EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Marcos vs. Manglapus

GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989

FACTS:
After he and his family spent a three-year exile in Hawaii, former President Ferdinand Marcos
sought to return to the Philippines. This prompted the family to request respondents to issue a
travel order to them and to enjoin President Corazon Aquino’s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution may
prohibit the Marcos family from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
The court held in the affirmative. According to Sec. 1, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, it
provides that “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” The
phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power, although in the same article
it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all
executive depts., bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the
powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations,
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to
submit the budget to congress and the power to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23)

According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific power enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. In this case, the President has the power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She has the obligation to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to balance the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is
the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Soliven vs. Makasiar
GR No. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988

FACTS:
Maximo Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Cory Aquino hid under her bed during
the coup de ‘etat. Petitioners Maximo Soliven, Luis Beltran, among others were charged by libel
by then President Corazon Aquino. Aquino herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and
others. Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from
suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can institute Criminal Proceedings against petitioners despite her
immunity from suit.

RULING:
Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings. The rationale for the
grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
Review Center Association of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita
GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009

FACTS:
On June 11 and 12, 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing
Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that
handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period.
George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the incumbent President of the
Philippine Nurses Association. On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC
from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on 22 August 2006.
Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members
of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the
Nursing Board Examinations. On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and
similar entities in the Philippines. the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner),
an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the
IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to... operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively
abolish independent review centers. With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the
CHED now is the agency that is mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all
review centers as provided for under Section 4 of the Executive Order which provides that "No
review center or similar entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the
favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits
or authorizations to conduct review classes.

ISSUE:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHED's jurisdiction; Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's
rule-making power.

RULING:
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced he has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department and its offices and officials. Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. The Court
cannot likewise interpret the fact that RA 8981 penalizes "any person who manipulates or rigs
licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes known licensure examination questions
prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers with the grades in the professional licensure
examinations" as a grant of power to regulate review centers. The provision simply provides for
the penalties for manipulation and other corrupt practices in the conduct of the professional
examinations. The assailed EO 566 seeks to regulate not only review centers but also "similar
entities." The questioned CHED RIRR defines "similar entities" as referring to "other review
centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations
given by the PRC including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service
examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like English, Mathematics and the like." The
PRC has no mandate to supervise review centers that give courses or lectures intended to prepare
examinees for licensure examinations given by the PRC. It is like the Court regulating bar review
centers just because the Court conducts the bar examinations. Similarly, the PRC has no mandate
to regulate similar entities whose reviewees will not even take any licensure examination given
by the PRC.
Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

RULING:
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not
cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process
is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission
GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010

FACTS:
President Benigno Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 on July 30, 2010 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body,
but it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but
it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law.

Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of
the Office of the President.Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to
petitioner, such power cannot be presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any
specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. Petitioners asked the
Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued among others that E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of
the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC
had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.
Funa vs Agra
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

Facts:
The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST
Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that
on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer,
commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or
designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the
antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate
Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of
Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March
5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished
his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his
successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding
the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two
offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving
the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Issue:
Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices
for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?

Ruling:
Yes. The court ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor General for
being unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; and
DECLARES that Alberto C. Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of
Justice.

Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. The evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their
tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the
language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be
a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as
a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra,
whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold
any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

Facts:
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 19881 and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed
Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor;
Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1
hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary
position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or

controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter
to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity, the citation
of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding
thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Restriction on the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2)
positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits them , unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders
respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary
of Local Government45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary
of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately
relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other
named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are no longer
occupying the positions complained of.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA
G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as
unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H.

Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC). Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his
capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition,
Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and
responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009. Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent
positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial
inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs
to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator
effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer
for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic
since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with
her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
and therefore, NULL and VOID.

Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the
disqualification was held to be absolute, we concluded thus:

These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family,
which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces,
are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a
class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. Such intent of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was also
succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong
noted during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil
Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore,
more checks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in
their case.” Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-19313 January 19, 1962

Facts:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the
same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he
issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President Garcia.

In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other
reasons:
(1) the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new
President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were approved by
the electorate in the last elections;
(2) these scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of
the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments;
(3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were issued only upon
the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall or
revocation by the incoming President, with the result that those deserving of promotion or
appointment who preferred to be named by the new President declined and were by-passed; and
(4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire
on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration.

On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the

Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was
validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be
considered void.

Issue:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

Ruling:
It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal,
his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The filling up vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly
be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost
all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a
mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.

The Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it
cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to
mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing
Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities
admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify
revocation, those described herein should fit the exception. It should be stated that the underlying
reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable
rights. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem
to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the
public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only strict legality, but also
fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.
In re: Appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Villarta as RTC Judges
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998

Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City
and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision
prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments
comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the
ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the
filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of
the ban
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010

FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after
the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to
the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en
banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief
Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC
resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to
invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later
than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position
of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit
to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist,
or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A
precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by
the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

Issues:
Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.

Ruling:
Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling,
and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the
Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department,
and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the
framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII.
Drilon v. Lim, SCRA 135

FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec 187 of the Local Govt Code (LGC), Sec. of Justice Drilon, on appeal to him,
declared the Manila Revenue Code null and void for noncompliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to
law and public policy. Said provision of the LGC states “that any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal xxx
to the Sec. of Justice xxx.” The City of Manila filed a petition in the lower court which ruled in
their favor. The lower court concluded that said Sec 187 was unconstitutional in that it, among
others, gave to the Secretary of Justice the power of control (vested by the Constitution in the
President) and not of supervision only.

ISSUE:
Does the questioned provision give the Sec. of Justice the power of control and not merely of
supervision?

HELD:
No. Sec 187 only authorizes the Sec. of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. An officer in
control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees
to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. Sec. Drilon did precisely this, and no
more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. Sec 187
is valid as it is constitutional.
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451

FACTS:
Mayor VIllena was under investigation for several crimes involving moral turpitude when the
Sec. of the Interior decreed his suspension to prevent possible coercion of witnesses. Villena now
seeks to prohibit the Secretary and have the latter declared without authority to suspend him.

ISSUE:
Does the Sec. of the Interior have the authority to decree the suspension of Mayor Villena?

HELD:
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the Sec. of the Interior to suspend a
Municipality Mayor who is under investigation. However, that power is expressly lodged the
President under the Administrative Code, and, under the presidential type of govt which we have
adopted and considering the departmental organization established, the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive,
for the functions of the Chief Exec are performed by and through the executive departments.166
The heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
the President; and each of them is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that
department where the Pres. is required by law to exercise authority. Hence, the suspension
decreed by the Secretary is deemed decreed by the President himself who has expressed
authority to do such. Petition dismissed.
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño, 21 SCRA 895

FACTS:
In a conflict between Magallanes Co. and Paño et al. involving agricultural land, the Director of
Lands rendered a decision in favor of the former. Pano et al. appealed with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources but it was dismissed, and the previous decision was affirmed.
The case was elevated to the President. The Executive Secretary “by authority of the President”
decided the controversy and modified the decision, directing the disputed land to be allocated
among Pano et al. Magallanes Co. now appeals to this Court.

ISSUE:
May the Executive Secretary, acting by the authority of the President, reverse a decision of the
Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

HELD:
Yes. Under the Constitution, the President has control of all executive departments. He controls
and directs the acts of his department heads who are men of his confidence. Implicit then is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. It
may not, therefore, be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary. It is not correct to say that the President may not delegate to his Exec. Sec.
certain acts167 for he is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The rule is where the Exec. Sec. acts “by authority of the Pres.”, his
decision is that of the President, and only the President may rightfully disapprove or reprobate it
and say that the Exec. Sec. is not authorized to do so.
City of Iligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158

FACTS:
Certain parcels of public land were up for auction sale when then Pres. Macapagal, pursuant to
the Public Land Act, issued Proc. No. 469 which donated and transferred some of it in favor of
Iligan City. Iligan City accordingly requested the Director of Lands to exclude said donated
parcels from the auction sale but no action was taken. Iligan City prayed to stop the auction sale
in court and was granted a preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the new President, Marcos, issued
Proc. No. 94 which declared the disputed parcels open to disposition apparently also pursuant to
the Public Land Act. In the trial, decision was rendered against Iligan City, hence this appeal.
Iligan City contends that the trial court erred in holding that Proc. No. 469 did not confer title to
them because the President does not have such authority as it was not sanctioned at all by the
Public Land Act. Sec 60 of the Public Land Act provides such lands may be leased, sold, donated
or granted by the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources thru the Dir. of Lands.

ISSUE:
May the President make donations or transfers of land to a province, municipality or subdivision
of the govt instead of the Dir. of Lands and or the Sec. of Agri. and Nat. Resources as provided
by the Public Land Act?

HELD:
Yes. Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive control xxx in the lease, sale or
any form of concession or disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate
control of the Sec. of Agri. And Nat. Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the
Pres. Has control over all executive depts, bureaus, and offices, etc., the Pres. Has therefore the
same authority to dispose of portions of the public domain as his subordinates—the Director of
Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Gascon v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989
Padilla, J.

Facts:
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered into by and between
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6
January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio and television stations (TV
Station Channel 4), and to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid
agreement from adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN.

Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement to
Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation

Held:
Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as the
Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the “Agreement to Arbitrate” was
signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and
executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now)
“assisted by a Cabinet” composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and
accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various
departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in
behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding
upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto
Kilusang Bayan168 v. Dominguez
GR 85439, 205 SCRA 92 [Jan 13, 1992]

Facts:
Petitioner KBMBPM, a cooperative, entered into a contract with the Municipality of Muntinlupa
thru its then Mayor Carlos, Jr. whereby the formers shall manage and operate the new
Muntinlupa public market. When the new Mayor Bunye (respondent) assumed office, he
abrogated the contract and declared that the Municipality was taking over the management. With
the officers of KBMBPM resisting take-over, Bunye et al. allegedly used arms and violence
purportedly to serve an Order from the Sec. of Agriculture (respondent Dominguez) which, in
sum, directed a management take-over, disbanding the board of directors. A “legal fencing”
ensued. Eventually, the case was filed against Bunye, Dominguez et al. with the Sandiganbayan.
Sec. Dominguez contends he was acting under Sec 8 of PD 175 which grants him authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. Under LOI 23,169 which implements PD 175, “an
elected officer, director or committee member [of cooperatives] may be removed by a vote of
majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly.”

Issue:
Is the Order issued by Sec. Dominguez valid?

Held:
No. It is clear from LOI 23 that there is a procedure to be followed in the removal of directors or
officers of the KBMBPM which was not followed, and Sec. Dominguez arrogated unto himself
the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. Sec 8 of PD 175 does not give him that right. An administrative officer
has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
The President’s power of control may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees in the executive department if they are presidential appointees, but NOT
to those in the classified service. It merely applies over the acts of the subordinate and not over
the actor himself – limitation of President’s power of control
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP

Held:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines
to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it
amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Eduardo Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34
G.R. No. L-54558 – 150 SCRA 144

Facts:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in
Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1)
unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President
and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño
and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo
Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went
to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD:
The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case
reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement.
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18
Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military
detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be
dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of
Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

ISSUE2:
The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians
while the civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD:
The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals
during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open
and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004

Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers
as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.

Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts
or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation
of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state
of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15,

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of
Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined,
the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the
duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces,
the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
RANDOLF DAVID VS PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
489 SCRA 160

Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No.
5 (GO 5) aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional
for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-
Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take
over power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP and still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of
the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional.
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO
5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not
stifle liberty.

Overbreadth Theory
As an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. A plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.

Calling Out Power Doctrine

President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers

Take Care Doctrine

The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority
to promulgate ‘decrees.’ It is a Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take
care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a
valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
Torres vs. Gonzales
G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987

Facts:
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment
and to pay indemnity. A conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement.
The condition of the pardon was allegedly violated by petitioner for having been charged with
twenty counts of estafa and convicted of the crime of sedition. NBI records also shows that a
long list of charges had been brought against him. Thus, the cancellation of the pardon was
recommended by the Board of Pardons and Parole and eventually cancelled by the President.

Issue:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary to constitute
violation of the terms of a President’s conditional pardon.

Ruling:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

Note: The determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination would
not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the
judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the
courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed
a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency
could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog
City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore
the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she
is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required
to pay the proportionate share.

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that
the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
2. Whether or not the absolute pardon exempts petitioner from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Ruling:

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
“Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered,
and no satisfaction for it can be required.”

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
People vs. Salle, Jr.
G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995

Facts:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants
seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal and were accepted by the Court. Later on, Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon
that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from
confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and
hence, the appeal should be dismissed.

Both appellants were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison. Atty. La’o further informed the
Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She then prays
that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his
acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused can be enforced during the pendency of his
appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court.

RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the
person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

The Court declared that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article
VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be
begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification
issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon
shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by
virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall
render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the
accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from
confinement.
GARCIA VS. COA
226 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him.
The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment
of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do
not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.

ISSUE:
Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to
the grant of executive clemency.

RULING:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was
forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in
automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to
back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him
a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a
person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party
from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the
grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his
reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make
reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right
to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally
dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.
LLAMAS VS. ORBOS

FACTS:
Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption. He was suspended for
office for 90 days; hence his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office. Less than two months,
however, Executive Secretary Orbos, without ruling on Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration,
issued a Resolution granting executive clemency. Thus, Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of
the province.

Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could
be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even
in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him,
the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also contends that the pardon granted was
premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary
period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated
since he was not notified of the pardon.

ISSUE:
May the president grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

RULING:
Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution.
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised
by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish,
we must not distinguish. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases
of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.
EDUARDO KAPUNAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi charges with the killing of KMU Chairman Rolando Olalia
and his driver Leonor Ala-ay.
On June 1986 Olalia and and Ala –ay dead body was found. The murder case of Olalia is a
controversial case during that time, Oliala is a profile individual being the Chairman of the KMU
at the time of his death.
On November 1998, private respondents Feliciano Olalia and Perlina Ala-ay filed a complaint
letter to the Department of Justice for the alleged complex kidnapping and killing of Olalia and
Ala-ay against Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi and other men and officers of Philippine
National Police and AFP.
The Petitioner filed a petition to dismiss in the Department of Justice on the ground that the
Amnesty Granted to them by the National Amnesty Commission extinguishes their criminal
liability under Proclamation 347 issued by Pres. Ramos, “Granting of Amnesty to the rebels,
insurgents and all other persons, who may or may be committed in the furtherance of political
ends.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes criminal liability in
Olalia case.

RULING:
The panel created by the Department of Justice refused to consider the defense of Amnesty of the
Petitioners on the ground that the document presented pertaining to the Amnesty failed to show
that the Olalia murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for.

The Court of Appel (COA) also dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion of
the Panel created by the DOJ. The Appellate Court refused to rule on the applicability of
Amnesty issued to Kapunan and Legaspi.

The SC dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the Amnesty granted to Kapunan
and Legaspi pertains only to the crimes against rebellion and not covered crime of murder of
Olalia na Ala-ay.
COMMISIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN SEA TRADING
3 SCRA 351

FACTS:
Several onion and garlic shipments imported by respondent consignee from Hongkong and Japan
were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of Section 1363 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Allegedly, none of the shipments had the certificate required by
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45 (requiring a Central Bank license and a certificate authorizing
the importation or release of the subject good ) for their release. The Collector of Customs of
Manila rendered judgment declaring the forfeiture of the goods in favor of the Government.
Upon appeal, theCommissioner of Customs upheld the Collector’s decision. Respondent filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA reversed the
Commissioner’ s decision. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the executive agreement sought to be implemented by EO 328 islegal and valid,
considering that the Senate has not concurred in the makingof said executive agreemen

RULING:
NO. Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution “No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Treaties are different from executive agreements. While treaties are formal documents which
require ratification by the Senate, executive agreements become binding through executive
action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress. Further, international agreements
involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; on the other hand,
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
usually take the form of executive agreements. The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by
long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements
covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
LOURDES RUBRICO et.al VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO et, al.

FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the
301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her
daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp.
Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that
a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

RULING:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit
not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of
the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.