G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429,
445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-
1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397,
405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602,
609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-
940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

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The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning
of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual
only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right
to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to
be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the
United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government
to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute
this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering

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that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered
his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line
of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no
such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such

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listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official
and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees
which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the
Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic
and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by
this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

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From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the
texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to
apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the
force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette.
From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances
result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any
binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement
would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice
Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.
It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they
can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be

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bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity.
Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or
executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am
not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must
still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully
invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court
has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to
be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official

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repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be
to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in
the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date
in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed
by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws
in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide
for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication
and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the
Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability."
It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

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In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for
no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in
the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to
apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the
force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette.
From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances
result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any
binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement
would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice
Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.
It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they
can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity.
Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or

8
Jc Isidro
executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am
not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must
still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully
invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court
has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to
be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code

9
Jc Isidro
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be
to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in
the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date
in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed
by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws
in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide
for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication
and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the
Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability."
It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for
no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree
insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

10
Jc Isidro
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in
the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE
TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical statement
by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part
if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matter of public concern.chanroblesvirtuallaw

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication
was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

11
Jc Isidro
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the
subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on
the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after
fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it
is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no
less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially,
the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the
public as a whole.

12
Jc Isidro
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of
the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the
case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency
on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due
publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering
its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better
perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available,
have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the
one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If
it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the

13
Jc Isidro
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the
law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties
that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause
its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all
the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be
so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right
of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I
would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong
stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which
traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man
legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject
matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one
granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax
on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No.
1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective
seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

14
Jc Isidro
FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same
time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret
such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The
enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute,
has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a
government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory
norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may
therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended
by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil
Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I
would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong
stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which
traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man
legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject
matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one
granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax
on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No.
1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective
seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same
time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret

15
Jc Isidro
such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The
enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute,
has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a
government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory
norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may
therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended
by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil
Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

16
Jc Isidro
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL,
namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV
No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65
section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court,
on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners
to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis
of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August
26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of
appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

17
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 In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is,
as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within
the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage
of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation
of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of
their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at
bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if
it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner,

vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4
August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the
Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that
Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to
comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, 3 which requires the publication
and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus,
surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the
business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities. 4

The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office
of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy
exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956
for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or
increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. 5

Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to
reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to
fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at
reasonable prices.6

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy
Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the
prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost,
increasing or decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and
claims on the OPSF.7

On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the sources
and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable
levels.8

On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that
respondent’s contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to
March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by
respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed
upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by
Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:

2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall
be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange

19
Jc Isidro
 payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally
produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent
(15%) of the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per
month if paid after thirty days.10 (Emphasis supplied.)

On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional
underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period
April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.

In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the
transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and
MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12

On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment,
totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13

In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a
total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the
period December 1989 to October 1991.

In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due.
Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondent’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of
Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.

On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the
President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996.
While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its publication and
filing with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such
requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads: 16

Given the foregoing, the DOE’s implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on
Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that
administrative regulation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its letters
dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the
President, which was denied on 28 November 2003.17

Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February
200418and 11 February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85
respectively, have not been filed before said office.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled
that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with
ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda,
Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules
already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three
months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.20According to the dispositive of the appellate court’s Decision: 21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and the
Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.

20
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 ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.

On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following
issues were raised:22

THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN AFFIRMED
BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT, MOF CIRCULAR NO.
1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A LAW REQUIRING
REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER

II

ASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS
OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT REQUIRED BY
PETITIONER.

This petition is without merit.

As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all
statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding
force and effect, to wit:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. (Emphasis provided.)

Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof
specifically providing that:

Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not
filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of
this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection. (Emphasis provided.)

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances
which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No.
1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987 – filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center – for
rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These
requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers

21
Jc Isidro
and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern
and, therefore, require strict compliance.

In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 200425 and 9 February 200426 issued by ONAR prove
that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said
office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of the
aforementioned circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances renders
MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.

In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court
emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to
enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified
several instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances, which failed to observe the proper
requirements, to have no force and effect:

Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of
both the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they "shall take effect
immediately." These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the Office
of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not
likewise filed with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no
force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint
Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the
accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering
the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national
government; (3) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating
applications for importation from the People’s Republic of China; (5) Corporation Compensation
Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of
other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees; and (6) POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders.

In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down
as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand,
in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of
the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was
filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time.
The Court emphasized therein that "publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect."

Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious.
MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents’ underpayment is based on MOF
Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.

Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer
necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously
flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be
annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned.

22
Jc Isidro
Hence, also in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court
pronounced:

In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with
the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that
parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public
consultation on the ERC’s proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public
consultation and even submitted their comments thereon.

However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their
respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing
Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of
publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether
even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their
comments.28 (Emphasis provided.)

Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent
enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is irrelevant in the
present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under
dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-
compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing cannot
be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85,
as amended from the aforementioned requirements.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales*, Tinga*, Reyes, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff classification
of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for
tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of
origin; and (3) port of discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either
as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.

CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 6

A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation
on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. 8 Respondent contended that CMO
27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation,
prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.

Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the
regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from
notice.9

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. 10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification
of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative
rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They likewise opposed the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the
issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are
assumed valid until declared otherwise.

On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary injunction
and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC

24
Jc Isidro
rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to
Dismiss.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum Order
27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the
District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from enforcing
the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent
concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief
was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that
respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation
in future transactions.

With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic
requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners had
"substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The
lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the
due process rights of respondent.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in
defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the
regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE.

The Petition has no merit.

We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.

Rule 63, Section 1 provides:

Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.

The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial

25
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determination.15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these
requirements.

First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner
of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:

The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 17 we said:

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. xxx

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it
was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the
desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an
interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a
matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the
rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)

Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily
imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.

Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-2003.
Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually
made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its
arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of
different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be
made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In
addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly
toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:

xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and every
importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting
aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that
business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is
shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It may be that the
petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency.
We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest
it with standing to file this petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)

26
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Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable19 for the
simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers
classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case
each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.

It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the
case.

Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2
of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not
filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party
of persons.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its
bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on
the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. 20

Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records – no
such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.

27
Jc Isidro
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee
of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.22

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.

Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the
product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other
hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be
made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.

It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent
their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but
results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that
are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those who
meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to
prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs
officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. – The
customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the
packages designated for examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry,
invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the
articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity, measurement, weight, and
tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis
when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or
admission into the Philippines of imported articles.

Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and sold,
and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties
prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1

The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article
even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no
longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the
wheat.

It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.23

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In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they
failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of
delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess
imported articles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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Jc Isidro
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort
Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein
respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274
and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette3 on 3
February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of

30
Jc Isidro
Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of
the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating
Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a
Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP
Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied,
covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the
Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-
Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area
the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions of
land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation
No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when
President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of
the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law
is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must
be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no
authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to
do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1
September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1,
2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No.
99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No.
99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by
respondents are likewise

31
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DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION
NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY
PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION
NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP
HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE
EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject
lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were
anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the
former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as
disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In
relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

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Jc Isidro
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the
law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does
not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in which we had the occasion to
rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not
apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result;
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of
the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are

33
Jc Isidro
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the
General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest,
was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not
part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law,
resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there
is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law,
not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as
the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy
sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to
include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly,
this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite
respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO
BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as
Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis
Occidental,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed
and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.

The Facts

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization,

founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology,
tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some
cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a
seminar cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.

On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building
Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply
for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No.
1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal
building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of a
building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8,
2002,9 but still the same remained unheeded.

It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No.
02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.12 On July 12, 2002,
Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were
posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and
prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A
similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.

On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
injunction and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that
they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the
subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL
assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public

35
Jc Isidro
consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by
Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not
approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17

In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are
not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging
to the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing
requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for
failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and
enforceable.

The RTC Ruling

On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based
on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not
duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor
was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or
fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the national government, through
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were
ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the public. 21 However, the petitioners were
ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid building permits 22 since they were found to
have no title over the disputed property.23

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.

Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to
declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. 25 It also
gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous
places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted with
various groups before the subject ordinance was passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez
Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section
447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer
sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30

On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the
Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.31

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9,
2009. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.34

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

36
Jc Isidro
Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances
and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the
local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its
action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it
has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere
passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time
the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved
and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:

Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word,
"action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of
the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid
in whole or in part. x x x.

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a
statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be
construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently
conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the
moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute. 37

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not published
nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC. 38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence
reveals that a public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover,
other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the
publication and posting requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence
thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or
legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which
they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court
upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the
part of the local government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal
lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said public

37
Jc Isidro
hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the
oppositor’s cause of action:

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any
evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in
question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed
conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to
establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure
prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was
alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the
provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court
held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that
the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore
unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing
that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the
duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the
different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been
complied with.

We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of
positive proof to the contrary.

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed
to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving
that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject
ordinance.

In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its
possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on Capayas
Island without building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and
conclusive upon them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL,
namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

38
Jc Isidro
CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV
No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65
section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court,
on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners
to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis
of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August
26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of
appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is,
as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within
the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

39
Jc Isidro
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage
of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation
of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of
their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at
bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if
it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

40
Jc Isidro
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m.
of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of
the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel
beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires
attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which
was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole
[p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the
building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who
luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board
and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of
the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but
without a safety lock.1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses,
the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

41
Jc Isidro
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic]
IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA
ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he
merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as
the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence
applies to written, as well as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light
and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be
tested by cross-examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official records. Section
44, Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the
requisites for admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not
present.

42
Jc Isidro
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court.
In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire
report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of
proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of the officer who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination,
the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions
and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of
the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter,
having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez],
may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of
the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It
has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain
utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule
are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in
which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials
would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is
accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge
their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in
discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a
degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his
report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the
sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no
showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.

43
Jc Isidro
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge
suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s
remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He
observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required
Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the
chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the
platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is
mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible. 19

Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA.
The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a
result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. 20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident
or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or
transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself,
the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least
permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was
under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury
was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by
the defendant’s want of care.21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon
the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff
complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof
of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three
prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means

44
Jc Isidro
 of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has
superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. 23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of
the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where
evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule
of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and
human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to
the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues
that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care
to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s
negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to
defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may
outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption
or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the
chain block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private
respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement
for being hearsay.

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as
evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.28 The
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse
party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not
prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements
which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use

45
Jc Isidro
said statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her
husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating
to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under
the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the
Civil Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee,
his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the
Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca
vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex
Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations,
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex
Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following
the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled
that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil
Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court
reasoned:

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Jc Isidro
 With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation
to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as
of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x
x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss
dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee
created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael
Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake
of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful
in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the
last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the
Civil Code. The Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all
further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that
the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits
under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring
supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation
report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel.
While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor
nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the
exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as
November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her
sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation
to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who
recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office.
This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have even
known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public

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Jc Isidro
 prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x
are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible
that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred
from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law
waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public
prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein
that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If
at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering
the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about
appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a
mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of
her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than
from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint
that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not
being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of
the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was
insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show
that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter,
private respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and
receive the benefits from the ECC.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is
final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by
the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of
remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair
to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. 38

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an
ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have
waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses
not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against
whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a

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 right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness
of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the
record or by the evidence.40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint
that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private
respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as
petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for
petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded
waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the
rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact"
that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private
respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and
regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a
fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until
the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a
waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when
on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation
report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the
application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before
the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of
the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s
ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. 42 This
may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not
excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of
remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total
amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she
received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991.
Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension

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Jc Isidro
was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of
P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to
the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial
court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater
than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall
be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 191787 June 22, 2015

MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6, 2005 Decision 3 of the Civil Service Commission-
Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17, 2010 Resolution4 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the Baguio Colleges
Foundation. When applying for graduation, he was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies despite a
deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with deficiencies of not
more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction came after, which is, that the
deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a graduate.

In 1985, petitioner found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra. Sometime in
September 1993, the personnel head of the SSS in Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that the Civil Service
Commission was conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in October of the same year.
Petitioner filed an application to take the examination, believing that the CSC still allowed CSPE applicants to
substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency which they may have. However,
the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had been discontinued since January 1993 pursuant to Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992.

Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating of 80.52%. Eventually,
petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued, Abra. In
October 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.

On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS
Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that
petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college
degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military
Education. Also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993 since he was not yet
then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the entry in his application form.

After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.6

Respondent’s Letter-Complaint7 against petitioner was docketed as CSC Disciplinary Administrative Case No.
BB-03-006.

In his Answer,8 petitioner essentially pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest mistake. He maintained
that at the time of his application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest belief that the policy of the CSC – that
any deficiency in the applicant’s educational requirement may be substituted by his length of service – was still
subsisting.

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On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog, rendered a Decision 9 containing
the following pronouncements:

Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without any fault under the foregoing circumstances. The only issue now
left is with respect to the particular offense for which Catipon may be held responsible. Respondent Catipon is
charged (with) four offenses: Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The key document allegedly falsified in this case is the Application Form x x x of respondent Catipon for the
purpose of taking the CS Professional Examination scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and careful perusal of
the said application form reveals that most of the entries filled up by respondent are typewritten. The only
entries handwritten by respondent are those corresponding to "Year Graduated" and "School Where
Graduated" which were answered by Macario with "1984" and "BCF" respectively. Another handwritten entry
is with respect to "Degree Finished", the handwritten "BSC" entry, however, was just superimposed on the
typewritten "Commerce".

The fact that majority of the entries or data in the application form is typewritten suggests that the said
application form was consciously drafted and meticulously prepared before its actual submission to the CSC
for processing. They are relevant and material entries or data sought from respondent. It is worth emphasizing
however that the pre-drafted application form, considering the typewritten entries, shows respondent’s
confusion on how to make entries thereat. Respondent answered both the IF YES column and IF NO column
corresponding to the question "Are you a college graduate" in Item 8. x x x

xxxx

The manner that Item 8 was filled up by respondent Catipon shows lack of deliberate intent to defraud the
government. He manifested in his application his uncertainty on how to take the fact that he only lacks 1.5
units Military Science to be conferred a graduate status, vis-à-vis the CSC policy on educational requirement.
Though the entry "undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee who processed the application would have
doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of respondent’s entries in Item 8 of the Application Form, and thus
the educational status of Macario. x x x

xxxx

Catipon had tried to show the real state of the matter regarding his educational attainment as can be deduced
from the manner he answered Item No. 8 in the application form. This may be taken as good faith, which will
serve to mitigate any liability incurred by respondent Catipon. The premeditated intent to deceive or willfully
distort the facts in this case is not present. The acts of Catipon do not even show blatant disregard of an
established rule or a clear intent to violate the law if at all, there was attempt to reveal the truth to the
examination division processing the application.

xxxx

With [regard] to the eligibility earned by respondent Macario in view of his passing the October 17, 1993
Career Service Professional Examination, the same needs to be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous tree, so
to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6, Rule II, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 states:

Provided that when an applica[nt] for examination is found to have x x x intentionally made any false
statement of any material fact in his application, x x x the Commission shall invalidate such examination x x x.

With the foregoing, respondent Macario U. Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head, Social Security
System, Bangued, Abra, is hereby exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents
and Grave Misconduct. However, respondent is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.

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Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is suspension of six months and one day to
one year.

Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good faith is enumerated as one mitigating circumstance. Thus,
respondent Macario Catipon, Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of six months and one day suspension, without pay,
which is the minimum period of the penalty attached to the offense committed. The Career Service
Professional eligibility of respondent is also ordered revoked, without prejudice however to retaking of the
said examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving suspension herein provided should not be allowed to go back to
his current position without CS Professional eligibility. Consequently, in case respondent Catipon fails to retake
or pass CSPE, after serving his suspension, he may be demoted to any available position that fits his
subprofessional eligibility.10

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in a March 23, 2006
Decision,12which contained the following pronouncement:

Catipon also asserted that in view of his exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and
Grave Misconduct, there is no longer any basis to hold respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. This contention is without legal basis. In the case of Philippine Retirement Authority vs.
Rupa 363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:

Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there is no description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault under the circumstances.
To completely exonerate respondent would be inequitable and iniquitous considering the totality of events
surrounding this case. Though there was no deliberate intent to falsify or to make dishonest entry in the
Application Form as deduced from the manner that the said form was accomplished, the fact that there was
indeed such dishonest or false entry in the CSPE Application Form is undisputedly established. In view of such
an established fact, the integrity of the Civil Service Examination, particularly the CSPE has been blemished
which is sufficient to constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review docketed with the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner prayed for injunctive relief
and the reversal of the above CSC-CAR decision. He argued that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found him guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he has been declared innocent of the charges of
dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct; that while the Supreme Court has held
that making false entries in public documents may be considered as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, such act must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard
established rules or norms in the service;14 and that with the finding that he merely committed an innocent
mistake in filling up the application form for the CSPE, he may not be found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.

On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision [sic] of the
Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region dated July 6, 2005 and March 23, 2006 is [sic]
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner should have interposed an
appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases;16 that by filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated the doctrine of

53
Jc Isidro
exhaustion of administrative remedies; that petitioner’s case is not exceptional as would exempt it from the
application of the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, 17 the absence of deliberate intent or
willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service does not preclude a finding of guilt
for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that petitioner did not act with prudence and
care, but instead was negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand
the requirements for the examination.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant recourse. Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

(A)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT
GIVEN THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-
CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AGAINST THE PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING JUDICIAL
RECOURSE BEFORE (THE COURT OF APPEALS);

(B)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT MISAPPLIEDIN THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED CASE THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

(C)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
THE PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS NEGATES GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.18

Petitioner’s Arguments

In his Petition and Reply19 seeking a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, consequently, exoneration
from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, petitioner argues that he was
constrained to file the petition for review with the CA as his decreed six-month suspension was imminent as a
consequence of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR decision; that immediate judicial intervention was
necessary to "prevent serious injury and damage" to him, which is why his CA petition included a prayer for
injunctive relief; that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not have been applied
strictly in his case, given the special circumstance that his suspension would mean loss of his only source of
income;20 that he should be completely exonerated from the charges against him, since conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or
disregard established rules or norms in the service – which is absent in his case; and that his career service
professional eligibility should not be revoked in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which
promotes and preserves civil service eligibility.

Respondent’s Arguments

In his Comment21 seeking denial of the petition, respondent counters that completion of all the academic
requirements – and not merely attendance at graduation rites – confers the necessary degree which qualifies a
student to take the CSPE; that petitioner’s claim that he is a graduate as of 1984 is belied by his Transcript of
Records22 and other pieces of evidence submitted, which reflect the date of his graduation as October 1995 –
or after completion of his 1.5-unit deficiency in Military Science; that petitioner cannot claim to suffer
irreparable injury or damage as a result of the CSC-CAR’s Decision, which is valid and binding; that the
revocation of petitioner’s eligibility is only proper, since he was then not qualified when he took the CSPE; that
the CSC-CAR was correct in finding that petitioner’s act compromised the image and integrity of the civil
service, which justified the imposition of a corresponding penalty; that this Court in the Rupa case made it

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Jc Isidro
clear that the act of making false entries in public documents constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, a grave offense punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year for
the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense; and that indeed, petitioner violated the doctrines of
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies when he proceeded directly to the CA, instead
of filing an appeal with the CSC.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article IX-B, state that –

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs.

Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the
removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service."23

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of
government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service
and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or
Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on
petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen
days from receipt thereof."24 "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.25

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review, under
Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the Commission
before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.26

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-CAR
Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As

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correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA
petition premature and thus dismissible.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can
be sought.1âwphi1 The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case." 27 Indeed, the administrative
agency concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the "best position to correct any previous error
committed in its forum."28

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence."29 When
petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed
in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.

We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE application
form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s claim
of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the
CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. 30 Moreover,
petitioner – as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE – cannot expect
to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is required for the examination falls on him, and
not the CSC or his colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the appellate court:

In Bacaya31 v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal case. Respondent judge in the said
case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in good faith and that it has been a practice
in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he would simply sign the prepared order. The
Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated that negligence is the failure to observe such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is necessary
for deliberate intent to exist; such is not necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He simply
relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in Military
Science with the length of his government service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of the SSS-
Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and careful person,
petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective examinees. In
so doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy disallowing substitution of one’s length
of government service for academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil
Service employee’s advice since it was not shown that the latter was authorized to give information regarding
the examination nor that said employee was competent and capable of giving correct information. His failure
to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a reasonably prudent and careful person would have done
constitutes negligence. Though his failure was not a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an act of
negligence and, as in Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.32

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Jc Isidro
The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed upon an
erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the office; and
the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. Under our civil service
laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as such: misappropriation of public funds;
abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records
and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of
brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s
participation in the execution of a document conveying complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in
the latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during
office hours; a CA employee’s forging of receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network
problems within his office and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system
in a vulnerable state of security;33 a public prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not
prepared by him, but by a judge;34 and a teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of
the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.35 In petitioner’s case, his act of making false entries in his CSPE
application undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a
willful or deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service "may or may not be characterized by corruption or a
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules."36

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy
which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility," his career service professional eligibility should not be
revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts to
violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the government and the public
in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public service. 37 "Assumption of public
office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A
person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing
less is expected."38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the
sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company against
Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the
salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error
for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on
September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the
time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee
for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of
an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa
or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June
19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No.
769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s.
1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular
No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on
September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981
appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the
explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to
secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting
authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review
interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn.,
476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the
check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or
part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid
defense.

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Jc Isidro
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage
of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April
3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the
Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued
against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court
of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties'
arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal . . .5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the
Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an
offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962),
ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada,
Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752,
could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of
the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No.
27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting
ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved
"personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the
absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old
Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500,
holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and
Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez
v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed
the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it
was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle
to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was
issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system . . .'"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

59
Jc Isidro
 It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the
prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid
doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the
law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on,
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205
SCRA 515, 527-528:8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to
DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale
on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended
was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and
respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil
Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights
that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . .
. when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited
case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine
advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification,
as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.

60
Jc Isidro
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect,"
and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these
presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County,
118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act
No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President
Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953
'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made
substantially the same observations, to wit:11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for
that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act
taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its
being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should
be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act
contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with.
This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed
theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had
to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed
to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication.

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Jc Isidro
 In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v.
Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar
speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA
1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 —
declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had
resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA
686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be
applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that
decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final
judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians
before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State
shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity
of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created
under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is
an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule
in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether
the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local
government abolished. 13

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the
familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the
only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from
those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other
government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the
defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid
defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a
private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the

62
Jc Isidro
Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may
be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that
resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the
respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no
administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine
of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set
out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and
set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial
Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended information
dated October 11, 1985 charged:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still
unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence
and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and in
the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300,00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal
property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of
levis pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a
total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims
Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property
being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the
above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2)
accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting
wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict
physical injuries to the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them
to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance for several number of days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp, 92-93, II Record.)

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305,
accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with
the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with
deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working
together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with
firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a band,
entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with
violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring
worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos,
making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or
consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused,
conspiring and working together with their companions who are still at large, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual

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Jc Isidro
 intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine
Belesario, against their will and consent.1âwphi1.nêt

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 90-91, II Record.)

Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both crimes
charged (p. 103, II Record).

After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:

Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that
the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed
against them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:

a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and
Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10)
years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4)
months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of
P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also to indemnify
Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for his
medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.

b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the
members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles
taken from them.

In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 80, Rollo.)

The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:

Criminal Case No. 18376

The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made by
complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister
Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).

Criminal Case No. 18305

Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified companion,
acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the
following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped
once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped
by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was
likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as former barangay-mate for a long time, as
well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and
aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a long period of time,

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thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Said
positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have ill motive to falsify
the truth and to implicate accused-appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and
dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 78-79, Rollo).

The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The trial
court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred
in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a
warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes
charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended upon the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).

The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses
Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar,
Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief, as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister
Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside
their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo
Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with him in
(pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).

Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman
to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together
with his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8,
10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of
his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo
Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-
16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).

Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed
the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN,
June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told
them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to
the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. The
other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon
Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred
pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip,
one (1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet
containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00)
inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged
Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30,
1988).

Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just
twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin, Jr.,
outside the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's name and
ask that the door be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one
of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of Josephine
Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other companions
of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with
knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's cousins, namely
Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 11-15,

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 TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt
and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30,
1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine
Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed:
"Money, money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into
a room where the latter gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15,
1990.). Then, appellants and their companions seized the following personalities of the
Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2)
pairs of lady's rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two
(2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed
with a butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she
did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly
removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but
appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque
brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 13-
14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun
took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.).
This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia
Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but to obey the man's orders. There,
she was raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia
Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on
guard (p. 18, ibid.).

Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with
his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered
appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was
prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her
over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a
gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he
undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant Alex Mijaque
brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money. When she
told him that they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he
found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her
outside the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and
Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on
the floor again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought
her outside the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the
ground so he pushed her downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her
twice. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant
Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to
undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of
appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua
Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man
demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also
carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to
lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out . He likewise succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of

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 the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins
were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living
room, she was pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When
she stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin,
armed with a double-bladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress
and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen (13) years old,
obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not
succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member
of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed
with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie
down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was
returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother
and were taking turns in beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).

Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated
earlier after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return
and kill all of them (p.19, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first
aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp.
18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14,
1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm, area
ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit
A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent
more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other expenditures (p.
19, TSN, December 16, 1986).

Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was
raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of
Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the
ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2) fingers". Further, hematoma was noted in
the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted at
nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are indications that a foreign object, which
could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen
(pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1âwphi1.nêt

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by
Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).

A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid).
Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one
centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations
were likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN,
November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the
vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of
the face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of
the head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm.
lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left
shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches
incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the
portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the

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 hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10,
1986).

Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum
which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh
laceration at six o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on
her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).

(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)

Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses,
Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with other
arguments, are summarized as follows:

Alfonso Patalin

Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he described
as the land lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the persons
who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the stand that when the victims saw him at the police
station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp.
10-11, 19-20).

In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness
Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo,"
said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her brother, and that she only recognized
the caller's voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he was
arrested without a warrant.

Alex Mijaque

Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there
is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes charged.
Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not
named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report mentioned
that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second report, it was
blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accused-
appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery
but did not report any rape.

According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the record
as "Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous to
the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the
agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for three days
without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all
police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque
contends, in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for
custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three days after his confinement, a
criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him
by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.

Nestor Pas

The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo,
and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states

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that the witnesses' declarations as regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-
210, Rollo).

Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what
happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 210, id). And when
Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the police
authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.

As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their respective
alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan,
Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the incident. As corroborative witness, he presented
Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the plantation where he was working, who testified that accused-
appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).

For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he was
working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for theft
of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three of the herein
complainants were brought in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the policemen pointed
to him and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he will file a case against
you." Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness,
Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latter's alibi that on August 11,
1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight, and accused-appellant
Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep
the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).

Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal,
Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented Cristina
Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from
accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and that he saw
Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p. 4).

We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm.

Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since,
as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record
(People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).

A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility, particularly the
ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring
in the very privacy of their own homes.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to prove
any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by
accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even
married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against
a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated.

Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As discussed
above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the
perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to
report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the robbery
committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders were

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unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention that
she was raped.

Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a
witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An examination of
Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as
accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's name, he
explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person who attacked him with the
bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he
found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned
"unknown persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive identification of accused-
appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.

Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to the
police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome
by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as
this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those
mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6
months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her
charge.

The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows: (1)
Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small
table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in darkness, while
on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in the house coming
from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated their house, allegedly
through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went
to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do
not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do not
impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness
to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs.
Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).

With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA
587 [1997]). Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA
181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused, it
deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it
would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or
its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA
369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela
Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995];
People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA
87 [1995]).

Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel
time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-
appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly,
accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is
approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate these

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alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their
testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.

Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-
appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-
appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11,
1984. More importantly and damning yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case
No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that
accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People vs.
Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in
the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims'
homes. He who goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code — Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting
opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We
further affirm the trial court's finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band considering
that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was
later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was
corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was
accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended
the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly
testified to by the victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed
with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10;
February 15, 1990, p. 5).

With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested without warrants,
suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated
brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo).

It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376
and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque,
together with unidentified companions, committed the crime charged. Said culprits shared the common
criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the
robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified companions), who were
positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the
household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-
appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits followed suit.
Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were staging a hold-up. After
robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine,
and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the
physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants
adduced at the trial —

. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and
from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the

72
Jc Isidro
 accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48
Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743,
May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . .

( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).

Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony of
the victims themselves.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the time the crimes
charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code).
However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article
III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-
appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987
Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its
discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature
from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law
which took effect on January 1, 1994.

Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had
retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on
January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the
trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed
by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court,
robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, was punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No.
767]).

True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its
trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers intended said
provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed yet.
Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically
— without need for any executive action — commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).

The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was
retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act

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restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative answer would free accused-appellants
from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life (or
lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom prevails
(Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed,
robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some
measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime
committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must
be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz,
Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is insufficient.

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-
appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."

A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character
since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive
effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the
prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the
sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p.
167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).

In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein
accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The
framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death
penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic
of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986
Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall
remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which
precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent
statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711
[1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their
retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights.
Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by
virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.

Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (Benzonan vs.
Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs.
Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).

By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old law
cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this
principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue.

As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly awarded
P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken, and
P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in

74
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Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with
the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said:

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and
the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on
like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the
present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not
less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure
of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape (considering
that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6,500.00
representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from the victims. In line with the recent ruling
in People vs. Prades(G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an
object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded
(People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).

Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally liable
for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable
for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the
aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accused-
appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum;

(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded by
the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the cash
and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo
Aliman for medication and hospitalization;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and

(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family representing
the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby awarded an
additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages,
and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts all the three accused-appellant
are jointly and severally liable.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

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G.R. No. 162518 August 19, 2009

RODRIGO SUMIRAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO and EVA DAMASO Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the
Resolution2 dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set
aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment (Civil Case
No. 93-2588) against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73. Petitioner
is also the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 with respondent Generoso Damaso as accused. Upon motion of respondents, said civil and criminal cases
were consolidated and jointly tried.

On February 21, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 dated January 16, 2003, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos.
92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.

As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is hereby rendered against the
plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the defendants Damaso. The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the
defendants the following:

a. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages

b. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and

c. the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated Match 4, 2003, stating that he received
a duplicate original copy of the decision on February 21, 2003. Respondents opposed said motion. On May 9,
2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on May 29, 2003,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that he received a copy of the decision
dated January 16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 19, 2003.

On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out
of time, emphasizing that the decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in the presence of both parties
and their counsels. Considering counsel for petitioner to have received a copy of the decision on said date of
promulgation, the RTC ruled that since petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration on the 13th day
(March 6, 2003), he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed it ten (10) days after allegedly

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Jc Isidro
receiving the Order of May 9, 2003 on May 19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on
June 20, 2003, but the same was denied by the RTC on October 1, 2003.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA found the petition unmeritorious
and dismissed the same in its Decision dated December 22, 2003. Ruling that petitioner was bound by his
judicial admission that he received the Decision of the RTC when it was promulgated on February 21, 2003, the
CA held that petitioner’s period within which to file an appeal had lapsed by the time the Notice of Appeal was
filed on May 29, 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution
dated February 20, 2004.

Hence, this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s period to appeal had lapsed,
as such ruling was premised on misapprehension of facts and contradicted by evidence on record. The CA also
allegedly failed to state in its decision and resolution the particular evidence upon which the same was based;
and there were supposedly some facts that, if properly noticed and considered, would justify a different
conclusion.

The petition deserves some consideration.

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals 5 that by virtue of the power of
the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal
periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6

The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 7 to wit:

Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present
Petition was already pending before us. x x x

xxxx

With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.

The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states
that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from."
The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the "final order," x x x.

xxxx

The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted
– from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal
which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file

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Jc Isidro
the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.1avvphi1

We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant may
now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen
days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule," expostulating that
procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably
procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or
determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present
case, without danger of violating anyone else’s rights. (Emphasis supplied)

The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of
promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties,
Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,8 stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in
cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.
That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as
they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested
retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice.
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm - _ftn Procedural laws do
not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation
of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm - _ftn

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal
may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule
on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the
present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity,
since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as
compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be
incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will
enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant
case, will not.9

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Jc Isidro
Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably, the
Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to the present case. Petitioner is entitled to a "fresh period" of 15
days − counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioner’s receipt of the Order denying his motion for
reconsideration of the RTC Decision − within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filed said
notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for
reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the Resolution dated February 20, 2004, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated June 2, 2003 in Civil Case No.
93-2588, and its Order dated October 1, 2003, reiterating the June 2, 2003 Order, are hereby declared NULL
and VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner’s
Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the
amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay
City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his complaint the following:

xxx

2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed
a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter
that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex "A";

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground
that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to
his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly
funded and will be honored when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the
check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand
defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s valid demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff
has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable
attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00 per appearance.

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 ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon
which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action
which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and
sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the time he issued a
check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1,
sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages
should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.3

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented
on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. 4

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment
bond for damages,5 pertinently averring:

xxx

On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant
action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx

xxx

While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No.
915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein
plaintiff’s criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as
a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a
Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to
plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex
"1".

It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s
attachment bond for damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is the alleged
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among others
that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
Simon" renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense

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Jc Isidro
 charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however,
it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has
already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No.
2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any
claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case,
during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private
prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove
damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right
of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based
on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a
separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks
to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor
of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the alleged
circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to
bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by
delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against
the drawer;

5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to
the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that
such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said
check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a
reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case
since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action may still be
prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for damages against the bond
is totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.6

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

xxx

After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the
application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages.

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Jc Isidro
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2)
cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the criminal case for violation of
BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being
asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In
both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts, are identical.

Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact
that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the
presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal
Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the
offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in
the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said
provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be
logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue
the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the considered
view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to
institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for sum of money is one based
on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to
wit:

"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages
sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendant’s physical
possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.

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SO ORDERED.

Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,8 viz:

Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and
which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio
decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan’s complaint,
disposing:9

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review, 10 challenging the
propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil
claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the
dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the
second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated
through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the
criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately
instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

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Jc Isidro
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability
arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:

"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation".

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became
effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed
against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was
no reservation as to its filing."

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on
allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the
check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same
may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules
may be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the
assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez 14 stretched the
meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal

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Jc Isidro
Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section
3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.15

In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used
the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and
that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil
action.

Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case
No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the

Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in
Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:

xxx

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may
be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of
another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons,
84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also
to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United
States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).

xxx

Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled
to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended
private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the
remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may
leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly
enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would,
therefore, be brought to naught.

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Jc Isidro
 xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention
of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly
provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.18

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or
arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, 20 except that
in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence

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Jc Isidro
to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity
would be unconstitutional for being ex post factounder the Constitution.21

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right,
because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall
henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which
penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed
or recognized.22

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994.
Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing
fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not
so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying
the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions
as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on
November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v.
Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,23 thus:

xxx

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22,
the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate
civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where

88
Jc Isidro
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the
complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees
are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P.
22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to
help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating
effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not
even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower
the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another
for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is
to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil
action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in
court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored
checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may
be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability
is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.24

The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez25 to give due course to the civil action of Chan
independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved
a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22.
Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct
crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from
these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party
may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on
fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations
of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated
in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the
violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action

on the ground of litis pendentia

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Jc Isidro
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar
the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites
is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered
in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the
first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.28

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of
litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and
in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No.
275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No.
0007280 worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And,
thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan
would be recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis
pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming
the MeTC.

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on
October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

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Jc Isidro
G.R. No. 128354 April 26, 2005

HOME BANKERS SAVINGS & TRUST CO., Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO N. AREVALO, FRANCISCO A. UY, SPOUSES LEANDRO A.
SORIANO, JR. and LILIAN SORIANO, ALFREDO LIM and FELISA CHI LIM/ALFREDO LIM, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 28, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40892 and its Resolution
dated February 19, 1997 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Each of private respondents entered into separate contracts to sell with TransAmerican Sales and Exposition
(TransAmerican) through the latter’s Owner/General Manager, Engr. Jesus Garcia, involving certain portions of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 19155, located at No. 45 Gen. Lim Street, Heroes Hill,
Quezon City, together with one unit three-storey townhouse to be built on each portion, as follows:

Respondent Pablo N. Arevalo purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 5 2 for the
amount of P750,000.00 on August 21, 1988 and had already fully paid the purchase price on
September 3, 1988;

Respondent Alfredo Lim purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 1 3 for the amount
of P800,000.00 on December 22, 1988 and fully paid the same upon execution of the agreement on
the same day;

Respondent Francisco A. Uy purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No. 6 4 on October 29,
1988 in the amount of P800,000.00 payable in installments and had allegedly made a total payment
of P581,507.41. He ordered to stop the payment of all [postdated] checks from September 1990 to
November 1995 on the ground of non-completion of his unit and had later learned of the foreclosure
of the property;

Respondent spouses Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. and Lilian Soriano purchased the portion of land
denominated as Unit No. 35 on February 15, 1990 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 and had allegedly
made a payment of P669,960.00. They had stopped paying because of non-completion of the project
and had later learned of the foreclosure of the property;

Respondents Alfredo Lim and Santos Lim purchased the portion of land denominated as Unit No.
76 for P700,000.00 on October 1988 and had been fully paid as of March 18, 1989; Santos Lim
subsequently sold and assigned his share of the property to private respondent Felisa Chi Lim on May
12, 1989.

It is stipulated in their respective contracts that their individual townhouses will be fully completed and
constructed as per plans and specifications and the respective titles thereto shall be delivered and transferred
to private respondents free from all liens and encumbrances upon their full payment of the purchase
price. However, despite repeated demands, Garcia/TransAmerican failed to comply with their undertakings.

On May 30, 1989, Engr. Garcia and his wife Lorelie Garcia obtained from petitioner Home Bankers Savings and
Trust Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) a loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and
without the prior approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), the spouses
mortgaged7 eight lots covered by TCT Nos. 3349 to 3356 as collateral. Petitioner registered its mortgage on
these titles without any other encumbrance or lien annotated therein. The proceeds of the loan were
intended for the development of the lots into an eight-unit townhouse project. However, five out of these

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eight titles turned out to be private respondents’ townhouses subject of the contracts to sell with
Garcia/TransAmerican.

When the loan became due, Garcia failed to pay his obligation to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner
instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure8 on the subject lots and being the highest bidder in the public auction, a
certificate of sale9 in its favor was issued by the sheriff on February 26, 1990. Subsequently, the sheriff’s
certificate of sale was registered and annotated on the titles of the subject lots in the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.

On November 8, 1990, private respondents filed a complaint with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA), HLURB, against Garcia/TransAmerican as seller/developer of the property and petitioner, as
indispensable party, for non-delivery of titles and non-completion of the subdivision project.10 They prayed for
the completion of the units, annulment of the mortgage in favor of petitioner, release of the mortgage on the
lots with fully paid owners and delivery of their titles, and for petitioner to compute individual loan values of
amortizing respondents and to accept payments from them and damages.

Petitioner filed its Answer contending that private respondents have no cause of action against it; that at the
time of the loan application and execution of the promissory note and real estate mortgage by Garcia, there
were no known individual buyers of the subject land nor annotation of any contracts, liens or encumbrances of
third persons on the titles of the subject lots; that the loan was granted and released without notifying HLURB
as it was not necessary.

Private respondents filed their Reply and a motion for the judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner did not file a
rejoinder. Private respondents filed a manifestation reiterating for a judgment on their pleadings and asked
that the reliefs prayed for be rendered as far as petitioner was concerned. Upon motion of private
respondents, the case against Garcia/TransAmerican was archived for failure to serve summons on him/it
despite efforts to locate his whereabouts or its office. The case was then considered submitted for decision.

On August 16, 1991, OAALA rendered its Decision,11 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the mortgage executed by and between respondents Engr. Jesus

Garcia/TransAmerican Sales and Exposition and Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company (formerly
Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) to be unenforceable as against all the complainants;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the annotations of the mortgage
indebtedness between respondents Engr. Jesus Garcia and Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company
(formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company);

3. Ordering, likewise the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the annotation of the
Certificate of Sale in favor of the respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company on the
following Transfer Certificates of Title to wit:

1) TCT No. 3350

2) TCT No. 3351

3) TCT No. 3352

4) TCT No. 3354

5) TCT No. 3356

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 4. Ordering respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and
Trust Company) to:

4.1. AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Deliver to Complainant Pablo N. Arevalo TCT No. 3352 free from all liens and encumbrances.

4.2. AS TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Deliver to Complainant Alfredo Lim TCT No. 3356 free from all liens and encumbrances.

4.3. AS TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

To compute and/or determine the loan value of complainant Francisco A. Uy who was not
able to complete or make full payment and to accept payment and/or receive amortization
from said complainant Francisco A. Uy and upon full payment to deliver TCT No. 3351 free
from all liens and encumbrances.

4.4. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

To compute and/or determine the loan value of Complainant Spouses Leandro A. Soriano, Jr.
and Lilian Soriano who were not able to complete or make full payment and to accept and/or
receive amortization from said Complainants Soriano and upon full payment to deliver TCT
No. 3354 free from all liens and encumbrances.

4.5. AS TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Deliver to complainant Alfredo Lim and Felisa Chi Lim TCT No. 3350 free from all liens and
encumbrances.

without prejudice to its right to require respondent Engr. Jesus Garcia/TransAmerican to constitute
new collaterals in lieu of the said titles sufficient in value to cover the mortgage obligation. 12

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB which dismissed the same in a
decision dated June 15, 1992.13 Petitioner then elevated the case to the Office of the President which rendered
a decision dated June 30, 199514 dismissing the appeal and affirming the June 15, 1992 decision of the
HLURB. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in a Resolution dated May 7, 1996.15

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA which, in the herein assailed decision dated November 28,
1996, denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Office of the President. The CA applied the case
of Union Bank of the Philippines vs. HLURB, et al.,16 where it was held that the act of a subdivision developer of
mortgaging the subdivision without the knowledge and consent of a unit buyer and without the approval of
the National Housing Authority (NHA, now HLURB) is violative of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 thus, falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of HLURB.

The CA upheld the findings of the OAALA, HLURB that private respondents had already entered into separate
contracts to sell with TransAmerican as early as 1988 while it was only in 1989 that spouses Garcia applied for
a loan with petitioner and executed a mortgage contract over the subject lots; that the proceeds of the loan
were purposely intended for the development of a property which was the same property subject of the
contracts to sell; that despite the contracts to sell, Garcia/TransAmerican did not apprise petitioner of the
existence of these contracts nor did petitioner exhaust any effort to inquire into their existence since
petitioner merely relied on the purported clean reconstituted titles in the name of Garcia; that the mortgage
of the subject lots without the consent of the buyers and the authorization of the HLURB is a clear violation of
P.D. No. 957; that the mortgage contract is void and unenforceable against private respondents.

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Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated February 19, 1997. 17

Petitioner is now before us raising the following grounds in support of its petition:

A. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE HLURB HAS JURISDICTION TO NULLIFY
OR DECLARE UNENFORCEABLE THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE VALIDLY CONSTITUTED BY THE OWNER.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE HLURB HAS JURISDICTION, RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY
ERRED IN FINDING THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF HOME AS INVALID AND
UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST RESPONDENTS.

C. IN THE EVENT THAT THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT FINDING THE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF HOME AS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST RESPONDENTS IS
UPHELD, THE UNREGISTERED CONTRACTS TO SELL IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS SHOULD ALSO BE
HELD VALID ONLY AS TO THE PARTIES THERETO BUT UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST PETITIONER.

Private respondents filed their Comment and petitioner filed its Reply thereto.

In a Resolution dated February 23, 2004, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda which they complied with.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Notably, the issues raised are mere rehash of the issues already passed upon by the HLURB, the Office of the
President and the CA which we uphold as we find no reversible errors committed.

Petitioner claims that HLURB has no power to declare the mortgage contract over real property executed
between a real estate developer and petitioner, a banking institution, void or unenforceable, as it is properly
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner asserts that being a mortgagee of the subject lots
and a purchaser in good faith, it is not a project owner, developer, or dealer contemplated under P.D. No.
1344, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA; and that since there is no seller-buyer relationship
existing between it and private respondents, HLURB has no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the mortgage
and to annul foreclosure proceedings.

The argument is untenable.

The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of the President that HLURB has jurisdiction to declare
invalid the mortgage contract executed between Garcia/TransAmerican and petitioner over the subject lots
insofar as private respondents are concerned. It correctly relied on Union Bank of the Philippines vs. HLURB, et
al.18where we squarely ruled on the question of HLURB’s jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium
buyer’s complaint for: (a) annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted by the project owner without the
consent of the buyer and without the prior written approval of the NHA; (b) annulment of the foreclosure sale;
and (c) annulment of the condominium certificate of title that was issued to the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, thus:

. . . The issue in HLURB Case No. REM-062689-4077 is the validity of the real estate mortgage of
David’s condominium unit that FRDC executed in favor of the Union Bank and Far East Bank without
prior approval of the National Housing Authority and the legality of the title which the mortgage
banks acquired as highest bidder therefore in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The applicable
provisions of P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective
Decree" are quoted hereunder as follows:

Sec. 3. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. – The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree.

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 Section 18. Mortgages – No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer
without prior written approval of the authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown
that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or
subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan
value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof if any
shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for
the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage
indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to
obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof.

P.D. No. 1344 of April 2, 1978 expanded the jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority to include the
following:

Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to
its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by

buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, broker or
salesman.

On February 7, 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the
NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.

Sec. 8. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS. – The regulatory functions of the National Housing Authority
pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred
to the Commission, together with such applicable personnel, appropriation, records, equipment and
property necessary for the enforcement and implementation of such functions. Among these
regulatory functions are:

1. Regulation of the real estate trade and business:

...

7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made by the

owner or developer;

...

11. Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or
salesmen; and cases of specific performance.

Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986 changed the name of the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission to Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Clearly, FRDC’s act of mortgaging the condominium project to Bancom and FEBTC, without the
knowledge and consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA (now
HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957, was not only an unsound real estate business practice but also
highly prejudicial to the buyer. David, who has a cause of action for annulment of the mortgage, the

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 mortgage foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate of title that was issued to the UBP and
FEBTC as the highest bidders at the sale. The case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NHA
(now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of 1978.

...

We hold that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to
include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the
mortgage, of a condominium unit, with damages.19

Petitioner avers that the Union Bank ruling is not applicable in its case, since it had no knowledge of any buyer
of the subject lots at the time the mortgage was constituted; that there was no construction in the subject lots
at the time petitioner accepted the same as collateral; that the title to the subject property was still in the
process of being reconstituted and the loan was in fact meant for the development of the subject lots into an
eight-unit townhouse project.

We are not persuaded.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that there were no buyers of the subject lots at the time of the constitution of
the mortgage, records show that private respondents Arevalo, Uy, Alfredo Lim and Santos Lim had entered
into contracts to sell with Garcia/TransAmerican as early as 1988 for their respective lots. In fact, they, except
for Uy, had already fully paid their townhouse units in 1988 without the certificates of title being delivered to
them. Garcia mortgaged the subject lots without their knowledge and consent.

While private respondents spouses Soriano bought the subject lots after the constitution of the mortgage in
favor of petitioner, the subject lots are, as early as 1988, subdivision lots which as defined under Section 2(e)
of P.D. No. 957 to mean any of the lots, whether residential, commercial, industrial, or recreational in a
subdivision project20 are entitled to the protection of P.D. No. 957.

Under Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, it is provided that no mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner
or developer without prior written approval of the authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is
shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or
subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. As in the Union
Bank, the mortgage was constituted on the subject lots in favor of petitioner without the prior written
approval from the HLURB, thus HLURB has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the mortgage.

Notwithstanding that petitioner became the owner of the subject lots by being the highest bidder in the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it must be remembered that it was first a mortgagee of the same. Since the lot
was mortgaged in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, HLURB has jurisdiction to declare the mortgage void
insofar as private respondents are concerned and to annul the foreclosure sale. In Far East Bank and Trust Co.
vs. Marquez,21 we held that Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 is a prohibitory law, and acts committed contrary to it
are void. We said:

In determining whether a law is mandatory, it is necessary to ascertain the legislative intent, as stated
by Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino, an authority on civil law:

There is no well-defined rule by which a mandatory or prohibitory law may, in all

circumstances, be distinguished from one which is directory, suppletory, or permissive. In
the determination of this question, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative
intention. Generally speaking, those provisions which are mere matter of form, or which are
not material, do not affect any substantial right, and do not relate to the essence of the thing
to be done, so that compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance, are
considered to be directory. On the other hand, statutory provisions which relate to matters
of substance, affect substantial rights and are the very essence of the thing required to be
done, are regarded as mandatory.

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 In Philippine National Bank vs. Office of the President, we had occasion to mull over the intent of P.D.
No. 957 thus:

. . . [T]he unmistakable intent of the law [is] to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming
subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial
institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law – as an instrument of
social justice – must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is
presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertaining (whether
thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition,
utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral, . . . On the other hand,
private respondents obviously were powerless to discover attempt of the land developer to
hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with this kind
of situation that P.D. No. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide
a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D.
No. 957 termed "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers."

Concededly, P.D. No. 957 aims to protect innocent lot buyers. Section 18 of the decree
directly addresses the problem of fraud committed against buyers when the lot they have
contracted to purchase, and which they have religiously paid for, is mortgaged without their
knowledge. The avowed purpose of P.D. No. 957 compels the reading of Section 18 as
prohibitory – acts committed contrary to it are void. Such construal ensures the attainment
of the purpose of the law: to protect lot buyers, so that they do not end up still homeless
despite having fully paid for their home lots with their hard-earned cash.22

Since the mortgage is void, HLURB’s orders of the cancellation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale, release of the
mortgaged lots and delivery of the corresponding titles to respondents who had fully paid the purchase price
of the units are but the necessary consequences of the invalidity of the mortgage for the protection of private
respondents.

Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that since the titles on their face were free from any claims, liens
and encumbrances at the time of the mortgage, it is not obliged under the law to go beyond the certificates of
title registered under the Torrens system and had every reason to rely on the correctness and validity of those
titles.

We are not convinced.

While the cases23 cited by petitioner held that the mortgagee is not under obligation to look beyond the
certificate of title when on its face, it was free from lien or encumbrances, the mortgagees therein were
considered in good faith as they were totally innocent and free from negligence or wrongdoing in the
transaction. In this case, petitioner knew that the loan it was extending to Garcia/TransAmerican was for the
purpose of the development of the eight-unit townhouses. Petitioner’s insistence that prior to the approval of
the loan, it undertook a thorough check on the property and found the titles free from liens and
encumbrances would not suffice. It was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the status of the lots which
includes verification on whether Garcia had secured the authority from the HLURB to mortgage the subject
lots. Petitioner failed to do so. We likewise find petitioner negligent in failing to even ascertain from Garcia if
there are buyers of the lots who turned out to be private respondents. Petitioner’s want of knowledge due to
its negligence takes the place of registration, thus it is presumed to know the rights of respondents over the
lot. The conversion of the status of petitioner from mortgagee to buyer-owner will not lessen the importance
of such knowledge.24 Neither will the conversion set aside the consequence of its negligence as a mortgagee.25

Judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of banks to investigate, examine and assess the real estate
offered as security for the application of a loan. We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Bank cannot
barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or
lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the

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subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.26 We find apropos to cite our ruling in Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs.
Marquez, thus:27

Petitioner argues that it is an innocent mortgagee whose lien must be respected and protected, since
the title offered as security was clean of any encumbrances or lien. We do not agree.

. . . As a general rule, where there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate
right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. This rule, however, admits of an exception as
where the purchaser or mortgagee has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the vendor, or that he
was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
property in litigation.

Petitioner bank should have considered that it was dealing with a [townhouse] project that was
already in progress. A reasonable person should have been aware that, to finance the project,
sources of funds could have been used other than the loan, which was intended to serve the purpose
only partially. Hence, there was need to verify whether any part of the property was already the
subject of any other contract involving buyers or potential buyers. In granting the loan, petitioner
bank should not have been content merely with a clean title, considering the presence of
circumstances indicating the need for a thorough investigation of the existence of buyers like
respondent. Having been wanting in care and prudence, the latter cannot be deemed to be an
innocent mortgagee.

Petitioner cannot claim to be a mortgagee in good faith. Indeed it was negligent, as found by the
Office of the President and by the CA. Petitioner should not have relied only on the representation of
the mortgagor that the latter had secured all requisite permits and licenses from the government
agencies concerned. The former should have required the submission of certified true copies of those
documents and verified their authenticity through its own independent effort.

Having been negligent in finding out what respondent’s rights were over the lot, petitioner must be
deemed to possess constructive knowledge of those rights.

As to the third issue, petitioner contends that private respondents were negligent in failing to register their
contracts to sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957; that private respondents’ unregistered
contracts to sell are binding only on them and Garcia/TransAmerican but not on petitioner which had no actual
or constructive notice of the sale at the time the mortgage was constituted.

We disagree.

Section 17 of P.D. No. 95728 provides that the seller shall register the contracts to sell with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. Thus, it is Garcia’s responsibility as seller to register the contracts and petitioner should
not blame private respondents for not doing so. As we have said earlier, considering petitioner’s negligence in
ascertaining the existence or absence of authority from HLURB for Garcia/TransAmerican to mortgage the
subject lots, petitioner cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. Petitioner is
bound by private respondents’ contracts to sell executed with Garcia/TransAmerican.

The last paragraph of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 provides that respondents who have not yet paid in full have
the option to pay their installment for the lot directly to the mortgagee (petitioner) who is required to apply
such payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid
for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment
thereof. Thus, petitioner is obliged to accept the payment of remaining unpaid amortizations, without
prejudice to petitioner bank’s seeking relief against the subdivision developer. 29

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Notably, although no issue was taken on the fact that the case against Garcia/TransAmerican, the
developer/seller and mortgagor of the subject lots, was archived for failure to serve summons on him/it as his
whereabouts or the office could not be located, it must be stated that Garcia/TransAmerican is not an
indispensable party since a final determination on the validity of the mortgage over the subject lots can be
rendered against petitioner. Thus, the absence of Garcia/TransAmerican did not hamper the OAALA from
resolving the dispute between private respondents and petitioner.

In China Bank vs. Oliver,30 we held that the mortgagor, who allegedly misrepresented herself to be Mercedes
M. Oliver, the registered owner of TCT No. S-50195, is not an indispensable party in a case filed by a person
claiming to be the true registered owner, for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title against the
mortgagee, China Bank. We found therein that even without the mortgagor, the true Mercedes Oliver can
prove in her complaint that she is the real person referred in the title and she is not the same person using the
name who entered into a deed of mortgage with the mortgagee, China Bank.

In the present case, private respondents, in their complaint, alleged that the mortgage was constituted
without the prior written approval of the HLURB which is in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957. Petitioner’s
admission that it granted and released the loan without notifying the HLURB because of its belief that it was
not necessary to do so, is fatal to petitioner’s defense. As a consequence thereof, the mortgage constituted in
favor of petitioner can be declared invalid as against private respondents even without the presence of
Garcia/TransAmerican. It is worthy to mention that the assailed decision was rendered merely against
petitioner and had not made any pronouncement as to Garcia/TransAmerican’s liability to private respondents
for the non-completion of the projects; or to herein petitioner, as mortgagee.

The present case merely involves the liability of petitioner bank to private respondents as buyers of the lots
and townhouse units.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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