I.

CANONS 1-3 THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

A) In the matter of James Joseph Hamm, Arizona Supreme Court No. SB-04-0079-M December 6,
2005
FACTS:

James Hamm, the petitioner, was sentenced to life imprisonment for a criminal charge of one-count of first degree murder for killing
Willard Morley, one of the victims, during a drug deal. Prior to serving his sentence, he was separated from his first wife to whom he
had a son. As a source of living, Hamm sold marijuana, other drugs and alcohols. When Hamm was in prison, he became a role model
prisoner. He worked and studied while he was staying in prison. He also met his current wife, Donna Hamms, in prison. Eventually,
he was granted a conditional parole on July 1992. After 17 years in prison, he was finally granted an absolute discharge on December
2001. While waiting for his discharge, he graduated from Arizona State University College of Law and passed the bar. He then filed
his Character and Fitness Report with the Committee for his admission to the bar. However, his application was denied by the
Committee. This prompted Hamm to file this petition to review the Committee’s recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not James Hamm should be admitted to the Arizona State Bar.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that James Hamm should not be admitted to the Arizona State Bar and affirmed the decision of the
Committee on Character and Fitness. The court decided that Hamm failed to prove the burden that he is of good moral character based
on the following grounds:
a. Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past criminal conduct by not accepting full responsibility for serious criminal
misconduct as he only admitted one count of murder but not for the whole murder charge.
b. Hamm's neglect of his financial responsibilities of a longstanding child support court order and his testimony as to his
failure to comply with the court order.
c. Hamm’s failure to disclose the incident involving him and his wife further affects his ability to make the needed
extraordinary showing of good moral character.

Hamm’s act of quoting lines from Supreme Courts’ decision and use the same in the introduction for his petition also do not assist him
in making the requisite showing of good moral character.

B) INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents
G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993
FACTS:

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) hired Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment
Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which says that an employer who has been convicted of a criminal offense
involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service. In1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Ortega of which he was
charged of the crime of homicide. The trial court rendered a decision finding Micosa guilty of homicide. In 1990, IRRI's Director
General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee and who may
not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.
Subsequently, IRRI's HRD Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the
case for homicide. Micosa then informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI, of which Pascual
replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude which was a clear violation of
Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's Personnel Manual.

Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who recommended to the Director General, his continued employment.
However, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment already terminated. When Micosa filed a case for illegal
dismissal, Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement. Of which NLRC
affirmed when was appealed.

The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a
valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations. That IRRI has the
prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the
aforesaid personnel manual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude, hence Micosa should be dismissed.
 HELD:

No, the conviction of a crime of homicide in this case, did not involve moral turpitude, hence Micosa was illegally dismissed.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic as everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals. Likewise, the court explained that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. It follows therefore, that moral
turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.

On the other hand, under, Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an
employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes.

In this case, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted
considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has
not been so classified as involving moral turpitude. Thus, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine. Since whether a particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances, of which the court believed cannot be found in the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

C) ROBERTO SORIANO v. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
FACTS:

Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of alcohol along Abanao St. in Baguio City when a taxi overtook him. Enraged,
Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over and berated and threatened Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver. To stop the aggression, Soriano
opened his door which caused Dizon to fall to the pavement. Soriano tried to help Dizon up but had to punch Dizon because he was
going to punch him. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car to get his gun, the handle
wrapped in handkerchief. Dizon shot Soriano who was then picking up Dizon’s eyeglasses to return it to him. After shooting Soriano,
Dizon sped off with his car and left him to die on the street.

The bullet hit Soriano in the neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated Soriano, he would have easily
died if not for the timely medical assistance. Nevertheless, the left side of Soriano’s body was paralyzed, leaving him unable to drive
anymore.

A complaint for Frustrated Homicide was filed against Dizon by Soriano. Dizon was eventually found guilty but was allowed
probation. One of the conditions of the probation is the payment of the civil liabilities.

Four years after the judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation to Soriano. A Complain-Affidavit for
disbarment was filed by Soriano before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Dizon was declared in default and an ex-parte hearing was held. The Commissioner of the CBD recommended to the IBP the
disbarment of Dizon for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner and sent its resolution to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1) Whether the crime committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude.

2) Whether Atty. Dizon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, warranting his disbarment.

RULING:

The Supreme Court approved the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and ordered the disbarment of Atty. Manuel
Dizon.

1st Issue

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Commissioner that the frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon was attended by
moral turpitude. The Court defined moral turpitude as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Atty. Dizon exhibited moral turpitude when he shot a taxi driver for no valid reason. His act
did not constitute self-defense. In fact, he was the aggressor.

It was him who first tried to punch the other. Soriano was merely defending himself and fending off the aggression when he counter
punched Dizon. Furthermore, the trial court also ruled that the crime was committed with treachery. Dizon shot Soriano when the
latter was not in a position to defend himself. Soriano was picking up eyeglasses which fell on the road when Dizon fell to return it to
him when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief. He
intended not to leave fingerprints on the gun he used.
 2nd Issue

Canon 1
The Supreme Court also ruled that there was indeed a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
provides that lawyers must obey the laws of the land and promote respect or law and legal processes. Atty.
Dizon was in violation of the law because he was in illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He also failed to obey the lawful
orders of the trial court when he failed to settle his civil liabilities, a condition for the grant of the probation. Atty Dizon also violated
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Dizon tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano but
when the negotiations failed, he instead made it look like it was the family who approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In
addition, Dizon fabricated a story saying that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According to three doctors, there
was no proof of assault on Soriano.

Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

D) PEDRO L. LINSANGAN v. ATTY. TOLENTINO A.C. 6672 September 4, 2009

This is a complaint for disbarment led by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To
support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him
to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling card:

Hence, this complaint. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card. The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation, found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and other
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended
that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty. We adopt the findings of the
IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty. The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged
intrusion by respondent into complainant's professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules. Canons of the CPR are
rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer's services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3
of the CPR provides: CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Time
and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called. 14 Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03.A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT
TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE
1.03.A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN'S CAUSE. This rule prescribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.

Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as promoted from referrals' suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. Through
Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. With regard
to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce
the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano's "referrals". Furthermore, he
never denied Labiano's connection to his office. 21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. The rule is that a lawyer
shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as
filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
 handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment
may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client's cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's case, the lawyer in effect acquires
an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to
the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client's cause. As previously mentioned, any act of
solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold
the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
findings. A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed
to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only
contain the following details: (a) lawyer's name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone
number and (e) special branch of law practiced. Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance" . The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

E) LILIA TABANG & CONCEPCION TABANG v. ATTY. GLENN GACOTT A.C. 6490, July
13, 2013
FACTS:

Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s
agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels.
Thus, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons. Lilia Tabang was able to purchase
seven parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons.

Complainants decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he
would help complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the
TCTs covering the parcels.

Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles. Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of
petitions, respondent executed several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly
signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven
parcels.

Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these
were for sale. Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gacott should be disbarred.

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner
Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself
the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels. While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities,
the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his
offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice
 and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he
orchestrated it. Thus, we impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment. Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following grounds: deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly
immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; violation of the lawyer’s oath; willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. It is established in Jurisprudence
that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other
persons.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

DISPOSITION: Respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility through
his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

F) DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.

BAYDO. A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
FACTS:

On May, 16 1968, private respondent twice married Lily Gomez with 4 children. A year later, the couple encountered marital
problems. Thus, they executed a special power of attorney, addressed to the Judge of Dominican Republic, to institute a divorce under
its law.

On July 14, 1984, Catindig married the petitioner, Elmar Perez with one son. During their cohabitation, she learned that the divorce
decree was not recognized in the Philippines and their marriage is void.

In 2001, Dr. Perez received an anonymous letter informing her that Catindig has a scandalous affair, that Atty. Catindig professed his
love to Atty. Badayo with a promise to marry her once impediment is removed. In the same year, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez
and lives together with Atty. Baydo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo should be disbarred

HELD:

Only Atty. Catindig is found guilty of gross immorality and of violating the lawyer oath and rule 1.01 Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 –
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one. He is disbarred from practice of law. Meanwhile, charge against Atty.
Baydo is dismissed for the lack of evidence.

G) ATTY. ECRAELA v. ATTY. PANGALANGAN A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015

FACTS:

This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator,
and other unscrupulous activities which cause undue embarrassment to the legal profession. Complainant and respondent were best
friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group
or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991,
they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while
married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years
1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal
knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically
involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being
romantically involved with CCC.

ISSUE

Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?

 HELD

Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct. The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar,
but must also be retained in order to maintain ones good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. In the case at bar,
complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainants own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as
well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent illicit relations with
DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence. In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to
participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.

H) ENGEL PAUL ACA v. ATTY. RONALDO SALVADO A.C. No. 10952 January 26, 2016
FACTS

On 30 May 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Engel alleged that Atty. Salvado enticed him to
invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month and assured of a profitable
investment. Engel madel investment in his business from 2010 to 2011 with promises of high rates of return. As consideration for his
investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon presentment, the
checks, however, were dishonored as they were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account. Engel alleged that he made several
verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly communicated with him, assuring him that he would not abscond
from his obligations and informing him that he has owned real properties that could serve as payment for his obligations. But, Atty.
Salvado eventually avoided his calls and text messages.

Engel, through Atty. Divina, served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to settle his obligations in the amount
P747,000.00. Atty. Salvado still refused to receive the said notice. Engel argued that Atty. Salvado’s act of issuing worthless checks
not only constituted a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law but also reflected his
depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not only refused to comply with his obligation, but also used his knowledge of the law
to evade criminal prosecution. He alleged that Atty. Salvado instructed his household staff to lie as to his whereabouts and to reject
any correspondence sent to him. This resort to deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain as a member of the Bar.
On the other hand, Atty. Salvado denied such accusations and claimed that he never enticed Engel to invest in his business. He also
claimed that the checks he issued were merely intended as security or evidence of investment. Atty. Salvado also claimed that there
were instances when he would request Engel not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This
arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as
collateral.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Salvado violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

HELD

Yes, Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty commensurate to his violation of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.

The excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration. Here, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to
the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the
legal profession and created the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to
satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar. His issuance of the subject checks displays his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court, thus, violating Rule 1.01
and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

Further, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade payment of his obligations. Instead of displaying a
committed attitude to his creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer complainant's demands. He even tried to make the complainant
believe that he was no longer residing at his given address. These acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. The subsequent offers he had made and the
eventual sale of his properties to the complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

Therefore, Atty Salvado is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Accordingly, the Court suspends him from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

` SOLICITATION OF LEGAL SERVICES

A) ATTY. KHAN v. ATTY. SIMBILLO A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
FACTS

A paid advertisement appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippines Daily Inquirer which reads, “Annulment of Marriage
Specialist – 532-4333”. Theresa Espelata, staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court called the published
number and pretended to be an interested party. A Mrs. Simbillo answered who claims that her husband Atty. Rizalino Simbillo was an
expert at handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6 months, provided that the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children.

Further research revealed that similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 in
Philippine Star.

On September 1, 2000, Assistant Court Admin and Chief Public Information Officer Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr. filed an admin complaint
against Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Section 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court.

Simbillo answered that he admits the acts imputed to him but argued that (1) advertising and solicitation are not prohibited acts per se;
(2) public view on the prohibition must change; (3) the interest of the public is not served by the prohibition; and (4) court can lift the
ban.

The case was referred to IBP for investigation and recommendation. On June 29, 2002, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed a
resolution finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 (A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business) and 3.01 and suspended him for 1 year for the practice of law. He was warned that repetition would be dealt
with more severely.

Simbillo filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not a lawyer may advertise his services.

HELD

Supreme Court agreed with the finding of IBP, “The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration.” Furthermore, it stated that proper solicitation must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession, made in modest and decorous manner such as: simple signs stating the names, office address and fields of practice, calling
cards, and reputable law lists.

B) Fabillo v. IAC, GR No. 68838, March 11, 1991

FACTS:

Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, FIorencio and her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, properties located in Leyte. After Justina's
death, Florencio filed a petition for the probate of said will. Florencio sought the assistance of lawyer Alfredo M. Murillo in recovering
the property. Acquiescing to render his services, Murillo said that since the case is a recovery of a lost case, Florencio must give him
40% of the money value of the house and lot as a contingent fee in case of a success. They agreed on the said contract. Atty. Murillo
then filed a case against Brioso to recover the property. The case was terminated in the nature of a compromise agreement, declared
Florencio as the lawful owner of the properties. Consequently, Murillo proceeded to implement the contract by taking possession and
exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said properties. They stated that the consent to the contract of services of the Fabillo
spouses was vitiated by old age and ailment; that Murillo misled them into believing that Special Proceedings No. 843 on the probate of
Justina's will was already terminated when actually it was still pending resolution; and that the contingent fee of 40% of the value of the
San Salvador property was excessive, unfair and unconscionable considering the nature of the case. Also they contend that it is in
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contingent fee charged by Atty. Murillo amounting to 40% of the value of properties is valid?

HELD:

A contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable as long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is
committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion. In fact, under the 1988
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. However, the Court held that the reasonable attorney’s fees must be P3,
000 considering the time spent and effort exerted by Atty. Murillo to the case. Also, the contract of services did not violate said
provision of law. Article 1491 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph 5 thereof, prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at
a public or judicial auction, properties and rights which are the objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
 profession. The said prohibition, however, applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the client's property.

C) Yu vs. Bondal, 448 SCRA 273 , January 17, 2005

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Attorneys Fees; An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is not an absolute fee arrangement which
entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation.—If, admittedly, the only payment given to
complainant by respondent is the amount of P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal
services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to
get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases
does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of complainant. Litigants
need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or “magicians” who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter
lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause.
Same; Same; Respondent obliged under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to immediately turn over all papers and
property which complainant entrusted to his successor.—Since respondent had been advised by complainant through counsel Chavez
Laureta and Associates, by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his services, as of said date, he was obliged, under
Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, x x x to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant
entrusted to his successor.

D) People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. Inocencio Gonzales, Jr., accused-appellant. G.R.
No. 139542 June 21, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

FACTS:

On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accused- appellant were both on their way to the exit of
the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an
opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales’. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino
Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun
which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process
held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight pushing against him the
appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noel’s wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and
nephew Kevin were wounded. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and
the parents of Kevin Valdez. Hence, an automatic review or this case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was present in the commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation,
incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances.

HELD:

1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment
or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to
deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of
the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by
the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behaviour of the victim were held to be without
treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have
been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for
the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.

2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition
of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender. The mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the
wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies
according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behaviour of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be
demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle. The plea for the appreciation
of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and
shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for
the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested
from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although
not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible
consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
E) IN RE RMJ 455 US 191 (1982)
FACTS:

Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court, regulating advertising by lawyers, states that a lawyer may include 10 categories of information
in a published advertisement: name, address and telephone number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign
language ability; office hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to
be charged for certain "routine" legal services. Although the Rule does not state explicitly that these 10 categories of information are
the only information that will be permitted, that is the interpretation given the Rule by the State Supreme Court and appellee Advisory
Committee, which is charged with its enforcement. An addendum to the Rule specifies two ways in which areas of practice may be
listed in an advertisement, under one of which the lawyer may use one or more of a list of 23 areas of practice, but may not deviate
from the precise wording stated in the Rule to describe these areas. In addition, the Rule permits a lawyer to send professional
announcement cards announcing a change of address or firm name, or similar matters, but only to "lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends, and relatives." An information was filed in the Missouri Supreme Court by appellee Advisory Committee, charging
appellant, a practicing lawyer in St. Louis, Mo., with violations of Rule 4. The information charged that appellant published
advertisements which listed areas of practice in language other than that specified in the Rule and which listed the courts in which
appellant was admitted to practice although this information was not included among the 10 categories of information authorized by the
Rule. In addition, the information charged that appellant had mailed announcement cards to persons other than those permitted by the
Rule. Appellant claimed that each of the restrictions upon advertising was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
but the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 4 and issued a private reprimand.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Appellant violated Rule 4 Regulating advertising by lawyers of the Advisory Committee of Missouri Bar?

HELD:

None of the restrictions in question upon appellant's First Amendment rights can be sustained in the circumstances of this case. The
listing published by appellant -- e.g., "real estate" instead of "property law" as specified by Rule 4, and "contracts" and "securities,"
which were not included in the Rule's listing -- has not been shown to be misleading, and appellee suggests no substantial interest
promoted by the restriction, the portion of Rule 4 specifying the areas of practice that may be listed is an invalid restriction upon speech
as applied to appellant's advertisements. Nor has appellee identified any substantial interest in prohibiting a lawyer from identifying the
jurisdictions in which he is licensed to practice. Such information is not misleading on its face. That appellant was licensed to practice
in both Illinois and Missouri is factual and highly relevant information, particularly in light of the geography of the region in which he
practices. While listing the relatively uninformative fact that he is a member of the United States Supreme Court Bar could be
misleading, there was no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court, there is nothing in the record to indicate it was
misleading, and the Rule does not specifically identify it as potentially misleading. With respect to the restriction on announcement
cards, while mailings may be more difficult to supervise, there is no indication in the record that an inability to supervise is the reason
the State restricts the potential audience of the cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only solution, and there is no
indication of a failed effort to proceed along a less restrictive path. The decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed.

F) SAMONTE v. ATTY. GATDULA A.M. No. P-99-1292 (1999)

FACTS:

This is an administrative case filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte against Atty. Rolando R. Gatdula, Branch Clerk of Court - RTC,
Branch 220, for an alleged grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with
his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. Atty. Gatdula denied the allegation that he is practicing law at the same time as an
employee of judiciary but he did not deny the fact that his name was included in the business card of the law firm in which his name
was included.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Gatdula is guilty of solicitation and advertisement of legal services, and the Canon 3.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the
professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b) (2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known
as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or
employee to, among others:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with official functions.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name
unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
G) DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE et al Adm Case No. 2131 (1985)

FACTS:

Atty. Adriano E. Dacanay filed a complaint to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers practicing law under the name of Baker
& Mackenzie, a law firm organized in Chicago, Illinois. Atty. Dacanay questioned the demand letter dated November 16, 1979 sent by
Atty. Vicente Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & Mackenzie, asking Rosie Clurman to transfer shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel.

The respondents admitted that Baker & Mackenzie is professional partnership organized in 1949, in Chicago, Illinois, and aside from
being members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mackenzie.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents can practice law in the Philippines under the name of Baker & Mackenzie.

HELD:

The court held that being an alien firm, Baker & Mackenzie cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Here, the respondents did not deny that Baker & Mackenzie is an alien firm. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’ use
of the firm name Baker & Mackenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could “render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.” This is unethical
because Baker & Mackenzie is not authorized to practice law in the Philippines.

H) The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao Bayot A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

FACTS:

Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the Sunday Tribune, in direct violation of the provision
of Section 25, Rule 127 which imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice

HELD:

Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law is a profession and not a trade. A member of
the bar degrades himself or herself in adopting the practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her services like a merchant
advertising ware.

However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to refrain from repeating the same misconduct, the
Court exercised leniency. He was merely reprimanded for his violation and he was reminded that the most effective advertisement
possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity as well as fidelity to trust.

I) IN RE TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 (1929)

FACTS:

Luis B. Tagorda is a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial Board of Isabela. He made use of a card that was in Spanish
and Ilocano which advertised his services as an attorney and notary public. The card also advertised his services in acquiring
homesteads and affidavits. Also presented in the case was a letter Tagorda made addressed to a lieutenant in his home barrio asking the
latter to inform his friends, relatives and the public in general that despite his election to the board he would still be offering his services
as lawyer and notary public. In the letter he also mentions his rates for aid in land registration (3 pesos per registration).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tagorda violated law in advertising his services as a lawyer and notary public.

RULING:

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment. It is a violation of the (then) Canons of Professional Ethics.
But due to the fact that Tagorda was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, his youth and inexperience at the bar and his promise not to
 commit a similar mistake in the future, only a modest suspension is deemed by the court as punishment. Tagorda is suspended for a
period of 1 month.

J) ULEP VS. THE LEGAL CLINIC 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

This is a petition to order the respondent THE LEGAL CLINIC to cease and desist from issuing advertisements and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.

The advertisements complained contains Secret Marriage, Guam Divorce, Annulment of Marriage, Immigration Problems, Adoption.

Petitioner contends that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.

To counter the petition, respondents admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed citing the case of Bates vs. State of Bar Arizona decided by the US Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court required several bar associations to submit their respective positions papers on the controversy.

ISSUE:

Whether the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law.

Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

HELD:

The services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is
in good moral character. The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Issue of validity of services/advertisements

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.

Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics
of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the the practice of law is a
profession.

It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. Lawyer lowers the standards of the profession.

The courts also reiterated that the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.

K) US v. NEY & BOSQUE 8 PHIL 146 (1907)

 FACTS:

In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine
Islands, upon the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified
for admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was entered accordingly.

In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a
circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands
and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law
Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque,jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney, abogado americano."

Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occurring through an
inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but
with the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado."

On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so signed with the
names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-
General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.

The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law.

Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not
permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a
signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too
obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the
fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the
bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names
appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing
by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. (In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however,
mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendants should be punished for contempt. Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as
follows:

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court
or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions.

HELD:

Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court.
On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior.
We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the
improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a
violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently
filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the bar.

The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this
court within ten days, with the costs de oficio.

L) GEFFEN v. MOSS Cal App 3d 215 125 Cal Rptr 678 (1975)

FACTS:

Ralph J. Geffen was appointed as a United States magistrate precluding him from continuing the private practice of law. He entered
into a written agreement with attorney Moss whereby Geffen agreed to sell and Moss to buy the physical assets, files and work in
process law practice. The agreement between plaintiff and defendant executed December 1, 1970, provided for the sale of all physical
assets of the Law Offices of Plaintiff Attorney, which consisted generally of a Library, Index of former and present clients, office
equipment, and a three-year lease which was subsequently assigned to defendant and which provided a substantial benefit by way of
rental less than prevailing rates in the community, and the custody of all files of completed and pending business were transferred to
defendant. Both plaintiff and defendant considered the expectation of future business from present and former clients as a principal
motivating factor in this sale transaction.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the attempted sale of future patronage by existing and former clients of the office constituted a sale of the good will of
the law practice.

HELD:

Each party considered the expectation of future business from present clients and former clients as a principal motivating factor in this
transaction. This is evidenced by paragraph 7 of the contract referring to plaintiff intention to exert his influence for the continued
welfare of the practice and to encourage present and former clients to utilize the legal services of the office in the future. Notably, the
two able experienced attorneys drew the agreement to sell only insofar as this could be accomplished within the limits and confines of
the canons of ethics they themselves acknowledge some applicable limitation on the scope of the sale. We agree that, insofar as the
parties purport to sell the physical assets and to assign the leasehold and dispose of pending office matters, the agreement does not
violate public policy as expressed in the canons of legal ethics. However, it appears obvious to us that both parties, recognizing a
limitation against the sale of good will, nevertheless attempted to avoid a proscription against such by deliberately failing to mention
good will as such in the agreement. The attempted sale of the expectation of future patronage by former and current clients of a law
office coupled with an agreement to encourage said clients to continue to patronize the purchaser of the physical assets of the office,
under the facts of this case, may well be said to constitute an attempt to buy and sell the good will of a law practice as a going business,
contrary to public policy, and that the portion of the agreement purporting to so do is invalid and unenforceable. Even though such is
not deemed contrary to public policy, the following language in Lyon v. Lyon, renders an attempted sale of good will of a law practice
suspect: The nature of a professional partnership for the practice of law, the reputation of which depends on the skill, training and
experience of each individual member, and the personal and confidential relationship existing between each such member and the
client, places such a partnership in a class apart from other business and professional partnerships. The legal profession stands in a
peculiar relation to the public and the relationship existing between the members of the profession and those who seek its services
cannot be likened to the relationship of a merchant to his customer. Thus, our research has brought to light no case in this jurisdiction in
which an allowance was made to a partner for goodwill upon the dissolution of a partnership created for the practice of law.

M) IN RE KRASNER 204 N E 2d 10 (1965)

FACTS

This proceeding was an extension of an indictment for a man named David E. Vogele who was charged with evasion of income tax. He
pleaded guilty, and at his hearing he admitted that he was a professional "ambulance chaser" and that the source of his unreported
income had been payments from some twenty lawyers, of whom respondent David P. Krasner was one. The trial judge brought the
matter to the attention of the Chicago Bar Association and as a consequence an inquiry was made and a complaint filed against Krasner.

During 1957-1959, by Krasner's admission, Vogele referred some 70 to 75 cases, and it was likewise conceded that Vogele had been
paid "gratuities" in excess of $20,000 during those years. Krasner testified that the pattern for each transaction was the same as the first,
that Vogele would telephone and claim to have referred a certain client, and that he took no steps to verify whether the client had in fact
been referred by Vogele, but took the latter's word for it and paid him a gratuity. Krasner considered that all payments made to Vogele
and others who had referred business to him, were voluntary gratuities, or gifts, and expressly denied that they were investigational fees
or commissions paid pursuant to agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Krasner must be suspended due to ambulance chasing even though the proofs constitute only of a testimony.

HELD:

Yes. The Court find the proof satisfactory and supports the changes and findings against respondent, and are likewise of the opinion
that the Canons of Ethics have been violated and that the Canons of Ethics have been adopted by the bar associations are not binding
obligations, nor enforceable by the courts as such, they constitute a safe guide for professional conduct and an attorney may be
disciplined for not observing them. And while neither their solicitation of law business nor the division of fees here involved imports
venality, fraudulent practices or moral turpitude, they are nevertheless practices which have long been condemned as blight upon the
legal profession.

The Commission remarked that even if respondent's payments to Vogele and others were considered to be "gratuities" in the true sense
of the word, such conduct is highly unprofessional and fraught with possibilities of evil, inasmuch as such payments could serve as an
inducement to the recipients to seek out or stir up litigation in the hope of obtaining further gratuities.

Solicitation or ambulance chasing, so-called, either directly or indirectly through the services of runners or others, is conduct which is
reprehensible and inimical to the traditions and best interests of the legal profession. Not only does it provoke derision and disrespect in
the eyes of the public, but it is an overreaching of the other members of the profession who adhere to the standards fixed by canons of
ethics and the dictates of good conscience.

Krasner was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.