THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AUGUSTO LORETO RINGOR, JR. , accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 123918, December 9, 1999, 320 SCRA 342
Justice Purisima

Facts:
This is an automatic review of the decision of RTC branch 6 in Baguio City finding
accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him
to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 13102-R and also guilty of illegal
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866.
On June 23, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M, Fely Batanes, a waitress at People's Restaurant
located at Kalantiao St., Baguio City, saw appellant Ringor and his two companions enter the
restaurant. After seating themselves, the group ordered a bottle of gin then appellant Ringor
approached one of the tables where Florida, the restaurant's cook was drinking beer. Without any
warning, appellant pulled Florida's hair and poked a knife on the latter's throat. Florida stood up
and pleaded with appellant not to harm him. Appellant relented and released his grip on
Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant together with his companions.
However, a few minutes later he was back with a gun and menacingly entered
the restaurant. Not encountering any resistance, he proceeded to the kitchen where Florida
worked. Stealthily approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired six successive shots at
Florida who fell down. His evil deed accomplished, appellant left the kitchen and fled.
Appellant was chased by a man who while running, shouted at onlookers that the person
he was running after was armed and had just killed somebody. Alerted, SPO2 Fernandez, who
was then in the vicinity, went into action and nabbed appellant. He frisked appellant and
recovered from him a Paltik revolver, caliber. 38,with Serial Number 853169.
Upon verification in camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed firearm
holder and that the said gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove
Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was
sentenced to death. He was found guilty of separate charge of possession of an unlicensed
firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.
Hence, this automatic review.

Issues:
Whether the court erred in applying the “used of unlicensed firearm” under the
amendatory law Republic Act 8294 which took effect in 1997 this case which occurred in 1994

Ruling:
The trial court erred in appreciating the used of unlicensed firearm for the murder of
accused appellant.
On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of “use of unlicensed firearm” in the
commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in appreciating the same to qualify to
death the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted that at the
time accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of a firearm used in
taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder.
We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
‘There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or muder, the
fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for
the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987
Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument
used in destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory
of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
 A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a
qualifying circumstance.’
Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the
murder committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed
by the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
to raise the penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of commission of the
crime.
The amendatory law making the “use of an unlicensed firearm” as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied here because the said provision of R.A.
No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms
under P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina nd reiterated in the recent case
of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez,that in cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession
of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
8294. There under, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply considered as
an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer as a separate
offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms shall be imposed provided
that no other crime is committed. In other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a
special aggravating circumstance.
It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of
firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that there can no longer be any prosecution for the
offense of illegal possession of firearms. In general, all pending cases involving illegal
possession of firearms should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly
provided in R. A. No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide, under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’ etat, under Section 3)
Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, where the new law is favorable to the
accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus, insofar as it spares accused-appellant a separate
conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given retroactive
application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 13102-R is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 100210, April 1, 1998, 288 SCRA 542
Justice Martinez

Facts:
This is an appeal seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the
order of the Regional Trial Court.
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under
Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as amended, before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but it remained unserved as he
could not be found.
On June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the
subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six (6) rounds of
live ammunition were found in his possession.
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Antonio Tujan filed on July 16, 1990, a motion to quash the Information in Criminal Case
Illegal Possession of Firearm filed in RTC Makati on the ground that he "has been previously in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged in Criminal Case for subversion in RTC
Manila. The said ground is based on Sections 3 (h) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In support, he contends that "common crimes such as illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in subversion," citing the cases
of Misolas vs. Panga, et al. (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648) and Enrile
vs. Salazar, et al. (G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217).
Antonio Tujan then avers that "the present case is the twin prosecution" of "the earlier
subversion case" and, therefore, he "is entitled to invoke the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy."
The petitioner opposed the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan does not stand in
jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the
subversion case, and (b) the offense charged against him in Criminal Case No. 64079 is for
Subversion, punishable under Republic Act No. 1700; while the present case is for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion, punishable under a
different law (Presidential Decree No. 1866).
The RTC granted the motion and was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for
review.

Issue:
Whether RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied retroactively in this
case

Ruling:
The motion to quash filed in the trial court did not actually raise the issue of double
jeopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the private respondent has not
even been arraigned in the first criminal action for subversion. It is clear from the foregoing, that
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with the law and jurisprudence
and thus should be reversed.
However, While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as
amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of Republic
Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended, has
substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law
being favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent, should be
given retroactive effect.
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondent's case has never been
raised as an issue by the parties — obviously because the said law came out only several months
after the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated and while the present
petition is pending with this Court — we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of justice
by applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it regardless of whether or not the accused or
any party has sought the application of the beneficent provisions of the repealing law
R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent. The repeal by
said law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and absolute. There was no
saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act with was
penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is
obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the
repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-
private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by
subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no longer a crime.
Wherefore the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, including the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A. Tujan in Criminal
Case No. 64079 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is hereby DISMISSED.
The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion against the same accused in Criminal Case No. 1789 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED AMENDED to Simple Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO LACSON, respondent.
G.R. No. 149453, May 28, 2002, 382 SCRA 365
RESOLUTION

Facts:
The PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the
killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with the
police in Quezon City on May 18, 1995. On May 22 same year, morning papers carried the news
that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members
was a “rub-out” or summary execution and not a shootout. On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon
dela Cruz, corroborated the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was
with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they
were killed in Commonwealth Avenue
On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director of Investigation, filed
murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and
personnel of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG). The nextof-
kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel.
On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 11 informations for murder against Respondent Panfilo Lacson and the 25
accused policemen as pricipal. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were
remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were amended
downgrading the participation of respondent lacson from principal into an accessory.
With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as none of the "principal" accused in
the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
citing Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred
to the Regional Trial Court which the the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997,
amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in
Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include
all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a
government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all
cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval.
In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of
the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal
cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer
of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations
for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in
discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before the
accused were arraigned, prosecution witnesses Delos Reyes, Dela Cruz, Capili and Gomez
recanted their affidavits while several private complainants filed their affidavit of desistance.
With these, the 26 accused including respondent Lacson, filed separate but identical
motions to make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the warrants of
arrest, hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants and dismiss the cases should the trial court
find lack of probable cause.
On March 29, 1999, the Criminal Case was dismissed for lack of probable cause. On
March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice new
affidavits regarding the KBG incident and a panel to investigate was formed where respondent
Lacson was subpoened to attend the investigation. Respondent Lacson, et. Al, filed a petition for
prohibition with the application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction with the RTC of Manila primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the
preliminary investigation invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy but was
denied.
 On June 6, 2001, new informations for murder were filed involving the same KBG
incident which charges 34 people including the former 26 respondents. Respondent Judge ruled
that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new
Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after said cases were dismissed on March 29,
1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the
petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more)
cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued.
On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals characterized the termination of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as “provisional dismissal,” and considered Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
respondents.

Issue:
Whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the
respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang

Ruling:
The In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to
determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether
or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be
enjoined.
Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson
should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or
absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve
disputed facts and arguable questions of law.
8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.”
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect.
However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases.
Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of
the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4)
whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases
against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who
moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it
is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the
multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year
bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the
date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were
received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the
opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to
penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can
therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 309
Justice Sarmiento

Facts
The appellant is appealing to the court regarding his participation in the killing of
a certain Loly Penacerrada. He claims that he did not participate in the killing based on the claim
that he was not present in the said act.
At around 9:00 pm of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada,
and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife
allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately
ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in
Poblacion, Ajuy.
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses to the municipal building and the couple
informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy
Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. The group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto
proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly
occurred. There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. The group stayed for about an hour during which time
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the
immediate surroundings. The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to
conduct further investigations.
Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay
Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion
arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who
had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own
investigation.
The autopsy of the deceased was performed at 11:20 a.m. Report shows the following:
 Sixteen wounds: five fatal as they penetrated the internal organs
 Multiple puncture, stab, incision, and lacerated wounds-
The prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness. He allegedly saw all the
accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada,
near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place
was then awash in moonlight. Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in
stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of the
Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan".
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the
deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein
accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep in his house which was
located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime when the incident happened. He
asserted that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales
went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.
The trial court disregarded the defense and believed the testimony of Huntoria. Custodia
Gonzales Sr., appealed which the CA found no merit.
Issue:
Whether the conviction of appellant Gonzales of murder based on the testimony of
prosecution witness, Hustoria, is valid

Ruling:
Court found that the prosecution’s stand is insufficient to convict Custodio .
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be
desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements even gave the date
of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch he made of the scene
is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations
relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. If, as the
version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses,
there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of
attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the
killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place
would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities.
Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on
February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that
Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins.
Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing of the victim..
Dr. Rojas admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus,
insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission
that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower
courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-
proclaimed eyewitness
However, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed,
by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. It also bears stressing that there is nothing
in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that
inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable
cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof.
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the
act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed
or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the
appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of
proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce
some effect in the external world." In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act"
committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that
produced his death. Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he
did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say,
because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does
not know what specific act was performed by the appellant.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he
only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing
on February 21, 1981.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-35748, December 14, 1931, 56 Phil 353
Justice Villa-real

Facts:
Defendant Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage,
cohabited with her co-defendant Martin Atienza from March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol,
Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, complainant Joaquin then filed with the
justice of the peace a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao
and Castor de la Cruz. On the same date, said defendants were arrested on a warrant and were
released on bail on May 20, 1930. Pending preliminary investigation, the two defendants begged
the municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to complainant Joaquin
to withdraw the complaint and in turn, defendants bind themselves to discontinue cohabitation
with a promise from Martin Atienza not to live again in the barrio of Masocol. Complainant
Joaquin acceded and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of adultery. Defendant Atienza
leave Masocol and went to live in Sto. Nino Paombong.

About November 20, 1930, the defendant Silvestre met her son Nicolas de la Cruz, in the
barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home
to the village of Masocol, and remained there. Defendant Atienza, who had continued to cohabit
with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz.

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la
Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, defendant Atienza told said
couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it as revenged
upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and
his co-defendant, Silvestre. Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol so no one dared say
anything to him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away. Couple Nicolas and
Antonia went to the barrio lieutenant to ask for help but they were too late because they already
heard cries of “Fire!Fire!”. The fire destroyed about 48 houses and witnesses saw defendants
Atienza and Silvestre leaving the house on fire.

The Court of First Instance convicted defendants Atienza and Silvestre of Arson. The
Court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmation of the decision with
regard to Atienza, but alleges that lower court erred in convicting Silvestre as accomplice and
erred in not acquitting the latter on the ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, or reasonable
doubt.

Issue:
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in convicting Silvestre as accomplice in the
crime of arson without evidence of moral or material cooperation

Ruling:
No. The lower court is not correct because the complicity which is penalized requires a
certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or
material, through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no
evidence of moral or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in
question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute
cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the
crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not
make her liable as an accomplice.
 For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere
passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by
article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively,
or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a
barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be
vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and
penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with

reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-
appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted.
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CATALINO APOSTOL, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 5126, September 2, 1909, 14 Phil 92
Justice Arellano

Facts:
On December 16, 1907, there were five individuals, including Catalino Apostol, who
went to the house of Pedro Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul to inquire
about their missing carabaos. Tabilisima, Vergara, and Manipul said that they knew nothing
about it and were asked to leave the house which they refused to do so. Accused Catalino
Apostol thereafter set fire to the hut and the same was burnt down.
According to the trial court, the testimonies of the injured party fully established the
responsibility of the accused and the act comes within the provisions of Article 549 of the Penal
code. Accused Apostol was sentenced to sixteen years and one day of cadena temporal.
Accused Apostol then appealed and claimed the absence of proof of criminal intent and
that in view of the fact that the burnt hut was situated in an uninhabited place, it is not proper to
apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether proof of criminal intent is necessary to warrant conviction

Ruling:
No, criminal intent is not necessary.
Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the
part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.
(Art. 1, Penal Code.)
Wherefore, for the reasons above set forth, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed.
As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the hut, Pedro Tabilisima testified
that he and his friends were in the same; that the accused and his companions arrived at 8 p.m.
and questioned them about carabaos that they said had been stolen from them; that after they
replied that they knew nothing, the former set fire to the house and they jumped out of it; that the
witness and two companions lived in the house; that it was situated in an uninhabited place,
surrounded by fields; that the nearest houses were far away, and cries could not be heard from
one house to another; and that the burnt house was not worth more than P1, because it was a
small one, the witness himself having constructed it.
Celestino Vergara says that several individuals arrived at 8 o’clock at night, asked them
for carabaos that they claimed to have lost, wounded Tranquilino Manipul, who was asleep, and
Pedro Tabilisima, forced them to leave the house, and as they did not want to do so for fear of
being assaulted the accused set fire to the same; they tried to put out the fire as long as they
could, but when no longer able jumped out of the house. The house was in an uninhabited
locality, in the fields, the nearest house being a small store to which the cry of a person might
carry, and the neighboring houses could be seen.
Tranquilino Manipul testified in almost the same terms as this last witness. The argument
which the defense advances, based on article 554, which in connection with 553 punishes the
setting fire to a building intended for habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply, because
the article in question refers to an edifice intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place
at a time when the same is unoccupied. It is article 549, which punishes with the very severe
penalties of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to any edifice,
farmhouse, hut, shed, or vessel in port, with knowledge that one or more persons were within the
same," that must be applied.
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-6486, March 2, 1911, 18 Phil 504
Justice Moreland

Facts:
The herein accused is a justice of peace of Baggao in Cagayan which was convicted with
the crime of malversation of funds by the Court of First Instance.
On October 2, 1909, 16 separate civil cases were filed by Juan Canillas against 16
individuals arising from breach of contracts before the court of the accused, who was the justice
of peace of Baggao, Cagayan. All cases were decided in favor of plaintiff Canillas. Hence, the
defendants appealed and deposited a bond of P16 and P50 each as required by law. Thereafter,
plaintiff Cannillas alleged that the sureties of said bonds were insolvent.
Therefore, erein defendant-appellant ordered the cancellation of the bonds and required
each of the appellants of the 16 cases to file another bonds within 15 days which none of the
latter have complied and presented. As a result, the final judgement was promulgated ordering
the sums attached and delivered the same to plaintiff Canillas.
The attorney of the defendants-appellants in the said cases thereafter presented this
complaint against Rafael Catolico for the crime of malversation of funds by the Court of First
Instance. The court convicted defendant Catolico of the crime Malversation of Funds.

Issue:
Whether the defendant-appellant committed the crime of malversation of public funds

Ruling:
No. The case made against the appellant lacks many of the essential elements required
by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds.
The accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person;
neither did he feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in
good faith under the belief that he was acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered
the sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants - appellants in the sixteen actions referred
to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed
and the judgments in his court had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the
plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment which he held iny those cases, can not be considered
an appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. He believed that,
as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right under the law to
cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to
require the filing of new undertakings, giving the parties ample time within which to do so, to
dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were not filed, and to declare the judgment final.
He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment had become final, the
sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments in the actions in which
said sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially and legally in making such
applications.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi nisi rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained
of be innocent.
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of
justice of the peace. He had jurisdiction of the actions before him. He had a right and it was
his duty to require the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper
undertaking with solvent sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the ?256 to
the plaintiff in said cases, he may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond
the limits of his jurisdiction and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so
far as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind
operating upon a state of facts. Giving the act complained of the signification most detrimental
to the appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial
function, and not an intention to deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had
back of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that
honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally and justly due, and not to enrich
himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was an error committed by a court, not an
act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the
commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused
committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal
intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind
that the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us
the act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the
sense that it would have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other proceeding in
the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a
degree in fact as properly to subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from
office. But, from the facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption
of criminal intention arises from the act.

Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even
though it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined,
and penalized in Act No. 1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for
violations of the preceding section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which
any person described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to
produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on the demand of any officer
authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed to
be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have been put to personal uses or
used for personal ends by such person within the meaning of the preceding section."
Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case against
the person accused. If he present evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or
property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and the prima facie case destroyed.
In the case at bar it was unnecessary for the accused to offer any such evidence, for the reason
that the people's own pleading alleged, and its own proofs presented, along with the criminal
charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had not been put to personal uses or
used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution demonstrated, both by the allegations
in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that the absence of the
funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively and
completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from the absence of
the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were
presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by other facts which
absolutely prevented its creation.
On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if. any, is that of estafa, as defined in
paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to does not
arise. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere
failure of the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even aprima
facie case. (U. S. vs. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep:, 238; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Hep., 580.)
Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts
from which conversion necessarily follows. (U. S. vs. Morales,supra.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from
custody forthwith.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry,", accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993, 219 SCRA 185
Justice Regalado

Facts:
The accused appellants were charged by kidnapping for ransom which was allegedly
committed on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Mrs. At around 5:00 in the afternoon, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place.
Thereafter, it’s time for Mrs. Socorro to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig so she got into
the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo as the driver. After the car turned right in a
corner of Araneta Ave., it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car
beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and
went to Ma. Socorro and poke (sic) a gun at her . Isabelo, who had earlier told her that Enrique
is his nephew announced, 'ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you.' She said she has
money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
P7,000.00 and was taken . Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma.
Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St.,
Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro
clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread
(sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her. The car sped off north
towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue
a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two
for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she
refused. Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga.
Ma. Socorro jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway
and was finally able to flag down a fish vendor's van. Her dress had blood because, according to
Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her
dress was torn too. Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM and both accused were
arrested the next day. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at
PCI Bank, Makati.
The The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to
step out of the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway.

Issue:
Whether accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged which may
further be classified as “highway robbery” under PD 532

Ruling:
No there is no kidnapping for ransom committed. There is no showing whatsoever that
appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts
against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats
or intimidation. For this crime to exists, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the case, the restraint of her
freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders. This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
 Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery). PD No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined
or particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was
casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case. This is not
justified by the accused's intention.
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2
months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs.
Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELIM, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 386
Justice Callejo Sr.

Facts:
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and
Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder of Modesto Manalo Bantas, who was
adopted by the father of the accused. On January 23, 1999, Modesto was forcibly taken by
defendants who were armed from his home, Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and
Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. Rita and Randy (his wife and son) was
warned not to leave the house. Modesto’s body was discovered on January 25, 1999by Randy
and his relatives.

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge using denial and alibi as their
evidence.

The RTC of Urdaneta found the above-mentioned accused appellants guilty for
aggravated murder and was sentenced to death. The trial court ruled that stating accused, armed
with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto and once inside with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premedidation, conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct
Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and
prevented the wife and son of Modesto from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior
strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Hence this automatic review of the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether the crime charged should be kidnapping under Article 267 as identified in the
information and not murder

Ruling:
The crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the
material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law
violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.
A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al., that for kidnapping to
exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive
the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely
an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. If the
primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the
victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the
killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.The crime committed
would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged
with — that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific
intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state
of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain
criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to
act.17 Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention
in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the
state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. 18 Kidnapping and murder are specific
intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be
inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on
record. Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the
reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an
essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general
rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence
of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such
as murder.
The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives
comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim.
In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive
for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the
motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive
is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the
malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely
to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting
Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no
specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive
Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.
Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias “RONALD”, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-66884, May 28, 1988, 161 SCRA 623
Justice Grino-Aquino

Facts:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of
murder in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December
30. 1980, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store
adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the
accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half pack of Hope cigarettes.
While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and
Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina,
upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul." Two persons, one
of whom she later identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the interior of the store
through the main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. Igawas mo ang
iyang armas" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two or more shots at
the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's
firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took
her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled. Months after the incident Victorina, was summoned
to the Buenavista police station where she saw the identified the accused as the man who killed
her husband.
The accused ‘s defense is alibi where he alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay in
Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered
dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused also capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him
by name. That circumstance allegedly renders the identification of the accused, as the perpetrator
of her husband's killing, insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively
identified by the widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him
inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an
incandescent lamp outside.

Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit
Lumber Company' s Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga, and the NALCO Daily Time Record of
Silverio Perol, showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but
was at work on December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this piece of
rebuttal evidence.
The Court of First Instance found Temblor guilty of Murder. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in finding that he was positively identified by the
prosecution witness as the killer and in rejecting the allegation of lack of motive in killing
Cagampang and

Ruling:
The appeal deserves no merit.

The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in
observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible
evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava. 149 SCRA.
582). The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victoria Cagampang did not
diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively identified the accused as her
husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is
credible, probable and entirely in accord with human experience.

The Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial
court which opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was
motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the
sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in
Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas"
campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively
identified (People vs. Tan, Jr.. 145 SCRA 615).

The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Gagampang and
taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. their flight was an implied
admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor,]49 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).

WHEREFORE, the judge merit appealed from is affirmed.