POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
(2) PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
Section 26. officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at
1. xxxx least six months of service, regardless of employment
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a status.
law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal. (Art VI)
Section 27.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate
his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
xxxx. (Art VI)
--------------------------
ABAKADA vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335.
R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
PAGES 222-228
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
“transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to
serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the
system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is
no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why
such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix
the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing
of revenue targets has been delegated to the President
without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for
the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee permits
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POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Rule: Every bill passed by Congress must be presented
to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature
and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a
valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take representing both Houses will draft a compromise
effect without such presentment even if approved by
both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a
law.
First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President.
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. - the following is the
procedure for the approval of bills:
“A bill is introduced by any member of the
House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the
former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number
and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for
study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be
recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first
held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature
or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill
under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for
second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in
its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended
when desired. The second reading is the most
important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its
final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third
PAGES 222-228
reading, the members merely register their votes and
explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further
debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other
chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings.
If there are differences between the versions approved
by the two chambers, a conference committee
measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally
approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the Senate
President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their
respective chambers… “
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA
9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of
the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA
9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to
implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be
deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the
statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause, the determination as to
when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a
law may be executed and the executive branch acquires
the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before
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POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly
of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the
law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress
or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made
by the members of the executive branch charged with
the implementation of the law
-------------
2. Question Hour
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon
their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House
of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session. (Art VI)
Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires, and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA;
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O.
464) “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took
effect immediately. The salient provisions of the
Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments
Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section
22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

The heads of departments shall, appear before, and be

When the security of the State or the public interest so
heard, by any house, on any matter pertaining to their
requires and the President so states in writing, the
departments:
appearance shall only be conducted in executive
session.
(i) upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President; or
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
(ii) upon request of either house, as the rules
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
of that house shall provide.
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
Written questions shall be submitted to the
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
presiding officer of the house at least 3 days before
offices including those employed in Government Owned
the scheduled appearance. The purpose is to
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
enable the cabinet member to prepare.
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).

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POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the
Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department for them to appear on
September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North
Rail Project).
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege
speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate
to investigate the alleged overpricing and other
unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project. Senate President Drilon received from
Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and
another letter informing him "that officials of the
Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
[regarding the North Rail project] will not be able to
attend the same without the consent of the President,
pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not
secured the required consent from the President."
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress
Rule:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3129 in that both require
the officials covered by them to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before Congress. There
are significant differences between the two provisions,
however, which constrain this Court to discuss the
validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads.
It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered
by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the
challenged order, made the determination that they are.
Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of
department heads under Section 1 is not made to
depend on the department heads’ possession of any
information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3
vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive
privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
PAGES 222-228
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the
Constitution on what has been referred to as the
question hour.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an
examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI.
Section 22 which provides for the question hour must
be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for
the power of either House of Congress to "conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation." As the excerpt of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows,
the framers were aware that these two provisions
involved distinct functions of Congress.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The
reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he
being one of the proponents of the amendment to
make the appearance of department heads
discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members
of the Commission that the Committee on Style,
precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved
the provision on question hour from its original position
as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31,
far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation.
In the context of a parliamentary system of
government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other
ministers accountable for their acts and the operation
of the government, corresponding to what is known in
Britain as the question period. There was a specific
provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution
which made the appearance of ministers mandatory.
The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary
system established by that Constitution, where the
ministers are also members of the legislature and are
directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of
government is the immediate accountability of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National
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POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
Assembly for the program of government and shall mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. .
determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in
the presidential system where the tenure of office of all In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be
elected officials cannot be terminated before their term facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that
expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent
office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
the mandatory nature of such appearance during
principle of separation of powers. While the executive
the question hour in the present Constitution so as
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
to conform more fully to a system of separation of
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is
to comply with its demands for information.
presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs
from the question period of the parliamentary
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
system. That department heads may not be
way for department heads to exempt themselves
required to appear in a question hour does not,
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
however, mean that the legislature is rendered
exempt by the mere fact that they are department
powerless to elicit information from them in all
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a
from this power — the President on whom executive
mandatory question period, the need to enforce
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
Congress’ right to executive information in the
except through the power of impeachment. It is based
performance of its legislative function becomes
on her being the highest official of the executive branch,
more imperative.
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
custom.
complementary to each other, should not be considered
as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
information that may be used for legislation, while the
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
the objective of which is to obtain information in
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice
department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as
------------------------
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of
3. Legislative Investigations
their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or
powers, states that Congress may only request their
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of
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PAGES 222-228
POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected. (Art VI)
Limitations:
First., the investigation must be in aid of legislation. No Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress
Secondly, the investigation must be in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure of Congress
And thirdly, the Constitution further mandates that the
rights of witnesses appearing in or affected by such
inquiries must be respected
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Rule: The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution
which reads:
witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon
by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the
questions of the senators on an important point, he
was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for
contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish
Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate
or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential
to obtain what is needed

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of

Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the
latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral
legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa
– and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar
provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno, a case
decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court
already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent
in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the
reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress
Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch may be deduced from
the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein
ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation
and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is
a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of
the government transaction involved in Arnault was a
proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being
related to the expenditure of public funds of which
Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court
held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the
operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not

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POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar
with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with
process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information
possessed by executive officials on the operation of
their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to
that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the
so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in
theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or
judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial
review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in
aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional
power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for
Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon
is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the
possible needed statute which prompted the need for
the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations,
along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry
and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof, there would be less room for speculation on
the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is
in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial the house of representative investigation.
safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done
in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published
rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without
duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also
mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition
that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in
the Bill of Rights.
PAGES 222-228
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the
courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons
affected, even if they belong to the executive branch.
Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances,
none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear
pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry
might be established, resulting in palpable violations of
the rights guaranteed to members of the executive
department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances,
depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by
the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be
accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are
still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive
privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the
challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions,
its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion
of executive privilege is crucial for determining the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ;
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
FACTS:
During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new
controversy arises. During the 2007 election the
conversation of President Arroyo and the herein
petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional
director, regarding the desire of the president to have a
favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables.
Such conversation was recorded and was played during
Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed
before the court praying that such playing of the
illegally seized communication was in violation of RA
4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition
for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
prevented from further conducting such investigation
for the basic reason that there was no proper
publication of the senate rules, empowering them to
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make such investigation of the unlawfully seized
documents.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due
process considering that he is summoned to attend the
Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires
the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for
one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of
the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was proper publication of the NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE (note, there are 2 Neri
rules as to empower the senate to further proceed vs Senate cases 549 SCRA 77, and 564 SCRA 52);
with their investigation? GR. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

Rule: The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with FACTS:

the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy
the basic requirements of due process. Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same
question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the
OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly
published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s
explanation:
PAGES 222-228
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
(11) hours on matters concerning the National
Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"). Petitioner
disclosed ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo")
of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to
the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused
to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project4 (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve it.6
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing
petitioner’s answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on
November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense with
petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear
before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. On November
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POLITICAL LAW I ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY | COLLEGE OF LAW
22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the
show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt. On November 29,
2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees,
he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness
to appear and testify should there be new matters to be
taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in
advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s VI, Section 21 of the Constitution requiring the
explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his
request for advance notice of the matters that he
should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January
30, 2008; citing petitioner in contempt of respondent
Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at
the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the above Order. He insisted that he
had not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of
contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to
testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did
not respond to his request for advance notice of
questions.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for
certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by
executive privilege; and second, respondent
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we
considered the subject communications as falling under
the presidential communications privilege because (a)
they related to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, (b) they were received by a
close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent
Committees failed to adequately show a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second
ground, we found that respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of
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executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did
not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c)
there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the
proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt
order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution because their inquiry was not in
accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order
arbitrarily and precipitately.
ISSUE:
WON the Senate violate the requirement under Article
publication of their Rules
RULING:
All the limitations embodied in : Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution form part of the witness’ settled
expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the
witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how
could there be a majority vote when the members in
attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority?
Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in
contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding
in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.
There is a greater measure of protection for the witness
when the concerns and objections of the members are
fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe
that respondent Committees have the discretion to set
aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially
true here where what is involved is the contempt
power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not
promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else,
it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper
observance of the Rules.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure
is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
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