THE IDEAL ROLE OF WOMEN IN PLATO’S AND ARISTOTLE’S

SOCIETIES

Alixandra Jawin

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD

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University of St. Andrews

2012

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 The Ideal Role of Women in Plato’s
and Aristotle’s Societies

Candidate: Alixandra Jawin

Degree: MPhil in Philosophy
Date of Submission: 31/08/11

Abstract
1
1. Candidate’s declarations:

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I was admitted as a research student in September, 2009 and as a candidate for the degree of MPhil in
September, 2011; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews
between 2009 and 2011.

Date 29/05/2012 Alixandra Jawin

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Date

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 This dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than
appreciated.

2
 Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………...4
Chapter 1……………………………………………………………6
1.1…………………………………………………………...7
1.2…………………………………………………………...16
1.3…………………………………………………………...20
1.4…………………………………………………………...34
1.5…………………………………………………………...36
1.6…………………………………………………………...41
Chapter 2……………………………………………………………42
2.1……………………………………………………………46
2.2……………………………………………………………51
2.3……………………………………………………………56
2.4……………………………………………………………58
2.5……………………………………………………………66
2.6……………………………………………………………70
Chapter 3……………………………………………………………72
3.1…………………………………………………………...76
3.2…………………………………………………………...84
3.3…………………………………………………………...89
3.4…………………………………………………………...96
3.5…………………………………………………………...102
3.6…………………………………………………………...110
Chapter 4……………………………………………………………112
4.1…………………………………………………………...119
4.2…………………………………………………………...125
4.3…………………………………………………………...132
4.4…………………………………………………………...138
4.5…………………………………………………………...144

Conclusion………………………………………………………….146
Bibliography………………………………………………………...148

3
Introduction

Modern scholars claim to have investigated Plato’s and

Aristotle’s views on women, but surprisingly few have actually done so

and those that have tend to have done so poorly. I believe there are

two main reasons for this: 1) philosophers place too much importance

on whether Plato or Aristotle can be considered feminists, and 2)

philosophers who approach classical texts with an interest in women

appear to do so with preconceptions and anger. First, trying to

determine Plato’s or Aristotle’s feminist leanings makes little sense.

Before one can agree or disagree with women’s rights one must have

a conception of what a right is; as Plato and Aristotle had no such

conception, attempting to put their ancient views into modern

4
terminology is pointless. When Plato and Aristotle are analyzed in

terms of feminism both fare badly, but such criticism is unfair; we are

judging them by criteria that did not exist in their time. Second, many

seem to read Plato and Aristotle with a preformed agenda that both

have only negative views of women and fail to pay attention to what is

actually stated. A careful examination of Plato’s and Aristotle’s work,

however, proves that both philosophers held nuanced views of

women’s natures and capacities, and this dissertation aims to do

exactly that: carefully analyze what Plato and Aristotle actually wrote

and how this fits into their larger theories and the society they lived in.

5
Chapter One

The most appropriate place to begin investigating the role of

women in Plato’s ideal state is the Republic, a text dedicated to the

ideal state itself. In Book V of Plato’s Republic, Plato addresses this

question indirectly by advocating the inclusion of women into the elite

class of Guardians. It is addressed indirectly for the Guardian class is

comprised of only the most excellent individuals and Plato does not

seek to determine the ideal role for all women in the state. Since we

can only deduce what Plato thought the role of women would be in

his ideal state from the comments he does make concerning women,

this chapter will undertake a detailed examination of his proposal to

elevate qualified women to the rank of Guardian. Many claim that

Plato’s demand for equality in the Guardian class is insincere and are

6
skeptical about the genuineness and breadth of his proposals. If this

claim were true then we can barely state that Plato gave any serious

attention to women’s role in his state but, as I will argue, this is not

the case. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that Plato is serious in his

proposal by providing evidence to support this conclusion throughout

the Republic as well other dialogues, and that there is no such thing as

an ideal role for women as such in Plato’s state.

I.

No one can deny that Plato makes many derogatory remarks on

the subject of women in the Republic as well as in various other

dialogues,1 but whenever Plato makes such a remark, he never uses

women’s nature as the explanation of why they act in the way he is

critical of. In the Greek literary tradition of Plato’s time, women were

condemned due to their phusis (nature).2 While Plato does use phusis

and its cognates throughout many dialogues, in none of them does

Plato use phusis as the reason for why he is critical of women. When

discussing women in Athens, Plato offers generic criticism of how

women behave, but when it comes to women in his ideal city who will

be raised under ideal circumstances, Plato differs from the poets by

judging women by the quality of their soul. If Plato thought that the

ways women did not behave well were incurable, he would say women

1 Phaedo 60a4-5, Apology 35b Timaeus 563b7-9, Republic 549c-550b, 550d, 557c, 563b-d, and 579b-c.
2 Levin 1996, 21
7
acted the way they did due to their nature.3 If we do as Levin suggests

though, and:

[E]valuate Plato’s derogatory comments with the distinction

between current (or less than optimal) and ideal circumstances
in mind, those remarks need not, and in fact cannot, count
against the view that he seriously intends the proposal
concerning women’s equality.4

In other words, Plato’s derogatory remarks towards women do not

detract from his support for his proposal since the women he speaks

poorly of are almost a different species of women from the ones he

will make equal in his ideal state. The women in his ideal state will

be judged by the quality of their souls, and those who are qualified

to become Guardians will be rigorously educated. If Plato condemned

women for their nature, then the discussion of the role of women

in the ideal city would be brief and we would be forced to conclude

that Plato did not make his proposals in Republic V seriously. If

women were by nature incapable of ruling over their emotions and

base desires, then not even Plato’s rigorous education system could

overcome their inferior phusis. But, since women are not by nature

incapable of governing their emotions, they can be taught to do so,

and one can be confident that Plato thought his education system up

to the challenge.

3 Levin 1996, 25.

4 Levin 1996, 24.
8
 Levin conducts a detailed study of passages that use words such

as gune5 and thelus6 versus phusis in dialogues up to and including the

Republic, and observes that when derogatory comments appear,

feminine behavior is explained as the cause for the criticism rather

than woman’s nature. By cross-referencing passages for words

featuring gune and thelus as well as phusis and its cognates, Levin

concludes that when these two terms are found in close proximity to

each other they can be broken down into three types. In group one, 7

Plato’s attitude towards women is neutral. He offers neither praise nor

criticism, and but for one exception, phusis and its cognates are not

utilized; the exception where we do see phusis near ‘women’ arises in

a context not strictly related to women.8 This case occurs in the

Symposium at 189d-e when Aristophanes states that human phusis

differs from the original human phusis as the original had three kinds

of natures.9 The first kind was androgynous and contained male and

female components.10 Considering that this speech is poetic is nature,

a type of myth and not from the voice of Socrates or his account of

5 Woman as well as wife.

6 The adjective “feminine.”
7 Passages in this group include: Prot, 325a6-b2, Menex 237d4-238a5; Symp 191a5-b4, 191c4-d3, 206c4-5,
Rep 324e7-424a8, 451c2-6, and 620c2
8 Levin 1996, 25.
9 These natures will be explained in greater detail later in the chapter.
10 Levin 1996, 25.

9
eros, Levin is correct that this use of phusis is not relevant to female

nature.11

The second group of passages which concern women are

negative in tone. When the assessments of women are negative,

however, phusis and its cognates are rarely near the passage in

question.12 The one time it is, however, at 579b4-8, has no relation to

the question of women’s nature. While discussing the soul of

tyrannical man Plato writes “He alone can never travel abroad to

attend the great festivals which every freeman wants to witness, but

must live like a woman ensconced in the recesses of his house.” 13

Barring this exception, one would expect that if Plato thought women

were by nature inferior, he would have taken the opportunity to say so

while characterizing them negatively.14 A particularly compelling

example of this argument can be found in the opening of the Phaedo

were Socrates attributes his wife Xanthippe’s emotional reaction to

habit, saying that her emotional exclamations are “just the sorts of

things which women are accustomed to say.”15 With the exception of

620c where Plato does discuss women’s phusis16, none of the passages

11 The next chapter, however, will look more carefully at speeches in the Symposium which are from
characters other than Socrates.
12 Examples include: Apology 35b, Phaedo 60a, Republic 387e-388a, 550d, 557c, 605d-e.
13 Republic 579b4-8.
14Levin 1996, 25.
15 Phaedo 60a4-5.
16 I will go into greater detail concerning this passage later in the chapter.

10
in the first two groups (neutral and negative) discusses women in

relation to their phusis. In the third group where women and phusis

are found close together, Plato does not provide a clear and direct

answer. Rather, Plato uses this as the beginning of the discussion that

I will examine: “Whether female human nature is capable of sharing

with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others.” 17 When

Plato’s full attention is focused on the subject of women’s nature, his

comments oppose the current attitudes towards women. Instead, he

argues that the current state of women goes against what is natural 18

and begins to reflect upon women as they would be under ideal

circumstances, when people are evaluated on the quality of their souls

and are educated accordingly.19

The positive comments concerning women’s nature do not

only occur in Book V, the Book where women’s equality is the most

relevant. At the close of Book VII Plato finishes his discussion of the

education plan for the philosopher-rulers and writes, “You must not

forget that some of them will be women. All I have been saying applies

just as much to any women who are found to have the necessary

gifts”.20 This comment is unexpected for women do not feature

strongly in Book VII. Book VII is famous for its allegory of the Cave

17 Republic 452e-453a.
18 Republic 456c1-2.
19Levin 1996, 26.
20 Republic 540c.

11
and the education of the philosopher-rulers, so discussing women

in this Book is not necessary and their exclusion would not raise

questions. Instead, Plato abruptly brings women into the discussion to

ensure they are not excluded from the rank of philosopher-ruler. The

fact that Plato does so suggests that he takes the proposal of women

becoming philosopher-rulers seriously.

If a woman in Plato’s ideal state did not have the soul to qualify

for Guardianship, she still came out ahead of Athenian women, for

every child in the ideal city has a better upbringing. In Book II, when

Plato discusses the early education of the Guardians, some of the

passages also apply to all children born in the state. Plato’s quarrel

with the poets goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, but in brief

he criticizes poetry for setting examples of how to behave that are far

from virtuous or worthy of imitation. Plato writes:

Then we must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers.

We’ll select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and
reject them when they aren’t. And we’ll persuade nurses and
mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, since
they will shape their children’s souls with stories. 21

Whether or not Plato is correct as to whether poetry has such a

profound effect on the moral education of children, for our purposes it

is only important that Plato clearly believes poetry can influence us in

such a way. Thus, if certain tales are not told to any children, then all

21 Republic 377b-c.
12
people in the ideal city will have a stronger moral core than the

Athenians. A woman who is not a Guardian will still be in more control

of her emotions than an Athenian woman, for in the ideal state she is

not exposed to bad influences which might cause her to act in an

undignified manner. Plato continues, “Such then…are the kinds of

stories that I think future guardians should and should not hear about

the gods from childhood on, if they are to honor the gods and their

parents.”22 According to this passage, a girl raised in the ideal city will

honor her parents and others more so than in Athens, so it is not an

intellectual leap to conclude that all women will be better in the ideal

state. Not all women will be Guardians, but the womanish behavior

that Plato berates people for demonstrating will not tolerated in his

state and children will be raised from birth not to behave in such

ways. By way of discussing what is and is not appropriate for children

to hear, Socrates concludes, “by the dog, without being aware of it,

we’ve been purifying the city we recently said was luxurious.” 23

Indeed, without the excesses that cause moral decay, all people in the

ideal city are morally superior to their Athenian counterparts. It is true

that Plato never explicitly discusses the position of women outside the

Guardian class, but for reasons that will be discussed later in the

chapter, it does not make sense for Plato to keep women secluded in

22 Republic 386a.
23 Republic 399e.
13
their homes.

It is important to note that many of the most negative

comments regarding women are in Books VIII and IX, the books

where Plato describes the degenerate types of states and souls, and

the extent to which they differ from the ideal.24 In these sections

Plato is particularly harsh towards women due to the fact that the

spirited and appetitive elements govern their soul rather than reason. 25

One must also note though that Plato is equally as critical of men

for having the same misrule in the soul. Moreover, there are many

opportunities where Plato has the chance to comprehensively condemn

contemporary Athenian women but he does not.26 Take for example

Socrates’ statement:

We shall do well, then, to strike out descriptions of heroes

bewailing the dead, and make over such lamentations to women
(and not to women of good standing either) and to men of low
character, so that the Guardians we are training for our country
may disdain to imitate them.27

While Plato is undeniably harsh in his criticisms of women, Plato is

critical of everyone in contemporary society. Rather than seeing Plato

as criticizing women for being ruled by their emotions, we should see

Plato’s main concern as worrying that all people are ruled by their

emotions and appetites.

24 Republic 549c-550b, 557c, 563b-d, and 579b-c.

25 Republic 387e-388s, 431b-c, 469d, 549d, 549c-550b, and 550d.
26 Levin, Susan 1996, 24.
27 Republic 388a.

14
 Another quote which benefits from Levin’s claim that we must

differentiate between times when Plato is remarking on women in

Classical Athens as opposed to the ideal city occurs when Socrates

asks:

Do you know of anything practiced by human beings in which

the male sex isn’t superior to the female in all these ways?
Or must we make a long story of it by mentioning weaving,
baking cakes, and cooking vegetables, in which the female sex is
believed to excel and in which it is most ridiculous of all for it to
be inferior?28

In this instance Plato clearly references women as they were in his

society, and due to the conditions that women in ancient Athens lived

in, it was highly unlikely any of his interlocutors would disagree. In

regard to his reference to men’s ability with housework, I believe we

can understand this comment as an attempt to illustrate his point

rather than a further indictment against women’s capacities. Plato’s

next comment, “It’s true that one sex is much superior to the other in

pretty well everything, although many women are better than many

men in many things. But on the whole it is as you say,”29 is more

positive than it appears at first glance. Even though he qualifies

the “many women are better than many men in many things”

with “But on the whole it is as you say,” Plato’s positivity in this

passage goes even further than Levin’s argument. In this statement

28 Republic 455c.
29 Republic 455d.
15
Plato is not referring to women as they might be but women as they

are, women in his very own society. Admittedly when Plato

says “many women are better than many men in many things,” he

possibly refers to the domestic arts, but it is still a statement in favor

of women in present circumstances. I doubt Plato had any grand

capabilities in mind when he states that many women are better

at “many things,” but it is interesting that he does not qualify

the “many things.” If women were by nature inferior to men, then it

would stand that men should be superior to women in every respect.

II.

The relation of the body and the soul is of the utmost importance

to this chapter since the answer will determine whether Plato seriously

intends his proposals regarding women in Republic V. If one’s

biological characteristics influence the quality of one’s soul, then

one can say that Plato is not committed to making qualified women

Guardians. Such a conclusion can be reached for if the quality of one’s

soul can be determined by physical characteristics such as sex, then

it can be argued that the biological characteristic of being a woman

indicates an inferior soul. If being a woman is a sign of a lesser soul,

then it is unlikely that any woman would ever have the requisite

nature to become a Guardian. However, should the body and the soul

have a minimal connection, and more specifically, should biological

16
features be unable to indicate the type of soul one has, then we can

conclude Plato deems that certain women can have the soul worthy to

become a Guardian. Of course, Plato can claim in the Republic that due

to physical reasons it is more difficult for women to be rational, but

when they are, they are as fit as rational men. I do not think this is

what Plato intends, but this question will be addressed in greater detail

later in the chapter.

The question of whether one’s physical or biological attributes

are relevant to the caliber of one’s psuche is appropriately discussed in

Republic V. Plato writes:

We have been strenuously insisting on the letter of our principle

that different natures should not have the same occupations, as
if we were scoring a point in a debate; but we have altogether
neglected to consider what sort of sameness or difference we
meant and in what respect these natures and occupations
were to be defined as different or the same. Consequently, we
might very well be asking one another whether there is not an
opposition between bald and long-haired men, and, when that
was admitted, forbid one set to be shoemakers, if the other were
following that trade.30

Undoubtedly this example acts as a metaphor for the forthcoming

discourse, but beginning the discussion with the distinction between

bald and long-haired men is clever; an interlocutor would be hard

pressed to say there was a qualified difference in the soul of a bald

person and a long-haired person vis-a-vis shoemaking by the virtue

of their hair alone, for some of Plato’s metaphors are more obscure.

30 Republic 454d.
17
Plato has already declared the premise that one’s ability to practice

a certain techne31 is based on the caliber of one’s soul, so now is the

appropriate time to determine whether biological and physical features

influence or even determine the quality of their souls.32 According to

this passage, Plato recognizes that while they have been focusing on

the principle that people with the same natures should pursue the

same occupations, he has been remiss in not stating clearly what

constitutes this sameness in significant respects. By providing the

example of the bald man, Plato frames the question of sameness and

difference in terms of physical and biological traits. As we see with the

hair example, purely biological differences are not reason enough to

make a qualitative opinion as to the condition of one’s soul.

Now that the discussion has been framed, the question we

must address is what can the biological differences between men

and women in their reproductive functions tell us about the quality

of their souls? Reproductive theories at the time held that there was

a correlation between reproduction and the quality of one’s mind,

and this worked against women,33 for women’s role in reproduction

was thought of as passive and indicated a lesser kind of soul. Plato,

however, takes a different view and writes:

31 Craft, art, or skill.

32 Levin 1996, 27.
33 Mayhew 2004, 113.

18
 If the male sex is seen to be different from the female with
regard to a particular craft or way of life, we’ll say that the
relevant one must be assigned to it. But if it’s apparent that they
differ only in this respect, that the females bear children while
the male begets them, we’ll say there has been no kind of proof
that women are different from men with respect to what we’re
talking about, and we’ll continue to believe that our guardians
and their wives must have the same way of life.34

The passage begins by reiterating the principle by which all decisions

must be made in light of: one must do the job which one is suited to

do by nature, so if one sex is better at one job than the other, the sex

that is more suited to the job ought to perform it. If the only difference

between men and women is biological in nature, and for our purpose

here that “the male begets and the female brings forth,” then Plato

has explained why women cannot be excluded from the Guardian

rank due to sex alone. The popular view that women’s role in the

reproductive process is a sign of the type of soul women possess is not

even acknowledged. Plato makes no mention of any physical process

that signifies the quality of one’s soul, for as we have seen with the

example of the bald-headed man, there is none. What makes Plato’s

omission of a correlation between reproductive roles and the soul more

important than the cobbler example, however, is that reproductive

roles are a far greater biological difference and importance than hair.

By discussing the reproductive roles in such neutral terms as “beget”

and “bring forth,” we do not even see an acknowledgment that

34 Republic 454d-e.
19
one might think that reproductive roles reveal the type of soul one

has. Whatever doubts or questions Plato may have had concerning

biological differences between men and women, he did not let these

doubts overshadow his principle conviction that if people are judged on

the quality of their souls then there is no reason that women and men

are not capable of the same level of philosophical ability.

This section has demonstrated why we cannot determine the

quality of one’s soul due to one’s sex, but the next section will take

this a step farther and argue that the soul itself is sexless. I will reveal

how Plato’s dualist conception of the mind and body proves that his

intent for qualified women becoming Guardians is sincere, for as Smith

states “the reason it is unnatural to discriminate on the basis of sex in

such cases is that the nature involved (the soul) is sexless.” 35 The Myth

of Er is where the argument shall begin.

III.

The use of myth in Platonic dialogues is a dissertation in and of

itself. While this project will be unable to go into Plato’s use of mythos

too deeply, it will look at Plato’s Myth of Er and how it relates to

women’s roles in the ideal city. In this section I demonstrate that due

to Platonic dualism and the disassociation between the body and the

soul as discussed in the previous chapter, the quality of one’s soul

35 Smith, N 1983, 473.

20
cannot be judged by sex alone. As we shall see in the Myth of Er the

soul is sexless, thereby making any claims about one’s soul due to

one’s sex false.

To summarize the plot, the myth concerns the man Er who

perishes in battle. Two days after his death he is resurrected and

tells a tale of the cosmos and what he observed on his journey in the

afterlife. My examination begins when souls from the heavens and

souls from the earth meet in a field and are organized into rows and

given lottery tokens. The Speaker tells the souls:

[T]his is the beginning of another cycle that will end in death.

Your daemon or guardian spirit will not be assigned to you by
lot; you will choose him. The one who has the first lot will be
the first to choose a life to which he will be bound by necessity.
Virtue knows no master; each will possess it to a greater or
less degree, depending on whether he values or distains it. The
responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice; the god
has none.36

The point emphasized is that there is no predestination and every soul

has the opportunity to determine what sort of life it wishes to lead.

The Interpreter then lays before the souls many lives, and importantly

as we shall see later, there are more lives than there are souls. Every

sort of life is presented ranging from the famous and infamous to the

unknown. The text focuses on examples that would have strongly

resonated with the ancient reader such as despots, some of whom

lived their lives and died while still in power and others who were

36 Republic 617d-e.
21
ruined and met tragic ends. Some lives would become famous for their

beauty, talents, or high birth, but of course there were a great many

undistinguished lives of men and women.

The next statement discusses a key concept: the disconnection

between the body and the soul and the soul’s superiority over the

body. Plato writes:

But the arrangement of the soul was not included in the model
because the soul is inevitably altered by the different lives
it chooses. But all other things were there, mixed with each
other and with wealth, poverty, sickness, health, and the states
intermediate to them.37

This comment demonstrates how the soul is independent of the body,

for the soul determines which body it will inhabit. Not only does the

soul determine its body for this life, but the soul makes this choice

over and over again. The sex of the body is not a determinant as to

the quality of the soul as Plato writes “But the arrangement of the soul

was not included in the model because the soul is inevitably altered by

the different lives it chooses.” This statement entails that the models

of the lives do not predestine the ethical characters of the souls that

will live those lives, for one’s soul will acquire ethical character from

living that life, and hence cannot be fully determined beforehand.

Influence, then, is mutual: the soul chooses a next life, including the

body, but is then affected by the choices it makes during that life.

37 Republic 618b.
22
 The Interpreter then states “There is a satisfactory life rather

than a bad one available even for the one who comes last, provided

that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously Therefore, let not

the first be careless in his choice nor the last discouraged.” 38 Here

again we see evidence that the sex of the body does not correlate to

the quality of the soul, for if the last soul’s best option is a fourth-

century Athenian housewife, according to Plato it is still possible for

this soul to lead a good life. Had this soul had a better lottery token,

then it could have been in the body of a legendary hero or infamous

tyrant. The element of chance shows how the body that one ends up

in is part choice and part luck, but that there is no body that cannot

house a virtuous soul. It must be noted, however, that while one can

determine the body one inhabits, that body’s life will still be subject to

the social conventions of its time. So even if a soul selects the body of

a woman with great intelligence, it is unlikely that her wisdom will be

appreciated by the men of her time.39

According to the myth, souls that had previously been in heaven

tended to pick evil lives for they were not disciplined by the

experience of earthly life, while souls newly arrived from earth were

more likely to make a more careful choice. Plato explains:

Because of this and because of the chance of the lottery, there

38 Republic 619b.
39 It should be noted that the thesis that lesser souls tend to pick female lives is never ruled out.

23
 was an interchange of goods and evils for most of the souls.
However, if someone pursues philosophy in a sound manner
when he comes to live here on earth and if the lottery doesn’t
make him one of the last to choose…it looks as though not only
will he be happy here, but his journey from here to there and
back again won’t be along the rough underground path, but
along the smooth heavenly one.40

This passage reveals that we cannot deem a soul that chooses to be in

a woman’s body as a lesser soul. We must keep in mind that perhaps

choosing the role of a woman was the least objectionable life available

or maybe that life was exactly what the soul was seeking. Take for

example the life of a slave girl as opposed to the life of a wealthy

Athenian male. On a superficial glance the life of the privileged male

appears as the better choice, but as the myth has shown us a body

does not give us a clue as to the soul inside. Perhaps this man’s life

will be dominated by violence and cruelty, he will become a murderer

and a thief who uses his money and status to hide his crimes until

he is eventually caught and is miserable in soul and circumstances.

Take then the life of a slave girl, her life may be one of toil and little

pleasure, but it may also be a life of contented simplicity. We see the

desire for a simple life with Odysseus. We are told that in the lottery

witnessed by Er, Odysseus’ token came last. Plato writes:

It chanced that the soul of Odysseus got to make its choice last
of all, and since memory of its former sufferings had relieved its
love of honor, it went around for a long time, looking for the life
of a private individual who did his own work, and with difficulty
it found one lying off somewhere neglected by the others. He
40 Republic 619d-e.
24
 chose it gladly and said that he’d have made the same choice
even if he’d been first. Still other souls changed from animals
into human beings, or from one kind of animal into another. 41

Odysseus is an example of one who has not forgotten the lessons from

his previous life and made his decision with wisdom. Though he will

not lead a glamorous life, Odysseus is careful enough to recollect that

his soul has had enough ambition and has learned its lesson. In Plato’s

account we find echoes of the modern cliché “don’t judge a book by its

cover;” for all one knows the bird one sees houses the soul of Achilles.

We can never know why a soul chose the life it did, for before the soul

returns to earth it must drink from the River of Unmindfulness which

causes the soul to forget all that has passed.

Plato demonstrates that as long as one is not very unlucky in

the body one’s soul is encased in and as long as one lives virtuously,

one is likely to find happiness in this life as well as the next. Plato

writes “Er said that the way in which the souls chose their lives was a

sight worth seeing, since it was pitiful, funny, and surprising to watch.

For the most part, their choice depended upon the character of their

former life.”42 What this entails is that if one lives the best life possible

in every life one has, then one can be happy in every life without

qualification of any sort for sex. A vegetarian43 might even see

41 Republic 620c-d.
42 Republic 620a.
43 The Pythagoreans were vegetarians. Huffman, Carl, "Pythagoras", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
25
justification for vegetarianism in this myth or at least justification for

treating animals humanely, though no doubt this is not what Plato

intended. Instead, what Plato did intend was to show that the body

acts as a shell or container, but to judge one’s soul based on the sex

of the container makes no sense.

In order to demonstrate the disassociation between the

soul and the body it is housed in, Plato gives us many examples such

as Orpheus who ‘hated the female sex because of his death at their

hands, and so was unwilling to have a woman conceive and give birth

to him,”44 and “the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale,

a swan choosing to be changed over to a human life, and other

musical animals doing the same thing.”45 The two examples most

relevant to this chapter, however, are those of Atalanta and Odysseus.

Plato writes “Atalanta had been assigned a place near the middle, and

when she saw great honors being assigned to a male athlete, she

chose his life, unable to pass them by.”46 His choice of Atalanta is

significant for she is hardly a typical Athenian woman. Atalanta, often

considered a goddess, grew up in the wild and was an acknowledged

fierce hunter. Her interest in picking the body of an athlete is

unsurprising due to the way her previous life was affected by running.

44 Republic 620a.
45 Republic 620a.
46 Republic 620b.

26
According to the myth Atalanta had no desire to marry, so when her

father attempted to force her into marriage she agreed but with one

condition, she would only marry if one of her proposed suitors could

best her in a race. Her father conceded and for a time Atalanta

appeared safe for her suitors were put to death after she won the

race. Her luck changed when Melanion sought the aid of Aphrodite

who gave him three irresistible apples. When racing, every time

Atalanta took the lead over Melanion he would roll an apple in another

direction and she could not help but chase after it. This was how

Melanion came to win her hand in marriage, and though this is

speculation, one can imagine she was peeved at this result. Plato’s

choice of Atalanta as the only soul who we are specifically told has

resided in a female body in the Myth of Er highlights positions already

discussed. Here, we are given an explicit example of a soul that was

once housed in a female body becoming housed in a male body - and

not just any male body, but one that will be honored for his talent. But

Plato did not have to include a woman to demonstrate how the souls

change body, for a man becoming a swan and a swan becoming a

man is a far stronger example of this principle than a woman

becoming a man. What is of interest, however, is that Plato could have

chosen any woman from all of Greek mythology, so why Atalanta?

It could be coincidence that female Guardians and Atalanta

27
appear in the Republic, for they do admittedly appear in different

books. But, if Plato is serious in his claim that women can become

Guardians, there is no better woman to use as an example in the Myth

of Er than Atalanta. She is in many respects an ideal Guardian. The

myth speaks of her virtue and physical skill, and while there is no

specific mention of her wisdom, there are enough tales of her holding

her own alongside men that there is no reason to suppose she was

not equally sharp in mind.47 Regrettably, there is no way to know why

Plato chose Atalanta for this myth, but we would justified in supposing

that if he wanted to use an example that included a soul who wanted

to become an athlete, then Atalanta is a perfect choice. No matter

what motivated Plato’s choice of Atalanta and even if he did not have

her in mind as one who in different circumstances could have become

a Guardian, on every interpretation her inclusion demonstrates that a

soul once housed in a female body can also be a great male athlete.

Had Plato not been serious in his proposal, he had a myriad of women

in Greek mythology who were not famous for their control over

their emotions or proportional responses. He could have picked any

character from mythology famous for irrationality and had her pick the

life of a baseless scoundrel.

Atalanta not only represents the potential that women

47 Though admittedly her wisdom failed her when it came to the apples.
28
have to become Guardians, but in a way she also represents the

struggle that women face in their current lives to live up to their

potential. Though Atalanta has the spirit and the skill of a Guardian,

the circumstances of being a woman in ancient Greek society cause

her to lose her freedom. Atalanta has no wish to marry but is forced to

by her father, an occurrence any Athenian girl would face. Though I

will not argue that Atalanta is the inspiration for women entering the

rank of Guardian for there is no proof that this is the case, it is

possible that Plato recognized Atalanta as a soul in a female body that

with proper instruction could become a Guardian. Even if this was not

done intentionally on his part, it underscores how with proper

instruction women can become Guardians. How Atalanta’s life

resembles that of an Athenian woman’s is that she also did not have

control of her destiny nor did she grow up under ideal circumstances.

Atalanta’s end is a sad one, for the myth says that after marriage she

allowed Melanion to seduce her in the temple of Zeus, and having so

angered Zeus he turned them into lions, for it was then thought that

lions could only mate with leopards thereby preventing them from

mating again. Had Atalanta’s soul been brought up under ideal

circumstances, it is likely she would not have given into lust.

It is possible that Plato thought there might be girls like Atalanta

in ancient Athens, but that due to the influence of human institutions

29
and conventions they were physically and intellectually stunted.

Gregory Vlastos writes:

We should recall here his vivid sense of the power of a corrupt

society to pervert the heart and conversely the power of
education to improve moral character. Putting into context
those woman-denigrating remarks, we can understand them as
voicing what Plato thinks most Athenian women grow up to be
in their present habitat, the domestic ghetto, which stunts them
intellectually and warps them morally.48

In other words, part of the reason why Athenian women were

susceptible to Plato’s less than complimentary remarks is due to the

social institutions of Athens, but as Vlastos notes, Plato is not one to

pay too much credence to cultural or popular values; he is aware of

the damage that a “corrupt society” has on the soul and recognizes

that once these influences are removed, women like Atalanta will

appear.

One factor that many philosophers fail to consider is that not all

women that Athenian men came into contact with were sequestered

house wives, though even house wives had far greater responsibility

and management skills then they are credited for. In Xenophon’s

Oikonomikos the husband Ischomachus gives detailed instructions to

his young bride as to how she is to manage his estate. In it he gives

specific instructions for ruling and training slaves, housekeeping, and

farming technology. These topics are hardly suitable for one with little

48 Vlastos 1989, 25.

30
intellect. Instead, the Oikonomikos presents a picture of the Athenian

wife as a competent manager of a large estate. We must also pay

close attention to Aspasia, a hetairai, or high-class courtesan for we

know that Plato knew of her as she is mentioned in the Menexenus.

Plato writes:

But I was listening only yesterday to Aspasia going through a

funeral speech for these very people. For she had heard the
report you mention, that the Athenians are going to select the
speaker; and thereupon she rehearsed to me the speech in the
form it should take, extemporizing in part, while other parts she
had previously prepared, as I imagine, at the time when she was
composing the funeral oration which Pericles delivered; and from
this she patched together sundry fragments.49

Hetaera led significantly different lives than Athenian wives in that

they were educated to discuss philosophy with their male clients,

learned the economic and management skills necessary to run their

own brothel, they were independent, and paid taxes. As a non-

Athenian and a hetairai, Aspasia was freed from the law that kept

Athenian wives secluded in their homes and was therefore able

to participate in Athenian public life. Though her marital status is

disputed, she was the mistress of Pericles and their house became

the intellectual meeting point of Athens’ most famous writers and

philosophers, including Socrates.50 According to Plutarch, Athenian

men would bring their wives to hear her converse despite her immoral

49 Menexenus 236b.
50 Adams 2007 , 75–76.
31
lifestyle.51 It is clear from the passage above that Plato had a very

high opinion of Aspasia and we do not see a single criticism of her

or her speech. It is not astounding then, that Plato imagined female

Guardians, for he did encounter intelligent women and praised them.

Plato had good reason to believe that better social

institutions produce better women, for there were examples of

proficient women in Plato’s own time. Women in Sparta did not live in

ideal conditions, but the Spartan social institutions were so different

from those in Classical Athens that it created different women. Unlike

their Athenian counterparts, Spartan women were educated in the arts

and athletics,52 owned more than a third of the land in Sparta in their

own right, dressed in shorter garments to allow more freedom of

movement, raised their sons until the age of seven, and with the men

often at war the women were free to take charge of all state affairs,

with the exception of the military. It is highly unlikely that Plato was

not influenced by Sparta’s women when conceiving the female

Guardians. If he harbored doubts that Athenian women were

incapable of physical exertion or intellectual thought, he had only to

look at Sparta to see that women who received training were capable.

As long as Athenian wives remain in their current condition of little

education and marriage at 14, it is unlikely that they will show traits

51 Plutarch, Pericles XXIV.

52 Republic 452c
32
that Atalanta or Aspasia posses. But, if Athenian girls were raised

under ideal circumstances, it seems like much less of a leap to think

that women could become Guardians.

One very important social institution which would be changed in

the ideal city is that female Guardians are not responsible for raising

their children. The result is that minus the actual process of giving

birth, the female leads the exact same life as the male Guardian. Plato

writes:

As the children are born, they’ll be taken over by the officials

appointed for the purpose, who may be either men or women
or both, since our offices are open to both sexes…And won’t the
nurses also see to it that the mothers are brought to the rearing
pen when their breasts have milk, taking every precaution to
insure that no mother knows her own child and providing wet
nurses if the mother’s milk is insufficient? And won’t they take
care that the mothers suckle the children for only a reasonable
amount of time and that the care of sleepless children and all
other such troublesome duties are taken over by the wet nurses
and other attendants?53

Clearly, on Plato’s view, giving birth is more of a purely physical

process than emotional, for once the children are born there is no

sense that the female Guardians will feel any loss or desire to raise

a child. In the passage above, giving birth is depicted as a routine

physical process; there are no mentions of emotions, irrationality, or

sadness at not knowing one’s child. This is vital since giving birth is

the main distinction between male and female Guardians. If giving

53 Republic 460b-d.
33
birth affected the rationality of a female Guardian, or in some essential

way changed her nature, then female Guardians would be significantly

different from male Guardians. But, if childbirth is just a physical

process and it does not change the nature of the emotions of the

female Guardian, then there is no fundamental way in which male and

female Guardians are distinct.

IV.

The Republic is not the only text where the soul’s sexless nature

is seen, for despite the negative comments about women during the

stage-setting,54 the Phaedo champions this view. The Phaedo is set

during Socrates’ final moments before his death as he discusses the

Forms and the immortality of the soul. It is not surprising that in a

dialogue where death is the climax, Plato’s dualism is more central

than in any other dialogue. When discussing the soul’s immortality,

and more specifically recollection, Plato considers the relation

between the soul and the body.55 In his account of recollection Plato

writes, “Our souls also existed apart from the body before they took

on human form, and they had intelligence.”56 In other words, before a

54 Plato asks for his wife to removed from his room so her crying will not disturb him. Plato writes that
Socrates’ wife Xanthippe “broke out and said just the kind of things that women are given to saying: ‘So
this is the very last time, Socrates, that your good friends will speak to you and you to them.’ At which
Socrates looked to Crito and said: ‘Crito, someone had better take her home.’ So she was taken away by
some of Crito’s people , calling out and lamenting.” (60a).
55 Levin 1996, 28.
56 Phaedo 76c.
34
soul becomes encased in a human body, the soul has intelligence.

One of the core philosophical points of the text is how practicing

philosophy is in actuality preparation for death. Plato explains this by

describing the nature of the soul and writes, “So the soul is more like

the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible?” 57 By

the invisible he is referring to the Forms and concepts such as

sameness, difference and number whereas the body is more akin to

the physical world of visible objects. He continues and writes, “The

soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform,

indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like

that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and

never consistently the same.”58 If we apply what Plato writes about the

soul in this passage to the discussion of whether one can determine

the quality of one’s soul according to one’s sex, we have further proof

that the soul has little correlation with the body; if the soul has

qualities such as divinity and constancy then the question of sex

becomes relatively minor.

In a certain sense it is more accurate to look at the myth in the

Phaedo than the Myth of Er, for the Myth of Er differs from all other

Platonic myths in how much choice the soul has in determining its

next life. In the other myths, and probably closer to Plato’s thought,

57 Phaedo 79c.
58 Phaedo 80b.
35
the next body a soul inhabits will be determined by one’s lifestyle in

one’s previous life. While there is a certain amount of choice in every

myth, there is much more preordination in the Phaedo for the soul is

an extension of the behavior that influenced its lifestyle.

Consequently, if the soul is influenced by the lifestyle it led in its

previous life, the souls housed in Athenian women will have a more

difficult time improving the quality of their souls. If social institutions

remain as they are, the souls in Athenian wives will have greater

difficulty improving and will slowly become corrupt. If the lifestyle of

the body can influence the quality of the soul, then it is unsurprising

that Plato’s ideal state is so strictly run. On his view, all souls will

improve from his education system, ban of inappropriate poetry and

music, and life under the rule of the wise Guardians.

V.

If we have any doubts as to Plato’s sincerity in making certain

women Guardians, his earnestness in the following statement proves

that his first commitment when it comes to determining profession is

based in nature rather than sex. Plato writes:

We’ll say, I suppose, that one woman is a doctor, another not,

and that one is musical by nature, another not…And, therefore,
won’t one be athletic or warlike, while another is unwarlike
and no lover of physical training? Further, isn’t one woman
philosophical or a lover of wisdom, while another hates wisdom?
And isn’t one spirited and another spiritless…So one woman may
have a guardian nature and another not, for wasn’t it qualities
of this sort that we looked for in the natures of the men we

36
 selected as Guardians…Therefore, men and women are by nature
the same with respect to guarding the city, except to the extent
that one is weaker and the other stronger.59

In this passage we see that men and women having the same abilities

is not only limited to the Guardian class, but also that this principle

applies to technai such as medicine and music. Plato’s final caveat in

the passage above is not as problematic as many think. Plato issues

a similar statement when he declares “various natures are distributed

in the same way in both creatures. Women share by nature in every

way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker

than men.”60 Claiming that women are weaker may not sound right

to the modern ear, but it cannot be denied that Plato is in a sense

correct. Modern athletics recognize that men are physically stronger

than women, and accordingly do not let them compete against each

other as it is unfair. A female athlete will be stronger than a physically

inactive male and perhaps even stronger than some male athletes;

physiologically though, most men are stronger. We should in no way

conclude that women cannot be strong warriors and effective in battle,

but only that they will acquire sufficient skills that will enable them to

fight with and alongside men. It should also be remembered that while

strength in battle is a crucial skill for a Guardian, for if the ideal state

59 Republic 455e-456a.
60 Republic 455d.
37
is to continue it must be able to defend itself, it is by no means the

most important. What marks the Guardian from the rest of society is

his or her ability to practice philosophy and comprehend the Forms.

Physical training may be difficult, but many citizens could undertake

such training, while the philosophical training a Guardian endures is a

trial only those with the best nature can survive.

Philosophers such as Julia Annas are correct that Plato’s

argument for making women Guardians is a utilitarian one, but this is

not as negative as she assumes.61 Yes, Plato was partly motivated to

include women into the rank of Guardian in order to widen the pool of

candidates, but this is not the only reason. More importantly, Plato is

only interested in how anybody can be of use to the state. His

argument is partly utilitarian, but it is equally utilitarian to both men

and women; everyone is raised to serve the state to his or her best

ability and no one is released from that duty. In addition, Plato does

not see service to the state, or as Annas terms it “usefulness,” as

some manner of servitude.62 To Plato there is no profession more

honorable than to serve the ideal state, and Annas fails to grasp the

sense of civic duty that Guardians will feel towards it. Annas also

reproaches Plato by claiming that even if a woman did not wish to

61 Annas 1996, 8.
62 Annas 1996, 8.
38
serve the city, Plato’s system would coerce her to.63 But, if Plato

believes people ought to be compelled to serve the state, then he

would believe that men as well as women are to be equally compelled.

It is improbable that anyone would be forced to become a Guardian

for it seems certain that one who did not aspire to serve the state

would not have the soul that would enable one to become a Guardian

in the first place.64 Guardians are by nature excellent and every single

person of this rank must be of the highest caliber; a less than stellar

Guardian is the downfall of the ideal state, so the women who will

comprise the Guardian class must contribute equally. Nowhere in the

Republic is there to be found any mention of female Guardians’

contributions to the state as being any less valuable than that of their

male counterparts.65

If what Annas is objecting to is how women in classes

other than that of Guardian fare, then it is an equally unfair objection

as the subject is never raised. If we are to speculate though, I assume

Plato continues to uphold the principle that every person ought to

pursue the activity to which they are suited to do by nature. There is

no reason to think that Plato suddenly diverges from this fundamental

63 Annas 1996, 8.
64 With the exception when trainee Guardians must be forced to return to the cave: “They must be made
to climb the ascent to the vision of Goodness, which we called the highest object of knowledge; and, when
they have looked upon it long enough, they must not be allowed, as they now are, to remain on the heights
refusing to come down again to the prisoners or to take part in their labors and rewards,” (520a).
65 It is an acknowledged difficulty that all Guardians are forced to return to the cave.

39
principle when it came to the lower ranks of his ideal state. If a

woman’s nature suited her to practice medicine, then it makes little

sense for Plato to waste her talent on a more domestic pursuit. Some

women will remain in domestic labor, but it is possible that some men

may be said to have natures suitable to such work as well. Plato is

after a city which functions harmoniously, and the ideal city will run

more smoothly when every citizen performs the function they are

suited for. It is unlikely, therefore, that women are allowed to be idle

all day and not occupied furthering the state. What is unclear is

whether a female doctor would practice medicine equally well as a

male doctor, but I believe we can assume so as we have already

demonstrated how natures are irrelevant to a body’s sex. None of this

is certain, but as Plato has been uncompromising in his principle so

far, we have no reason to think he suddenly becomes squeamish.

Annas does make a valid point when she writes that as soon as

Plato stops thinking that the ideal state will ever exist in the Republic,

he concurrently stops thinking women should perform the same

functions as men. Annas writes “It comes as no surprise, then, that

when Plato stops believing that the ideal state can be realized, he also

stops thinking that women should do the same jobs as men.”66 Rather

than see this as an indicator that Plato only endorses his proposals in

66 Annas 1996, 12.

40
Republic V on a whim, we should see that if the ideal state does not

exist, then the principle that people should be judged by their nature

also has no application. This argument provided the justification for

how all of society functioned, not just women; as soon as this principle

is no longer what determines people’s roles in society, the entire ideal

state collapses. Admittedly, once the ideal state ceases to exist we say

farewell to female Guardians, but to say that this is the whole position

is to miss the much larger one; unjust men will rule the state. Plato

is unconcerned about what happens to women after the ideal state,

for it was never his intent to examine women’s role in society as it

is. Instead, Book V demonstrates how the principle of judging people

according to their nature will reveal that some women will have the

nature of the Guardian and should partake in the ruling of the state.

VI.

To return to the initial question of the ideal role of women in

Plato’s state, I hope to have demonstrated that while Plato does

intend his proposal in Book V seriously, the ideal role of women in his

state is whatever her nature deems her best suited to do. If we extend

the principle that everyone should pursue what they are best suited to

pursue by nature to include women, then a woman’s role will be

determined by her nature. As this chapter has shown, however, the

sexless nature of the soul makes it impossible that a soul residing in a

41
female body is necessarily lesser than a soul in a male body.

Chapter Two

When a large part of a dissertation on the role of women in

Plato’s ideal state then turns to investigate Plato’s Symposium, the

42
natural conclusion one comes to is that the author intends to make an

argument focusing on Diotima, Socrates’ female teacher of eros.

Diotima is a fascinating figure, especially for those attempting to

discern Plato’s attitudes towards women, for while Plato often laments

the poor state of Athenian women, he gives a woman a supremely

distinguished position. Diotima and her theory of eros have been

thoroughly investigated in terms of how they apply to women, but my

investigation will only briefly touch on Diotima before addressing the

main reason for my examination: Plato and his attitudes towards

pregnancy and giving birth, for men and women.67 In the Symposium,

a dialogue about Love, Diotima gives a detailed account of how men

can be pregnant with ideas and give birth to true virtue. Intellectual

pregnancy is clearly of great interest to Plato for the topic arises again

in the Theaetetus where Socrates describes his role as a midwife of

ideas. One may wonder what all this discussion of pregnancy and birth

has to do with the role of women in the ideal state, but it is in fact of

the greatest importance since in Book V of the Republic Plato claims

that, besides women being physically weaker than men, the only

difference between male and female Guardians is that women become

pregnant and give birth. In Book V Plato explains that if men and

67 There is not a lack of articles on the Symposium and women but surprisingly few of these pay close
attention to textual detail and therefore come up with rather odd ideas which bear little relation to any
Platonic theory. Examples include: Julia Ward 1996 and Anne-Marie Bowery 1996.
43
women:

differ only in this respect, that the females bear children and
while the males beget them, we’ll say that there has been no
kind of proof that women are different from men…and we’ll
continue to believe that our guardians and their wives must have
the same way of life.68

I believe the proof that he fully supports this claim is seen by his

discussions of pregnancy in the Symposium, Theaetetus, and Laws

for in these dialogues Plato’s writings on pregnancy range from high

praise to pragmatic neutrality. The Symposium and the Theaetetus

emphasize the virtues of male pregnancy and birth, while the Laws

demonstrates that Plato views human pregnancy and birth as a bodily

function that does not fundamentally alter the nature or rational

capacity of the woman. By demonstrating that pregnancy is a purely

biological function with no relation to rationality and that pregnancy

does not change one’s capacity to reason, Plato removes the greatest

barrier women face in becoming Guardians.

Before we begin, however, I will take the opportunity to do

some stage-setting as Plato does. The Symposium, often considered

Plato’s poetic and dramatic masterpiece, recounts a formal drinking

party in honor of the tragedian Agathon after his first triumphant

production. Phaedrus, a member of the party, laments the paltry

treatment the subject eros receives, thereby giving the rest of the

68 Republic 454e.
44
party the idea to take turns orating speeches in honor of eros. There

are six initial speeches with a seventh delivered by a drunken

latecomer, but it is Socrates’ speech that is most unusual since Plato

has Socrates not provide his own account, but instead reports a

discourse on eros he had with Diotima, a priestess from Mantinea.

Diotima provides a description of the “final and highest mystery” of

the “rites of love,” though she doubts Socrates is capable of following

her account.69 In her discourse, one begins the ascent of eros by

loving an individual and ends by loving the Form of the Beauty; she

states the Beautiful “always is and neither comes to be nor passes

away, neither waxes nor wanes” as well as that it is “not beautiful this

way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another”

but instead “just what it is to be beautiful.”70 We are lead to believe

that the party occurred many years previously and that Apollodorus

who recounts the symposium was not himself there that night. 71

Another point we must clarify is how we are to understand the

term ‘Love’, or in Greek ‘eros’, both of which I shall use throughout

69 Symposium 210a.
70 Symposium 211a.
71 The Symposium itself is told as a story. The true narrator of the story is Apollodorus, a friend of Socrates
who was not present the night of the party in question. Instead, Apollodorus heard it from Aristodemus
who was in attendance. To increase the distance from the actual event, we learn that it occurred many years
ago as Apollodorus explains he was not there as he was a child at the time. By the time we come to the
tale then, not only was the party a very long time ago, but since Socrates was an old man when he told the
symposiasts about Diotima’s lessons and he learned them from her when he was a young man, Diotima’s
narration to Socrates took place long before that. Unfortunately, not only is time against us, but we hear
Diotima’s narration on a fourth telling: Diotima told Socrates, Socrates told the symposiasts including
Aristodemus, Aristodemus told Apollodorus, and Apollodorus tells the readers.

45
the course of this chapter. In the Symposium eros has a quite specific

usage. Here the emphasis is on the adult male’s position as an

intellectual and ethical educator of the teenage boy, which was

customary among Athenians whether it was sexual or not. Though this

concept may seem unusual to the modern reader it was common

enough in Classical Athens that Plato does not feel it necessary to

define eros further; the conception of eros discussed here includes

sexual attraction, affection, and love between men and women and

between men and adolescent boys.

I.

What makes the Symposium interesting in terms of female

Guardians is that while Plato does not address the issue of women’s

roles in this text, he does give a woman a position of prominence.

Plato discusses women in the Republic because he has to; when

discussing the ideal state he can hardly ignore half the population.

In the Symposium, however, where the issue of sex and the role of

women in the state is not addressed nor are women much discussed,

we are presented with Diotima. According to the Republic we are

to judge one by one’s soul rather than one’s sex, but that principle

only exists in the ideal city. The Symposium, which takes place in

contemporary Classical Athens, presents us with an opportunity to

look at Plato’s thoughts on a woman in a non-ideal state. We never

46
learn the specifics of her background, but we can be sure they are far

from what Plato deems ideal. Plato does not only make her wise but in

addition wiser than all the participants of the symposium, for Plato has

her give the correct account of eros when all the men who preceded

her could not.

Athenian females contributed to the welfare of the city by

participating in a multitude of religious matters. In his play The

Captive Melanippe Euripides writes:

And in divine affairs - I think this of the first importance -

We have the greatest part. For at the oracle of Phoebus
Women expound Apollo’s will. At the holy seat of Dodona
By the sacred oak the female race conveys
The thoughts of Zeus to all Greeks who desire it.
As for the holy rituals performed for the Fates
And the nameless goddesses, these are not holy
In men’s hands; but among women they flourish,
Everyone of them. Thus in holy service woman
Plays the righteous role.
(The Captive Melannipe, frag.13, Page Greek Literary Papyri [420’s
B.C.E.?]: trans. Helene P. Foley.

This passage demonstrates not only that women played a part in

religious life, but specifically that women could perform religious duties

men were incapable of. Though women spent the majority of their

lives in the domestic sphere women participated publicly in religion.

Athena Polias, or “Athena of the city,” the patron goddess of Athens

and the chief priestess72 held great power and influence. The priestess

of Athena Polias was worshipped in Athens but also played a role in

72 The priestesshood of Athena Polias was passed down through the women of the Eteoboutadae family.
47
international politics. Herodotus provides us with proof of her power

and prestige when he recounts that in 508 B.C. Cleomenes, the King

of Sparta, endeavored to interfere in domestic Athenian politics by

going against Cleisthenes, a popular reformer. As the Spartan King

came to Athena Polias’ shrine the priestess declared he could not enter

since it was sacrilegious for a Dorian to come into the shrine (5.72). 73

Herodotus provides another example: in 480 B.C. the priestess agreed

with the judgment to evacuate the city prior to the battle of Salamis

and encouraged the citizens to comply by declaring that Athena’s

sacred snake had already left the acropolis.74 It also should not be

forgotten that Athena, the goddess of wisdom, was female.

In festivals such as the Panathenaea celebrated on the birthday

of Athena Polias, both men and women participated but it was the

young girls who played an especially important role. These girls, the

kanephoroi, were virgins from aristocratic families and were given the

responsibility and honor of carrying sacred baskets in the procession.

Other festivals which both sexes participated in included the Lesser

and Greater Mysteries which took place every year at Eleusis to pay

tribute to Demeter and her daughter Kore. The Mysteries, which

remained the most venerated cult till paganism ended, were

associated with the cycles of the harvests and eventually became a

73 Fantham 1994, 93.

74 Pomeroy 1976, 75.
48
metaphor for man’s immortality. The Mysteries included two

priestesses, hierophantides, and a group of priestesses known as

panageis who lived in isolated conditions and were banned from any

contact with men.75 The most prestigious of all was the chief priestess

of Demeter who originated either from the Phileidae or Eumolpidae

family. Any man, woman, or child who could speak Greek and had not

committed murder was able to become initiated into the Greater and

Lesser Mysteries. Only women were eligible to participate in the

kernophoria, an opening ceremony where sacred vessels were carried.

All initiates looked on as the women commemorated earlier women

who danced in tribute to Demeter by performing sacred dances

themselves.76

The important festival of the Thesmophoria, also in honor of

Demeter, only allowed women to participate. The Thesmophoria was

not as complicated as the Mysteries and resembled as well as acted as

an agrarian festival. The festival occurred during the autumn to

guarantee a bountiful harvest by way of the festival’s fertility magic. 77

The only role men played in the festival was that the sufficiently

wealthy were obligated to pay for the festival on behalf of their wives.

All women with an unblemished status78 were eligible to participate,

75 Pomeroy 1976, 76
76 Pomeroy 1976, 77.
77 Pomeroy 1976, 77.
78 “Unblemished” refers to an unmarried woman’s virginity and a married woman’s fidelity.

49
but all women were required to be chaste for three days previous to

the festival and throughout its continuation. Sexual behavior was

prohibited, but the women freely used foul language often found in

fertility rituals.79 It is likely that female-only festivals existed due to

women’s connections with birth and fertility and the desire to transfer

these properties to the harvest.

Plato and his contemporaries therefore would not find anything

abnormal in a priestess speaking authoritatively. When Socrates

begins to give his account of eros he declares:

I shall try to go through for you the speech about Love I once
heard from a woman of Mantinea, Diotima - a woman who was
wise about many things besides this: once she even put off the
plague for ten years by telling the Athenians what sacrifices to
make. She is the one who taught me the art of love, and I shall
go through her speech as best I can on my own.80

If one argues that Plato creates a fictional character because he does

not believe a woman can be wise, one could then object that the

greatest fictional leap Plato takes is to make a human, regardless of

sex, so wise.81Admittedly, Diotima’s fictionality is the strongest

79 Pomeroy 1976, 78.

80 Symposium 201d.
81 It is also noteworthy that Diotima is not only wise but extremely powerful. To the modern reader
whose only experience of the plague is through media such as literature and film, it may be difficult to
comprehend how the plague would resonate with Plato’s audience. The plague of Athens occurred in 430
B.C., during the second year of the Peloponnesian war. The exact number of deaths is unknown, but the
losses were devastating. The plague not only claimed soldiers, but their leader Pericles as well. Things
went from bad to worse for Athens, so by the time Plato began writing it must have appeared as if the glory
days of Athens had passed. While modern historians vary on whether the plague played a significant role
in the loss of the Peloponnesian war, it is likely that the Athens of Plato’s time would not only remember
the damage of the plague but the stinging loss of the war as well. When considered with the history, Plato’s
attributing Diotima with preventing the plague for ten years is to imbue her with incredible power. Donald
Kagan. The Pelopennosian War. New York: Penguin Group, 2003.
50
objection to claiming Plato believes that a woman is capable of being

Socrates’ teacher since one can say that Plato creates a fictional

woman because in fact he does not think it possible for a woman

outside of the ideal city to possess wisdom. While I cannot definitively

prove this is not the case, I do not believe it to be so; the concept of

Socrates having a female teacher would have been extremely

outlandish regardless of her being fictional.82 But perhaps the most

obvious and simplest reason for using a fictional character is that

Socrates never had the conversation in the Symposium with anyone at

all, so if Plato were to give a historical person this role he would be

guilty of falsely representing someone and attributing thoughts to this

person that he did not have. In this respect, it is much simpler for

Plato to be free from any historical restraints and create a character

who could freely espouse Plato’s account of eros without having to

worry about what this person actually thought. To continue on this

thought, one common argument explaining the fictional Diotima is

that Plato creates a fictional character to separate his own ideas from

Socrates. Cooper writes that Diotima’s fictionality is how “Plato lets us

know that this theory of the Beautiful is his own contrivance, not really

an idea of Socrates (whether the historical philosopher or the

82An Athenian man would find Diotima’s role as Socrates’ teacher so remarkable that the fact that she was
not a historical character would not take away from the novelty of her being a woman, indeed it made it
more acceptable.
51
philosopher of the Socratic dialogues).”83 While this is probably true, it

still does not explain why Diotima is a woman, and if it is true, then

Plato chooses to present his own views in the voice of a woman.

Despite Diotima’s fictionality, Plato still chose to give a woman this

role rather than give it to a fictional man.

II.

Before I discuss Plato’s views on pregnancy and birth it

seems appropriate to address Socrates’ role in this process and why

he needed a teacher such as Diotima on the subject of eros. In the

Theaetetus Socrates explains he is the son of the famous midwife

Phaenarete and that he practices the art of midwifery as well though

he himself is barren.84 But rather than aid people in giving birth to

babies, Socrates helps young men give birth to abstract ideas. Though

he induces young men to give birth to their ideas, Socrates himself

plays no part in the creation of these ideas. Socrates says, “And yet it

is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it

is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things,

which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God’s help, who

deliver them of this offspring.”85 A woman is aware of the great pain

and difficulty involved in giving birth, but Socrates claims that the

83 Cooper 1997, 457.

84Theaetetus 149a
85 Theaetetus 150c.

52
process is even more painful for men when he states “those who

associate with me are like women in child-birth. They suffer the pains

of labor…indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain my

art is able to bring on, and also to allay.”86 But how has Socrates

acquired this art if Socrates has not given birth himself previously? He

may have learned the principles of midwifery from his mother but

explains:

For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary

midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom…and that is true
enough. And the reason of that is this, that God compels me to
attend the travails of others, but has forbidden me to procreate.
So that I am not a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my
own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. 87

It is unfortunate that this point is not elaborated upon since it is

possible that Socrates’ barrenness is what causes him to know only

his own ignorance, for if Socrates is barren he himself will be unable

to give intellectual birth to ideas. Socrates takes the inscription at the

oracle of Delphi “know thyself” seriously, and by knowing himself he

is aware that he lacks wisdom. In the Alcibiades Socrates implores

Alcibiades to “trust in me and in the Delphic inscription and ‘know

thyself’.”88 Later in the dialogue Socrates demonstrates the inherent

difficulty in the inscription when Socrates asks “Is it actually such an

easy thing to know oneself? Was it some simpleton who inscribed

86 Theaetetus 151a.
87 Theaetetus 150c-d.
88 Alcibiades 124a-b.

53
those words on the temple wall at Delphi? Or is it difficult for me

and not for everybody?”89 In other dialogues such as the Phaedrus

Socrates claims to lack even this knowledge, “I am still unable, as the

Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me

ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that.” 90

When Socrates states “I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any

discovery worth the name of wisdom,” he asserts that his own soul

cannot produce wisdom in himself.

It may seem as if the discussion has entirely veered away from

the role of women in society all together, but I believe one way to

explain Diotima’s sex is concerned with the discussion of pregnancy.

One possible explanation is the philosophically unexciting one that the

discussion of giving birth is more natural coming from a woman.

Considering Socrates’ declaration of his barrenness, how could Plato

have had Socrates as the expert of giving birth, especially when he

has no personal experience of it?91

Diotima discusses male and female pregnancy, but for

philosophical purposes she deals primarily with male intellectual

reproduction. When men and women come together to reproduce they

are “providing themselves through childbirth with immortality and

89 Alcibiades 129a.
90 Phaedrus 230a.
91 It must be noted that we are unaware, and Socrates never inquires, as to how Diotima came to have
knowledge of eros, though there is no reason to suppose that she does not follow the model she endorses.
54
remembrance and happiness, as they think, for all time to come,” but

the process is not very different for men. Men who are pregnant in

soul, and Diotima states that men can be more pregnant in their soul

than a woman could be physically pregnant, are “pregnant with what

is fitting for a soul to bear and to bring to birth.”92 The reason that

reproduction and pregnancy is the aim of love is that reproduction is

the closest human equivalent to immortality; Diotima explains “a lover

must desire immortality along with the good, if what we agreed earlier

was right, that Love wants to posses the good forever”.93 Diotima

describes that a lover is “turned to the great sea of beauty, and,

gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and

theories, in unstinting love of wisdom, until, having grown and been

strengthened there, he catches sight of such knowledge,” so Socrates’

barrenness bars him from reaching the pinnacle of thought. 94

There are many instances in the Symposium where Diotima

clearly questions Socrates’ ability to fully comprehend eros, possibly

due to Socrates’ barreness.

“Even you, Socrates, could probably come to be initiated into

these rights of love. But as for the purpose of these rites when
they are done correctly - that is the final and highest mystery,
and I don’t know if you are capable of it. I myself will tell you,”
She said, “and I won’t stint any effort. And you must try to
follow if you can.”95
92 Symposium 208e-209a.
93 Symposium 207a.
94 Symposium 210e.
95 Symposium 210a.

55
She flatly doubts his ability to understand eros when she says “I don’t

know if you are capable of it.” She agrees to attempt, even though

she doubts the success of this venture, and one can imagine her doing

the ancient equivalent of rolling up her sleeves to get to work on a

challenge when she states “I won’t stint any effort. And you must try

to follow if you can.” The previous passage is not the only instance

where she voices concern over Socrates’ capacities to follow her lesson

on eros. A little later on in the discussion you can see her attempting

to keep Socrates focused on her message when she states “Try to pay

attention to me…As best you can.”96 Diotima is clearly concerned that

Socrates is incapable of fully understanding eros, though it is unclear

if she attributes this fact to his barrenness or that he is just in fact

incapable.

III.

This section will more directly address a topic briefly

mentioned in the previous chapter: Plato and his thoughts on

pregnancy. Plato’s approach to pregnancy is especially interesting as it

is often clinical or practical. When it comes to women giving birth, he

seems to view it as a biological function, so once the birth takes place

the woman is as she was before; if anyone is fundamentally affected

by pregnancy it is men, though pregnancy affects them for the better.

96 Symposium 210e.
56
Not only is Plato’s interest in pregnancy significant, even more

essentially he does not view pregnancy as a women’s issue or

something that denotes inferiority in the sexes. Where Aristotle and

others will take the view that pregnancy is tied to women and is part

of the reason why women are inferior, by giving men and women the

experience of pregnancy he demonstrates there is nothing in this

process that affects the pregnant person’s rationality or quality of the

soul, which lends credence to his stance in Republic V that the only

true difference between men and women is that women need nine

months away from their physical Guardian duties; once they have

given birth they are just as qualified to return to work as they were

before. Pregnancy is thus a purely biological process that in no way

reflects negatively on women; how can it when Plato states that men

can be more pregnant than women. If Plato looked down on

pregnancy or had an inclination that it fundamentally changed a

woman’s nature there would be reason to think that men and women

are distinct in fundamental ways, putting the matter of female

Guardians into jeopardy.

By making pregnancy available to both sexes the sexless

soul once again comes into play: the sexless soul indicates a soul can

enter the body of any sex, so since both sexes give a kind of birth this

suggests that all souls desire to give birth. This implies Plato has in

57
mind a sexless or sex-neutral society, for by having men give birth to

ideas and giving women the chance to govern and fight he removes

the traditional male and female boundaries. There is no reason to

assume this is not his intent, for if the difference in sex is only in the

body and this does not affect the quality of one’s soul, what

importance does sex hold except for the pragmatic concern of

resupplying the state’s population. And, by giving both sexes the

impulse to give birth it seems as if all souls desire this and that it just

manifests itself differently depending on the body.

One serious objection to this is that the Symposium and the

Republic are not only different works, but works that do not cohere

particularly well together. By applying the principles of female

Guardians to the intellectual birth of the Symposium we face risks as

well as many unanswered questions. For example, could two women

give birth to an idea? Can a man and a woman give birth to ideas as

well as to children? Perhaps most importantly: are people allowed to

give birth to ideas in the ideal city? Would it create relationships that

would interfere with the unity of the Guardians and would conceptual

birth somehow interfere with human birth? Since Plato may not have

58
ever asked himself these questions we are unable to speculate. 97 As

far as thinking of the two dialogues in conjunction, however, I do

not think it too risky to do so. As long as we keep in mind that the

Symposium does not exist in the ideal state and that we do not know

what Plato would have thought about intellectual birth in the ideal city

amongst the ranks of the Guardians, I do not believe we are guilty

of butchering Plato’s thoughts; I only intend to demonstrate how

two different theories from two different texts support the view that

women are not by nature inferior to men, rather that current society

raises them to be.

IV.

In this section we shall turn towards Plato’s views on human

birth, the logistics required to ensure healthy children, and how female

Guardians are able to return to their responsibilities and have their

mothering duties delegated to others. In Plato’s Laws, Plato looks at

female pregnancy in a purely objective manner. Like the Republic,

the Laws is a dialogue about the construction of the state, but unlike

the Republic the Laws is not an ideal society; this entails that when

pregnancy is discussed, it neither tries to defend nor support a theory

97 I shall engage in some speculation, however, for I do not believe that intellectual birth or the
resulting “intellectual children” violate the conditions of the Guardian class. Guardians are prohibited
from owning property and knowing their own children, but once an intellectual child/concept is born it no
longer belongs to the parents. The idea which they have given birth to becomes the public property of all
Guardians and therefore becomes communal.
59
regarding women as the Republic does, rather, the discussion looks

at pregnancy in purely practical terms. Such a discussion is vital for

it is our first opportunity to understand to see Plato’s thoughts on

pregnancy when nothing philosophical is at stake.

Plato’s approach to pregnancy in the Laws can best be described

as pragmatic. He makes no value judgments and cannot be accused

of sentimentality. Of course it must be noted that Plato’s notions on

pregnancy are often incorrect or not based on modern science, but it

is unfair to hold this against him as he only has the medical knowledge

of the time. Incorrect as he may be, his incorrect views do not display

any hint of bias. The first mention of pregnancy is clinical in nature

and begins with a discussion of the “athletics of the embryo”: “It’s

hardly surprising you haven’t heard of these athletics of the embryo.” 98

Plato describes the benefits of these athletics when he writes:

All bodies find it helpful and invigorating to be shaken by

movements and joltings of all kinds, whether the motion is due
to their own efforts or they are carried on a vehicle or boat or
horse or any other mode of conveyance. All this enables the
body to assimilate its solid and liquid food, so that we grow
healthy and handsome and strong into the bargain.99

Whether or not motion helps digestion we see that Plato puts the

emphasis on producing the healthiest child possible. It is not odd for

Plato to have such interest in the production of his future citizens as

98 Laws 789b.
99 Laws 789b-d.
60
he needs the best possible citizens for his state. Clearly he thinks the

first step towards producing a healthy and strong population begins

before birth. To demonstrate this we can look at the precise guidelines

he provides:

If you like, we could lay down precise rules (and how people
would laugh at us!): (1) A pregnant woman should go for walks,
and when her child is born she should mold it like wax while it is
still supple, and keep it well wrapped up for the first two years
of its life. (2) The nurses must be compelled under legal penalty
to contrive that the children are always being carried to the
country or to temples or relatives, until they are sturdy enough
to stand on their own feet. (3) Even then, the nurses should
persist in carrying the child around until it’s three, to keep it
from distorting its young limbs by subjecting them to too much
pressure. (4) The nurses should be as strong as possible, and
there must be plenty of them.100

In this passage Plato gives specific instructions as to how a

child must be carried in order to prevent the child’s limbs from

becoming “distorted.” What is unusual here is the practical nature

of the guidelines for they are in no way philosophic. It is true that

Plato often discusses practical logistics in order to demonstrate

how his theory can work; take for example the details of the living

arrangements of the Guardians in the Republic. What is different

in this passage though is that there seems to be no other end than

producing healthy babies. We therefore have a non-philosophical

discussion about pregnancy and childbirth which is of interest to us

100 Laws 789e.

61
due to the philosophical discussion of this topic in the Symposium.

In the Symposium Plato extols the virtue of male pregnancy and

birth, but as noted earlier he does not pay much attention to female

pregnancy. While Plato does not have glowing praise on the virtues of

female pregnancy there is nothing negative either; the tone is neutral

and disinterested.

There is one passage in the Laws, however, that on first

impression may appear as an objection to my argument. In this

passage Plato finally turns to the emotional state of the pregnant

mother and states that a pregnant woman must be monitored to

prevent her from having intense emotional experiences. Plato writes:

All newly-born children…that’s the age when habits, the seeds

of the entire character, are most effectively implanted. I’d
even say…that all expectant mothers, during the year of their
pregnancy, should be supervised more closely than other
women, to ensure that they don’t experience frequent and
excessive pleasures, or pains either. An expectant mother
should think it important to keep calm and cheerful and sweet-
tempered throughout her pregnancy.101

I would note first that nowhere in this passage is a woman’s nature

or her inferiority to men mentioned. In other words, he does not say

he gives his advice because women as such are more susceptible

to undue pleasure or pain. The passage does not refer to women’s

emotionality or reasonability as the reason they need to be watched,

but so they don’t experience anything very painful or pleasurable. A

101 Laws 792e.

62
painful or pleasurable experience would elicit a reaction from a man or

a woman, otherwise the experience does not have the quality of being

pleasurable or painful; so while Plato is cautioning not to become

overexcited, he is not cautioning them because they are women. The

need arises from the belief that the mother’s temperament will affect

the unborn child and from that perspective it makes perfect sense that

the mother should be calm.

The only reason to have a negative impression from this

passage is the supervision which makes it appear as if the mother

needs help achieving the desired calm. I do not believe this to be the

case for if we look at the passage carefully the supervision is

necessary to prevent the mother from having an intense experience,

but we must remember that “experience” does not equal emotion. We

must be careful not to confuse a pleasurable or painful experience

with a pleasurable or painful emotion. If a woman needed to be

supervised so that she did not have intense emotions then it would

appear as if Plato thought a woman could not control her emotions. An

experience, however, can take many forms and it is not difficult to

come up with examples that might upset the calm of the mother.

Painful experiences could include learning that a loved one has died or

falling and breaking a limb which would agitate and upset the calm of

any person; if agitation is thought to harm the child it makes perfect

63
sense to shield the mother as much as possible from such

experiences.

There seems to be little evidence that Plato views

pregnancy and giving birth as anything other than a bodily function

when it produces a child and as a desire for immortality when it

produces true virtue. The fact that Plato views human pregnancy and

birth as a physical process that does not affect the soul proves that

women can be Guardians, and that with the exception of the nine

months needed to have a child, once they have had the child they

have not fundamentally changed. In the Republic Plato writes “Do you

think the wives of our Guardian watchdogs should guard what the

males Guard, hunt with them, and do everything else in common with

them? Or should we keep the women at home as incapable of doing

this, since they must bear and rear puppies, while the males do work

and have the entire care of the flock?”102 Philosophers such as Julia

Annas have raised the criticism that Plato’s watchdog analogy is a

metaphor rather than an argument.103 I disagree with this as I believe

that the watchdog example is exactly what Plato intends to argue, that

aside for giving birth women Guardians are in no way different than

men. I do agree with Annas though when she states that Plato

is “taking seriously the idea that the life of the human female is like

102 Republic 451d.

103 Annas 1996, 4.
64
that of any female animal, with reproduction making only short breaks

in physical activity otherwise like the male’s. No doubt this is because

he is mainly interested in the eugenic possibilities for his ‘herd’.” 104 It

is true that in the ideal state Plato has strong opinions on how to

create the best “herd,” but even in these arguments there is no hint of

bias against female Guardians.

By this point in the Republic Plato has already abolished the

traditional model of the family. One of the consequences of this

action is that “no parent will know his own offspring or any child his

parent.”105 This separation sounds cruel to the modern and perhaps

even the ancient reader, but this statement is part of what enables

female Guardians to be equal to the males, for by freeing the female

Guardian of any sense of responsibility towards one specific child she

in a certain sense does not become a mother. If the female Guardian

does not know which child is hers she will not feel a pull to take care

of her child, which would interfere with her primary role as a Guardian.

In a certain sense Plato creates an extreme form of child day-care;

a child is watched by a professional so the mother can continue with

her professional life. We have already seen Plato’s explanation of this

extreme day-care center, namely:

And won’t the nurses see to it that the mothers are brought
to the rearing pen when their breasts have milk, taking every
104 Annas 1996, 4.
105 Republic 457d.
65
 precaution to insure that no mother knows her own child and
providing wet nurses if the mother’s milk is insufficient? And
won’t they take care that the mothers suckle the children for
only a reasonable amount of time and that the care of sleepless
children and all other such troublesome duties are taken over by
the wet nurses and other attendants?106

While mothers who have children might see matters differently, Plato

clearly believes he is doing the female Guardian a service by liberating

them from “troublesome duties.” If the female Guardians appear to

lack maternal instincts it is because she does. In Plato’s society she is

a Guardian first and foremost who has the extra duty of giving birth

to future citizens. If Plato thought female Guardians had maternal

instincts then he would be creating a distinction between female and

male Guardians, for if female Guardians had concerns besides the

welfare of the state they would be inferior to male Guardians. One

may object that modern society demonstrates that women can have

children and a successful career, but in an unusual twist Plato is truly

treating female Guardians equally by viewing them as Guardians first

and their capacity to produce citizens as a byproduct of the body their

souls inhabit.

V.

This section turns to Aristophanes’ account of eros in the

Symposium, for though it is not the correct account, it indirectly

gives insight into Plato’s thoughts on women. Aristophanes’ speech

106 Republic 460d.

66
may provide support for the claim that Plato does take his proposal

in Republic V seriously, and further the view that Plato did not see

a soul that resided in a female body as necessarily inferior. It would

be putting words in Plato’s mouth to claim anything definitive from

Aristophanes’ speech, but it is also neglectful not to analyze the

text. Aristophanes’ account of eros closely resembles the modern

conception of soul mates and seeks to describe why people search for

another person that will make one feel whole. The account is set in the

past before humans were as they are now; these original humans were

of three types, physically distinct having many arms and legs, and

freely interacted with the gods. Aristophanes’ tale describes how these

three kinds were the original humans were great:

in strength and power, therefore, they were terrible, and they

had great ambitions. They made an attempt on the gods, and
Homer’s story about Ephialtes and Otus107 was originally about
them: how they tried to make an ascent to heaven so as to
attack the gods.108

The first type as discussed in the previous chapter was androgynous

with both male and female elements. The second and third types of

original humans are similar in that they have two elements but these

are of the same sex, so the second kind of human was composed of

two male elements whilst the third kind of two female elements.

There is something curious for our discussion about

107 Iliad v.385, Odyssey xi.305 ff.

108 Symposium 190b.
67
Aristophanes’ account in that there is no value judgment between

the three kinds of original humans, or more specifically, there are no

stated differences between the three types of original humans based

on gender. There is nothing to indicate that the humans who were

composed of two female elements are in any way inferior to the ones

with two male elements. While sexuality is more prevalent than sex in

this passage, as the objective of the account is discussing love rather

than the state as in the Republic, the fact that sex plays so small a

role is telling. The fact that there is no distinction between the males,

females and androgynous humans indicates that when Plato does not

have to prove women are equal, he does not do so and lets the facts

stand for themselves. One would expect that if Plato thought female

nature was inherently inferior, there would be some mention that the

original females were physically weaker or that their thoughts were not

as great as their androgynous or male counterparts. But as there is

no such qualification, this lends support to the claim that Plato did not

think that women had a naturally inferior phusis, for if they had, not

all of these original humans would have been able to attack the gods.

After Aristophanes explains the three types of original humans

he continues his tale with the gods’ fear of them. Aristophanes writes

that Zeus creates a plan to weaken the humans:

[H]e cut those human beings in two, the way people cut sorb-
apples before they can dry them or the way they cut eggs with

68
 hairs. As he cut each one, he commanded Apollo to turn its face
and half its neck towards the wound, so that each person would
see that he’d been cut and keep better order.109

The text makes no reference to any distinction between the three

kinds of humans. The original females are never portrayed as anything

other than equal to the male and androgynous humans. Aristophanes

then explains how the humans were so devastated at their separation

that the humans embraced with their other half, willing themselves

to grow back into one; but when they could not, they began to die

from hunger and neglect of the body. Zeus pitied these men and

women and reshaped their bodies so they could reunite through sexual

acts and reproduce. After this second alteration we arrive at modern

humans: the original androgynous became heterosexual humans, the

females became lesbians, and the males became homosexuals. 110

Even when discussing modern humans, however, Plato

offers no criticism or qualifier for the women. He is only critical of the

heterosexual humans and deems them lecherous: “That’s why a man

who is split from the double sort (which used to be

called “androgynous”) runs after women. Many lecherous men have

come from this class, and so do the lecherous women who run after

men.”111 He does not offer any explanation of why this should be so,

109 Symposium 190e.

110 The translation uses “homosexual” to refer only to gay men reserving lesbian to refer to gay women.

111 Symposium 191d-e.

69
but for whatever reason he clearly thinks heterosexual love is lesser

than the other types. It is unsurprising that Aristophanes espouses the

virtues of homosexual love, but what is most unexpected is his

statement on lesbian love: “Women who are split from a woman,

however, pay no attention at all to men; they are oriented more

towards women, and lesbians come from this class.”112 One cannot find

anything negative in this statement. Plato does not praise lesbian love

as he does homosexual, but he in no way derides it or claims that it is

inferior to any other form of love. Even his comment on male love

does not make it seem superior to female love: “People who are split

from a male are male-oriented. While they are boys they are chips off

the male block, they love men and enjoy lying with men and being

embraced by men; those are the best of boys and lads, because they

are more manly in their nature.”113 The only potential indicator that

male love is superior is “these are the best of boys and youths.” Here

I would bring in Levin’s argument from the previous chapter that Plato

distinguishes between women as they are now and women as they

might be under ideal circumstances. Considering that Socrates’

account of love will reveal that falling in love with bodies is the first

step on the ladder to falling in love with the Forms and philosophy, I

think this at that very least suggests that Plato fully supports his

112 Symposium 191e.

113 Symposium 191e-192a.
70
claims in Republic V that women can become philosopher-rulers.

VI.

The Symposium therefore reinforces the argument that since

Plato believes the soul to be sexless, there is nothing about the female

body that makes it less rational than the male body. The two ways

the Symposium does this specifically tackle two of the main objections

levied against Plato which claim that he did not truly believe women

could become Guardians: that women could only become Guardians

in an ideal society and since this city will not be realized he does not

truly think women could occupy this position, and that giving birth

made female Guardians fundamentally distinct from male Guardians.

To address the first issue Plato presents us with Diotima, and while

she is not a warrior she is undeniably wise and given the credit of

being Socrates’ philosophical teacher of eros. Had Plato not thought a

woman could have had a philosophical nature then how could he have

made Diotima the expert on eros? And while she is fictional it is far

more likely she is so in order that Plato had free license in his theory

without worrying about historical accuracy, rather because a real

woman could not possess knowledge.

71
Chapter Three

Plato’s Laws, one of Plato’s last works, is less well known than

the Republic due to its length, dry style, and the often dull subject

matter. Though by no means a pleasurable read, the Laws presents

us with Plato’s second account of women’s role in society. The

Republic and the Laws differ in many respects, but the most significant

difference to our discussion is that the Republic presents an ideal state

whereas the Laws does not. Unlike the Republic which does not have

a spatial location, the Laws seeks to create good laws for a state that

will be colonized in an area of Crete called Magnesia. Not only does the

area of Magnesia exist, but it is picked specifically for the area’s self-

72
sufficiency and distance from the sea.114 The Laws is often understood

as a more pragmatic version of the Republic, leading Magnesia to be

known as the “second best” state. There is evidence to support this

claim as Plato allows private property and the family into Magnesia;

two institutions he forcefully banned from the Guardian class in the

Republic. Magnesia is a more realizable state, but it is a mistake

to think of the Laws as only a compromised Republic. Plato himself

recognizes that the reintroduction of private property and the family

compromises the integrity of Magnesia when he states:

You’ll find the ideal society and state, and the best code of laws,
where the old saying ‘friends’ property is genuinely shared’ is put
into practice as widely as possible throughout the entire state.
Now I don’t know whether in fact this situation - a community of
wives, children and all property - exists anywhere today, or will
ever exist, but at any rate in such a state the notion of ‘private
property’ will have been by hook or by crook completely
eliminated from life…It may be that gods or a number of the
children of gods inhabit this kind of state…And so men need look
no further for their ideal: they should keep this state in view and
try to find the one that most nearly resembles it.”115

We should not assume, however, that this passage automatically

indicates that Magnesia is merely a second best state; to do so

is to fail to appreciate the distinct aims of each city. One way of

understanding the difference between the state in the Republic and

Magnesia is that the Republic’s is the ideal state whereas Magnesia is

the good state.

114704a-705c.
115 Laws 739d-e.
73
 It is unlikely that Plato thought a state like Magnesia possible

when he wrote the Republic, for it was not until his later period that

he became optimistic about people’s ability to achieve genuine

virtue.116 The reason for this optimism can be found in a belief he

acquired after the Republic, that non-philosophers have the capacity

to attain virtue, though they will attain it imperfectly117. Now that Plato

believes non-philosophers can achieve genuine virtue, he is able to

devise new concepts of the good city and the good citizen.118 As we

look at the role of women in Magnesia we must keep in mind that the

aim of the Laws is to create the best laws it can for non-philosophers,

but that these laws are not ideal and cannot make the citizens truly

virtuous. A tangible result is a less certain role for women in

Magnesia. With the just laws of the Republic’s state people were

judged according to the quality of their souls, and to judge by any

other criteria like sex was unjust. Women in Magnesia will have a

more nuanced role in society than their female Guardian counterparts

in the Republic. An important similarity between the Republic and the

Laws, however, is that Plato is unconcerned with creating more justice

for women. It is true that women are treated more fairly in Magnesia

then they were in any actual state of Plato’s time,119 but greater

116 Bobonich 2004, 374.

117 Bobonich 2004, 374.
118 Bobonich 2004, 92.
119 Laws 805d-806c.
74
fairness to women was not Plato’s intention. As in the Republic,

women’s improved situation in Magnesia is the result of his political

aim to create a good state, but this does not entail that Plato had any

particular concern with justice for women as such.

Some of the confusion about women’s role in Magnesia stems

from the Athenian stranger’s120 own inconsistent positions regarding

women and the negative remarks he makes concerning women’s

nature. In this chapter I shall address these inconsistencies and

negative remarks, and demonstrate how neither lead to the conclusion

that Plato views female citizens as inferior to the men. Acknowledging

that the role of female citizens in Magnesia is not as definitively equal

to the men’s as it was in the Republic, the reintroduction of the family

and private property are not the main cause. Rather, the main cause

is the colonizers of Magnesia themselves, for they bring their own

prejudices and ideas on what is natural for women into the new state.

Plato, however, is prepared for such an eventuality and writes:

It shall not be left up to the father’s wish to decide who shall

attend and whose education shall be neglected, but rather, as
the saying goes, ‘every man and child insofar as he is able,’
must of necessity become educated, because they belong more
to the city than those who generated them. Indeed, my law
would say all the very same things about females that it says
about males, including that females should be trained equally. 121

120 In the Laws the Athenian stranger occupies Socrates’ usual role.
121 Laws 804d-e.
75
From this statement we can infer that Plato acknowledges some early

colonizers will disapprove of women being educated, but that such

resistance will be met and will eventually disappear through the good

laws of Magnesia.

In this chapter I hope to demonstrate that Plato conceives that

the women of Magnesia are not inherently inferior to the men, but he

recognizes that he will need specific laws to turn the domesticated and

uneducated Athenian women into educated citizens who fight in the

military and run for elected office. In the Republic we saw that Plato

understood the power social institutions have in shaping people, so

while the good laws in Magnesia can create good women, he will need

laws to undo the generations of habituation they have been subjected

to. The reason we see comments on women’s inferior nature and laws

focused on ridding them of their “feminine traits” is that in order for

the women in Magnesia to be the equal members he envisages them

as, he will have to fundamentally alter the colonizers’ conception of

what is natural for women.

I.

Just as scholarly opinion is sharply divided on Plato’s views

of women in the Republic, so too we find great controversy about the

Laws. This is hardly surprising as the women in Magnesia are similar

to female Guardians with the important exception that the women in

76
Magnesia will be part of a family.122 Part of the uncertainty in the Laws

stems from the fact that we know the reintroduction of the family and

private property will affect women, but how these effects take shape

is unclear. It is tempting to agree with Susan Okin when she states

that “Despite all his professed intentions in the Laws to emancipate

women and make full use of the talents he was now convinced they

had, Plato’s reintroduction of the family has the direct effect of putting

them firmly back into their traditional place.”123 It is easy to assume

that the family will affect women’s role in society, but we have no

specific reason to do so; indeed, to do this may be to make the very

assumptions about the ‘proper place’ of women that Plato is

attempting to dispel. The wife and mother in Magnesia bears no

resemblance to her Classical Athenian counterpart or the traditional

archetype of housewife: women in Magnesia do not prepare meals for

their families due to the communal meals, slaves are responsible for

work in the field and the home,124 and children are sent off to their

teachers at dawn.125 Like men, women are educated, fight in the

military, and hold elected office.

The Athenian sets the appropriate ages for marriage, entering

public office, and military service for men and women, and here we

122 This exception applies equally to the men.

123 Okin (1979, p. 50).
124 Laws 806e.
125 Laws 808d.

77
can see that men and women will participate in these activities with

the only significant difference being when they start:

A girl should marry between the ages of sixteen and twenty…and

a boy between thirty and thirty-five. A woman can enter office
at forty, a man at thirty. A man is subject to service in war from
the age of twenty until the age of sixty; in whatever military
services it seems women should be employed, each will be
ordered to do what is possible and fitting for her, after she has
borne children and until she is fifty years old.126

Several things must be mentioned about this passage, but the

overarching theme is one that gives women the same opportunities as

men. Let us begin with the marriage age of women. Sixteen sounds

young to the modern reader, but is quite late for a woman to be

marrying in the ancient world. In Classical Athens the ideal marriage

situation included a fourteen year old girl marrying a thirty year old

man.127 Fourteen and sixteen may not seem like a significant age

difference, but we also must remember that a great deal of maturation

may occur during those two years and sixteen is the absolute

minimum age for marriage in Magnesia.

The passage above explicitly states that women can hold

elected office; the only distinction between men and women is that

women must wait ten years longer. Plato does not provide an explicit

reason for the delay, but it seems reasonable that it is related to

reproductive concerns rather than apprehension over a woman’s

126 Laws 785c.

127 Pomeroy 1976, 64.
78
ability to perform the job at a younger age. At the age of thirty, when

a man can enter office, a woman is in the middle of her childbearing

years. If we keep in mind that a woman may be married as late as

twenty, Plato will expect her to produce children into her late thirties.

By having women enter office at forty, he suggests that a woman can

enter office as soon as she has finished her duty of producing children.

The twenty-year child-bearing period is of vital importance to the re-

population of the state, so it is unsurprising that Plato would not have

them enter office while they are repopulating Magnesia.128 Admittedly,

Plato has another option: allowing women to serve in office while

pregnant and accept that they will need some time off to give birth. It

is interesting Plato does not take this option for he could easily create

a sophisticated day-care system enabling women to return to work

as soon as the baby is born as in the Republic, but there is evidence

that Plato thought women holding office while pregnant might create

difficulties for the pregnancy.

In the previous chapter I noted that in the Laws Plato

states that pregnant women must remain calm, cheerful, and avoid

extreme pleasure or pain.129 Considering the grave responsibilities,

duties, and decisions the elected officials must deal with, no official

128 Although we do not know the infant mortality rate in Classical Athens, we can assume it was quite
high by modern standards. A lack of medical knowledge, unhygienic conditions, and a host of other factors
made childbirth dangerous for the mother and child.
129 Laws 792e.

79
could always remain calm and cheerful. If pregnant women are to

remain in a peaceful state then they cannot engage in the

complexities and challenges of holding office for nine months. One

could argue that women will not be pregnant for the entire ten years

from age thirty to forty, so Plato could allow women at thirty to hold

office but make them temporarily resign during their pregnancy. This

solution, however, raises more problems than it solves. The first

logistical issue is replacing the pregnant women for nine months. If

women are elected, then how can they be replaced? Matters also

become more complex when we remember that women in the ancient

world had far less, if any, control over when they had children. This

fact has consequences for female officials of childbearing age, for the

women will have no control over when they become pregnant; women

could become pregnant during the middle of an important project or

when one woman is for some reason irreplaceable. The far simpler

measure is to avoid such complexities altogether and have women

begin work at forty.130

A significant difference between the lives of female

Guardians and the women of Magnesia is that the female Guardians

130 Women not only begin their political careers later but they must also end their military duties earlier.
Men serve in the military until they turn sixty whereas women only serve until they are fifty. One possible
cause for this is that women’s bodies likely wore out earlier. Without any birth control and with women
marrying at a young age, a woman could easily have ten children by her fortieth birthday. A significant
amount of pregnancies, without modern medical treatment, combined with ten years of military service
could cause a woman’s body to weaken faster than a man’s. More importantly, however, is that there is no
age where men or women are made to leave elected office.
80
seem much less interrupted by pregnancy. While it is possible that

Plato for some reason thinks Magnesian women are less equipped to

hold office while pregnant than the female Guardians, there are two

more plausible reasons. The first is that the Republic is not concerned

with the logistics of human pregnancy. The discourse of the Republic

concerns the structure and nature of the ideal state, so an in-depth

inquiry as to what makes a healthy pregnancy and baby would be out

of context. The discourse of the Laws, however, aims to give

philosophic as well as practical measures, so a discussion on what

women must do and not do to produce strong children is relevant. The

only comment on the logistics of a female Guardian’s pregnancy 131

is “a woman is to bear children for the city from the age of twenty to

the age of forty.”132 Given the fact that Plato imagines the female

Guardians and female Magnesians having similar age-ranges for giving

birth, it is not impossible that had Plato thought of the pragmatics of

female Guardians having children, he would have also cautioned them

to avoid extreme pleasures and pains and to remain calm during their

pregnancies. Perhaps one reason that female Guardians are less

affected by pregnancy than women in Magnesia is due to Plato’s

education system. In Magnesia, women old enough to have children

131 I mean “pregnancy” to refer to the nine month gestation period rather than the process of becoming
pregnant, for Plato has much to say on that topic.
132 Republic 460e.

81
will have likely completed their education and are competent to hold

office. As there is no mention of boys being better educated than

woman or of male office-holders being more competent than female

ones, there is no reason to think that women of childbearing age

would be unfit to hold office. Female Guardians, on the other hand,

are still in the midst of their studies. Plato writes:

From the age of twenty…the subjects they learned in no

particular order as children they must now bring together to
form a unified vision of their kinship both with one another
and with the nature of that which is…you’ll have to look out for
the ones who most of all have this ability…And after they have
reached their thirtieth year…you’ll have to test them by means of
the power of dialectic.133

Studying mathematics and dialectic is extremely challenging, but

oddly enough ideal for Plato’s conception of pregnant women. Pursuing

mathematics and dialectic requires intense concentration, reasoning,

and excludes extreme emotional responses and passions. In this

respect, a pregnant woman can continue her study of these subjects

without any threat to her pregnancy. It is true that physical training

continues during this period,134 but this is merely maintenance as

most physical skills were developed at a younger age.135 Since this

discussion occurs during Book VII, long past the description of

female Guardians, there is no mention of pregnant women studying

133 Republic 537b-537d.

134 Republic 537c.
135 Republic 537b.

82
mathematics and dialectic, so we do not know for certain if Plato made

this association. Regardless, female Guardians from twenty to forty

will not have their studies inconvenienced by pregnancy, but the duties

and politics of elected office entail that Magnesian women cannot be

pregnant while holding office.

It appears as if every office is open to women after the age of

forty but there is one office for which only women are qualified. Here

Plato is perhaps guilty of reverting to traditional sex stereotypes or

acknowledging that in the less than perfect state sex-based roles exist,

but in any case women are in charge of marriage. Plato writes that

marriages:

Should be supervised by the women whom we have chosen136

(several or only a few - the officials should appoint the number
they think right, at times within their discretion). These women
must assemble daily at the temple of Eileithuia…and when they
have convened each must report to her colleagues any wife or
husband of childbearing age she has seen who is concerned with
anything but the duties imposed on him or her at the time of the
sacrifices and rites of their marriage.

If the primary aim of marriage is to produce children, then it is not

difficult to understand why Plato gave this position to women. Instead

of seeing this as a regression back to traditional stereotypes, we can

also recognize the fact that Plato is entrusting the welfare of this vital

institution to women. Plato is rightly concerned with marriage, for its

136 But as Cooper notes [1456] “No such women have been mentioned. In other ways too the state of the
text hereabouts suggests a lack of revision.”
83
product, children, is essential for Magnesia to continue. If Plato was

concerned women would regress once back in the family, he was not

concerned enough to give this imperative responsibility to men.

II.

Despite the reemergence of the family and private

property, there is no indication that Plato has reversed his belief that

men and women have the same capacity for virtue, or that there is

any connection between the two. According to Susan Okin, 137 Plato

believes that equality between the sexes is political and can only exist

in conditions such as those in Book V of the Republic, so once private

property and the family return in the Laws, women return to the

household.138 While it is true that women in Magnesia lose some of the

privileges that created the equality of the sexes female Guardians

enjoyed in the Republic, such as the permanent nursery and wet-

nurses which allowed female Guardians to return to work as soon as

they gave birth, there is no reason to think the women of Magnesia

will be essentially distinct from, or inferior to, the men. If the only

differences between men and women remain that women are

physically weaker and give birth, then there is no reason to assume

that the return of private property and the family will significantly alter

137 Okin 1979, 31, 42.

138 While Okin’s beliefs seem unwarranted, it is important to note that her writings are from over
thirty years ago and she was one the first philosophers to look at Plato from a feminist perspective. Her
conclusions now seem conservative, but at the time they were published they were groundbreaking.
84
the women in Magnesia.

The specific reason that the family was abolished in the

Republic was not that it hinders sex equality, for that is not what

concerns Plato, but that the family and the preferences and affections

that come with it are unjust; the family causes the placement of

disproportionate value on the welfare of friends and family. 139 Socrates

takes great pains to demonstrate that the second wave of Book V in

the Republic is necessary, for a family will contain its own allegiances.

In essence, without the family, the community itself is of the utmost

importance to every citizen. With each citizen sharing an attachment

to the same goal, we see a completely just community where, with

complete solidarity, everyone cares for each other and the state.

With the introduction of private property and the nuclear family into

Magnesia, however, its citizens will be inclined to nourish such private

attachments. Aware of this inevitable result, Plato envisages laws

to keep such attachments to a minimum and maximize the concern

one feels for the entire community. One such law is the mandatory

communal meals, for by eating with other citizens an individual citizen

will widen the ties that one feels towards one’s family and extend them

towards the entire community.

Susan Okin is concerned that women cannot own property, but

139Forde 1997, 664. It is possible that by the time Plato began writing the Laws, he was aware of
Aristotle’s criticisms of the Republic.
85
this does not necessarily have any connection to women’s capacities.

The Athenian stranger does not provide a reason for not allowing

women to own property, but I think it is safe to conclude that Plato

imagined all women old enough to own property to be married and

producing children. One could why women past child-bearing age

could not own property, but I suspect Plato did not see a reason why

a woman owning property would better the state. Though I do not

believe there are specific provisions for widows, with the concern that

every citizen is meant to feel for the whole community it is easy to

imagine her living with one of her children. That being said, very few

citizens benefited from Magnesia’s property and inheritance laws, for

unless you were the favorite son, you would not inherit your father’s

property; any other children in the family, even the non-favorite sons,

would not inherit anything. If the property laws are unfair to women,

then they are similarly unfair to sons:

As for the other children, in cases where there are more than
one, the head of the family should marry off the females in
accordance with the law we shall establish later; the males he
must present for adoption to those citizens who have no children
of their own ˗ priority to be given to personal preferences as far
as possible.140

By not being able to inherit or own private property, parents have no

reason to love one daughter more than another, or to even approach

their daughters with that mindset. When parents have more than one

140 Laws740b-e.
86
son, they must actively think which about which one they love more,

and they have reason to not love the other sons as much as they will

either be adopted or leave Magnesia altogether.

The marriage laws for daughters not only entail that all

daughters are treated equally, but also assume that a father will pick

a prospective son-in-law based on his suitability with his daughter.

Such sentiment is best expressed when the Athenian discusses

marriage arrangements for a family with only daughters. The Athenian

states that the father:

must forgive that lawgiver if he arranges the giving of them

in marriage with an eye on only two out of three possible
considerations: close kinship, and the security of the estate.
The third point, which a father would have taken into account -
namely to select from among the entire citizen body someone
whose character and habits qualify him to be his own son and his
daughter’s bridegroom - these considerations, I say, will have to
be passed over, because it’s impractical to weigh them. 141

In this passage there is no mention of preferring one daughter to

another, or any indication that a father has any motivation or need to

love one daughter at the expense of another. Instead, this passage

assumes that a father will look for a husband that he believes is

worthy to be his son-in-law. Women also have the advantage in

marriage over men, for even if there is a shortage of men in Magnesia,

girls are not forced to find new adoptive parents or emigrate to a new

colony. In fact, if this is the case, a girl gets to choose a husband from

141 Laws 924c-d.

87
another colony. The Athenian states:

If a girl is hard put to find a husband among her compatriots,

and has in view someone who has been dispatched to a colony
whom she would like…then if the man is related to her, he
should enter into the state under the provisions of the law; if he
is not of her clan…he shall be entitled by virtue of the choice of
the daughter of the deceased…and return to his homeland. 142

Here we have a situation where a girl picks her husband, and it is

unclear whether the husband has much choice to refuse. Marriage and

inheritance laws in Magnesia are complex, but men suffer more from

them as it forces their parents to love their sons unequally.

In Magnesia there is a great emphasis on compatibility

and equal legal rights for men and women in marriage. Of particular

note are the divorce laws which are far fairer towards women than the

laws in Classical Athens. In Magnesia, divorce depends upon the

agreement of ten Guardians and the ten women who are responsible

for marriage. These members will make up a court in order to

determine whether there is no possibility of saving the couples’

marriage. If the court decides that reconciliation cannot occur, the

couple may part ways and the court shall attempt to find new partners

for the male and female.143 The Magnesian procedure greatly differs

from Athenian divorce, where a husband could send his wife back to

her family or guardian without any legal action; the wife did at least

142 Laws 925b-c.

143 Chase 1993, 148. Laws 929e-930a.
88
get to keep her dowry. 144 This system was not only unfair to women in

that no legal process was necessary for their husbands to divorce

them, but it was also extremely difficult for a woman to divorce her

husband. A wife could only divorce her husband with the aid of her

former guardian, and then present the Archon with a writ of divorce

that had to be successfully defended.145 Another legal departure from

Classical Athens is that in Magnesia, a woman over the age of forty

and without a husband can act as an associate in a legal case and can

bring suit as well.146 In Athens, a woman could do little without a male

as her legal representative.147

III.

In the second chapter I argued that Plato was aware of wise

priestesses such as Diotima and educated courtesans like Aspasia,

so even though his comments on idle Athenian housewives are

unforgiving, he knew not all women were in such a poor state. Plato

was aware different Greek states gave women different roles, and

put this empirical knowledge to work in the Laws. Such knowledge is

vital for it demonstrates the power of habituation, enabling Plato to

look at a society’s institutions and see how they affect women. Had

144 Lysias, Against Alcibiades, I, 28; Pseudo-Demosthenes, Against Neaera, 51 ff., 82 ff.
145 Demosthenes, Against Onetor, I, 17, 26, 31; Isaeus, On the Estate of Pyrrhus, 78. Andocides, Against
Alcibiades, 14, Alcibiades wife was forced to go the Archon without her legal protector.
146 Chase 1933, 160.
147 Isaeus, On the Estate of Pyrrhus, 2-3.

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Plato thought the women in Magnesia were not potentially virtuous or

good, he could have treated them as the Thracians did: “What about

the practice of the Thracians and many other peoples, who make their

women work on the land and mind sheep and cattle, so that they turn

into skivvies indistinguishable from slaves?”148 The Athenian is much

more impressed and influenced in the Laws by the Spartan treatment

of women. Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans:

Make your girls take part in athletics and you give them a
compulsory education in the arts; when they grow up, though
dispensed from working wool, they have to ‘weave’ themselves a
pretty hard-working sort of life which is by no means despicable
or useless…but they don’t take up military service. This means
that even if there were some extreme emergency ever led
to a battle for their state and the lives of their children, they
wouldn’t have the expertise to use bows and arrows, like so
many Amazons, nor could they join men in deploying any other
missile.149

Plato, however, proposes to go farther than the Spartans, for he is

conscious of another contemporary Greek state with military trained

women: the Sarmatians, who Plato hopes to recreate in Magnesia. The

Spartan women are industrious, but:

I would speak without being at all afraid of the argument that

horseback riding and gymnastics are fitting for men, but not
fitting for women. For I am persuaded by the ancient stories I
have heard, and at this moment, so to speak, I know there are
countless myriads of women around the Black Sea - women
called Sarmatians - who are enjoined to handle not only horses,
but the bow and the other weapons as well, in equality with
men, and who practice them equally.150
148 Laws 805d-e.
149 Laws 806a-b.
150 Laws 805a.

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Plato’s awareness and knowledge of women’s roles in other cultures is

essential, for it proves he was aware that women were capable when

given an opportunity, and in the case of the Sarmatian women, they

rival their men. Since Plato was unlikely to think Athenian women

fundamentally or inherently different from Spartan or Sarmatian

women, Plato would have correctly inferred that the most logical

explanation for the Athenian housewife’s state was the way Athenian

social institutions habituated her to be.

Another point of scholarly controversy is the question of

women’s role in the military. The Athenian himself wavers on how

much military training is appropriate for women, sometimes declaring

that women’s participation is optional and at other points that it is

mandatory. We see an example of the former when the Athenian

states:

When the boys and girls have reached the age of six, the sexes
should be separated; boys should spend their days with boys
and girls with girls. Each should attend lessons. The males
should go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing and
slinging-and the females too - if they are agreeable, may attend
at any rate the lessons, especially those in the use of weapons. 151

Here we see a clear indication that girls should be allowed to

participate if they wish, but they are by no means forced to do so. One

way of understanding this passage is that the Athenian is cognizant

151 Laws 794a.

91
that the first few generations of women will be wary of military

training, so he leaves the door open for later generations of girls who

will see no reason not to participate. The following passage, however,

directly contradicts the previous passage by making martial training

necessary:

Lessons must be attended by the boys and men of the state, and
the girls and women as well, because they too have to master
these techniques. While still girls, they must practice every kind
of dancing and fighting in armor, when grown women, they must
play their own part in maneuvering, getting into battle formation
and taking off and putting on weapons, if only to ensure that if
it ever proves necessary for the whole army to leave the state
and take the field abroad, so that the children and the rest of the
population are left unprotected, the women at least will be able
to defend them. 152

I contend that this passage is closer to Plato’s view, for half of the

motivation to train women in the first place was to increase the

military’s capacity. This passage still presents us with a further

ambiguity when he states that women must be trained to fight in

case the city is attacked while the army is elsewhere. One obvious

interpretation is that women will not actively serve in the military, so

when the male army is away, all the women in Magnesia can defend

the city. I believe that Plato has a different picture in mind: the army

is comprised of men and women, and the women left to defend the

city are the women who are too young to serve, women under forty.

Admittedly the reason women under forty are not allowed to serve is

152 Laws 813e-814a.

92
that they must focus on bearing healthy children for the state, but it

would be nearly impossible for all the women in Magnesia to be very

far along in their pregnancies at the same time. In theory, a certain

proportion of the women will be too far along in their pregnancy to

fight, but all the other women under forty can defend the city. Another

passage which lends credibility to this theory acknowledges that

females can be fearsome warriors when protecting their young. The

Athenian posits a situation where Magnesia is invaded when the army

is away. He explains the disastrous consequences for Magnesia if:

Women proved to have been so shockingly ill-educated that they

couldn’t even rival female birds, who are prepared to run every
risk and die for their chicks fighting against the most powerful of
wild animals. What if instead of that, the women promptly made
off to temples…with the disgrace of being by nature the most
lily-livered creatures under the sun?153

What this statement suggests is that if women are not educated, they

act cowardly without even showing the bravery of female birds. We are

well aware, though, that this is not the case in Magnesia; since women

will be educated and trained to fight, it is not difficult to surmise that

the women under forty left to guard Magnesia will fight fiercely to

defend their young.

Plato then clearly believes women - and not just a select few

- can accomplish martial feats as well as the men if they are given

153 Laws 814

93
the opportunity to learn and practice. The tasks mentioned above,

horseback riding and handling various weapons, lend credibility to the

argument that Plato envisaged women in Magnesia as full members of

the army and not just in supporting roles. We also see here a critique

of Athenian society, for if women can become warriors if given the

opportunity, then the poor condition the Athenian housewife is in is the

fault of Athenian society rather than any natural defect in women. The

Athenian continues the passage above by claiming:

If, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this

way, then the way that they are now arranged in our lands
- where it is not the case that all the men with their entire
strength…practice the same things as women - is the most
mindless of all. For in this way, almost every city is just about
half of what it might be, when with the same expenditures and
efforts it could double itself.154

We must note that the Athenian declares that states like Classical

Athens are “half” of their potential, whereas if women were trained

equally with the men, the state’s capacities would be “doubled.”

The choice of “half” and “double” demonstrate that Plato believes

women’s efforts will equal and match those of the men. This is an

important point, for some argued that the female Guardians in the

Republic would be inferior to the male Guardians but here we have

evidence that Plato views women’s talents to equal those of men. We

must also bear this point in mind when it comes to Magnesia, for this

154 Laws 805a-b.

94
concept gives Plato reason and motive to have the women in Magnesia

contribute just as much as the men.

There has been much scholarly debate on whether Plato truly

intended the women of Magnesia to hold office. Trevor Saunders is

correct when he states that we should not be asking if Plato meant

for women to hold office and expect a straight yes or no answer. As

Saunders explains, a better question is “Would he have intended it,

once convinced it was feasible?”155 Saunders continues to argue that in

accordance with Plato’s:

own functional and pragmatic premises, he surely would

have regarded any state in which women hold major office
successfully as a better state than one in which they do not.
In Magnesia, by accident or design, he is not clear whether he
envisages it; but he has at any rate left the door open, and
would surely be very happy to see the Magnesians walk through
it.156

I disagree with Saunders in that I do believe Plato envisages women

holding office, but his remark brings up an interesting possibility.

Perhaps a better way of stating Saunders’ comment is that Plato did

not think the first female colonists or even the first few generations of

female Magnesians would hold office. This position makes pragmatic

sense as the first female settlers would lack the education to hold

office, and if they found the idea of eating in public outlandish, then

the idea of holding office would have been beyond imagination. The

155 Saunders (1995, p. 604).

156 Saunders (1995, p. 604).
95
daughters of these first settlers would have the education to hold

office, but lingering prejudices or social views from their parents

may dissuade them from running. By around the third generation,

however, one can see that those young girls would see no reason

why they should not hold office. Admittedly this transition may take

more generations, but the chief point is that Plato did envisage women

holding office, but he was aware that it would take time to bring this

about. In this respect I agree with Saunders that Plato has “left the

door open,” but I do not think Plato would have only been “very happy

to see the Magnesians walk through it.” Instead, Plato fully expected

women to walk through it, for a state in which women did not hold

office is not nearly as good as a state where women did.

IV.

One way of resolving the tension between the praise for the

women of Magnesia and their capacities and Plato’s negative remarks

is similar to the way we solved this problem in the Republic: when

Plato discusses the women who have been raised in Magnesia he

sees them as equal to the men, but when he speaks of the female

colonizers he declares that they are secretive, crafty, etc. A good

example of a discussion where Plato makes negative remarks on

the female colonizers’ nature occurs as the Athenian explains that

communal meals for women must be mandatory since they are used

96
to seclusion and will have difficulty adjusting to their new dining

arrangements. The Athenian, knowing the female colonizers are

habituated to seclusion asks:

How on earth are you going to avoid being laughed to scorn

when you try to force women to take their food and drink
in public…women have got used to a life of obscurity and
retirement, and any attempt to force them into the open will
provoke tremendous resistance from them.157

The key point in this passage is that “women have got used to a life

of obscurity,” so they will be habituated to protest with “tremendous

resistance.” Not only does the Athenian believe the women will resist

this measure, they will do so because they are inclined to be secretive

and crafty:

On the contrast, half the human race - the female sex, the half
which in any case is inclined to be secretive and crafty, because
of its weakness - has been left to its own devices because of the
misguided indulgence of the legislator. Because you neglected
this sex, you gradually lost control of a great many things which
would be in a far better state today if they had been regulated
by law. You see, leaving women to do what they like is not just
to lose half the battle (as it may seem): a woman’s natural
potential for virtue is inferior to a man’s, so she’s proportionally
a greater danger, perhaps even twice as much.158

Athenian wives would appear secretive to the Athenian stranger, and

it is also possible that without as many rights or education, a woman

in Athens would need to be cunning to get what she desired.159 More

specifically, weakness does not always make women secretive and

157 Laws 781d.

158 Laws 781a-b.
159 Bobonich 2004, 387.

97
crafty, but it inclines them to be so. If women are given educational

and physical training, however, they will not be weak and will not

need to resort to subterfuge. Plato does not blame the women, but the

legislators, for by having “neglected this sex, you gradually lost

control of a great many thing which would be in a far better state

today if they had been regulated by law.”160 There is no doubt

concerning the negativity of this statement, but there is reason to

believe that women’s inferiority is a result of how they have been

habituated, for the next line states, “So the happiness of the state will

be better served if we reconsider the point and put things right, by

providing that all our arrangements apply to men and women alike.” 161

It should also be remembered that the Athenian is in the midst of a

conversation with the Cretan Clinias and the Spartan Megillus, which

entails that the Athenian must not only persuade the reader of his

measures, but his two companions as well. Though Clinias and

Megillus prove themselves worthy interlocutors, they are more

influenced by the social conventions of their time than the Athenian.

When the Athenian therefore makes declarations such as a woman’s

natural potential for virtue is less than a man’s, he may be framing

the argument at a level where it is more likely to influence Clinias and

Megillus. We have such an example at 805a-b, where after the

160 Laws 781a.

161 Laws 781b.
98
Athenian describes the impressive Sarmatian women and continues to

declare that the current state affairs entails that a state only develops

half its potential, Clinias responds:

A lot of these proposals, sir, are incompatible with the average

state’s social structure. However, you were quite right when you
said we should give the argument its head, and only make up
our minds when it had run its course. You’ve made me reproach
myself for having spoken.162

This quote indicates that even though Plato believes women are as

good by nature as men, he must occasionally pitch the argument at

a level which will appeal to his interlocutors’ sensibilities as to what

is natural for women. A curious result is that even if Plato does not

convince Clinias and Megillus that women are not by nature inferior

to men, they will still have reason to support the Athenian’s proposals

for women; if women are weaker and more deceitful than men, they

are therefore potentially dangerous in secret and accordingly must

be made to be in public. Another interpretation of woman’s natural

potential being inferior to man’s is that this will only apply to the first

generation of colonizers.

We must not forget that the men and women who will

colonize Magnesia will not be citizens who have benefited from Plato’s

rigorous education system. Rather, they will suffer from the common

prejudices and institutions of their time and society, so the women

162 Laws 805a-b.

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who will colonize Magnesia may in fact be inferior to their husbands.

Taking this into account we must imagine how the typical Athenian

wife, accustomed to spending the majority of her time in her own

home, would react to being told not only that she must have

communal meals with every other female citizen of Magnesia, but that

she also has a right to vote and hold office, and a duty to serve in the

military. It is hard to imagine anyone not having a certain degree of

difficulty in adjusting to this requirement. As the generations change

their ways through the superior laws of Magnesia, the women will

shed the characteristics which Athenian social institutions produced.

The detailed nature of the Laws demonstrates Plato’s belief that good

laws make good people, and by creating laws that educate women he

believes that women will become good enough to hold office in the

state; hardly a duty he would give to those of questionable virtue or

nature. There is a point Plato does not make, though it would not be

inconsistent with his views on habituation: if in a different society

gender roles were reversed and the women were lawmakers while

men were uneducated and idle at home, then the men would be just

as secretive as the women of Classical Athens.

The Athenian stranger paves the way for an argument on the

equality of the sexes when he discusses ambidexterity and claims that

right-handedness is not related to our nature but due to habituation.

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The Athenian declares that habituation of this kind is wasteful for it

unnecessarily squanders half of our natural talent.163 After discussing

how the two sexes should be educated the Athenian states:

People think that where the hands are concerned right and left
are by nature suited for different specialized tasks - whereas
of course in the case of the lower limbs there is obviously no
difference in efficiency at all. Thanks to the silly ideas of nurses
and mothers we’ve all been made lame-handed so to speak.
The natural potential of each arm is just about the same, and
the difference between them is our own fault, because we’ve
habitually misused them.164

If taken in the context of sex equality and education, this passage

strongly asserts that “there is obviously no difference in efficiency

at all,” and that habituation of this sort leads us to be “made lame-

handed so to speak.” He also asserts that the “natural potential of

each arm,” or boy and girl, “is just about the same,” and therefore

any difference between them is not natural but as a result of

having “habitually misused them.”165 Such a strong argument echoes

those of the Republic, so it is interesting to note that in the Laws

this argument is not made explicitly in reference to sex but is placed

after a discussion on educating the sexes. But once this Republic-like

argument is made the Athenian pulls back.

V.

In this section I shall turn my attention to the Timaeus,

163 Laws 794d-795a.

164 Laws 794d-e.
165 Laws 794e Okin 1979, 61.

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where Plato makes possibly his most negative comments on women.

Chronologically the Timaeus takes place the day after Socrates has

given a discourse similar to that of the Republic. Socrates begins the

dialogue by briefly recounting the discourse’s three-fold division of

labor, the Guardians’ education, and how Guardians must search for

the best children in order to provide them with the proper education. 166

There is no indication in Socrates’ summarization that he has revised

his opinion on female Guardians, for Socrates states “In fact we even

made mention of women. We said that their natures should be made

to correspond with those of men, and that all occupations, whether

having to do with war or with other aspects of life, should be common

to both men and women.”167 Socrates is present for the entire

Timaeus, but the majority of the text is a speech by Timaeus, a

cosmology describing the origins of the world. Having spent the earlier

part of the chapter discussing the Athenian stranger, we know we

cannot necessarily infer anything from a change in narrator. Timaeus,

however, differs from the Athenian in an important way: Socrates is

present for the dialogue, so Plato’s usual mouthpiece is in attendance

but mostly silent; the Athenian stranger, though, is Plato’s only

spokesman in the Laws. The question, then, arises of how much of

Timaeus’ discourse Plato subscribes to. As Cooper notes “Plato, as

166 Timaeus 18c-e.

167 Timaeus 18c.
102
author of the work, is responsible for all Timaeus’ theories,” but it is

unclear if the theories embody Plato’s own theories.168 Cooper also

asks us to consider the Phaedrus, where Socrates claims that speakers

well trained in the art of rhetoric will found their speech on the truth,

but they are prepared to alter and exaggerate their account to keep

the listener engaged and convince him as to what the most important

points are.169 Timaeus may be Plato’s mouthpiece, but it would be

careless to forget the Phaedrus’s warnings on rhetoric.

Much of the literature on Plato’s views of women reference the

Timaeus to demonstrate that despite the positive comments Plato

makes in dialogues such as Book V of the Republic, he still retains

the belief that women are by nature inferior to men. Indeed, the

Timaeus is unlikely to be used a starting point in a defense of Plato

on this topic, but it is not necessarily as negative as most believe.

One important distinction that is commonly disregarded is that the

Timaeus is a cosmology, an entirely different kind of text than the

political treatises of the Republic and the Laws. These dialogues were

concerned with women’s capacity for virtue and the quality of their

souls whereas the Timaeus is concerned with women’s biology. This

entails that any negative biological remarks made regarding women

in the Timaeus do not necessarily apply to Plato’s political beliefs.

168 Cooper 1997, 1225.

169 Cooper 1997, 1225.
103
We also should not be surprised that a biological account of men and

women will focus on their bodily and reproductive differences rather

than concern itself with souls and virtues, for it is exactly the biological

difference between men and women that makes reproduction possible.

Therefore, any comments that Plato makes concerning women cannot

be taken as evidence that he sees women’s potential for virtue as

inferior to that of men.

Once Timaeus finishes describing the creation of men he

states “We should go on to mention briefly how other living things

came to be - a topic that won’t require many words. By doing this

we’ll seem to be in better measure…so far as our words on these

subjects are concerned.”170 This comment, however, is misleading as

women are vital for human reproduction and especially important in

this cosmology as all animals in one matter or another descend from

humans.171 Though Timaeus does not spare many words on women,

those he does are possibly the most pejorative in the Platonic

cannon: “All male-born humans who lived lives of cowardice or

injustice were reborn in the second generation as women.” 172 Besides

the brevity of this statement, one striking feature is that there is no

explanation of how the second generation of humans was born.

170 Timaeus 90e.

171 Tinaeus 91d-92c.
172 Timaeus 91a.

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Without any women the logistics are puzzling. More important than

the pragmatic difficulties of a second generation of humans produced

without women, is the fact that all women are by nature inferior to

men. If all women were cowardly or unjust men in their previous life,

then it is impossible for a soul in a woman’s body to be as virtuous as

a soul in a man’s body. Curiously there is no mention of whether a

woman might be able to change her lot. Take for example a woman

lived a just and good life; could she “upgrade” to a man’s body in the

next life? It is unfortunate that this is cosmological discourse at this

point, for if it were political it is likely Plato would have provided an

explanation for how such an “upgrade” could be achieved as the

Timaeus appears to allow them.

The most famous association of women and the Timaeus is their

being second-generation cowardly men, but the second is not a

discussion of women directly, but of the “receptacle.” The receptacle

enters the dialogue when Timaeus begins his second account of the

creation of the world. Concerning Timaeus’ previous endeavor, he

admits:

I couldn’t convince even myself that I could be right to commit

myself to undertaking a task of such magnitude. I shall keep
to…likely accounts, and so shall try right from the start to say
about things…what is no less likely…than what I have said
before.173

173 Timaeus 48d.

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Although this statement occurs before describing the receptacle, we

must remember that even his account of second-generation women is

also therefore only “likely,” though this likeliness is due to the vague

nature of cosmology. Also of note is that though “likely” is less definite

than “certain,” a “likely” account still contains reasons for it to be

believed to be true. Yet, Timaeus is not as convinced that women are

second-generation cowardly men as Socrates is when he states that

women are capable of becoming Guardians; this is of course unfair to

Timaeus as Socrates’ subject matter allows a greater degree of

certainty whereas Timaeus’ does not. On this train of thought,

however, it is permissible to think that Timaeus does not rule out that

females occurred in the first generation and not only as returning

cowardly men. If we look at a few words before that passage we see

that Timaeus states “According to our likely account, all male-born

humans who lived lives of cowardice or injustice were reborn in the

second generation as women.”174 Clearly this is also another “likely”

account, but more importantly, it does not explicitly preclude the

existence of first generation women. If first generation women did

exist, it would dissolve the mystery of how a second generation could

be born if there were no women in the first. It easy to assume why

one would suppose women are precluded, but the text does not

174 Timaeus 91a.

106
definitively state so. The obvious objection to this argument is that if

there were first generation women, why make the cowardly first

generation men women in the next? One possible answer I will explore

is that this is not a political text, so when it discusses women it is

doing so from a fully biological perspective.

As Timaeus does not directly critique women’s nature, it is

possible to assume that the reason why becoming a woman is a

punishment is due to biology as well; more specifically, the biological

discomfort associated with giving birth and other hormonal aspects

such as menstruation and menopause. It is clear that Timaeus is

aware that certain aspects of women’s biology are unpleasant, for

when he discusses reproduction he states that:

A woman’s womb or uterus, as it is called, is a living thing

within her with a desire for childbearing. Now when this remains
unfruitful for an unseasonably long period of time, it is extremely
frustrated and travels everywhere up and down her body. It
blocks up her respiratory passages, and by not allowing her to
breathe it throws her into extreme emergencies, and visits all
sorts of other illnesses upon her until finally the woman’s desire
and the man’s love brings them together.175

The biological process of hysteria that Timaeus references, it does not

seem an enjoyable one.176 It is therefore possible that the demotion

to a woman has to do with biology rather than nature. If this is true,

175Timaeus 91c.
176 As was noted earlier and as was discussed earlier in this chapter, women had no control over how
and when they became pregnant so it is not difficult to imagine a man wishing to avoid upwards of ten
pregnancies; pregnancies which often lead to the mother’s death.
107
then it ties in with the concept of women upgrading and becoming a

man in the next generation, for if she lived virtuously she would avoid

the biological discomforts of being a woman in her next life. Timaeus

also has an opportunity to criticize women when he discusses how

various animals descend from flawed humans, but instead of stating

that animals derive from flawed women, they all descend from flawed

men.177

To return to the receptacle, Timaeus revises his previous claim

that the universe had two kinds to say that there are now three.

The first kind “was proposed as a model, intelligible and always

changeless,” and the second kind was “an imitation of the model,

something that possesses becoming and is visible.”178 The new addition

of the third kind is in Timaeus’ own words “difficult and vague,” and he

defines it as “a receptacle of all becoming - its wetnurse, as it were.”179

After a failed attempt at describing its nature he tries again by taking

the example of gold which can be melted into any shape. Timaeus

states that if one saw a gold triangle and asked what it was, it would

be incorrect to say “triangle” for the shape can change, but if one

says “gold” one will have grasped its unchanging nature.180 Timaeus

continues:

177 Timaeus 91d-92b.

178 Timaeus 49a.
179 Timaeus 49a.
180 Timaeus 50b.

108
 Now the same account…holds also for nature which receives
all the bodies. We must always refer to it by the same term,
for it does not depart from its own character in any way. Not
only does it always receive all things, it has never in any way
whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the things
that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to make
its impression upon…These are the things that make it appear
different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are
imitations of those things that always are, imprinted after their
likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe. 181

We clearly have a woman-type figure in the receptacle, but it is

difficult to say whether one can garner a position on women from it.

Plato describes the three eide of Timaeus’ second account as “that

which is generated, and that in which it is generated, and that

of which what was generated is a naturally derived resemblance.

What is generated may be likened to a child and what harbors it

may be likened to the womb of a mother.”182 It would appear that

the receptacle functions in a reproductive sense and is viewed as

necessary and positive. Timaeus explains the receptacle’s importance

in the universe when he states:

We shouldn’t call the mother or receptacle of what has come

to be, of what is visible or perceivable in every other way,
either earth or air, fire or water, or any of their compounds
or their constituents. But if we speak of it as an invisible and
characterless sort of thing, one that receives all things and
shares in a most perplexing way in what is intelligible, a thing
extremely difficult to comprehend, we shall not be misled. 183

The receptacle itself seems neutral, but it is a necessary, perhaps

181 Timaeus 50b-c.

182 Timaeus 50c-d.
183 Timaeus 51a-b.

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catalyzing, component in the universe. Though we are unclear as to

how the receptacle actually interacts with what it receives and shares,

it clearly plays a vital role. The receptacle is indeed perplexing, but

what is important for our purpose is that it is not inherently negative.

VI.

In this chapter I hope to have demonstrated that despite the

return of the family and private property in the Laws, there is no

reason to think either that Plato has changed his view of women’s

nature, or that he permits any sex-based discrimination. To do so

would be unjust, and the only injustice he is allowed to admit in terms

of the family is private attachments. We must also remember that any

negative comments concerning women’s nature reference the female

colonizers, but that within a few generations the good laws of

Magnesia will re-habituate the women so these remarks are no longer

accurate.

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Chapter Four

In the painter Raphael’s The Schools of Athens, Plato is

portrayed as pointing up towards the heavens representing his belief

in the Forms whereas Aristotle gestures to the earth, representing his

belief that knowledge is gained from empirical observation and

experience. The differences in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies are

of course far more complex than The Schools of Athens portrays, but

in fact it broadly captures a main distinction in their approach to

philosophy. Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies are more connected

than almost any other pair of philosophers, for Aristotle was Plato’s

student at his Academy for nearly twenty years. Perhaps Aristotle’s

greatest departure from the Platonic tradition is a rejection of Plato’s

Forms and his replacement of them with observable particulars. For

Plato, one could look at a bed, but this bed derived its “bedness” from

the universal Form of Bed. The Form of Bed was intangible, invisible,

and immortal, so any bed observed by the human eye was a lesser

form of Bed. Aristotle, however, had his own different theory of the

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Forms and argued that the universal quality of a thing existed in its

physical manifestation; if Aristotle looked at a bed, he would contend

that the universal existed not only in the bed in front of him, but also

in every manifestation of a bed. This is a dramatically simplified

account, but the point to grasp is that Plato does not think knowledge

and truth can be observed in the physical world and therefore

discounts empirical observations, while Aristotle believes truth can be

derived from observation and experience. Their methods will have

implications for what each deems the appropriate role for women in

society. Plato is able to conclude a woman should not be excluded

from any role in virtue of her sex since one’s true nature resides in a

soul which cannot be observed. Aristotle however, forms his views of

women based on observations and therefore cannot escape tying his

theory to the Classical Athenian women he observes.

Plato and Aristotle have differing views on women for many

reasons, but perhaps the most significant distinction is that Plato

thought that since the only difference between good men and women

was that “the females bear children while the males beget them, we’ll

say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different

from men.”184 According to Aristotle, however, the relation of men

and women is that of ruler and ruled, men and women have distinct

184Republic 454e
112
virtues due to their distinct functions, although women have the

capacity to deliberate their reason lacks authority, and while a man

can possess practical intelligence the most a woman can achieve is

true opinion.185 Aristotle’s ethical theory makes theoretical reasoning

necessary in order to achieve true human excellence, since “reason

more than anything else is man.”186 This concept combined with

Aristotle’s account of women’s nature, which he characterizes as a

defective capacity for rationality,187 creates an ethical theory that

excludes women from ever achieving human excellence. His political

theory carries a similar sentiment in that he writes “some should rule

and others be ruled, is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from

the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for

rule.”188 Though Plato has similar thoughts, his are based on one’s soul

rather than one’s sex.

Aristotle’s negative conclusions concerning women’s capacities

are surprising considering he knew of impressive women such as

Aspasia and knew Plato’s arguments in Book V of the Republic, even

if Aristotle disagreed with them. Aristotle was Macedonian rather

than Athenian, but he was likely aware of women’s role in religion, of

wise women such as Diotima, and that the city of Athens is named

185 Pol. 1.13, 3.4.1277b24-29, NE 8.7.1158b11-28, 8.11.1161a22-25, Rhet. 1.5.1361a4-16.

186 NE. 10.7.1178a7-8.
187 NE. 8.9.1160b32-37, Pol. 1.5. 1254b12-15.
188 Pol. 1.5.1254a21-23.

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after Athena, goddess of wisdom. Plato’s observations lead him to

conclude that the poor state of Athenian women is due to habituation

and Athenian social institutions, but he recognizes that better laws

will produce good women. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not aim to

create the ideal state nor radically alter society, but one wonders

how he could not attribute even a degree of blame on Athenian social

institutions, particularly since like Plato he knew women in other

cultures labored to their benefit. In the Generation of Animals he

writes of women experiencing discomfort during pregnancy:

Their way of life is partly responsible for this, for being sedentary
they are full of more residual matter; among nations where the
women live a laborious life gestation is not equally conspicuous
and those who are accustomed to hard work bear children easily
both there and elsewhere; for work consumes the residual
matter, but those who are sedentary have a great deal of it in
them because not only is there no monthly discharge during
pregnancy but also they do not work; therefore their travail is
painful. But work exercises them so that they can hold their
breath, upon which depends the ease or difficulty of child-
birth.189

This passage presents many questions for Aristotle for if he knows

some women “live a laborious life,” then how can he claim as he

does in the History of Animals that women are soft and unable to

withstand levels of pain that men can?190 Given that Aristotle is aware

that exercise benefits women one expects him to advocate at least

moderate exercise and a less sedentary lifestyle for Athenian women,

189 GA 4.6.775a30-b2.
190 HA 9.1.608b1.
114
but he instead argues women are by nature intended to remain

within the home.191 It appears Aristotle determined that the traits of

Classical Athenian women are the traits characteristic of women by

nature; rather than concluding Athenian women are softer and less

spirited than Athenian men, Aristotle applied this observation to all

women. Mayhew argues Aristotle “seems simply to take the Greek

social structure as what is natural” rather than as a social structure. 192

Although Aristotle presumes Athens is superior to its neighbors, this

claim should not lead to the conclusion that Athenian society is closer

to nature than any other state; while Aristotle can claim Athenian

society is superior to all other societies, this does not entail that

Athenian society is natural and best.193

In addition to the above assumption, Aristotle’s consciousness of

popular opinion may have prevented him from questioning Athenian

society too harshly. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes:

We must, as in all other cases, set up the apparent facts before

us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove,
if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these
affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number and
the most authoritative; for if we both resolve the difficulties and
leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved
the case sufficiently.194

191 Econ. 1.3.1343b7-1344a8.

192 Mayhew 2004, 112.
193 Mayhew 2004, 113.
194NE 1145b3-10. We must be careful, however, not to take this passage to indicate that Aristotle always
aimed to uphold common opinions. Rather, he was conscious that common opinion often contained a grain
of truth.
115
Here we see another distinction between Plato and Aristotle: Plato

views the public as corrupting and incompatible with philosophy

whereas Aristotle seeks to find the best of popular opinion. Plato states

his opinion of the multitude when he writes:

The members of the small group have tasted how sweet and
blessed a possession of philosophy is, and at the same time
they’ve also seen the madness of the majority and realized…that
hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is
no ally with whom they might go to the aid of justice and
survive…just like a man who has fallen among wild animals…nor
sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. 195

Plato has reason to distrust common opinion in that it was the decision

of the many to sentence Socrates to death on charges of impiety,

and partly from this disdain stems his ability to see beyond the

conventions of his time. Plato had no motive to assume that women’s

role in Athens was best and natural and was therefore able to allow his

philosophy to dictate what role women should serve in the state. With

Aristotle’s concern for maintaining common opinion if possible, he had

motive to argue against any radical shift in women’s positions. I do

not mean to suggest that Aristotle thought women were more capable

than common opinion allowed but remained silent in order to avoid

controversy - rather, Aristotle genuinely believed women’s natural

place in society was within the domestic sphere and therefore had no

reason to advocate a drastic and difficult-to-implement theory.

195 Republic 496c-d.

116
 Aristotle’s remarks on women’s nature and women’s biology

have received a great deal of attention as well as criticism, but far less

attention has been focused on women’s actual role within society. This

is not surprising as he provides little information on women’s ideal

duties and capacities, but by looking at texts that center on the home

such as the Economics196 we learn that Aristotle views women as

essential parts of his society, not merely for their reproductive

capacities but for the partnership they form with their husbands.

I.

In addition to the physical distinctions Aristotle observes

between men and women, he also asserts that women are

psychologically different from men. Aristotle presents his perceived

differences in character and cognition in the History of Animals. The

passage that best demonstrates this, HA 9.1.608a21-b18, is long so I

shall only reproduce the most pertinent sections:

In all genera in which the distinction of male and female

is found, nature makes a similar differentiation in the
characteristics of the two sexes. This differentiation is the most
obvious in the case of human kind and in that of the larger
animals and the viviparous quadrupeds. For the female is
softer in character, is the sooner tamed, admits more readily of
caressing, is more apt in the way of learning; as, for instance,
in the Laconian breed of dogs the female is cleverer than the
male…

In all cases, excepting those of the bear and the leopard, the
female is less spirited than the male; in regard to the two

196It is possible that this text was not written by Aristotle but by one of his students. Even if this is not by
Aristotle’s own hand it almost certainly reflects his views.
117
 exceptional cases, the superiority in courage rests with the
female. With all other animals the female is softer in disposition,
is more mischievous, less simple, more impulsive, and more
attentive to the nurture of the young; the male on the other
hand, is more spirited, more savage, more simple and less
cunning. The traces of these characteristics are more or less
visible everywhere, but they are especially visible where
character is the more developed, and most of all in man. The
fact is, the nature of man is the most rounded off and complete,
and consequently in man the qualities above referred to are
found most clearly. Hence woman is more compassionate than
man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time is more
jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She
is, furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful
than the man, more void of shame, more false of speech, more
deceptive, and of more retentive memory. She is also more
wakeful, more shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and
requires a smaller quantity of nutriment. As was previously
stated, the male is more courageous than the female, and more
sympathetic in the way of standing by to help. Even in the case
of cephalopods, when the cuttlefish is struck with the trident the
male stands by to help the female; but when the male is struck
the female runs away.

Two of the qualities ascribed to females are of particular importance:

women are softer and less spirited than men. These two essential

qualities appear to lead to, or at least have a connection with,

women’s cognitive and character traits.197 In the HA passage softness

refers to one’s ability to manage pleasure and pain.198 Softness relates

to bodily pleasures and physical comfort (NE 7.4.1148a11-13, Rhet

1.10 1368b18), but primarily relates to one’s incapacity to endure

physical pain and discomfort that most could if forced:

Now the man who is defective in respect of resistance to the

things which most men both resist and resist successfully is soft
197 Mayhew 2004, 93.
198 NE 7.4.1147b21-23.
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 and effeminate; for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a
man trails his cloak to avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the
invalid without thinking himself wretched…But it is surprising
if a man is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains
which most men can hold out against, when this is not due to
hereditary or disease, like the softness that is hereditary with
the kings of the Scythians, or that distinguishes the female sex
from the male. (NE 7.7.1150b1-5, b12-16)

Softness in a woman cannot be considered a virtue or a vice

(NE 7.1.1145a35-b2) whereas softness in an average male is

blameworthy, for his softness is the result of active deliberation. 199

Softness in women as well as in men who are inherently effeminate

or ill is not deemed a moral flaw for they are soft by nature. Though

women cannot be blamed for their softness, it does lead them to

disproportionately value and desire appetitive goods. We should not

attach too much importance to softness, however, for softness is a

specific trait and Aristotle himself makes the point in the Eudemian

Ethics that is possible for a man to face death bravely while being

easily affected by extremes in temperature.200

In addition to their softness, Aristotle asserts that women’s souls

are less forceful than male souls. Women’s lack of spirit entails that

they are less emotional in regard to emotions connected to “spirit” 201

rather than less emotional in regard to the appetites.202 According to

199 Mayhew 2004, 99.

200 EE 3.1,1229b1-8.
201 Such as “courage” or “temperance.”
202 Mayhew 2004, 100.

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Aristotle, women’s softness directly relates to their lack of spirit: a

woman’s desire for appetitive pleasure cannot be checked by her weak

spirit. Less spirit corresponds with Aristotle’s other claims such as

women are cowardly, unlikely to aid another in trouble,203 tend to lie,

and are disingenuous.204 In the Rhetoric Aristotle claims that the

spirited are passionate, quick to act, truthful, and candid whereas the

less spirited will reflect upon an event and fabricate a story;205 when a

man angers he reacts without delay, but when a woman angers she

mulls over the event and conspires for revenge. One’s degree of spirit

affects how one controls the appetites, for in the Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle asserts:

[A] passionate man is not given to plotting, nor is anger

itself - it is open; but the nature of appetite is illustrated
by what the poets call Aphrodite, ‘guile-weaving daughter
of Cyprus’…Therefore if this form of incontinence is more
unjust and disgraceful than that in respect of anger, it is both
incontinence without qualification and in a sense vice. 206

From this evidence Mayhew concludes that Aristotle judges women

as susceptible to bodily pleasures and schemers who act deceitfully

to satisfy their appetites and evade pain.207 One cannot easily avoid

the conclusion that women by nature have inferior natures than men.

Instead of blaming women for their lesser nature, however, Aristotle

203 HA 608a33-35, b14-18.

204HA 9.1.608b12.
205 Rhetoric 1.9.1367a38.
206 NE 7.6.1149b1-18.
207 Mayhew 2004, 101-102.

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assumes women are so by nature and therefore unable to be better.

Although women are not faulted for their nature, inherent qualities

such as impulsiveness208 compromise a woman’s capacity to act

morally; if one acts impulsively one has deliberated on the best course

of action but does not follow through due to appetites. 209

Additional traits discussed in the History of Animals passage

are women’s jealousy, complaints, and tendency to fight.210 Jealousy

and a tendency to fight could indicate a strong spirit, but in context it

likely refers to envying material goods, fighting over trivial matters,

and scolding, while a predisposition to complain correlates to women’s

softness. Aristotle writes “the female is softer in character, is the

sooner tamed, admits more readily of caressing, is more apt in

the way of learning,”211 but the praise in this statement relates to

domestication and how one handles animals, entailing that women are

more easily trained and tamed than men.212 Furthermore, the passage

begins by discussing women’s softness and lack of spirit, and since

animals with less spirit are more easily trained and animals with less

control of their appetites require training, it implies women are by

nature suited to learn domestic duties.

208 An additional result of softness. HA 9.1.608b1-2.

209 Mayhew 2004, 102. NE 7.7.1150b19-21.
210 9.1.608b8-11.
211 608a25-28.
212 608b3.

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 When Aristotle claims women are less simple he does not refer

to human intelligence but to the kind of low-level cognition found in

some animals, and to a degree, in humans. He also states that women

have a superior memory, but the context indicates that women have a

better memory for perceived insults: “She is, furthermore, more prone

to despondency and less hopeful than the man, more void of shame,

more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive

memory.”213 In the initial passage, Aristotle discusses the natural

characteristics that certain animals as well as humans are born with,

but we must not confuse these with the traditional human virtues that

belong only to humans. Lennox argues that according to

Aristotle, “humans begin life with the very natural capacities that are

the beast’s likeness of bravery, temperance, understanding, or

intelligence, yet end up with quite different learned and acquired

states, namely true bravery and intelligence.”214 When Aristotle makes

the positive-sounding claim that women feel more pity, mercy, and

compassion it should be noted that these emotions are related to

women’s tendency to cry and a lack of spirit.215 Although feeling pity

correctly deserves praise, it is unlikely women experience pity

appropriately. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes:

[B]oth fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity
213 608b11-13.
214 Lennox 1999a, 18.
215 9.1.608b8-9, NE 2.5.1105b21-25.

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 and in general pleasure and pain may be felt too much and too
little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right
times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both
intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence. 216

Clearly the way one feels pity is not only specific but requires

knowledge and sensitivity as to what is too much pity and what is

too little. Women therefore feel pity to a higher degree than a man

should, but unlike feeling too much anger or fear, feeling pity acutely

does not affect anyone negatively, excepting the woman experiencing

the pity. Though declaring that women are more compassionate is

praise, this praise is used to set up her negative traits: “Hence woman

is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the

same time is more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to

strike.”217 Though feeling a greater degree of compassion is still praise,

the fact that it is used to illustrate women’s truculent nature makes

the compassion seem less important.

II.

One of the many departures from Plato’s philosophy is Aristotle’s

perception of emotions which lead him to form a new conception of

human psychology.218 Understanding that the emotions can be

persuaded by reason, Aristotle significantly changes his ethical theory

216 2.6.1106b19.
217 608b8-11.
218 As opposed to Plato’s tripartite psychology.

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which results in a more thorough consideration of women’s

subordinate role in the state. Aristotle concurred with Plato that one’s

role in society should be determined by one’s nature, entailing that

different natures therefore require different roles,219 while also

concurring with Gorgias that women and slaves have distinct virtues

from men due to their different roles in society.220 Aristotle examines

women’s role in society and the virtues suited to their domestic role 221

and concludes that not only do women require less courage than

men,222 but that “the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the

courage and justice of a man and a woman, are not, as Socrates

maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding,

of a woman in obeying.”223 If, as Aristotle asserts, the sexes have

distinct virtues, women are by nature intended to occupy different

roles than men, whereas Plato maintains there are no specifically male

or female virtues. Plato and Aristotle both compare men and women’s

physical conditions and conclude that women are physically weaker,

but while Plato attaches little importance to the distinction, Aristotle

understands women’s physical weakness as an indication that they are

meant to occupy a domestic role.

219 Pol. 1.13.1260b27-28.

220 Pol. 1260a15-17.
221 Pol. 1.13.1260a16-17.
222 Pol. 3.4.1277b20-2.
223 Pol. 1.13.1260a20-24.

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 The concept of proper virtues for different categories of people in

society with the principle that virtue is related to function is important,

but the true question occurs on a more essential level: why do

different categories of people have distinct roles in the state? 224 The

answer lies in observing how Aristotle’s new bipartite psychology and

the ability to deliberate leads to differences in the souls of the sexes.

Aristotle explains the relationship between husband and wife as ruler

to subject and writes:

Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way;
in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the
excellence of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of
the subject - the one being the excellence of the rational, and
the other of the irrational part.225

Men therefore naturally rule women due to the rationality of men’s

souls and the irrationality of women’s souls. Aristotle continues:

[T]he slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has,

but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.
So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the excellences
of character also; all should partake of them, but only in such
manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of
his function. 226

Women are thus comparable to slaves and children in that none have

control over their deliberative capacity. Women, however, significantly

differ from slaves and children in that women’s deliberative capacity

is not in someway defective, as are the others; instead, women’s

224 Fortenbaugh 1975, 138.

225 Pol. 1.13.1260a4-7.
226 Pol. 1.13.1260a14-17.

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capacity to deliberate is akuron, meaning it lacks authority and is often

overruled by emotions and appetites. Although women’s major flaw

are of a volitional nature, this flaw is not as significant as an inability

to reason due to the extreme importance Aristotle places on one’s

deliberative capacity. Rather than base decisions on reason women

are directed by pleasure, in need of temperance, and ill-suited for any

position of responsibility in society.

Women’s functioning ability to deliberate is often over shadowed

by the claim that women cannot achieve human excellence, but the

essential point to grasp is that this is due to the strength of their

emotions rather than a flaw in their reasoning. According to Aristotle,

women are intelligent, capable of deliberation, and of giving logical

advice, so it is not that women cannot deliberate logically, but that

emotions are likely to overpower their deliberations.227 Proof of his

recognition of female intelligence is that it is in virtue of their

intelligence that they differ from slaves, who have no reason

whatsoever, and children who have reason but use it imperfectly.

Euripides’ Medea demonstrates not only Aristotle’s conception of how

the emotions overrule reason, but the way Classical Athenians

perceived women and how they were portrayed in literature. Medea,

angered that her husband Jason has abandoned her for another

227 Fortenbaugh 1994, 139. Fortenbaugh notes that this view of women was common in the literature of
the time. 139
126
woman, plots to take her revenge by murdering her children fathered

by Jason. Upon deliberation, Medea accepts that killing her own

children for revenge is not a proportional response and would greatly

pain her as well. Although Medea does indeed waver after deliberating

the consequences of her actions, her reason cannot exert the required

authority to enable her to follow through with her deliberations and

she murders her children.228 Aristotle clearly sees defects in women’s

ability to control their passions, but he does not fault their actual

capacity to reason; just because a woman acts unreasonably and

emotionally does not entail that she is incapable of producing

intelligent thought. As Fortenbaugh notes229 however, Aristotle’s

evidence of women’s acumen was due to the belief that “Women are

most clever contrivers of every evil.”230 Aristotle likely assumes women

turn their deliberations towards an end that is motivated by their

emotions, so like Medea, women recognize that what they are about

to do is wrong but are not dissuaded by this recognition. 231

Although Aristotle’s conclusions about women have led many to

claim he was blinded by prejudice or was a flawed but eager biologist -

and to a certain degree both claims may be true - Aristotle’s views are

in fact the result of his new conception of the soul in combination with

228 Euripides, Medea 285, 1079.

229 Fortenbaugh 1994, 139.
230 Euripides Meadea 409
231 Fortenbaugh 1994, 139.

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Plato’s distinction that one’s nature should determine one’s role in

society. A point where Aristotle departs from Plato is that, where Plato

argues people should be judged according to their nature only in the

ideal city, Aristotle seeks to apply this in his own society. The fact that

citizens are not judged by their nature in the Laws indicates that

organizing society by nature requires factors such as good laws and

wise rulers. This is unsurprising for in order for one to judge the

caliber of another’s soul, one must have knowledge of what comprises

a superior soul as compared to an inferior soul. Only Guardians would

be capable of making such distinctions and appropriate judgments and

if Guardians only exist in the ideal city, then it is not surprising that

Plato does not envisage people being given roles in society based on

their nature anywhere else. It is unclear if Aristotle understood the

implications of assigning roles in the state based on contemporary

laws which are subject to the prejudices of the time, for as noted in

the introduction, Aristotle does not account for the fact that the way

Classical Athenian society is structured is not in fact closest to nature.

Where Plato saw how failings in the law led to the less than impressive

women in Athens, Aristotle assumed that women were by nature

inferior. This assumption is curious for two reasons: the first being

that as a student of Plato, Aristotle would at least be aware that there

was a school of thought that believed women had been habituated by

128
laws and social institutions into their current situation, and second

that Aristotle himself set great store in the power of habituation to

create moral men. Aristotle writes:

[I]ntellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its
growing to teaching (for which reason it requires experience
and time), while moral excellence comes about as a result
of habit…From this it is also plain that none of the moral
excellences arises in us by nature…This is confirmed by what
happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by
forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator;
and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this
that a good constitution differs from a bad one.232

This statement demonstrates that Aristotle relies on the power

of the state and habituation to create good citizens, but by not

acknowledging the possibility that the current laws and social

institutions had habituated Athenian women to be as they are, he fails

to appreciate that women could be habituated differently. This passage

is reminiscent of the Laws where Plato writes:

If, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this way,
then the way that they are now arranged in our lands - where
it is not the case that all the men…practice the same things as
women - is the most mindless of all. For in this way, almost
every city is just about half of what it might be, when the same
expenditures and efforts it could double itself.233

Both quotes recognize that the state has the duty and the

responsibility to make good citizens, but more importantly both quotes

indicate that both philosophers believe good laws and habituation

232 NE 2.1.1103a14-b2.
233 Laws 805a-b.
129
can accomplish this. Even though Aristotle neither appears to have

considered whether women in Classical Athens were inferior to men

by nature or because they have been formed this way by the state,

nor had any wish to introduce a theory of radical political change, it is

unfair to state that Aristotle would have kept his negative opinion of

women if he had had the thought that women could be habituated to

become good.

Of course, on Aristotle’s view, the clear impediment towards

habituating women differently is that no matter how many changes

are made, women are still psychologically different from and inferior

to men. Though Aristotle may have viewed some changes in

habituation as beneficial for women, there would be little reason to

put too much store in habituation. If the main psychological distinction

between men and women is that women’s reason is akuron, then to a

degree they cannot be easily habituated. Aristotle recognizes that

moral excellence does not arise naturally in anyone, but it appears

that due to women’s incapacity to control their emotions and resist

pleasure, habituating them to experience their emotions appropriately

and temperance would go against their fundamental nature.

III.

This section discusses women’s excellences, but before doing

so one should note that according to Aristotle a society is only truly

130
happy if its women are happy as well. Aristotle asserts that in states

where the women are unhappy, the entire state can only achieve half-

happiness in society:

Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the
latter are, in body, beauty and stature, in soul, self-command
and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as
individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women
as well as their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the
state of women is bad, almost half of them are not happy. 234

Unlike Plato, Aristotle places value upon individuals’ happiness and

deems that women’s happiness is of benefit to the entire state. It

is unfair though to judge Plato harshly on this point as Plato had no

concern for the happiness of any individual or individual group. What

is perhaps more noteworthy, however, are the traits that comprise

women’s excellences. Aristotle does not specifically prescribe how

the first, bodily, excellences - stature and beauty - can be achieved

but a strong possibility is through moderate exercise. As noted

earlier, Aristotle recognizes that women who perform physical labor

experience an easier pregnancy and childbirth, making this excellence

practical for women’s health and well-being. Aristotle does not

advocate strenuous physical labor for women, but appreciates that

moderate exercise which leads to a good stature provides many

benefits for all. Further reason to assume that when Aristotle mentions

the excellence of stature he envisages women engaging in moderate

234 Rhet 1.5.1361a6-12.

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exercise is that he advocates exercise during pregnancy. In a passage

in the Politics reminiscent of the Laws, Aristotle writes:

Women who are with child should take care of themselves; they
should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. The first of
these prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by
requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where
they can worship the gods who preside over birth. Their minds,
however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for the
offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do
from the earth.235

Given the problem of ‘residual matter’ that results from a sedentary

lifestyle, presumably Aristotle would want women who were not

pregnant to take moderate exercise as well. Arguing that women

should take daily walks, pregnant or otherwise, does not necessarily

contradict Aristotle’s position that women belong in the domestic

sphere. One possible interpretation is that whilst nature intended

women to remain in the home, he recognizes that even Classical

Athenian women would profit from taking walks. Walking, however,

necessarily entails leaving the home, something wealthy Athenian

wives only did for occasions such as religious festivals and funerals. 236

Suggesting women take daily walks therefore demonstrates that

Aristotle is prepared to propose at least minor changes to the status

quo when appropriate.

The excellence of women’s souls, self-command, appears at

235 Pol. 7.16.1335b13-19.

236 Pomeroy 1976, 71.
132
odds with Aristotle’s writings in the Politics where he states that

women’s deliberations are akuron. Admittedly, self-command is a

virtue of the soul whereas deliberation is connected to one’s capacity

for reasoning, so one must be careful before claiming that these

positions are contradictory. Yet, how can Aristotle claim that women’s

excellence of soul is self-command be at least reconciled with his belief

that women’s deliberations are akuron? There does not appear to be

a simple resolution to this question. One option is that in the Politics

Aristotle consciously defends the current social structure of Classical

Athens and is therefore more persuaded by the popular sentiment that

women cannot control their emotions. Another option is that when

discussing the deliberative capacities of slaves, women, and children,

he observes his contemporary society and to explain why each

occupies the role in society that one does. In the Rhetoric passage,

however, he describes women’s excellences not specifically referencing

Athens.

Regardless of how one understands that women have self-

command and a deliberative capacity that is akuron, the important

fact is that Aristotle credits women with having the ability to command

their souls. Although self-command is an excellence and not an

inherent quality, the fact that women can achieve self-command

entails that Aristotle recognizes that women have more control of their

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soul, or should at least aim to, than he acknowledges in the Politics.

One could object, though this objection would be weak, that self-

command is an excellence that either women cannot achieve and can

only aim for, or that only exceptional women will attain this excellence.

This objection would be weak as, firstly, there is little sense in

mentioning an excellence that cannot be achieved, and secondly,

excellences are not easily achieved by women or men; the nature of

an excellence is such that only the best people shall achieve them. It is

unclear exactly how women’s self-command affects their role in society

if one only looks at the Politics, but as the next section shall discuss

there are other texts such as the Economics which portray women’s

role in society as vital and requiring self-command.

Even should women have self-command, however, it still

remains that Aristotle deems it necessary for husbands to govern their

wives:

Of household management we have seen that there are three

parts - one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has
been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a
husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and
children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over children
being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although
there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by
nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and
full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. 237

The fact that children and women are governed differently, however,

237 Pol.1.12.1259a37-b4.
134
suggests that the relation between men and women in the home

is in fact more nuanced than many appreciate. In a royal rule it is

quite clear that the superiority and power resides in the ruler, but

as Aristotle acknowledges a constitutional rule does not have such

obvious distinctions. Aristotle writes:

[I]n most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled
by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that
the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all.
Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor
to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles
of respect…The relation of the male to female is always of this
kind.238

This passage indicates that the natures between men and women are

not markedly dissimilar, but due to the conventions and traditions

in governance, it is customary to encourage external differences

and ways of being addressed. Aristotle writes “Again, the male is by

nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the

other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.” 239

Aristotle unequivocally declares that the superior party must rule the

inferior, but what often goes unnoticed is that Aristotle acknowledges

the degrees of inferiority by the type of rule. Children are far inferior

and therefore require a royal rule, but by declaring women’s rule

constitutional, Aristotle recognizes that women are only slightly inferior

to men.

238 Pol.1.12.1259b4-10.
239 Pol. 1.5.1254b13-14.
135
 When promoting women’s excellence of industry, Aristotle is

vague for he promotes industry with no other clarification than that it

not be sordid. Whatever industry Aristotle does envisage most

certainly takes place within the home, but there are still many

worthwhile tasks and occupations available to Athenian women in the

domestic setting. There is also precedent for having women work in

Classical Athenian society without any changes to the current social

institutions. In particular, Xenophon describes a conversation between

Socrates and Aristarchus where Aristarchus laments that due to the

political disorder of the time, Aristarchus was forced to allow fourteen

of his female relatives to move into his home for protection.

Aristarchus, unable to afford the costs of maintaining them laments

his upcoming insolvency. To help, Socrates proposes that Aristarchus’

relatives should be put to work. Aristarchus counters that this cannot

be done, for women of his class are unused to working. Socrates,

however, succeeds in convincing Aristarchus not only that honorable

work will not demean the women but also that the women themselves

will be far happier if they engage in productive employment.240

Aristotle does not specifically explain the benefits of industry, but he is

well aware that industrious women have an easier experience with

pregnancy, and according to Xenophon at least, women are happier

240 Pomeroy 1976, 71.

136
with productive industry. If industrious work is considered a woman’s

excellence, then we should not be surprised – as I discuss in the next

section regarding women’s role in society - that women are meant,

with their husbands, to significantly contribute to the home.

IV.

If one only focuses on Aristotle’s comments concerning women’s

nature, Aristotle appears to entertain an unwarrantedly negative

opinion of women, but if one investigates Aristotle’s conception of a

good marriage, one comprehends that Aristotle credits women with a

far more important and respected role in society than many

appreciate. As stated previously, Aristotle provides his harshest

criticism towards women in the Politics, a text where he defends the

status quo of Classical Athens, therefore in order for him to advocate

keeping women in their current position he seeks ways in which they

are inferior and require governing. In other texts, however, women

play a vital role in the family, and by extension, the state. In Book

VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle discusses friendship,

he writes:

Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature;

for man is naturally inclined to form couples - even more than
to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more
necessary than the city, and reproduction is more common to
man than with the animals. With the other animals the union
extends only to this point, but human beings live together
not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various
purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided,

137
 and those of man and woman are different; so they help each
other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It
is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be
found in this kind of friendship. But this friendship may be based
also on excellence, if the parties are good; for each has its own
excellence and they will delight in the fact.241

Admittedly, the friendship between husband and wife is not the

highest form of friendship, but this passage recognizes that women

are necessary for domestic happiness as well as reproduction. The

type of marriage Aristotle describes requires that both parties exhibit

excellences of their respective sex, so even though men and women

have different excellences, both must be sufficiently competent to

contribute to the family. Aristotle expects women to contribute to the

family, if not in equal measure to the men then at least significantly. It

seems that if women did not make a considerable contribution to the

family Aristotle would not write that men and women help each other

by utilizing their individual talent. Aristotle seems to argue that men

and women have distinct functions, but each function is considerable

and that women could not do men’s functions as well as men do,

and men could not do women’s as well as women do. Of course, the

reason women have distinct functions from the men is due to the fact

that Aristotle believes they have distinct natures, but yet he does not

belittle women’s contributions.

241 NE 8.12.1162a15-27.

138
 Aristotle devotes more attention to the relationship between

men and women in marriage in the Economics and emphasizes the

unique bond between husband and wife. Aristotle writes:

As regards the human part of the household, the first care is

concerning a wife; for a common life is above all things natural
to the male and to the female. For we have elsewhere laid down
the principle that nature aims at producing many such forms of
association, just as also it produces the various kinds of animals.
But it is impossible for the female to accomplish this without the
male or the male without the female, so that their common life
has necessarily arisen. Now in the other animals this intercourse
is not based on reason, but depends on the amount of natural
instinct which they possess and is entirely for the purpose of
procreation. But in the civilized and more intelligent animals the
bond of unity is more complex (for in them we see more mutual
help and goodwill and co-operation), above all in the case of
man, because the female and the male co-operate to ensure not
merely existence but a good life.242

Aristotle believes that the partnership between men and women is not

simply convenient or a way of replenishing the state, as Plato views

it in the Republic and the Laws. In this text, Aristotle unequivocally

states that the women do not make a contribution significant for a

woman, but that there is “more mutual help” between the man and

the woman. We also see a reassertion that the marriage relationship

is not only natural, but that the goodwill between the two results in a

good life. Aristotle continues:

Thus the nature both of the man and of the woman has been
preordained by the will of heaven to live a common life. For
they are distinguished in that the powers which they possess
are not applicable to purposes in all cases identical, but in some
respects their functions are opposed to one another though
242 Eco. 1.3.134b7-20.
139
 they all tend to the same end. For nature has made the one sex
stronger, while the other weaker, that the latter through fear
may be the more cautious, while the former by its courage is
better able to ward off attacks; and that the one may acquire
possessions outside the house, the other preserve those within.
In the performance of work, she made one sex able to lead a
sedentary life and not strong enough to endure exposure, the
other less adapted for quiet pursuits but well constituted for
outdoor activities; and in relation to offspring she has made both
share in the procreation of children, but each render its peculiar
service towards them, the woman by nurturing, the man by
educating them.243

Unlike Plato who views the soul as sexless, Aristotle believes that

a woman’s body and a man’s body possess preordained natures,

thereby preventing any need to investigate what a woman’s nature

is best suited to do; one’s sex, not one’s soul, determines what one

is most suited to do by nature. On Aristotle’s account, husband and

wife work for a common end and this common end resembles a mean

with the husband and wife being at opposite ends of the spectrum.

Unlike the doctrine of the mean where traits on either side of the mean

are flawed, Aristotle views women’s weakness and men’s strength

as good, natural, and necessary. According to Aristotle, nature made

women more cautious, weaker, well-suited to a sedentary life, and

nurturing for specific reasons. It is important to recognize this point

as some believe that, when he states that women are weaker than

men, Aristotle is claiming that women are deficient in this respect.

What the passage above demonstrates, however, is that women’s

243 Eco. 1.3.1343b7-1344a8.

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nature is necessary for their role in the family and not only are women

by nature suited to a domestic role, but that men could not perform

women’s role as well or as contentedly. Aristotle does not keep women

within the home because their deliberative capacity lacks authority

or because women fall short of men in other vital ways; women have

the role they do solely because they are best at it and their success is

due to their having the natures they do. Aristotle, then, does not view

women as deficient men or as somehow lacking, but as ideally suited

by nature to perform the tasks at which they excel and men do not.

In the Politics, Aristotle criticizes women’s akuron deliberative

capacity, but passages from the Economics portray women as not only

capable of running the home without their husband’s supervision, but

that the husband is blameworthy if there is a lack of affection in the

marriage. Aristotle writes that a husband:

[m]ust not do her any wrong; for thus a man is less likely
himself to be wronged. This is inculcated by the general law, as
the Pythagoreans say, that one least of all should injure a wife
as being ‘a suppliant and taken from her hearth’. Now wrong
inflicted by a husband is the formation of connexions outside his
own house. As regards association, she ought not to need him
when he is present or be incapacitated in his absence, but should
be accustomed to be competent whether he is present or not. 244

This passage implies that it is in a husband’s interest to treat his wife

well and not view her as “a suppliant and taken from her hearth.”

What is more telling, though, is the statement that a wife should not

244 Eco 1.4.1344a9-15.

141
need her husband’s presence or aid to perform her role as mistress

of the home; in order for this statement to be true women require

intelligence and practical capacities in order to run the home without

requiring supervision. Aristotle continues to write:

The saying of Hesiod is a good one:

A man should marry a maiden, that habits discreet he may teach
her.245
For dissimilarity of habits tends more than anything to destroy
affection. As regards adornment, husband and wife ought not
to approach one another with false affection in their person any
more than in their manners; for if society of husband and wife
requires such embellishment, it is no better than play-acting on
the tragic stage.246

Aristotle, unlike Plato, sees marriage not only as a necessary and

natural social institution but one based on more than procreation.

When Plato discusses marriage in the Laws there is little mention of

the relationship of married couples besides those relating to producing

children. Though Plato does provide provisions for divorce if a couple is

incompatible, he does not emphasize genuine affection in marriage. It

is of course possible that Plato assumes that the couples will come to

have affection for each other by living their lives together and raising

children, but Aristotle appears to place more value on the emotions

between husband and wife. From the passage above, Aristotle gives

the husband the responsibility to in some manner form his wife, and

if we remember that brides could be as young as fourteen, they likely

245 Works and Days, 699.

246 Eco. 1.4.1334a15-22.
142
did require maturing and development. Aristotle recognizes not all

couples are so fortunate, but he clearly considers genuine fondness to

be the goal, if not the norm, in marriage.

V.

Perhaps the most appealing aspect of Aristotle’s conception of

women’s nature and their resulting role in society is its cohesiveness.

The same in fact can be said of Aristotle’s entire conception of

peoples’ natures and their appropriate role, for every nature has a

perfectly corresponding role in the state. On Aristotle’s account every

category of person is specifically designed by nature to occupy a

certain role and as a result there is no need for any radical change.

More importantly, however, everyone is happy in their role and there

is a sense of order and continuity. Another result, however, is that by

assuming Classical Athenian society is a reflection of what is natural,

women cannot be judged by the merit of their soul or their potential.

Women are not the only category not to have an opportunity for a

different role in society, as slaves are also deemed to be slaves by

nature. Aristotle does not explain women’s ideal role in society

exactly, though it is clear that it is extremely similar to the role of

contemporary Athenian women. What is clear is that women’s nature

makes their ideal role in society to be within the domestic sphere, and

since their inherent nature cannot be changed, this is the only

143
appropriate role for women.

Conclusion

To conclude, I have demonstrated that women play a vital role

in Plato’s and Aristotle’s states. Plato is philosophically committed to

144
only judge people by their nature entailing that there is no such thing

as an ideal role for women as such in his state; instead, a person

should pursue that which he is meant to do by nature. On Plato’s

account, the main distinction between men and women is that women

give birth, but since he views childbirth as a purely biological process

that does not affect one’s capacity to reason or one’s soul, women

cannot be barred from any profession based on sex alone. Aristotle,

while believing that men and women have distinct natures, sees the

differences between men and women as complimentary rather than in

terms of better and worse. Women are not as brave or intelligent, but

they have their own unique virtues that are equally necessary to the

welfare of the family. Plato and Aristotle did not support modern

notions of women’s equality, but as shown this does not mean women

did not occupy crucial roles in their societies.

145
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