that he was adopting the evidence in the Injunction Case
and that had already been offered as appellant's evidence in the Legal Redemption Case:

Your Honor, we are reproducing the evidence presented by the defendants in Civil Case No. 6521 entitled 'Luz Briones,
et al., versus Jose Renato Lim, et al.

'ATTY. REYES

Your Honor, counsel is asking a mark of Exhibit 14 when he has no Exhibit 1 yet.

'COURT

That should be Exhibit 1 with respect to this case.

'ATTY. LIM

Your Honor, we are reproducing, we are adopting the evidence on the other case.

'COURT

Yes but you are presenting this exhibit now on this case No. 6518.

'ATTY. LIM

You Honor, what I'm planning to do, because I am adopting my exhibits in the other case...

'COURT

Yes but this marking here.

'ATTY. LIM

My last exhibit there in that other case is Exhibit 13 in this redemption...

'COURT

So you offer in rebuttal?

 'ATTY. LIM

Because I am adopting those exhibits, this will bear the marking in this case.

'COURT

Anyway this is a joint trial?

'ATTY. LIM

Yes, Your Honor,'32

It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation if testimonial evidence. However, a
liberal interpretation of these Rules would have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil
Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly
heard by the trial court, counsel for Renato Lim had already declare he was adopting these evidences for Civil Case No.
6518. The trial Court itself stated that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon
this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony
since at the time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness is
called to tetify.33Rules of procedure should not be applied in every rigid, technical case as they are devised chiefly to
secure and not defeat substantial justice.

The trial court's interpretation on the application of the rules on evidence, which while technically sound, was correctly
addressed by the respondent court when it said:

"While under Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court the court shall not consider any evidence that has not been
formally offered, the record discloses that the defendant-appellant Jose Renato Lim formally offered his documentary
evidence was formally offered his documentary evidence in the Legal Redemption Case at the hearing on March 5, 1996
when his counsel made an oral offer. It, therefore, cannot be said that no evidence was formally offered in the Injunction
Case since, consistent with the declarations of the trial court and the understanding and the agreement of the parties, the
same evidence that was offered in the Legal redemption Case also constituted evidence in the Injunction Case whenever it
so appeared to be relevant and whenever deemed proper by the trial court motu proprio.

" That the evidence in one case has a bearing on the other was made clear by the trial court itself and by counsel for
plaintiffs-appellees himself in the Legal Redemption Case at the hearing on June 21, 1984.

'COURT

Eventually some testimony of this witness may have a bearing on the other case, she is not yet through with her
testimony.

'ATTY. REYES

Definitely it has a bearing, Your Honor, because the subject matter of these two cases is basically the same.
 xxx

COURT

It is up for the Court to appreciate the evidence.' (pp. 12-14, TSN, June 21 1984)"34

The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was being overly technical about
the non-submission of Jose Renato Lim's formal offer of evidence. This posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive
litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice.
Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-general,35 still remains
relevant:

" x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the
court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the
administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."

We further take into account that counsel for petitioners lengthily cross-examined the witnesses for private respondents in
Civil Case No. 6521. Thus, any supposed defect that may have arisen with the purported absence of a formal offer of
evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was cured.

The remaining issue on the mootness of the injunction complaint need not detain us long. We quote with approval the
observation of the respondent court on this issue, thus:

"Be that as it may, plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan's cause of action for mandatory injunction to open the gate fronting
Ancheta Street has been rendered moot and academic by sheer passage of time since plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan's
right to occupy the premises had long expired. Besides, there is even no showing that the front portion of the property
where the gate was located was burdened by a servitude in favor of the interior portion. Plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan's
complaint in the Injunction Case is not even is not even premised on a legal easement of right of way and was not coupled
with an offer to pay proper indemnity (Article 649, Civil Code)."36

Imputing error on the Court of Appeals, Marcelino Tan argues in his petition:

"In its assailed decision, the Hon. Respondent Court of Appeals claims that the complaints was rendered moot and
academic by the passage of time. It is to be stressed that Petitioner Marcelino Tan's failure to continuously occupy has
been unlawfully interrupted by the Private Respondents Jose Renato Lim and as such he should not be allowed to profit
therefrom. Moreover, it is not for the Private Respondent to invoke the expiration of the lease. To sustain the view that the
complaint has been rendered moot and academic is to put premium to an illegal act which should not be sanctioned."37

We sustain the Court of Appeals. The complaint for injunction is dependent on petitioner Marcelino Tan's right to posses a
portion of the property as lessee. The expiration of the lease contract simply resulted in the loss of his possessory rights.
Whatever loss resulted from the interruption of Marcelino Tan's possesion during term of the lease cannot be remedied by
injunction but by a claim for damages. Thus, the action for injunction, there being no existing lease from which right of
possession results, must be considered moot. respondents court likewise correctly held that petitioner Marcelino Tan has
no demonstrable right to an injunction for there is no evidence that he has an easement of right of way to Ancheta Street,
either by virtue of a title or prescription or that the conditions on a legal easement were properly met, to justify an
injunction to be issued.

Furthermore, Marcelino Tan's proof of damages is simply inadequate, providing no basis for the award of actual, moral or
exemplary damages. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the respondent court that;

"Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual damages are awarded only upon adequate proof, no such adequate proof
of loss exists on record. Even construction materials. Indeed as pointed out by defendant-appellant Jose Renato Lim who
took them or had them taken. Besides, as owner of these materials, plaintiff-appellee Marcelino Tan should have exercised
due diligence in minimizing the damage to him by either attempting to recover the materials or by reporting the loss to the
authorities (Article 2203, Civil Code), which he did not. Such conduct is not ordinarily expected of the one who has lost
valuable property.

"With regard to moral damages, suffice it to state there being no adequate proof that defendant-appellant Jose Renato
Lim encroached upon the portion of the property leased by the plaintiff-appellee Marcelino tan or that plaintiff-appellee
Marcelino Tan suffered lost of construction materials, the anxiety, wounded feelings and embarrassment he claims to have
to have no evidentiary basis. For the same reasons, there be no a war for attorney's fees or exemplary damages."38

In sum, the respondent court did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED