Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

7/24/2010
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Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled
bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek
a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court
has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of
a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a
viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it
has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-
fashioned democratic theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors
by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at
bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just