Chaves vs.

Public Estate Authority

G.R. No. 133250

FACTS:
The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with
CDCP to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay under the MCCRRP.
Later on President Marcos signed PD No. 1084 and 1085 creating PEA and transferring to
PEA the reclaimed lands in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay. In addition, a
Memorandum of Agreement was executed between PEA and CDCP wherein the latter
acceded and transferred its rights and interest in favor of the former as regards CDCP’s
reclaimed lands under MCCRRP. During Aquino’s administration, special patents as well
as 3 TCTs (the lands were known as Freedom Islands) were issued in favor of PEA.

PEA and AMARI, a private corporation, through negotiation but without conducting any
public bidding entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) for the develop-
ment of the Freedom Islands. A year later, Senate President Maceda described such JVA
during his privileged speech as the “grandmother of all scams”. Consequently, a joint
investigation was conducted and the report concluded that the JVA is illegal because
what PEA seeks to do is to transfer ownership of the reclaimed lands which are public
lands hence inalienable to AMARI. However, the Legal Task formed by Pres. Ramos up-
held the legality of the JVA.

Phillipine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that Pres. Ramos ordered that rene-
gotiations regarding the JVA be again made. Such JVA (now called Amended JVA) was
later on approved by Pres. Estrada. Petitioner Chavez prays that the Amended JVA be
declared null and void for it violating the Constitutional and statutory provisions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation may acquire the reclaimed lands? NO

HELD:
In this case, the SC traced back the laws governing reclaimed lands as regards its alien-
ability. The previous Constitutions including the 1987 Constitution has adopted the Re-
galian Doctrine wherein it states that all public lands and waters are owned by the State.
The court discussed and emphasized also CA No. 141 which states that the only way the
government can sell to private parties’ government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. In
addition, the Constitution has established that private corporations (such as AMARI) can-
not acquire the reclaimed lands however; these corporations are allowed to lease them.
This rule is absolute.

Applying these provisions to the case, the reclaimed lands are classified as public prop-
erty and in order for PEA to sell these lands; there must be a legislative act granting such
right to sell. In addition, even if there exist an express provision in favor of PEA, such would
still subject of the constitutional ban as regards private corporation acquiring reclaimed
alienable lands.
As mentioned and established already, these reclaimed lands are considered inaliena-
ble public property. PD No. 1085 granting PEA the power to oversee the Freedom Islands
did not in any way convert the lands into alienable or disposable lands. The issuance of
special patents by Pres. Aquino as well as the TCTs also did not convert it into private
lands. It must be noted that the registration of public lands under Torrens system cannot
convert it into private property.

Villarico vs. Sarmiento

G.R. No. 136438
Facts:
Teofilo C. Villarico is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, Metro Manila with
an area of 66 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 95453 is-
sued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.
Petitioner’s lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue by a strip of land belonging
to the government. As this highway was elevated by four meters and therefore higher
than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) con-
structed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to
have access to the highway. Respondents Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sar-
miento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, had a building constructed on a portion of
said government land. A part thereof was occupied by Andok’s Litson Corporation and
Marites’ Carinderia. Petitioner alleged inter alia that respondents’ structures on the gov-
ernment land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached
on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430. The trial court found that petitioner
has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in question. On the con-
trary, the defendants are the ones who have been in actual possession of the area. Ac-
cording to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of his "right of way" as he could
use the Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in concluding that existence of the plaintiff-appellant’s
right of way does not carry possession over the same.

Held:
No. The lot on which petitioner’s alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the state or
property of public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the
Civil Code. Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a prop-
erty of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of
way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the
government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he
can not claim any right of possession over it.

Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic

G.R. No. 179987
Facts:
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Ba-
rangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D. On
February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the
Regional Trial Court in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predeces-
sors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse posses-
sion and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judi-
cial confirmation of his title.1 To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June
11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part
and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

Held:
No. Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patri-
monial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article
425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the
public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must
only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or na-
tional parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassifica-
tion,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested
in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classi-
fied as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public
land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly author-
ized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its preroga-
tive to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable. The property subject of the appli-
cation of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.To
be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is neces-
sary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable. To reiterate, then, the
petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their prede-
cessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satis-
fying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land
cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subse-
quent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Sec-
tion 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligi-
ble for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Republic vs. Santos, III.

G. R. No. 160453
Facts:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arca-
dio Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B
(the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paranaque City. The property was
bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Ar-
cadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an aban-
doned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his
co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notori-
ous, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. The City of Para-
ñaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed
the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal ease-
ment of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of
the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and
had not resulted from accretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the finding of the court that respondents have continously, openly, pub-
licly and adversely occupied the subject property for more than 30 years is not sup-
ported by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.

Held:
Yes. The application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous
in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but in-
stead the drying up of the Parañaque River. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion,
must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may
be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to al-
ienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of en-
try, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect title. A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from
a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1)
and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property
of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the
creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. vs. Republic

G. R. No. 177168
Facts:
A Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) issued in Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc
(NOVAI)’s name covers a land situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military
Reservation in Taguig. This property was previously a part of a larger parcel of land
which TCT’s under the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The then President
Garcia issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for military purposes certain
parcels of the public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and
Pasay City. Thereafter, then President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461
which excluded Fort McKinley a certain portion of land situated in the provinces above
mentioned and declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be disposed of under the pro-
visions of certain laws. However, this area was subsequently reserved for veterans’
rehabilitation, medicare and training center sites.

The property was the subject of deed of sale between the Republic and NOVAI to
which the TCT was registered in favour of the latter. The Republic then sought to cancel
NOVAI’s title on the ground that the property was still part of the military reservation thus
inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be the subject of sale. The RTC ruled
that the property was alienable and disposable in character. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the property covered by TCT issued under the name of NOVAI is inalien-
able land of public domain and cannot be the subject of sale.

Held:
Yes, the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have
been validly disposed of in NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of prov-
ing that the property was not intended for public or quasi-public use or purpose. As pro-
vided in Article 420 of Civil Code, “property of the public dominion as those
which are intended for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the
State and are intended for some public service”. In this case, the property was classified
as military reservation thus, remained to be property of the public dominion until with-
drawn from the public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Con-
gress or by proclamation of the President. Since there was no positive act from the
government, the property had to retain its inalienable and non-disposable character. It
cannot therefore be subject of sale otherwise, the sale is void for being contrary to law.

City of Lapu-Lapu vs. PEZA

G.R. Nos. 184203, 187583
Facts:
The City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA
real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in
the Mactan Economic Zone. The City reiterated its demand. It cited Sections 193 and
234 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that withdrew the real property tax exemp-
tions previously granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons. The City pointed out that
no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA
from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66
that explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly ex-
empted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax
the PEZA. The City made subsequent demands on the PEZA. In its last reminder. the City
assessed the PEZA real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 2002.

Issue:
Whether or not PEZA is a property of public dominion thus, exempt from payment of real
property taxes

Held:
Yes. Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real property such as lands, build-
ings, machinery, and other improvements not otherwise specifically exempted under
the Local Government Code. Real property taxes are ad valorem, with the amount
charged based on a fixed proportion of the value of the property. Under the law, prov-
inces, cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area have the power to
levy real property taxes within their respective territories. Except as provided herein, any
exemption from payment of real property taxes previously granted to, or presently en-
joyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or -con-
trolled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encum-
brance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execu-
tion or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to pub-
lic policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.On the other hand, all other properties of
the state that are not intended for public use or are not intended for some public ser-
vice or for the development of the national wealth are patrimonial properties.

Petitioners, therefore, are not deprived of revenues from the operations of economic
zones within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The national government ensured
that local government units comprising economic zones shall retain their basic auton-
omy and identity. All told, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government.
Furthermore, the lands owned by the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic
of the Philippines. The City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan cannot collect real
property taxes from the PEZA.

Republic vs. Aboitiz

G.R. No. 174626
Facts:
Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land Title of a parcel of land located in
Talamban, Cebu City, and identified as Lot 11193 of the Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension,
before the RTC. In support of his application, Aboitiz attached the original Tracing Cloth
Plan with a blueprint copy, the technical description of the land, the certificate of the
geodetic engineer surveying the land, and the documents evidencing possession and
ownership of the land. To prove his claim, Aboitiz presented his witness, Sarah Be-
nemerito his secretary, who testified that he entrusted to her the subject property and
appointed her as its caretaker; that he purchased the subject property from Irenea Ka-
puno on September 5, 1994; that he had been in actual, open, continuous, and exclu-
sive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner; that as per record
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, the sub-
ject property had been classified as alienable and disposable since 1957; that per certi-
fication of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu
City, the subject property was not covered by any subsisting public land application;
and that the subject property had been covered by tax declarations from 1963 to 1994
in Irenea’s name, and from 1994 to present, in his name. Another witness for Aboitiz, Luz
Kapuno, daughter of Irenea, the original owner of the subject property, testified that
she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the deed of sale of the subject property
and that saw her mother affix her signature on the said document. She added that her
mother was in open, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive possession of the said prop-
erty.

Issue:
Whether or not Aboitiz is entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529, or, in the alternative, pursuant to Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Held:
No. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not re-
quire that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire pe-
riod of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe im-
posed by Section 4722 of the Public Land Act. The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Regis-
tration Decree. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a dec-
laration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express govern-
ment manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive pe-
riod for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Patrimonial
property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patri-
monial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Alolino vs. Flores

G.R. No. 198774
Facts:
Alolino is the registered owner of 2 contiguous parcels of land situated at No. 47 Gen.
Luna Street, Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 784 and 976. TCT No. 784 was issued on August 30, 1976 while TCT No. 976 was is-
sued on August 29, 1977. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the
property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his two-
storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors. There are
also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another
three (3) on the second floor. Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their
house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the
rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. Since they were constructing on a municipal
road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only about 2
to 3 inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit
door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had
previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through
the rear door of his house.

Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter re-
fused. Thus, he complained about the illegal construction to the Building Official of the
Municipality of Taguig. He also filed a complaint with the Barangay of Tuktukan. Acting
on Alolino's complaint, the Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal Construction
against the respondents on February 15, 1995, directing them to immediately stop fur-
ther construction.4

The respondents began constructing a second floor to their structure, again without se-
curing a building permit. This floor was to serve as residence for their daughter, Maria
Teresa Sison. The construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with the Build-
ing Official of Taguig. The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal Construction
against the respondents on May 6, 2002, directing the respondents to desist from their
illegal construction.5

The Office of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan issued a certification that no settlement
was reached between the parties relative to Alolino's 1994 complaint.6 The respondents
did not comply with the directive from the building official. This prompted Alolino to
send them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the removal of their illegally
constructed structure.

Issue:
Whether or not Alolino has a right of way over the lot occupied by the respondents be-
cause it is a barrio road.

Held:
Yes. There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on government
property. Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property
for public use or patrimonial property. Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes be-
tween the two classifications. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial
and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public do-
minion devoted to public use.

Dumo vs. Republic

G.R. No. 218269
Facts:
The Subject Property was purchased by Espinas from Carlos Calica through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 19 October 1943. Espinas exercised acts of dominion over the Sub-
ject Property by appointing a caretaker to oversee and administer the property. In 1963,
Espinas executed an affidavit stating his claim of ownership over the Subject Property.
Espinas had also been paying realty taxes on the Subject Property. Meanwhile, on 6 Feb-
ruary 1987, the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale over a
parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 17276. Finding that the Deed of Partition
with Absolute Sale executed by the heirs of Trinidad included the Subject Property, the
heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages to
protect their interests. The heirs of Espinas also sought a Temporary Restraining Order to
enjoin the Writ of Partial Execution of the Decision in a Forcible Entry complaint filed by
the heirs of Trinidad against them.

Issue:
Whether Dumo is able to prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable land of public domain.

Held:
No.The evidence submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration
in order to show the alienable character of the lands subject herein. In this case, Dumo
failed to submit any of the documents required to prove that the land she seeks to register
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Land of the public domain is con-
verted into patrimonial property when there is an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth. Without such declaration, acquisitive prescription does not start
to run, even if such land is alienable and disposable and the applicant is in possession
and occupation thereof. There must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, re-
mains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are ex-
pressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the de-
velopment of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. Mere
classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable does not make such land
patrimonial property of the State – an express declaration by the State that such land is
no longer intended for public use, public service or the development of national wealth
is imperative. Under CA No. 141, the power given to the President to classify lands as
alienable and disposable extends only to lands of the public domain. Lands of the public
domain are public lands intended for public use, or without being for public use, are
intended for some public service or for the development of national wealth. Lands of the
public domain, like alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, are not private
lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are those that are to be dis-
posed of to private individuals by sale or application, because their disposition to private
individuals is for the development of the national wealth. Thus, homesteads, which are
granted to individuals from alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, are for
the development of agriculture which would redound to the development of national
wealth. However, until the lands are alienated or disposed of to private individuals, they
remain "alienable lands of the public domain," as expressly classified by the 1987 Philip-
pine Constitution. Lands of the public domain become patrimonial property only when
they are no longer intended for public use or public service or the development of na-
tional wealth.

Republic vs. Sps. Alejandre

G.R. No. 217336
Facts:
On July 18, 1991, Spouses Alejandre filed an application for the registration of Lot
No. 6487 under P.D. No. 1529. They alleged that they are the owners of the subject
property by virtue of a deed of sale or conveyance; that the subject property was
sold to them by its former owner Angustia Lizardo Taleon by way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990; that the said land is presently occupied
by the applicants-spouses. The Land Registration Authority submitted a Report
noting that there were discrepancies in the plan submitted by the applicant
spouses, which discrepancies were referred to the Lands Management Sector for
verification and correction. The trial court granted the applicant spouses' motion
to submit original tracing cloth plan and technical description for purposes of fa-
cilitating the approval of the re-surveyed plans as well as the submission of the
new plan for the scrutiny and approval of the LRA.

The LRA submitted its Supplementary Report stating that the "polygon does not
close" even after the corrections effected on the bearings and distances of the
technical description were made. Hence, the LRA requested for reverification
and correction. the LRA submitted its Final Report stating that it applied the cor-
rected technical description of the subject lot and no more discrepancy exists,
however, the area was increased by 6 meters. The trial court ordered the submis-
sion of publication of the amended or new technical description.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in controversy is of private dominion.

Held:
No. Pursuant to Article 419 of the Civil Code, property, in relation to the person
to whom it belongs, is either of public dominion or of private ownership. As such,
properties are owned either in a public capacity (dominio publico) or in a pri-
vate capacity (propiedad privado).There are three kinds of property of public
dominion: (1) those intended for public use; (2) those intended for some public
service; and (3) those intended for the development of national wealth. This is
provided in Article 420 of the Civil Code. In turn, the Civil Code classifies property
of private ownership into three categories: (1) patrimonial property of the State
under Articles 421 and 422; (2) patrimonial property of LGUs under Article 424;
and (3) property belonging to private individuals under Article 425.

Respondents, based on the evidence that they adduced, are apparently claim-
ing ownership over the land subject of their application for registration by virtue
of tradition, as a consequence of the contract of sale, and by succession in so
far as their predecessors-in-interest are concerned. Both modes are derivative
modes of acquiring ownership. Yet, they failed to prove the nature or classifica-
tion of the land. The fact that they acquired the same by sale and their trans-
feror by succession is not incontrovertible proof that it is of private dominion or
ownership. In the absence of such incontrovertible proof of private ownership,
the well-entrenched presumption arising from the Regalian doctrine that the
subject land is of public domain or dominion must be overcome. Respondents
failed to do this.

Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. vs. COA

G.R. No. 210669
Facts:
The government, through the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (now DPWH),
converted to a road right-of-way (RROW) a 29,690 sq. m. portion of the 89,070 sq. m.
parcel of land (subject property) located in Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, for the Manila
South Expressway Extension Project. The subject property was registered in the name of
Commercial and Industrial Real Estate Corporation (CIREC) under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-40999. Later on, Philippine Polymide Industrial Corporation (PPIC) ac-
quired the subject property, which led to the cancellation of TCT No. T-40999 and the
issuance of TCT No. T-120988 under its name. PPIC then mortgaged the subject property
with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government financing institution,
which later acquired the property in a foreclosure proceeding. TCT No. T-120988, under
PPIC's name, was then cancelled, and TCT No. T-151837 was issued in favor of DBP. De-
spite the use of the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the property as RROW, the government neither
annotated its claim or lien on the titles of CIREC, PPIC and DBP nor initiated expropriation
proceedings, much less paid just compensation to the registered owners. Upon issuance
of Administrative Order No. 14 entitled "Approving the Identification of and Transfer to
the National Government of Certain Assets and Liabilities of the Development Bank of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank," the DBP submitted all its acquired assets,
including the subject property, to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposal, pursuant
to Proclamation No. 50.

APT disposed of a portion of the subject property in a public bidding. The Abstract of Bids5
indicated that Fibertex, through Ester H. Tanco, submitted a ₱154,000,000.00 bid for the
asset formerly belonging to PPIC located in Calamba, Laguna while TNC Philippines, Inc.
and P. Lim Investment, Inc. submitted a bid of ₱106,666,000.00 and ₱138,000,000.00, re-
spectively. With respect to the former assets of Texfiber in Taytay, Rizal, only Fibertex sub-
mitted a bid of ₱2 l 0,000,000.00. In a Certification, APT certified that Fibertex was the
highest bidder of PPIC and Texfiber assets for ₱370,000,000.00, and recommended to the
Committee on Privatization to award said assets to Fibertex. In a Letter, APT certified that
Fibertex paid APT ₱370,000,000.00 for the purchase of the said assets formerly belonging
to PPIC and Texfiber.

Issue:
Whether or not the government can enter into a contract with the highest bidder and
incorporate substantial provisions beneficial to the latter which are not included or con-
templated in the terms and specifications upon which the bids were solicited.

Held:
No. It is contrary to the very concept of public bidding to permit an inconsistency be-
tween the terms and conditions under which the bids were solicited and those under
which the bids were solicited and those under which proposals are submitted and ac-
cepted. Moreover, the substantive amendment of the terms and conditions of the con-
tract bid out, after the bidding process had been concluded, is violative of the principles
in public bidding and will render the government vulnerable to the complaints from the
losing bidders.
Thus, since the area of [29,690 sq. m. which later became] 26,997 sq. m. covered by the
ROW was not subject of the public bidding, Hi-Lon cannot validly acquire and own the
same. The owner of this property is still the Republic of the Philippines.

Article 420 of the New Civil Code considers as property of public dominion those in-
tended for public use, such as roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the state, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character. Being of similar char-
acter as roads for public use, a road right-of-way (RROW) can be considered as a prop-
erty of public dominion, which is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased,
donated, sold, or be the object of a contract, except insofar as they may be the object
of repairs or improvements and other incidental matters. However, this RROW must be
differentiated from the concept of easement of right of way under Article 649 of the
same Code, which merely gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on
the property but grants no title thereto, inasmuch as the owner of the servient estate
retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the
same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.