Sixto Brillantes, Jr.

vs Haydee Yorac
192 SCRA 358 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Constitutional Commissions – The
Commission on Elections – COMELEC’s Constitutional Independence
FACTS: In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create
a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he
has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee
Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting
capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-
C of the Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity”.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the
President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions.
The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely
grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the functions of the
COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes.
It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting
chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most senior
member).
But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the
members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the point
here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the
principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.
Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission
FACTS: Petitioner was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing
Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. He was separated from
the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public
funds. On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
NHC with the Department of Labor. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner then elevated the case
to the NLRC, which rendered a decision reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed to the Supreme
Court on January 17, 1985. The Court granted respondent's petition and set aside the
decision for illegal dismissal, with preliminary injunction. Respondent moved for dismissal
on the ground that the CSC has no jurisdiction over the case. The CSC dismissed the
complaint against NHC. Respondent NLRC through Labor Arbiter Manuel L. Caday this
time ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment. Respondent NHC
filed its appeal before the NLRC. The latter reversed the decision on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC has the jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint
for lack of jurisdiction because under the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, NHC's relations
with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled
corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: "The terms and conditions of
employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned
and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law rules and
regulations. . . The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand
provided: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency-subdivision and
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, that employees of
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or
formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil
Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987
Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides: "The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter." (Article IX-8, Section
2[1]).
We ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished
from corporations organized under the Corporation Code.
HIDALGO VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS: In order to socialize the services of AFPCES, General Order No. 920 was
issued by the AFP GHQ reorganizing the AFPCES as an AFP-Wide Service Support
Unit. This, in effect, centralized the management of the commissary exchange
services to the AFPCES.

Petitioners, on the other hand, were hired as regular employees of AFPCES. AFPCES
advised petitioners to undergo an indefinite leave of absence without pay, allegedly
upon a conditional promise that they would be allowed to return to work as soon as
AFPCES tax subsidy is released and upon resumption of its store operations.

When AFPCES failed to recall petitioners to their work as allegedly promised,

petitioners filed a complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal with damages against
AFPCES before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioners
by ordering AFPCES to pay a total of P16,007,996.00 as back wages, 13th month pay
and separation pay to petitioners.
AFPCES filed an appeal praying that it be exempted from posting the required appeal
bond. The NLRC, however, denied the plea. Meanwhile, petitioners sought the
immediate execution of the Labor Arbiters decision.
NLRC dismissed AFPCES appeal following its failure to post the required appeal
bond. Court of Appeals granted AFPCES motion to lift the writ of garnishment and to
stay the execution of the Labor Arbiters monetary award.

Appellate court promulgated the assailed Decision granting AFPCES petition. The
Court of Appeals explained that since AFPCES is a governmental agency that has no
personality separate and distinct from the AFP, petitioners are considered civil service
employees, and that complaints for illegal dismissal should therefore be lodged not
with the Labor Arbiter but with the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints
for illegal dismissal against an adjunct government agency engaged in proprietary
function? Should the complaint be lodged before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) or to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: civil service

In Philippine Refining Company v. Court of Appeals, we declared that AFPCES is a

government agency that is not immune from suit since it is engaged in proprietary
activities. We find no compelling reason to deviate from such pronouncement. The
historical background of its creation and establishment indicates that AFPCES is an
agency under the direct control and supervision of the AFP as it was established to
take charge of the operations and management of all commissary facilities in military
establishments all over the country. By clear implication of law, all AFPCES personnel
should therefore be classified as government employees and any appointment,
promotion, discipline and termination of its civilian staff should be governed by
appropriate civil service laws and procedures.
Petitioners employment to the AFPCES should have been made in conformity with
pertinent civil service regulations since AFPCES is a government agency under the
direct control and supervision of the AFP. However, since this did not happen,
petitioners were placed under an anomalous situation with AFPCES insisting that they
are government employees under the jurisdiction of the CSC, but with the CSC itself
disavowing any jurisdiction over them.
This notwithstanding, since it cannot be denied that petitioners are government
employees, the proper body that has jurisdiction to hear the case is the CSC. Such
fact cannot be negated by the failure of respondents to follow appropriate civil service
rules in the hiring, appointment, discipline and dismissal of petitioners. Neither can it
be denied by the fact that respondents chose to enroll petitioners in the SSS instead
of the GSIS. Such considerations cannot be used against the CSC to deprive it of its
jurisdiction. It is not the absence or presence of the required appointment from the
CSC, or the membership of an employee in the SSS or in the GSIS that determine the
status of the position of an employee. We agree with the opinion of the AFP Judge
Advocate General that it is the regulation or the law creating the Service that
determines the position of the employee.
Petitioners are government personnel since they are employed by an agency attached
to the AFP. Consequently, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Labor
Arbiters decision on their complaint for illegal dismissal cannot be made to stand since
the same was issued without jurisdiction. Any decision issued without jurisdiction is a
total nullity, and may be struck down at any time.
However, given petitioners peculiar situation, the Court is constrained not to deny the
petition entirely, but instead to refer it to the CSC pro hac vice. The Court notes that
this case has been pending for nearly a decade, but deciding it on the merits at this
juncture, while ideal and more expeditious, is not possible. The records of the case
fail to adequately spell out the validity of the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as
the actual amount of the claim. In fact, the records even fail to disclose the amount of
salary received by petitioners while they were engaged to work in AFPCES facilities.
But rather than directing petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claim before the CSC
a step which will only duplicate much of the proceedings already accomplished the
Court deems it best, pro hac vice, toorder the NLRC to forward the entire records of
the case directly to the CSC which is directed to take cognizance of the case. The
CSC is directed to promptly resolve whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from
the service, and whether they are entitled to their monetary claims. Further, taking into
consideration AFPCES failure to observe the proper procedure required by pertinent
civil service rules and regulations regarding the hiring, appointment and placement of
petitioners, we likewise caution the CSC not to use the AFPCES inefficiency to
prejudice the status of petitioners employment or to deny whatever right they may
have under pertinent civil service laws. To hold otherwise would only be giving
premium to AFPCES delinquent attitude towards petitioners in particular, and to the
civil service in general. The AFPCES cannot be made to have its cake and eat it, too.
De los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, [August 31, 1950],
FACTS: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio
on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified
for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950,
Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same
position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public
Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works
for another assignment Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor
and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare
the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.
The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads:
"No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law."
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legality of the petitioner's removal from the same
office which would be the effect of Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to
stand. |||

HELD: The Court held that petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of
Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he
resigns or is removed for cause, and that respondent Mallare's appointment is
ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.
Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, giving the Chief Executive power
to remove officers at pleasure is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall removed or suspended except for cause
as provided by law." The two provision are mutually repugnant and absolutely
irreconcilable. One in express terms permits what the other in similar terms prohibits.
Pursuant to section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, we declare that this particular
provision has been repealed and has ceased to be operative from the time the
Constitution went into effect.
We are not declaring any part of section 2545 of the Revised Penal Code
unconstitutional. Unconstitutionality, as we understand it, denotes life and vigor, and
unconstitutional legislation presupposes posteriorly in point of time to the Constitution.
It is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of conduct the effect of
which the Constitution specifically forbids." (State ex-rel. Marck vs. Guckenberger,
139 Ohio St. 273; 39 NE [2d] 840.) A law that has been repealed is as good as if it
had never been enacted, and cannot, in nature of things contravene or pretend to
contravene constitutional inhibitions. So, unlikely legislation that is passed in defiance
of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put
it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and
eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate.
Article XII of the Constitution which contains the provisions on Civil Service
contemplates the entire Civil Service regardless the employees embraced therein
belong to the classified or unclassified service the exception of those positions "which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." This theory
is confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30, 1936,
to implement article XII of the Constitution. |Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains Civil
Service almost in the identical words of the Article of the organic law. As a
contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil
Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution.
Three specified classes of positions — policy determining, primarily confidential and
highly technical — are excluded from merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These
positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in
nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service demands that appointments
coming under this category may be terminable at the will of the officer who makes
them. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence
is reposed in the occupant of a position primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office
but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor
highly technical.
Attention is drawn to supposed inconvenience of trying the hands of the appointing
power in changing and shifting officers in the unclassified service. Questions of
expediency are, of course, beyond the province of the courts to take into account in
the interpretation of laws or the Constitution where the language is otherwise clear.
The phrase "for cause" (sec. 4 Art. XII, Constitution) in connection with removals of
public officer has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the
law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal
cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise may deem
sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested
with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to
and affect the administration of office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interest of the public."
Salazar v. Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-44061, [September 20, 1976]
FACTS: Petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
"confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service
Insurance System. Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service
under Section 5, paragraph (j) of Republic Act No. 2260, 1 subject to the usual
physical and medical examination. Her tenure was extended several times by another
appointment by way of promotion, as "confidential agent" in the same office with
compensation as well as her salary was adjusted for a number of times.
Thereafter, much to her surprise, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General
that her services as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, Government
Service Insurance System have been terminated
The Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor
of the Government Service Insurance System issued an appointment to petitioner
Melania C. Salazar as Junior Examiner in his office.
Petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated
to her former position as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS.
However, no action was taken on said letter.
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor
General to reinstate her to her former position as "confidential agent" in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for mandamus
without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance which
petitioner did by filing the proper action in the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for mandamus to compel the Auditor General to return her to her former position
as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the services of petitioner as "confidential agent" in the Office
of the Auditor, GSIS was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of
confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after
accepting-the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
HELD: The Court affirmed the decision appealed from.
There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1)
When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now
Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; 12 or
(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office,
there exists "close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state."
In the case before Us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, 14 declaring ". . .
confidential agents in the several departments and offices of the Government, unless
otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential" brings within the fold
of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office
of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential. Since
the position of the petitioner falls under the first category of primarily confidential
positions, it is no longer necessary to inquire into the nature of the functions attached
to the office in order to determine whether her position is primarily confidential or not.
Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the
termination of her services as confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS is
in violation of her security of tenure.
It can be said that petitioner was not removed from her office as confidential agent in
the office of the Auditor, GSIS, but that her term in said position has already expired
when the appointing power terminated he services.
SAMUEL B. ONG, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.,
Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ong joined the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as a career employee
in 1978. He held the position of NBI Director I from July 14, 1998 to February 23, 1999
and NBI Director II from February 24, 1998 to September 5, 2001. On September 6,
2001, petitioner was appointed Director III by the President.

On June 3, 2004, the petitioner received from respondent Reynaldo Wycoco

Memorandum Circular No. 02-S.2004 informing him that his appointment, being co-
terminus with the appointing authority's tenure, would end effectively at midnight on
June 30, 2004 and, unless a new appointment would be issued in his favor by the
President consistent with her new tenure effective July 1, 2004, he would be
occupying his position in ade facto/hold- over status until his replacement would be
appointed.

On December 01, 2004, the President appointed respondent Victor A. Bessat as NBI
Director III as replacement of the petitioner. Ong filed before the CA a petition for quo
warranto. He sought for the declaration as null and void of (a) his removal from the
position of NBI Director III; and (b) his replacement by respondent Victor Bessat
(Bessat). Ong likewise prayed for reinstatement and backwages.

The CA denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the validity of Ong's removal

HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed.

Political Law- in the hands of the appointing authority are lodged the power to
remove

This Court notes that MC No. 02-S.2004 did not in effect remove Ong from his post.
It merely informed Ong that records of the NBI showed that his co-terminous
appointment had lapsed into a de facto/hold-over status. It likewise apprised him of
the consequences of the said status.

Be that as it may, if we were to assume for argument's sake that Wycoco removed
Ong from his position as Director III by virtue of the former's issuance of MC No. 02-
S.2004, still, the defect was cured when the President herself issued Bessat's
appointment on December 1, 2004. The appointing authority, who in this case was
the President, had effectively revoked Ong's appointment.

Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his
appointment was "co-terminus with the appointing authority." His appointment being
both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be revoked by the President even
without cause and at a short notice.

It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for
it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those
employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature.

In the case at bar, Ong's appointment as Director III falls under the classifications
provided in (a) Section 14(2) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code, to wit, that which is "co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority or at his pleasure"; and (b) Sections 13(b) and 14(2) of Rule V, CSC
Resolution No. 91-1631, or that which is both a temporary and a co-terminous
appointment. The appointment is temporary as Ong did not have the required CES
eligibility.

At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because petitioner
lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a
permanent capacity, there could not have been any violation of petitioners supposed
right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said
right at least during his tenure as Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services.
Hence, no challenge may be offered against his separation from office even if it be for
no cause and at a moments notice.

Petition Denied
Luego v. Civil Service Commission (G. R. No. L-69137)
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor,
Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was
described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as
“temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private
respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and
accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The
private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor
Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as
well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s
title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a

permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment
in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the
Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.