Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
People
G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6] dated August
29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias
Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a
sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are
prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party in the amojunt to be proved during the trial.
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not prejudicial to
the child-victim’s development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and he should be charged
under the Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
HELD:
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules
and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act
prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits
any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty
and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in Section 10(a) of Republic
Act No. 7610 before the phrase “be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development” supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse;
second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial
to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as
a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as
slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the
protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law, child
abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant
falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1
of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act
No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped
her knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with
physical injuries, as duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal must determine, in light
of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in its comment,3 as
follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary
School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March
14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not
obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on
his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a
desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two
of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident
(TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay
Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a
doctor. Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police
Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case
was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo,
upon approval and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime
of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1
of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him on
different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to
lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A.
7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated on May 11,
2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court
a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum of it,
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child
abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner’s constitutional right to due process
and her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not violated when the
essential elements of the crime charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are mainly factual and,
therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in
accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that
the information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.11
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in her present recourse.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof law. The immediate implication of the
limitation is to have the findings of fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the
Court by virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of
fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went
beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g)
the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial
appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all
other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further exception is
recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by MichaelRyan to
maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her
maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of
the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the
physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at
her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the
child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita
Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the
victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had
sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the trial
judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation of
blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by
pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the
doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said area.
She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the
victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound
No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping
as he walked.14
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by
wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need
not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and
weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits
and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but
instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him
down on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner,
compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established
circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded
and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only
maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also
experienced the petitioner’s cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in
Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents
manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26,
2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and
substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and that her
constitutional and statutory right to due process of law was consequently violated.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the petitioner in the context of the
statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the
petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the
challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the
information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so,
resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence had been adduced
thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge
for the omission was misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the
victim’s feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and
the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well
as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower
courts committed a plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v.
People,21 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and
determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to
recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120
of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended
its commission; (2) the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now
do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final
reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. 1âwphi 1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to
by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby
fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of
such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts
should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should
prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex
delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or
waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and in that respect
the Court believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages,
considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her being a
public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act
No. 7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public
good and as a deterrent to other public school teachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family
Code, supra, against the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The
lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the granting of a measure of
compensation in the formof temperate damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be
recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being
no question aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat least ₱20,000.00 are
warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum
shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No.
7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and
one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the
ground that the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of
Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum
period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the
information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however,
because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor
in its minimum period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the
minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and
seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate
sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision correccional in the
maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years,
two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine
1âwphi 1
months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS
that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the
maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each
item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision2 and September 26,
2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed with modification the
April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30 (RTC), finding petitioner Christian
Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 76104(RA
7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act," in relation to Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
(Rules on Child Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610
which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include statements pertaining to the delivery of private complainant
AAA’s6 baby. The Amended Information7 reads:
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of Violation of
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in the City
of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a 23 year old
man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the
innocence and lack of worldly experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time, having been born on
November 3, 1980, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said AAA, by
persuading and inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely
pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition prejudicial to her development, to the damage and
prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a
choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was a sophomore college student at the
University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu
City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became
sweethearts.9 Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her
uncle. In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This
was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and second weeks of May 1998, on August 31,
1998 and in November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City, except the one in August which occurred in
Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and later gave birth on March 8, 1999.11
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to
promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal
method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and
consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were
unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s mother confronted Caballo to find out what his
plans were for AAA, he assured her that he would marry her daughter.12
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as
he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three
boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1)
week in a certain Litang Hotel and another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to
the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of
AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected
because she was still studying.13
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it sentenced
Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from prision correccional, in its maximum period
of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum. It also ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00.14
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s
ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated the crime charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article VI
of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support a charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.16
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that Caballo
persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal knowledge with him. Towards this end, Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on to promise marriage to her. He also assured AAA that she
would not get pregnant because he would be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon these repeated
coaxing and assuring words that AAA succumbed to Caballo’s evil desires which deflowered and got her pregnant.
On this score, it observed that consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct and therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable.17 It also found basis to sustain the award of
moral damages.18
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on September 26, 2011.19
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "due to the coercion or
influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. Consequently, the interpretation which the Court accords herein
would determine whether or not the CA erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b) of the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal method" should not
be considered as "persuasion" or "inducement" sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned offense, asserting
that these should be coupled with some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse. He further alleges
that he and AAA were sweethearts which thus, made the sexual intercourse consensual.
In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA 7610
as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon Caballo’s repeated assurances and persuasion
that AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that the sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo,
deserves scant consideration in view of the Court’s ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x
xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing offense are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. Records disclose that Caballo had
succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all those instances, was still a minor.
Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence of the second element. On this note, the defense submits that
AAA could not be considered as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the incidents to do
not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence" on Caballo’s part.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of
affording "special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and
other conditions prejudicial to their development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions for their commission."23 It
also furthers the "best interests of children" and as such, its provisions are guided by this standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the same law in order to penalize child
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a definition of who is considered a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." As illumined in Olivarez,25 citing People v. Larin26 and Amployo v.
People,27 the final version of the aforesaid provision was a product of various deliberations to expand its original
coverage to cases where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or
intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be
observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress
really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct,
not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.
This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or profit.’ I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be
child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who is being
misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other
consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for
money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been used for profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will
agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR
FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT,
SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change that too?
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable ‘child abuse’?
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment
is approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse
or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their
development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party’s free will.28 Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another
person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free
will and substitutes another’s objective."29 Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified as "coercion" and
"influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery
and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto
ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart
defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give
consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The
mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her
than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and
to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection
against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even
unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by
law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x x32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity
between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will
upon the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence. Records reveal that Caballo
1âw phi 1
repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that
she would not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were
meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with which he
succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and unexpected
manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her
in, to a certain extent, a position of duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances
and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a
situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other choice
would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law, and that
AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011 Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED .
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on November 19, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00769-MIN affirming, but with modifications as to the penalties, damages and interests imposed, the conviction by
the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Butuan City, Branch 1,3 of Samuel "Tiw-Tiw" Sanico (accused-appellant) for one
count of rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353,5 and lascivious conduct under Article 3366 of the same code, in relation to R.A. No.
7610,7otherwise known as "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
Antecedents
Two separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant before the RTC, viz:
That at more or less 1:00 P.M. of April 19, 2006 at XXX City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA,8 a twelve (12) year [old] minor, by touching her breast against her
will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in such amount as may be proven in Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended in relation to R.A. [No.] 7610)9 (Citation
omitted)
That sometime in the year 2005 at XXX City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, threat or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a twelve (12) year old minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 266-A, par. (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, par. 6(10) of R.A. [No.] 8353 in relation
toR[.]A[.] [No.] 7610)10 (Citation omitted)
The accused-appellant went into hiding but was subsequently arrested in his hometown in Leyte on May 13, 2008.
He was arraigned on August 26, 2008, during which heentered a not guilty plea.11
During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following: (a) the identity of the accused-
appellant and the fact of his arrest in Leyte; (b) AAA was more than 12 but less than 13 years of age at the time the
acts complained of were allegedly committed by the accused-appellant; and (c) the incident on April 19, 2006
occurred in AAA’s residence.12
In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered the testimonies of AAA, her mother BBB, and Dr. Roslyn
D.Orais (Dr. Orais), medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Caraga Region. On the other hand,
the accused-appellant was the defense’s lone witness.13 Version of the Prosecution
As indicated in her birth certificate, AAA was born on June 14, 1993. Her mother BBB works as a cook, while her
father is a "trisikad" driver. AAA was 12 years old when the acts complained of were allegedly committed by the
accused-appellant, but was already 15 years of age at the time she testified in court.14
The accused-appellant was a pig butcher and ice cream vendor. He and his children rented a room for about ten
(10) to eleven (11) years in the house where AAA lives with her family. Thereafter, the accused-appellant’s family
moved to their own house built near AAA’s residence.15
AAA claimed that the accused-appellant raped her in 2005, but she could not recall the exact month and date. She
remembered though that she was raped at around 2:00 p.m.while she was washing dishes in the kitchen. There was
nobody else in the house except her and the accused-appellant. He approached and held her hands tightly. She
boxed the accused-appellant, but he pushed her. Thereafter, he threatened to kill her if she would shout. Knowing
that the accused-appellant was a pig butcher, AAA was overcome by fear. He then succeeded in removing her
clothes and undergarments and pushing her against the wall. He took off his short pants and briefs and inserted his
penis into her vagina for two to three minutes. She felt pain. The accused-appellant then pulled up his short pants
and laid down in the sofa.16
AAA alleged that she was again raped for six or seven times, but she endured the harrowing experiences in silence
due to the accused-appellant’s threat to kill her. She also dreaded the possibilities of quarrels and deaths, which
would ensue if her parents find out.17
On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was napping in a room with her niece. AAA woke up when she felt that
the accused-appellant was touching her. AAA rose and repeatedly boxed the accused-appellant, but the latter held
her tightly, pulled up her clothes and mashed her breast. Her father, CCC, was just in another room atthat time, but
out of fear, AAA kept quiet. When the accused-appellant took off his short pants and inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina, the latter resisted. Being merely built out of wood, the house shook, which caused CCC towake up. CCC
lost consciousness for a short period of time when he caught the accused-appellant performing lascivious acts on
AAA. The accused-appellant then seized the opportunity to flee.18
At around 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Dr. Orais performed a medico- genital examination on AAA and found the
latter to have suffered from sexual abuse. AAA’s hymen was "coaptated" or slightly open and bore "old healed
laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock positions". The hymenal laceration was possibly caused by "an injury secondary to
intravaginal penetration by a blunt object". No human spermatozoa was found in AAA’s vagina. Dr. Orais, however,
explained that even in the presence of seminal fluid, there are cases whenno sperm can be found. Dr. Orais likewise
noted no physical or extra-genital injurieson AAA, but found ample evidence of sexual intercourse having occurred
more than one but less than four month/s ago. Dr. Orais also testified that AAA was at times uncooperative, timid,
and emotionally restrained.19
BBB testified that it was CCC who saw the accused-appellant touching AAA’s breast. BBB sought payment of moral
damages.20
The accused-appellant was the lone witness for the defense. At the time he testified in court, he was 53 years old.
He stated that for years, he had lived in the house of AAA’s family, but was no longer a resident therein when the
acts complained ofwere allegedly committed.21
On April 19, 2006, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree with CCC in the latter’s house lasting from 8:00 a.m.
to 12:00 p.m. As the two were both drunk, the accused-appellant slept in the salawhile CCC did so in his room. The
accused-appellant woke up from slumber when AAA touched the former’s pocket to search for money.She got some
coins and bills. The accused-appellant, in turn, touched AAA’s chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants.
AAA complied. As the accused-appellant was touching AAA’s breast, CCC woke up. Upon seeing what was taking
place, CCC got a boloto hack the accused-appellant, but the latter escaped.22
The accused-appellant testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina. He admitted touching AAA on
April 19, 2006 but he did so only because the latter initiated it. He also claimed that he was very close to AAA and
he treated her as if she were his own child.23
On October 13, 2009, the RTC rendered an Omnibus Judgment24 convicting the accused-appellant of one count of
rapeand of acts of lasciviousness. The RTC found AAA’s testimony of what had transpired as sincere and truthful,
noting though that a specific allegation as to the exact date and month of the commission of rape in 2005 was
absent. The trial court thus pointed out the settled doctrine that in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission,25 the latter not being an
element of the crime.26 Further, the accused-appellant cannotascribe any ill-motive against AAA which could have
induced the latter to fabricate such grave charges. The accused-appellant’s flight after he learned that charges were
filed against him likewise worked to disfavor him. If he were indeed innocent, he would have stayed to vindicate
himself from the accusations.27
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in the offenses
as charge[d], in criminal case no. 12022 for rape[,] he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay [AAA][,] through
her father[,] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
([P]50,000.00) as moral damages. In criminal case no 12021 for acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced tosuffer
imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. He isfurther ordered to pay [AAA] the sum of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos ([P]25,000.00) as moral damages and another Twenty Five Thousand Pesos ([P]25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
He shall serve his sentence at Davao Prison and Penal Farms, Panabo City, Davao del Norte.In the service of his
sentence[,] he shall be credited with the full time benefit of his preventive imprisonment provided he agrees in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners[,] otherwise[,] if he does not[,] he
shall be entitled with only four-fifths (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 as amended of the
[RPC].
SO ORDERED.28
The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition before the CA.29 He argued that while the time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape, a complainant’s inability to give the exact dates, during
which she was allegedly raped, puts her credibility in question.30
AAA alleged that she was raped on April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m. However, Dr. Orais, who conducted a
medical examination on AAA three hours after the incident, testified that human spermatozoa was absent in AAA’s
vagina and the hymenal lacerations found were possibly inflicted more than a month ago.31
The accused-appellant admitted though that he could be held liable for acts of lasciviousness for touching AAA’s
breast and asking her to remove her short pants.32
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on its part, sought the dismissal of the appeal.33 It contended that the
accused-appellant’s denial of the charges against him cannot prevail over AAA’s positive testimony. Further, the
date of the commission ofrape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s
narration practically hinge thereon.34 Such circumstance does not obtain in the case under review.35
The accused-appellant was also nonchalant in admitting that he touched AAA’s breast and asked her toremove her
short pants. The accused-appellant’s behavior exhibited no less than his lewd designs on AAA.36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The October 13, 2009 Omnibus Judgment
of the [RTC] of Butuan City, Branch 1, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 12021, [the accused-appellant] is sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayoras
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum. The moral and exemplary damages of
[P]25,000.00 each awarded by the court a quoare reduce[d] to [P]15,000.00 each. He is further ordered to pay civil
indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine of [P]15,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 12022, being in accordance with the law and the evidence, [the accused-appellant] is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the awards of civil indemnity of [P]50,000.00 and moral damages of
[P]50,000.00, [the accused-appellant] is further ordered to pay AAA exemplary damages in the amount of
[P]30,000.00.
3) [The accused-appellant] is further ordered to pay interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annumon all the
damages awarded in this case fromdate of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.38
In additionally directing the payment of fine and civil indemnity, and modifying both the penalty imposed upon the
accused-appellant and the award of damages to AAA as regards Criminal Case No. 12021 for lascivious conduct,
the CA explained that:
[A]n assiduous review of the arguments [the accused-appellant] proffered reveals that what was questioned by him
was his conviction for the crime of rape only. In fact, in his appellant’s brief, he emphasized that he is liable only for
the charge of acts of lasciviousness after having admitted that he merely touched the breast of AAA and asked the
latter to remove her short pants for him to see her private part. Apparently, [the] accusedappellant no longer
assailed his conviction [for] the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This notwithstanding, we are constrained to review the entire records of the case pursuant to the settled rule that
when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether they are
assigned as errors or not. x x x
xxxx
While we sustain [the] accused-appellant’s conviction of acts of lasciviousness, yet, we nonetheless modify the
penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the court a quo. x x x [W]e find that the court a quo erroneously
imposed the penalty [for] the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to RA 7610. It is
important to note that [the] accused-appellant was charged [with] acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to RA 7610 which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefore under
Article III, Section 5 thereof. Certainly, [the] accused-appellant was sufficiently informed of the accusation against
him and he can thus be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610 based on the evidence
presented against him. Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.- Children, whether male or female, who for money or profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporalin its medium period to reclusion perpetuashall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
orsubject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rapeor lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x.
xxxx
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but
alsowith a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but
also where one – through coercion, intimidation or influence – engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
[T]here is no doubt that [the] accused-appellant is guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article XIII of
RA 7610 after having admitted the lascivious conduct he made with AAA. It is undisputed that AAA was still 12
years old when the crime happened and as admitted by [the] accused-appellant himself, hewas touching AAA
because AAA was looking for money inside his pocket and he told AAA to remove her short pants for him to see her
private part. x x x.
It is important to note however that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. x x x
xxxx
Undoubtedly, [the] accused-appellant’s acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse"includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin,breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or [pubic] area of
a person. x x x Indubitably, AAA was deemed to be [a] "child subjected to other sexual abuse" as defined above.
Accordingly, the imposable penalty should be the penalty prescribed under RA 7610 and not the penalty under
Article 336 of the RPC as imposed by the court a quo. In People v. Leonardo, the Supreme Court ruled that the
penalty to be imposed for violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is as follows:
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, the penalty
prescribed is reclusion temporalin its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that Republic Act No.
7610 is a special law, the [accused-] appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the [accused-]appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporalminimum, the range of which is from 8 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty
prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, which is reclusion temporalin its medium period
to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum,
medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum – 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months; medium – 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20years; and maximum – reclusion perpetua.
Thus, in this case, we imposed on [the] accused-appellant the indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum.
Corollarily, in view of recent jurisprudence,we deem it proper to reduce the amount of moral and exemplary
damages awarded by the court a quofrom [P]25,000.00 each to [P]15,000.00 each. [The] accusedappellant is
however ordered to pay civil indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine of [P]15,000.00.39 (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12022, the CA affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction for rapeand the
award by the RTC of civil indemnity and moral damages in favor of AAA. Additionally, the CA ordered the payment
of ₱30,000.00 asexemplary damages. In both Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, the CA likewise directed the
accusedappellant to pay AAA the legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on all damages awarded to be
computedfrom the date of finality of the decision until full payment.40 The CA cited the following as reasons:
Indubitably, it is unimaginable for a young girl like AAA to concoct a tale of defloration, drag herself and the rest of
her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the object of gossip among their neighbors and friends if the
accusation was indeed untrue. x x x.
xxxx
The contention of [the] accused-appellant that the rape allegedly committed on April 19, 2006 was highly implausible
because of the absence of fresh lacerations and spermatozoa in AAA’s vagina is untenable. It should be
emphasizedthat [the] accused-appellant was charged [with] rape that occurred sometime in 2005 and not on April
19, 2006. The fact that only old healed lacerations were found does not negate rape. x x x:
x x x In People v. Espinoza, it was held that healed lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations, whether
healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.x x x. Moreover, in the present case, Dr. Orais
clarified to the court that even if the alleged sexual assault took place in the year 2005 or a year after AAA was
examined, the old healed lacerations could still be found.
xxxx
[T]he absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, In fact, in People v. Perez, it was held that:
x x x The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa isimmaterial
since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape. x x x.
xxxx
As to the award of damages, x x x the victim shall likewise be entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos ([P]30,000.00) as justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public example and serve
as a deterrent against the elders who abuse and corrupt the youth.41 (Citations omitted)
Issue
The accused-appellant now comes before the court for relief insisting anew on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had, in fact, raped AAA.
Both the accused-appellant and the OSG did not file supplemental briefs, adopting instead their respective
arguments raised before the CA.42
As aptly stated by the CA, it would be a superfluity to exhaustively re-evaluate the accused-appellant’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 12021 for lasciviousness conduct committed on April 19, 2006. First. The RTC and the CA
uniformly found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. Second. The accused-appellant himself admitted touching
AAA’s breast and directing the latter totake off her short pants. Third. In the appeal filed before the CA and this
court, no error was ascribed on the part of the RTC in convicting the accused-appellant for lascivious conduct.
The RTC and the CA, were however, not in agreement as to the proper imposable penalty for the accused-
appellant’s lascivious conduct. The RTC applied the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC and sentenced the
accused-appellant to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of imprisonment. The CA, on the other hand, invoking
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes sexual abuses committed against minors, imposed upon the
accused-appellant the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum.
In the instant appeal, the Information relative to Criminal Case No. 12021 bears the caption "for acts of
lasciviousness." It is, however, indicated that the acts are being prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of "Article 336
of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610."43
In the herein assailed decision, the CA explained that during the trial, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610. The CA thus modified the penalty
and imposed instead the one provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
In Flordeliz v. People,44 we allowed the imposition of a penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610 despite the absence in
the Information filed of any explicit reference to the saidstatute. We declared that:
We are aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC,
without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the offense by
statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does
not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The
character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have beenviolated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances inthe
complaint or information.
In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been committed by
petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.45 (Citation
omitted)
In the accused-appellant’s case beforethe Court, the Information even specifically mentions R.A. No. 7610. The
accused-appellant, therefore, was fairly apprised that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 7610 as well.
Further, it was shown that the requisites of Section 5(b) of the statute are present. The CA thus inferred that it could
not be precluded from imposing the proper penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
The CA aptly declared that when an appeal isfiled in a criminal action, it opens the entire matter for review and that
the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the accused-appellant’s case.
However, grounds exist compelling us to reinstate the penalty and damages imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 12021.
It bears stressing that the case before the Court involves two separate Informations filed – one for rape and another
for lascivious conduct.
People v. Francisco46 involved the issue ofunder which appellate jurisdiction the crimes of rape and lascivious
conduct fall. The court, however, had the occasion to explain that:
Nor can we widen the scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that the trial court heard two (2)
distinct and separate cases simultaneously. Such procedure [referring to the conduct of a joint trial] adopted by the
trial court cannot and did not result in the merger of the two (2) offenses. In fact, a cursory reading of the assailed
decision of the court a quoreveals with pristine clarity that each case was separately determined by the trial judge,
as each should be separately reviewed on appeal. x x x.47
In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct was admitted by the accused-appellant in his testimony.
No issue regarding his conviction for lascivious conduct had been raised in his appeal before the CA as well.
Despite the fact that the appeal filed was captioned as one with reference to Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022,
the body stated in no uncertain terms that what was being assailed was merely the conviction for rape. Effectively
then, it was as if no appeal was filed relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC
for lascivious conduct should not be disturbed anymore.Necessarily then, the CA cannot impose upon the accused-
appellant a graverpenalty and increase the amount of damages awarded to AAA at least relative to Criminal Case
No. 12021. This is the path more in accord with the general rule that penal laws are to be construed liberally in favor
of the accused.48 Criminal Case No. 12022
The court finds no reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA anent the accused-appellant’sconviction for
rape in Criminal Case No. 12022.
In People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Delen y Esco Billa,49 the court emphatically stated that:
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the bestposition to assess the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such
findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of
the case.
Moreover, "[w]e have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case,
courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they
testified were not true."50
The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the instant case where the accused-appellant cannot ascribe any
ill-motive against AAA in accusing him of the offenses charged,and where the factual findings of the RTC coincide
with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of
force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is
twelve years of age, or is demented."51
In the instant appeal, the RTC and the CA both found AAA’s testimony that she was raped in 2005 as credible. AAA
did not specifically refer to an exact month and date when the sordid act was committed. Nonetheless, her testimony
that the accused-appellant threatened to kill her, pushed her to the wall and inserted his penis in her vagina at
around 2:00 p.m., while she was alone washing dishes at home, was positive, clear and categorical.52
To exculpate him from liability, the accused-appellant invokes Dr. Orais’ medical findings that human spermatozoa
was absent in AAA’s vagina, and that her hymen bore old healed and not fresh lacerations possibly sustained more
than one but less than four month/s ago.53 These, however, are not compelling reasons to warrant the reversal of the
assailed decision.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 12022 charged the accused-appellant for raping AAA in 2005.On the other
hand, in Criminal Case No. 12021, the accused-appellantwas indicted for committing lascivious conduct on April 19,
2006. The results of the medical examination conducted on April 19, 2006 by Dr. Orais, finding that there was no
human spermatozoa found in AAA’s vagina and that the latter’s hymen bore old healed and not fresh lacerations,
are not inconsistent with the conclusion that the latter was raped in 2005. Repetitive as it may be, the rape was
committed in 2005 and not shortly before the medical examination conducted upon AAA on April 19, 2006.
Prescinding from the above, the Court finds no grounds to reverse the herein assailed decision convicting the
accused-appellant of one count of rape and of lascivious conduct. The Court likewise finds no error in the penalty,
civil indemnity, and damages ordered by the CA relative to Criminal Case No. 12022. However, inCriminal Case No.
12021, the lesser penalty and damages imposed by the RTC are reinstated. Lastly, to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annumshall be imposed on all the damages awarded to
AAA in both Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, to be computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until
fully paid.54
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated November 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00769-MIN, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) In Criminal Case No. 12021, the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of imprisonment as minimum to 6 years as maximum imposed
by the R TC upon the accused-appellant, and the award in favor of AAA of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages, are
reinstated; and
(b) An interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the damages awarded to AAA in Criminal Case Nos.
12021 to 12022 is likewise imposed upon the accused-appellant to be computed from the date of the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision3 dated July 30,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo
(appellant) of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 76104 in relation to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603,5 with a modification of the penalty imposed.
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information6 dated August 29, 2001 which
reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog,
Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],7 a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the
upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to
the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No.
7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying
versions emerged.
Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in Mentalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF and MMM.8
On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico
Ronquillo (Escolastico), located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol. FFF and his family occupied the house beside the fishpond
which was left by the former tenant.9
On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting grass in their yard, appellant arrived
looking for FFF who was then at another fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located in Boacao, Clarin, Bohol. VVV
knew appellant because he is the husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo (Bienvenida), one of the heirs of
Escolastico.10She noticed that appellant had a sanggot (sickle) tucked in his waist.
Appellant then went to VVV’s house and inquired from VVV’s younger brother, BBB, the whereabouts of the latter’s
father. BBB did not answer but his mother, MMM, told appellant that FFF was not around. Right then and there,
appellant told them to leave the place and started destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As a result,
appellant destroyed the roof, the wall and the windows of the house.11 MMM got angry and told appellant that he
could not just drive them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV was then
sent by MMM to fetch a barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod Nicolas Patayon refused to oblige
because he did not want to interfere in the problem concerning the fishpond. On her way back to their house, VVV
saw appellant coming from his shop with a gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV to
better pack up her family’s things because he would burn their house.12
Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood from the back of their house to defend
themselves and their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood from
the latter and started beating him with it.13 At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed him. Irked by what
she did, appellant turned to her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and
once below her right buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several pieces. VVV picked up some of the broken
pieces and threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight back. After which, appellant
left, bringing with him the gallon of gasoline.14
FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day. When he learned about what had happened, FFF brought his
daughter to the Clarin Health Center for medical attention and treatment.15 Dr. Vicente Manalo (Dr. Manalo)
attended to VVV and issued her a medical certificate16 dated September 2, 2000, stating that VVV sustained the
following:
From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin Police Station where they had the incident
blottered.17Thereafter, FFF requested Eliezer Inferido to take pictures of the injuries sustained by VVV.18
Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987. Sometime in 1997,
FFF occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement19 (MOA)
entered into by FFF with the Heirs of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo. After the MOA expired in
1998, appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, decided to discontinue the lease because they did not understand the
management and accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him to return possession of the fishpond but
FFF refused, asking for a written termination of the contract from all the heirs of Escolastico. To solve the problem,
appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the fishpond, providing him with fingerlings,
fertilizers and all necessary expenses.
This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around 7:00 in the
morning, after pasturing his cattle, appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed accounting
because he and his wife were not satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000. MMM, however, retorted, saying that
they would no longer make any accounting, as Benny Ronquillo, brother of appellant’s wife, would finance the next
cropping. Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they leave the fishpond. FFF's
family resented this demand and a commotion ensued. BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the latter
was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of the piece of wood which actually broke. Intending not to hurt
anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold of the said piece of
wood and hit appellant once at the back of his shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not strong enough to
injure him.20
Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for allegedly beating her.
Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was fabricated and was being used as a means to
extort money from him.21 Moreover, appellant asseverated that Ronald Lauren22 (Ronald) witnessed the incident.
Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to parry the blow; that
appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when appellant threw the piece of wood, there was no one there at the
time; and that appellant left the place immediately.23
On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty. Theodore
Cabahug (Atty. Cabahug), admitted that he hit VVV, although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of
proving that, at the time VVV was hit, appellant was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not
favor appellant because his demand for FFF's family to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated
with actual use of force, exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held that the injuries sustained by VVV
were distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was strong. Thus, the RTC
disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying in his favor the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, this Court imposes on him the indeterminate sentence of an imprisonment of Six (6) years
of prision [correccional] as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with
costs against him. The Court orders him to pay [VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for civil
indemnity and the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for damages; the awards for civil indemnity and
damages are without subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.
IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610, the Court exercising its discretion also
imposes on Leonilo Sanchez y Aranas the penalty of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) without subsidiary
penalty in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.24
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 contending that appellant never admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC,
however, denied the motion in its Order26 dated August 8, 2003 for being pro forma. Aggrieved, appellant appealed
to the CA.27
On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before
the RTC belied appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a
manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative
defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional. Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed
by appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full
credence to the factual findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant was not
defective inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the prosecution had fully
established the elements of the offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No.
603. However, the CA opined that the RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because R.A. No.
7610 is a special law. Lastly, the CA deleted the award of civil indemnity and damages for utter lack of basis. The
fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed Judgment dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No. 11110 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree No. 603 is
hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision mayor.
The fine imposed is retained.
The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant's motion for reconsideration is hereby AFFIRMED.
The award of civil indemnity and damages in the assailed Decision is deleted.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 which the CA denied in its Resolution30 dated July 11, 2007.
1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;]
2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION [OVER] THE
CASE DESPITE A DEFECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS
(sic) NOT COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED[; AND]
Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; that the RTC erred when it
shifted the burden of proof to appellant; that the RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative
defense when, all throughout his testimony before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV; and that
appellant and his counsel did not sign any written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby, hence, the burden of
proof still rests in the prosecution. Moreover, appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him
because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up the fishpond. Appellant pointed out that VVV, in her
testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the back of their house. Appellant also
claims that he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he would have done so earlier that day; that
if BBB was also beaten, he should have submitted himself for medical treatment and examination; and that the
Information charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were
covered by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts complained of
are clearly constitutive of Slight Physical Injuries punishable under Article 26632 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a cruel
and unusual manner nor deliberately subjected to excessive indignities or humiliation. The act was not cruel since
the injury was merely slight per medical findings; the location of the injury was on the thigh which is not unusual; and
VVV was not beaten in front of many people as to humiliate her. Lastly, no evidence was submitted by the
prosecution, such as a testimony of a child psychologist, or even of VVV's teacher who could have observed
changes in the victim's behavior, as to prove that the injury was prejudicial to the victim's development. Appellant
alleges that the charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries, in order to
subject him to a much heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal based on reasonable doubt and, in the
alternative, if found guilty, he should be convicted only of the crime of slight physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code.33
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that the instant Petition is fatally defective
because it raises purely factual issues contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that
the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during appellant's arraignment on November 6, 2001 clearly
shows that appellant, through Atty. Cabahug, raised an affirmative defense, hence, appellant cannot now change
his theory; that the prosecution established the fact that appellant committed the acts complained of by virtue of the
direct, positive and categorical testimonies of VVV, corroborated by MMM and duly supported by the medical
examination conducted by Dr. Manalo and the entry in the police blotter; that VVV's and MMM's statements are
consistent with their allegations in their respective complaint-affidavits; and that appellant failed to present any
reason or ground to set aside the decisions of the RTC and the CA. Furthermore, the OSG argues that there is no
ambiguity in the Information as the allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the
offense of child abuse, to wit: (a) minority of the victim; (b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development of
the child-victim; and (c) the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603.
The OSG submits that appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense under which he was specifically
charged, and to which he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.34
However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC. The
offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse as defined and punished under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special law,
carries the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period which is a penalty defined in the Revised Penal Code. The
OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing
appellant to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, the minimum term thereof being within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to the prescribed penalty, as there were no attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be denied and the assailed CA Decision be modified as
aforementioned but affirmed in all other respects.35
Our Ruling
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual
or not, which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.36
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 5937 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a)
of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are
different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act
No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse,
child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
lavvphi1
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development" supposes that there are four punishable acts
therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be
interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the
entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.39
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical
injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that
when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by
the Constitution.40 As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's
contention.
In the same manner, we reject appellant's claim that the Information filed against him was defective. In Resty
Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that what controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information
clearly make out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The following were alleged: (1)
the minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and (3) said acts
are clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the OSG, the
commission of the offense is clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot now feign ignorance of this.
Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be credible witnesses,
whose testimonies deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and respect are usually accorded by the
appellate court to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.42 Equally noteworthy is the fact that the CA did not disturb
the RTC's appreciation of the witnesses’ credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are
accorded respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA
and we find no reason to deviate from the findings of both courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant is
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse.43
However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA deserves review. The imposable penalty under Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 is prision mayor in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA modified this by imposing upon
appellant the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum,
of prision mayor, postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have imposed on appellant
an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."44 On the other hand, the OSG contends
that the RTC appropriately applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling in People v. Simon.45
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is derived
from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised
Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where
the special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it
would in felonies.46 In People v. Simon,47 the Court applied the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court applied the same principle to
cases involving illegal possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized under special
laws. Finally, in Dulla v. Court of Appeals,49 a case involving sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
This case should be no exception.
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and because it is favorable to appellant, we find the penalty of four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, proper. lawphi1
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for
the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and
Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for
strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.51
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No.
27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Leonilo Sanchez is hereby sentenced to four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.