Republic of the Philippines CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

SUPREME COURT ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

Manila CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,
sabing ganoon —
FIRST DIVISION
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa
review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents. kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko

up to 10:00 p.m.
KAPUNAN, J.:
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
na kita).
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy."1 CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no
(sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am. CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

1
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana — INFORMATION

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako. Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako. That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did
ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
doon. person.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union. Contrary to law.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na
hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey
lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa
no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa
'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent
filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the
said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989,
the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that
1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and
that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19,
1989.

2
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its
assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and
void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the
ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of
a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance
or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information,
otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A.
4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under
this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
3
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element
of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor,
the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but
would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a
recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some
in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the
parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording,
would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the
purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your
Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution
of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special
proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape
recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then
using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose;
Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the
parties should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there
is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people
whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons,
we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used
against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite
of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest,
well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a
recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him
knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that
what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno:Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of
the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he
would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but
the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated
by the bill. It is the communication between one person and another
person — not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together
with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
4
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT
before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication"
in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as
in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires
of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution
must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals
and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with
the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must
be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on
a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing
to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur. Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
5
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA
SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close
association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May
1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also
employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support
was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very
close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that
company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under
the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the
latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by
the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that
Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial
and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager
of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often
recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had
taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to
defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered
only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar.1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that
Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in
transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed
that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between
Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of
the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to
inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company
placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for
one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30)
days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an
explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension,
which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation
and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner
notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was
considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove
these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985,
ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her
former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other
benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages
of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission
in the questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the
aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private
respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and
subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin
Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations
manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar
6
was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders
airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared
with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was
the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending
Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the
charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary
measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee.5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated
Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at
all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's
memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to
present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to
the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension
without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive
suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from employment
was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to
"make whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, under
settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be
deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should
have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular
employments, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause as
provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by
existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages." (Emphasis supplied)
7
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the
present Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in
guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups
of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several
articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it
was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice
and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the
Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources
Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's
Organizations and Human Rights.9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
7
 to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law.10(Emphasis
supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution
under the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that
provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall ensure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the
rights of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no
gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present
Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the
sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore
accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers
and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., who substantially contributed to the present formulation of the
protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be
incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article
on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the
special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the
necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in
national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor
provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress
that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except
for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater
importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence
labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent
policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms,
where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved
by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose
duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has
failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find,
application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the
legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any
possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which
watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full
protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an
authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private
respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of
reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore
the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the
dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state,
conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed"15 and in
the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce
make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed
employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for
denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view
of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the
realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's
interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it
will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the
company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when
supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score
unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
8
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment
of backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the
first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous:
"An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the
principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived
from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by,
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the
provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there
may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited
provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned
occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his
employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the
efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the
above principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for
Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of
the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a
position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in
commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a
non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to
the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible
simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the
parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right
could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer
had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust
and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained
relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for
an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest
situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company
policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any
company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when
private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership
papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier
of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable
position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such
a circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a
systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved
around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a
continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company
assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar
on loss of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of
confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must
rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An
employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
9
suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not
pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis
of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal

would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered
principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions
as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar,
Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable
activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting
from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after
Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since
Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings,
the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence
obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of
Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of
his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried
out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal
grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her
dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National

Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to
her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and

Nocon, JJ., concur.

10
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability
under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides
compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama,
were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated
murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the
latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was
apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner.
Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and
ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal
proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused
was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter
of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter
barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the
appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more,
petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show
conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No.
7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to
"any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."1 The claim
was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but
the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at
the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between
him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that
the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding
that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's
ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11,
1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . .
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was
wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not
commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust
imprisonment." In the instant case, however,
Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim
since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows
that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but
upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45
nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of
the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the
importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the
petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able
to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be
found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the
trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a)
is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the
claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently
acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim
because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified.
Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in
11
criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the
accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for
requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can
recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a
reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of
construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be
given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the
qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The
following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any
person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted
[and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the
accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was
"unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and
his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set
aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of
the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he
may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the
evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required
for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action
for damages.2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of
statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the
offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and
ordered deported.3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation
for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly
inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow
petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation
under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been
intended as evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the
burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not
synonymous with guilt,"4so is the presumption of innocence not a proof
thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be
innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another
thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been
"unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not
ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure
of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of
unlawful conduct do not exist.5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do
with the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An
accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the
crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having
been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to
an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while
erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct
to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for
compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code.
What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it
is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence,
and the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly
unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence
or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard,
that although he has acted without malice, he failed to
observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence,
prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in
the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
12
 injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the
legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that
is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a
very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious
violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a
result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to
an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused,
in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned.
It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution
of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all
probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not
malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required
quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not
necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the
prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on
"probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on
such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an
erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that
petitioner's conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the
product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the
contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-
accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of
Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a
grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his
coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their
way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because
there was no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said
the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant
Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both
fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything
at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having
committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to
commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It
seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to
conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit
murder and two frustrated murders on that night of
June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to
commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on
two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the
commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as
the record shows — nothing but part of the dark
shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may
be shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why was
petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together?
And what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner
and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be
passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant
in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted
and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on
appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent
Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave
abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
13
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr.,
father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N.
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts
become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Ligle do we realize that
statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our
way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may
already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order
be issued restraining the respondents from applying
and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of
petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution,
hence void; because its provision that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever
i.) has taken away the right of
petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott
garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners' favor in violation
of substantive due process guaranteed
by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency
depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for
criminals like the herein respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals
could escape civil liability for their
wrongful acts by merely converting their
money to a foreign currency and
depositing it in a foreign currency
deposit account with an authorized
bank.
The antecedent facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist,
coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go
with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to
rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on
February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and
detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No.
021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book
No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking
Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear)
used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya
filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal
Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4)
counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional
14
Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989,
the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the
latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure
Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the
criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order
dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners,
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners
gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the
amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued
by the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of
Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March
13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation
invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati
Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation
saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank
deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment
properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed
the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the
Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated
March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the
Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of
CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has
been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory
the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
May 26, 1989
Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:
This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989
regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No.
960 (1983).
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does
not admit of any exception, nor has the same been
repealed nor amended.
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts
within the country's banking system which would help
in the development of the economy. There is no
intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as
was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be
harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law.
Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director1
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion
for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-
3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott."
Summons with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his
answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7,
1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter:
15
 1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N.
Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of
P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of
them;
3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of
P100,000.00; and
4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to
25% of the total amount of damages herein awarded;
5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
6. Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the
award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as
follows:
The defendant in this case was originally detained in
the municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape
therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the
Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge,
Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged
with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention
(Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon
motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was
served upon defendant by publication in the Manila
Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested
by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times,
Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant,
however, failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from
the last publication; hence, upon motion of the
plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in
default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their
evidence ex parte.
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as
witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father,
Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar
and a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following
testimony:
Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's
Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to
Arellano University for her second year.
In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the
Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna
Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench
in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her.
She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already
left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15,
1989, pp. 2 to 5)
The American asked her name and introduced himself
as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to
her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that
he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister
allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and
who was with him in his house along Kalayaan
Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)
The American asked Karen what was her favorite
subject and she told him it's Pilipino. He then invited
her to go with him to his house where she could teach
Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to
persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo,
turning right to reach the defendant's house along
Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
When they reached the apartment house, Karen
noticed that defendant's alleged niece was not outside
16
the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was
inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece
inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece
was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p.
7)
Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked
the door. Karen became nervous because his niece
was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord
and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed
her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her.
He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with
it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the
bed which was just near the door. He tied her feet and
hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front
of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt
severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could
come out because there were tapes on her mouth.
When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood
and Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the
finger. (Id., p. 8)
He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to
his sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he
forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do
so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to
breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe
pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert
his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen
could not recall how long the defendant was in that
position. (Id. pp. 8-9)
After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to
wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and he
untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of
the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in
the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a
shower more blood came out from her. In the
meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it
was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed
by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got
tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m.
Karen had no way of determining the exact time
because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did
not care to give her food before she went to sleep.
Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following
morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a
breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m.
defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding.
For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was
raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m.
In the evening, they had rice for dinner which
defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who
cooked the rice that is why it looks like "lugaw". For the
third time, Karen was raped again during the night.
During those three times defendant succeeded in
inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether
the organ was inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon.
The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a
tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help
for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the
windows and doors were closed. And even if she
shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so
afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be
able to call the police, it was still possible that as she
was still inside the house, defendant might kill her.
Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday,
ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he
slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three
times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after a
breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again
in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there
was a window because everything was covered by a
carpet, until defendant opened the window for around
fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found
that the window was covered by styrofoam and
plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a
17
hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet
back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for
help, although defendant left but kept the door closed.
She went to the bathroom and saw a small window
covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small
hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help
through the hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so
akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap
ako!" Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably
a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was
"istorbo". Karen pleaded for help and the woman told
her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell
asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and
she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She
waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again
got some food but he always kept the door locked. As
usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On
that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three
times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second
at about 8:30 — 9:00, and the third was after lunch at
12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time
he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he
caught her shouting for help but he did not understand
what she was shouting about. After she was raped the
third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp.
16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted
for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she
heard many voices. The voices were asking for her
name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion.
After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying
they will just call the police. They were also telling her
to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to
the room but she did not change her clothes being
afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and
the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill
her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the
American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p.
16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door.
He asked her if she had asked for help because there
were many policemen outside and she denied it. He
told her to change her clothes, and she did change to
the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed
her to tell the police that she left home and willingly;
then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She
could hear people conversing but she could not
understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
When she heard the voices of many people who were
conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the
door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going
upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a
policeman. The policeman asked her name and the
reason why she was there. She told him she was
kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in
uniform and the defendant was talking to them.
"Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen added. "The
policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id.,
p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her
neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a
certain person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors
whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita.
They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was
investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her
father arrived, followed by her mother together with
some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the
second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions
by the investigator. The written statement she gave to
the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they
proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation
together with the investigator and her parents. At the
NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her
private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning
of the following day when they reached the NBI. (TSN,
Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal
officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
18
 She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay
City at the time of the incident but she subsequently
transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University,
situated along Taft Avenue, because she was
ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the
school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad
Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the
Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied
admission after she told the school the true reason for
her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they
might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989,
p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does
not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she
is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-
minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house.
(TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be
restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father prays for
P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this
shocking experience which probably, she would always
recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if
she could ever recover from this experience. (TSN,
Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said
notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three
consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the
trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's
dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank
invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil
down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that
original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower
court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known
as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign
transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of
petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y
Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners'
favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue
favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the
herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could
escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their
money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency
deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board,
in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded
its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the
plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by
the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs
substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the
writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as
granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges
that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960
did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is
copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D.
1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption
from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the
law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the
substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it
was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is
enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies
to all members of a class.
19
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other
order or process of any court, is to assure the development and
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the
Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to
encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to
properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines,
thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country;
that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency
deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision
is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that
the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the
society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take
some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so
doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of
restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest.
Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted
from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No.
6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among
others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving
reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that
respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings
experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands
of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of
Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has
undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426
and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the
harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative
but to follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the
court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and
treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor
and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief.2 However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one
for mandamus.3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans
are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece
the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went
with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said
American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was
detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to
escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the
child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for
damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount
could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she
had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and
knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could
not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable
law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable
judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully
deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court
believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking and
traumatic experience she had undergone which could
haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of
which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she
had been actually humiliated once when she was
refused admission at the Abad Santos High School,
Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from
another school, simply because the school authorities
of the said High School learned about what happened
to her and allegedly feared that they might be
implicated in the case.
xxx xxx xxx
20
 The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective
damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner
defendant had committed the acts of rape during a
period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim,
the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her
being so naive and credulous to believe easily that
defendant, an American national, could not have such
a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such
a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that
unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of
an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a
snake, . . . .4
If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be
difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit
could be more important than his child's rights to said award of
damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien
who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where
he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a
time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why
said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show
that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for
being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned
law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as
the case before us.
It has thus been said that —
But I also know,5 that laws and institutions must go
hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as
new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed
and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and
keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy,
as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of
their barbarous ancestors.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
The present petition has far-reaching implications on
the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong
committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law
and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does
not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by
the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the
question whether the protection against attachment,
garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign
currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No.
960 applies when the deposit does not come from a
lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist
who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank
for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the
protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum
by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and
Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on
the strength of the following provision of Central Bank
Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment.
— Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
21
 Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The
Monetary Board of the Central Bank
shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act
which shall take effect after the
publication of such rules and
regulations in the Official Gazette and
in a newspaper of national circulation
for at least once a week for three
consecutive weeks. In case the Central
Bank promulgates new rules and
regulations decreasing the rights of
depositors, the rules and regulations at
the time the deposit was made shall
govern.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8
of Republic Act NO. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246,
thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency
Deposits. — All foreign currency
deposits authorized under this Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, as well as foreign currency
deposits authorized under Presidential
Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared
as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon
the written permission of the depositor,
in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office
whether judicial or administrative or
legislative or any other entity whether
public or private: Provided, however,
that said foreign currency deposits shall
be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection
against attachment, garnishment and other court
process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its
whereases, viz.:
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine
banking institutions and branches of
foreign banks are authorized to accept
deposits in foreign currency;
WHEREAS, under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1034
authorizing the establishment of an
offshore banking system in the
Philippines, offshore banking units are
also authorized to receive foreign
currency deposits in certain cases;
WHEREAS, in order to assure the
development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit System and
the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines, certain incentives were
provided for under the two Systems
such as confidentiality of deposits
subject to certain exceptions and tax
exemptions on the interest income of
depositors who are nonresidents and
are not engaged in trade or business in
the Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the
protective cloak of confidentiality over
such foreign currency deposits,
exempting such deposits from tax, and
guaranteeing the vested rights of
depositors would better encourage the
22
 inflow of foreign currency deposits into
the banking institutions authorized to
accept such deposits in the Philippines
thereby placing such institutions more
in a position to properly channel the
same to loans and investments in the
Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the
country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection
accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to assure the
development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in
the Philippines" (3rd Whereas).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD
No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as
follows:
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the
establishment of an offshore banking
system, such as political stability, a
growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others,
exist in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of
developing countries to have as wide
access as possible to the sources of
capital funds for economic
development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking
system based in the Philippines will be
advantageous and beneficial to the
country by increasing our links with
foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of
desired investments into the
Philippines, creating employment
opportunities and expertise in
international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location,
physical and human resources, and
other positive factors provide the
Philippines with the clear potential to
develop as another financial center in
Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit
system was created by PD. No. 1035. Its purposes are
as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an
offshore banking system in the
Philippines has been authorized under
a separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local
commercial banks, as depository bank
under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
(RA No. 6426), have the resources and
managerial competence to more
actively engage in foreign exchange
transactions and participate in the grant
of foreign currency loans to resident
corporations and firms;
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the
foreign currency lending authority of the
said depository banks under RA 6426
and apply to their transactions the
same taxes as would be applicable to
transaction of the proposed offshore
banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the
Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency
Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of
PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is
23
 these deposits that are induced by the two laws and Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar
given protection and incentives by them. against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower
court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
incentives and protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we
therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for have served the ends of justice.
a short time.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426
a transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to
his temporary stay in the Philippines. COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214,
"Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV,
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of
thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy
Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of the judgment.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246
against attachment, garnishment or other court SO ORDERED.
processes.6
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any Padilla, J., took no part.
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved
by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when
the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental
solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
(Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central

Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.

24
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO
SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE
RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM
GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and
setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the
petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional
Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William
Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent
Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de
Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was
inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte
on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the
Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in
favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is
a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the
petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104
with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently
released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount
of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again
mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National
Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of
P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine
National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a
public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent,
William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to
him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately,
on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the
private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of
possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial
court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order
for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private
respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however,
attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the
possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate
and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to
repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15,
1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The
petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents'
motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property.
Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial
court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession
prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to
the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984
granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984,
denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
25
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court
gave due course to the petition; required the parties to submit
simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and
restrained the trial court and the private respondent from executing,
implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of
possession until further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision
promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner,
Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was
issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute
sale on February 28, 1970 of the property covered by
said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the
property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 as amended could have already started.
Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been
dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from
parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the
"conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on
the issue raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate
court went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to
repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already
prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the
property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their
formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly
expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because on
May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the
same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the
courts below, their right to repurchase within five years under Section
119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their
contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of
Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate
court's decision, states that the sale of the contested property by the
patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal
heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the petitioners) no
longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section
119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or
not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to
the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to
repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to
repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from
the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes
of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-
patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention
of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court
that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of
repurchasers because they acquired the property not through
inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses
are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the
contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being
a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must
be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of
"legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
26
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent
and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land
that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in
clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a
daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there
is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to
repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the
law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other
issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to
repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the
respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present
controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from
those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de
retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question
raised there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section
119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is
with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land
has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the
homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable
why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de
retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession
over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the
vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an
absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on
the other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the
case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were
obtained either through homestead or free patent. These properties
were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of
the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed.
In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to.
repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale
under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of
redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby
formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise.
Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the
mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent
on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July
12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on
November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984
were both made within the prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the
private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public
auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to
November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and
taxes on the property that the private respondent might have paid after
purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as
that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the
Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October
12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey
the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of
reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him
by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of
assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per
month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
27
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy,
Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing
for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive
officials and employees of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under
this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however,
denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service
Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration
dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the
Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not
conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The
law merely requires that a government employee
whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual,
should have two consecutive years of government
service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more
than meet the requirement. Persons who are not
entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As
to the budget needed, the law provides that the
Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a
certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to
government corporations. Moreover, personnel of
these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular
benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and
the like. There is no reason why we should not be
entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be
granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-
CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an
applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on
the date of separation/retirement but further requires
said applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status as of
December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A.
6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31,
1988, the date of your separation from the service, is
co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual
in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original
decision.
28
 xxx xxx xxx3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a
special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the
benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of
the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires
an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary
or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions
of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular
Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No.
6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under
R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by
agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with a
definite expected output: i.e.
membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including
those of the Philippine Constabulary
and Integrated National Police (PC-
INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees
who retire or elect to be separated from
the service for optional retirement with
gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or
with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No.
1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired
voluntarily prior to the enactment of this
law and have received the
corresponding benefits of that
retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with
pending cases punishable by
mandatory separation from the service
under existing civil service laws, rules
and regulations; provided that if such
officials and employees apply in writing
within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein
authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and
their application accepted and
approved by the head of office
concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does
not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time
employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held
a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a
position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . .
. If casuals and emergency employees were given the
benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this
petitioner who was holding a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15
years of faithful, continuous service in the government
should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic)
purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683,
because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per
appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head
office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed
Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan,
Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed
as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position
became functus officio.
29
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her
position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-
career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived,
temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel
can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial
assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS
law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent,
security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration
of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant
separation or retirement benefits but reorganization 5to streamline
government functions. The application of the law must be made
consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the
expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will
not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP
which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature
of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early
retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to
reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the
WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government,
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of
the parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of
employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No.
492, as amended) deems an employment regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October
1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No.
2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292
promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep.
Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular
employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed
in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career
service is classified as follows:
1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements
of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary
appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may
be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes
available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which
prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or
highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain
their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
30
 (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career
Executive Service, who are appointed by the President,
such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department
of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-
career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled,
or unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual
tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service;
and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited
to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential
staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who
hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards
with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in
the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing
agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year and performs
or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual — where and when employment is not
permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and
brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel
v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2
December 1974 designated as a laborer
holding emergency status with the NIA — Upper
Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24
March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research
aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1
September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with
the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January
1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS
(Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems)
DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P.
(Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project)
retaining the status of temporary employee. While with
this project, her designation was changed to personnel
assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982,
the status became permanent until the completion of
the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment
paper 12attached to the OSG's comment lists her status
as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted
projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered
employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or
31
cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990,
27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966
dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is
charged with the function of determining creditable
services for retiring officers and employees of the
national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order
No. 966 provides that all previous services by an
officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment to a position in the Civil Service are
considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a)
thereof states that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable
services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid
provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency
or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that
services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual
status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment
therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement
purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis
provided)
1. These services are supported by
approved appointments, official records
and/or other competent evidence.
Parties/agencies concerned shall
submit the necessary proof of said
services;
2. Said services are on full time basis
and rendered prior to June 22, 1984,
the effectivity date of Executive Order
No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years
period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service
requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency,
seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are
tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The
12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's
employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn
was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-
terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series
of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous
employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person
whose entrance in the service is characterized by
confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which
is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further
classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project —
When the appointment is co-existent
with the duration of a particular project
for which purpose employment was
made or subject to the availability of
funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing
authority — when appointment is co-
existent with the tenure of the
appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent —
when appointment is co-existent with
32
 the appointee, in that after the
resignation, separation or termination of
the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period,
e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3
years" — the appointment is for a
specific period and upon expiration
thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two
classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous
is the position, and not the appointee-employee.
Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is
guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security
of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why
the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but
the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly
extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-
INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute
had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet
adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where,
workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from
one project to another were considered non-project-regular and
permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive
projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the
existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot
be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We
ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar
a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
the classification applies not only to present conditions
but also to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would
violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents'
submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by
said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should
not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary
implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the
details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What
is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-
embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for
the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
33
 privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power,
right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus
sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early
Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's
interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are
extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three
(3) years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on
early retirement and voluntary separation. It is
irrespective of the actual status or nature of the
appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under
this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No.
33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law).
Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed
overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill,
on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the
national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under
this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of
two (2) consecutive years government service as of the
date of separation. The term "contractual employees"
as used in this Act does not include experts and
consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to
perform specific activities or services with definite
expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is
to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed
abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the
inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such
objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation
of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is
considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and
contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only
have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This,
incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project
employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient,
whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here,
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes
glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are
entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the
Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by
granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual)
without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no
abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would
merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain,
and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have
rendered years of continuous service should be included in the
coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they
comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this
connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March
1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to
qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7)
years of government service which need not be continuous, in the
career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual,
emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military
and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service
Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the
inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive
the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all
social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-
being of public servants"22 After all, co-terminous personnel, are also
34
obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the
respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early
retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to
the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after expiration
of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed
the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the
interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all
she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition

of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act
No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-

Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.

35
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-
appellants, vs. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents-Appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half
percent (%) realty tax imposed by the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act
No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the
annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1- %).
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund
Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January
1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per
centum on the assessed value of real property in addition
to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under
existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centrum.
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila
the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three percent. So, by
means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor
on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third
quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half
percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half
percent (1/2%), or in short a total of three percent (3%)
realty tax (1-% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila;
1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and % per this Ordinance)
on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of
P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent realty tax for
the third quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries
located in Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said
amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent
tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter
nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance
void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to
Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer
appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the
legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981
averred that the said tax ordinance is still in force; that
Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10,
1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real
properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that
two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special
Education Fund Law gives a total of three percent realty
tax on commercial properties.
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its
manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this
time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax
and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of
P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real properties.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2)
of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No.
464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a
36
city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not
less than one half of one percent but not more than two
percent of the assessed value of real property".
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax
on real property for the Special Education Fund in addition
to the basic two percent realty tax.
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half
percent realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax
Code. What is in controversy is the legality of the
additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year
period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the second
quarter of 1974.
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory
construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that
the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by
the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund
Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is
plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch
Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd
404).
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty
tax at one and a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968
Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent
as the maximum real property tax of which one percent
would accrue to the Special Education Fund.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half
percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations.
Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax
that would accrue to a city or municipality.
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code
specifically fixes the real property tax at two
percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to
impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also
the avowed intention of the questioned ordinance.
In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the
view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education
Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of
the additional one percent realty tax would have the effect
of raising the total realty tax to more than three percent
and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose
an additional realty tax beyond the one percent fixed by
the said law.
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable
contention. But the fact remains that the city charter fixed
the realty tax at 1-% and the later law, the Special
Education Fund Law, provides for three percentas the
maximum realty tax of which one percent would be
earmarked for the education fund.
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized
the imposition of an additional one-half percent realty tax
since the contingency referred to by the complaining
taxpayer would not arise in the City of Manila.
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of
a municipal corporation to levy a tax should be expressly
granted and should not be merely inferred. But in this
case, the power to impose a realty tax is not controverted.
What is disputed is the amount thereof, whether one and
one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep.
Act No. 2264.)
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education
Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in
prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly
37
authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the
pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and

set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for
recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De

Castro, JJ., concur.

Justice Abad Santos is on leave.

Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second

Division.

38
G.R. No. 96663 August 10, 1999
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-ARBITER
NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY
EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-UOEF, respondents,
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 103300 August 10, 1999
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
HON. CELENIO N. DAING, in his capacity as Med-Arbiter Labor
Regional Office No. X, Cagayan de Oro City, CAGAYAN DE ORO
PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORS UNION (UOEF), respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari relating to three (3) cases filed with
the Med-Arbiter, to wit: MED ARB ROX Case No. R100-9101-RU-002
for Certification Election filed by Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union-UOEF
(Union), MED ARB Case No. R1000-9102-RU-008, Re: Petition to Set
Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke the Charter Affiliation of the Union, and
MED-ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012, for Cancellation of
Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in favor of the Union.
G. R. No. 96663
The facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Sometime in June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-
UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-
Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of
Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI).
On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit
statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de
Filipinas (federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions. Pepsi-
Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the
Philippines (PEUP).
On July 23, 1990, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the
Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-UOEF and docketed as Case No. 725-
90, on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers
and (b) a supervisors' union can not affiliate with a federation whose
members include the rank and file union of the same company.
On August 29, 1990, PEPSI presented a motion to re-open the case
since it was not furnished with a copy of the Petition for Certification
Election.
On September 4, 1990, PEPSI submitted its position paper to the BLR
in Case No. 725-90.
On September 21, 1990, PEPSI received summons to appear at the
pre-trial conference set on September 25, 1990 but which the hearing
officer rescheduled on October 21, 1990. 1âwphi1.nêt
On October 12, 1990, PEPSI filed a Notice of Appeal and
Memorandum of Appeal with the Secretary of Labor, questioning the
setting of the certification election on the said date and five (5) days
after. It also presented an urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend the
Certification Election, which motion was granted on October 18, 1990.
On November 12, 1990, the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and
Motion for Reconsideration. Even as the Petition to Cancel, Revoke
and Suspend Union Charter Certificate was pending before the BLR,
PEPSI found its way to this Court via the present petition for certiorari.
On February 6, 1991, the Court granted the prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
The pivot of inquiry here is: whether or not a supervisors' union can
affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file unions
are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code
(PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715, which provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. — Managerial
39
 employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
In its Comment dated March 19, 1991, the Federation argued that:
The pertinent portion of Article 245 of the Labor Code states
that. "Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank and file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organization of their own.
This provision of law does not prohibit a local union composed
of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation
which has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the Petition to Cancel, Revoke or Set Aside the Charter
Certificate of the private respondent is anchored on the alleged
ground that certain managerial employees are included as
members thereof. The grounds for the cancellation of the
registration certificate of a labor organization are provided in
Section 7 of Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, and the inclusion of managerial
employees is not one of the grounds. . . . (in this case, the
private respondent herein) remains to be a legitimate labor
organization.1
On April 8, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, sent in a Comment, alleging inter alia,
that:
. . . under Article 259 of the New Labor Code, only orders of
the Med-Arbiter can be appealed through the Secretary of
Labor and only on the ground that the rules and regulations for
the conduct of the certification election have been violated.
The Order of the Representation Officer is "interlocutory" and
not appealable. . . .
. . . until and unless there is a final order cancelling its
certificate of registration or charter certificate, a labor
organization remains to be a legitimate labor organization
entitled to exercised all the rights and duties accorded to it by
the Labor Code including the right to be certified as a
bargaining representative. . . .
. . . Public respondent cannot be deemed to have committed
grave abuse of discretion with respect to an issue that was
never presented before it for resolution. . . .
Art. 245 of the New Labor Code does not preclude the
supervisor's union and the rank-and-file union from
being affiliated with the same federation.
xxx xxx xxx
A federation of local union is not the labor organization referred
to in Article 245 but only becomes entitled to all the rights
enjoyed by the labor organization (at the company level) when
it has complied with the registration requirements found in
Articles 234 and 237. Hence, what is prohibited by Article 245
is membership of supervisory employees in a labor union (at
the company level) of the rank and file. . . .
. . . In other words, the affiliation of the supervisory employee's
union with the same federation with which the rank and file
employees union is affiliated did not make the supervisory
employees members of the rank and file employee's union and
vice versa.2 . . .
PEPSI, in its Reply dated May 7, 1991, asserted:
It is our humble contention that a final determination of the
Petition to Set-Aside, Cancel, Revoke Charter Union Affiliation
should first be disposed of before granting the Petition for the
Conduct of Certification Election. To allow the conduct of the
certification election to proceed would make any decision
arrived at by the Bureau of Labor Relations useless inasmuch
as the same would necessarily be rendered moot and
academic.3
40
On June 7, 1991, petitioner again filed a Supplemental Reply (TUPAS) vs. Trajano No. L-61153, January 17, 1983, 120
stressing: SCRA 64].

It is likewise stressed that officials of both the PCLU and PEUP xxx xxx xxx
are top ranking officers of UOEF, the federation of supervisors'
union, to wit: In Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. CIR No. L-35120, January
31, 1984, 127 SCRA 268, the Supreme Court (then dealing
with the interpretation of Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act,
POSITION IN
POSITION IN RANK AND FILE from which Section 245 of the Labor Code was derived)
FEDERATION UNION
grappled with the issue in the case at bar. It held that,
1. Rogelio de
PCLU-President General Vice President
la Cruz There is nothing in the provisions of the Industrial
Peace Act which provides that a duly registered local
2. Felix Gatela PEUP-President General Treasurer union affiliating with a national union or federation
loses its legal personality, or its independence.
3. Carlito PCLU Board Educational Research
Epino Member Director
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
The respondent supervisory union could do indirectly what it
could not do directly as the simple expedient of affiliating with
UOEF would negate the manifest intent and letter of the law
that supervisory employees can only "join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own" and cannot "be
eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank and
file employees."4
On August 6, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment filed a
Rejoinder, claiming thus:
. . . an employer has no legal standing to question the validity
of a certification election.
. . . For this reason, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that, as a rule, a certification election is the sole and exclusive
concern of the employees and that the employer is definitely
an intruder or a mere bystander (Consolidated Farms vs.
Noriel, L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals
Corporation vs. Ople, L-43861, September 4, 1981, 107 SCRA
211; Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
However, there is absolutely nothing in the Labor Code that
prohibits a federation from representing or exercising influence
over its affiliates. On the contrary, this is precisely the reason
why federations are formed and are allowed by law to exist.5
On November 8, 1991, the Union also filed a Rejoinder.
On December 9, 1991, the Court resolved to DISMISS the case for
"failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion."
In a Resolution dated March 2, 1992, the Second Division of the Court
resolved to grant the motion for reconsideration interposed on January
28, 1992.
G. R. No. 103300
What are assailed in this case is Med-Arbiter Order dated May 23,
1991 and the Decision and Order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, dated October 4, 1991 and December 12, 1991,
respectively.
The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiter Order under attack, reads:

41
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, an order is hereby 4. Gilberto Emano,
issued: Route Manager
Jr.

1. Dismissing MED ARB ROX CASE NO. R1000-919104-RU- 5. Jaime Huliganga Chief Checker
012 and R1000-9102-RU-008 for lack of merit; and
6. Elias Edgama, Sr. Accounting Manager
2. Ordering the conduct of a Certification Election to be 7. Romanico Ramos Route Manager
participated by and among the supervisory workers of the
respondent company, Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. at 8. Raul Yacapin Route Manager
its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City, including all the
satellite warehouse within the territorial coverage and control of 9. Jovenal Albaque Route Manager
the Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Plant. The choices are as
10. Fulvio Narciso Route Manager
follows:
11. Apolinario
1. Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Supervisors Union Route Manager
Opiniano
(U.O.E.P.)
12. Alfredo Panas Route Manager
2. No union.
13. Simplicio Nelie Route Manager
The parties are directed to attend a pre-election conference on 14. Arthur Rodriguez Route Manager
June 10, 1991, 2:30 p.m. at the Regional Office to determine
the qualification of the voters and to thresh out the mechanics Warehouse Operations
15. Marco Ilano
of the election. Respondent/employer is directed to submit five Manager and
(5) copies of the names of the rank and file workers taken from
16. Deodoro Ramos Maintenance Manager
the payroll on October 1-31, 1991; alphabetically arranged (sic)
indicating their names and positions and dates of employment
and to bring the aforementioned payroll during the pre-election On June 6, 1991, PEPSI appealed the said Order to the Secretary of
conference for verification purposes.6 . . . Labor and Employment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
docketed as Case No. OS-A-232-91.
The supervisory employees of the Union are:
On October 4, 1991, the Secretary modified the appealed decision,
ruling thus:
POSITION
1. Felipe WHEREFORE, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 23 May
Route Manager 1991 is hereby modified to the effect that MED ARB ROX Case
Valdehueza
No. R1000-9104-RU-012 and R1000-9102-RU-008 are hereby
2. Gerberto referred to the Office of the Regional Director which has
C & C Manager
Vertudazo jurisdiction over these cases. The call for certification election
among the supervisory workers of the Pepsi-Cola Products
Sales Service Department Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City is
3. Paul Mendoza
Manager
hereby sustained.7

42
On October 19, 1991, PEPSI presented a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid Order but the same was denied on December 12, 1991.
Meanwhile, the BLR issued Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in
favor of the Union. Dissatisfied therewith, PEPSI brought the instant
petition for certiorari, contending that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS ARE NOT MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES;
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS PROHIBITED FROM
AFFILIATING ITSELF WITH A FEDERATION ALREADY
AFFILIATED WITH THE RANK AND FILE UNION;
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE OF (SIC)
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE
INSTITUTION OF A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
UNION REGISTRATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO A PETITION CERTIFICATION
ELECTION.8
The petitions must fail for want of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that on September 1, 1992, there
was a Resolution of the Union withdrawing from the Federation, to wit:
BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that this
UNION WITHDRAW, as it hereby WITHDRAWS its affiliation
from the Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas, and at the
same time, give our thanks to the said federation for its help
and guidance rendered to this Union in the past.9
The issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the supervisors union can
be affiliated with a Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly
under the supervision of the former, has thus become moot and
academic in view of the Union's withdrawal from the federation.
In a long line of cases (Narciso Nakpil, et. al., vs. Hon. Crisanto
Aragon, et. al., G.R. No. L-24087, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 85;
Toribio v. Bidin, et. al., G.R. No. L-37960, February 28, 1980, 96
SCRA 361; Gumaua v. Espino, G.R. No. L-36188 — 37586 February
29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402), the Court dismissed the petition for being
moot and academic. In the case of F. C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship
Co., March 31, 1915, the Court held:
It is unnecessary, however to indulge in academic discussion
of a moot question. . . .
. . . The action would have been dismissed at any time on a
showing of the facts as they were. The question left for the
court was a moot one. Its Resolution would have been useless.
Its judgment would have been impossible of execution . . . .
However, in the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., the court resolved the case, ruling that "even if a
case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle
is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of
the parties but of others similarly situated. . . .10
In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 121
[1992] decided by the Third Division with J. Gutierrez, Jr.,
as ponente and JJ. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and now Chief Justice
Davide, Jr., as members it was ratiocinated:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where
supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the
supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting
interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed
to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file
employees where that federation actively participates in union
activity in the company.
xxx xxx xxx
The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local
union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court
emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of
supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which
43
 include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of
the law is clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the
supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom
they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke
registration is a prejudicial question to the petition for certification
election, the following ruling in the case of Association of the Court of
Appeals Employees (ACAE) vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, in her
capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations et. Al., 203 ACRA 597,
598, [1991], is in point, to wit:
. . . It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceedings is
not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily
understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact
finding character." (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-
Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]. Thus,
the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to
grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the
petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained
in the position papers and other documents.
At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly
followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a
certification election is proper despite the pendency of the
petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the
respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the
respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal
personality to perform such act absent an order directing the
cancellation.
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join
the labor union of the rank and file, what was held in the case of
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) — Republic Planters
Bank Supervisors Chapter vs. Hon. R. D. Torres, et. al., G.R. No.
93468, December 29, 1994, applies to this case. Citing Bulletin
Publishing Corporation vs. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 628, 635, Golden
Farms vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 471, and Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confessor et al., G.R. No.
110854, February 14, 1995, the Court ruled:
. . . A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence
on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the
Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of
necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed, as
elucidated in several case; the latest of which is Chua v. Civil
Service Commission where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the
details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What
is thought, at the time of the enactment, to be an all
embracing legislation maybe inadequate to provide for
the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication . . ., Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may
be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis . . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into
consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of
managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing
Corporation v. Sanchez, thus ". . . if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view
of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become
company — dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the
collective bargaining process, managerial employees are
supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well
44
 protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the
same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of
confidential employees as included in the disqualification found
WHEREFORE, the petitions under consideration are DISMISSED but
subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment is MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and
Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees not eligible for
membership in a supervisors' union. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees

were written in the provision. If confidential employees could SO ORDERED.
unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves,
then they could be governed by their own motives rather than Melo, Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of Panganiban, J., in the result.
confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals
who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers. It is
not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they
might jeopardize that interest which they are duty bound to
protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden
Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja reiterated in Philips Industrial
Development, Inc., NLRC, that "confidential employees such
as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who,
having access to confidential information, may become the
source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy
or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.

The Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that Route
Managers, Chief Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are
supervisors while Credit & Collection Managers and Accounting
Managers are highly confidential employees. Designation should be
reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees. A
careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they don't lay
down company policies. Theirs is not a final determination of the
company policies since they have to report to their respective superior.
The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not
necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd
situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the
right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel
Corporation v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996, it was
stressed that:

What is essential is the nature of the employee's function and

not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines
whether the employee has rank and file or managerial status,
or whether he is a supervisory employee.

45
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the
defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as
recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The
same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in
the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable
cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty,
the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground
that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice
of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion
was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-
G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was
held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this
second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the
reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the
lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this
single question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province,
no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or
exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public
peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not
comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken
from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided
the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer,
fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of
the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the
words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the
Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted
that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word
"judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance",
while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such
modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code
because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the
First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there
was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
46
generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any
word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges,
like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of
Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and
justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes
addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the
peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of
his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas.
441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law.
In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including
justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify
and clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the
Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act.
Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however,
only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case
as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4
amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336
and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has
pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of
the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which
was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election
Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the
provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The
present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867,
2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by
Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the
following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections,
nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public
office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
election, except for reelection to the position which he may be
holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any
municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of
being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any
public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however,
That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive
any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any
election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January
15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace
provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any
municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating
the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or
employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office
or employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided,
however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed
to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at
any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on
September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the
Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question
read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer,
fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of
the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis
supplied)
47
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act
No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election.
— Any judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any
municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the
classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in
any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any
election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than
P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor
more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from
public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period
of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on
August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and
Employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor
of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural
police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any
election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto,
or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative
development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that
the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code
as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the
two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in
Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which
preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First
Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by
the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice
of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would
seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the
words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to
exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed
congressional records which might have offered some explanation of
the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated
above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the
peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper
and additional clarifications from these records proved futile.
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of
Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said
section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then
refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a
province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the
phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace
from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not
provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of
the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national
officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition?
The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it
qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as
provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise
invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then
indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally
48
and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus
omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has
been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has
already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices
of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging
in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,
defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule,
being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes
that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must
be strictly construed against the government since proceedings under
it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal
statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of
penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due
process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning
of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language
that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle
v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from
the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for
reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There
has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule
merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an
aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been
recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently
be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will
govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict
construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes
of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may
consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular
instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal
District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean
such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended.
Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best
harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge
43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory
Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the
language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where
the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S.
v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the
Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact
that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its
purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,
judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included
in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to
eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This
point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases
"Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
"judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in
the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all
judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or
special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the
peace court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge
49
 thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken
rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there
are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself
why justices of the peace should be prohibited from
electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and
judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given authority
and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103,
104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear
and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are
permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the
impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open
to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create
such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact
that the administrative or executive department has regarded justices
of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others,
Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President
of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of
Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the
separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in
engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election
Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No.
2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed
legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already
expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political
participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill,
Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit
justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676
was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not
merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House
Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election
laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment,
until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest
any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons
expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in
debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining
the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213,
pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a
bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that
justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54
must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly
and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace
from participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the
old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709).
Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code.
Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387,
and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving
at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section
54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of
exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it
would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of
omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a
justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion.
Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the
rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously
applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the
50
 maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be
invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the

trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the
merits.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and

Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

51
EN BANC
G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF
CEBU, Represented by Provincial Auditor ROY L.
URSAL,, Petitioner, v.PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by
Governor PABLO P. GARCIA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public
school teachers appointed by local chief executives in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes; as well as the expenses for college
scholarship grants, be charged to the Special Education
Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned?
The instant petition for review, which raises a pure
question of law, seeks to annul and set aside the
decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20,
in a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-24422.
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as
chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the
Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers
who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle
extension classes that would accommodate students in the
public schools.
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on
Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period
January to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and
personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by
the province for the extension classes were charged
against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF
were the college scholarship grants of the province.
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the
province of Cebu, 2 saying that disbursements for the
salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not
chargeable to the provincial SEF.
Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA,
the province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the trial court.
On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a
decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized
expenditures of the SEF. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered giving due
course to this instant petition for declaratory relief
declaring and confirming that petitioner is vested with the
authority to disburse the proceeds from the Special
Educational Fund [SEF] for the payment of salaries,
allowances or honoraria for teachers and non-teaching
personnel in the public schools in the Province of Cebu and
its component cities, and, municipalities, as well as the
expenses for scholarship grants of petitioners specially to
poor but deserving students therein.
Declaring, further, respondent's audit findings on pages 36
and 37 in the Annual Audit Report on the Province of Cebu
for the year ending December 31, 1999 as null and
void.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the instant petition by the Commission on Audit.
The Special Education Fund was created by virtue of R. A.
No. 5447, which is An act creating a special education fund
to be constituted from the proceeds of an additional real
property tax and a certain portion of the taxes on Virginia-
type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco,
52
 defining the activities to be financed, creating school
boards for the purpose, and appropriating funds
therefrom, which took effect on January 1, 1969. Pursuant
thereto, P.D. No. 464, also known as the Real Property Tax
Code of the Philippines, imposed an annual tax of 1% on
real property which shall accrue to the
SEF. 4cräläwvirtualibräry
Under R. A. No. 5447, the SEF may be expended
exclusively for the following activities of the DECS -
(a) the organization and operation of such number of
extension classes as may be needed to
accommodate all children of school age desiring to
enter Grade I, including the creation of positions of
classroom teachers, head teachers and principals for
such extension classes x x x;
(b) the programming of the construction and repair of
elementary school buildings, acquisition of sites, and the
construction and repair of workshops and similar buildings
and accessories thereof to house laboratory, technical and
similar equipment and apparatus needed by public schools
offering practical arts, home economics and vocational
courses, giving priority to elementary schools on the basis
of the actual needs and total requirements of the country x
x x;
(c) the payment and adjustment of salaries of public
school teachers under and by virtue of Republic Act
Numbered Five Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Eight
and all the benefits in favor of public school teachers
provided under Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Six Hundred Seventy;
(d) preparation, printing and/or purchase of textbooks,
teacher's guides, forms and pamphlets x x x;
(e) the purchase and/or improvement, repair and
refurbishing of machinery, laboratory, technical and similar
equipment and apparatus, including spare parts needed by
the Bureau of Vocational Education and secondary schools
offering vocational courses;
(f) the establishment of printing plant to be used
exclusively for the printing needs of the Department of
Education and the improvement of regional printing plants
in the vocational schools;
(g) the purchase of teaching materials such as work books,
atlases, flip charts, science and mathematics teaching
aids, and simple laboratory devices for elementary and
secondary classes;
(h) the implementation of the existing program for
citizenship development in barrio high schools, folk schools
and adult education classes;
(i) the undertaking of education research, including that of
the Board of National Education;
(j) the granting of government scholarships to poor
but deserving students under Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Ninety; and
(k) the promotion of physical education, such as athletic
meets. (Emphasis supplied)
With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991,
petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was repealed,
leaving Sections 235, 272 and 100 (c) of the Code to
govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit:
SEC. 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the
Special Education Fund (SEF). A province or city or a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy
and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%) on the
53
assessed value of real property which shall be in addition
to the basic real property tax. The proceeds thereof shall
exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF).
SEC. 272. Application of Proceeds of the Additional
One Percent SEF Tax. The proceeds from the additional
one percent (1%) tax on real property accruing to the SEF
shall be automatically released to the local school boards:
Provided, That, in case of provinces, the proceeds shall be
divided equally between the provincial and municipal
school boards: Provided, however, That the proceeds
shall be allocated for the operation and maintenance
of public schools, construction and repair of school
buildings, facilities and equipment, educational
research, purchase of books and periodicals, and
sports development as determined and approved by
the local school board. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget
xxx
(c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to
the following:
(1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school
buildings and other facilities of public elementary
and secondary schools;
(2) Establishment and maintenance of extension
classes where necessary; and
(3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal,
and barangay levels. (Emphasis supplied)
Invoking the legal maxim expressio unius es exclusio
alterius, petitioner alleges that since salaries, personnel-
related benefits and scholarship grants are not among
those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF under
the Local Government Code, they should be deemed
excluded therefrom.
Moreover, petitioner claims that since what is allowed for
local school boards to determine under Section 99 5 of the
Local Government Code is only the
annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation
and maintenance of public schools, as well as
the supplementary local cost to meet such needs, the
budget of the local school boards for the establishment
and maintenance of extension classes should be construed
to refer only to the upkeep and maintenance of public
school buildings, facilities and similar expenses other than
personnel-related benefits. This is because, petitioner
argued, the maintenance and operation of public schools
pertain principally to the DECS.
The contentions are without merit. It is a basic precept in
statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is
the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. 6 In
this connection, the following portions of the deliberations
of the Senate on the second reading of the Local
Government Code on July 30, 1990 are significant:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Guingona is recognized.
Senator Guingona. Just for clarification, Mr. President. In
this transfer, will it include everything eventually -- lock,
stock and barrel, including curriculum?
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, our stand in the
Committee is to respect the decision of the National
Government in terms of curriculum.
Senator Guingona. But, supposing the Local Education
Board wishes to adopt a certain curriculum for that
particular region?
54
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, pursuant to the wording
of the proposed transfer of this elementary school system
to local government units, what are specifically covered
here are merely the construction, repair, and maintenance
of elementary school buildings and other structures
connected with public elementary school
education, payment of salaries, emoluments,
allowances et cetera, procurement of books, other
teaching materials and equipment needed for the proper
implementation of the program. There is nothing here that
will indicate that the local government will have any right
to alter the curriculum. (Emphasis supplied)
Senator Guingona. Thank you, Mr. President.
Similarly instructive are the foregoing deliberations in the
House of Representatives on August 16, 1990:
INTERPELLATION OF MS. RAYMUNDO
(Continuation)
Continuing her interpellation, Ms. Raymundo then adverted
to subsection 4 of Section 101 [now Section 100,
paragraph (c)] and asked if the budget is limited only to
the three priority areas mentioned. She also asked what is
meant by the phrase maintenance of extension classes.
In response, Mr. De Pedro clarified that the provision is not
limited to the three activities, to which may be added
other sets of priorities at the proper time. As to
extension classes, he pointed out that the school
boards may provide out of its own funds, for
additional teachers or other requirements if the
national government cannot provide funding therefor.
Upon Ms. Raymundos query, Mr. de Pedro further
explained that support for teacher tools could fall under
the priorities cited and is covered by certain circulars.
Undoubtedly, the aforecited exchange of views clearly
demonstrates that the legislature intended the SEF to
answer for the compensation of teachers handling
extension classes.
Furthermore, the pertinent portion of the repealing clause
of the Local Government Code, provides:
SEC. 534. Repealing Clause. - x x x
(c) The provisions of . . . Sections 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act No. 5447, regarding the Special Education
Fund are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and
effect.
Evidently, what was expressly repealed by the Local
Government Code was only Section 3, of R.A. No. 5447,
which deals with the Allocation of taxes on Virginia type
cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco. The
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws, such
that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or specific
provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a
specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and the old laws. 7 Hence, the provisions
allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under Section
1, of R.A. No. 5447, which are not inconsistent with
Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code,
remain in force and effect.
Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the
hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions
as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
55
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. 8 Verily, the
services and the corresponding compensation of these
teachers are necessary and indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is
lodged principally with the DECS. This is the reason why
only salaries of public school teachers appointed in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes, inter alia, pertain to the supplementary
budget of the local school boards. Thus, it should be made
clear that not every kind of personnel-related benefits of
public school teachers may be charged to the SEF. The SEF
may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-
related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school
boards in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes. Extension classes as
referred to mean additional classes needed to
accommodate all children of school age desiring to enter in
public schools to acquire basic
education. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a
reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government
Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects
for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It
should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local
Government Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of
R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of salaries of teachers
which falls within the ambit of establishment and
maintenance of extension classes and operation and
maintenance of public schools, the granting of government
scholarship to poor but deserving students was omitted in
Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government
Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not
for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where
the legislature has omitted it. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
In the same vein, however noble the intention of the
province in extending said scholarship to deserving
students, we cannot apply the doctrine of necessary
implication inasmuch as the grant of scholarship is neither
necessary nor indispensable to the operation and
maintenance of public schools. Instead, such scholarship
grants may be charged to the General Funds of the
province.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for declaratory relief may be filed
before there is a breach or violation. The Solicitor General
claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA to
the respondent province amounted to a breach or
violation, and therefore, the petition for declaratory relief
should have been denied by the trial court.
We are not convinced. As held in Shell Company of the
Philippines, Ltd. v. Municipality of Sipocot, 12 any breach of
the statute subject of the controversy will not affect the
case; the action for declaratory relief will prosper because
the applicability of the statute in question to future
transactions still remains to be resolved. Absent a definite
ruling in the instant case for declaratory relief, doubts as
to the disposition of the SEF will persist. Hence, the trial
court did not err in giving due course to the petition for
declaratory relief filed by the province of Cebu.
WHEREFORE , in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, in Civil
Case No. CEB-24422, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers
appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes, are declared chargeable against the
56
Special Education Fund of the province. However, the
expenses incurred by the provincial government for the
college scholarship grants should not be charged against
the Special Education Fund, but against the General Funds
of the province of Cebu.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ.,
concur .

Buena, J., on official leave .

57
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A.
TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A.
TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL,
Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D
Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and
1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin
case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a
complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners
of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon
City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by
the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and
on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three
hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father
by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case
No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants
Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason
pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the
Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT
No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant
Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land
registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches
and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court
denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on
those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C.
Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from
the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the
parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October
16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived
from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in
court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the
purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and
the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed
the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia,
that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined
from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents
Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the
Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
58
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the
be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and
The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which without costs. No costs.
led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was
based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and SO ORDERED.
3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias
in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ.,
of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action concur.
and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
Fernando, J, took no part.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of
OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld.
(Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili
vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara,
Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is
simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases
directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs.
Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and
Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason,
92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman,
99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-
30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20
SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta

movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova
cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no
longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be

relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at
the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium."
(Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

59