ASSIGNED CASES AND STUDY MATERIALS FOR RECITATIONS (FIRST ROUND) | by Sheenah S.

Ilustrisimo LLB-I

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in
this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office. cdphil
Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
 condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys."
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law." cdrep

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that 'They must be Members of the Philippine Bar' — I am quoting from
the provision — 'who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' "
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to
interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you."

. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice
of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The
practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State
Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).LibLex
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not
[be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in
this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of
the policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-
making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. LLjur
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in
a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
— often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to identifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
 economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. llcd
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law"
is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships
with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not to understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial
law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11,
1989, p. 4). LLpr

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform
bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative."(pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
 fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers
for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either
party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule
of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: 'They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.' (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p.
265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking
into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: prcd

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide." (emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated bySection 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without re appointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts
of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. llcd
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus
in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would
be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help
in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins."

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent Office,respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE PATENT OFFICE. — Practice of law in the Philippines includes
such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION. — A member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business
in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the patent law and other laws applicable
as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are under the law taken to the Supreme Court.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J p:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office,
the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one of the
petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much
so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent
Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition
or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent cases before the
Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge
than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No.
165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which is similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with
which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as what prescribed by respondent. . . . ."
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who may practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is
similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations
the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first
time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before
the Patent Office and the preparation and prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
 preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys."
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A. 139, 144).
(Emphasis supplied)
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors,
and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions of the
Director of Patents have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not
be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be
considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or described in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign
country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines
for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the
true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, and Section 12 says that an application for a patent may be
filed only by the inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a
patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the
patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of
three years from the day the patent was granted, any person may apply for the grant of a license under a particular patent on
several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the
patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license, purchase,
lease or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade
or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or
public safety. All these things involve the application of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,
provides that:
". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a
patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the
Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the Director."
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not
the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent
Office.
". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give
authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied). ". . . .
The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a
patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and
his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner
should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
sale of the article invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,
because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or
other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as,
the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and technical description of
said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do
business before him to submit to an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and that the U. S. Patent Office in its Rules of Practice
of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed
and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
 "Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of attorneys and a register of agents are kept in the
Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before
the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent. Registration in the Patent Office
under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
"(a) Attorneys at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and
complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name
entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
"(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall
apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all
requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good
moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary
to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him
in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner
may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office."
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized
by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules
and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good
repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons
valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further
practice before his office any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any
manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such
suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition
of the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules
determine." (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just
reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him
should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the
Patent Office."
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While
the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may
take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point.
Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications
of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations
or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions
of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureaus of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction,
to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that
any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination
to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice
law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from
requiring members of thePhilippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear
and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
||| (Philippine Lawyer's Association v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426, [February 16, 1959], 105 PHIL 173-184)
 EN BANC

[B.M. No. 712. July 13, 1995.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, AL C. ARGOSINO,petitioner.

Benedicto Malcontento for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO CITIZENS OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER.
— The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval
and which we regard as having persuasive effect.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY AS TO THE MORAL CHARACTER IS BROADER IN SCOPE THAN IN A DISBARMENT PROCEEDING. — It
has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J p:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging
Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon
him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was grantedin an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take
the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was
not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated
11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of
his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is
a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character inthose who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we
quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3

"xxx xxx xxx

This 'upright character' prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license
to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all
the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor infollowing the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do
the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties
of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
 fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief
concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx" 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

"It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow
path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom
of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners, as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be
made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore,
to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very
source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license."
In Re Keenan: 6

"The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade
or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit
from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it."
Re Rouss: 7

"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one
of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness."
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

"Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests
of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to
courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of
the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest
possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice."

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
". . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
'The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless
he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything,
to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be
acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament
to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead
of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.'" 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
"The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding."
Re Wells: 11
". . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot
reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause
for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader inits scope than that in a
disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not
establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment."
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity
be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system
as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good
moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately
led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted
such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very
least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
 Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction
was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) days from
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
||| (In re of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [July 13, 1995],
316 PHIL 43-52)
 EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 712 . March 19, 1997.]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

SYLLABUS

1.LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law is
a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed our" lawyers who have become a
disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
2.ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER'S OATH; NOT A MERE CEREMONY OR FORMALITY FOR PRACTICING LAW; EVERY
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES WEIGH HIS ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAWYER'S OATH AND THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. — After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following, admonition: Inallowing
Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded
that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the
lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to
the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J p:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight
(8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and uponre-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending
petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge
from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two
(2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8)
accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a.He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather
than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b.He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only
out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c.As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father
who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
 d.He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits
the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who
are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s
oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission
to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent,
a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes
other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief
and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable.
It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer. cdasia

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of
Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer' s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the
contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him
the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL
TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the
Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL 766-771)
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. 93-7-696-0. February 21, 1995.]

IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client. There
would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the proceeding at bench, at
least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with
nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been
instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the
courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has, "with all the
valor of ignorance," 1 been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a well-known song,
rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him
competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly,
the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial
proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as
well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactions with three (3)
banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with his contractual
commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans
or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of
his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own
terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When,
understandably, the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously,
against said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued,
as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court
employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number of no
less than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has
been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish, complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978,
he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered
by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred
Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security
a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage
these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration
of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three
mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the properties at their auction
price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his outstanding account under
Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeodemurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits
commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R. CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance and
damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel
defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges,
without need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on
December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by the decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the
"plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant to allow redemption of the
properties in question."cdasia
Borromeo elevated the case to this Court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated August
15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of
Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution
dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third
such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to
the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7,
1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment, and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court
merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and
declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . .."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750; CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil action in the same Cebu
City Regional Trial Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB Branch Manager,
Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the
defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990, 3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action —
i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin
T.Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein. cdasia
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485; CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed
immovables. Contending that that act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given
short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto
Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva
A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the law firm, HERSINLAW . The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485.
The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases
just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed
properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it was
dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-
22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja,
Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th
Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368; CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action for the
same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law office.
This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money,
Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed
on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 14) 5 on the ground of litis pendentia. cdasia
The RTC ruled that —
"Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the Honorable Jufelinito
Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz
and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the present
Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW.
The only difference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City
Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City
Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently
they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case. . . ."

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485,
and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation
of the three properties mortgaged years earlier byBorromeo to TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on
November 11, 19916 — the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of November 11,
1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on march 31, 1992 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.Borromeo), 7 which decision also
directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event
the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's' attorneys — Mario Ortiz, Honorato
Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and
described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved the
foreclosure of the three (3) immovable above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and
premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendants' motion, the
trial court8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek
annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil
Case No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and
its officers and lawyers,Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the members
of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-
8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers and
lawyers (HERSINLAW Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who
had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 8th, 9th and
10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated
August 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendant Justices for —
". . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and pertinent laws,
rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or
 laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against deprivation of
property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and
contemptuous acts of defendant TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF
POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OFTHE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL
PRIMARY RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019,
for which defendants must be held liable under said laws."

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and
recovery of "P100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action,
too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order
dated November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.
7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior actions
instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario
Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata — the subject matter
being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same as
that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344; CA G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22)
against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 This case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial.
His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an
early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be
agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion was again found without
merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to
nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there had been
unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without merit.14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31,
1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-
91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution dated march 23, 1994. cdasia

a. Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional,
Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . . (failed) to
state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patience drew his
attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao,
G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994,
after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of
and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated
that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening
clause —
'Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated
__________,'
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions.
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that
on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with the
subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of
Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J.
Garma, dated May, 19, 1989. 18 And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which
was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to fasten not only
civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal
prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.
1. I.S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto
Jamero (then still TRB Branch manager), "John Doe and Officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed as
I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among
others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud,
deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his
(Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00,
although in light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the complaint observing that
actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his
sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no
basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was
beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof
of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted
to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and directed
against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which
were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:
a. I.S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution
dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter dated
June 4, 1985, sent by the Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables,
advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as the new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated
title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of
sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from
the transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False Pretenses
and Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.
2. I.S. Nos. 88-205 to 88-207
While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court,23 In that
affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real
property together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT
No. 87398 in the name of TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso. cdasia
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the foreclosed
lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant falsehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and
invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the
notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the
Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution,
considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus the
document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment
of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of a
criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint
— against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div.)" — was dismissed for lack of
merit in a resolution issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
"It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules of Court,
particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Office to make a review of
Decisions and resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records do not warrant
this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20 of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act states that 'the Office of the Ombudsman may not
conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that
(1) the complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body'; and Sec. 21 of the same
law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over members of the
Judiciary."
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)
As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted
over a 122-square meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards
sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de
retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had obtained from the
Traders Royal Bank,Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB. cdasia
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's
delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased
from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of
which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed
for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings to foreclose the mortgage
constituted by Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB and
the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R. No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-square-
meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was
represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis.Borromeo contested Lao's
application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying
consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de
retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00,
representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other
taxes in connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to
file brief in his behalf.Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals dated
December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
 The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page Resolution
dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion
for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional
because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there
was "no way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the
members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment, Borromeo having failed to more
for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated
November 27, 1989. cdasia
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent
to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON
and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to
vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the adverse
dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of
damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of
Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of
judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional
'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment'in G.R. No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants to RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These processes
were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in G.R.
No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra)
dated June 1, 1990, the Court En banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-
8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed inhis
court." Accordingly, Judge Ybañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the summonses and dismissing the
complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent
by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:
"This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the
Court. In several letter-complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly
alleged that he 'suffered injustices,' because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed
to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of
Article VIII of the1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his
cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and
do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the
chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed
only by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the
issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is inaccord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the
early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course
always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in InRe: Wenceslao Laureta, 18 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he
Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case"
. . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are
factual, or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis
stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14,
Article VIII ofthe Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the
Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken
on their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the
deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v.
Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said — "[M]inute resolutions of
this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of
a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise
of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel.
When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions. cdasia

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a
case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign
all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their
time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be
more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature
and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlog
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .."
b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501) 6740; G.R. No. 84054
 It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or
SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against administrative
officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a
certain Tomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and prematurely (for non-compliance with P.D.
1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it
was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario Dizon.
Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order dated may 28, 1988. His first and
second motions for reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Hon. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a
verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second
Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once more
remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had nor been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of fact or
law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the
minute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for
failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a
thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its aubalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains
the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No.
82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute
resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions,
and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the
Court's action to the parties concerned. cdasia
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series,
was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of
Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No.
84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas
presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R.
No. 91030 — in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to demonstrate any
reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of
February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been singed only by the defendant clerks of court and
not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding an explanation for said
"patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by
issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof;
and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral
shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than
P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Supreme Court
conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Samson Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it for
appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the injustices"
committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the
record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R. CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed
a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendantsin the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu
Branch Manager), and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty.
Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. Antonio
Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr., presiding) dismissed
the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of
P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That
Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his appeal
and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it for
insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was
denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31,
1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division)
said:cdasia
"The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself and
Resolved to DENY they same for lack of merit, the motion having been filed without "express leave of court"
(Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for
Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that
petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of
 Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the
merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there is a
special and important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed
summarily on the ground that 'the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the
question raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration' (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of
fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed
therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence of
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to a resolution
as to which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration need
state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion
for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's
arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the petition for review, and consequently
bringing about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the
errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore, there was no cause to
modify the conclusion set forth in that judgment, and in such a case, there is obviously no
point inreproducing and restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT."

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's First
Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-SERVING
LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside
from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . ." and characterizing the
conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . .." To the letter Borromeo attached
copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED,
UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTES RESOLUTIONS'"; (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3)
a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was
ordered expunged from the record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by
Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R. SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosure
effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was Civil
Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T.Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages."
Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with atty. Deen. cdasia

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint
on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but
his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that Court's
Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and
its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated
October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents therein
named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his
appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989
of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained
no findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this
time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded
as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella G. Pagtanac and Marissa
Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge German
G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due
course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En
Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and
Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for
issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for time represented Borromeo in G.R. No.
84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between him and
his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings, papers, etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and
advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had had) no hand inthe filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178
before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989,
apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on
motion of the principal defendants therein, namely Judge Genoroso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated
November 29, 1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R. CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to
another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as
the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional
Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action
was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid
and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereof by Lao to
Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's
judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.cdasia
Borromeo came up to this Court on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution
of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well as
the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings
thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated June 3,
1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions through various
motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him by the
Clerk of Court did not bear the signatures of any Justice — elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk
of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:.
"Dear Mr. Borromeo:
This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the 'actual resolution with the
signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division' in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R.
No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the Supreme Court declared that
"(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the
case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and
cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which
should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the
challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of
Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the
Court.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
xxx xxx xxx"
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without
foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No. OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the judgment of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a
complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of
the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City
Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised
Penal Code. cdasia
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaints,
opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts
including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987. That resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we
find it unreasonable or complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered
by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . .".
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990,
against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a
violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that
they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not
bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed his
complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to
constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering
them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial resolutions." 33
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY BANK & TRUST COM. (SBTC)
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-21615; CA-G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank
& Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on may 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa)
issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his
obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC
brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares,
presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law firm,
HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendants were sentenced to pay to
SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable
of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder,
SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same was denied on
March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals for
relief (CA-G.R. SP No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for
reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On
September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for
reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitrance
and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal
concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo. cdasia
2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267.
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu
RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty.
Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud,
Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and
deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts
caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which
he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to present
their own evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458; CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Noting daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same
parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the
latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for
Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws, Violation of the Constitution, Fraud
and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Cañares and Jacinto for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-
21615 & CEB No. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving
to defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had been
"caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for which the former are liable
under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15
(Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from
liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court.
The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said the
Court:
"Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact, proffer nothing but
a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res judicata under the
circumstances."cdasia
xxx xxx xxx
"By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant for argumentum ad
hominem, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation
and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets he admits to
have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and
reputation of the Court. That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason why his otherwise
contumacious behaviour is presently accorded the patience and leniency it probably does not deserve.
Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that
similar displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with commensurate severity."
IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R. CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is Case No.
CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose
Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. 36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from
Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations. Lao agreed to, and did
pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a deed of sale was
executed in his favor by Borromeoover two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above
stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court
alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him by the
trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770.
On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a
Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was
given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition for review
"for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him were
unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution
therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
 What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of this
Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18), which
was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated against him by
the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding
judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:cdasia
". . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no jurisdiction to
review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions
complained of by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court of
the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this
humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret
or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but
also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the
complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution of the Supreme
Court which was allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made
directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the case, how could this
Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which
according to the plaintiff himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiff's petition and affirming the Lower
Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules of
Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy
should not have been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts
of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a show of uncommon common sense. Lower
courts are without supervening jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts."

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and
legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for his
adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these
lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His
complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that
the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale withpacto de retro as
a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary
rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted
to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pure
harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite
Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court," July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter,
signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa
A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the
following observations:cdasia
"It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with deferential awe and
respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with
gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the authority
and name of the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that there is a non-lawyer who uses the instruments
of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more especially if their actuations do not
conform with his whims and caprices."

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
with supposed infidelity and violation of the Constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:
"The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other members of the Judiciary
are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the
Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will
undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the lose of confidence in the country's judicial system
and administration of justice."

". . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal profession. So many
baseless badmouthing have been made byBorromeo against this Honorable Court and other courts that for
him to go scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court
with all the respect and esteem due them."

Subsequently, in the same proceeding, Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of the
Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the
notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding
records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15,
1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning toBorromeo to
be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
 Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars,"
flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against him and
defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court employees
involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent
lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently
undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to
his "apparent penchant forargumentum ad hominem" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . .
(which were found to be ) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the
Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of
the Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reported conferment
on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding the
Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently violative
of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of
FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES. . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court. cdasia
He circulated and "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after
INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING
THEM, labelled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences
therein . . ."; in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by
this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not been
fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and
defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the
court of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not
comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his,
dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa,"
repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and
landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one
TOMAS B. TAN — all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite your firm
assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talk in your house last march 12,
1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a
wrongful party. . . ."
In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentions what
he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders
Royal Bank of Borromeos' lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked
Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB, para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat!
TRB WILL STEAL!" etc. Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions
w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan:
STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38
One other "circular" reads:
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS !!!
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS
by : JOAQUIN BORROMEO
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the judiciary. Adding,
"The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance of the Supreme Court." These are lame,
cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for
themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself.
It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR,
SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14,
Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham
rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through
said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that
CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic
resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land
grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the motion for
reconsideration (G.R. No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the SC to order a case
dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks 'immune from suit' —
despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and
rules of court and DUE PROCESS inso doing? (GR No. 82273).cdasia

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves! NARVASA &
ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!
"IMPEACH NARVASA
º ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS'
VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution
º VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN
ORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679)
DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO
FILE PLEADINGS, HENCE IN DEFAULT
 º CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS
NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO
STEAL 3 LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION
º CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF
TWO LAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF
TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION
º BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME
AND PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND
FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES
º DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES , and even MERE
CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-
ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO
ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST
HIMSELF
JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO
Mabolo, Cebu City
Te. 7-56-49.
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter, IBP, dated June 21, 1992
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June
21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, above — " . . . sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and
probably other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks against the
Supreme Court and the whole justice system" — and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly
urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act.".cdasia
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993
Acting thereon, the Court En banc issued a resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on the
letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the Court discloses inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty.
Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four-page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin
T. Borromeo v. Traders Royal bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator
therein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No.
77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeov. Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin
T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the
Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases
and dealt with the matters mentioned in his "circular."

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases instituted
by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No.
82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of other
communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already passed upon by the
Court in his cases and condemning the Court's rejection of those arguments.
Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru
its above named President, and taking account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved:
1) to REQUIRE.

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt against Joaquin
T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter, Integrated bar of the Philippines, and (2) to
SEND to the city Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June
21, 1993 together with its annexes; and cdasia
(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution and a copy of
the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address
at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

(2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and the IBP
Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the letter and its annexes as well as
on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.
SO ORDERED
||| (In re: Borromeo, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 (Resolution), [February 21, 1995], 311 PHIL 441-523)
 EN BANC

[B.M. NO. 1678. December 17, 2007.]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus,
this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member
of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that
he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and
clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who
is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyer's oath 9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law — membership in good standing — is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual professional
tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed
by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar
and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." 17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant
to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before
a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated
above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine
bar.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Dacanay, B.M. NO. 1678, [December 17, 2007], 565 PHIL 165-171)
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008.]

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street,
Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and
Antonio Pastor 3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint
was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila 4 where the parties
reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint, 6claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head
of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however,
were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his
legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to
prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As
there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective
position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent. 7 SEHDIC
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings
and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and
Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713: 8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; . . . (emphasis
supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month with
a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 9 This was adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors. 10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that
Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in
said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." DHcEAa
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not
covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT
SECTION 7 (B) (2) OF RA 6713,
GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private
practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, Thatsanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions
of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law
with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7 (b) (2) of RA
6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus. 13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the
vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays. jurcda
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required
to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they m ay
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors
and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to
hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage
in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. 15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And
this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month. 16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government
can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
 interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)cCHETI
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society
is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: IAEcCT
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar. 18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. 19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath 20 and/or
for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his
oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty.
Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance. SCaITA
SO ORDERED.
||| (Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, [February 19, 2008], 569 PHIL 539-551)
RULES 138 OF COURT

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 19-86

TO : The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari'a District Courts and Shari'a Circuit Courts

SUBJECT : Adoption of Rule 138-A of the Revised Rules of Court to Permit Limited Law Student Practice

Quoted hereunder, for the information and guidance of all concerned, is the text of new Rules of Court numbered Rule 138-A adopted by the
Supreme Court's Resolution En Banc of December 18, 1986, effective immediately, as follows: cdt

"Bar Matter No. 194. — Re: Petition to amend the Revised Rules of Court to include a Law Student Practice Rule. The Court Resolved to ADOPT
the following Rule permitting limited law student practice effective immediately, as follows:

RULE 138-A

Law Student Practice Rule

'Sec. 1. Conditions for Student Practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted
by the legal clinic of the law school. cdasia

'Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to
be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

'Sec. 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar
communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic. acd

'Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members
of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.'

"Let copies hereof be circulated among all Courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and major voluntary bar associations, and the Deans of
the law schools."

December 19, 1986.

(SGD.) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE

Chief Justice

||| (Adoption of Rule 138-A of Revised Rules of Court to Permit Limited Law Student Practice, Supreme Court Circular No. 19-86, [December 19,
1986])