Succession Recit Notes - Pagayatan| Africa, B2021
I. Introduction to Succession
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value
of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law (Art. 774)
Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual
creation. Ownership and other real rights over property
are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by estate
and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition. They may also be acquired by
means of prescription (Art. 712).
• Basis of law of succession:
a. Family relations: individual seeks to accumulate
wealth in order to perform his duty of service to
the members of the family.
b. Right of property: it is incomplete without the
right to transmit it.
• Inheritance vs. Succession:
- Inheritance refers to the objective element, that is the
universality or entirety of the property, rights and
obligations (Art. 776)).
- Succession refers to the legal mode by which
inheritance is transmitted.
BALUS vs. BALUS
FACTS:
1. The parties in this case are the children of Rufo and
Sebastiana. Before Rufo died, he mortgaged the land
in question for a loan he obtained from Rural Bank of
Maigo. This was then foreclosed and the ownership of
the bank was consolidated as the property was not
redeem within the prescribed period.
2. 5 years after Rufo’s death, the parties executed an
extrajudicial settlement of estate, adjudicating 1/3
each.
3. 3 years after the execution, respondents bought the
land from the bank. They then filed complaint for
recovery of possession as the petitioner continues to
possess the lot.
4. RTC ordered that respondents give 1/3 of the lot to
the petitioner, but this was reversed by CA which
ordered the petitioner to the surrender the possession
of the property to the respondents.
5. Petitioner argues that they agreed to continue the co-
ownership fo the property and that by buying it back
from the bank inures to his benefit to give him right to
claim his portion comprising of 1/3 of the lot.
Issue & Ruling: The petitioner is not entitled to 1/3 of
the lot in question. His argument was premised on the fact
that at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate
of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his
heirs.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from
the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a
person consists of the property and transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership
of lot during his lifetime, land in question is no longer part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim at the time of
his death. Therefore, petitioner was wrong in assuming
that they were co-owners of the lot. Additionally, there is
nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement that
expressly stipulates that the parties will continue with their
supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.
HEIRS OF TUNGED v. STA. LUCIA REALTY
Facts:
1. Petitioners, who are IPs being members of the Ibaloi
tribe, filed an environmental case against the
respondents, who are real estate developer (Sta. Lucia
Realty) and claims to be the lot owner of the subject
land (Baguio Properties, Inc.).
2. They alleged that the respondents’ acts of demolishing
and bulldozing the subject land, which caused the
destruction of small and full grown trees and sayote
plants and other resources of the petitioners, violated
their rights pursuant to the IPRA and PD 1586.
3. RTC found that as the main relief prayed for by the
petitioners is the recognition of their right of
ownership. Without the con︎firmation of their rights as
IP to the property, the ︎filing of this case is premature.
As such, the petitioners do not have the legal
personality to initiate the case.
Issue & Ruling: The court erred in finding that the
petitioners have no legal standing. In the report and
recommendation of the NCIP on petitioners' Petition for
the Identi︎cation, Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral
Claim and Issuance of CALTs pending before the said
Commission, NCIP concluded that petitioners have
established themselves as the heirs of Tunged and that the
subject land was proven to be part of the vast tract of land
that Tunged and his successors possessed and occupied.
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Other ruling: The Court ruled that RTC erred in declaring
that they don’t have the jurisdiction over the case and that
such lies with NCIP. There are two conditions before a
case ma be brought to NCIP: (1) exhaustion of remedies
under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance
with condition precedent through the said certi︎cation by
the Council of Elders/Leaders—both presume that the
parties must come from the same ICC/IP. Since
respondents are not IPs, NCIP has no jurisdiction.
MALANG v. MOSON
Facts:
1. Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage
with Aida Limba, begetting three sons and a daughter.
He married for the second time another Muslim
named Jubaida Kado. No child was born out of the
second marriage. When Aida was pregnant with their
fourth child, Abdula divorced her.
2. In 1965, Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H.
Omar, but they were childless. Thereafter, he
contracted another marriage with Hadji Mabai, and
soon they had a daughter named Fatima. Not long
after, Abdula married three other Muslim women, but
he eventually divorced them.
3. Hadji Abdula then married petitioner Neng Malang,
his fourth wife, excluding the wives he divorced.
During their marriage, Abdula acquired properties
and deposited money in different banks. While he was
living with petitioner, Abdula died without leaving a
will.
4. Petitioner filed with the Shari'a District Court in
Cotabato City a petition for settlement of estate with
the prayer that letters of administration be issued in
the name of petitioner's niece.
5. This was opposed by Hadji Mohammad, the eldest son
of Hadji Abdula, ︎alleging that his father had no
conjugal partnership with petitioner because his
having contracted eight (8) marriages with different
Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that
provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal
partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage. Shari'a
District Court held that there was no conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and the
decedent primarily because the latter married eight
times.
Issue & Ruling: The record of the case is inadequate for
purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of
the petition and the case was remanded. However, the
Court made the following pronouncements in the
Succession Recit Notes - Pagayatan| Africa, B2021
discussion of the “watershed of collateral issues” presented
in this case:
1. All laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary
appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied. The Muslim
marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code is governed by the Civil
Code. Therefore, the marriage contracted with the
petitioner cannot be valid.
2. Since at the time of the celebration of the marriages in
question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage
relations, this shall also govern property relations
between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
The Court stated that Art. 144, which allows co-
ownership between a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife, is not applicable in the
present case because it requires that the man and
woman must be capacitated to marry. It cannot apple
to Hadji’s marriages subsequent to a valid and legally
existing marriage. However, they are not precluded
from proving which is their exclusive property.
3. Since the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (4 Feb 1977) was already in effect when
Hadji died, it should determine the identification of
the heirs in the order of intestate succession and their
respective shares of the heirs. The status and capacity
to succeed on the part of the individual parties who
entered into marriage will depend upon the law in
force at the time of the performance of the marriage
rite. The status and capacity to succeed of the children
will depend upon the law in force at the time of
conception or birth of the child.
Note: Due to the complexity of the issue, the Court
solicited the opinions of two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo
C. Puno and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura
(member of the presidential code commission which
reviewed Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).
ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
Facts:
1. Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens
who have resided in the PH for 30 years. They have an
adoptive daughter, Kyle. in 1979, Audrey died leaving
a will where she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard. This will was then admitted to probate by
CFI Rizal.
2. Later on, Richard married the respondent, with whom
he had two children. When Richard died, he left a will
bequeathing his entire estate to respondent, except his
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shares in A/G Interiors which he left to Kyle. The will
was also admitted to probate in Maryland and RTC
Makati.
3. In the first probate proceeding, petitioner filed a
motion to declare Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs
with he former being apportioned 3/4 and the latter
1/4 of the Audrey’s Makati properties. This was
granted.
4. In the second probate proceeding, project of partition
was filed wherein 2/5 of Richard's 3/4 undivided
interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to
Richard's three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the
State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject of
the legacy.” Partition was disapproved.
5. Respondent then filed a complaint for annulment of
the first proceeding, alleging that petitioner
disregarded the State of Maryland on the distribution
of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will and
since she devised her entire estate to Richard and the
latter left his entire estate, except the A/G Interior
shares, to respondent, the entire Makati property
should be hers. Petitioner’s defences were that his
thought it would be the best interest of the surviving
children that PH laws be applied.
Issue & Ruling: The order from the first probate
proceeding must be annulled. A decree of distribution of
the estate of a deceased person may be corrected by a
timely appeal. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree
of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. There is extrinsic fraud when a party
is prevented from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court.
It is undisputed that although she was residing in the PH,
she is domiciled in Maryland and he last will was executed
and probated before the Orphan's Court in Baltimore,
Maryland. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of
Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the
State of Maryland, pursuant to Art. 16, which provides
that “intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to order and amount of successional rights and
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
Succession Recit Notes - Pagayatan| Africa, B2021
Although foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey's estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland. The petitioner's failure to pro︎ficiently manage
the distribution of Audrey's estate according to the terms
of her will by failing to introduce in evidence the pertinent
laws of the State of Maryland amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Note: Action has not described yet. Prescription period
commenced from the discovery of the fraudulent act. In
this case, it was discovered in 1991 when the order of the
proceeding was decreed. The case was timely filed in 1993,
before the 4-year period.
A. Subjects of succession
• Decedent: general term applied to the person whose
property is transmitted through succession, whether or
not he left a will (Art. 775).
• Testator: decedent who left a will (Art. 775).
• Heir: person called to the succession either by the
provision of a will or by operation of law (Art. 782).
- He is a continuation of the personality of the
deceased.
- Kinds of heirs:
1. Compulsory: Those who succeed by force of law
to some portion of inheritance, the amount of
which is predetermined by the law. They cannot
be deprived by the testator except through valid
disinheritance.
2. Voluntary or testamentary: Those instituted in the
will to succeed to the inheritance or the portion
thereof which the testator can freely dispose. They
succeed by reason of a will.
3. Legal or intestate: succeed to the estate of the
decedent who dies without a valid will, or to the
portion of such estate not disposed of by will.
• Devisee: person to whom real property is given by
virtue of a will (Art. 782).
• Legatee: person to whom personal property is given by
virtue of a will (Art. 782).
• What is the importance of the distinction between heir
and devisee/legatee?
- Under the Spanish Civil Code, the heir, as the
continuation of the personality of the deceased,
answers for all the obligation of the deceased but his
own private property, while the devisee/legatee did
not respond for such obligations beyond the value of
the legacy.
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- However, such distinction does not matter under the
current law. The heirs and devisee/legatee are both
not responsible for such obligations beyond the value
of the legacy on the ground that debts are first paid
from the estate before such can be distributed among
the successors.
Should the testator dispose of the whole or part of his
property for prayers and pious works for the benefit of
his soul, in general terms and without specifying its
application, the executor, with the court's approval shall
deliver one-half thereof or its proceeds to the church or
denomination to which the testator may belong, to be
used for such prayers and pious works, and the other
half to the State, for the purposes mentioned in Article
1013 (Art. 1029).
• For the entities without juridical existence, they succeed
not by virtue of capacity, but by reason of this provision
conferring capacity upon them.
A testamentary disposition may be made to the State,
p rov i n c e s, mu n i c i p a l c o r p o r at i o n s, p r i vat e
corporations, organizations, or associations for
religious, scientific, cultural, educational, or charitable
purposes.
All other corporations or entities may succeed under a
will, unless there is a provision to the contrary in their
charter or the laws of their creation, and always subject
to the same (Art. 1026).
• This should not be confused with one which is merely a
condition or burden imposed upon an heir. devisee, or
legatee (ex: I impose upon my heir the obligation to
devote 1k every year for the benefit of my soul).
• The real beneficiary is the soul of the testator. It confers
capacity to succeed upon something that has no legal
existence either as natural or as artificial person.
NERI v. AKUTIN
Facts:
1. Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12,
1931, had by his first marriage six children, and by his
second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children.
2. The trial court found that Agapito, Rosario and the
children of Getulia did not receive from the testator no
property whatsoever. But clause 8 of the will is invoked
wherein the testator made the statement that the
children by his first marriage had already received
their shares in his property, excluding what he had
given them as aid during their financial troubles and
Succession Recit Notes - Pagayatan| Africa, B2021
the money they had borrowed from him which he
condoned in the will.
3. SC annulled the institution of heirs and declared a
total intestacy. The respondents filed this MR on the
grounds that there is no preterition as to the children
of the ︎1st marriage who have received their shares in
the property left by the testator, and (2) that, even
assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect
would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs
but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.
Issue & Ruling: The Court can rely only on the findings
of the trial court that the inventory indicates that the
property of Neri has remained intact and that no portion
has been given to the children of the first marriage. Neri
left his property by universal title to the children by his
second marriage, and did not expressly disinherit his
children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to
them, either. This is a case of preterition governed by Art.
814, which provides that, “preterition of one or all of the
forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies
and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not
inofficious.” It must be observed that the institution of
heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct
from legacies or betterment. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined.
Legacy refers to specifi︎c property bequeathed by a
particular or special title. The ︎rst is also different from a
betterment which should be made expressly as such (article
828). The only instance of implied betterment recognized
by law is where legacies are made which cannot be
included in the free portion (article 828). But again an
institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy.
The total nullity of the testamentary disposition would
have the effect, not of depriving totally the instituted heir
of his share in the inheritance, but of placing him and the
other forced heirs upon the basis of equality. This is also in
consonance with the presumptive intention of the testator.
Preterition, generally speaking, is due merely to mistake or
inadvertence without which the testator may be presumed
to treat alike all his children. It is true in the instant case
where the testator omitted the children by his ︎1st marriage
upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already
more shares in his property than those given to the
children by his second marriage. The institution of heirs
should be annulled and intestate succession declared open.
MR denied.
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