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SUCCESSION: WRITTEN REPORT

Submitted by:

Roa, Vanessa C.

Submitted to:

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

Submitted on:

August 5, 2019
I. NUGUID v. NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

Facts:
Rosario Nuguid dies without descendants, surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 siblings. Remedios, one of the sisters filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as sole, universal
heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter
of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the
ground that by institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors, who
are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited, rendering the
institution void. Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of one of the siblings of the deceased as the sole universal
heir in effect preterited the compulsory heirs.

Ruling:

Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but left
the forced heirs in the direct ascending line and the holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, is one of preterition and not an
ineffective disinheritance. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. On the other
hand, disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir in his or
her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

II. AZNAR v. DUNCAN


G.R. No. L-24365, June 30, 1966

Facts:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines,
died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. (In 1954) The will was admitted to
probate by the CFI and it also declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was a natural
child of the deceased. The decision was appealed to the SC and was affirmed.

In 1963 another incident relative to the partition of the deceased’s estate, the RTC
approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the
will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia
appealed from the order of approval and the SC reversed the ruling on the ground that the
validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law. SC returned
the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said
law.
In 1964the CFI issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the
executor wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy
Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter
and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.

Lucy Duncan appealed with the sole question of whether the estate, after
deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares or
whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire
estate.
RTC ruled and appellee now maintains that there has been preterition of Helen
Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution
of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the CC. Appellant contends that Helen Garcia is entitled
only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were instestate.

In the will of the deceased, Helen Garcia was given a legacy of P3,600.00.

Issue:
Whether or not there was preterition.

Ruling:
No, there was no preterition. The solution (from three SC Spain decisions cited by
Manresa) was that the heir ask that the legitime be completed and not that the institution
of heirs be annulled entirely. This solution is more in consonance with the expressed
wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the
provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter,
and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently
declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial
declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards here would have
undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy
Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.

The testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

Therefore, ¼ of the estate of the deceased which consisted of 399 shares of stocks
and a certain amount of cash descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she
became the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent, she is
entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently
accruing.

Therefore, there is no preterition if the heir is given a legacy or devise.


III. MANINANG v CA
G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982

Facts:
ClemenciaAseneta, single, died and left a holographic will. The will states that all
her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang and her family whose family the
testatrix has lived with continuously for 30 years. The will further stated that she is
troubled with her nephews and that She did not consider Nonoy as her adopted son for
letting her do acts against her will. Maninag filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic will while the adopted son instituted intestate proceedings. The cases were
consolidated and the testate proceeding was dismissed by the trial court following the
court’s reasoning that the adopted son was preterited and intestacy should ensue.
Maninag filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the court’s findings should be limited
to the extrinsic validity of the will and not the intrinsic validity.

Issue:
Whether or not a court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of a will during
probate.

Ruling:
As a general rule, NO. Judgment reversed. Testate proceeding remanded to trial
court for determination whether the adopted son was preterited or validly disinherited.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The case of
Nuguid vs. Nuguid and Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez provide the exception rather than the
rule. The intrinsic validity of the will in those cases were passed upon even before
probate because “practical considerations” so demanded.

Doctrine of Nuguid vs. Nuguid:

In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the Court should meet that issue.

Doctrine of Balanay vs. Martinez:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.

In this case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the will,
the adopted son had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether there was a
valid disinheritance. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of
that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. From the face of the will, the
issue of the will on preterition/disinheritance is a conclusion that is not indubitable.

IV. SOLANO v CA
G.R. No. L-41971, November 29, 1983

Facts:
Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr.
Meliton Solano filed an action for recognition against him. Solano denied paternity. He
died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter, Zonia Ana Solano substituted
himas the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated before
he died.Zonia entered her formal appearance as a "substitute defendant" claiming
additionally that she was the sole heir of her father, Dr. Solano, and asking that she be
allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated Will with the least interference
from the Garcia siblings who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of
Solano".

The Garcias filed their reply to Zonia’s appearance impugning the recognition of
her being the natural child of the decedent with the prayer that she be declared instead,
like them, as an adulterous child. Zonia did not file a responsive pleading and the case
proceeded to trial. The Garcias further moved for the impleading of the Solano estate in
addition to ZONIA, which was opposed by the latter, but which the Trial Court granted.
The RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of
Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding,
RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia as
sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of
sole heir from decedent’s will.

Ruling:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton Solano’s
will, and as a result, Zonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be
valid…

The intention of the decedent is to favor Zonia with certain portions of his
property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-
half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of Zonia’s share is
hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and the Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of
the will should not be invalidated all together.

V. PECSON v CORONEL
G.R. No. L-20374, October 11, 1923

Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated the last will and testament of
decedent, Dolores Coronel who declared heir sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of
her niece, Angela Coronel. The relatives by consanguinity of the testator questioned the
genuineness of the will on the following grounds: first, that it was improbable and
exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate by excluding her blood
relatives; and second, that if such will was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous
illegal influence.

Issue:
Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her
estate.

Ruling:
Yes. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but we
understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The
liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced (compulsory) heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1989.

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of
her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary.
Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most
usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute
dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without
regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite
capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or
undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural,
unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric,
as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. X XX ” (40 Cyc.,
1079.)

VI. NERI v AKUTIN


G.R. No. L-47799, June 13, 1941

Facts:
Decedent AgripinoNeri, survived by his six children in his first marriage, and five
children in his second marriage. One of his children in the first marriage, died and was
survived by seven children.

In his will he left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the
herein petitioner.The testator made the statement that the children by his first marriage
had already received their shares in his property during his lifetime in the form of
advancement. Since, however, this is an issue of fact tried by the CFI and the SC is
reviewing the CA’s decision upon a question of law, the SC can rely only upon the CA’s
findings of fact:

Since all the parcels that corresponded to AgripinoNeri y Chaves are now in the
administrator's possession, as appears in the inventory filed in court, it is clear that the
property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion thereof has been given to
the children of the first marriage.

Thus, this is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal title to
the children by his second marriage, the respondents, with preterition of the children by
his first marriage, the petitioner. This Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared
a total intestacy.

The children of the second marriage filed an MR on the ground (1) that there is no
preterition as to the children of the first marriage who have received their shares in the
property left by the testator, and (2) that, even assuming that there has been a preterition,
the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction
of the bequest made to them.

Issue:
Whether or not there is preterition.

Ruling:
Yes. According to the court’s findings, none of the children by the first marriage
received their respective shares from the testator’s property. The Court can rely only on
the findings of the trial court that the inventory indicates that the property of Neri has
remained intact and that no portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.
Neri left his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and did not
expressly disinherit his children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them,
either. This fits the case of preterition according to Article 814:

“The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the
institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are
not inofficious.”

VII. CAYETANO v LEONIDAS


G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984

Facts:
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of
America and a permanent resident of Philadelphia. She executed a Last Will and
Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws
thereat, and that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos
died in the City of Manila, leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United
States of America. The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in
accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the testator, was appointed Administratrix of the estate of
said decedent.

This was opposed by Adoracion’s father, Hermogenes Campos, who earlier filed
an Affidavit of Self-adjudication not being aware that Adoracion had left a will. He later
died and was substituted by Polly Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her
sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of a forced heir
to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession.

Issue:
Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in case the testator was a
citizen of another country.

Ruling:
No. Applying Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which
governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national
law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would
be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

VIII. ACAIN v IAC


G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 2987

Facts:
Petitioner ConstantinoAcain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late NemesioAcain and for the
issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise that NemesioAcain
died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by NemesioAcain on February 17, 1960 was written in bisaya with a translation
in English submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The
will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a
certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
Part of the will:

“THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. House, lands and
money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to
my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing….
In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceased me, all the money properties, lands,
houses…. which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita,
Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Segundo predeceased Nemesio. Thus the children of Segundo who are claiming to be
heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner.

The oppositors respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted


daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa DiongsonVda. deAcain filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the
trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of NemesioAcain. His motion
for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the
review of respondent Court's decision.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.

Ruling:
Yes, on the part of the adopted child but NO on the part of the wife.Art. 854. The
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from
the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of
the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as
if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of
the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is
a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are
the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. The effect
of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy
except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
IX. ESCUIN v ESCUIN
G.R. No. 4359, September 24, 1908

Facts:
Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a will before a notary public of
Sevilla in January 1899, Spain, stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son of
Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter being deceased; that he was
married about six months previously to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and that he had no
lawful descendants; the testator, however, stated in clause three of his will, that in case he
has a duly registered successor, his child would be his sole and universal heir; but that if,
as would probably be the case, there should be no such heir, then in clause four he named
his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and his
universal heirs, they to divide the estate in equal shares between them.

The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899, as certified to by the Municipal
court of Magdalena, Sevilla, on the 20th of March, 1990.

Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were appointed to
consider claims against the estate, and, according to a report presented to the Court of
First Instance on the 20th of June, 1907, one claim was allowed amounting to 3,696.50
pesetas.
On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de Leon,
and the attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac,
appealed to the Court of First Instance from the findings of the aforesaid commissioners.

Hence, the decedent designated in his will his father and his wife as his sole heirs.
He ignored his recognized natural child.

Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid.
Ruling:
The will is partly valid. It is valid with respect to the 2/3 of the properties which
the testator can freely dispose. The 1/3 should be give to his recognized natural child.

The above-mentioned will neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the testator leaves
two-thirds of his property to his father and wife; testamentary provisions impairing the
legal portion of a general heir shall be reduced in so far as they are illegal or excessive.

The late testator did not leave a recognized natural child, the appellant minor, and a
widow; that the said minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is the general heir of his natural
father, the said testator who recognized him while living, and in the present case is
entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural
child; and for the reason that the minor was ignored by his natural father in his will, the
designation of heirs made therein was, as matter of fact annulled by force of law, in so far
as legal portion of the said minor was thereby impaired. Legacies and betterments shall
be valid, in so far as they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator cannot deprive the
heirs of their legal portions, except in the cases expressly indicated by law.

X. LAJOM v LEUTERIO
G.R. No. L-13557, April 25, 1960

Facts:
Judicial proceedings of Maximo Viola’s estate were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. An agreement of partition and distribution was executed by and
between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo and
Juana Toura whereby the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided
among themselves.

Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other things, that he be declared
a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and acknowledged in accordance
with the laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola,
Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition and distribution executed in
1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void and
that there be a new partition with 1/7 of the estate of Maximo given to him and 2/7 to
each of the other heirs.

CFI of Nueva Ecija found in favour of Donato and ordered the partition among
Jose, Rafael and Silvio as null and void and asked for the collation of properties in
question.

Jose and Silvio were ordered to submit liquidation of fruits and products of the 3
parcels of land that have come under their administration. Partition was ordered: 1/7 of
said properties and products to Donato and 2/7 each to Jose, Silvio and Rafael. This
decision of the CFI of Nueva Ecija was affirmed by the SC.

Rafael filed a report of what he received under the partition. Donato noticed that
his report did not contain the fruits of a riceland allegedly donated by Maximo to Rafael.
Donato wanted Rafael to include said Riceland to the redistribution of estate. Rafael
objected saying that the riceland was not mentioned or included in the complaint filed in
this case.

Judge Leuterio sided with Rafael saying that only the donations to Jose and Silvio
were questioned in the complaint and the decision’s dispositive portion only ordered
those 2 to collate. Properties donated to Rafael had not been put into questioned and
therefore cannot be deemed to have been embraced in the dispositive requiring collation.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not properties not mentioned in the complaint of Donato can be
ordered to be collated .
2. Whether or not Civil Case for annulment of partition became a special
proceeding.
Ruling:

1. No. The properties in question were described in an inventory attached to


petitioner's original complaint in case No. 8077 and did not include the
aforementioned riceland, with an area of 215 hectares. Indeed, Donato admits
that he did not include, and could not have included or mentioned it, in his
complaint because, at the time of its filing, he did not know of the existence of
said property.

The decision of Judge Leuterio did not direct collation of all property but
rather asked Donato to submit report to list properties which he believes
belong to Maximo and that the other heirs can file and opposition thereto.
Thus, it left the question whether other properties should be collated or not
open for future determination. In any event, respondent Judge was merely
enforcing a decision that had already become final. Any order directing what
was not required in said decision — and the same contained no
pronouncement with respect to the riceland adverted to above — would be in
excess of his jurisdiction and therefore, null and void.

2. No. It is next alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the
institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective,
and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate proceedings
for the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly untenable. There might
have been merit therein if we were dealing with a special proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of
said preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the
settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of
the deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the
authority of the court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties
described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not include the aforementioned
riceland.

Comparative Analysis:

In the case of Escuin vs Escuin, the will is neither null, void, nor illegal in so far
as the testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father and wife; testamentary
provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir shall be reduced in so far as they
are illegal or excessive. (Art. 817, Civil Code.) The partition of the property of the said
testator shall be proceeded with in accordance with the foregoing legal bases.

Meanwhile in Lajom vs Leuterio, it was alleged that petitioner having been the
victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola
became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly untenable. There
might have been merit therein if we were dealing with a special proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of said
preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the settlement of an
intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased. But, Civil
Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having
jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which
admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.

Thus, in Escuin vs Escuin there is preterition while Lajom vs Leuterio is not a case of
preterition.