Persons and Family Relations Digests

Void Marriages
60. Republic vs. CA and Castro [Marriage License]
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that
she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for
only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration
for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro
is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the
peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
61. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184621 : December 10, 2013 [Declaration of presumptive death]
FACTS:

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel. Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal
dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not
seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of presumptive death.
She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. Despite inquiries
from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and
friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check
the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

The RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry presumptively
dead.

The CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines
affirmed in toto the latters order, thus:

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court . It maintains that
although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive
death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article
247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review
oncertiorari.

Likewise, petitioner posited that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify
the declaration of her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to
conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband pursuant to the strict standard
under Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is overruled.

CIVIL LAW - existence of well-founded belief

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993

In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry by inquiries and through the patients directory when she went to the
hospital.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required
by jurisprudence for the following reasons: (1) the respondent did not actively look for her
missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her
hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him; (2) she did not report
Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him;

(3) she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named; (4) there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence
proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from
her friends and in-laws about her husbands whereabouts.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
States policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as
the familys foundationand since it is the states policy to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic social institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to uphold the
sanctity of marriage.Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, November 19,
1991.

62. Republic v. CA and Molina, GR 108763 (1997) [psychological incapacity]

This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina and Reynaldo Molina’s marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of
“psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to
a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early
stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and
squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty
on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the
sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her
friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On
14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity
HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage
is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing
of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be
proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically
or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards
husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for
the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

63. RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier gets married after
six months of courtship. Back then, petitioner observed respondent to be a very sweet and
thoughtful person. Everything went well for the first three years of their marriage. Respondent
was everything petitioner could hope for in a wife — sweet, loving and caring.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage. According to
petitioner, respondent started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time with
her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent
reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's
needs and the upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. After being gone from
their home for days on end, she would return without bothering to account for her absence. As
a result, they frequently quarreled. Finally, respondent suddenly left for the United States.
Petitioner has not heard from her since.
Petitioner instituted a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to
petitioner.
RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: W/N the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner was enough to establish that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The court
overlooked the need to show the gravity, root cause and incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his brother, Roderico
Bier. He also presented as evidence a psychological report written by Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical
psychologist. Petitioner reasoned out that the personal examination of respondent was
impossible as her whereabouts were unknown despite diligent efforts on his part to find her.
Consequently, Dr. Tayag's report was really hearsay evidence since she had no personal
knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Her testimony should have thus been
dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.
It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent's
personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her essential
marital obligations, had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do.
The decision of CA was affirmed.
64. BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
G.R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than
18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a
verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice
a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.

65. Te v. Te , GR 161793 February 13, 2009

ARTICLE 36 OF FAMILY CODE
FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a
freshman in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. They
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They
left Manila and went to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for only a month and they
could not find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was away, Rowena threathened him that
she would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two to a court to get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles
place where Edward was treated like a prisoner and was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. After a month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena. On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena and told her that they should live with his parents but she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC
of Quezon City, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the
trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only
on the information provided by petitioner. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC the
instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage
void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist
to personally examine respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

66. Ochosa v. Alano, GR 167459

Facts:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973,
when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued
her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985,
whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the
failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his
driver, Corporal Gagarin. He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about
the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and their
foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him
and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a
psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and
two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and
Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36
of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and
incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and
reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy
the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and
abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception
of their marriage.

The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and
sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of
antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be
desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological
incapacity.
Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other
witness testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their
marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the information
gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility
that the information fed to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence
of sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

67. Baccay vs Baccay and Republic G.R. No. 173138

FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's snobbish and hard-to get traits
attractive.
Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. They agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the two had several
romantic episodes.
In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of
his mother, Noel grudgingly married Maribel. The two lived on Noel's family. Maribel remained
aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have sex with him.
Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense quarrel about Maribel's alleged miscarriage
causing the latter to leave the house and never came back.
Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. RTC declared
the marriage null and void on the ground of Maribel's alleged psychological incapacity. Nedy L.
Tayag, a clinical psychologist who presented as Noel's witness, found Maribel unable to
perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have
sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when
he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist failed to establish
that Maribel's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her from validly assuming
the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist even testified that Maribel was
capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere
difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated under the Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage.
68. AGRAVIADOR V. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 170729, [December 8, 2010]
DOCTRINE/RULING:
The court held that both Enrique’s court testimony, as well as Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital duties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (Enrique)challenges the resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed the resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) MuntinlupaCity,
declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (Erlinda)
null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
In 1971, Enrique, then a security guard, first met Erlinda at a beerhouse where the latter
worked, and later on became sweethearts after courtship. They soon entered into a common-
law relationship, but later contracted marriage in 1973, whereby they begot four children.
Enrique’s family, however, expressed their apprehensions because Erlinda came from a broken
family and because of the nature of her work.
In 2001, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, alleging that she was carefree and irresponsible, and
refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for
long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child to the
point of his death; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use
the family name Agraviador in her activities. He also claimed that she refused to have sex with
him because she became very close to a male border of their house, and even caught their love
notes and trysts. However, because the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not
medically identified and alleged in the petition, motion was denied. The petitioner, thus,
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims through the
psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac, who claimed that Erlinda is suffering
from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She was said to been having this
disorder since her adolescence, with no definite treatment for her disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD:
No, the totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
RATIO:
The court held that both Enrique’s court testimony,as well as Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital duties. First, petitioner’s claims should be distinguished from the
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect,” in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages to the level of psychological incapacity that the
law requires. He merely showed that Erlinda had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish
that the respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the marriage. His claims that Erlinda
“does not accept her fault,” “does not want to change,” and “refused to reform” are insufficient
to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
Second, Dr. Patac failed to clarify the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she
did in her attempt to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondent’s condition. The
report that he submit likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondent’s
condition, as his enumeration of the respondent’s purported behavioural defects (as related to
him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from
mixed personality disorder deemed insufficient. There was no other statement regarding the
degree of severity of the respondent’s condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. The Psychiatric
Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion
that the respondent’s personality disorder had “no definite treatment.” It did not discuss the
concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and
failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create
a necessary inference that the respondent’s condition had no definite treatment or is incurable.

69. G.R. No. 185595

CALDERON VS ROXAS
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas,
were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four hildren. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

While the action was pending, the trial court granted Calderon’s request for support pendent lite
(while the action for nullity is pending).

On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage null and void,
awarding custody of the children to the mother and ordering Roxas to provide support to the
children. Several actions were raised in court, with Roxas asking for a decrease of the monthly
support while Calderon asking for an increase in the amount and Roxas’ payment on his arrears
for support.

ISSUE: This petition is raised by Calderon not to assail the nullity of their marriage but, rather,
is premised on whether or not the matter of support pendent lite is already interlocutory and
final

HELD: Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the
assailed orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce supportwhich was
granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out
that the ruling on support in arrears which have remained
unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of final orders
assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.
An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the
order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the
same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on
compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.

Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the
RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early
stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and
ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente
lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed
her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in
arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente
lite.

Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages
incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the
CA.

70. JARILLIO V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 164435, [June 29, 2010]

DOCTRINE:
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS:
On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage
with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only
discovered in 1999.
On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for
annulment of marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of
their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of
their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the
crime of bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of
prision mayor.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed
bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so,
the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her
marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had
notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.
ISSUE:
W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of
bigamy despite the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.
HELD:
No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant]
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question.
71. ANTONE V. BERONILLA G.R. No. 183824, [December 8, 2010], 637 SCRA 615.
DOCTRINE:
As reiterated in a long line of cases, Article 40 of the Family Code has been established as a new
provision expressly requiring judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage for purposes of
remarriage. Therefore, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in March 2007, that she and Leo were
married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The
prosecution filed the Information in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because his marriage with Myrna
was declared null and void as of April 2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo
argues that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was
actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage
of Myrna and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second marriage on 1991, for which
bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void
on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contracting the
subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD:
Yes.
RULING:
Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the
Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void abinitio marriage will not
prosper because there is no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initiomarriage
is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there
would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy
complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code
a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy
case because, by then the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person
who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado,
the first marriage was actually solemnized, although later declared void ab initio. While
in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer,
because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a private act. Thus,
there is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a
subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case.

72. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN |

G.R. No. 191566 | July 17, 2013
DOCTRINE: A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
FACTS:

 On July 2, 1980, Edgardo married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). Alagon died on November 10, 2003.

 In August 1994, Edgardo filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On
February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City granted Edgardo’s petition and declared his
marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.

 In June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of Edgardo’s previous
marriage with Modina and so she filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with
Bigamy and Edgardo was indicted in an Information for Bigamy.

 On February 5, 2008, respondent moved for the quashal of the Information on two grounds:
(1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished.

 The RTC denied respondent’s Motion and held that the facts alleged in the information
constitute the crime of bigamy. Further, the trial court held that neither can the information
be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal
liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

 Edgardo instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, assailing
the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage
with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.

 The CA granted Edgardo’s petition. Citing the case of Morigo v. People and held that there is
cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence
would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of
the crime of bigamy would be lacking.
ISSUE: Does the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio extinguished respondent’s
criminal liability which already attached prior to said judgment? – NO
RULING:
Citing precedents, the Court ruled that a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a
number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
An examination of the information filed against respondent shows the sufficiency of the
allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the
crime. The information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and
(4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The Court in this case did not allow the presentation of evidence to support Edgardo’s motion
to quash because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. The court held that
it is not proper to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this
stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented
by respondent. With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out
which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the
hypothetical admission thereof.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because
he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him. The Court did not sustain the contention. Criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him
until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.

73. NOLLORA VS People

G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011 [Article 349 Revised Penal Code - Bigamy; Article 35 -
Marriage void ab initio]
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two
years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the
moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion,
proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is
the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he
told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she
learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and
he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio
under Article 35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally
married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the
second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and
4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity
of Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance
with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family
Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the
wife or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the
Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of
his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability,
he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no
longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.

74. Zamoranos v. People, GR 193902

Facts:
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the
Decision dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos), thus, affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lanao del Norte for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum,
Sr.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by
talaq. The court held that after evaluating the testimonies of the parties, it is fully convinced
that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam
prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by
and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. Consequently, the marriage between
Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman was dissolved
by the Shari’a Circuit District Court in Isabela, Basilan.
Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first nuptial
to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau
of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites and in order to strengthen the ties of their
marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony.
Zamoranos and Pacasum were then de facto separated. Pacasum filed cases for the annulment
of their marriage, criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case for disbarment against
Zamoranos. Pacasum contracted a second marriage. The prosecutor found prima facie
evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy but the same was thereafter dismissed upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by Zamboranos.
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice assailing the
dismissal of the complaint for bigamy. The DOJ Secretary granted the petition and reversed the
dismissal. Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent
Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and
(3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest before the Secretary of
Justice. Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice
in a resolution. Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions,
was likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the lower court
rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The court found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at
the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
which provides that the Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
same. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari’[a] Court is valid, recognized,
binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
The court held that the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is
hereby granted. The CA and the SC affirmed the dismissal and the same became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
The RTC of Iligan, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating criminal case for Bigamy
against Zamoranos.
Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over her person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the
decision of the RTC categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the
mootness and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum
and prayed for the dismissal of the case.
The motion to quash and motion for reconsideration filed by Zamoranos was denied. She then
filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the order of the RTC. The CA
dismissed Zamoranos’ petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to
assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information. She now comes to the SC in a petition
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal is a legally permissible remedy in an order denying a motion to
quash.
Held:
No. The Court granted the petition for certiorari and granted the motion to quash filed by
Zamoranos. The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an
interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that,
when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is
considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a
motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the
court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b)
when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial
justice"; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases "have attracted
nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
thereof." The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of
jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’ motion to quash.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts—acts which courts have no power
or authority in law to perform.
True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the
RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg.
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia
Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested
the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court
has jurisdiction over this case.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos’ Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the
CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated
the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was
already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation
of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs,
traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over
the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and
the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two
situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both
parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of
the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.
One of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’
divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit
Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in
1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for
the crime of Bigamy.