FACTS:
L-9005 June 20, 1958
Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and
husband in Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no
children. Matea became seriously ill. Knowing her critical
condition, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and
convinced her to go for confession. They fetched Father Bautista,
Catholic priest of Pasay and the latter upon hearing the
confession of the bed-ridden Matea and knowing that she is
living with Felipe without the benefit of marriage then ratified the
union of the two by solemnizing their marriage in articulo mortis
with the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from her illnes but
died subsequently after few months. Arsenio and Ricarda de
Loria, granchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint and
complete delivery of the property of the deceased contending
that they are the succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the
marriage of the latter is not valid because of lack of marriage
contract signed by the contracting parties. Felix resisted the
action standing his rights as the widower. CFI ruled in favor of the
complainants but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis
is valid.
HELD:
YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis, where
all the requisites are present renders its validity. The failure of the
solemnizing priest to make and file an affidavit as required under
Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law does not affect the validity nor
renders the nullity of said marriage. Hence, CA’s devision is
affirmed.
G.R. No.
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the
central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo
mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific,
these two persons lived together as wife and husband at
Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had
no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and
surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing
her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated
to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They
fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of
Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been
living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage,
asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites
of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the
confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy
Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in
articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting
as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but
death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was
interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial
ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed
this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to
deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are
grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and
claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe
Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of
first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed
and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally
to consider the legal question-which they amply discussed in
their petition and printed brief — whether the events which
took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law,
a valid and binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr.
Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis
of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January
29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the
reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old
priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the
other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the
celebration or performance of the marriage in question,
Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo
mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point
of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that her
condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and
according to his observation, she might die at any moment
(Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her condition that
he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme
unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest
objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the
validity of the marriage under consideration, is the admitted
fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage
Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to
solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties
had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both
declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these
propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded
couple the witnesses and the priest, as required by section 3
of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage
with the local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may
seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding
thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such
marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the
marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question
at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send
copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local
Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record
of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the
said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue tendered
in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on
Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the
failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute
a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned
in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal
capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of
legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This
declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate,
signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and
said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing
the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29
and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage.
Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential
requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter
being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife" — which in this case actually occurred.3 We think
the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was
required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing
the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited
making it an essential requisite — not the formal requirement
of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of
marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be
established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the
solemnization of marriage usually provide for the issuance of
a certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording
of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or
recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the
statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license,
certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and
registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence
"Marriage" p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that
statutes which direct that a license must be issued and
procured, that only certain persons shall perform the
ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be
present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed,
returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed
to persons in authority to secure publicity and to require a
record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do
not void common-law marriages unless they do so
expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without
obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of
these statutes to discourage deception and seduction,
prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and
relieve from doubt the status of parties who live together as
man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the
marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage"
pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris
Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several formal requirements
of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to
furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate
(section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed
G.R. No. L-43588 November 7, 1935
accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the
wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's
omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the
prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its
environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file
the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's
obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious
consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this
case, it was caused by the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's
natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo
mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it
does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites
for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones
vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon,
55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage
license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file
it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the
issuance of a marriage license. The firstpractically
substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated
without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this
marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such
affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of
men and women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage6,
(section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the
deceased than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister
Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews,
children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with
costs. So ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD LUAGUE and WENCESLAO ALCANSARE, defendants-appellants.

Vicente E. Calanog for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

RECTO, J.:

The spouses Wenceslao Alcansare and Natividad Luague having been charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros and sentenced, the former to the penalty of from eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to fourteen years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, with the accessories of the law, and the latter to that of from six
years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, with the
accessory penalties of the law, both to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Paulino Disuasido in the sum of one thousand pesos,
with costs, appealed to this court for a review of the judgment rendered against them, praying that the same reversed and that they
be acquitted.

Upon examination of the appeal, it appears: that in the morning of February 18, 1935, while the accused Natividad Luague was in her
house situated in Lupuhan, barrio of Agpañgi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros, with only her three children of tender age
for company, her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare having gone to grind corn in Juan Garing's house several kilometers
away, Paulino Disuasido came and began to make love to her; that as Natividad could not dissuade him from his purpose, she started
for the kitchen where Paulino followed her, notwithstanding her instance that she could by no means accede to his wishes, for Paulino,
bent on satisfying them at all costs, drew and opened a knife and, threatening her with death, began to embrace her and to touch her
breasts; that in preparing to lie with her, Paulino had to leave the knife on the floor and the accused, taking advantage of the situation,
picked up the weapon and stabbed him in the abdomen; and that Paulino, feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the
window and falling on some stones, while the accused set forth immediately for the poblacion to surrender herself to the authorities
and report the incident.

Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare, and in
the circumstances above set out, constitutes the exempting circumstance defined in article 11, subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
because, as stated by a commentator of note, "aside from the right to life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have
the right to party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony." (1 Viada, 172, 173, 5th
edition.) "Will the attempt to rape a woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense?" asks the
same commentator. "We think so," he answer, "inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not
more, cannot her very existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress, in an outrage
which impresses an indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman Law says: quum virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non
protest (because virginity or chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills
the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage." (1 Viada,
301, 5th edition.)

Similar to the present question was the one determined the Supreme Court of Spain in a decision of February 21, 1911: "This court in
due homage to the principles of morality and in strict observance of the provision of law justly interpreted, has always held that one
of the rights referred to in article 8, subsection 4, of the Penal Code, is that which assists a woman in defense of her honor when an
attempt is made to repel the aggression or to avoid in time the imminent danger of its consummation; and in view of this, it must be
conceded upon the findings of the trial court, that the accused Maria Sanchez Cañistro acted in legitimate self-defense, because the
conduct of Diego Cardenas, who made love to her, in blowing in at midnight, knocking at the door and demanding admittance and
against Maria's refusal, insisting in his purpose and threatening to break open the door, in the light of prior events and the
circumstances of the case, implies the imminence of an affront against honor, involving an actual and certain danger to the person so
threatened, while at the same time the fact that she was alone that no help was forthcoming; her founded fear that the door might
give way and the dreaded evil wrought, her consequent helplessness on the advent of that crisis, and her natural desire to attest openly
her conjugal fidelity by foiling all suspicious aspersions, show the reasonableness of the defensive measures availed of by her and
warrant her complete exemption from liability, inasmuch as, aside from all these, it does not appear from the decision that said accused
had previously committed any act deserving of censure or marring the just motive which obviously induced her to repel, as she did, a
violence unprovoked by her. Thus viewed, all the requisites of the exempting circumstance above mentioned are present and should
be taken into consideration, etc." (1 Viada, 304, 5th edition.)

The theory the prosecution, which we consider a trifle unsubstantial is as follows: The accused Wenceslao Alcansare, thinking that
Paulino importuned his wife with unchaste advances, out of jealousy, decided to get rid of him. His chance to bring about his plan can
when, in the morning of the crime, Paulino happened to pass in front of the house of the spouses with his friend Olimpio Libosada.
The accused wife invited Paulino to drop in, which the letter and his friend did. The spouses met them at the threshold. The accused
wife asked Paulino whether he had a knife and as the latter answered in the affirmative, she asked him to lend it to lend it to her
because she wanted to cut her nails, to which Paulino willingly acceded, while the accused wife was cutting her nails, she asked Paulino
where he came from and the latter answered, turning his head around, that he came from the house of one Inting, whereupon the
accused wife slashed him in the abdomen. Paulino tried to return the blow but the accused husband picked up a stone and struck him
in the forehead. Wounded in the abdomen and in the forehead, Paulino fled therefrom.

The government presented three witnesses to establish this theory. Pablo Alvarez, barrio lieutenant of Cabuñgahan, testified that on
his way to "communal" the day before the crime, he met the accused wife who told him that she had wanted to see him and ask his
help because her husband, who was jealous of Paulino, was maltreating her and he was furthermore resolved to assault Paulino at
sight. On the following day, Alvarez, in his way to Bacacay, dropped in the house of the accused spouses to inquire whether they had
tobacco seeds and, as they answered him in the negative, he went his way. He had hardly left the place when Paulino and Olimpio
arrived, the accused wife inviting the former to drop in. Paulino and Olimpio went to the threshold of the house and the accused
spouses, in turn, went down, and the four engaged in a conversation which, to Alvarez, seemed a friendly one. The witness left and
when he returned to the place sometime later, he was informed that Paulino had been stabbed.

The accused were from the barrio of Agpañgi and not from Cabuñgahan where the witness was the barrio lieutenant. Had the accused
wife gone to complain against the alleged conduct of her husband, she would have sought the lieutenant of Agpañgi, her barrio. The
accused wife, by reporting the incident directly to the municipal authorities without seeking the intervention of any barrio lieutenant,
showed that she knew where to go in a difficulty.

Were it true that the accused husband, prompted by jealousy, designed to do away with Paulino, it would have been because he
observed that his wife somehow returned Paulino's attentions, for otherwise he would not have indulge in tragic cogitations. From any
point of view, however, it is quite incomprehensible why the wife would take upon herself and the husband would charge her with, the
execution of the plan. The observation is no less true if the spouses plotted in common for it would have been patently disgraceful and
cowardly of the husband to thrust its execution upon the wife at the hazard of her life, and liberty to shield his own, in the event of
prosecution; and there is the husband was thus minded. Under the theory of the prosecution, whether the accused husband doubted
his wife's fidelity or was sure of it, in connection with Paulino's attentions, the natural thing in either case would be for him, unaided by
his wife, to avenge the affront or punish the offender. In the case at bar, we must assume that, if the motive attributed to him by the
prosecution were true, the accused would have acted, as would the great majority of men in identical circumstances.

The witness Alvarez, himself testified that he was informed the day before by the wife of the accused husband that the latter would
get even with Paulino at the first opportunity. The witness saw them together in the morning of the crime and he should have surmised
that the announced tragedy might take place. Rather than foil it, as an agent of the law, if for no other reason, he went his way
unconcerned, as if nothing serious was impending.

We find his conduct, or that which he claims to have followed, so extremely strange to be considered true. When the truth is beyond
our reach, as is often the case, we have to be contented with the probable. This is the basis of the so-called presumptions of fact. The
acts which this witness claims to have done are so out of ordinary conduct of men as to be devoid of probability. Occasionally, indeed,
there are those who behave strangely, but this is the exception and not the rule.

In addition to this, the theory of the prosecution that the accused husband and his wife had conspired to kill Paulino is overcome by
the very facts which the prosecution itself has attempted to prove. If such conspiracy had really existed, the accused spouses would
have been fully prepared to carry it into execution, because rational beings differ from those who are not in that when they embark
on anything, they make the s equal to its realization. However, these amused, on the on, had neither a rusty bolo nor an outworn club
to cope with Paulino. The weapon with which Paulino was first wounded was his own knife which, according to the prosecution, the
accused wife had to borrow from him on the pretext that she wanted to cut her nails, and later a stone which the accused husband
casually picked up from the ground. Yarns of this kind make good material for fables.

Angel Emia, the other government witness who testified at the trial that he saw the crime attributed to the two accused by the
prosecution, made a previous statement wherein he disclaimed knowledge of who had stabbed Paulino. Required to explain the
contradiction, he bungled in his attempt. The trial judge erred in giving him credit. Olimpio Libosada, another government witness,
likewise affirmed that he had seen all that bad transpired, claiming that he then accompanied Paulino, It seem strange, however, that
in the two statements made by Paulino before his death he did not state that he was accompanied by Libosada or by any other person
in the morning of the crime. It likewise happens that the conduct of this witness, according to his own testimony, appears to be
inconsistent because he did nothing to defend and help Paulino, his friend and companion, in that most critical moment, and did not
report the crime to the authorities, disappearing from the scene all of a sudden with a very frivolous excuse that "he was afraid to be
implicated". Furthermore, after discarding the testimony of Angel Emia, there is nothing to corroborate that of Olimpio Libosada which,
by its inherent weakness, cannot be alone and unsubstantiated by other reliable incriminatory circumstances, support a judgment of
conviction.lawphil.net

As to the two statements, Exhibit C and D, styled, ante mortem by the Solicitor-General, the trial court properly disregarded because
them there is no evidence of record that Paulino had made them under a sense of impending death and with no hope of recovery.

The trial judge gave unusual importance to the testimony of the two policemen who testified that they made an ocular inspection of
the scene of the crime and found no bloodstain in the kitchen of the house of the accused spouses. This, according to the trial judge,
destroys the theory of the defense that Paulino was stabbed in said kitchen by the accused wife when he tried to lie with her through
intimidation and violence. We are of the opinion that the trial judge erred on this point as he did on others. It appears that the said
policemen did not also find any bloodstain on the threshold of the house of the accused spouses where, according to the
prosecution, the aggression took place. Therefore, said testimony contradicts the defense no less than it does the prosecution.

In resume, we are of the opinion that we should, as we do hereby hold that the accused Natividad Luague in wounding Paulino
Disuasido to death, acted in legitimate self-defense, and that the other accused Wenceslao Alcansare had no participation in said act;
wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, we hereby acquit both accused, and order their immediate release, if in confinement,
with costs de oficio.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan
CARINO, defendant Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001 year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the
Facts: care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceasedfrom various government agencies. Nicdao was
able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total
of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the
latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage
was solemnized without the required marriage license. The
trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay
Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan
Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does
not fall within any of those exceptionsand a marriage license
therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently
overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino
is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity
of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was
contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of
the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 103047, September 2,
1994236 SCRA 257
FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony without the knowledge of the former’s parents. All the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage which
includes procurement of marriage license, was attended by
Cardenas. It was stated in the marriage contract that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of Castro and
Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after which they parted
ways. Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible
annulment of her marriage with Cardenas before leaving for the
States to follow her daughter who was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a
certification stating that Castro and Cardenas were allegedly
married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June
20, 1970 but such cannot be located since it does not appear in
their records. It was then that she found out that there was no
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of her marriage
with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of her marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial
Court denied her petition. It ruled that “inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued.”
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that
the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established
the absence of a marriage license. The respondent appellate court
reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring that the marriage
between the contracting parties is null and void and directed the
Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the marriage contract. However,
the Republic of the Philippines, the petition erherein, brought a
petition for review on certiorari which alleged that the certification
and the uncorroborated testimony of Castro are not sufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.
ISSUE
:Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of marriage.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and
inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate
of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his
office did not issue marriage license no.3196182 to the contracting
parties. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not aground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The finding of the appellate court that
the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for
lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed,
a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing officer. It was held that under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of
the subject marriage license. Therefore, the petition is DENIED
there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.

Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257

FACTS: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in
a civil ceremony without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including
the procurement of the marriage license. After the marriage, they
did not live together since their marriage was unknown to Castro’s
parents. They only decided to live together when Castro
discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four
months and the couple parted ways. When Castro was fixing her
marital status before leaving for the U.S., shediscovered that there
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage. She then filed for a declaration of
nullity of her marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license.
As evidence, she presented a certification stating that their
marriage license could not be located. The trial court denied the
petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish
the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the
celebration of the marriage between the parties. RTC ruled that the
"inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is
not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.”
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid.

HELD: Marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970. Hence, the law
governing controlling that time was the New Civil Code. NCC
provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a
marriage license. It is an essential requirement, hence, it’s absence
would render the marriage void ab initio.