Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) vs.

DND
FACTS:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, Pres. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for the Fort Bonifacio military reservation.

On 28 May 1967, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proc. No. 423, which excluded the Libingan ng mga Bayani
and reserved it for a national shrine under the administration of Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

On 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded brgys Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proc. No. 423 and declared it open for disposition. At the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan, (SGD.) Marcos". The
controversy started when Proc No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the addendum.

On 16 October 1987, President Aquino issued Proc. No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this
time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of NMSMI filed a Petition with the COSLAP, praying for: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied,
covering Lot 3 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proc. No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of
the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the LMB’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the lot to its bona fide occupants.

On 1 September 2006, COSLAP granted the petition and declared the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with
Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was
an integral part of Proc. No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence
or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proc. No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers,
it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proc. No. 172 could not have superseded much
less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when Pres. Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

Ass Com Aguilar-General dissented that pursuant to Art. 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she
held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent,
the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to
supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proc. No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on
the field of the legislature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proc. No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

RULING:

YES! Art. 2 of the NCC provides: “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.”

In the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, the Court ruled that publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did
not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if
the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication
(or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.

The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476
as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
 Furthermore, under Sec.24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.

It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law.

Facts:

R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF),
which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of
collecting and administering the Fund was Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA).

P.D. No. 755, under its Section 1 states that: “It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the
implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA…;
and that the PCA is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers….

.....Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D. No. 755, under its Section 2, authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF
collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank interest free, the deposit withdrawable only
when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. The same section also decreed that all levies PCA is
authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government within
the contemplation of P.D. No. 711.”

P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of coconut/palm oil industries.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to finance various projects and/or was converted
into various assets or investments. Relevant to the present petition is the acquisition of the First United Bank controlled by Pedro
Cojuangco’s group, and was subsequently renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank.

Per Cojuangco’s own admission, PCA paid, out of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), the entire acquisition
price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It
would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10%
of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock. In all, from the "mother"
PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840
shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.

As to whether P.D. No. 755 and the text of the agreement described therein was published, the Court takes judicial notice that
P.D. No. 755 was published in volume 71 of the Official Gazette but the text of the agreement was not so published with P.D. No. 755.

Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded the status of a law without publication.

Ruling:

NO! It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not
reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law.

It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a
law. Tañada v. Tuvera said as much: Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x. Laws must come out in the open in the
clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.

The publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the
law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy
the publication requirement.

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way
reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. The SC
cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the Court joined the Sandiganbayan in its holding that
the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under
the Civil Code.
 SEC vs GMA

FACTS:

On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval
of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC).

The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting
System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16,
2000.

Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the
application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of
P1,212,200.00.

On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment.
However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed
to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment
amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.

The following year, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof
referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was
formed. But GMA requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application for
extension of its corporate term.

Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding
the validity of the questioned assessment.

Thusly, GMA appealed the ruling of the SEC to the Court of Appeals (CA), on the ground that ground that the assessment of filing fees
for the petitioner’s application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof
is not in accordance with law.

ISSUE:

Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA’s
application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term?

RULING:

The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1,
Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.’s (GMA’s) application for the amendment
of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term.

The appellate court agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a
corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary
amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of incorporation.

However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having
been published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an
internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The
due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a person’s right to property.

The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.