G.R. No.
L-44896 July 31, 1936 inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER,Petitioner, vs. MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of
First Instance of Manila, Respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He
objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court
below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed
this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First
Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of
First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the
petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the
United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such
jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the
Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a
consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is
accredited. ( Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt
from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he
resides. (U. S. vs.Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law
[2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution
of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the
question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner
extended ex propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the
about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On
the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and
effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the members of
this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the
Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the
Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to the great
instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and
jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the
instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this
court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have
such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court
"shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises
whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from
section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of
Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before
it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo
warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred
on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs.
197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and
exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the
Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in
this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over
such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of
the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction"
in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In
construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original
jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases
affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra;
Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a
fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such
jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we
have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities
of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country
where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the
Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to
continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they
were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction
granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made
exclusively by any, law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court
by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in
such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to
remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to
amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs.Insular Collector of
Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
to try the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.
So ordered.
Avance�a, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court
over the petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The strictly
legal reason is set forth in the preceding illuminating opinion. The other reasons
are ( a) historical and based on what I consider is the ( b) theory upon which the
grant of legislative authority under our Constitution is predicated.
( a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the
Constitution of the United States, considerable light would be gained by an
examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the United States.
The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787)
gave the Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the
plan, authority to hear and determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier resort . . .
all cases touching the rights of ambassadors . . . ." This clause, however, was not
approved. On July 18, the Convention of 1787 voted an extraordinarily broad
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court extending "to cases arising under laws passed by
the general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the national peace
and harmony." This general proposition was considerably narrowed by Randolph in
his draft of May 29 which, however, did not mention anything about ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls. But the Committee of Detail, through Rutledge,
reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section 3. The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; . . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, . . . this jurisdiction shall be original . . . ."On September 12, the
Committee on Style reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The
judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." This
provision was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate
and is now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the
United States. (The Constitution and the Courts, Article on "Growth of the
Constitution", by William M. Meigs, New York, 1924, vol. 1, pp. 228, 229. See
also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale University Press,
1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.)
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years
after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act
(Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat., c. 20, 687) was approved by the first Congress
creating the United States District and Circuit Courts which were nisi priuscourts, or
courts of first instance which dealt with different items of litigation. The district
courts are now the only federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having
been abolished by the Act of March 3, 1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code.
The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested the district courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of
the courts of the several states, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls and the
Supreme Court of the United States with original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
suits in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party. By the passage of the Act of
February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction was repealed and, since then state courts have had
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings
against a consul or vice-consul. At the present time, the federal courts exercise
exclusive jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other or
other public ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law
can have consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive,
jurisdiction, of all suits brought by ambassadors or other public ministers, or in
which a consul or vice-consul is a party." (Act of March 8, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156,
reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24, 1789; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 341;
Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 233.) The district
courts now have original jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls."
(Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins'
Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by
the Congress of the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for more
than 145 years. It was prepared chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (1 Ann.
Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in the Constitutional Convention,
who was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1796-1800).
It is interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the
House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates who actually
attended the Convention that adopted the federal Constitution (Warren, Congress,
the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston, 1935], p. 99). When, therefore,
the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789 vesting in the Supreme Court
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a vice-consul
shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the word
"original" as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has
never been repudiated. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S. Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):
In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by
Congress, at the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the
significant fact that, from 1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in
its actual adjudications determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is
not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United
States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the
Constitution with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative department of
the government to say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may safely
be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high privileges of
those for whose protection the constitutional provision was intended. At any rate,
we are unwilling to say that the power to make the grant does not exist.
Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means "exclusive"
and as observed by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S.,
36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69), the question has given rise to some differences of
opinion among the earlier members of the Supreme Court of the United States.
( See, for instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U. S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall.,
297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance was had on more or less general expressions made
by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch,
137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:
"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction
where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of
jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance." But Chief Justice
Marshall who penned the decision in this case in 1803 had occasion later, in 1821,
to explain the meaning and extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury
case. He said:
In the case of Marbury vs.Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed.,
60), the single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this,
was, whether the legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in
which the Constitution had clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting
the construction of the article could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we
think very properly, that the legislature could not give original jurisdiction in such a
case. But, in the reasoning of the court in support of this decision, some
expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury had insisted
on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial
power; and it is against this argument that the reasoning of the court is directed.
They say that, if such had been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have
been useless to proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals
in which it should be vested." The court says, that such a construction would
render the clause, dividing the jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate,
totally useless; that "affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of
other objects than those which are affirmed; and, in this case (in the case of
Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they
have no operation at all." "It cannot be presumed," adds the court, "that any clause
in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it." The whole reasoning of
the court proceeds upon the idea that the affirmative words of the clause giving
one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction,
because otherwise the words would be totally inoperative, and this reasoning is
advanced in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in that case original
jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause under consideration would have
been entirely useless. Having such cases only in its view, the court lays down a
principle which is generally correct, in terms much broader than the decision, and
not only much broader than the reasoning with which that decision is supported,
but in some instances contradictory to its principle. The reasoning sustains the
negative operation of the words in that case, because otherwise the clause would
have no meaning whatever, and because such operation was necessary to give
effect to the intention of the article. The effort now made is, to apply the
conclusion to which the court was conducted by that reasoning in the particular
case, to one in which the words have their full operation when understood
affirmatively, and in which the negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to
defeat some of the great objects of the article. To this construction the court
cannot give its assent. The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison
must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in this opinion;
limitations which in no degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of its
reasoning. (Cohens vs.Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat., 264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that
Congress could not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly
mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of construction being that affirmative
words of the Constitution declaring in what cases the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases. ( See Ex
parteVallandigham [1864], 1 Wall., 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's
Lessee [1816], 1 Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass.,
1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That was all.
It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion in the
case of Davis vs. Packard (11833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the
jurisdiction of the state court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul
was denied solely on the ground that jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case
upon the district courts of the United States exclusively of the state courts. Such a
ground, says Justice Harlan in Bors vs.Preston ([1884], 111 U. S., 252; 4 S. Ct., 407;
28 Law. ed., 419), would probably not have been given had it been believed that
the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court deprived Congress of the
power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in such cases upon subordinate
courts of the Union, concluding that the decision in the case "may be regarded, as
an affirmance of the constitutionality of the Act of 1789, giving original jurisdiction
in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United States." Of the seven justices
who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated in the
decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed.,
204), also penned by Chief Justice Marshall and relied upon as authority together
with Marbury vs. Madison, supra.
The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United
States. The question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then
existing had jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States to
hear and determine any suit whatever against the consul of a foreign government.
Justice Harlan said:
The Constitution declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall extend
. . . to all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls;" to
controversies between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or subjects; that "In
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . . the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction;" and that in all other cases
previously mentioned in the same clause "The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make." The Judiciary Act of 1789 invested the
District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the
several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for offenses of a
certain character; this court, with "Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all
suits . . . in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party;" and the circuit courts
with jurisdiction of civil suits in which an alien is a party. (l Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this
act we have an affirmance, by the first Congress - many of whose members
participated in the Convention which adopted the Constitution and were,
therefore, conversant with the purposes of its framers - of the principle that the
original jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a consul or vice-consul is a party,
is not necessarily exclusive, and that the subordinate courts of the Union may be
invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such representatives of foreign
governments. On a question of constitutional construction, this fact is entitled to
great weight. In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by
Chief Justice Taney in the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838;
Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that case of Gittings, it was held that neither public policy
nor convenience would justify the Supreme Court in implying that Congress is
prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the inferior
judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief Justice Taney said:
If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate
and original, as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude that tribunal from
appellate power in the cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right,
from the same clause, to imply words of exclusion as respects other courts whose
jurisdiction is not there limited or prescribed, but left for the future regulation of
Congress? The true rule in this case is, I think, the rule which is constantly applied
to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of jurisdiction over a certain
subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be
exclusive. In the clause in question, there is nothing but mere affirmative words of
grant, and none that import a design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of
other courts of the United States on the same subject-matter. ( See
also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs.Louisiana
[1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890],135 U. S.,
403; 10 S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz
[D. C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs.Van de Carr [1897], 166 U.S., 391; 17 S. Ct.,
595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y., 1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58;
Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No. 8517; St. Luke's
Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf., 259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C. C.
Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of Alabama vs. Wolffe (C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836,
837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)
It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra, the
jurisdiction of circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no exception being
made as to those who were consuls, was maintained. ( See 1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20,
sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.)
From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word
"original" in reference to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the United States
over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, was never
intended to be exclusive as to prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent
jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.
It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 placed cases
affecting the official representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of
Federal Supreme Court to prevent the public peace from being jeopardized. Since
improper treatment of foreign ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
may be a casus belli, it was thought that the federal government, which is
responsible for their treatment under international law, should itself be provided
with the means to meet the demands imposed by international duty. (Tucker, The
Constitution of the United States [1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The Federalist, No.
LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in mind in the distinction which
international law establishes between ambassadors and other public ministers, on
the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives, on the other,
Congress saw it fit to provide in one case a rule different from the other, although
as far as consuls and vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal
Supreme Court, as already observed, though original is not exclusive. But in the
United States, there are two judicial systems, independent one from the other,
while in the Philippines there is but one judicial system. So that the reason in the
United States for excluding certain courts - the state courts - from taking
cognizance of cases against foreign representatives stationed in the United States
does not obtain in the Philippines where the court of the lowest grade is as much a
part of an integrated system as the highest court.
Let us now turn our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner. Undoubtedly
Philippine courts are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary
Acts of the United States. We have a judicial system of our own, standing outside
the sphere of the American federal system and possessing powers and exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of our own Constitution and laws.
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our
Constitution and laws which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the
laws of nations. There are no treaties between the United States and Uruguay
exempting consuls of either country from the operation of local criminal laws.
Under the generally accepted principles of international law, declared by our
Constitution as part of the law of the nation (Art. II sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls and vice-
consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess
the status and can not claim the privilege and immunities accorded to ambassadors
and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec. 249; Kent, Commentaries, 44;
Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The American Constitutional
System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1;
Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 9 R. C. L., 161.) The only
provisions touching the subject to which we may refer are those found in the
Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace the history of these provisions.
The report of the committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29,
1934, did not contain any provisions regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls. The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the
Sponsorship Committee, submitted on October 20, 1934, however, contains the
following provision:
Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction as may
be possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . . ." The Special
Committee on the Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco
and Norberto Romualdez, included in its report the provisions which now appear in
sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 2 provides:
The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribed, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other ministers and
consuls . . . . And the second sentence of section 3 provides:
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court
"original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls" is literally the same as that contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of
the United States Constitution.
In the course of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was
expressed regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our
Supreme Court. An examination of the records of the proceedings of the
Constitutional convention show that the framers of our Constitution were familiar
with the history of, and the judicial construction placed on, the same provision of
the United States Constitution. In order to end what would have been a protracted
discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee on the Judiciary
gave the following information to the members of the Convention:
. . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta
dispuesto a hacer constar que la interpretacion que debe dard a la ultima parte de
dicho articulo es la misma interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante
disposicion en la Constitucion de los Estados Unidos. (January 16,1935.) Without
further discussion, the provision was then and there approved.
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled
meaning in the United States - the country of its origin. It has there received
definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and judicial interpretation. And the same
meaning was ascribed to it when incorporated in our own Constitution. To
paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are justified
in interpreting the provision of the Constitution in the light of the principles and
history with which its framers were familiar. (United States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897],
169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42 Law. ed., 890, cited with approval in
Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin [1904]; 195 U. S., 100; 49 Law.
ed., 114.)
( b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or
idolatrous adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of
our Constitution it is realized that historical discussion while valuable is not
necessarily decisive. Rationally, however, the philosophical reason for the
conclusion announced is not far to seek if certain principles of constitutional
government are borne in mind. The constitution is both a grant of, and a limitation
upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal restraint of
legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is exercisable by their
representatives in their legislature. The rule is that the legislature possess plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. A prohibition to exercise legislative
power is the exception. (Denio, C. J., in People vs.Draper, 15 N.Y., 532, 543.) These
prohibitions or restrictions are found either in the language used, or in the purpose
held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the adoption of the
particular provision as part of the fundamental law. ( Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim.
Rep., 1; 73 S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.)
Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have
committed legislative power in a most general way to the National Assembly has
plenary legislative power in all matters of legislation except as limited by the
constitution. When, therefore, the constitution vests in the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
without specifying the exclusive character of the grant, the National Assembly is
not deprived of its authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said
that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power
behind. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people, and that these representatives are no further
restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have
that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p.139, ante.) What the Constitution
prohibits is merely the deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction
over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls and while it
must be admitted that original jurisdiction if made concurrent no longer remains
exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction does not cease to be original merely
because it is concurrent.
It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases would
mean the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls such that the Supreme
Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the lowest courts in our judicial
hierarchy, the justice of the peace of the courts, in a petty case for the instance, the
violation of a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just mentioned. However,
no serious objection to these result can be seen other that the misinterpreted
unwillingness to share this jurisdiction with a court pertaining to the lowest
category in our judicial organization. Upon the other hand, the fundamental
reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the land is made to
take recognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal
ordinance simply because of the character of the parties affected. After alluding to
the fact that the position of consul of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a
citizen of the United States (and this also true in the Philippines) Chief Justice
Taney, in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed:
It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our
constitution to require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less
than five dollars against another citizen, who had been clothed by some foreign
government with the consular office, should be compelled to go into the Supreme
Court to have a jury summoned in order to enable him to recover it; nor could it
have been intended, that the time of that court, with all its high duties to perform, original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution is not
should be taken up with the trial of every petty offense that might be committed by concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.
a consul by any part of the United States; that consul, too, being often one of our The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having
own citizens. jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner,
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that the writ of prohibition should be denied.
considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in
our jurisdiction, there may be cases where the Supreme Court may not actually
exercise either original - whether exclusive or concurrent - or appellate jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this class of cases to the
Supreme Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a justice of the
peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a foreign consul and no question
of law is involved, it is evident that in case of conviction, the proceedings will
terminate in the Court Appeals and will not reach the Supreme Court. In this case,
the Supreme Court will be deprived of all jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul
notwithstanding the grant thereto in the Constitution of original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting consuls. This is a situation, however, created not by the Constitution
but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National Assembly.
The Constitution cannot deal with every casus omissus, and in the nature of things,
must only deal with fundamental principles, leaving the detail of administration
and execution to the other branches of the government. It rests with the National
Assembly to determine the inferior courts which shall exercise concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and irrespective of the
amount of controversy. The National Assembly may as in the United States (Cooley,
Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the
Supreme Court in all cases affecting foreign diplomatic and consular
representatives.
Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was exercisable
by our courts. This is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution
framed and adopted pursuant thereto are in force. The fact that the National
Assembly has not enacted any law determining what courts of the of the
Philippines shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no
moment. This can not mean and should not be interpreted to mean that the
G.R. No. 8217 September 5, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO FOO SUY and GO JANCHO, defendants-appellants.
O'Brien and DeWitt, and Gaston M. Ashe for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, sentencing
the appellants, Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho, each to eight years and one day
of cadena temporal, to the accessory penalties provided by law, and to the
payment of one-fifth of the costs of the cause for the crime of frustrated arson. The
complaint in this case also included Go Juat Chiong, Go Cho Jim, and Go Quip as
defendants, the first two being acquitted by the court and the last not having been
apprehended at the time of the trial.
On the night of February 24, 1912, house No. 30 on Calle Norte America of the city
of Cebu was partially destroyed by fire. While this fire was in progress, fire also
broke out in house No. 26, which was separated from No. 30 by a passageway
having a width near the street of about 3 ½ meters and in the rear (where the fire
in No. 30 was) of 9 ½ meters. Both buildings were built entirely of strong materials.
The first floor of house No. 30 was occupied by Go Chico, a Chinese carpenter. The
second floor was occupied by Marcelina Sabugan, her husband, and her husband's
brother. The appellants, Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho, conducted a dry goods store in
No. 26, and used the upper portion as living quarters. Antipas Paquipo and her
husband, a Chinaman, occupied the upper story of the last section in the rear of
No. 26 as tenants of the appellants. The appellants rented the entire building from
its owner, Filomena Burgos. The first floor No. 26 consisted of three rooms. The
first was devoted to the sale of dry goods. The second was used as an office and to
store a reserve supply of dry goods. These two rooms were connected by a door.
The stairway to the upper portion of the house, as near as we are able to
determine from the record, was in the office or trastienda. The third room was a
bodega, where were stored lumber, sauale, and other materials belonging to the
firm. There was no communication between the trastienda and this bodega. They
were separated by a partition built partly of interwoven bamboo, as shown in the
photograph. ( Exhibit F of the prosecution.) On the said nearest No. 30 were two
doors, one leading into the tienda proper and the other into the trastienda, as near
as we are able to determine from the record, the latter being used at night by the
occupants on entering and leaving the house after the tienda had been closed.
From the statements of the various witnesses, it is apparent that the fire in No. 30
had been burning a considerable time before No. 26 caught fire. The witness Cuico,
who lived in a nipa shack a few meters from No. 30, stated that it was half past 2 by
his watch when he first discovered the fire in No. 30. The municipal president who
lived "two or three minutes" from the scene of the fire arrived after Cuico
discovered it. The president brought a hose, which was first turned on Cuico's
house to dampen it so as to prevent its catching fire. Cuico also testified that when
fire broke out in No. 26 the fire in No. 30 was so far under control that there was
no longer danger of its spreading. Albert Bryan, an electrician, stated that he was
notified of the fire by telephone, and that just as he reached the scene fire broke
out in No. 26. Miguel Bototo, a municipal policeman and a witness for the defense,
testified that he arrived at 15 minutes past 3 o'clock; and that when the fire in No.
30 was about put out, fire broke out in No. 26. Pedro Noel, another municipal
policeman and also a witness for the defense, testified that he arrived at what he
thought was about 3 o'clock. He entered No. 26, warning a Chinaman (whom he
identified as the appellant Go Jancho) who was in three gathering up papers that
he should leave, and then, at the Chinaman's request, went upstairs with him to
get his trunk, which they carried as far as the stairway and then abandoned it and
went downstairs and left the house. When he left the trastienda he saw no signs of
fire. He testified that he then assisted with the hose at the fire in No. 30 and was so
employed when the Constabulary arrived.
Lim Bian Chong, who was a guest of the appellants on the night of the fire, testified
that upon the alarm being given, he became scared and started downstairs
immediately. Everyone went downstairs ahead of him except the woman Antipas,
who followed him. Upon leaving the house he went to a plaza a short distance
away, and found all the accused there. The woman Antipas testified that her
husband's brother awakened her. She seized a picture and immediately ran
downstairs and went to the plaza. As she passed through the trastienda she saw
the appellants gathering up books. She returned to the house the second time to
get her trunk. She saw no more Chinamen as she left the house the second time.
She denied that in her sworn declaration in the preliminary investigation she had
stated that when she left the house the second time the two appellants were still
there. Go Jancho testified that he went downstairs immediately upon ascertaining
that there was a fire, opened the safe, and took out important papers. These he
put in a sack with the aid of Go Foo Suy and Go Cho Jim, and then ordered them to
open the door. Go Cho Jim carried the sack out of the door. Witness remained
looking for his certificates and some receipts. A little later a policeman entered. He
and the policeman then went upstairs to get the trunk, which was abandoned at
the head of the stairway. He left the house immediately, carrying nothing with him.
All of his coaccused were outside of the house then, but she saw Lim Bian Chong
near the door. He went to the plaza and there found Go Foo Suy, Go Cho Jim, and
Go Juat Chiong. He ordered the latter to return and get his (Jancho's) trunk, but Go
Juat Chiong came back in a little while saying that the policeman would not let him
enter the house.
Go Juat Chiong testified that he was sleeping downstairs; that he was awakened by
the alarm of fire and saw the appellants come downstairs and enter the office. He
himself went directly upstairs to get his trunk. He was still in the house when Lim
Bian Chong and Go Quip came downstairs. Upon coming downstairs he did not see
Go Cho Jim, Go Foo Suy or Go Jancho in the trastienda. He did not wish to say that
he was the last to leave the house, but simply that he did not notice anyone when
he came downstairs. He left the house carrying his belongings and went to the
plaza, where he saw the others. Go Jancho ordered him to return to get a trunk,
but upon reaching the house the policeman refused to allow him to enter. He saw
persons inside the house then.
Go Cho Jim testified that he was sleeping in the lower part of the house near the
stairway when he heard some one upstairs give the alarm. He got up and after he
had dressed himself Go Jancho ordered him to open the door so that he could
leave with the money and books. When he opened the door he saw no one. As he
left with the money he saw some policeman outside. There remained in the tienda
Go Foo Suy, Go Jancho, and Go Juat Chiong. He did not go upstairs or return to the
house after he left it.
It will be noted that while there is some disagreement between the inmates of the
house as to the order in which they left it, none of them claim to have spent more
than a few minutes in the house. All, further, state positively that there was no fire
in the house when they left. According to this testimony, then, they must have
been standing on the plaza a considering time before No. 26 caught fire.
Captain Hemmett of the Constabulary, whose attention was attracted to the fire in
the trastienda of No. 26 immediately upon his arrival, and who went directly to
that fire, stated that on entering the trastienda he saw a policeman with four of fire
Chinamen who had just come out of the trastienda.
Pablo Navarro, the municipal policeman who on arriving went directly to the fire in
No. 26, testified that he went to the door of the trastienda, and upon entering saw
a Chinaman in the doorway and three others seated at a table, one of whom was
writing and identified them as being, respectively, Go Juat Chiong and Go Jancho,
Go Foo Suy and Go Cho Jim; that when they saw him they began to run; that he
asked them why they did so as there was a fire in the house; that he told the chief
of police about this upon the latter's arrival shortly afterwards; and that the chief
the latter's him to go and arrest the Chinamen. He found and arrested two of the
Chinamen on the plaza.
Enrique Tabada testified that he saw Go Juat Chiong and Go Cho Jim in the house
upon entering. A curtain which was on fire he tore loose and threw out of the
house. Besides the Chinamen that he saw, he heard the voices of others but could
not say whatever they were outside or inside the tienda. The policeman Batoto
testified for the defense and stated that upon arriving at the trastienda a Chinaman
came up, and that acting under instructions from the policeman Tabada he
arrested the Chinaman and refused to let him enter. The sworn declaration of the
chief of police, made on February 26, contains the following statement:
The accused Go Cho Jim is the one who was arrested by me at the moment of
coming out of the door and at the time when the rear end of the bodega was
broken open by order of the president for the purpose of putting out the fire which
had been discovered within.
The conflict between the statements of these witnesses and the declarations of the
inmates of the house is most evident. According to these witnesses, a number of
Chinamen were found in or near the house after the trastienda had caught fire, all
of them being actually identified as the accused persons by one or more of the
witnesses; while the accused declare positively that they had left the building very
shortly after the alarm of fire on No. 30 was given and had gone directly to the
plaza, which would make them standing there a considerate time before the fire in
No. 26 broke out. In this connection Go Jancho testified that he did not return to
the store after leaving it; that he was arrested on the plaza, and that it was not until
arrived at the police station that he learned that a fire had occurred in No. 26.
Presumably, therefore, where he was standing on the plaza, it was impossible to
observe the fire. It does not seem probable that the owner of a stock of goods, if
prompted by good motives, would thus desert his property when there was so little
danger of personal injury. Even if the defendant' statements that they remained on
the plaza and did not go near the fire were accepted as true, only an unfavorable
inference could be drawn from such conduct.
Gil de la Cruz, an employee of the city garbage system, testified that while waiting
at No. 26, between 1 and 2 o'clock on the morning of the fire, for the cars to come
and carry away the pails he had collected, he saw Go Jancho coming into the
passageway between Nos. 30 and 26 from the Street Norte America, and go as far
as the kitchen of No. 30 and then return to the street again. Jancho was fully
dressed with the exception of a hat. Jancho declared that after going to bed that
evening about 11 or 12 o'clock he did not get up until the alarm of fire awakened
him.
Three fires were discovered in No. 26 almost simultaneously. One was in the
bodega, where some rolls of sauale lying on the floor were fire. This fire was
practically in the center of the room. One was in the trastienda where bolts of cloth
stored on impromptu shelves made of boxes piled on above the other were afire.
The bed in the living quarters of the woman Antipas also caught fire.
As to the fire in the room of the woman Antipas, counsel for the defense say in
part: "This," referring to the testimony of the chief of police, "is the only evidence
as to how and when the hole was burnt in the bottom of the bed."
Again they say: "Several witnesses for the prosecution were allowed to give
hearsay evidence to the effect that the bed was burn in the room of the woman,
but nobody testified that they saw it burning or that they extinguished the fire. As
has been noted, the fiscal asked a few adroit questions relating to the bed, and
then promptly changed his questions to other topics. This is so noticeable that
there is only one deduction to be drawn from it, namely, that nothing definite was
known about the fire in that room and that the testimony relating to it is mere
conjecture."
Aldanese, the chief of police, identified Exhibit G as a photograph of the burnt bed,
and pointed out the bed standing at the window as shown in Exhibit B. He also
testified that the bed was burned at the same time the other fires in No. 26
occurred.
The witness Bryan testified that when he entered the trastienda there was a fire on
the second floor and that he could hear it burning. He stated that he did not go
upstairs. Captain Lucas testified that he did not go upstairs. The policeman Tabada
testified as follows:
When we saw fire in the rear of this house (No. 26) we called to the firemen to put
it out, and when the fire which was burning in the street was put out, we saw also
that there was a fire in the lower part of the same house. As it was difficult to put
out the fire which was in the lower part of the house, we went to the bodega
underneath the part where the fire had occurred, and tore off some pieces of zinc .
...
The first question put to him on cross-examination was:
Q. So that the first fire you saw in house No. 26 was upstairs? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Afterwards you saw there was also a fire in the place below the fire,
where the store was? —
A. Yes, sir.
Pedro Noel, another municipal policeman, who testified for the defense, stated
that the three fires in No. 26 were burning at the same time; that when he saw the
fire in the window upstairs, he said to the man who had charge of the house, "Let
us throw water on this fire." In another place he says that after throwing water on
the bed they went back to No. 30 and heard one Frusctuoso Ramos crying "Here is
another fire," and on going back began to put out the fire in the bodega. Aside
from this evidence of the witnesses, an empty bottle which had contained
petroleum and a small kerosene lamp, also empty, were found underneath the
bed. The photograph of the bed was also admitted as evidence and shows that only
the matting which formed its bottom and the furnishing were burned. This
evidence establishes the fact that there was a fire upstairs at the same time the
other fires in No. 26 were burning. We confess our inability to perceive any ulterior
motive on the part of the prosecution in neglecting to make a more extended
investigation of this fire. Counsel for the defense were equally at liberty to sift this
matter to the bottom on cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution
who testified in regard to this fire, and in the direct examination of their own
witness, Pedro Noel. It certainly cannot be denied that this bed was afire at or
nearly at the same time as the other two fires in No. 26, and that it was put out.
These are the important facts, and from the testimony of the witnesses Tabada and
Noel, it would appear that the hose was simply directed at the window near which
the bed was standing and that the fire was easily extinguished in this manner. The
chief of police testified that there was no wind blowing at the time of the fire.
Photographs submitted by the prosecution show two nipa shacks located on the
opposite side of No. 30 within 3 or 4 meters, which were not damaged. The
witness Cuico, who lived in one of these shacks, stated that it was about 3 ¼ meters
from No. 30 and that it did not suffer the slighest damage from the fire. The only
openings in the side of No. 26 nearest No. 30 were two windows. From the record
it appears that at least one of these windows opened in to the trastienda and that
it was closed up to the time the fire was discovered in this room. Pieces of paper in
this window were not touched by the fire. There were two windows in the upper
floor opening at the rear, the bed standing near the one farthest from No. 30. The
window nearest No. was closed when the photograph (Exhibit B) was taken, while
the other was open, and the bed in question can be seen standing near it. The
record does not show whether this window was open or closed when the fire
occurred, but assuming that it was open, sparks from No. 30 would have had to
cross the passageway of 9 ½ meters to No. 26, as well as the additional space
between the nearest wall of No. 26 and the window near the other side, and in so
doing must necessarily have described an arc, as the end walls of both houses were
practically on a line. As noted above, the fire in No. 30 had no inclination to spread
and houses of highly inflammable material much nearer than the bed in question,
and which sparks could have reached without impediment of any kind, were not
touched by the fire. The shed or lean-to attached at No. 30 and directly between
that house and No. 30 was left intact. It seems highly improbable that sparks from
No. 30 could have entered the window and set fire to the bed. Nor does this
explanation dispose of the evidence of incendiarism in the way of empty kerosene
receptacles found in the room where the bed was.
Counsel for the appellants also contend that the fire in the trastienda caught from
the fire in the bodega by passing through the partition between the two rooms. All
the evidence of record appears to negative this proposition. The witness Bryan, it is
true, says that the fire in the trastienda appeared to be entering through a wall,
and in another place says that the flames came from behind the wall from the
burning sauale in the bodega, but a little later in his testimony he says that there
was a fire in the trastienda at the same time as the fire in the bodega was burning,
ands that although they took down many bolts of cloth looking for a possible
connection between the two fires, they could not find any signs of the flames
passing from one room to another either above or on the sides of the room.
Captain Hemmett testified that he went to the house on the following day and saw
no signs of fire on the partition between the two rooms. Captain Lucas said it was
possible that the fire in the trastienda could have caught from the fire in the
bodega, but that the fire in the bodega was more to the left. Several of the
witnesses stated that only the outer edges of the bolts of cloth were burned. It
would seem that if there was as a matter of fact any connection between the two
fires, the bolts of cloth would have caught fire on the ends nearest the partition.
But it appears that the fire in the bodega (or, for that matter, either of the other
two fires in No. 26) did not damage the building in the slightest. The fire in the
bodega could not, therefore, have assumed large proportions, and its insignificance
is also am indication of the improbability of its igniting a fire in another room. The
court, after an ocular inspection of the premises, also decided that the fire in the
bodega could not have started the fire in the trastienda. That the burning bolts of
cloth in the trastienda were covered with petroleum is undisputably established by
the testimony of competent witnesses. In his deposition taken the day after the
fire, the appellant Go Jancho is recorded as saying that he could not explain why
this cloth was covered with petroleum, but the fact was, nevertheless, that there
was petroleum on it. In the court below he denied making this statement, saying
that what he did say was that he did not know whether petroleum or water had
been poured on it. As the appellant must have sufficient sagacity to know that
water-soaked cloth will not burn, the insincerity of this statement is apparent.
Three bottles were found under the table and one was found behind the door in
the trastienda, all of which had contained petroleum.
As to the fire in the bodega, it is practically conceded by the defense that it was of
incendiary origin. The only thing that was burning in this room was some sauale
lying on the floor. The witness Rosello testified that he found two bottles in the
bodega near the burning sauale, together with a broken match box. He stated that
he saw signs of petroleum on the sauale. The policeman Batoto, a witness for the
defense, testified that he found a bottle in the bodega which had contained
petroleum. Witness Bryan testified that the burning sauale was taken out of the
bodega and that as it was unrolled it would burst into flame. But it is urged by the
defense that some unknown person found access to the bodega through its door
and deliberately started the fire. It is strongly insisted that the evidence of record
not only shows that the door to the bodega was not locked, but that those who
came out the fire found the door open. Upon this point the witness Cuico testified
that while was assisting at the fire in No. 30 the president told him to look around,
and on so doing he saw smoke issuing from the bodega of No. 26. He immediately
started for the bodega, followed by the president and two policemen. On arriving
there the president ordered that an opening be made in the wall of the bodega.
Cuico remembered there was a door on the other side of the bodega and ran to
open it. While he was trying to push the door open, he heard something moving in
the bodega. He could not say whether it was an animal or a person. He knocked on
the door and called out, "Open, open" several times, but receiving no response he
left the door and went to the rear where they were making a opening in the wall by
tearing off some pieces of iron. Again, he says that as they had no tools with which
to make an opening in the bodega he went to get some, and upon their return they
began to force the door open and finally it yielded. He says that hole in the wall in
the rear was made first. After the fire he looked around the bodega as he was not
certain about the noise he had heard inside and saw a hole in the bamboo matting
forming the partition between the bodega and the trastienda. When the fiscal
came to the house to conduct an investigation, Cuico called his attention to this
hole and told him about the noise he had heard in the bodega. The hole shows
plainly in the photograph (Exhibit F, of the prosecution). Although we agree that
Cuico's testimony with regard to the door being closed and in reference to hearing
something moving in the bodega is not corroborated by any other witness, is does
not appear that he was flatly contradicted by Captain Lucas, as counsel insist. As
stated above, when Captain Lucas arrived, both houses were on fire. He first
entered the trastienda. But he was not, by his own testimony, the first person to
enter the trastienda, as stated by counsel for the appellant. He found a policeman
and a clerk, Mr. Bryan, and one or two other persons whose names he could not
remember, when he entered the trastienda. The fire in this place, according to
Captain Lucas, had burned some time when he arrived. It will be noted that
Captain Lucas first entered the trastienda and that he spent some little time there.
There could have been plenty of time, then, for Cuico to find the door in question
closed and to hear the noise within the bodega and to secure aid in forcing it open
before Captain Lucas actually arrived at the bodega. The same is true with regard
to the other witnesses who testified that they found the door open. Before
convicting Cuico of a deliberate falsehood in testifying that he found this door
closed upon the strength of the testimony of other witnesses who found it open, it
seems necessary to show they reached the door first or at least at the same time as
Cuico. Neither can it be presumed that the witnesses who actually testified in
regard to this door (some half dozen at the most) were the only ones who assisted
in putting out the fire in the bodega. It must be remembered that a number of
persons were assisting in this work who were not called as witnesses, and the aid
rendered Cuico in forcing the door could easily have come from persons who were
not called as witnesses at all. It seems that Cuico was familiar with the location of
this door, while the others were not; and instead of obeying the president's orders
to make an opening in the wall of the bodega, he went to open the said door,
which accounts for his reaching it first. Captain Hemmett, who visited the place by
daylight, testified that the only connection between the bodega and the trastienda
was a hole a apparently made by some person trying to escape. This was the hole
to which Cuico referred. The defense were eloquently silent in regard to this hole.
No attempt was made to show that it was impossible or even tolerably difficult to
enter the trastienda by means of this hole; and it must be held proven beyond
question that the hole was made on the night of the fire. After a very careful
examination of all the testimony bearing upon the question as to whether the door
to the bodega was open or not when the fire in that room was discovered, we do
not find that Cuico's testimony in this respect is contradicted by anyone.
None of the accused were able to sat whether the empty kerosene bottles found in
various parts of the house belonged to them or not. There were no electric lights in
the house and the occupants depended entirely upon kerosene lamps. The
appellant, Go Jancho, admitted at the trial that bottles were used in transferring
petroleum from the cans in which it was brought to the various lamps, but said that
all this work was done by two muchachos, who were not in the house on the night
of the fire.
We conclude (1) that certainly the fires in the bodega and in the trastienda were of
incendiary origin, with a strong probability that the fire in the room upstairs was of
like character; and (2) that the fire in the trastienda did not catch from the fire
which was burning in the bodega, but was started separately.
No insurance was carried by the owner of either building at the time of the fire,
and the Chinese carpenter who lived in No. 30 carried no insurance on his stock of
goods. The appellants carried an insurance of P25,000 on their stock of goods.
Accompanied by the fiscal and the then counsel for the appellants, a committee of
three business men, having experience in the appraisement of merchandise, went
to the tienda of the accused the day following the fire and appraised the stock
found there. The highest valuation placed upon the stock by one was P5,500; by
another, between P6,000 and P7,000; and by third, not more than P8,000.
Nevertheless, in the court below the appellant, Go Jancho, testified that according
to the books of the firm the stock of good was worth P14,000, and the furniture in
the store P1,000. According to his testimony, the books (which were in Chinese)
further showed a profit of about P4,000 for the period September 5, 1910, to
February 24, 1912. This profit, however, depends upon the existence of a stock of
goods worth P14,000, and P1,000 worth of furniture, as well as debts owing to the
firm amounting to P22,673.08. We cannot accept the testimony of the appellant
that the books showed a profit of about P4,000 for the period in question, for the
reason that the statement that according to the said books the value of the stock in
the tienda was P15,000 cannot be accepted as true. The appraisement and their
stock was made in the presence of the accused and their counsel by persons
accepted by them in the court below as qualified to make it correctly. The highest
figures submitted by any of them are scarcely more than half of what the
appellants claim the stock was worth. Notwithstanding the fact that the
committee's estimates were so far below the value of the stock as represented by
their books, the accused made no effort to take a detailed inventory of the stock to
substantiate the figures shown in their books and show that the committee was in
error. Under these circumstances, we do not feel justified in accepting the figures
of the appellants. There can be no question but that the figures of the committee
were reasonable accurate.
Considerable effort has been made on this appeal to destroy the value of the
testimony various witnesses on the ground of minor differences in their testimony.
We have carefully examined the points made by counsel. It will be found that most
of them depend upon the establishment of the fact that the persons concerned
had equal opportunities for observation. We have already pointed out this fact in
the case of Cuico and Captain Lucas. But in any event we do not consider any of
these alleged inconsistencies as reflecting upon the credibility of the witnesses. It is
to be expected that testimony of several witnesses as to events which transpired in
rapid succession, which were attended by hurry and excitement, and with the
opportunity for observation so greatly hindered by the darkness of night, will
disagree in the details. If the witnesses in the present case should agree in their
testimony that all the events occurred in precisely the same order and in the same
manner, that fact would itself be a suspicious circumstance. It must be
remembered that much of the work of putting out the fire was done by persons
who did not appear as witnesses at all. With so many assisting in putting out the
fires, and the fact that it occurred in the nighttime, it is not strange that some
should see what others did not see, that two witnesses observing the same
incident should differ in some respects in describing it later, or that gaps in the
evidence should appear because persons who assisted in putting out the fire were
not called as witnesses. The fact that a united and orderly narrative of the fire in
the bodega cannot be drawn from the testimony of the various witnesses who took
part in extinguishing it tends rather to stamp the testimony of each as being
truthful to the best of his observation. Furthermore, the conflicting testimony was
for the lower court to weigh. This court has repeatedly refused to disturb a finding
of guilt when the evidence was conflicting and there was enough before the court
to warrant a conviction were evidence of the prosecution true, and conflicting
evidence offered by the defense false, unless from the record it appeared that
there was reasonable doubt as to the correctness of the trial court's classification
of the evidence as true or false.
The testimony of the accused in the present case is far from convincing. Go Jancho
denied that he was out in the passageway between 1 and 2 o'clock on the morning
of the fire, saying that he went to bed about 12 and did not get up until the alarm
of fire, or about half past 2 o'clock. Yet we have the positive and unshaken
testimony of De la Cruz that he was there between the two houses between 1 and
2 o'clock, fully dressed. Of all the empty petroleum bottles scattered over the
house the defendants were unable to either deny or affirm that nay of them
belonged to the house. These bottles, according to the, were intrusted to the care
of muchachos who were not in the house on the night of the fire. Yet, it would
seem that some of the inmates of the house would have been able to recognize
some of the bottles. It is difficult to account for the presence of these bottles,
empty, in the places where the fires occurred. Were they thus carelessly left by the
muchachos the last time the lamps were filled? That would be possible, but it does
not account for the oil found upon the cloth and upon the rolls of sauale. Nor is it
shown that any lamps or other oil-burning receptacles were used in the bodega,
where some of these bottles were found. Were they taken from the place where
the oil was usually kept by unknown person on the night of the fire and their
contents used in starting the fires? If strangers did this, they must have known the
house and its contents intimately and have spent considerable time passing from
one room to another while securing and distributing the oil. Furthermore, they
must have been daring enough to do these things after the crowd had gathered to
put out the fire in No. 30, since it has been shown that the fires in No. 26 were not
started until after No. 30 had been burning for a considerable time. Or were the
defendants cognizant of the location of the bottles and did they deliberately use
them to carry oil to the places where the fires occurred and pour their contents
upon the cloth and the sauale? Of all possible explanations of these empty bottles
and the traces of oil found in the places where the fires occurred, this is the most
convincing. Go Jancho testified in the court below that he saw the saturated cloth
but did not know whether oil or water had been poured upon it. The sincerity of
such an answer is obviously to be doubted, especially in view of the fact that in his
deposition he had admitted that it was oil. The accused stated that they remained
on the plaza for nearly an hour while the fire raged in No. 30, without once
venturing near to see the fate of their own property. In fact, according to them,
they were ignorant of a fire having occurred in their own house until after they had
been brought in the police station. Such testimony is not above suspicion.
Especially is this so when it is remembered that, according to witnesses for the
prosecution, they were all recognized at the very scene of the fire after it had
broken out. The defense seemed content to allow the theory of the prosecution
that the hole in the partition was made on the night of the fire and that a man
could make his escape from the bodega through it. Would strangers have gone to
all this trouble and risk in setting fire to the house? Or would it be more likely that
the defendants would do this? The trial court was called upon to decide these
questions. He heard the testimony, saw the witnesses testify, observed their
demeanor on the stand, stand refused to credit the testimony of the defendants.
But in addition to the adverse inferences suggested by this testimony, it was
conclusively proven at the trial: (1) That neither the fire in the bodega nor that in
the trastienda of No. 26 caught from the fire in No. 30; (2) that there was no
connection between the fire in the bodega and the fire in the trastienda of No. 26;
(3) that both the latter fires were on incendiary origin; (4) that the value of the
stock of goods in No. 26 was between P5,000 and P8,000; (5) that P25,000 worth
of insurance was carried on this stock by the appellants; (6) that the appellants, Go
Foo Suy and Go Jancho, were the owners of this merchandise and consequently the
beneficiaries of the insurance; (7) that their business operations over a period of
approximately eighteen months just prior to the fire had resulted in a loss of at
least P4,000. Here we have a fire of incendiary origin and a very powerful motive
for starting it. The appellants had been conducting their business at a loss for
nearly eighteen months. The success of their crime meant that they would receive
about twice the value of their stock of goods and thus convert a losing investment
into a profitable one.
In State vs. Ross (77 Kan., 341), an arson case, it was said that the testimony
showed a singular state of affairs, but its weight and credibility was for the jury.
Having been found true by the jury and approved by the trial court, the appellate
tribunal decided that its sufficiency could not be successfully controverted before
it.
To the same effect is People vs. Stewart (163 Mich., 1). In this case there was
evidence tending to show that the buildings were insured for less than they were
worth.
In State vs. Henriksen (1216 Minn., 336), it was said in sustaining a conviction:
That some one deliberately set the house on fire after making careful plans for the
success of the deed is a conceded fact in the case. The only question before the
jury was whether defendant either alone or in collusion with his wife laid these
plans and fired the building, or whether it was the act of some third person.
In People vs. Mix (149 Mich., 260), the evidence used in securing a conviction was
wholly circumstantial, but the appellate court sustained the verdict of guilty,
notwithstanding that evidence was offered by the defendant tending to prove an
alibi, the court saying that the persons who to testified could have been mistaken.
In this case the building was insured, but evidently not to an exorbitant figure.
In United States vs. Benitez and Lipa (18 Phil. Rep., 513), an arson case, this court
said:
In a conflict of testimony such as is presented in this case, the court must depend
to a considerable extent upon the discernment of the judge who sits at the trial. A
careful and discriminating trial judge has unequaled advantages in determining the
relative credibility of opposing witnesses. If he exercises his faculties with
shrewdness and sagacity, he performs a most valuable work for the appellate court.
We have considered this case in a very painstaking manner. We have searched the
record for any evidence indicating that the learned trial court was mistaken in his
judgment as to the relative credibility of the witnesses or that he had overlooked
some fact or circumstance of weight or influence in passing upon the evidence, or
that he had misinterpreted the significance of the facts as proved. We have been
unable to find from the record that the learned trial court has fallen into such
error; and, in accordance with the rule which we have so often laid down, namely,
that this court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing
upon the relative credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or its significance misinterpreted by him, we decline to interfere with
the judgment of the trial court upon the facts in this case.
In the present case the motive of committing the crime was powerful; the
incriminating evidence is strong; and suspicion rests upon the exculpatory evidence
submitted by the defense in many places.
After a most careful examination of the entire record, we are of the opinion that
the finding of guilty by the lower court ought not to be disturbed.
The appellant Go Foo Suy was offered as a witness in his own behalf by counsel,
but upon being refused a Chinese interpreter, counsel declined to permit him to
testify. Go Foo Suy himself testified that he had been resident of Cebu seventeen or
eighteen years, and the court observed that the witness was able to testify in the
local dialect if he had wished to do so. Moreover, the court stated that an
interpreter would translate his statements whenever he found any difficulty in
making them. We cannot say that there was any prejudicial error in not allowing
the appellant an interpreter.
The court found the appellants guilty of frustrated arson and sentenced them
under article 549 of the Penal Code for setting fire to a building which they knew at
the time to be occupied by one or more persons. It is urged by the defense that the
court erred because the evidence shows that all the inmates had left No. 26 when
the fires occurred, and, accepting the theory of the prosecution that the appellants
started the fire in order to collect the insurance on the merchandise which
belonged to them, the offense would fall under article 561 of the Penal Code.
Article 561 provides that if the burned things shall be the exclusive property of the
incendiary, he shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree
to prision correccional in its minimum degree, if the arson shall have been
committed with intent to defraud or cause damage to another.
In view of the disposition we propose to make of the case, this proposition requires
no attention. In its decision of December 31, 1988, the supreme court of Spain laid
down the doctrine that setting fire to the contents of a building constitutes the
consummated crime of setting fire to the building. We agree with this doctrine, and
it is therefore immaterial that the contents of the building in the case at bar
belonged to the defendants themselves while the building belonged to a third
person.
We think, however, the court erred in applying article 549. An essential element of
the crime punished by this article is knowledge on the part of the wrongdoer that
the building was "occupied at the time by one or more persons." That all the
essential elements of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require elaboration. The facts of the present case do not justify the assertion that
the defendants knew the building to be occupied at the time.
In view of the considerable time which intervened between the discovery of fire in
No. 30 and its discovery in No. 26, and considering the noise which must have been
made by the crowd which assisted in putting the fire out in No. 30, it is not
probable that any person residing in No. 26 was caught unawares when the fire
broke out in this house. And also bearing in mind the suspicion which rests upon
the conduct of all the inmates of this house, we are of the opinion that the
defendants ought not to be charged with knowledge that the building was
occupied at the time they set it on fire. As the damage occasioned by the fire did
not exceed 6,250 pesetas, the crime of the defendants in punishable under article
550, paragraph 2, in connection with article 551, paragraph 1. The aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity being present in the commission of this crime, with no
extenuating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum degree.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore modified accordingly and the
appellants sentenced to ten years and one day or presidio mayor. In all other
respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The appellants will pay the costs
of this instance. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-47388 October 22, 1940
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO R. MARCOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
The defendants and appellants in their own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Solicitor Guerrero for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
In the elections of 1934 in which Mariano Marcos and Julio Nalundasan, both of
Batac, Ilocos Norte, were rival candidates for the office of representative for the
second district of said province, Nalundasan was elected. The term for which the
latter was elected was, however, cut short as a result of the approval of the
Constitution of the Philippines under the general elections for members of the
National Assembly were by law set for September 17, 1935. In these general
elections Julio Nalundasan and Mariano Marcos resumed their political rivalry and
were opposing candidates for assemblyman in the same district. In the strife
Nalundasan again came out triumphant over Marcos. In the afternoon of
September 19, 1935, in celebration of Nalundasan's victory, a number of this
followers and partymen paraded in cars and trucks through the municipalities of
Currimao, Paoay and Batac, Ilocos Norte, and passed in front of the house of the
Marcoses in Batac. The parade is described as provocative and humiliating for the
defeated candidate, Mariano Marcos. The assemblyman-elect, Julio Nalundasan,
was not, however, destined to reap the fruits of his political laurels for on the night
of September 20, 1935, he was shot and killed in his house in Batac. Very intensive
investigation of the crime by the Government authorities, particularly the
Philippine Constabulary, followed, as a consequence of which an information was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte charging one Nicasio Layaoen, a
businessman of Batac, Ilocos Norte, with having committed the murder of
Nalundasan. After trial, however, Layaoen was acquitted. This acquittal resulted in
another protracted investigation and detective work by the Governmental
agencies, particularly the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice,
with a view to solving the Nalundasan murder. On December 7, 1938. or more than
three years after the death of Nalundasan, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand
Marcos and Quirino Lizardo were prosecuted for the crime of murder in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte under the following information:
Que en o hacia la noche del 20 de septimbre de 1935, en el Municipio de Batac,
Provincia de Ilocos Norte, Filipinas, y dentrio de la jurisdiccion de este Honorable
Juzgado, los acusados arriba nombrados, armados con armas de fuego, puestos de
acuerdo y conspirandose entre si, voluntaria, elegal y criminalmente, con alevosia y
premeditacion conocida y con intencion de matar, dispararon contra Julio
Nalundasan, entonces electo Diputado por el Segundo Distrito de Ilocos Norte,
tocandole en su costado derecho habiendo la bala interesado organos vitales
internos, lesionandolos, las cuales lesiones causaron la muerte instantinea de dicho
Julio Nalundasan.
Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley y con las circunstancias agravantes de
nocturnidad y de haberse cometido el delito en la morada del occiso.
On June 10, 1939, before the conclusion of the trial, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos,
Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo filed eight separate complaints before the
justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, charging Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal
witness for the prosecution, who was still under cross-examination in the trial
against Lizardo, with the offense of false testimony allegedly committed in the
preliminary investigation of December 7, 1938, and during the trial. The defense
had not yet completed the presentation of its evidence, and the prosecution was
preparing its rebuttal testimony. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal of Ilocos
Norte, the trial court ordered the provincial dismissal of the complaints. Fiscal
Higinio Macadaeg also moved said court to find the Marcoses and Lizardo guilty of
contempt of court, by virtue of which the latter were ordered to show cause why
the motion should not be granted. After the conclusion of the trial, the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte rendered judgment the dispositive parts of which
read as follows:
En su virtud, el Juzgado halla a los acusados Quirino S. Lizardo y Ferdinand E.
Marcos culpables, fuera de toda duda recional, del delito de asesinato, con
agravante de morada, pero compensada por la atenuante de provocacion en el
caso de Quirino S. Lizardo, y por la circunstancia adicional de minoria de edad en el
caso de Ferdinand E. Marcos, y condena al primero a la pena de resolucion
perpectua, a las accesorias de ley, y al pago de una cuarta parte de las costas
procesales; y al segundo, a la pena indeterminada de diez anos como minima a
diecisiete anos y cuatro meses como maxima, a las accesorias de ley, y al pago de
una cuarta parte de las costas procasales; y ambos a indemnizar mancomunada y
solidtriameiite a los herederos del occiso en la cantidad de mil pesos (P1,000), pero
sin prision subsidiaria en caso de Insolvencia; y se absuelve a los acusados Mariano
R. Marcos y Pio Marcos, con la mitad de las costas procesales de oficio, y con la
cancelacion de la fianza que han prestado para su libertad provisional.
Por lo expuesto, el Juzgado declara a los acusados en el incidente reos de desacato,
y les condena a cada uno a pagar una multa de P200, o a sufrir la prision subsidiaria
correspondiente en caso de insolvencia o falta de pago.
From this judgment the defendants Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino appealed,
assigning the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in according greater credibility to the prosecution
witnesses.
2. The trial court erred in convicting two and acquitting two accused upon the
same evidence.
3. The trial court erred in considering the character of Quirino Lizardo against the
accused.
4. The trial court erred in not crediting the electoral censo, Exhibit 84 for the
defense, with any probative value. lawphil.net
5. The trial court erred in denying the motions of the accused for a reopening and a
new trial.
6. The trial court erred in finding the four accused- appellant guilty of
contempt.1awphil.nêt
The defendants Mariano Marcos and Pio Marcos have also appealed, but only from
so much of the judgment as found them guilty of contempt. A three-volume brief
was filed by the appellants and a comprehensive brief submitted by the
Government. Both briefs are, however, more valueable for their literary value. Oral
argument was had and doubtful points eliminated.
In view of the importance of the case and the fact that the Government asks for
the extreme penalty of death for the defendants-appellants, Ferdinand Marcos and
Quirino Lizardo, we have taken over the case on appeal with utmost caution and
searching scrutiny of the evidence presented both by the prosecution and by the
defense. As a general rule, this court will not interfere with judgment of the trial
court in passing upon the weight or credibility that should be attached to the
testimony of witnesses; but this court may determine for itself the guilt or
innocence of the defendant and may modify or reverse the conclusions of fact laid
down by the trial court if there is some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been over- looked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.
The theory of the prosecution, stripped of nonessentials, is that Mariano Marcos,
Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo were prompted to conspire
against the life of Julio Nalundasan by the latter's electoral victory over Mariano
Marcos, father of Ferdinand and brother-in-law of Lizardo, on September 17, 1935;
that Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, was a trusted and
loyal attendant and bodyguard of Quirino Lizardo; that the said Calixto Aguinaldo
was present in various conference of the Marcoses and Lizardo, in the last of which
(that held on September 20, 1935) it was decided that Nalundasan must be killed;
that Ferdinand was selected as the trigger man because he was a marks- man and
because, if discovered and convicted, he would only be sent to Lolomboy
reformatory school in view of his age, and that Mariano Marcos, father of
Ferdinand, would in the meantime be in Laoag; that about nine o'clock in the
evening of September 20, 1935, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, the first
armed with an automatic pistol and the second with a police positive revolver, and
accompanied by Calixto Aguinaldo, left for the fatal mission and, upon reaching
Nalundasan's yard, they posted themselves at a point where they could not be
detected but where they could get a full view of the intended human target; that
Calixto Aguinaldo was asked to watch while his two companions, Ferdinand and
Lizardo, were to execute the act that would put an end to Nalundasan's life; that
Calixto Aguinaldo, after waiting for a few minutes, was seized by fear as a result of
which he proceeded to return to the house of the Marcoses, but that on his way he
heard the fatal shot from the direction of Nalundasan's home; that Ferdinand fired
the fatal shot at Nalundasan while the latter's back was turned towards Ferdinand
and Lizardo. On the other hand, the defense is one of complete denial of
participation by any of the herein defendants in the commission of the crime. It is
at once apparent that the validity of the theory of the prosecution rests upon the
weight that should be accorded to the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal
witness for the prosecution and the alleged companion of the defendants-
appellants, Quirino Lizardo and Ferdinand Marcos on the night of the killing of Julio
Nalundasan.
It is important to observe that, as stated, immediately after the death of
Nalundasan and as a result of the efforts exerted by the agents of the Government,
particularly the Philippine Constabulary, Nicasio Layaoen, a businessman of Batac,
Ilocos Norte, was prosecuted for the murder of Nalundasan. In that case the star
witness, Gaspar Silvestre, identified Layaoen as the man who fired the fatal shot at
Nalundasan on the night in question, and the prosecution, with the same
earnestness and vehemence exhibited in the case, prayed for the imposition of the
extreme penalty of death upon the accused Layaoen. In that case it was claimed
that the accused Layaoen was seen on the night in question with a revolver under
the house of the deceased and that in a house immediately adjoining that of
Layaoen and under the care and control of his wife, the Constabulary agents
discovered eighty-one rounds of ammunition of the 22 long Lubaloy Western rifle,
the brand and class of bullet which was alleged in that case and is alleged in the
present case to have killed Nalundasan. Nevertheless the accused Layaoen was
acquitted by the court of First instance of Ilocos Norte.
According to Calixto Aguinaldo, the principal witness for the prosecution, he was
present in the various stages of the conspiracy to murder Nalundasan and, as noted
above, he was present at the time of the commission of the murder on the night of
September 20, 1935. Aguinaldo also alleges to have been present at the meeting in
the house of the Marcoses in the morning of September 15th as well as at the
meetings in the morning and in the after- noon of September 20th, The very
evidence for the prosecution therefore shows that Calixto Aguinaldo was a
coconspirator. His testimony accordingly comes from a polluted source and should
be received with a great deal of caution and, for this reason, should be closely and
carefully scrutinized. A painstaking review of the evidence reveals several
important considerations leading to the inescapable conclusion that the testimony
of Calixto Aguinaldo does not deserve the credit that was accorded by the trial
court.
It is noteworthy that Aguinaldo claims to have been present at the various stages of
the conspiracy and to have participated in the commission of the offense herein
charged to the extent admitted by him. Nevertheless he remained silent for
approximately three years, it appearing that it was only in November, 1938, that he
broke his silence. The reason given the prosecution is that his loyalty to the
defendant Quirino Lizardo prevented him from betraying the latter's confidence,
and in this connection it was admitted in the argument by the representative of the
prosecution that it was only when Aguinaldo was approached by the Constabulary
agents that he decided to speak out the truth. The pretended loyalty of Aguinaldo
is conspicuously disproved by the circumstance that, as the prosecution itself
admits, although he was asked to watch, he returned to the house of the Marcoses
before Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo has executed the alleged fatal act.
But whatever might have Aguinaldo's reason, the fact is that his long continued
silence creates serious doubts in the mind of this Court as to his motives for
breaking that silence. The change of attitude could not have been due to a
desireable impulse to serve the interest of justice and proves, if it proves anything
at all, the tardy revival of stultified civic consciousness.
According to the theory of the prosecution, Ferdinand was selected as the trigger
man for two reasons, namely: because he is experienced in pistol shooting, having
been cadet major in the University of the Philippines, and because he was below
eighteen years of age and, if discovered and convicted, would be merely sent to
Lolomboy reformatory school. With reference to the first reason, it is even
represented that Mariano Marcos, father of Ferdinand, not only acquiesced in the
arrangement but apparently encouraged his son to perform the foul task, with the
simple remark that an assurance be made that the target was not missed and, if we
may believe further the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo, that he (Mariano Marcos)
was to go in the meantime to Laoag, Ilocos Norte, thereby leaving his son to
accomplish the dirty job while he, the person most affected by the electoral
triumph of Nalundasan, was to stay away safe and sound. This is something
extraordinary for a father to feel and to do, and we incline to reject the testimony
of Aguinaldo and the inferences deducible therefrom, because the story is, while
possible, devoid of reasonable probability and opposed to the lessons of common
experience and the teachings of experimental psychology. As regards the second
reason, it appears that both the prosecution and the defense agree that Ferdinand
Marcos was at the time of the commission of the alleged offense already over
eighteen years of age. As a matter of fact, one of the ground invoked by the
Solicitor-General in asking for the modification of the judgment of the lower court
and imposition of the death penalty upon this appellant is that he was more than
eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the offense. It is of course
reasonable to assume that at least his father and the interested party himself, if not
his uncle Pio Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, knew this fact. The theory that Ferdinand
was chosen to be the trigger man because of minority must therefore be decidedly
false.
We find the claim of Calixto Aguinaldo that he was present at the alleged various
conferences held in the house of the Marcoses as a mere bodyguard of Quirino
Lizardo to be incredible, in view of the absence of a valid reason for the latter,
admitted by the prosecution to be "a domineering, blustering giant of a man" and
by the trial court to be "un hombre de rebusta constitucion fisica, de caracter
implusivo, val;iente y decidido," to employ as his bodyguard Calixto Aguinaldo, who
is only about one-half of Lizardo in size and who has not been shown to be capable,
either by experience or by nature, to discharge such office. More incredible still is
alleged participation of Aguinaldo in the actual conspiracy to kill Julio Nalundasan,
especially in view of the fact that, notwithstanding the attempt of the prosecution
to show that he was a trusted man of Quirino Lizardo, there is evidence to prove
that the relationship between the two could not be said to be of the best, it
appearing, according to the admission of Aguinaldo himself, that he lost his job in
the Government by order of the University of Labor upon the strength of the
findings in an administrative investigation in which Lizardo testified Aguinaldo. It is
hard to believe that either the Marcoses or Quirino Lizardo would allow themselves
to commit the stupidity of permitting Calixto Aguinaldo, who was a stranger to the
Marcoses and who, as already stated, had reason to be antagonistic to Lizardo, to
know their alleged plan to kill Nalundasan and of later asking Aguinaldo to merely
play the insignificant, nay unnecessary, role of watcher, unless it was the intention
of the defendant herein to facilitate the discovery of the alleged crime and to
preserve the only means of their conviction. Since, according to the theory of the
prosecution, Ferdinand Marcos was selected to be the trigger man, Quirino Lizardo,
Mariano Marcos or Pio Marcos could easily have personally done the alleged
watching.
Calixto Aguinaldo testified that when he and Quirino Lizardo arrived at noon in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, Ferdinand was in the house of the Marcoses to whom he was
introduced. It is a fact, however, that Ferdinand was a student of the University of
the Philippines and left Manila in the morning of September 15, 1935, arriving in
Batac only at 8:30 p. m. of that day. Aguinaldo therefore declared falsely when he
stated that he met Ferdinand in the house of the Marcoses at the time he
(Aguinaldo) and Lizardo arrived in Batac at noon of September 15, 1935.
The prosecution has pictured Quirino Lizardo as a person more interested and
enthusiastic than his brother-in-law, Mariano Marcos, in seeing the latter win in the
elections of September 17, 1935, against Julio Nalundasan at all costs. Thus it is
represented that when Pio Marcos informed Lizardo prior to the elections about
the imminent defeat of Mariano Marcos, Lizardo is alleged to have impulsively
exclaimed " Eso no puede ser! !Si vamos a perder la eleccion ganaremos en otra
cosa, y es . . . matar a Nalundasan! Con una bala voy a terminar la politica en
Ilocos!" In this connection it is well to recall that after marriage of Quirino Lizardo
to Maria Marcos, sister of Mariano and Pio Marcos, animosity and ill feeling arose
between the Marcoses and Lizardo as a result of family questions, which
culminated in the filing in court of a criminal complaint against Lizardo for
attempted homicide in which the offended party was the mother of the Marcoses.
In the light of this circumstance, we cannot align ourselves with the theory that
Lizardo could thereafter have shown such interest in the candidacy of Mariano
Marcos as to take the initiative not only of suggesting but of participating in the
murder of Julio Nalundasan, even granting that previous family differences had
been patched up.
The trial court was of the opinion that the Marcoses and Lizardo conceived the idea
of killing Nalundasan with some seriousness only in the morning of September 209,
1935, after the provocative and humiliating parade held by Nalundasan's followers
and partymen in the afternoon of the preceding day. But while the defeat of
Marcos, followed by such insulting parade, might have irritated the herein
defendants, the existence of a motive alone, though perhaps an important
consideration, is not proof of the commission of a crime, much less of the guilt of
the defendants-appellants.
By and large, we find the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo to be inherently
improbable and full of contradictions in important details. For this reason, we
decline to give him any credit. In view of this conclusion, we find it neither
necessary nor profitable to examine the corroborative evidence presented by the
prosecution. Where the principal and basic evidence upon which the prosecution
rests its case fails, all evidence intended to support or corroborate it must likewise testimony without first knowing the extent of the sentence to be imposed against
fail. Lizardo and the Marcoses (Revised Penal Code, art. 180). The latter should
In passing we may state that the prosecution deserves commendation for the therefore have waited for the termination of the principal case in the lower court
industry and zeal it has displayed in this case, although its failure to obtain the before filing the charges for false testimony against Calixto Aguinaldo. Facts
conviction of Nicasio Layaoen in the first case it is not necessarily vindicated by the considered, we are of the opinion that the action of the Marcoses and Lizards was
instant effort to secure a judgment against the herein defendants-appellants, calculated, or at least tended. directly or indirectly to obstruct the administration
unless the latter's guilt is shown to the point of a certain degree of moral certainty of justice and that, therefore, the trial court properly found them guilty of
and the judicial mind is set at ease as to their culpability. contempt. (In re Gomez, 6 Phil., 647; U.S. vs. Jaca, 26 Phil., 100.) In view of the
The judgment of the lower court, herein appealed from is accordingly reversed, result, however, arrived at in the principal case, and considering that the inherent
and the defendants-appellants, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo, acquitted of power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the charge of murder and forthwith liberated from imprisonment and discharged the vindictive principle (Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil., 778), and on the
from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re Lozano and
With reference to the incident of contempt, it appears that on June 10, 1939, the Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801), it is our view that this purpose is sufficiently achieved and
four accused below filed eight separate complaints with the justice of the peace of the principle amply vindicated with the imposition upon each of the four accused
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, charging the principal witness for the prosecution, Calixto, above mentioned of a fine of fifty (50) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
Aguinaldo, with the crime of false testimony because of alleged false declaration of insolvency. So ordered.
made by the latter in the preliminary investigation of December 7, 1938, and Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
during the trial of the aforesaid four accused. When the several complaints for false
testimony were filed, it appears that Calixto Aguinaldo was under cross-
examination in the separate trial against Quirino Lizardo, and the trial of the other
three accused, Mariano, Pio and Ferdinand Marcos, had not yet commenced. The
judge of the Court of First Instance who was trying the murder case, upon motion
of the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte, ordered the provincial dismissal of the
various complaints filed in the justice of the peace court of Laoag against Calixto
Aguinaldo and, thereafter, a motion was presented asking that the Marcos and
Lizardo be declared in contempt. Lizardo and the Marcoses were ordered to show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt and, simultaneously with the
judgment on the principal case for murder, Quirino Lizardo, Mariano Marcos, Pio
Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos were adjudged guilty of contempt and sentenced
each to pay a fine of two hundred pesos, with corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
It is evident that the charges for false testimony filed by the four accused above
mentioned could not be decided until the main case for murder was disposed of,
since no penalty could be meted out to Calixto Aguinaldo for his alleged false
G.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y
CAROLINO, and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-
0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN
MARTINEZ y CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y
CUNANAN, without authority of law, confederating together, acting jointly and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and
possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and
rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the
proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.3
Version of the Prosecution
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard
Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector
Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears
that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 o’clock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon
was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan
City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session
was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro
Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from
people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando
Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the
house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar
Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised
by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets
(containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in
the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime
Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory
examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test
and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez,
claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along
Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper
who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials
for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for
Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person
pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven
policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to
the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and
charged with sniffing shabu.
The Ruling of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino,
and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings
defined and penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the
cost of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be
disposed of in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1
Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses
of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in
constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present
as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC
as to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further
held that although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of
evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded.
The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying
for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be having a pot
session at the time of their arrest;
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant the
shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accused-appellants without
warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been
sufficiently established;
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1
Azardon insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime charged;
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.
For accused Rafael Gonzales
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1]
that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the
same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to
raise such issue before arraignment.5 However, this waiver is limited only to the
arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with
it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.6
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the
accused, it has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if
unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,7 especially when the
transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.8 While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again,
this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights.9 Thus, despite the
procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the
evidence in the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accused’s right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into
the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.10 Sec. 2,
Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all
searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following
instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant — (i) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest;11 (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of
a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop
and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.12
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order
to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a
warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the
subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony
of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to,
and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you
how many persons were actually conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed
with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not
know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police
blotter before you proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of
the person who told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing
pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does
not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could
not see what is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of
shabu on the table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael
Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you
that he was informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session
going on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.14
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b),
on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be
present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held
to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.15
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases16 that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search,17 such
rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a
buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole
tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police
officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely
on an informer’s tip. The case of People v. Bolasa18 is informative on this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a
woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately
proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house
accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped inside
through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They
then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the
drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under
any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest,
accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to
commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a
crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that
accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners
who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested.
Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was
not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through
the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants
inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a
moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and
frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the
evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted
first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected
culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they
should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.
The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal.
Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against
accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the
fundamental law.19
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion,
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based
on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 20
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were
committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to
enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to
paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just
committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip
originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the
information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was
based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the
house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information
originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on?
[No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot
session was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going
on somewhere in Arellano but you don’t know the exact place where the pot
session was going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the alleged
pot session because he claimed that he derived that information from somebody
else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot
session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot
session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant don’t [sic] know physically what was really
happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there,
sir.21 [Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The
elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.22
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally
entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they
discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police
officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so
should the warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search
be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a
customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering
that the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then
a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure.
The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal.
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.23 The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible.
The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges
have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are
able to present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed
rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law
fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law.24
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the
accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply
with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with
moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities
having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous
Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the
confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken,
no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give
them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from the time
of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing.
Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt
as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor
was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i)
the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.25 Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the
dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to
establish the existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently
established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts
regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and
tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to
the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.26 Malillin v. People was the first in a
growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in
dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.27
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,28 defines chain of custody as
follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of
seized or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their
identity and integrity, as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime
laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance
changes hand a number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the
substance from the suspect to place his marking on its plastic container and seal
the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a
tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized
substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches
the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal
the same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the
same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory
technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he should
put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since
the police officer’s seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then
describe the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was handed to him
and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would
have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage
personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one’s possession has
been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not
been tampered with or substituted while in his care.29
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
further elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided
that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case,
however, no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a
failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of
presentation in court. A review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
the documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in the chain of
custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following CONFISCATION RECEIPT
were confiscated from the accused, to wit: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues. THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs with our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed
colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ). of SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues. Guarin apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues. ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.30 DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this
[Emphases supplied] city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver, a resident of
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married, businessman,
indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN,
Urbano) for proper disposition.31 A letter-request for laboratory examination was 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this
prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items: city.
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to
marked "DC&A-1." Dagupan City Police Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues Desk Officer to record the incident and the sachet of suspected Shabu
marked "DC&A-2." Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A- Laboratory Examination.
3."32 Seizing Officer:
[Emphases supplied] (sgd.) (sgd.)
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Maranion by SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D- Affiant Affiant
042-06L listed the specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit: Remarks:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED: Refused to Signed
A – A1 to A115 – One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with Refused to Signed
tag each containing suspected shabu residue without markings. Refused to Signed
B – B1 to B11 – Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing Refused to Signed
suspected shabu residue without markings. Refused to Signed34
C – C1 to C49 – Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing [Emphases supplied]
suspected shabu residue without markings.33 The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil,
[Emphases supplied] and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as
Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
Exhibits "H" and series, "I" and series, and "J" and series, respectively. Said items
were identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.35
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were
properly preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized
from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for
laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
After seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was
conducted in the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus,
no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner
required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,36admitted that no photographs
were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.37
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance.
The suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the
requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory
and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides
specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs
shall be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may
have had should have dissipated by the time they reached the police station, as the
suspects had already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been
held that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer
from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items
at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the law’s intent to preserve
their integrity and evidentiary value.38
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases are People v.
Garcia,39 People v. Dela Cruz,40 People v. Dela Cruz,41 People v. Santos,
Jr.,42 People v. Nazareno,43People v. Orteza,44 Zarraga v. People,45 and People v.
Kimura.46
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v.
Sanchez is instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly
specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to
ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence
subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at
the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that
they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.This step initiates the process of
protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of
protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on
planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x
Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag
unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling
and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the
handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of
custody.47 [Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela
Cruz does it appear that the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the
letter-request for laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to
have been marked with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no showing,
however, as to who made those markings and when they were made. Moreover,
those purported markings were never mentioned when the subject items were
identified by the prosecution witnesses when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets,
rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain
to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry
Report48 that the precise number of each type of item was indicated and
enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the subject
items were never accurately quantified but only described as "pieces,"49 "several
pcs,"50 and "shabu paraphernallas."51 Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates
that all the subject items had "no markings," although each item was reported to
have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject
items during laboratory examination and testing.52 Doubt, therefore, arises as to
the identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that
the subject items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the
laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking
of seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,53 People v.
Kimura,54 and People v. Laxa.55
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts
below gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the
seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the
receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their
quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt should provide.
The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of
the accused and the general description of the subject items as "the sachet of
suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory." The
receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardon’s admission in his
testimony56 that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did
not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification57 issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the
subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano
for proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp.
Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were
transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No
witness testified on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior
to their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings
in People v. Cervantes,58 People v. Garcia,59 People v. Sanchez,60 and Malillin v.
People.61
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary
to PO1 Azardon’s testimony62that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen
while at the police station, the Letter63 to the Executive Director of the DDB states
that the apprehending officers were tipped off "while conducting
monitoring/surveillance." Said letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation
Receipt, that the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and not
September 2, 2006, as alleged in the Information. It was also mentioned in the
aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police
officers that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated
from the accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory
examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the
prosecution’s position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items
were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the
Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been
shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti.
The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means
that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is
essential before the accused can be found guilty.64
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of
R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,65 this Court held that said section was silent
as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as
a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit
only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigation and
prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still
possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs
cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not
affect the admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.66 Thus, had the subject
items in this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value
would be insufficient to warrant conviction.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail.
However, such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the
regular performance of duty.67 Where the official act in question is irregular on its
face, the presumption of regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to
be irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the
presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the
accused.68
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous
drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search
and seizure procedure under the law.69 Some bona fidearrests and seizures in
dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug
enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the
seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert
greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and
handling of seized drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165
may not always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is
not necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized,
addressed and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.70
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec.
1171 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 1572 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of
R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court
notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where
the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the
form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not
incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges
under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use,
provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.
The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec.
15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in
a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone
would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide
them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of
residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of
dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed
charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there
was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 1473 (Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the
maximum penalty under Sec. 1274(Possession of Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be
imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty
is imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same
section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is
prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.1avvphi1
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this
Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to
exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs
is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under
Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a
chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the
accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
 WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC- been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
NO. 03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING opinion of the Court’s Division.
the accused and ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are RENATO C. CORONA
confined for any other lawful cause. Chief Justice
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this
decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-
General, Philippine National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs
Enforcement Agency, for their information and guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the
seized items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in
the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep
and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon
meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen.
Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his
father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven
months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus
which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon
conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and
to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was about to go
down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of
the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to
bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep,
he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held
his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies
were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room.
At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded.
Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded
himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody
that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his
wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and
Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with
which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean
that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe
into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme
moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for
the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the case, in which
the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose
house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao,
his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence
presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily
commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The
doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted
while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the
deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it.
Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to
have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw
how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his
wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the
evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his
enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he
stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the
courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he
is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty
would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-4467 April 30, 1959
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTER DEL ROSARIO MURRAY, defendant-appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Villamor for
appellee.
Diokno and Sison for appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Hon. Ceferino de los
Santos, presiding, finding appellant Mrs. Ester del Rosario-Murray guilty of
parricide for the death of her husband George C. Murray, and sentencing her
to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of said deceased, and pay the costs.
The following facts appear sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The appellant
herein was married to the deceased George Murray during the liberation, more
specifically on May 9, 1946. Appellant was a widow at the time of the marriage,
namely, Maria Luisa, 16, Caridad, 17, Jasmin, 6, and Eddie, 4 years. The deceased
was a retired officer of the United States Army and together with a partner,
Thomas Simmons, was ostensibly engaged in buying and selling surplus U. S. Army
equipment. The appellant and her husband and the children of the former lived in
a rented two-story house at No. 202 N. Domingo Street, San Juan, Rizal. They had a
maid by the name of Maria Naral, and a driver, Jose Tagle. They had two cars, one a
Buick, used by Mrs. Murray and her children, ordinarily driven by the driver and
occasionally by her, and another a Cadillac, driven by Murray himself. The upper
story of the house had three bedrooms, one used by the spouses, another beside
it, used by the younger children Jasmin and Eddie Boy, and a third, separated from
the couple's bedroom by a small hall where the stairs landed occupied by the elder
children and the housemaid. The driver slept in the garage, where the two cars of
the family were kept. Mrs. Murray kept three boxer (bull) dogs and three native
dogs. The former were kept in a kennel in the yard while the three native dogs
were kept in the garage.
Both Murray and Mrs. Murray appeared to have loved each other. They often went
dancing in night clubs, and also spent time together aboard a yacht, the "Mistress,"
which the deceased and his partner owned. While aboard the yacht the deceased
had taught the appellant to use the revolver, in which use she became proficient.
Murray seemed to be much in love with his wife. On one occasion he came to
blows with an American who tried to dance with her without his previous
permission.
Murray and the appellant seemed to have lived quietly until May, 1949, when
Murray met Carolina Trinidad, a young cinema actress, 20, whose screen name is
Carol Varga. The occasion of the meeting was aboard the yacht "Mistress," where a
picture was then being filmed, in which Carol Varga was one of the members of the
cast. The Sunday after that meeting Murray invited Varga to lunch, then in the
evening took her to night club where they stayed till 3:00 a.m. As time passed by
their meetings and going to night clubs became more and more often. Murray
made love to her and she accepted his love and they became engaged. In June or
July Murray went to Hongkong and while there kept sending cables to her, telling
her how he was missing her (Exhs. "V," "V-1" "V-5").
The last time that Carol saw Murray was on August 12, 1949, at about 7:00 in the
evening. They went on a ride in Murray's cadillac to "Marifusa" where they took
drinks. At 9:30 they left the place and Murray conducted Varga to her home. After
that, he went home, reaching it at 10:00 p. m. When he left her, he told her he was
going to the Riviera.
The same evening at 7;00 Mrs. Murray arrived home with her children, who had
come from school. She opened a drawer of a sewing machine near the dining room
and took out therefrom Murray's revolver, which she placed in her white bag. Then
she went down to the garage and from there went out in the Buick car, alone,
driving it herself. It so happened that the car had a flat tire, so she left it, and
ordered Tagle to fetch the car. Tagle arrived with the car at 9:00. Murray arrived at
11:00 in the evening and began looking for his revolver. But he could not find it,
and was mad about not finding it. As above stated, Mrs. Murray had taken the
revolver earlier in the evening and did not give it to him. They went up talking; then
Murray came down alone — and left.
Murray came home about 4:00 o'clock the next morning, August 13th. Some thirty
minutes thereafter Mrs. Murray entered the room of the girls where the maid and
the two older girls slept. Mrs. Murray brought there the small boy, Eddie, and asked
the maid to let him sleep beside her; then she left, closing the door behind her. Not
long after Mrs. Murray had left, the maid heard four shots, one after another, at
short intervals. The shots came from the room of the spouses. She turned around
on the bed wondering, but as she felt an urge to urinate, she stood up and opened
the door, and as she did so, she saw Mrs. Murray opening the door of their room
also. Mrs. Murray proceeded down the stairs, while the maid followed her. At the
middle of the stairs Mrs. Murray suddenly turned back while the maid continued
on her way down to the bathroom to urinate. When the maid went up, she saw
that the two eldest daughters of Mrs. Murray were already with the latter in the
bedroom of the spouses, crying, so she also went inside. There she saw Mrs.
Murray standing beside the window, bending over her lifeless husband, who was
bleeding and motionless. Mrs. Murray said in Tagalog, "George, are you dead
now?" Murray was lying down on the bed naked, except his drawers, as was his
habit when going to bed to sleep. She noticed that the two windows were slightly
opened, while the door leading to balcony was also open. It had been the practice
of the couple to have both windows open, while the door to the porch was kept
closed.
Jose Tagle, the driver of the family, slept as usual in the garage on the evening of
August 12, 1949. Between 4:00 and 5:00 at dawn he was awakened by the noise of
two shots. He stood up immediately and again heard two shots. He went up the
driveway to the stairs leading up the house. Upon arriving at that place he noticed
that the door of the balcony above the stairs, leading to the room of the spouses,
was being opened. Then he saw that it was Mrs. Murray who had opened it and
further saw her in the act of throwing something away, after which he heard leaves
rustling and then thud produced by something falling on the ground, near the place
where the boxer dogs were being kept.
Not long after the maid had come up to the bedroom of the spouses, Mrs. Murray
ordered her daughter Caridad to phone for a doctor and fetch a policeman. Caridad
and the maid went down; so did the other girl, Maria Luisa. Caridad could not use
the phone as it was out of order. They proceeded to the garage and told the driver
to have the car ready. The three rode in the Buick car and went first to the house of
one Dr. Santos and from there they went to the municipal building. A policeman
came with them in the auto. On their way back they passed by the house of the
doctor, but as he was not yet ready, they returned home with the policeman only.
The policeman ordered that the things in the bedroom not be touched, then asked
for a cup of coffee, and the maid went down to brew coffee.
When the maid went to the bedroom of the spouses, after having fetched the
policeman, she noticed that the wardrobe was already open and the clothes were
scattered around. The wardrobe was closed when they left to fetch the doctor and
there were no clothes scattered in the room. She also noticed that Mrs. Murray had
already changed her dress, after having taken a bath. When seen going out of her
bedroom after the shots were heard, appellant was wearing a white silk gown with
flowers, but when the maid and the two girls came back, she was already wearing a
dress with stripes.
At 11:00 o'clock in the morning a medico-legal officer examined the body of the
deceased Murray. At that examined the body was already in rigor mortis. The
following wounds were found: One wound, the point of entrance of which was on
the center end of the left eyebrow and the point of exit at the back. A second
wound with point of entry on the right side of the lower lip but without exit. The
bullet, according to the medico-legal officer, upon hitting the teeth must have been
deflected. This wound was not fatal. A third wound with entry just below the neck,
left breast, and point of exit at the back, penetrating the thorax and the upper lobe
of the right lung, and point of exit at the right side of the scapula. A fourth wound
penetrating the upper thorax and the border of the upper lobe of the left lung,
lacerating through and through the back of the aorta and trachea and without
point of exit because the slug had lodged at the muscles at the back. The wounds
penetrating the head and the chest caused the death of Murray (Exh. "II"). The
direction of the wound indicated that the assailant must have been towards the
legs of the victim on the left side.
Appellant denies the following facts testified to by the maid and the driver: that
she kept the revolver of the deceased in her white bag on the evening of August
12, alleging that she returned it to him upon finding it in the drawer of her sewing
machine; that she was seen by the maid wearing her white nightgown and
negligee, just after the shots; that she had opened the door of the balcony, and
threw something down from the window, which fell near the dog kennel; that the
room of the spouses was in order just after the discovery of the murder, and all the
other circumstances pointing to her as the author of the crime.
The theory which the appellant tried to develop by the evidence she submitted is
that the deceased was a violent temper; that some unidentified robber must have
entered their bedroom when appellant was downstairs taking coffee and preparing
to sew; that the murderer must have climbed the balcony and passed the door
leading to the bedroom, which door was then open; that the murderer ransacked
the clotches of the deceased and must have found the revolver which she had
given the deceased before the latter left at 10:00 o'clock the previous evening; that
the intruder must have found the wallet of the deceased, and took away therefrom
something less than P600, leaving the empty wallet on his way out of the room.
Another possibility which she merely insinuated, is that someone who had dealings
with the deceased in connection with the latter's business of smuggling
ammunition and carbines, might have had the interest to eliminate him and thus
caused or induced the murder. This latter theory is supported by evidence
submitted by her to the effect that the police had been trying to check up the
murder on this angle.
The first theory is supported mainly by her own testimony and by those of her two
daughters. In the main it runs counter to the declarations of two star witnesses for
the prosecution, namely, the maid Maria Naral and the driver, Jose Tagle, which
have been already set forth above as sufficiently proved.
Appellant also testified that the door of the balcony of their bedroom was open the
night of the murder, thus contradicting the testimony of the maid that it was closed
as the family had been accustomed to do. The fact, however, is that the night of
August 12 had been a rainy night and the balcony door must have been closed to
prevent the rain from getting in. The appellant also wants the court to believe that
some intruder must have entered the room and shot the deceased and in order to
prove this, she and her daughters testified that the clothes of the deceased had
been scattered around, and his wallet was found empty on the floor, near the door
of the balcony. But these claims are in turn contradicted by the maid who testified
that when she entered the death room for the first time, the clothes of the
deceased were not scattered around, as well as by the finding of the first police
who went into the room for investigation that he found no footprints in the room
towards the balcony.
The police, following her subordinate theory, had tried to follow and check up
appellant's claim that some enemy of the deceased must have caused his death
but it appears that they were never able to get confirmation of said theory. Instead,
the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation on the existence of nitrates on
the right hand glove and the cartridge in the revolver of the deceased, as well as
the slugs near the latter's body fully and completely support the testimonies of the
maid and the driver as to appellant's having herself, in all probability, committed
the murder.
Where the identity of a person committing a crime is in dispute, the motive that
may have impelled the commission is very relevant. (U.S. vs. Mac Mann, 4 Phil.,
561; People vs Ragsac, 61 Phil., People vs, Bastatas, 65 Phil., 543; People vs. Tagasa,
68 Phil., 147; People vs. Caggauan, et al., 94 Phil., 118.) So we come to the motive
that could have impelled the commission of the crime by the appellant. The
prosecution claims jealousy of another woman, Carol Varga. Appellant denies this
and claims that she never came to know Carol Varga. But the mother of the latter
declared that appellant had once gone to their house on Calle Pepin, pretending to
be another actress name "Daisy," a supposed companion of Carol Varga, asking if
Carol had gone to the Riviera the previous night. The driver, Jose Tagle also testified
that he used to drive appellant along Santa Mesa Boulevard on many occasions,
and as they would approach the junction of Pepin Street, residence of Carol Varga,
appellant would ask him to lessen his speed to enable appellant to see if her
husband's car was parked in front of Carol Varga's residence. But a minor resident
testified to by one of appellant's daughter shows that appellant knew her to be the
object of the attentions to her deceased husband, and that said daughter knew
that her mother was aware of these attentions. A joint picture of the deceased and
Carol Varga was found by appellant's daughter, Caridad, in the Buick car, in which
she, Maria Luisa, Naral and the driver rode to call for a doctor and the police soon
after discovery of the murder. According to Caridad herself, said picture was burned
by her on August 14, the day following the murder because she "did not want my
mother to see it." (Testimony of Caridad del Rosario, t.s.n., p. 29.) This conduct and
statement of appellant's daughter Caridad creates the reasonable inference that
appellant knew the affection of the deceased for Varga and she, the appellant, was
jealous thereof.
Another incident which indicates how appellant felt toward Carol Varga is testified
to be Adriano del Rosario, owner of Funeraria Quique, who had been contracted by
appellant for the funeral of her husband. Del Rosario testified that the appellant
expressly ordered him to keep the coffin of the deceased closed, and in accordance
with appellant's instruction, he placed the following notice on it: "Thru the request
of the widow, this coffin will not be opened." Carol Varga went to the funeral parlor
and asked permission to have the coffin opened and see the face of the deceased,
and as Del Rosario had been instructed to have the coffin closed and not to open it,
he went to appellant to have her permission for Carol Varga to see the cadaver, but
appellant there upon refused Carol Varga's request, saying: "She (Varga) could not
because she was the cause of all this trouble" (Testimony of Adriano del Rosario,
t.s.n., p. 2).
John Snure, Jr., a friend of the deceased living in Park Avenue, Pasay, testified that
on one occasion, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the deceased and Carol Varga
visited him at his home where he was living alone. As Snure went up to the
bathroom situated on the second floor of his house, the deceased followed him
there and told him that his life was being threatened. According to Snure, "he
(Murray) told me that his wife knew that he was going with Carol Varga;"
(Testimony of John Snure, Jr., t.s.n., p. 107); that he (Snure) refused to allow the
deceased to live with him because he did not want to interfere with his domestic
difficulties." (Idem, p. 108.)
Mrs. Margaret S. Pier, a close friend of the Murray's, who had been frequently
visiting at the Murray house in July, testified that on the occasion Mrs. Murray told
her, in her presence and that of the deceased, that a certain Mr. Yatco had asked
appellant if she knew her husband was going around with other girls and movie
stars, to which the deceased replied that Yatco had nothing to do with it. On
another occasion witness was present during a quarrel or sort of misunderstanding
between appellant and the deceased, at which time the deceased told witness that
appellant did not want him to go out; and at one time she saw appellant grab
Murray's necktie and shirt and open its botton, but despite appellant's attitude the
deceased went on to change his shirt and then left the house. (Testimony of M. S.
Pier, t.s.n., pp. 68-69). She further testified that Murray had once confided to her
that he wanted a divorce and had asked appellant for it, explaining that he was still
young and had not yet "finished sowing his wild oats." (Id., p. 70). Note that when
appellant married the deceased on May 9, 1946, the latter was only 26 years, 7
months, while the former was already 31 years and 9 months (Exh. "B-1") with four
children by a former marriage. The deceased was an American who considered
divorce as a simple matter, demandable at the will of either of the spouses, but
which opinion is not shared and is seldom tolerated by Filipino women.
Whether or not the appellant knew of the love relations between her husband and
Carol Varga, and her reactions toward such relations, are matters which cannot be
proved other than by appellant's utterness or acts or conduct. Unless such acts or
statements are admissable, the inner feelings of an individual would be impossible
to prove in court. The testimony, therefore, of the mother of Carol Varga as to
appellant's visit on one occasion and what she (appellant) had asked about; that of
Del Rosario on why appellant refused to have the coffin of her husband opened;
that of Snure as to what the deceased had told him; that of Mrs. Pier as to the
incidents testified to by her; and the act of appellant's daughter in destroying the
picture of the deceased with Carol Varga — all these in the opinion of the Court,
are admissable as relevant to prove the knowledge by appellant of, and her
attitude towards, her husbands actions. To all the above we must add the
testimony of Carol Varga herself that in the month of June she used to go
nightclubing with the deceased two or three times a week (Testimony of Carol
Varga, t.s.n., p. 4); that the deceased used to fetch her between 8:00 and 8:30 in
the evening for dinner; that after dinner they would go to nightclub, remaining
there till two or three o'clock in the morning, when the deceased would bring her
home. In the month of July, also according to Carol Varga, there was one whole
week when she saw him everyday. It is not possible that appellant's attention could
have been attracted by these continuous meetings of the deceased with Carol
Varga and his much to frequent absences from home. So, consistent with this
knowledge, in the afternoon of August 12, at about 7:00 o'clock, she drove the
Buick car herself, along Santa Mesa Boulevard, evidently with purpose of seeing if
her husband was at Varga's house again. When her husband came home at 10:00
o'clock that evening, bringing along with him some P600, she must have suspected
that he was again going out with Carol Varga; and finally, when the deceased
arrived at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, again asking for some more money,
as appellant herself stated, she must have convinced herself that her husband had
again come from the nightclub with Carol Varga.
When we consider appellant's claim that the deceased had loved her, had
frequently taken her for a ride in his yacht and to dancing places or nightclubs, and
had demonstrated his love by such act of possessiveness as assaulting another who
had tried to dance with her without his permission, which must have made her so
happy, the sudden change in his conduct in frequently going to night clubs without
taking her along, must have at first aroused her suspicion, and then later, her
jealousy, especially upon learning that a beautiful rival was behind his sudden
change of attitude towards her.
So when the deceased arrived at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of August 13, she
must have been overcome by such an overpowering feeling of jealousy that she
decided to destroy the man she loved so dearly, rather than allow another to enjoy
his love and affection, and thereby put an end to her misery. Revenge must have
blinded her reason and goaded her to destroy the man who had once loved but
had now turned cold to her. This must have been the state of her mind when her
husband arrived at 4:00 o'clock on that fateful morning of August 13, when she
brought her young son to the room where the maid and her two daughters had
their beds and were sleeping, most probably to keep him away from any danger.
The fact that she thereafter closed the door leading to the said room, contrary to
her usual practice of leaving it open, clearly indicates an attempt to conceal an act,
which she was then intending to commit, from the rest of the household.
We will now consider the positive evidence which point to her as the one who had
fired the shots at her sleeping husband. They are as follows:
1. The first policeman who came to the bedroom where the dead body of Murray
lay, found that entrance to the bedroom could not have been effected through the
windows because there were grilled and all doors downstairs were locked; that the
door to the balcony, which faced N. Domingo Street, was slightly open, but there
were no footprints in the balcony itself nor in the room leading therefrom to the
death bed. The policeman made the above inquiries because Mrs. Murray
explained to him that the assailant might have passed through the door in the
balcony. On going to the first floor he also noticed that all the doors were locked
and there was no opening for anyone to enter, so he did not try to find out if there
were footprints there. He also looked over the grilles of the first floor just under
and leading up to the balcony but saw no marks mud or earth, on the grilles to
show that persons had gone climbing up the said grilles. Neither did he see any
ladder or bamboo pole near the balcony which could have been used to climb to
the balcony. These circumstances positively prove that the assailant could not have
come from the outside and could have been an inmate of the house.
2. The revolver, Exhibit "C", found by the maid at about 8:00 o'clock the next
morning when she went to feed the dogs, was given to the agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation together with two slugs found near the scene of the crime.
The N. B. I. found that the revolver had its barrel end clogged with mud or earth
(Exh. "AA"); that in the magazine chamber there had been five bullets, four of
which were fired (Exh. "BB"). The fifth, which had not been fired, was between the
first two fired bullets and the last two fired bullets and the last two fired bullets
(Exh. "III"). This circumstance tallies with the testimony of the driver that he first
heard two shot, then after a brief interval, another two. The middle bullet was left
unfired probably because the wielder of the revolver had drawn the cock before
firing the last two bullets so as to insure the death of the victim. A test was made
to determine from what revolver the two slugs had been fired and it was found
that they came from the same revolver (Exh. "III"). The revolver in question is a .38-
caliber police pistol, licensed in the name of Mr. George Murray (Exh. "T" and "T-
1"), by a close friend if the deceased as belonging to the latter.
3. At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of August 13, 1949, three policemen went
to investigate the murder room. Two of them saw a pair of gloves, then suspected
by them to have been used. Appellant, upon seeing that the gloves were being
examined that she had been using them when she worked in the garden. A
neighbor testified that it was she who had given appellant said gloves. That
morning the policemen saw the left glove was on top of a suitcase place on a chair.
At 11:30 a.m. when the two policemen who first saw the gloves were already in
their station, their sergeant phoned them from the death room to inquire if they
had seen a pair of gloves, and they answered that they did. At that time (11:30
a.m.), however one of the gloves, the right one, had disappeared. Appellant was
asked to try to locate this missing glove, and it was only on August 17, that she
informed the police by phone that her daughter had found it in the laundry room.
However, she refused to give it up, upon advice of her attorney, so that a search
warrant (Exh. "WW") had to be secured, and only then were the police able to
secure possession of the right glove. The disappearance of the glove and
appellant's refusal to give it to the police when requested by the latter, indicate a
guilty mind, and is enough to convince one that it must have been used by her
when she shot the deceased.
4. Early at dawn after the maid heard the shots, she tried to hear if there was any
one walking in the house, turning around in her bed, but she heard none. Then she
felt like urinating, so she stood up and opened the door of their room, she saw
Mrs. Murray also opening the door of her room. This was just after the shots had
been fired. Appellant as then wearing a white silkgown and a negligee. When the
maid returned with the policeman, whom she and appellant's two daughters had
fetched, appellant had already taken a bath and changed her attire and was already
wearing a stripped dress. This, she pretended to the police, to be the dress she was
wearing when the shots were heard. As the investigation progressed, it was noticed
that the dress she had on when seen coming out of her bedroom right after the
shots were heard, had disappeared, and when the police finally located it, it had
already been washed, although some stains were found on it. These stains,
appellant explained, were supposedly caused by her monthly menstruation.
5. The right glove was found by the chemist who examined it to have spots of
nitrate at the dorsum about the first phalange thumb, ring finger, and third finger
(Exh. "YY-1"). Appellant tried to explain the presence of this substance in the right-
hand glove, saying that it was caused by the fertilizer that she had used for her
plants in the garden, but the chemistdisprover her claim by saying that if the
nitrate had been caused by her handling of "vigoro," the substance would have
been in bigger sizes on the palm, not as mere spots at the dorsum of the glove. The
above facts conclusively show that the hand with the glove on had something in its
grip, which could have been no other than a revolver, the firing of which caused the
spots found in the dorsum of the glove.
6. Appellant, from the start of the investigations by the police, had always
answered the questions of the policemen, both for herself and for the maid,
instead of allowing the latter to face the investigators and answer their questions
herself. On one occasion appellant ordered the maid to hide in a closet of the
house just so the policemen could not talk to her. Later on, she hid the maid in the
house of her laundry woman, planning to send her away to Cavite to prevent her
from facing the investigators. It was when the maid was about to board a jeep to go
away that she was grabbed by agents of the N.B.I. and then taken into custody for
purposes of investigation and later for use as a witness for the prosecution.
It can be seen from the above that the prosecution has succeeded in weaving a net
of incidents, facts and circumstances, all belying the claim of the appellant that
some intruder might have entered the room and shot her husband. None of the
incidents, facts or circumstances is consistent with all the others. All of them put
together produced a conviction in the mind of the Court that it was appellant, and
no other, who had a motive to end the life of the deceased, and that it was she
herself who voluntarily shot the deceased.
. . . in order that circumstancial evidence may constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt, there must be a series of circumstances satisfactorily proved, that the
circumstances are consistent with each other, and that each and everyone of them
is consistent defendant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. (U.S. vs.
Douglas, 2 Phil., 461, 474; U.S. vs. Lim Sip, et al., 10 Phil., 627; People vs. Chan Uh,
57 Phil., 523; people vs. Ludday, 61 Phil., 216.) People vs. Mahlon, et al., 92 Phil.,
883.
No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence
necessary to convict. (People vs. Ludday, 61 Phil., 216, 221)."All the circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent." (U.S. vs. Levente, 18 Phil., 439; People vs. Tan-choco y Marcelo, 76 Phil.,
463; people vs. Mahlon, et al., supra; see 3 Moran, 1957 ed., p. 592.)
. . . the evidence submitted by plaintiff, which is all circumstantial and therefore
less susceptible to fabrication, constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and
rational circumstances corroborating each other, and it certainly can not be
overcome by the very in concrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the
defendants." Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Exconde, 93 Phil., 894.
The Rules of Court expressly provides:
SEC. 98. Circumstantial evidence when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have, therefore, no other alternative than to follow the law as quoted above
and find the appellant guilty of parricide as charged and, as found by the court
below.
Whether or not the deceased was awake when appellant assaulted and shot him,
the evidence is not sufficiently clear to convince us one way or the other. Only the
appellant knows under what circumstances she shot the deceased. We are
constrained to find, therefore, no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of crime. Since the penalty prescribed for parricide
is reclusion perpetua to death, the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should
be that of reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, par. 2(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.
As to the indemnity, we do not see any reason for departing from the practice of
fixing it at P6,000. The decision should, therefore, be modified in this respect.
Before closing, some word of explanation must be given why the case lasted more
than eight years in this Court. The records were forwarded to this Court on January
8, 1951. But it took four years and eight months before the stenographic notes
could be fully transcribed by the stenographers who took notes at the trial. The
counsel for the accused was notified of the completion of the record only on
October 25, 1955, and he filed appellant's brief on March 26, 1956.
The Solicitor-General should have filed his brief for the Government on April 25,
1956, but no less than fifteen extensions were asked for and granted, and the
Government's brief was filed only on August 30, 1956. The case was submitted for
decision only on June 12, 1957.
All the above explain the delay in the disposal of this case.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with modification as to the indemnity as above indicated. With costs against
appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion
and Endencia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.
Angel Roco for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of
homicide which is under discussion in the present appeal are these:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was
anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from
where the river debouches into the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise
the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri,
and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused
was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman,
while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the
accused, and he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon
this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they
would work better, if he would not insult them. The accused took this
remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards
Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the
accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently
believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and
disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards
from shore and was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored
to the shore, but between these and the boat intervened a space which may be
estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full midday, and there was nothing to
obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of Venancio Gargantel to
rise to the surface conclusively shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim
or the strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and was
drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped
into the water, the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet
or he would kill them. For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue;
but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio did not again come to the
surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact that the accused at his
juncture threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment except tho
show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the
lighthouse to watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and
could thus be recovered. Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of
it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he
lived as a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings
have been delivered to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of
Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is needless to say, take it for granted that he is
dead.
The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all
reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think
that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his
death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The proof is direct that he
never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers could
see; and this circumstance, coupled with the known fact that human life must
inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death.
The possibility that he might have swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from
the view of his companions, we consider too remote to be entertained for a
moment.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the
likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in
the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in
no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was but the exercise of
a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same
circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a
man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs.
Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13,
1882, is cited in the brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that
upon a certain occasion an individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries upon
another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the injured person and to
escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by
drowning. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that
only one of the wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the
injured person, supposing that he had received no succour, and that by throwing
himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. Having been
convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he
was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of
frustrated homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the
following doctrine: "That even though the death of the injured person should not
be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which
almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage impossible
to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless
as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in
order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly
compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal
wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined
resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help
and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed
from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide,
did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the
act of the accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of
Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The
trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender
had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal
Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo
imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the
corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of
P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law; and it being
understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in
article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
The only fact that the evidence shows in that Venancio Gargantel, one of those
who were in a boat of the steamer Vigan subject to the orders of the accused
Calixto Valdez and who at the time was engaged in the work of raising the anchor
of that vessel, which was then lying at the Pasig River, a short distance from the
lighthouse and not far from its mouth at the Manila Bay, upon seeing that the
accused was approaching him, armed with a big knife, and in the attitude of
attacking him, threw himself into the water and disappeared from the surface and
had not been seen again. This event took place at noon on November 29, 1919, the
boat being then about 30 or 40 yards from land and about 10 steps from the Vigan,
there being two lighters moored to the shore and at a distance of about 18 or 20
yards from the boat. All of these facts are stated in the decision itself.
The original information in the present case, charging Calixto Valdez y Quiri with
the crime of homicide and alleging that as a result of his having thrown himself into
the river under the circumstances mentioned, Venancio Gargantel was drowned,
was presented on December 8, 1919, that is, nine days afterwards.
There is no evidence whatever that the corpse of Venancio Gargantel had been
found or, what is the same thing, that he had died. From November 28, the day
when the event occurred, until December 8, when the information was filed, it
cannot in any manner be maintained that the necessary time had passed for us to
properly conclude, as is alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by
drowning, as a consequence of his having thrown himself into the water upon
seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. Neither does it appear in
the evidence that all the precaution necessary for us to assure ourselves, as a sure
and proven fact, that Venancio Gargantel then died by drowning, were taken; nor is
there any evidence that it would have been impossible for him, by swimming or by
any other means to rise to the surface at a place other than the Pasig River or that
where the boat was, from which he threw himself into the river, and in that
manner save himself from death.
From the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution which is the only evidence
in the record, for the accused di not take the stand, it only appears that Venancio
Gargantel, after having jumped from the boat, did not rise again to the surface.
Such was the statement of two of those witnesses who were members of the
boat's crew at the time. Another witness also declared that Gargantel was
afterwards not again seen at the house where he lived in this city, No. 711 San
Nicolas Street, where he kept his trunks and some effects, a fact which caused his
mother, who lived in the municipality of Guimbal, in the Province of Iloilo, upon
being informed of it and upon the failure of Venancio to appear in said place, to
give special power on the 28th of that month of December, that is, one month
afterwards, to a student, Ignacio Garzon, to get the trunks and effects of Venancio
from said house. Sid Garzon himself testified, upon being asked whether Venancio
Gargantel had returned to the house of his parents since November 29, 1919, that
he had no information about it, and another witness, Pedro Garcia, of the
prosecution, stated that he had probably died, because he had not seen Venancio
Gargantel.
Therefore, in short, the only fact proved is that since Venancio Gargantel threw
himself into the river, upon being threatened with a knife by the accused, his
whereabouts has remained unknown even at the moment of rendering judgment
in this case, or, February 9, 1920, that is, two and one-half months after the
occurrence of the event.
It is stated in the decision that the friend and parents of Gargantel give him up for
dead. There is nevertheless in the record no statement of any parent of Gargantel
to that effect; for his mother Maria Gatpolitan, a resident of the municipality of
Guimbal, merely stated in the power of attorney executed in favor of Ignacio
Garzon that the latter should take steps in order that the city fiscal might
investigate the death of her son which, according to information, was caused by
another members, of the crew of the steamer Vigan; and none of his friends, that
is, none of the two members of the party in the boat at that time and of the crew
of the steamer Vigan, nor Maximo Gumbog, the owner of the house in which
Gargantel lived in this city, nor Pedro Garcia, another member of the crew of that
steamer, and finally, nor Ignacio Garzon himself has stated that he gave up
Gargantel for dead, for the simple reason that this was not possible, for they only
knew that he did not again rise to the surface and was not seen again after having
thrown himself into the river from the boat.
For this reason it is stated in the decision that the circumstances therein stated are
such that they exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel could
have survived and that the circumstance that never rose to the surface after having
jumped into the river, as witnessed by the persons present, together with the
admitted fact that human life is necessarily asphyxiated under the water, is
conclusive that he died. Then, there is nothing more than a deduction that
Gargantel had died based upon those facts and circumstances.
In my opinion this is not sufficient to convict the accused as guilty of homicide,
because there is the possibility that Gargantel had risen to the surface at some
place away from the where he threw himself into the river and had embarked on
some other vessel in the same river or out of it in the bay and had gone abroad, or
to some province of these Islands and is found in some municipality thereof,
cannot be denied. And this is very probable inasmuch as it does not appear in the
record that the necessary investigation has been made in order to determined even
with only some measure of certainty, not to say beyond all reasonable doubt, that
it was and is impossible to find said person or determined his whereabouts.
Furthermore, there is not even a presumption juris tantum that he had died, for in
order that this presumption may exist, according to section 334 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is necessary that no information about him should have been
received for seven years from his disappearance upon his throwing himself into the
river, which occurred on November 29, 1919, that is, only about one year and four
months ago. And if, in order that a finding of a civil character in favor of or against
some person, may be made, by virtue of that presumption, it is necessary that
seven years should have elapsed without any notice being received of the person
whose whereabouts is unknown, it is not just, reasonable, or legal that the period
of one year and four months from his disappearance or since Venancio Gargantel
threw himself into the water should suffice for us to impose upon the accused
Calixto Valdez such a grave penalty as that of twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, merely assuming without declaring it, as a proven fact, that Gargantel
has died and at the same time finding said accused to be the author of that death.
Lastly, the decision of the English Supreme Court or that of the Spanish Supreme
Court dated July 13, 1882, cited by the majority opinion is not applicable. The first,
is not applicable because in the present case it is not proved, beyond reasonable
doubt, that some damage resulted to Gargantel, just as it cannot be considered as
proved that he had died, or that he had been injured or that he had suffered some
injury after having thrown himself into the river as a result of the threat of the
accused. The second is not applicable because the decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain refers to a case, in which the injured party had already been wounded
with a cutting instrument by the accused before throwing himself into the river
upon the latter aiming at him with his gun, it having afterwards been proved upon
his being taken out of the river that the wound inflicted upon him by the accused
was mortal; and, consequently, it was declared by said court that, even if the death
of the deceased be considered as not having resulted exclusively and necessarily
from that most grave wound, the persistence of the aggression of the accused
compelled his adversary to escape it and threw himself into the river, by depriving
him of all possible help and placing him in the serious situation related in the
judgment appealed from -a case which, as is seen, is very different from that which
took place in the present case.
For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion, with due respect to the opinion
of the majority, that the accused Calixto Valdez y Quiri cannot be found guilty of
homicide and should be acquitted.
G.R. No. L-26789 April 25, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DICTO ARPA and MAALUM ARPA defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio L. Africa for defendants-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Automatic review by this Court of the death penalty imposed by the trial court on
the accused for the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide.
In the information filed before the Court of First Instance of Davao, the accused,
Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Triple
Homicide (Criminal Case No. 9694); alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about February 20, 1966, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having
boarded a motor banca named "MAMI I", owned by Epimaco Mola together with
other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and once the motor banca was in
the middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, the accused,
conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to steal the motor banca
and by means of intimidation, the accused Dicto Arpa firing his .22 cal. revolver to
scare the passengers of the banca, and fired at one of the passengers, hitting the
said passenger at the right shoulder, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took and
carried away the said motor banca "MAMI I" belonging to the said Epimaco Mola
valued at P2,100.00, to the damage and prejudice of the above-named owner in
the aforementioned amount of P2,100.00, and as a result of the jumping into the
sea of all the passengers of the motor banca, Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas
and Lourdes Villegas, all passengers of the motor banca were drowned and died.
On the scheduled date of arraignment on March 7, 1966, the accused, through
their counsel de oficio, Atty. Bernardino Bolcan Jr., manifested their desire to plead
guilty only as to the fact of "the killing of one of the persons mentioned in the
information," 1 denying the killing of the two other persons. The fiscal, however,
manifested that the State could not agree to the accused's offer to plead guilty to
only one homicide, since "the two other persons were lost on the same
occasion, ... because of the incident. They jumped overboard after the firing at one
of the victims, ..." 2 The trial judge, Hon. Manases G. Reyes, accordingly did not
accept the plea and reset the arraignment for the next day, informing the accused
that as the prosecution was not agreeable to their qualified plea, they would have
to enter into trial.
When the case was called on the following day, the information was read to the
accused in the dialect they understood, and both accused pleaded guilty, their
counsel de oficio invoking, in their favor two mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The fiscal objected to the
appreciation of the latter circumstance, demonstrating that "there could be no lack
of intent when they immediately fired at one of the victims point blank with a
pistol, that is fatal." 3
The case was submitted and the trial court rendered thereafter on March 11,
19661, its decision, crediting the accused with the mitigating circumstance of their
voluntary plea of guilty, but rejecting the claimed mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong, in view of "the nature and gravity of the offense
committed." The trial court further found two aggravating circumstances against
the accused, as follows;
A perusal of the information reveals the following, allegation in the information:
...and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it developed
engine trouble....
These allegations to the mind of the Court constitute two aggravating
circumstances. The first underlined portion constitutes the aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place. (People vs.
Rubia 52 Phil. 172). And the second constitutes the aggravating circumstance that
the crime is committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake,
epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea
is a misfortune which tends to create confusion and apprehensions of the
passengers and, thereby, to commit a crime such a time the accused manifested
greater perversity and instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking
advantage of the said misfortune.
As it is, therefore, the accused in the commission of this crime has one mitigating
circumstance in their favor and two aggravating circumstances against them, and
offsetting one another there is still remaining one aggravating circumstance to the
accused.4
Consequently, the trial court sentenced each of the accused to the penalty of death
and order both of them, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of
P6,000.00 for each of them, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
by reason of the penalty imposed, and to indemnify Epimaco Mola in the sum of
P2,100.00, and to pay the costs proportionately.
For purposes of this review, Atty. Antonio L. Africa was appointed counsel de
oficio for the accused, upon the latter's request for such counsel. Said Counsel
urges the reversal of the death sentence, and the Solicitor-General recommends
the affirmance thereof. Counsel for the accused in a well-prepared brief, assigns
the following errors: —
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS
ROBBERY WITH TRIPLE HOMICIDE.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNINHABITED PLACE AND
ON THE OCCASION OF A MISFORTUNE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT
COMMITTED.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH.
The accused, leaving voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information, come under the
firmly settled doctrine of being deemed to have admitted all the material facts
alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein
alleged. 5
The first error assigned that "if the original criminal design does not clearly
comprehend homicide, (in view of the allegations in the information that the
accused's intent was to steal the motor banca and that accused Dicto Arpa fired his
22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca), but homicide follows the
robbery as an incident of the latter, the criminal acts should be viewed as
constitutive of two offenses, and not as a single special offense (of robbery with
homicide)" 6 is without merit. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
which defines the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide
with the use of violence against, or intimidation of any person, imposes one
distinct penalty of reclusion perpetua to death "when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed." In the case
of People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 7 this Court pointed out that the "English version
of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of sale paragraph,
which reads as follows:lawphi1.nêt
I. o Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte cuando con motivo o' con occasion
del robo resultare homicidio.
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery
with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26,
1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal code, p. 267 and 259-260,
respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the
circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the
death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October
22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be
produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes
or persons intervening in commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal p.
501-502).
In that case, one of the two unidentified co-participants of the appellant
Mangulabnan climbed up a table and fired at the ceiling, which was conceded to be
"an unpremeditated act that surged on the spur of the moment and possibly
without any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein" that resulted in the killing
of said Vicente Pacson, but said appellant having been shown to have participated
in the criminal design to commit the robbery with his co-defendants was held guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide. Here, upon the accused carrying out their
criminal design to steal the motor banca, one of them, Dicto Arpa, started firing his
revolver to scare the passengers and fired directly at one of the passengers, hitting
him at the right shoulder, and as a result, the three passengers jumped into the sea
and met their death by drowning. Even if we were to concede appellants'
contention that their original criminal design did not clearly comprehend homicide,
and that homicide followed the robbery "as an incident of the latter", still the
deaths clearly resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery and the trial
court therefore correctly found them guilty of the crime of robbery with triple
homicide.
The remaining errors assigned concern the trial court's appreciation and finding of
two aggravating circumstances as against one mitigating circumstance of a
voluntary plea of guilty in the commission of the crime and the mandatory
imposition, as a consequence, of the penalty of death.
We hold that the trial court correctly held that the crime committed was attended
by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place. The accused, in having
boarded at Davao City the motor banca, together with other passengers bound for
Talicud Island, Davao, and carrying out their criminal design of stealing the said
motor banca, once it was in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine
trouble, with one of them firing revolver shots in order to forestall any resistance,
certainly cannot disclaim that they sought the isolation of the sea to attain their
criminal objective without interference. As held by this Court in People vs.
Rubia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of the crime of homicide having been
committed in an uninhabited place must be considered, where the deed was
committed at sea, where it was difficult for the offended party to receive any help,
while the assailants could easily have escaped punishment, and the purely
accidental circumstance that another banca carrying the eyewitnesses to the crime
was also at sea in the vicinity at the time without the assailants' knowledge is no
argument against the appreciation of said circumstance.
We hold, however, against the trial court's finding of a second aggravating
circumstance in that the crime was committed "on the occasion of a conflagration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune." 9In so holding,
the trial Court reasoned:
The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea
is a misfortune which tends to create confusions and apprehensions of the
passengers and, thereby, to commit a crime at such a time the accused manifested
greater perversity and instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking
advantage of the said misfortune. (Decision, p. 3).
The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come
within the context of the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Article
14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, which refer to other conditions of
distress similar to those precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "configuration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic", such as the chaotic conditions resulting from
war or the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War. The reason for
the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is found in the debased form of
criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid
to the afflicted adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to
despoil them." 10 Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or misfortune existed
when the motor banca developed engine trouble.
It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the
engine trouble developed was a serious one such as to create confusion and
apprehension on the part of the passengers as perceived by the trial court, and
that the same was not easily repaired; if at all, the indications are to the contrary,
for as alleged in the information, the accused succeeded in stealing the motor
banca at sea.
We hold also against the accused's claim of a second mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The trial court correctly held that this
circumstance could not properly be appreciated in favor of the accused "viewed
from the nature and gravity of the offense committed." As previously pointed out
by this Court in the case of People vs. Boyles, 11 the true nature of this
circumstance "addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular
moment when he executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during
the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case under review the original plan
was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the resistance offered by the victim,
was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery with homicide, the plea
of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly granted." In the
present case, the accused embarked on their most reprehensible criminal design of
pirating a motor banca at sea, firing a volley of shots at the passengers
notwithstanding the lack of indications of any resistance, thus forcing them to jump
overboard in a desperate act of self-preservation only to be swallowed by the sea.
The accused cannot now disclaim their lack of criminal intent and responsibility for
the direct, logical and fearsome consequences of their unlawful acts.
As thus established, therefore, the crime committed was Robbery with Triple
Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstance of the same having been
committed in an uninhabited place which is offset by the accused's voluntary plea
of guilty, and the proper imposable penalty is the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua. (Article 294, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 3, Revised Penal Code.)
The compensatory damages awarded to the heirs of the victims should properly be
increased to P12,000.00. (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968.)
It may be noted that even if the accused were to be granted the additional claimed
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent, the said imposable penalty would still be
the same. 12 The question of the fact of death of the two other passengers, since
the accused deny knowledge of the fact of their death, as their counsel in the lower
court claimed that there was no showing of such fact, 13 although both counsels in
this Court as well as in the lower court do not dispute the "judicial admission by
the accused appellants of the fact of killing (death) of one of the persons named in
the information" 14 would not affect the nature of the single and indivisible crime
of Robbery with Homicide committed by the accused nor the proper imposable
penalty as herein established, since all the homicides perpetrated by reason or
occasion of the robbery are merged in the composite, integrated whole that
constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide. 15
Nevertheless, we feel constrained to add that in reviewing the records of the case,
we were struck with the paucity of facts and evidence attending the commission of
the crime other than those stated in the information and other circumstances that
would aid the Court in its ordained task of passing en consulta upon the legality
and propriety of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, e.g. the age and
education or lack thereof of the accused, and whether there were other
passengers who survived, aside from the three persons named in the information
as having drowned, as well as what the crew did, if anything, during the
commission of the crime. Were it not for the conclusion here reached of imposing
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, by virtue of our disallowance of the
additional aggravating circumstance of calamity or misfortune found by the trial
court, we might have been constrained to remand the case for new trial to the
court a quo in order to satisfy ourselves as to the degree of culpability of the
accused in relation to the death penalty imposed, especially since the information
did not expressly designate as such the aggravating circumstances found by the
trial court and there was no discussion nor spelling out thereof whatever in the
eight-page transcript of the entire proceedings. We therefore reiterate the rule of
practice recommended since the early cases of U.S. vs. Talbanos 16 and U.S. vs.
Rota. 17 set out in Rule 118 section 5 of the Rules of Court, 18 and thereafter
suggested a number of cases, lastly, in the case of People vs. Bulalake, 19where this
Court said:
It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion
of the trial court. Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the
extreme penalty of death are subject to review by the Supreme Court as law and
justice shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic
review neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade it would seem that
the proper and prudent course to follow where the accused enters a plea of 'guilty'
to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant person with little or no
education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but to aid
the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of
his plea.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the accused are imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in
the amount of P12,000.00 for each of them, and Epimaco Mola in the sum of
P2,100.00, and proportionately to pay the costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz
for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted
murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of
heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4)
Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F.
Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal
Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita
which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern
Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight
years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins, they look alike
very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14,
1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since
September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila
also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him
that she would give him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a
pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with
Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his
expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left
Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog,
Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and
from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila
at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the
big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By
means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they
were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the
Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store. Accompanied
by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's
establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's
grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right
pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the
agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took
the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their
homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five
o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car.
The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three-
passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows.
The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the
rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the
window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her
baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more
than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing
on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman
who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the
two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were
sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one
Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman,
her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front
of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna.
The brothers bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when
the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a
pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim
stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was
seated opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to
leave her seat, but before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her
right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered
the dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was not
injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who had
run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z.
Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife
and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee
when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he
had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon
reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a
distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches
Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand,
with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a
Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his
knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between
his palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse,
stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate
thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a
pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw
Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car
when he received the information that there were killings in the third coach. He
immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa
who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a
small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-
3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the
coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the
scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat
and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him
down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the
scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered
to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted
the twins from the train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba
police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained scissors and knife
were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up
along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive
were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering
twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were
autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the
victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train,
died from stab wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3,
C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to
T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped
from the moving train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City
(Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon,
Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D
to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand
by Jose Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she
was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City
where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury,
she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby
losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety
with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from
two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second
Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On
January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant
Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North
General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a
person "from the station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing
his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died and others
that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from
him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed
other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to
kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by
a person "from Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his
assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were
demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he
commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and
stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly
pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge
himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in
the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the
Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple
frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died
after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not
guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction
already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the
alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two homicides and for physical
injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants'
statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad
Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to
buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out his money from
the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket.
The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were
allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The
twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing
the twins. They were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat
facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio and
Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were suspecting of having
evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other two
seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When the
train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up,
approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the other man
who was sitting near the window and who was holding also a balisong knife
attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he would
not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of
his money provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place
was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife
or small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his
pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with
his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. Antonio
identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs
of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was
stabbing the second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed him on
the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio
has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn).
He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money
was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man
who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed
in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the
abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed
because he was already weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He identified
Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he
himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier
brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North
General Hospital who treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and
who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-
frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS
right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the
fifth rib on the left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the
spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the
left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous
behavior, which resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made
the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It
appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard
earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum
of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to
receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in
Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which
could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very
close resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them, immediately
suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused
coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who
happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated
them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-
aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had
no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or
extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their co-passengers
were talking about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes
about their humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained
the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their
ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence,
they became hostile to their co-passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into
violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial
court and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a
confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary
investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo
C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take the
risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they
might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3,
1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides
would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing,
their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of
the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio and
the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and
the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose
was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife,
while Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had
purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which he gave
to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already rusty.
As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to
commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would
be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate,
Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the
person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had stabbed several
persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That
fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa
does not detract from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses
confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found
in the trial court's decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and
Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed
contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of
Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and
apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the
other twin, disabled him and prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling
was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near
Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and
Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed
testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the
train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give
identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed.
139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is
no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did
not observe the same events and their powers of perception and recollection are
not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one
corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping
woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is
that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the
twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins,
could have inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus
delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh.
1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea,
Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were
caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the
statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in
Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion
and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of
how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that
crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more
persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the other
passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been an
attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the
blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous
rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because
they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical
injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to
reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on
the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached
manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban
areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are
convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the
eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the
trial court, because they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of
Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in judgment
was probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four
persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and
Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of
abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities
(Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed
but in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not
adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of them,
the information charges that the accused committed homicide. The trial court
dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy
reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their
deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would
be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of
Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of
danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41
Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is
directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm
and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by
drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four
victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the
appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The
charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano
Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5)
was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the
offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of
murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins
upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act
like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves (even if some of
them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co- the trial court was not warranted.
passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design. A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as
constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of
for committing the other". them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and
delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven victims
(el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650). named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim,
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to
"acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son Amanda Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the
varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed.
soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, Costs against the appellants.
January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403). SO ORDERED.
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra,
vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one Makasiar, J., took no part.
frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31,
the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants were convicted of fourteen
separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired
successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham,
15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving
eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260,
271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil.
1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs.
Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61
Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where
the crimes committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the
theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case,
the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio
and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's
house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom.
Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned
out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness
testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you
(the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic)
you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court
(RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment
by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he
and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime
was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and
to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent.
Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had
it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to
remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the
person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that
the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these
conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally
liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal
Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something
quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would
constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article
4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate
or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. 16One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he
thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a
different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court
convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined
where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt
to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the
criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction
in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the
aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his
intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was
lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained
that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became
impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder.
This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit
the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the
crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation
as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in
short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of
extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted
robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted
Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his
criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public
requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths
of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The
community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words,
excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act
which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of
victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the
victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of
attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by
Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against
Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at
hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws
regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the
Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it
provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code.
Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is
merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases
generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid
criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated
for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the
matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the
warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's
knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the
transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower
court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a
defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and
the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern
view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did
not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person
could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it
said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct
constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time
as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new
non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is
factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal
liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where
the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the
other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible
crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an
impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime
charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the
actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as
an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted
Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of
criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by
the law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-23693 April 27, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUDY REGALA and DELFIN FLORES, defendants, RUDY REGALA, defendant-
appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder
with assault upon an agent of a person in authority in an information filed on June
27, 1964 by the provincial fiscal of Masbate with the Court of First Instance of
Masbate which reads:
That on or about the 13th day of June, 1964, at the Magallanes Gate in the
poblacion of the Municipality of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring together and helping
each other, with deliberate intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery
and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and stab with. a knife (cuchillo) one Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., a
member of the Philippine Constabulary while he was then in the performance of
his official duty, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds at the mid-
epigastric region penetrating abdominal cavity and perforating cordial and cardiac
regions which injury directly caused his instantaneous death.
to which defendants pleaded not guilty.
To establish its case against defendants, the prosecution initially presented five
witnesses, namely, Erlinda Tidon, Juanito Evangelista, Modesto Taleon, Dr. Orlando
delos Santos and Municipal Judge Jose M. Angustia.
Erlinda Tidon and Juanito Evangelista both testified that they were at the scene of
the crime and saw the accused Rudy Regala stab the victim, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. In
other words, they claimed to be eyewitnesses to the crime.
Erlinda Tidon who at the time she testified on August 7, 1964 was 22 years old,
single, housekeeper and a resident of barrio Luy-a, municipality of Aroroy province
of Masbate, declared that she knew the victim, Juan Desilos Jr., who was a sergeant
of the Philippine Constabulary; that in the evening of June 12, 1964, she was at the
Magallanes Gate, Masbate, Masbate, because she wanted to get inside to dance;
that at the Magallanes Gate which was well lighted, she saw Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. in
uniform attending to the exit door; that while Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was guarding the
Magallanes Gate and trying to clear the exit gate of people, accused Rudy Regala,
with co-accused Delfin Flores who had his arm on the shoulder of the former (Rudy
Regala), arrived; that thereafter, she tried her best to get inside the Magallanes
Gate and Delfin Flores and Rudy Regala "were there at the Magallanes Gate in my
front. I was at their back" ; that when accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores
reached the exit gate where Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stationed, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.
pushed accused Rudy Regala and told him "not to get thru this entrance because
this is for the exit" (p. 9, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.); that the person pushed by Sgt. Desilos
was accused Delfin Flores (id, at p. 10); that while Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was pushing
accused Delfin Flores, accused Rudy Regala became angry, got his knife from his
waist and stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that Exhibit "A", which is a long knife with a
white sharp blade, was the same knife used by accused Rudy Regala in stabbing
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that accused Delfin Flores was at the back of accused Rudy
Regala when the latter stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that accused Delfin Flores was
one-half meter, more or less, from Sgt. Juan Desilos but accused Rudy Regala was
nearer to Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was hit in the abdomen and
he fell down and then accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores ran away, with the
latter following the former; that she was one-half meter, more or less, from Sgt.
Juan Desilos Jr., accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.
was stabbed on June 12, 1964 at twelve o'clock midnight, more or less, at the
Magallanes Gate, municipality of Masbate, province of Masbate; that Exhibit "B" is
the uniform of Sgt. Juan Desilos at the time he was stabbed by accused Rudy
Regala; that she was investigated in connection with the stabbing incident by Sgt.
Balase; and that she knew Sgt. Taleon who also investigated her in connection with
the case (pp. 3-16, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, witness revealed that in Masbate, Masbate, she has been
staying at the house of Sgt. Dominador Balase since Tuesday, August 5, 1964,
because he wanted her to stay thereat; that she attended the town fiesta of
Masbate, Masbate, on June 12, 1964 to dance and enjoy the evening; that her
religion is Roman Catholic and as such she follows its precepts; that she was on
that occasion with her sister Nenita Tidon who is also single; that she and her sister
did not have any escorts; that she arrived at the Magallanes Gate on June 12, 1964
and she was not able to enter the plaza immediately because it was then too
crowded as there were many people inside the plaza, at the gate, as well as outside
the gate of Quezon Street; that she intended to get inside the plaza through the
exit gate because the entrance gate was already closed; that she saw Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr. guarding the exit gate which was so marked as "EXIT" where people were
then milling around; that the exit gate was lighted with three (3) electric bulbs
placed thereat separately; that before this case was filed she knew accused Rudy
Regala only by appearance and she came to know his name only after he was
already accused of the crime in this case; that during the investigation, she did not
know the name of accused Rudy Regala but knew his appearance; that she
executed on June 15, 1964 an affidavit marked as Exhibit "l" for the defense,
wherein she declared that she knew Rudy Regala only by face: that she told the PC
investigator all the truth she knew about the case, but was not able to name the
accused as that was the truth; that she came to know the name of Rudy Regala
only when an information or a complaint was filed on June 15, 1961 against him by
the PC authorities with the Justice of the Peace Court of Masbate, Masbate; that
on the 12th, 13th and 14th of June, 1964, she did not yet know the name of the
accused Rudy Regala: that she has known Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. even before June 12,
1964 or since 1963; that she saw accused Rudy Regala on June 12, 1964 approach
the exit of Magallanes Gate which Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was regulating the flow of
traffic; that she saw at the instance Rudy Regala placing his hand on the shoulder of
accused Delfin Flores, but she cannot remember which hand: that in the evening of
June 12, 1964, she did not also know the name of accused Delfin Flores although
she knew him by his appearance, because she had not seen accused Delfin Flores
and accused Rudy Regala before; that she came to know his name only on June 15,
1964 when he was already accused of the crime in this case; that the name of
Delfin Flores was told to her by PC Sgts. Balase and Taleon who investigated her;
that Sgt. Balase and Sgt. Taleon showed her the appearance of accused Rudy
Regala; that at the Magallanes Gate, one could not move very fast because of the
heavy traffic; that even if she had wanted to run because of fright, she could not
because of the heavy traffic; that the distance between the exit gate and Quezon
road is about two (2) meters; that there is a concrete road embankment between
the exit gate and Quezon road; that the space between the exit gate and Quezon
road was full of people; that she did not see any policeman outside the Magallanes
Gate; that at the time Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed by the accused Rudy Regala,
she was facing Sgt. Desilos Jr. and the distance between them was 1/2 meter
(demonstration made by witness in open court showed that she was oblique to,
not directly facing, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. that in that position Rudy Regala appeared
from the right side going towards Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. (witness pointing to her right
side which was directly in front of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. and approximately the same
distance (see p. 49, t.s.n., Vol. III); that when accused Rudy Regala was in that
position which was in line with her, they were pushed by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. who
told them "Don't get inside this gate because this is for exit"; that it was accused
Delfin Flores who was pushed by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., who was then at the side of
Rudy Regala, but she does not know whether accused Delfin Flores was at the right
side or at the left side of accused Rudy Regala; that accused Delfin Flores was next
to accused Rudy Regala and they were in the same line with her; and it was in that
position that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. pushed accused Delfin Flores; that both accused
Delfin Flores and Rudy Regala were pushed by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. but it was
accused Delfin Flores who was directly hit by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that because of
the pushing, accused Rudy Regala got angry and still at the same distance, he drew
his knife from the left side of his waist which was covered by his shirt and then
stabbed with it Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. in the stomach; that at the time accused Rudy
Regala stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., she was still at the same distance from him as
before; that accused Rudy Regala was able to pull off the knife from the body of
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., but she was not able to see whether blood immediately
spurted from the wound because she had already left; that accused Rudy Regala
was then wearing a close-necked buttonless blue shirt with short sleeves; that all
that accused Delfin Flores did during the incident was to walk, together with
accused Rudy Regala who placed his arm on accused Delfin Flores' shoulder,
towards Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. that no other act or acts were made by accused Delfin
Flores; that when she saw the horrible incident she went towards the road, walking
naturally and slowly because there were plenty of people; that there was no other
unusual occurrence that took place within the immediate vicinity of the place
where Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed; that she came to Masbate to testify of her
own volition; and that she was served with a subpoena by a policeman of Aroroy
Masbate, in connection with this case (pp. 17-57, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Witness Juanito Evangelists, then 26 years old, married, driver by profession and a
resident of Bagumbayan, Masbate, declared that in the evening of June 12, 1964,
he went to the plaza at the Magallanes Gate and there met Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.
who was in PC uniform; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed in the abdomen by
accused Rudy Regala with a sharp pointed knife; that Exhibit "A" is the knife used
by accused Rudy Regala in stabbing Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. at the exit of Magallanes
Gate on the night of June 12, 1964; that Exhibit " B " is the uniform of Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr. at the time he was stabbed; that he knows accused Delfin Flores who
was then by the side of accused Rudy Regala when he stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.;
that before accused Rudy Regala stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., he (Regala) first
pushed aside accused Delfin Flores; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. fell on the ground;
that he was very near Sgt. Desilos when he was stabbed by accused Rudy Regala;
that the place of the incident was well-lighted as there was a dance going on; that
after Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. fell, accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores ran outside;
that he ran after them to know who they were but was not able to catch up with
them because they ran fast; that he saw accused Rudy Regala throw away the knife
(Exh. "A") on the road; that he did not pick up the knife; that he did not know the
names of the accused but knew their appearances; that he had seen the face of
accused Delfin Flores before the incident; that he now knows the name of accused
Delfin Flores; and that he did not know the reason why Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was
stabbed by accused Rudy Regala (pp. 70-82, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Upon cross examination, witness Evangelista stated that it was at around seven
o'clock in the evening of June 12, 1964 when he went to the Magallanes Plaza at
Masbate, Masbate; that the stabbing incident took place at around 1 o'clock in the
morning (obviously referring to June 13, 1964); that he was at the gate when the
incident took place and there were many people; that Sgt. Juan Desilos was
guarding the Magallanes Gate because people were rushing towards it. When
asked whether he also then wanted to enter the gate, he answered that he was
there inside, about a distance of one meter from the gate, and when asked once
more, he affirmed his answer (pp. 82-87, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Witness Dr. Orlando delos Santos, then 35 years old, married and a resident
physician of Masbate Provincial Hospital at Masbate, Masbate, told the court that
on or about midnight of June 12, 1964, he was on duty in the hospital when the
dead body of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. of the Philippine Constabulary was brought in.
According to him the probable cause of death was cardiac hemorrhage; and that
the stab wound at the mid-epigastric region, penetrating the abdominal cavity and
perforating the cardiac region was caused by a sharp blunt instrument and that the
injury directly caused the death of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. He opined that the knife
Exhibit "A" could have caused the wound on the body of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. and he
Identified Exhibit "B" as the uniform of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. and Exhibit "B-1" as the
cut on the front right side of said uniform. He further Identified Exhibit "C", the
death certificate he issued, and Exhibit "C-1", his signature thereon (pp. 58-65,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
When cross-examined, witness admitted that it was his first time to see the knife
Exhibit "A" and that he did not examine the same as it was not brought to the
hospital for chemical examination. He opined that Exhibit "A" is stained with blood
but he cannot distinguish whether it is human blood or animal blood (pp. 65-67,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Questioned by the Court, he ventured the opinion that the stain in the uniform of
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. could be the blood that came from the wound inflicted on him.
He further declared that he probed the wound of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. with an
instrument to find out the extent of the entrance and penetration of the wound
and found that the wound was midway umbilicus, the point of entrance of the stab
wound was one-half inch to the right, which is at the epigastric region; and that the
wound was directed a little upward and in a lateral way, about 7 to 8 inches deep.
He was certain that the cause of death was the stab wound which was caused by a
sharp pointed instrument (pp. 67-69, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Technical Sergeant Modesto Taleon, assigned as investigator and platoon sergeant
of the 60th PC Company, Masbate, Masbate, testified that he has been connected
with the Philippine Constabulary since May 27, 1941; that he knew Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr. who was one of their platoon sergeants and who relieved him as security
on June 12, 1964 at the Magallanes Gate, where there was then a coronation
dance. Their designation as security in charge was in writing; marked as Exhibit "D",
signed by their Commanding Officer, Capt. Eugenio. In said Exhibit "D", the name of
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. appears, with seven enlisted men, whose time of duty started
as therein specified at 1900 hours. On the night of June 12, 1964, he was at the
Magallanes Gate and Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., who was in uniform and with a sidearm,
was also there as he was performing security duties at the coronation dance and
maintaining peace and order thereat. When he (witness) was near the stage and
while looking at the crooner he saw Chief Salvacion take the microphone from the
singer and call for a doctor as the soldier assigned at the Magallanes Gate had been
stabbed. When he heard the announcement, he immediately rushed to the scene
of the crime and found that there were already many men in uniform at the scene,
and Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was no longer there as he had already been brought to the
Masbate Provincial Hospital. So he, together with his commanding officer,
investigated the incident and they were able to recover the fatal weapon which
was then dripping with blood; he Identified said weapon in open court, which was
marked as Exhibit "A" and the blood stains thereon as Exhibit "A-1 ". He found the
knife, Exhibit "A ", on the road facing the Magallanes Gate around five meters away
from the scene of the crime, wrapped it and presented it to the commanding
officer for safekeeping. Then they proceeded to the Masbate Provincial Hospital
where they saw Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. in the operating room already dead; Sgt.
Desilos uniform which was already removed, was stained with blood with a cut at
the last button of the uniform (Exh. "B-1 ") which appeared to have been pierced
by a blunt instrument and coincided with the wound of the deceased, Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr. The uniform, including the pants, Exhibit "B", was full of blood. He
Identified the patch on the uniform as that of the P.C. (Exh. "B-2" and the chevron
of a staff sergeant (pp. 87105, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
The cross-examination elicited from witness the fact that he studied criminal
investigation and he specialized on the subject as he was sent in 1958 by the
Government to Camp Crame to take up criminal investigation and he likewise
trained in 1963 in a seminar held in Cebu. He applied what he had learned in his
investigations at Masbate, including the investigation of this stabbing incident. He
affirmed that he, together with two companions, recovered the fatal knife. Exhibit
"A", on the road five meters away from the scene of the crime but outside of the
area cordoned off by the PC and admitted that he did not actually measure the
distance but merely calculated it; although he advanced the opinion that where an
incident took place in a crowded place, a trained investigator gets the actual
distance. According to him, the place of the incident was cordoned off or
surrounded by soldiers who did not tamper with anything thereat. As other people
and peace officers arrived ahead of him at the scene of the incident, he did not
know the investigating officer who arrived first. When they found the knife, he just
grabbed it and presented it to his commanding officer, because he already knew
that it was the fatal knife as it was then dripping with blood and lying flat on the
ground. But when he picked it up, it was no longer dripping with blood but it was
wet with blood. The route where the blood came from and where the knife was
found was marked with blood stains. He admitted that per investigation procedure,
important evidence like Exhibit "A" should not be touched with the (bare) hands;
but he explained and demonstrated that he handed Exhibit "A" with care, with his
thumb in the inner blade, and his two fingers on the outer blade, near the foot of
the wooden handle, without touching its blade. He revealed that after the said
Exhibit "A" was presented to his commanding officer nothing more was done.
Exhibit "A" was not sent to the PC laboratory to test its blood stains; neither was
the same examined for fingerprints. In fact, the suspects were never fingerprinted.
He just concluded that Exhibit "A" was the fatal weapon (pp. 106-118, t.s.n., Vol. III,
rec.).
Judge Jose M. Angustia then 63 years old, married, municipal judge of Masbate,
Masbate, resident of Masbate, Masbate, declared that he knew Rodolfo Regala,
alias Rudy Regala, as he was brought several times before his court as accused in
cases involving peace and order. Lately, he convicted him of the crime of malicious
mischief. He could not recall having convicted him of the crime of physical injuries;
but he Identified Exhibit "E" as the original duplicate copy of a decision in criminal
case No. 2794 of the Municipal Court of Masbate, convicting accused Rodolfo
Regala of the crime of slight physical injuries and Exhibit "E-1" as his signature
affixed thereon (pp. 123-127, t.s.n. Vol. III, rec.).
Immediately after aforesaid witness had testified, counsel for accused moved to
strike out the testimony on the ground that the same is impertinent and immaterial
but said motion was denied as without merit by the court (pp. 128-131, t.s.n., Vol.
III, rec.).
Thereafter, counsel for accused asked the court for the recall of prosecution
witness Juanito Evangelista for further cross-examination on the ground that there
were vital matters overlooked by said defense counsel who earlier, in obedience to
the order of the court, had to enter trial without having first consulted the accused.
The prosecuting fiscal objected on the ground that prosecution witness Juanito
Evangelista who had earlier informed him of his fears of reprisal, was not in the
courtroom. Defense counsel, in insisting on the recall of said witness, informed the
court that it has come to his knowledge that "... the first suspect of the PC was
Evangelists. His clothes were found with blood stains as well as his hands ..."
Nevertheless, the court denied the motion to recall but advised defense counsel to
establish that fact as a defense of the accused (pp. 131-135, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
After the evidence for the prosecution was admitted by the court, defense counsel
moved, by way of demurrer, for the dismissal of the case on the grounds that the
prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of accused Delfin Flores and
second, that there was variance between the date of the commission of the crime
as alleged in the information and that proved by the evidence (pp. 138-151, t.s.n.,
Vol. III, rec.).
The prosecuting fiscal interposed his objection on the main ground that the alleged
variance was not substantial as the events leading to the stabbing incident began in
the late hour of June 12, 1964 culminating at around midnight or immediately
thereafter. Hence, the information alleged the time of the crime as "... on or about
the 13th of June, 1964 ..." (pp. 151-162, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Defense counsel prayed for time to file his memorandum in support of his motion
to dismiss and he was granted by the court up to August 21, 1964 to file the same
and the provincial fiscal was required to reply thereto up to August 29, 1964 (p.
166, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On August 14, 1964, defense counsel filed his memorandum in support of his
motion to dismiss and prayed for the dismissal of the case against both accused
(pp. 34-44, Vol. II, rec.), and thereafter or on August 25, 1964, he filed a
supplementary Page memorandum (pp. 45-54, Vol. II, rec.).
On August 25, 1964, without waiting for the reply memorandum of the prosecuting
fiscal, winch was filed only on September 7, 1964 (pp. 59-60, Vol. II, rec.), the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss (pp. 55-58, Vol. II, rec.).
Consequently, the case was set for the reception of the evidence of the defense.
Eight witnesses were presented by the defense, including accused Rudy Regala and
Delfin Flores. Three of these witnesses — Alberto Abayon, Eladio Mendoza and
Noemi Almirol — claimed to have been at the scene of the crime and seen the
stabbing of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr..
Alberto Abayon, then 19 years old, single, and a student of Osmeña College,
Masbate, testified that on June 12, 1964, he was at the Magallanes Gate, arriving
thereat at about 9:30 o'clock in the evening, together with Shirley Letada Rogelio
Ora-a and Violets Sorsogon. They could not immediately enter the auditorium
because of so many people crowding the place. They were able to enter at about
10:00 o'clock in the evening. He was not aware whether there were movie
actresses inside. He stayed in the plaza for a long time and went home at around
12:30 in the morning (June 13, 1964), with Noemi Almirol. Upon reaching
Magallanes Gate on his way home, he saw a person whom he did not know, stab
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.. He was then behind Sgt. Desilos Jr. and around one meter
away from him. He saw blood dripping from Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.'s abdomen. His
companion, Noemi Almirol who was then at his left side, fainted upon seeing the
blood flowing from Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.. Then he heard Sgt. Desilos say "Noy please
accompany me but he does not know the person requested by Sgt. Desilos Jr..
Witness described the man who stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. as tall, with long hair,
quite black in complexion and wearing a short-sleeved polo shirt with red stripes
(pp. 168-170, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
He saw Rudy Regala at around 12:20 in the morning (June 13, 1964) drinking beer
with companions inside the canteen at the Magallanes Gate, a place beside the
Liceo School. He does not know the companions of Rudy Regala. Said accused was
at that time wearing a white polo shirt. Shortly thereafter, he (witness) left for
home at which time Rudy Regala was standing inside the canteen (p. 171, t.s.n.,
Vol. III. rec.).
After Noemi Almirol had recovered, he brought her home alone and as they passed
by the gate, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was no longer there (p. 172, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Claiming that he is familiar with Magallanes Gate, witness affirmed that it is
enclosed with concrete walls on its sides except at its back which is enclosed with
wire. Its side facing Quezon street is walled with hollow blocks. According to him, if
one were inside the Plaza Magallanes and looked towards Quezon street, he would
not be able to see the persons outside who are facing the wall; and if one were
outside at Quezon street and looked towards the plaza, he would not be able to
see the people inside (pp. 171-172, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, witness disclosed that he went to the plaza that evening of
June 12, 1964 to dance; that before he entered Osmeña College, he studied in
Masbate High School but Rudy Regala was not one of his classmates there; that he
did not report what he saw to and he was not interviewed by, the police, but the
following morning, he was interviewed by a PC man whom he did not know and
they had an exchange of opinions and he was asked by the PC man whether he
knew the man who stabbed Sgt. Desilos and he answered that he did not. He
affirmed and he was sure that he saw Rudy Regala drinking in the canteen inside
the Magallanes Gate and that said canteen is far from the Magallanes Gate but he
could not calculate the distance; and that Sgt. Desilos was stabbed right at the gate
marked as EXIT of Magallanes Gate at which precise moment he was a meter
behind Sgt. Desilos He saw Rudy Regala at about 12:20 in the morning and this was
before the stabbing incident. He does not know whether the gate was closed at the
time of the stabbing incident but knew for a fact that there were many persons
milling around the gate marked EXIT. He did not see the fatal weapon used by the
culprit (pp. 172-174, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
In re-direct, he affirmed that he was a meter behind Sgt. Desilos when the latter
was stabbed and Noemi Almirol was beside him and there were many people
outside (p. 174, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Questioned by the Court, he revealed that Noemi Almirol is a young girl; that he
brought her alone to her home at 12:30 in the morning, that he does not know her
age; that he had known her for a long time as they were once neighbors;, that the
residence of Noemi Almirol is at Quezon Street, far from Magallanes Gate,
somewhere near the Medinas, in front of the residence of Dr. Sta. Cruz; that he is
16 years old but does not know who is older between him and Noemi Almirol; that
Noemi Almirol is a third year high school student at Masbate High School; that he is
a high school graduate as of June 13, 1964; and that he did not use to go out with
Noemi Almirol and he had not gone to her house (pp. 174-175, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Noemi Almirol, then 18 years old, single, a resident of Masbate, Masbate and a
student of Masbate High School, testified that on June 12, 1964, she was at the
Plaza Magallanes Gate, arriving there at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, with Amparo
de Paz, Luningning Bonan and Elena Esparaguerra They were able to enter the
plaza immediately and stayed thereat up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. At about 12:00
o'clock midnight, she met Alberto Abayon and they went home together at around
2:00 o'clock the following morning of June 13, 1964; that at the gate of Plaza
Magallanes, she observed something unusual which was the killing of a PC soldier,
and she fainted when she saw blood flowing from the body of Sgt. Desilos who was
about one meter from her. She has known accused Rudy Regala for a long time and
before she fainted she did not see Rudy Regala at the place where the PC man was
bleeding (pp. 186-187, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Cross-examined, she affirmed that in going home, she was with Alberto Abayon
and it was then about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964, although she is
not sure of the time; and that she was behind the victim who was about a meter
away from her. She did not know what happened after she fainted nor did she hear
the announcement made by Police Chief Salvacion about the stabbing incident. She
further declared that Rudy Regala was not her classmate at Masbate High School;
nor did she ever see him there as she had just transferred to that school. She did
not know that Rudy Regala was also studying in the Masbate High School (pp. 188-
189, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Upon redirect examination, she revealed that she had a time piece on that night of
the incident but she did not check it before leaving for home (p. 189, t.s.n., Vol. III,
rec.)
Questioned by the Court, she insisted that she did not see Rudy Regala that
evening. She stated however that she was not alone in going home with Alberto
Abayon as there were many girls with them and that it was not true that Alberto
Abayon brought her home alone (p. 189, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Witness Eladio Mendoza, then 21 years old, single, third year high school student
of Masbate College, Masbate, Masbate, told the Court that he resides at Domingo
Street, Masbate, Masbate; that he knows the accused Rudy Regala; that on the
evening of June 12, 1964, he was at the Plaza Magallanes gate which is in the
poblacion of Masbate, Masbate; that he arrived there at 9:00 o'clock in the
evening; that his companions that night were Rudy Regala, Rudy Espinas and Pedro
Verga and they were not able to enter the gate immediately because it was
crowded by many people but were able to enter at around 9:00 o'clock in the
evening; that once inside he went around and then together with his companions,
Rudy Regala, Pedro Verga and Rudy Espinas, went to the canteen which was
managed by a priest, at the left side of the Magallanes Gate (as one enters the
same) near the Liceo College; they drank beer in the said canteen and stayed there
for a long time; that he did not dance, but Rudy Regala did at around 11:30 P.M.
with the queen, Carol Bataga and this lasted for about 2 minutes, and at the next
piece, with one of the princesses whose name he (witness) did not know and after
this dance with the princess, Rudy Regala went back to the canteen and drank
beer; that at about midnight, he (witness) was still at the canteen and at that time,
more or less, something unusual happened, which was the stabbing of a PC man at
the gate which he learned about through the announcement made by Chief
Salvacion on the stage at around 12:30 in the morning of June 13, 1964; that at
that time, accused Rudy Regala was at his side drinking beer; that he did not do
anything after the said announcement; neither did accused Rudy Regala do
anything; that accused was at that time wearing a short-sleeved white polo shirt;
that he cannot remember how many bottles of beer he drank that evening but the
whole gang finished one case of beer; that he knows Sgt. Desilos although he did
not see him that night; that he went home at around 2:00 o'clock of the morning of
June 13, 1964 at which time accused Rudy Regala was still seated inside the other
canteen located at the right side of Magallanes Gate, belonging to Mayor Ben
Magallanes (pp. 175-178, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
He testified during the cross-examination that he studied at Liceo de Masbate, not
at the Masbate High School, before he transferred to Masbate College; that on
June 12, 1964 when he went inside the gate, there were many people; and that he
went inside the auditorium together with Rudy Regala, Espinas, and Verga and they
drank beer in the canteen owned by a priest (p. 179, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Questioning by the Court extracted from him the fact that he is a very good friend
of Rudy Regala as they have been friends since childhood; that they were 'not
together too often as they are studying in different schools, Regala in Masbate High
School while he, at Liceo; and that they go out together and drink once in a while
(p. 179, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Thereafter, defense counsel manifested in open court that the testimonies of the
other defense witnesses, Pedro Verga and Rudy Espinas, will corroborate the
testimony of defense witness Eladio Mendoza in all its material aspects or that they
will testify as Eladio Mendoza did. Prosecuting Fiscal did not interpose any
objection; hence, such fact was made of record.
Witness Eddie Zaragoza, then 34 years old, married, a municipal policeman of
Masbate, Masbate (since July 1, 1961) testified that in the evening of June 12,
1964, he was detailed as guard at the Magallanes Gate, at Quezon Street, near the
church of Masbate, Masbate and he stayed there until the dance which started at
around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, was over at past 1:00 o'clock of the following
morning; that on that midnight of June 12, 1964, when he was the guard, nothing
unusual happened, but the next night, June 13, 1964, at around 11 o'clock an
incident happened near the Exit gate of the plaza around 75 meters from his post;
that he went to the scene of the incident to investigate and saw Sgt. Desilos being
carried by Sgt. Hilario to the jeep of the vice-governor, Moises Espinosa, to be
brought to the hospital,; that while investigating the people around the scene of
the incident, he heard Dick Avinas driver of the vice-governor, shouting "Here is a
knife that was dropped"; that Dick Avinas was then inside when he shouted; that
he (witness), together with chief of police Salvacion, went to the spot of the
incident and saw a knife near the bumper of the jeep; that he got a piece of paper
and with it held the knife's blade and delivered it to chief of police Salvacion, who
told him that the blade should be held but not the handle; that thereafter, he
continued with his investigation by gathering information from the people present
but the result of his investigation was negative (pp. 5-12, t.s.n., Vol. IV rec.).
On cross-examination, he declared that it was coronation night when the incident,
happened but it was not before midnight of June 12, 1964; that there were two
nights for coronation, June 12, 1964 for Baby Queen and June 13, 1964 for Lady
Queen; that the incident took place during the coronation of the Lady Queen; that
he could not remember whether the coronation of the baby queen was held prior
to June 12, 1964, but it was the night previous to the coronation of the lady queen;
that on June 12, 1964, he was on duty as guard at the Magallanes Gate from 8:00
o'clock in the evening up to after midnight (pp. 12-17, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Clarificatory questions were propounded by the prosecuting fiscal and the trial
judge with respect to the actual date and time of the incident, thus:
Butalid
Q — And on the night of June 12, 1964, past midnight, the incident occurred?
WITNESS
A — No, sir.
Q — But it was after your duty on June 12, 1964 at about 8 o'clock that the incident
occurred?
BLANCA
Misleading, your Honor. We object.
COURT
Q — You were a guard on June 12, 1964 from 8 o'clock to past midnight ?
A — Yes, your Honor.
Q — And when you said that on June 12, up to midnight there was no incident
about Sgt. Desilos?
A — Yes, your Honor. xxx xxx xxx
Q — After midnight of June 12, it is already June 13, 1964? (pp. 14-16, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
A — Yes, your Honor. Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores testified in their defense and both
Q — After midnight of June 12, which is June 13, 1964, that was the time when Sgt. claimed that they were not present at the spot of the commission of the crime and
Desilos according to you, met an accident that they are strangers to each other.
BLANCA Rudy Regala declared that he is 21 years old, single, a student at Masbate High
If your Honor, please, with due respect to the question of the Honorable Court, we School at Masbate, Masbate; that he was at the Magallanes Gate, Masbate,
would like to make it of record our objection, on the ground that it is misleading. Masbate in the evening of June 12, 1964, together with Rudy Espinas, Pedro Verga
COURT and Eladio Mendoza, and they were not able to immediately enter the gate; that as
Put it on record. soon as they had entered the gate, they looked around the auditorium and
WITNESS afterwards at around 10:00 o'clock they proceeded to the canteen near the Liceo
A — No, your Honor College; that the canteen is at the right side of, if one is facing, the grandstand; that
Q — In other words, from one minute after 12:00 o'clock of June 12, 1964 until they drank beer in the canteen which is owned by a priest; that at around 11: 30 in
6:00 o'clock of that morning, which is June 12, Desilos was still alive? No incident the evening, he danced with the queen, Carol Bataga for about 2 minutes and then
happened to Sgt. Desilos with the princess whose name he does not know, which dance also lasted for about
A — Nothing happened. two minutes; that after his dance with the princess, he went back to the canteen;
Q — According to you, Desilos was killed on June 14, 1964? that thereafter, or at around 12:40 in the evening, and while still in the canteen, he
BLANCA heard Chief Salvacion announce that a PC man was stabbed; that after the
If your Honor, please, we shall again, with due respect to the question of the announcement he did not do anything; that he went home around 2:30 to, 3:00
Honorable Court, we are constrained again to make our objection on the ground o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964; and that except to dance, he did not leave
that it is misleading. The testimony of the witness said that the incident took place the canteen (pp. 189-192, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
about past 11:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1964. He further informed the, Court that he knew Sgt. Desilos but did not see him that
COURT night when he (deceased) entered the gate; neither did he see him in the morning
Past 11:00 o'clock. Let the witness answer because he does not clarify. or afternoon of that day; that he has no grudge against him nor any motive to kill
WITNESS him; that his family has no grudge against Sgt. Desilos and that his family, however,
A — Not yet. has a quarrel with the PC (p. 182, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
COURT Moreover, he testified that he does not know prosecution witness Erlinda Tidon
Q — When was it? Tell us the definite date? and it was only on the witness stand that he first saw her and he denied as true her
A — More or less, at 11:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1964 when the declarations; that he knows prosecution witness Juanito Evangelista but denied as
incident took place. true his declarations; that he did not know his co-accused Delfin Flores either
Q — So it was on June 13, 1964 at 11:00 o'clock? before or on that night of June 12, 1964; that he came to know him only at the PC
A — More or less, your Honor. headquarters on June 16, 1964 when they returned to the municipal building and it
Q — You are sure about that? was only on June 14, 1964 that he saw for the first time Delfin Flores at the PC
A — Yes, your Honor. compound; that his attire at the Magallanes Gate that evening of June 12, 1964
was a short-sleeved shirt which appears yellow at daytime but blue during
nighttime; that said shirt which he Identified in court (Exh. "2") is now in the
possession of his lawyer (pp. 192-193, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Testifying further, he told the court that he was arrested with Roger Ampuan by
Sgt. Gotis at around 10:3'0 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964 at the
market and they were brought to the PC compound where they stayed up to 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon; that St. Gotis investigated him that same day and pointed
to him as the companion of Roger Ampuan in stabbing Sgt. Desilos but he told Sgt.
Gotis that this was not true; that after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he and Roger
Ampuan were allowed by Capt. Eugenio to go home; that he was again arrested by
Sgt. Gotis and his companion on June 14, 1964 at about 12:30 to 1:00 in the
afternoon in the market area; that this time, he was arrested with Rudy Espinas
and they were brought to the PC compound where they were immediately placed
in separate rooms; that inside the room, he was maltreated by a person whom he
knows only by appearance; that he was ordered to admit the crime because
according to the investigators, Rudy Espinas had already told them that he
(accused) was the one stabbed Sgt. Desilos Jr., but he told them that that was not
true, that he was boxed, then kicked and made to squat; one pulled him by his
buckle and he was made to look upward with the man's fingers pointed towards his
(accused) nose; that it was a PC soldier named Formalejo and two others, whose
faces he could recognize, who did the maltreatment and that Peroy Merillo kicked
him at the side of his body while inside the toilet; that he was given only ten
minutes to rest and he was continuously maltreated that day of June 14, 1964,
from 12:00 or 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that in the evening
nothing was done to him at the PC compound where he slept although he was
investigated by Sgt. Taleon who did not reduce into writing his investigation; that
on June 15, 1964, nothing happened to him as he was not investigated that day;
that he stayed in the PC compound from the 14th to the 6th of June, 1964; that
there were seven persons investigated at the PC compound, namely, Rudy Espinas,
Pedro Verga Eladio Mendoza, Miller Gaton, Roger Ampuan Delfin Flores and
himself; that on June 16, 1964, he and Delfin Flores were brought to the municipal
building; then they were taken on June 23, 1964 to the provincial jail and they
passed by the PC barracks where he got his eyeglasses and hat; that he was at that
time accompanied by Patrolman Natural; that in the PC barracks, he was called by
Sgt. Balase and, leaving behind Pat. Natural, he approached Sgt. Balase who told
him that now that he is being pointed to as the killer, it would be better for him to
tell the truth as to who was the real author of the crime so that he (accused) would
be utilized as witness, but he told Sgt. Balase that he was very innocent of and did
not know anything about the crime; that before the body of Sgt. Desilos was
brought to the cemetery it was shown to him by Sgt. Balase and the coffin was
placed in front of him; and that on that occasion, PC Formalejo who was then with
Sgt. Balase attempted to box him (accused) but Formalejo was cautioned by Sgt.
Balase (pp. 194-197, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Accused Rudy Regala further revealed that when he saw on June 3, 1964 witness
Juanito Evangelista at the PC barracks, the latter asked him why he and Roger
Ampuan were at the PC compound and he replied that they were taken by the PC
because of the incident the night before and Evangelista told him "You were not
present there that evening"; that their conversation took place in the presence of a
PC officer whom he can recognize by appearance only; that he met Capt. Eugenio
on June 13 to the 16th; that on June 14, Capt. Eugenio told him that there was
another suspect who wore a blue shirt with stripes; that another PC officer asked
him who was the owner of that blue shirt with stripes and he answered that he
saw somebody wearing that; that during his maltreatment by the PC, a PC soldier
who was posted as guard went inside the room and hit and kicked him; that he had
not seen Exhibit "A", the knife used in the stabbing, before, as it was only in court
that he first saw that knife; that he does not use that kind of knife; and that when
he went to the Magallanes Gate that evening of June 12, 1964, he had no weapon
or knife with him (pp. 197-198, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
In the course of his cross-examination, accused Rudy Regala was caught smiling by
the trial judge who warned him of his act and behavior and not to take the trial
lightly as the trial is not a joke, nor was there anything funny, and advised him to be
serious as he is fighting for his life (p. 198, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). He confirmed that he
studied for two years at Masbate High School, but denied breaking the crystal
(glass) of the bulletin board of the school; that he was arrested on June 13, 1964 by
Sgt. Gotis at the market place between 10:30 and 11:00 o'clock in the morning;
that at the time of his arrest no knife was taken from him by Sgt. Gotis that he was
maltreated but not investigated by Formalejo that he does not remember any
incident he had with Formalejo that he does not remember and it was not true
that a knife was confiscated from him by Laguerta when he (accused) was about to
stab PC Formalejo that he stays at the market place; that it is not true that during
vacation time, he worked as part time butcher in the market; that he knows
Patrolman Perez; that he knows former policeman Cornal that he has a tattoo in his
shoulder (which he showed to the court) and the tattoo consists of the words
"Black Jack No. 3"; that Black Jack is not a gang but a club to put up recreational
facilities in the market and the president of the club, of which he is a member, is
Tony Aguilar; that Rudy Espinas is also a member but not Pedro Verga Floresta and
Alberto Abayon; that every member of the club must have to be tattooed with
Black Jack. According to him, his body was battered because of the maltreatment
he suffered from the PC that he was confined in the provincial jail for the first time
on June 23, 1964 at around 9:30 to 10:00 o'clock and that until now he is still
confined there; that he was maltreated only on the 14th of June, 1964; that at the
provincial jail, he was not able to ask somebody to examine his battered body
because he was not even allowed to communicate with the persons he knows as
he was isolated in the provincial jail; that in a room in the provincial jail, he was
with one named Julian Bartido who was the same person who was convicted in the
shooting of Moises Espinas and the wounding of Marcial Tamares; that he was not
therefore examined by a physician; that the purpose of the PC in maltreating him is
to force him to admit his guilt but he did not admit; that there were seven other
persons investigated in the PC compound; that he, Delfin Flores, and the seven
other persons were lined up in the PC compound and he was the one called by Sgt.
Balase and that at the time he was called by Sgt. Balase he did not see Juanito
Evangelista (pp. 198-204, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Defense witness Romeo Floresta, who was then 16 years old, single, a first year
high school student of the Masbate College and a resident of Masbate, Masbate,
corroborated defendant's defense of denial and alibi and thus declared that on the
evening of June 12, 1964, he went to the Magallanes Gate and returned home at
2:30 in the morning of the following day, June 13, 1964; that at around 12:00
midnight, he saw Rudy Regala drinking beer in the canteen inside the plaza
(Magallanes Gate); that from the time he met Rudy Regala at 10:00 up to the time
he went home, he saw Rudy Regala drinking in the canteen; that the plaza was
crowded that evening of June 12, 1964; and that he went home together with Rudy
Regala (pp. 183-184, t.s.n. Vol. III, rec.).
He revealed on cross-examination that he saw Rudy Regala that evening dance
twice; that the canteen where he stayed the whole night was the one located at
the left side, if entering the gate; that he never left that canteen from the time he
entered the same up to the time he left for home; that Rudy Regala likewise did not
leave the canteen except to dance after which he returned to the canteen; that
from the time he entered the plaza at 8:00 o'clock of June 12, 1964 up to the time
he and Rudy Regala went home together, he was always with Rudy Regala and that
he saw Rudy Regala at the canteen situated at the left side of Magallanes Gate (pp.
184-185, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Defendant Rudy Regala's father, Cleto Regala, then 52 years old, married, a
merchant and residing since 1947 at the market site, Masbate, Masbate, testified
that as a merchant he sells vegetables and sari-sari; that he does not sell coffee;
that in the evening of June 12, 1964, he was at the pingpong game site and he was
selling coffee because it was the town fiesta; that he knows that his son Rudy
Regala went to the dance at the Magallanes Gate that evening; that at around 3:00
o'clock of the following morning of June 13, 1964, his son Rudy Regala arrived at
the pingpong site where he was selling coffee; that his son did not talk to him,
neither did he talk to his son; that his son drank coffee and thereafter he slept on
the bench; that he had not seen Exhibit "A" (knife), as among those in his
household; that his son had not used that kind of weapon; that at around 10:30 to
11:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964, PC Sgt. Gotis picked up his son at his
residence and brought him to a car; that in the evening of June 14, 1964, Sgt. Gotis
arrived at his (witness) residence and asked for the blue banlon shirt of Rudy
Regala as according to him (Sgt. Gotis Rudy Regala needed it as he was feeling cold;
that he gave Sgt. Gotis a newly ironed shirt but Sgt. Gotis told him that that was not
the one because he (Sgt. Gotis was looking for a blue banlon shirt with stripes; that
the shirt of Rudy Regala when he came home from the plaza was one which
appeared to be yellow during daytime but white during nighttime; that Exhibit "2"
is the shirt he was referring to as worn by Rudy Regala that morning; that this was
the very shirt he showed Sgt. Gotis but Sgt. Gotis told him that that was not the
one; and that Rudy Regala does not have a blue shirt with red stripes (pp. 180-183,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
The other accused Delfin Flores who was then 24 years old, single, a farmer and a
resident of Cawayan Interior, Masbate, Masbate, testified in his defense that in the
evening of June 12, 1964, he arrived at around 9:00 o'clock without any companion
at the dance at Plaza Magallanes and he was able to enter immediately; that he
stayed there up to 1:00 o'clock of the following morning, June 13, 1964; that at
1:00 o'clock nothing happened to him; that before 1:00 o'clock in the morning of
June 13, 1964, while he was dancing, Chief of Police Salvacion announced on the
stage that a PC man had been stabbed; that after that announcement, he was
boxed by one Bacalano from the Island by reason of which he fell and when he
stood up he drew his double-bladed knife but policeman David Natural approached
and told him to surrender the knife, which he did, and then he was arrested and
taken to the municipal building of Masbate, Masbate, where he was lodged in jail
until the next (whole) morning; that on or before June 12, 1964, he did not yet
know his co-defendant Rudy Regala; that he came to know Rudy Regala for the first
time in the PC camp on June 16, 1964 when they were brought to the municipal
building of Masbate, Masbate; that on June 13, 1964 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon he was taken by a PC man whom he did not know, from the municipal
building to the PC camp; that at the PC compound, he was investigated by persons
whom he does not know; that in the investigation he was told to admit the crime
because according to them Rudy Regala had already admitted and pointed to him
(accused) as one of Rudy Regala's companions but he told them that he could not
admit because Rudy Regala was not his companion; that because of his denial, he
was boxed by them in the abdomen and he fell down with his buttocks on the
ground; then he was boxed again on the left side of his buttocks by reason of which
he rolled on the ground; that he does not know the names of those who boxed
him; that the maltreatment was done inside the room without the presence of PC
officers, as only the PC man who boxed him was present; that there were two PC
men who boxed him but he does not know their names; that he stayed up to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of June 13, 1964 in the PC compound; that on that day,
June 13, 1964, there were six other suspects who were investigated but he does
not know their names; that he was returned to the municipal jail on June 13, 1964
and on June 14, 1964, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, 2 PC soldiers, whose
names he does not know, took him from the municipal jail and brought him back to
the PC compound and, again, he was told by a PC captain who investigated him, to
admit the crime because according to them, Rudy Regala had already admitted and
pointed to him as his companion when he (Rudy Regala) stabbed Sgt. Desilos but
he told them that he could not admit as Rudy Regala was not his companion; that
while he was being investigated by the PC captain, another PC soldier got hold of
his abdomen and boxed him; that he does not know this PC soldier but he can
recognize his face, Chat the investigation results were not reduced into writing;
that he did not sign anything nor was he ever subjected to fingerprinting; that he
was brought to the PC compound four times in all; that every time he was brought
to the PC compound he was being told to admit the crime as Rudy Regala had
already admitted and pointed to him as his companion who stabbed Sgt. Desilos
but in all such occasions, he answered them that he could not admit because Rudy
Regala was not his companion; that the second time that he was brought back to
the PC compound, there were six other suspects in the compound who were
investigated but he does not know them; Chat he was mixed with the other six
suspects and lined up inside the PC compound; that when they were lined up, the
PC did not do anything but only left them there lined up; that they were fined up
only once.
He further testified that he does not know either Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. or Erlinda
Tidon that the declarations of Erlinda Tidon in the witness stand regarding his
participation in the stabbing of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. are not true; that it was only
while Erlinda Tidon was on the witness stand that he first saw her; that he did not
see Erlinda Tidon at the Plaza Magallanes in the evening of June 12, 1964; that
neither does he know witness Juanito Evangelists; that the declarations of Juanito
Evangelista with respect to his participation in the stabbing of Sgt. Desilos are not
true; that he saw Juanito Evangelista for the first time only when the case was
being tried by the court; and that he did not see witness Juanito Evangelista in the
evening of June 12, 1964 at Plaza Magallanes (pp. 17-36, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Cross-examined, he revealed that his educational attainment is Grade VI. Over the
objection of his counsel the Court allowed a question propounded to him about his
previous criminal conviction and he declared that he was convicted of the crime of
murder in Masbate, Masbate by Judge Benedicto; that the victim in that crime of
murder was Ricardo Cuyos that by reason of his conviction he served sentence in
Muntinglupa and thereafter he was paroled; that on the night of June 12, 1964 at
9:00 o'clock in the evening, he went to the dance at Magallanes Gate; that at that
time, there were so many people trying to get in that there was no PC soldier at the
gate but there were many people around the vicinity going to the entrance; that he
went inside the auditorium and saw the coronation of the queen; that he was not
at Magallanes Gate the night previous to June 12, 1964 as it was only that evening
of June 12, 1964 that he went there; that he was dancing when Chief Salvacion
made the announcement; that he does not know the name of the person with
whom he was dancing; that the music being played previous to the announcement
was sweet; that when Chief Salvacion made the announcement, the music stopped
and so everybody stopped dancing; that he was at a distance of 15 meters from the
gate when the dance was stopped; that he was no longer dancing with his
unknown partner when Chief Salvacion announced the stabbing of the PC soldier;
that he does not know witnesses Erlinda Tidon and Juanito Evangelista and does
not know of any grievance or trouble with them; that he knows Balacano who
boxed him several times after the announcement made by Chief Salvacion; that he
was arrested only after Chief Salvacion had finished his announcement; that before
his arrest, he was no longer dancing; that he was not dancing when Balacano
boxed him; that David Natural, a policeman, of Masbate, Masbate arrested him
that night inside the Magallanes Gate 15 meters from the gate; that after his arrest,
he was brought to the municipal building of Masbate, Masbate; that policeman
Natural was with PC soldiers who escorted him to the municipal building where
they arrived at past 1:00 o'clock; and he stayed there until that time that the PC
soldiers got him from the municipal jail at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of
June 13, 1964; and that from 1:00 o'clock to 8:00 o'clock of June 13, 1964, he was
detained in the municipal jail of Masbate, Masbate. Cross-examined by the Court,
accused Delfin Flores affirmed that the only time he attended the dance at the
Magallanes Gate was on the evening of June 12, 1964; that he entered the gate at
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening that he did not have a watch at that time; that
per his calculation, Chief Salvacion made the announcement on the stage at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening of June 12, 1964; that because he had no watch it was
possible that the time when Chief Salvacion made the announcement was
midnight of June 12, 1964 or one minute thereafter, which was already June 13,
1964; that he was no longer dancing at the time Chief Salvacion made the
announcement as he was then conversing with a lady at a place around 15 meters
from the Magallanes Gate; that on that night he had in his possession a double-
bladed knife which he brought with him to the dance hall because he was alone
when he left his house; that he hid the knife in his body so that nobody could see
it; that at the time he was dancing with his unknown partner, the knife was in his
body; that he knew that he was a suspect not because he had a conversation with
the PC but because he was placed in a line-up; that when he was being placed in
the line-up, he did not know that he was being scrutinized by certain individuals
from somewhere, but there were people in the PC barracks; that he did not know
whether these Miss Ridon and Mr. Evangelists were looking at him while he was
placed in the line-up; that he was placed in the line-up only once; that he did not
come to know that on that evening after the line-up there were persons who have
Identified him and Rudy Regala as the persons seen at the Magallanes Gate near
the exit gate; neither did he come to know that after the line-up that evening, Miss
Tidon and Mr. Evangelista had pinpointed him and Rudy Regala as the persons they
saw in front of Sgt. Desilos immediately before he fell down wounded by a knife;
that the PC soldiers maltreated him; that he was not made to sign anything;
neither was he forced by the PC to sign anything; that Rudy Regala was not also
forced to sign anything nor obliged to declare anything; that he did not know that
Sgt. Desilos was a PC soldier; that at the time he was arrested that evening he
already knew that a PC soldier had been stabbed but did not know yet that it was
Sgt. Desilos that he only came to know the victim as Sgt. Desilos in the morning of
June 13, 1964; that he was charged with concealment of a deadly weapon by the
police force of Masbate; and that he pleaded guilty to the charge and was
consequently sentenced to two months' imprisonment which he had served out
already (pp. 45-60, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
On re-direct he revealed that in the criminal case of People versus Delfin Flores for
the murder of Cuyos, he pleaded guilty to the crime charged, and affirmed that in
the case of illegal possession of deadly weapon, he also pleaded guilty (pp. 60-61,
t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
By way of rebuttal evidence, prosecution presented witnesses Felixberto Laguerta
and Gerardo Gotis.
Felixberto Laguerta who was then 43 years old, married, and a policeman of
Masbate, Masbate, testified that the testimony of Rudy Regala that the Black Jack
organization is a club and not a gang, is not true because it is called the Black Jack
gang; that he knows that it is a gang and not a club because the members have
tattoos on their shoulders; that it is also not true that Pedro Verga Eladio Mendoza,
Rudy Espinas, Romeo Floresta and Alberto Abayon are not members of the Black
Jack gang; that all of them were arrested for being members of the said gang; that
it is also not true as testified by Rudy Regala that he was not arrested by him at the
cockpit when he (Rudy) was about to stab PC Formalejo for the truth was that on
December 22, 1963 he arrested him and confiscated from him a knife; that Exhibit
"F" is the same knife he confiscated from Rudy Regala, but no case was filed against
Rudy Regala in connection therewith because Formalejo refused to file a complaint
against Regala (pp, 6367, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Cross-examined, he testified that he has been a policeman for 19 years; that he
was told by Fiscal Butalid to testify in this case that he did not execute any affidavit
in connection with his arrest of Rudy Regala and confiscation from him of a knife,
Exhibit "F"; that he reported the matter to the chief of police of Masbate, Masbate,
Chief Salvacion; that he does not know whether the arrest and confiscation were
recorded in the police blotter as it was the police sergeant who was in charge of
recording the same; that the basis of his testimony that Rudy Espinas, Pedro Verga
Romeo Floresta are members of the Black Jack gang is the tattoo on their shoulders
which is in the form of cards and that all of them were arrested by reason of the
fact that they are all members of said gang; that membership in the Black Jack gang
is a crime; that because they are members of a gang, he suspected them of doing
something bad; and that they were arrested because they were doing something
wrong in the poblacion (pp. 68-72, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Cross-examined by the trial judge, witness confirmed that Rudy Regala is a relative
of a very high ranking municipal official of the town of Masbate, Masbate, as the
mother of Rudy Regala is the cousin of the town mayor-Mayor Magallanes.
However, he does not know whether it was by reason of this relationship that Rudy
Regala's father and mother are living inside the market site of Masbate, Masbate.
He further revealed that he delivered the knife "Exhibit "F" to Chief Salvacion but
no action was taken by Chief Salvacion against Rudy Regala in connection therewith
(pp. 72- 73, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
The other rebuttal witness, Gerardo Gotis, then 47 years old, married, and sergeant
of the PC at Masbate, Masbate, testified that Rudy Regala's assertion on the
witness stand that he was maltreated at the PC barracks was a he as Rudy Regala
was never maltreated; that when he arrested Rudy Regala on June 13, 1964 at the
market place, he was able to confiscate from Mm a knife (identified as Exh. "G")
[pp. 74-76, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.].
Cross-examined by defense counsel, he affirmed that he got the knife, Exhibit "G"
from Rudy Regala last June 13, 1964; that he did not file any case against Rudy
Regala in connection with Exhibit "G" as he merely indorsed the same to the 1st PC
sergeant and because his commanding officer, Capt. Eugenio ordered him not to
file any case as there was already a case against Rudy Regala. However, he
retracted his testimony that the non-filing of the case was the order of Capt.
Eugenio. The reason for the non-filing was because it was merely overlooked as
they were then busy investigating suspects in this murder case (pp. 76-78, t.s.n.,
Vol. IV, rec.).
The trial Judge gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the witnesses
of the People than that of the accused, resulting thus, as aforestated, in the
conviction of accused Rudy Regala for the complex crime of murder with assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, and the imposition on him of the supreme
penalty of death. However, with respect to the other accused, Delfin Flores, the
trial Judge found him guilty only as an accessory after the fact. Consequently, the
trial Judge imposed upon accused Delfin Flores the penalty of eight months and 21
days as minimum, to six years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum with the
recommendation that his parole be immediately cancelled.
Before Us therefore by way of review is only the death penalty imposed on accused
Rudy Regala; because Delfin Flores did not interpose any appeal from his conviction
as an accessory after the fact, and was accordingly released on June 11, 1973 after
the expiration of his sentence as certified by the Director of the NBP (p. 198, Vol. I,
rec.).
Counsel de officio contends that the trial court erred in failing to give the two
accused a fair trial; in holding Rudy Regala responsible for the killing of Juan Desilos
Jr.; in convicting Rudy Regala, assuming arguendo that he was the man who
stabbed the victim, of the crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person
of authority; and in holding Delfin Flores, under the alleged facts of the case, liable
as accessory after the fact of the crime of murder with assault against an agent of a
person in authority.
I
Counsel de officio claims in support of the first assigned error that the indignation
and revulsion of the trial Judge at the commission of the monstrous crime herein
involved as can be gleaned from the decision under review, thus:
Murder as a crime is indeed heinous. But when the crime had to be committed in a
public place, where people were enjoying the spirit of the fiesta, and amidst the
sound of the drums and the trumpets and the tantalizing sweetness of the dance
music, the deviltry of the perpetrator is compounded. The perversity of the
perpetrator is even made more ugly and ugliest indeed because the victim was in
the uniform of an agent of the law and was performing his duty as he saw fit. He
was there foregoing the pleasure of the evening so that others may enjoy. He was
there as a symbol of authority so that peace may be maintained for those many
who love peace and tranquility. He was there, distant from his home, his wife and
his children who would want him near them during those happy and festive
moments in answer to the call of duty, only to be treacherously killed by an
assassin with the blackest soul. He died almost in the spot where duty demanded
of him. He died so that others may enjoy and live. His was a fruitful life with a duty
well done and his was a heroic death. He died in the altar of public service and his
was a death of a hero. The Court would be recreant of its duty if it should fail to
notice this splendid performance of a lowly but loyal public servant (p. 44, Vol. I,
rec.).
directly caused undue prejudice against the accused because of his previous
criminal record as manifested by the following portions of the decision of the trial
Judge —
Who is Rudy Regala? He is a convict, although in the crime of slight physical
injuries. According to Municipal Judge Jose Angustia. of Masbate, he has been
brought very often to his Court for several mischiefs he has committed. And who is
Delfin Flores? He is a convicted murderer and a parolee. Birds of the same feather,
flock together (p. 32, Vol. I, rec.).
Is there a possibility that Rudy Regala could perpetrate the crime in company of
Delfin Flores, a parolee, moments before midnight and/or moments after
midnight? The distance of the canteen from the exit gate is not considerable. Rudy
Regala could have been at the canteen early that evening and could have gone out
with Delfin Flores and then returned at the exit door, committed the crime and
then returned to the canteen to prepare for his alibi? This may be conjectural, but
the possibility would not be farfetched. To a man with criminal mind and criminal
tendencies, anything could be possible (p. 25, Vol. I, rec.).
... So that after the incident, he could have disappeared among the crowd and he
and Rudy Regala could have returned inside in order to establish an alibi. It should
be remembered that Delfin Flores and Rudy Regala are convicts and are
dangerously mischievous. Although it may be argued that criminals would not at
times return to the scene of their adventures, nevertheless, there are those who,
to prepare an alibi, would do so, accustomed as they have been in committing acts
of deviltry Is this possible and/or probable?
While witnesses of the defense, because of their ages, their being acquaintances
close and tight, have every reason to help their friend Rudy Regala in his terrible
predicament, Rudy Regala, a member of an organization with tatoos on their right
arm, could have certain moral ascendancy over Abayon, Mendoza and Florista and
even with Noemi Almirol, that in the spirit of friendship they are coming to the
rescue of criminal friend Rudy Regala (pp. 25-26, Vol. I, rec.).
The defense of the accused is alibi. Rudy Regala claimed that he was inside the
canteen, which was a few members from the exit door of the Magallanes
auditorium on the night Sgt. Desilos was stabbed. Rudy Regala is a convict and a
notorious young man and the Court will take the same into account (p. 29, Vol. I,
rec.).
In essence, therefore, counsel de officio's first assigned error boils down to the
delicate question of whether appellant Rudy Regala was denied due process of law.
It must be emphasized that the jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution treated
the right of an accused to impartial trial as an aspect of the guarantee of due
process. Under the present Constitution, that right to impartial trial is now
expressly declared as one of the cardinal rights of an accused. Thus its Section 19,
Article IV (Bill of Rights), provides that "(I)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused ...
shall enjoy the right ... to have a speedy, impartial and public trial ..." (emphasis
supplied). WE have declared that "... It is a fundamental right enshrined in the
Constitution that no one is to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
Moreover, there is a specific reference to its indispensability in a criminal
prosecution. Thus is emphasized its importance for an accused. He can rely on the
guarantee of fairness according to the fundamental law, which moreover provides
additional safeguards at the stage of trial. Our Constitution does indeed go far in
throwing the mantle of its protection on the one who is caught in the meshes of
criminal law. The proceeding must neither be arbitrary nor unjust. It is to
underscore the importance of a trial judge being detached and objective, free from
bias either for or against the prosecution or for the person indicted. As was so aptly
put by Justice Dizon: 'It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal and that every litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge ...' Earlier in
People vs. Castañeda, Justice Laurel made clear the necessity for a 'trial before an
impartial judge.' If it were otherwise, the pledge of due process becomes a myth.
The trial is reduced to nothing but a useless formality, and Idle ceremony. If a judge
had made up his mind to convict, even innocence would not suffice as a defense"
(People vs. Angcap, 43 SCRA 437, 441-442 [1972]).
The thrust of appellant's posture is that the trial Judge, considering "his fully
justified indignation and revulsion at the commission of such a monstrous crime" of
murder, became prejudiced against appellant (as well as his co-defendant) after his
previous criminal conviction was brought forth during the trial, to the extent that
the trial Judge no longer gave due consideration to the evidence of the defense
(pp. 73-78, Vol. I, rec.).
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submits that the above argument of
counsel de oficio does not properly fit the assigned error, because it assails the
decision of the trial court and its appreciation of the evidence submitted therein
rather than the conduct of the trial itself (pp. 607, Appellant's Brief, p. 184, Vol. I,
rec.).
An impartial trial necessarily requires an impartial judge to conduct the same. In
other words, absent an impartial judge, there can be no fair and impartial trial.
Appellant impugns the impartiality of the trial judge, who was allegedly prejudiced
against the appellant.
WE do not agree with counsel de officio that the trial court failed to accord
appellant Rudy Regala a fair trial. Appellant has not pointed, and We have found
none, to any part or stage of the trial betraying the trial Judge's hostility, bias and
prejudice against the appellant after the prosecution had brought forth the fact of
appellant's previous criminal conviction. As a matter of fact, appellant's previous
conviction of the crimes of malicious mischief and slight physical injuries was
testified to only by the witness last presented by the prosecution in its evidence in
chief. And the trial Judge, contrary to the claim of the appellant, gave due
consideration to his evidence as shown by the fact that in the decision of
conviction, the trial Judge examined extensively the testimonies of all the eight
witnesses for the defense. Consequently, while the quoted portions of the
judgment of conviction are interspersed with statements and phrases which
properly should not have been made as they may be wrongly interpreted as
indicative of bias and prejudice, such aforestated statements and phrases in the
judgment of conviction do not per se constitute evidence of bias and impartiality in
the conduct of the trial by the trial Judge as to violate appellant's right to an
impartial trial. WE view the trial Judge's aforequoted statements and phrases as
merely an expression, in the very words of appellant's counsel de officio herself, of
the Judge's " ... fully justified indignation and revulsion at the commission of such a
monstrous crime ..."
II
1. The trial court correctly rejected appellant Regala's defense of alibi and denial.
Indeed such defenses cannot prevail over the affirmative testimonies of Erlinda
Tidon and Juanito Evangelista who positively Identified appellant Rudy Regala as
the one who inflicted the single but fatal wound on the deceased Sgt. Juan Desilos
Jr. (People vs. Cabiling 74 SCRA 285 [1976]; People vs. Roxas, 73 SCRA 583, 591
[1976]. And the exit gate where the stabbing took place was just in the vicinity of
— about 15 meters from — the canteen where appellant was allegedly drinking
beer during the night of June 12 until the early morning of the 13th. Alibi, to be
convincing must preclude any possibility that the accused could have been
physically present at the place of the crime nor its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission (People vs. Roxas, supra).
While the crime took place at midnight or a little past thereafter, such circumstance
does not vitiate witnesses' Identification of appellant Rudy Regala as the person
who stabbed to death Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; because the place at that time was well
lighted by reason of the affair being celebrated (pp. 16, 78, Vol. III, rec.).
Furthermore, the two witnesses were close to the exact spot of the incident as
witness Tidon was barely one-half meter from the victim (p. 14, Vol. III, rec.), while
witness Evangelista was about a meter from the exit gate where the victim was
stabbed (p. 84, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, the possibility of erroneous Identification is
remote. Despite the fact that both witnesses before the stabbing incident did not
know appellant by name, they both declared that they knew him by face or
appearance (pp. 31, 81, Vol. III, rec.).
Furthermore, appellant has not shown by evidence of any evil motive on the part
of prosecution witnesses Tidon and Evangelista to testify in the manner they did.
The absence of any such improper motive enhances the credibility of said
witnesses (People vs. Roxas, supra).
2. It is a recognized principle that on the matter of credibility of witnesses, the
observation of the trial court must be accorded respect and great weight in view of
its special opportunity to observe closely the demeanor of the individual witnesses.
As a matter of fact, the trial court gave its observations on the witnesses' conduct
and candor on the witness stand, thus:
Because of the seriousness of the offense not only because of the challenge that
the perpetrator has poised upon the community the people and all citizenry
because of the brazen manner of its commission, which was made before several
people and in the midst of the festive mood of the occasion but because of the
grave penalty which the crime carries, the Court took special interest in the two
witnesses for the prosecution. It was carefully observed by the Court that both
witnesses were curt on their declaration they were straightforward in their reply
and their voice carry the ring of sincerity and truth. Their manner of replying
on (sic) the question of the prosecution were those (sic) of serene honest and
truthful individuals, who wanted to impart clearly what they saw. Their answer to
the cross examination were (sic) given with a clear and convincing manner. They
were men who sat on the witness stand merely to convey what they have seen and
noticed then, without hesitation.
The Court cannot help but be convinced of the trustworthiness of their revelation.
Under the searching barrage of cross-examination, they were never ruffled but
they withstood the fire with simple dignity, speaking with a voice full of candor and
truth. That is the impression these two witnesses have created in the mind of the
Court. The clearness and simplicity of their assertion and their direct and positive
Identification of the accused Rodolfo Regala alias Rudy Regala and Delfin
Flores have convinced this Court (emphasis supplied).
Because the trial Judge had spoken on a matter, which he indisputedly is in a much
better position to appreciate, this Court can do no less than to place its
imprimature thereon. Indeed, it has been aptly observed that
... the judge who tries a case in the court below has vastly superior advantages for
the ascertainment of truth and the decision of falsehood over an appellate court
sitting as a court of review. The appellate court can merely follow with the eye the
cold words of the witness transcribed upon the record, knowing at the same time,
from actual experience, that more or less of what the witness actually did say is
always lost in the process of transcribing. But the main difficulty does not lie here.
There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what
credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even
if there were no doubt as to the Identity of the words. However artful a corrupt
witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillfull cross-
examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him,
and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by
which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be
transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the
appellate court. For this reason the rule is firmly established that where there is an
irreconcilable conflict in the testimony, the appellate court will not reverse the
judgment of the trial court, where the evidence of the successful party, when
considered by itself, is clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict (several cases cited)
or unless some conclusion established from the fact is inconsistent with the court
findings or there is some inherent weakness in the evidence upon which the
conclusion is based, or unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, as where the trial court in the
valuation of testimony misinterpreted a supposed inherent weakness thereof not
arising from the behaviour of the witness on the stand ... (People vs. Alto, 26 SCRA
342, 365 [1968]).
3. Consequently, the inconsistencies and incredibilities in the testimonies of the
material witnesses of the prosecution as pointed out by the appellant are better
left to the appreciation of the trial court, which has not found the same sufficient
to destroy the probity of said witnesses.
Appellant contends that prosecution witness Erlinda Tidon's testimony to the effect
that appellant Rudy Regala and accused Delfin Flores ran away after appellant Rudy
Regala had stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., is improbable considering that, according
to Tidon herself, the scene of the crime was crowded or overflowing with people
and consequently one cannot move fast or run (pp. 15, 16, 43, Vol. III, rec.). Such
inconsistency or improbability is more apparent than real. It may be true that
under normal condition, that is, absent any unusual incident such as the killing of a
peace officer, such assertion may be characterized as improbable. This is not so,
however, in the instant case; because the commotion created by the stabbing
incident enabled the culprits to easily disappear among the milling throng.
Again, the testimony of Erlinda Tidon to the effect that no other unusual incident
occurred after the stabbing incident may not be characterized as false; because
witness Tidon may have treated the stabbing incident and the consequent
commotion engendered by the same as one continuing incident, instead of treating
them as two separate incidents. Hence, she answered that aside from the stabbing
incident no other unusual incident took place.
Moreover, We have noted in People vs. Resayaga (54 SCRA 350 [1973]) that it is a
common phenomenon to find inconsistencies, even improbabilities, in the
testimony of a witness, especially on minor details or collateral matters. That the
accounts of witnesses regarding the same occurrence are contradictory on certain
details is not unusual. There is no perfect or omniscient witness because there is
no person with perfect faculties or senses or a perfect control of his emotions. An
adroit cross- examiner may trap a witness into making statements contradicting his
testimony on direct examination. By intensive cross- examination on points not
anticipated by the witness and his lawyer, a witness may be misled or trapped into
making Statements that do not dovetail with the testimonies of other witnesses on
the same points. Yet, if it appears that the witness has not wilfully perverted the
truth, as may be gleaned from the tenor of his testimony and as appreciated by the
trial Judge from his demeanor and behaviour on the witness stand, his credibility
on material points may be accepted.
III
The killing of Sgt. Juan Desilor Jr., according to the trial court, was qualified as
murder by the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and hence,
appellant was convicted of the complex crime of murder with assault upon an
agent of a person in authority.
Neither treachery nor evident premeditation can be properly appreciated and
considered in tills instance case so as to characterize the killing as murder. So
appellant contends and the Solicitor General agrees. WE find the aforesaid
common stand correct as the evidence supports the same.
Treachery is never presumed; it must be proven as conclusively as the act itself. It
must be shown that the accused employed "... means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without
risks to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. "
By prosecution's own evidence, appellant was enraged because the deceased (Sgt.
Juan Desilos Jr.) pushed his companion Delfin Flores and admonished him not to
get in through the exit gate, then pulled out his knife and stabbed the victim in the
abdomen. Treachery cannot therefore be appreciated as the attack made by
appellant Rudy Regala was merely an immediate retaliation for the pushing made
by the deceased, which act placed him on his guard. Moreover, deceased Juan
Desilos Jr. at the time had a sidearm (p. 97, Vol. III, rec.) and was free to defend
himself with it. If appellant's design was to be safe from a possible defense that the
victim might make, he could have disarmed the victim first before stabbing him.
This he did not do. Certainly, these circumstances negate treachery.
With respect to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, it is well-
settled that the essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act
must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
Consequently, it must be clearly established by evidence the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime, and a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. Neither the record nor the appealed decision
intimates the existence of the foregoing circumstances which are essential for a
positive finding of evident premeditation. On the contrary, the circumstances of the
case rule out premeditation.
The principle enunciated in the Manalinde (14 Phil. 77 [1909]), Butag (38 Phil. 746
[1918]), Binayon (35 Phil. 23 [1916]) and Zalzos (40 Phil. 96 [1919]) to the effect
that premeditation may exist even if there was no predetermined victim, does not
apply in the instance case In all these cases it was sufficiently established that the
accused deliberately planned to kill although without a definite person as intended
victim. In the present case, there is no evidence pointing to the fact that appellant
planned to kill any person who ma cross his path. His act of bringing with him a
knife in going to the plaza is not an indication that he did plan to kill anybody.
Consequently, the killing of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. by appellant cannot be qualified as
murder. It was simple homicide.
But the appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority because the information filed
against appellant did not allege the essential elements of assault that the accused
then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a
person in authority. (People of the Philippines vs. Rodil, L-35156; Nov. 20, 1981;
People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V, 68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975). The information in
this case barely alleged that the accused "... with deliberate intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with a knife (cuchillo)
one Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., a member of the Philippine Constabulary while he was
then in the performance of his official duty thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious stab wounds at the mid-epigastric region penetrating abdominal cavity and
perforating cardial and cardiac region which injury directly caused his
instantaneous death," which is similar to the information in the
aforesaid Rodil case — "appellant 'attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while
the latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." in which We ruled that
"[S]uch an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment
to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the
imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver
offense ... "
Furthermore, as in the Rodil case, the subject information cannot be cured or
validated by the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29,
1967), because unlike in the latter case, there are no allegations of facts from
which it can be implied that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of
the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority.
Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the
prosecution without any objection on the part of the accused cannot likewise cure
the aforestated defect in the information so as to validly convict the accused
thereof; because to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime not properly
alleged in the body of the information in violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
As already stated, the crime of assault was definitely demonstrated by the
evidence of the People because it showed that the victim (Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.)
while maintaining peace and order at the exit gate of the Plaza Magallanes where
the crime took place, was in complete PC uniform at the time the accused attacked
him by reason of the latter's act of pushing the accused and his co-accused so as to
prevent them from entering the plaza through its exit gate. In the aforesaid Rodil
case, it was stated that "[L]ike a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be
expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of
such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as aggravating circumstance. Applying this
principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace
officer, could be considered only as aggravated by being 'in contempt or with insult
to the public authorities' (par. 2, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code) or as an insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank ..." (par. 3,
Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
Appellant can therefore be convicted only of the crime of homicide, aggravated by
the circumstance of "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (par. 2,
Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due to
the offended party on account of his rank ..." (par. 3, Revised Penal Code).
WE stated in the Rodil case, thus:
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as suck refers to a
high social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a
graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458);
xxx xxx xxx
or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any
scale of comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of
comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p.
100).
xxx xxx xxx
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those
"generally considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age
or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social
condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating
circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A.— The Revised Penal Code
Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
xxx xxx xxx
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under
paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in
the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-
158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this
Court ruled that the term public authorityrefers to a person in authority and that a
PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but merely an agent
of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not
justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2
of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in
Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of
the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public
authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have
easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of
Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148
and 152. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public
authority, which may however include, but not limited to, persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or
barangay captain is a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school
teacher is now considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil. 228). So is the town
municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil. 640), as well as a nurse,
a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs.
Yosoya, CA-G.R. No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al., O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in
authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and
order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the
laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who
cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although
specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957, The
town chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the municipality
as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality, which
is patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or
barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or
barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
Likewise, the guilt of appellant is aggravated by recidivism as he was previously
sentenced by final judgment for slight physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT RODOLFO REGALA ALIAS RUDY REGALA IS HEREBY
FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY RECIDIVISM AND BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC
AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON
ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, WITHOUT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, AND HE IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
RANGING FROM TWELVE (12) YEARS OF PRISON MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO TWENTY
(20) YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM:
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM HIS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL
OTHER RESPECTS.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Ericta,
Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed
against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust
operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was
said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio
Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed
to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The
Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to
the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under
the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian
Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was
deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations
and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance
Movement in the Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to
his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an informer of the
Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff
at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff
assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the
introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As
a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00
for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other
Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension
of over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the
defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is working at the
US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and gave his address
as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in
defendant’s own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a
US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The
defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa.
Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar.
Thereafter, the defendant promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for
dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar.
Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not
yet there, he requested the restaurant people to x x x place the same in the
refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which
he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18
years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which
plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For
the reason that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant
would come back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with
his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the
pair of carpets.1awphi1.nét
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to
plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter
and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe
in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the
latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he
would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the
house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab.
Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama
pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street.
To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-
powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6
Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street,
he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while
in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out
of the bedroom and out from defendant's attaché case, he took something and
placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was
at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who
was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together.
Plaintiff was not told why he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his
house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to
use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant,
but the defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he would be
able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come
out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the
defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the
safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth
$10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made
Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00
together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed,
the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in
his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the
world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in
the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x
xx
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in
the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places
informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame
handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and
water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance
for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed
advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on
the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988,
Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that
he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam,
was beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its
order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for
extension of time to file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance
equivalent to service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of
the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer
was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not
seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States
government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was
peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and
the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the
case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The
court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R.
No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate
court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then
elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No.
91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply
with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show
that the appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a)
declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and
(b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a
motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint.
Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo
denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative
defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b)
that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent
of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys'
fees and expenses of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case,
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the
United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice
Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its
original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court,
docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao
Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered
dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R.
SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity
of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a
petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow
Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242),
appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September
1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed
the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for
trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in
granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person
without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414
and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo
committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his
official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s
diplomatic immunity could not be taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November
1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient
evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of
P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the
sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of
the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that
the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant.’"2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence
presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it
ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of
committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was
sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby
immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to
the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold
issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the
decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court
of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2)
whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata,
would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a
judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and
causes of action.3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 -
"whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private
respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the
instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point
with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation -
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial
Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present
documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and
surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in
Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his
position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-
serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a
reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity."4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his
functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as
"conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines
believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and)
having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic
agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a
number of documents -
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department
of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the
Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3');
and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol,
Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed
to the Chief Justice of this Court.5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States
Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine
Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his
departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm
from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with
respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the
Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of
Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to
indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive
Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally
advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all
diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the
Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo
additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation
on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that
Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the
complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his
previous counsel6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice
Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United
States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985
until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation
of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as
member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a
prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself
recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985
up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the United States
diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the
Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office
of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal
investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on
narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to
establish and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law
enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving
international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old
customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law
had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the
peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and
among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person
of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the
end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were
published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of
customary international law.8Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse
among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the
preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary,
the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state
would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it
would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna
Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the
representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly
relations with the receiving state.9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11  government.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the
ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d'
affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of
the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the
technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service
staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of
diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same
be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the
Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or
members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges
from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their
respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain
administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas,
authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy
the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for
the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in
political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant
Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the
Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the
diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative
or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain
ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or
department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with
the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor,
science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his
duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe,
analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host
country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home
diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes
Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990,
25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to
alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an
erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private
respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private
respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the
petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took
private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the
time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion
asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of
State and Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the
purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note
from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that
such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be
peremptorily dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him
were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other
than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have
sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have
been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been
overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even
suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with
which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November
1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records
of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of
office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as
an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore,
accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified
true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was
presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the
executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,15  agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually
tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity,
designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the
Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most
circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem
motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from
the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability;
it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.16 The
government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has
formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State
Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses
an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 
Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic
passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note
formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the
holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and
performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic
missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to
that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol
would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category.19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug
activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when
he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then
be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-
standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his
representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If
the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign
from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem,
non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the
judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the
state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.23
In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air
Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged
with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited
drugs, this Court has ruled -
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x
x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of
the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts."25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity
as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was
clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials
or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by
one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of
his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State
from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
"x x x x x x x x x
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority
and jurisdiction."27
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives
of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement
of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve
officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory,
under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any
similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United
States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related
activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent
or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore
elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies
of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as
the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-
bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo,
may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the
target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the
arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-
buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government
to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic,
is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are
important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues
embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the
jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the
office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue
them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-
year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from
power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a
longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000,
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and
delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of
receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.
The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the
Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order
and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the
exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez,
Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop
Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council
of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency
as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of
the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C.
Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of
resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on
October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However,
petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of
the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel
de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and
Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives
defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on
November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political
convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the
impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee
names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority
Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto
Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan
Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were
assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense
counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and
Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun
and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV
and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points
were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic
point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice
president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from
petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4,
2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit
of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were
exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as
petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was
facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when
by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a
spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella
tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco
quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings
until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of
the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's
resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human
chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to
show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all
masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20
p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President
where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00
p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together
with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of
cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce
that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP
Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a
similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies
for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To
stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to
the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26There was no turning
back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang''
Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo,
Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was
represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance
Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the
palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada
protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice
Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA
Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that
will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency
of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities
given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following
letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of
my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the
Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January
20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day
although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court
issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to
the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve
unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the
Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath
of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines,
at noon of January 20, 2001.1âwphi1.nêt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that
may be filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and
special envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign
governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at
Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio
Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of
respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a
telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the
House of Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175
"expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration
of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also
approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
the nation's goals under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management
Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and
Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her
Vice President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82
confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing
as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert
Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator
Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his
oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the
impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether
Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public
acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26,
2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7,
2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President
Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that
President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of
Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to
52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC
or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or
very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared
in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by
Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on
November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury,
serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees,
etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc.
on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo
Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use
of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by
Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and
corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de
Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned
complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with
this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
"conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755,
1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his
office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738
for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath
as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on
the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing
of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing.
Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio
Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former
Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they
have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight
on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were
given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to
submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of
resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed
by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20,
2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief
Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court
under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending
decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the
cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at
bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were
deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner
Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for
the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the
assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal
prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground
of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a
political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide.
They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy
of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the
presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the
14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency
and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these
realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad,
have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the
best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political
question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on
prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional
law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine
whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962
case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,
there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political
question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions',
not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases
calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political
question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused
on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other
provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket.
Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this
Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof
x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or
Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to
support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the
government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more
cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited
cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of
a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the
legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is
beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is
not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the
oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is
discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987
Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people
power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government
for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech
and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of
these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our
national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of
the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus
non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress
in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the
right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of
the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of
human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send
petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights
were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the
Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900
issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The
guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902
and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and
the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to
democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom
of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is
an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is
essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society;
and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable
community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly
provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society
can take place without destroying the society."70In Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in
the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and
this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v.
Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to
those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to
petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the
people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section
875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of
Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's
in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as
posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual
ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial
notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not
vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of
the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the
unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate
or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then
act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and
qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be
considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the
14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a
factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a
resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral.
It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is
important to follow the succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of
petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate
against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives
which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the
House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began
deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate
President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow.
Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary
of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his
resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11)
members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It
sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over,
the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance.
Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the
countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on
the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of
Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of
January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the
crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it.
Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his
small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito.
Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour
later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election
for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m.,
General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of
the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from
the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift
of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he
asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit
or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was
falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the
petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal
a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough
funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no
objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed,
Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the
palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he
had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he
could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up
Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng
(let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was
no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at
this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately
started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was
limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his
family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name
of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a
disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to
Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and
the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations.
The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised
by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any
more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to
resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na"
are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara
Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson)
Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January
2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice
President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of
the new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice
President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their
orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall
function under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective
immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee
the security of the President and his family as approved by the national military
and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection
with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in
accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate
President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and
undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which
time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety
of their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President
Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation
from government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police
authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment
court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial
as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January
2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an
appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation
program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall
obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form
and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has
resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the
resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side
and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the
signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the
respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the
fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the
five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these
points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which
resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President
will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall
commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President
to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent
officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee
the safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural
lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in
the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the
subject savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for
in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement,
signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has
decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you
wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the
part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double
cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since
this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first
provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and
Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the
signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at
least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice
Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few
friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at
Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military
have already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada
family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final
statement before leaving Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I
do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency
of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities
given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary
leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of
my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the
Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by
the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the
circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner
reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the
petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint
of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to
tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to
govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for
the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release
of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press
released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from
the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is
another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's
letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues
that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly
prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for
any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort
to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original
draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision
similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship
speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose
during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no
public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is
under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or
retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted
as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or
retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his
prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality
of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's
immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was
thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the
deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the
President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was
hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a
public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that
as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield
to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him
and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render
service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official
has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at
the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the
dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use
his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the
cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001,
the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-
1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have
been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then,
petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases
whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold
otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down
when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily
unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a
President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January
20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel
and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article
VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a
President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House;
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on
January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24,
2001 House Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS
A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had
withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on
20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had
extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a
policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national
unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be
achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of
Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of
fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure
to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all
obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all
efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political
wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a
direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all
the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and
collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption
into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the
Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution
No. 17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in
the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with
integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with
dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others,
as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines –
qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House
of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as
the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now,
Secretary General" therefore, be it
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen.
members of the Senate signed the following: Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
"RESOLUTION Adopted,
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
meaningful change and challenge; President of the Senate
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will; (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative Secretary of the Senate"
measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives; On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No.
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of 83101 which states:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS
nation's challenges." 99 OFFICIO
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states: Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S Court is functus officioand has been terminated.
NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate.
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon Senate president.
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately; Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Adopted,
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
the Republic of the Philippines; President of the Senate
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
responsibility and patriotism; Secretary of the Senate"
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true (5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the
statemanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such
as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on
Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any
recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner
continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of
temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both
Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines.
Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial
power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language
in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot
pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court
without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before
the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been
convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive
immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this
jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco
and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila,
respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the
judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may,
under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a
construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly
free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a
person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has
n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the
governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature,
may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act
executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to,
and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly
warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as
nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or
of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even
by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is
mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the
performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine
Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official.
On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly
that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between
such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts
in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to
have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act.
What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages
not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority,
provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in
determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining
the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the
question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for
that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority
to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not
granted immunity from suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state
delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation;
disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state
and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way,
in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on
executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was
amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17,
Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to
in Article XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential
Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For
Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law,
Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional
amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging
and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the
President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims.
Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President
outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to
include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials
or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at
that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense
syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian
concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by
them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who
argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated
the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a
return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from
office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was
crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973
Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft
proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner
Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the
very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at
least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his
tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he
might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii
is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by
the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam
President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We
reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first
be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led
to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before
he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him
in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him,
viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed
against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of
conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does
it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office,
then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the
provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary
courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period
of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand
as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman
that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a
different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-
sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character.
They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty,
be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts
and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a
judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search
for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to
produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids
and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of
conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a
burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate
Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an
unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and
that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be
made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme
Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest
in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process
of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the
president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme
Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money
damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of
executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy
that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that
"public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-
graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with
enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or
inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain
petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for
criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from
conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of
prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due
process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to
deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high
profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that
publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal
trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American
approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential
effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability
of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court
to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People
vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals,
et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial
due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the
case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials.
Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible
to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair
trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as
they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These
news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial
of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of
the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon.
Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due
process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural
impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty
while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match
the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case
continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views
not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in
the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have
participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to
a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press
and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American
justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively
open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions
based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community
therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a
community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is
important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v.
United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by
allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be
concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal
trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US
610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom
such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting
the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in
the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been
open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the
right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent
right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial
courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the
media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been
thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people
have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the
press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under
certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content
of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is
composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors.
Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that
they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by
the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its
summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did
petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground
of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis
supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant
this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-
free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office
of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed,
the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second
guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the
petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman
himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman
"has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to
the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also
been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged
the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors
investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The
accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of
judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent
Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we
adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their
own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which
they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should
not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes
that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will
now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of
the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a
higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the
right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair
investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all
freedoms."135To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to
prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint
against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in
a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and
not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a
democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the
definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of
government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the
majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive
they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not
throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic
are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra and Tayag for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Felicisimo R. Rosete, Solicitor Lolita O. Gal-lang and Special Attorney Gamaliel H.
Mantolino for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is
raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an
American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force
in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on
him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by
him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps,
the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his
contention, seriously and earnestly expressed, that in legal contemplation the sale
was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional
power to tax.
Such a plea, far-fetched and implausible, on its face betraying no kinship with
reality, he would justify by invoking, mistakenly as will hereafter be more fully
shown an observation to that effect in a 1951 opinion, 1 petitioner ignoring that
such utterance was made purely as a flourish of rhetoric and by way of
emphasizing the decision reached, that the trading firm as purchaser of army
goods must respond for the sales taxes due from an importer, as the American
armed forces being exempt could not be taxed as such under the National Internal
Revenue Code.2 Such an assumption, inspired by the commendable aim to render
unavailing any attempt at tax evasion on the part of such vendee, found expression
anew in a 1962 decision,3 coupled with the reminder however, to render the truth
unmistakable, that "the areas covered by the United States Military Bases are not
foreign territories both in the political and geographical sense."
As thus clarified, it is manifest that such a view amounts at most to a legal fiction
and is moreover obiter. It certainly cannot control the resolution of the specific
question that confronts us. We declare our stand in an unequivocal manner. The
sale having taken place on what indisputably is Philippine territory, petitioner's
liability for the income tax due as a result thereof was unavoidable. As the Court of
Tax Appeals reached a similar conclusion, we sustain its decision now before us on
appeal.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Tax Appeals, after stating the nature of
the case, started the recital of facts thus: "It appears that petitioner, a citizen of the
United States and an employee of Bendix Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation
Corporation, which provides technical assistance to the United States Air Force,
was assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959 ... . Nine (9)
months thereafter and before his tour of duty expired, petitioner imported on April
22, 1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at $6,443.83,
including freight, insurance and other charges."4 Then came the following: "On July
11, 1960, more than two (2) months after the 1960 Cadillac car was imported into
the Philippines, petitioner requested the Base Commander, Clark Air Base, for a
permit to sell the car, which was granted provided that the sale was made to a
member of the United States Armed Forces or a citizen of the United States
employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On the same date, July 11,
1960, petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr. (Private
first class), United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines, as shown
by a Bill of Sale . . . executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date, Pfc. Willie
(William) Johnson, Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000.00 as evidenced by
a deed of sale executed in Manila."5
As a result of the transaction thus made, respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as the personal
exemption to which petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net taxable income arising
from such transaction the amount of P17,912.34, rendering him liable for income
tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the sum, he sought a refund from
respondent claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request for
refund, he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum
of P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest.
As noted in the appealed decision: "The only issue submitted for our resolution is
whether or not the said income tax of P2,979.00 was legally collected by
respondent for petitioner."6 After discussing the legal issues raised, primarily the
contention that the Clark Air Base "in legal contemplation, is a base outside the
Philippines" the sale therefore having taken place on "foreign soil", the Court of Tax
Appeals found nothing objectionable in the assessment and thereafter the
payment of P2,979.00 as income tax and denied the refund on the same. Hence,
this appeal predicated on a legal theory we cannot accept. Petitioner cannot make
out a case for reversal.
1. Resort to fundamentals is unavoidable to place things in their proper
perspective, petitioner apparently feeling justified in his refusal to defer to basic
postulates of constitutional and international law, induced no doubt by the weight
he would accord to the observation made by this Court in the two opinions earlier
referred to. To repeat, scant comfort, if at all is to be derived from such an obiter
dictum, one which is likewise far from reflecting the fact as it is.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme,
its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to
a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what
otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction."7 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of
what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor
does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject
to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is
with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military
bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
Decisions coming from petitioner's native land, penned by jurists of repute, speak
to that effect with impressive unanimity. We start with the citation from Chief
Justice Marshall, announced in the leading case of Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon,8 an 1812 decision: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could
impose such restriction." After which came this paragraph: "All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories,
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source."
Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision,9 affirmed the fundamental principle of
everyone within the territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands:
"For undoubtedly every person who is found within the limits of a government,
whether the temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by its laws." It is no
exaggeration then for Justice Brewer to stress that the United States government
"is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting
directly upon each [individual found therein]; . . ."10
Not too long ago, there was a reiteration of such a view, this time from the pen of
Justice Van Devanter. Thus: "It now is settled in the United States and recognized
elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under
its dominion and control the ports, harbors, bays, and other in closed arms of the
sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line
outward a marine league, or 3 geographic miles."11 He could cite moreover, in
addition to many American decisions, such eminent treatise-writers as Kent,
Moore, Hyde, Wilson, Westlake, Wheaton and Oppenheim.
As a matter of fact, the eminent commentator Hyde in his three-volume work on
International Law, as interpreted and applied by the United States, made clear that
not even the embassy premises of a foreign power are to be considered outside
the territorial domain of the host state. Thus: "The ground occupied by an embassy
is not in fact the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong
through possession or ownership. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts there
committed is determined by the territorial sovereign. If an attache commits an
offense within the precincts of an embassy, his immunity from prosecution is not
because he has not violated the local law, but rather for the reason that the
individual is exempt from prosecution. If a person not so exempt, or whose
immunity is waived, similarly commits a crime therein, the territorial sovereign, if it
secures custody of the offender, may subject him to prosecution, even though its
criminal code normally does not contemplate the punishment of one who commits
an offense outside of the national domain. It is not believed, therefore, that an
ambassador himself possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction, contrary to the will
of the State of his sojourn, even within his embassy with respect to acts there
committed. Nor is there apparent at the present time any tendency on the part of
States to acquiesce in his exercise of it."12
2. In the light of the above, the first and crucial error imputed to the Court of Tax
Appeals to the effect that it should have held that the Clark Air Force is foreign soil
or territory for purposes of income tax legislation is clearly without support in law.
As thus correctly viewed, petitioner's hope for the reversal of the decision
completely fades away. There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends
support to such an assertion. It has not become foreign soil or territory. This
country's jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax,
have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was
provided for.
Petitioner could not have been unaware that to maintain the contrary would be to
defy reality and would be an affront to the law. While his first assigned error is thus
worded, he would seek to impart plausibility to his claim by the ostensible
invocation of the exemption clause in the Agreement by virtue of which a "national
of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with
the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in
the Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his
income unless "derived from Philippine source or sources other than the United
States sources."13 The reliance, to repeat, is more apparent than real for as noted
at the outset of this opinion, petitioner places more faith not on the language of
the provision on exemption but on a sentiment given expression in a 1951 opinion
of this Court, which would be made to yield such an unwarranted interpretation at
war with the controlling constitutional and international law principles. At any rate,
even if such a contention were more adequately pressed and insisted upon, it is on
its face devoid of merit as the source clearly was Philippine.
In Saura Import and Export Co. v. Meer,14 the case above referred to, this Court
affirmed a decision rendered about seven months previously,15 holding liable as an
importer, within the contemplation of the National Internal Revenue Code
provision, the trading firm that purchased army goods from a United States
government agency in the Philippines. It is easily understandable why. If it were not
thus, tax evasion would have been facilitated. The United States forces that
brought in such equipment later disposed of as surplus, when no longer needed for
military purposes, was beyond the reach of our tax statutes.
Justice Tuason, who spoke for the Court, adhered to such a rationale, quoting
extensively from the earlier opinion. He could have stopped there. He chose not to
do so. The transaction having occurred in 1946, not so long after the liberation of
the Philippines, he proceeded to discuss the role of the American military
contingent in the Philippines as a belligerent occupant. In the course of such a
dissertion, drawing on his well-known gift for rhetoric and cognizant that he was
making an as if statement, he did say: "While in army bases or installations within
the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil."
It is thus evident that the first, and thereafter the controlling, decision as to the
liability for sales taxes as an importer by the purchaser, could have been reached
without any need for such expression as that given utterance by Justice Tuason. Its
value then as an authoritative doctrine cannot be as much as petitioner would
mistakenly attach to it. It was clearly obiter not being necessary for the resolution
of the issue before this Court.16 It was an opinion "uttered by the way."17 It could
not then be controlling on the question before us now, the liability of the petitioner
for income tax which, as announced at the opening of this opinion, is squarely
raised for the first time.18
On this point, Chief Justice Marshall could again be listened to with profit. Thus: "It
is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to
be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment
in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision."19
Nor did the fact that such utterance of Justice Tuason was cited in Co Po v. Collector
of Internal Revenue,20 a 1962 decision relied upon by petitioner, put a different
complexion on the matter. Again, it was by way of pure embellishment, there being
no need to repeat it, to reach the conclusion that it was the purchaser of army
goods, this time from military bases, that must respond for the advance sales taxes
as importer. Again, the purpose that animated the reiteration of such a view was
clearly to emphasize that through the employment of such a fiction, tax evasion is
precluded. What is more, how far divorced from the truth was such statement was
emphasized by Justice Barrera, who penned the Co Po opinion, thus: "It is true that
the areas covered by the United States Military Bases are not foreign territories
both in the political and geographical sense."21
Justice Tuason moreover made explicit that rather than corresponding with reality,
what was said by him was in the way of a legal fiction. Note his stress on "in
contemplation of law." To lend further support to a conclusion already announced,
being at that a confirmation of what had been arrived at in the earlier case,
distinguished by its sound appreciation of the issue then before this Court and to
preclude any tax evasion, an observation certainly not to be taken literally was thus
given utterance.
This is not to say that it should have been ignored altogether afterwards. It could
be utilized again, as it undoubtedly was, especially so for the purpose intended,
namely to stigmatize as without support in law any attempt on the part of a
taxpayer to escape an obligation incumbent upon him. So it was quoted with that
end in view in the Co Po case. It certainly does not justify any effort to render futile
the collection of a tax legally due, as here. That was farthest from the thought of
Justice Tuason.
What is more, the statement on its face is, to repeat, a legal fiction. This is not to
discount the uses of a fictio juris in the science of the law. It was Cardozo who
pointed out its value as a device "to advance the ends of justice" although at times
it could be "clumsy" and even "offensive".22 Certainly, then, while far from
objectionable as thus enunciated, this observation of Justice Tuason could be
misused or misconstrued in a clumsy manner to reach an offensive result. To
repeat, properly used, a legal fiction could be relied upon by the law, as Frankfurter
noted, in the pursuit of legitimate ends.23 Petitioner then would be well-advised to
take to heart such counsel of care and circumspection before invoking not a legal
fiction that would avoid a mockery of the law by avoiding tax evasion but what
clearly is a misinterpretation thereof, leading to results that would have shocked its
originator.
The conclusion is thus irresistible that the crucial error assigned, the only one that
calls for discussion to the effect that for income tax purposes the Clark Air Force
Base is outside Philippine territory, is utterly without merit. So we have said earlier.
3. To impute then to the statement of Justice Tuason the meaning that petitioner
would fasten on it is, to paraphrase Frankfurter, to be guilty of succumbing to the
vice of literalness. To so conclude is, whether by design or inadvertence, to misread
it. It certainly is not susceptible of the mischievous consequences now sought to be
fastened on it by petitioner.
That it would be fraught with such peril to the enforcement of our tax statutes on
the military bases under lease to the American armed forces could not have been
within the contemplation of Justice Tuason. To so attribute such a bizarre
consequence is to be guilty of a grave disservice to the memory of a great jurist.
For his real and genuine sentiment on the matter in consonance with the
imperative mandate of controlling constitutional and international law concepts
was categorically set forth by him, not as an obiter but as the rationale of the
decision, in People v. Acierto24 thus: "By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should
be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein."
Nor did he stop there. He did stress further the full extent of our territorial
jurisdiction in words that do not admit of doubt. Thus: "This provision is not and
can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the
Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation
of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional
rights granted to the United States and not exercised by the latter are reserved by
the Philippines for itself."25
It is in the same spirit that we approach the specific question confronting us in this
litigation. We hold, as announced at the outset, that petitioner was liable for the
income tax arising from a sale of his automobile in the Clark Field Air Base, which
clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within our territorial jurisdiction to
tax.
4. With the mist thus lifted from the situation as it truly presents itself, there is
nothing that stands in the way of an affirmance of the Court of Tax Appeals
decision. No useful purpose would be served by discussing the other assigned
errors, petitioner himself being fully aware that if the Clark Air Force Base is to be
considered, as it ought to be and as it is, Philippine soil or territory, his claim for
exemption from the income tax due was distinguished only by its futility.
There is further satisfaction in finding ourselves unable to indulge petitioner in his
plea for reversal. We thus manifest fealty to a pronouncement made time and time
again that the law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and that he who
would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken
and too categorical to be misinterpreted.26 Petitioner had not done so. Petitioner
cannot do so.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966 denying the
refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs
against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J., took no part.
BASELINE LAW 8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. 16º59’18.03" 122º27’56.61" 3.51
Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session 9 PAB-06C Digollorin 16º49’56.11" 122º26’50.78" 2.40
Rk.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two 10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 16º47’38.86" 122º26’4.40" 30.94
thousand eight.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9522 March 10, 2009 11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt. 16º18’44.33" 122º14’06.69" 116.26
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS 12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 14º29’54.43" 122º57’51.15" 80.29
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 13 PAB-11 Horodaba 14º6.29.91" 124º16’59.21" 0.54
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Rk.
Congress assembled:: 14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 14º6.10.40" 124º17’26.28" 96.04
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the
Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of 15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12º41’6.37" 125º3’53.71" 6.79
Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows: 16 PAB-13A Bacan Is. 12º36’18.41" 125º8’50.19" 5.52
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and
described specifically as follows: 17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 12º32.33.62" 125º12’59.70" 0.80
Basepoint Station Location World Geodetic System of Distance 18 PAB-14A Cube Rk. 12º31.57.45" 125º13’32.37" 4.90
Number Name 1984 to next
19 PAB-14D NW Manjud 12º28’36.42" 125º17’12.32" 1.30
(WGS 84) Coordinates basepoint
Pt.
(M)
Latitude (N) Longitude (E)
20 PAB-15 SE Manjud 12º27’37.51" 125º18’5.23" 7.09
1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21º6’57.73" 121º57’27.71" 70.08 Pt.
2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 19º57’38.19" 122º9’46.32" 99.17 21 PAB-16A S Sorz Cay 12º21’41.64" 125º23’7.41" 5.68
3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt. 18º18’35.30" 122º20’19.07" 71.83 22 PAB-16B Panablihon 12º17’27.17" 125º27’0.12" 5.21
4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 17º7’16.30" 122º31’28.34" 1.05 23 PAB-16C Alugon 12º13’21.95" 125º30’19.47" 1.94
5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt. 17º6’14.79" 122º31’43.84" 0.39 24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 12º11’48.16" 125º31’30.88" 0.54
6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17º5’51.31" 122º31’42.66" 3.29 25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt. 12º11’20.67" 125º31’48.29" 5.71
7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17º2’36.91" 122º31’3.28" 9.74 26 PAB-18A SE Tobabao 12º6’7.00" 125º34’11.94" 83.94
Is.
27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 10º45’16.70" 125º58’8.78" 56.28 46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 6º9’8.44" 124º15’42.81" 122.88
28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 9º49’59.58" 126º10’6.39" 57.44 47 PAB-33A Kantuan Is 6º26’47.22" 122º13.34.50" 29.44
29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 8º53’16.62" 126º20’48.81" 40.69 48 PAB-34A Tongguil Is. 6º2’33.77" 121º56’36.20" 2.38
30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt. 8º13’11.53" 126º28’53.25" 30.80 49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 6º1’8.51" 121º54’41.45" 1.72
31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 7º42’45.02" 126º34’29.08" 12.95 50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6º0’17.88" 121º63’11.17" 85.94
32 PAB-22C Languyan 7º29’49.47" 126º35’59.24" 0.54 51 PAB-38A Kirapusan Is 5º12.8.70" 120º41’38.14" 55.24
33 PAB-23 Languyan 7º29’16.93" 126º35’59.50" 0.76 52 PAB-39 Manuk 4º47’39.24" 119º51’58.08" 43.44
Manka Is.
34 PAB-23B Languyan 7º28’30.97" 126º35’57.30" 1.2
53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 4º24’53.84" 119º14’50.71 0.61
35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt. 7º27’29.42" 126º35’51.31" 10.12
54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4º25’3.83" 119º14’15.15" 15.48
36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 7º17’19.80" 126º36’18.26" 1.14
55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 4º36"9.01" 119º3’22.75" 6.88
37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt. 7º16’14.43" 126º35’57.20" 63.28
56 PAB-42A Paguan Is. 4º42’52.07" 119º1’44.04" 8.40
38 PAB-25B Cape San 6º17’14.73" 126º12’14.40" 1.28
Agustin 57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 4º45’55.25" 119º3’15.19" 2.28
39 PAB-25 Cape San 6º16’8.35" 126º11’35.06" 67.65 58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4º47’5.36" 119º5’12.94" 18.60
Agustin
59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 4º55’10.45" 119º22’1.30 23.37
40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani 5º23’34.20" 125º28’42.11" 0.43
60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis 5º2’23.73" 119º44’18.14" 44.20
Is.
Pt.
41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato 5º23’21.80" 125º28’19.59" 3.44
61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 5º46’35.15" 119º39’51.77" 75.17
Pt.
62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is. 6º5’58.41" 118º26’57.30" 8.54
42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 6º21’55.66" 126º25’11.21" 3.31
63 PAB-48A Taganak Is 6º4’14.08" 118º18’33.33" 13.46
43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 5º21’58.48" 125º21’52.03" 0.87
64 PAB-49 Great 6º11’4.65" 118º6’54.15" 3.97
44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5º22’2.91" 125º20’59.73" 1.79
Bakkungaan
45 PAB-31 Marampog 5º23’20.18" 125º19’44.29" 78.42 Is.
Pt.
65 PAB-50 Libiman Is. 6º13’39.90" 118º3’52.09" 5.53 83 PAB-71 Hermana 15º48’43.61" 119º46’56.09" 9.30
Mayor Is.
66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 6º17’43.99" 118º0’5.44" 41.60
84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 15º57’61.67" 119º44’55.32" 12.06
67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 6º52’14.53" 118º23’40.49" 75.06
85 PAB-72B Rena Pt. 16º9’57.90" 119º45.15.76" 0.25
68 PAB-53 South 7º30’26.05" 117º18’33.75" 26.00
Mangsee Is. 86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 16º10’12.42" 119º45’11.95" 6.43
69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 7º48’30.69" 116º59’39.18" 6.08 87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 16º16’34.46" 119º46’19.50" 0.65
70 PAB-54A Balabac 7º51’27.17" 116º54’17.19" 1.18 88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 16º37’12.70" 119º46’28.62" 1.30
Great Reef
89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 16º18’29.49" 119º46’44.94" 1.04
71 PAB-54B Balabac 7º52’19.86" 116º53’28.73" 2.27
90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 16º19’28.20" 119º47’7.69" 0.63
Great Reef
91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16º20’4.38" 119º47’20.48" 80.60
72 PAB-55 Balabac 7º54’36.35" 116º53’16.64" 5.42
Great Reef 92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 17º34’24.94" 120º20’33.36" 6.86
73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 8º2’0.26" 116º54’10.04" 10.85 93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 17º41’17.56" 120º21’2.20" 14.15
74 PAB.61 Secam Is. 8º11’18.36" 116º59’51.87" 30.88 94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17º55’4.13" 120º24’40.56" 35.40
75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 8º87’56.37" 117º15’51.23" 7.91 95 PAB-79 Cape 18º29’32.42" 120º33’42.41" 1.77
Bojeador
76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 8º44’17.40" 117º20’39.37" 11.89
96 PAB-79B Bobon 18º30’52.88" 120º34’55.35" 58.23
77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt. 8º53’32.20" 117º28’15.78" 13.20
97 PAB-80 Calagangan 19º10’14.78" 121º12’52.64" 98.07
78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao 9º2.57.47" 117º37’38.88" 81.12
Pt.
Pt.
98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 20º43’15.74" 121º46’57.80" 25.63
79 PAB.64B Dry Is. 9º59’22.54" 118º36’53.61" 82.76
99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21º7’17.47" 121º56’43.85" 0.08
80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan 11º13’19.82" 119º15’17.74" 74.65
Pt. 100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21º7’18.41" 121º56’48.79" 0.25
81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 12º19’35.22" 119º50’56.00 93.88 101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21º7’12.04" 121º57’3.65" 0.44
82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 13º53’24.45" 120º1’5.86" 115.69 Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representative on February 17,
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; 2009.
and (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA- (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. YAP Secretary of Senate
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, Secretary General
sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in House of Represenatives
the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without Approved: MAR 10, 2009
limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
of 1991, as amended. President of the Philippines
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and
maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the
Secretary General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)
shall forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale
clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this
Act.
Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be
provided in a supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of
the year of its enactment into law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No.
5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances
inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
Approved
(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
NOGRALES President of the Senate
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain
Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history
and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century
piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so
as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of
Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening,
the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros
all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the
Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter
of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored
violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the
Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de
officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the
laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial
judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants
guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the
offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the
costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de
officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly
disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and
as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without
jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime
not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which
he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter
that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for
the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as
follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the
next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and
those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same
article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred
and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this
code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the
national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person,
who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard
shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States
relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United
States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of
transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs.
McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines
by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley
Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines,
when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal
laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and
property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not
usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This
enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code
in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also
make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as
piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of
the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the
concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal
Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress,
in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev.
Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress
were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the
law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines
relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in
the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the
logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here
crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and impose capital punishment.
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the
case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the
"authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the
comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with
Government of the Philippine Islands. provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the
as follows: defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed
the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case,
perpetua. shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor. Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, concur.
notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation
to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the
last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of
piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena
perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding
present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article
11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At
least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for
its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means
were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also
G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla)
from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that
of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing
them2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱10,000,000.00 each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel
Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the
Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicate crime group as they all help one another, for purposes of gain
in the transport of illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a
Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to read
"Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is commonly known as
shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight
(503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever.3
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City4 on 1 August 2007 convicted
Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan,
Quezon, of illegal transport5 of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty
eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the
prosecution’s failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense
charged. The dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱10,000,000.00 each. Accused
Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered
immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as
representative sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is
ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles
driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an
ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired
prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for
transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the
information turned out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their
motor vehicles more than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride.7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to
transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only
accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his
fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack
of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that
he was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with
Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not
bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an
accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they
were caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles
driven by each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to corroborate their
explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained.8
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the
two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven
by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was
ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police
officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers.
Through the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks
inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks
contained narra wooden tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car
for further inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white
crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla
to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with
Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.9 His request was
rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks
turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This discovery
prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police
officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They
then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that
his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus,
Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At
this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected.
Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks
of methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial
court for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequilla’s and Yang’s mere presence inside
the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators
of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.12
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld
the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent
to transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board
their respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport
methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive
the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra,
who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the
illegal contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden
tiles was implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and volume.14
Court’s Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be
convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove
his culpability as alleged in the Information.15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure16 to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the
Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement
"the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality
of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime
group as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the
words used in the Information.17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information,
at this point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morilla’s failure to assert it as a
ground in a motion to quash before entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his
defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate
courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy,
there must be a common design to commit a felony.21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group
involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of
the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof
of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole.22In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads
to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to
transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of
dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to
drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s
turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a
routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers
requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy
with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the
mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and
he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the
said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used
under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to
another."23 It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the
ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going
to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of
transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied
by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.24
In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal
transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag
full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle
at a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,26 the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683,27 the penalty
was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to
thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No.
7659,28 where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of ₱10,000,00.00 to be
paid by each of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application
of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30)
years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life
imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration and carries no accessory penalties.29
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People,30 thus:
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate
court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled
that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15
of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The
decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 shall be
imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new
amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to
₱30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00
to ₱10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section
20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory
law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
 The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the Court's Division.
petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.1âwphi1 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held: Associate Justice
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that Second Division Chairperson
the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the CERTIFICATION
original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
application, x x x." Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, opinion of the Court's Division.
have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty imposed by the trial court upon MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, Chief Justice
which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July
2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua
instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of ₱10,000,000.00 by each of the
accused.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the
petitioners of murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded
damages.2
The petitioners contest the CA’s affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via
petition for review on certiorari.
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador
Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the
time of the commission of the crime. We order his immediate release from prison
because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add to the
damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to accord with the
prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally
charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through
the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Bogña, Municipality of
Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable
cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot
one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on
November 7, 1994,4 the trial ensued.
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra
Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona
(Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona),
her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla,
Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel
Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a
barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desder’s house, she
heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and then two successive
gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona;
that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, that’s enough!;
that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the
direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was
moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the
petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to the house of
barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that
she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.5
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18,
1994,6 based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the
Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that
penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.7
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent ₱30,000.00 for the
funeral expenses of Llona.8
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the
Defense were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana
(Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had
been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had
been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon
drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the
crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had been
implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the
alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted
Danilo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and
Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil
indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to reimburse the
heirs of the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the
cost.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime
charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the
provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other lawful cause or
causes.
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited
in full in the service of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court referred the petitioners’ direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v.
Mateo.10
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants
Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of
Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱30,000.00 as
actual damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.11
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,12 the petitioners now
appeal.
Issue
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of
murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla
despite her not being a credible witness; that some circumstances rendered
Mirandilla’s testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the
assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them shooting at Llona;
(b) she had merely assumed that they had been the assailants from the fact that
they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the autopsy report
stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to
Mirandilla’s claim; (d) Mirandilla’s testimony was contrary to human experience;
and (e) Mirandilla’s account was inconsistent with that of Jesalva’s.
Ruling
The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty
imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.
I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect
The RTC and CA’s conclusions were based on Mirandilla’s positive identification of
the petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of
them made during her court testimony on March 6, 1995,13viz:
q Who were you saying ‘we sat together’?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the
sala and the house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting
arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was
infront of me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona
q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in
otherwords, the door was at his back.
q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.
q Was the door immediately found… Rather was this the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see
assisting the persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you where the gun was pointed at?
doing then? a It was pointed towards me.
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child. q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
q How about Kgd. Jesalva? a Yes, sir.
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness. q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this
q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was man?
any incident that happened? a Yes, sir.
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?
successive shots. a Yes, sir.
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?
was responsible for the shots? a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado. the person, the person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador
q Who is this Salvador Atizado? Monreal.)
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona. q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his
q Can you be able to identify him? revolver and he was moving backward, did you see other persons as his
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador companion, if any?
Atizado.) a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot? on the process of leaving the place.
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
downward. a Danilo Atizado
q Then after that what happened? q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible ‘stop that’s enough’, a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona. Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed,
q Then after that what happened? Mirandilla’s positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden
trigger of the gun. deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to
q Then what did you do when you heard that? kill and had done so with treachery.
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judge’s
that time I do not know his name. evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness’ testimony is accorded
q Then what did you see of him? the highest respect because the trial judge’s unique opportunity to observe directly
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine whether the witness is
of the gun. telling the truth or not.14 Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on
the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the
disposition of the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners
have not called attention to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that
Mirandilla’s positive declarations on the identities of the assailants prevailed over
the petitioners’ denials and alibi.16
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.17 Yet,
the State did not have to prove the petitioners’ previous agreement to commit the
murder,18 because their conspiracy was deduced from the mode and manner in
which they had perpetrated their criminal act.19 They had acted in concert in
assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and
design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as
co-principals.20 Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-
principals in murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or
of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other
public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which offended party might make.21 For treachery to be attendant,
the means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or consciously
adopted by the offenders.22 Moreover, treachery must be present and seen by the
witness right at the inception of the attack.23
The CA held that Mirandilla’s testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that
treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizado’s shooting the
victim at the latter’s back had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime;
and that Atizado and Monreal’s conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their
presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that they had fired
except that Monreal’s handgun did not fire.24
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted
their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its
imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the assailants had
preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The
assailants had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to
deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.25 Such manner
constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured their
unhampered execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty
for murder is reclusion perpetuato death. There being no modifying circumstances,
the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado,
which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.26 But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15
but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s
minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when
the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed
on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.27 Secondly, the police blotter
recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on
May 18, 1994.28Thirdly, Villafe’s affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that
Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.29Fourthly, as RTC’s minutes of
hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,30 Monreal was 22 years old when he
testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,31 which meant that he was not
over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla
described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.32
The foregoing showing of Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed
with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,33 viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with
the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a
child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons,
the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt
as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing
of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide
the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in
the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the
child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said
motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and under 18
years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based
on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower
than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment
imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum
period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period.
Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day
of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on
May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreal’s detention
should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of
Republic Act No. 9344,35 the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate
release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted
under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor
offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention,
intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their
development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his
sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. –
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving
heirs of Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of
the crime stands,36 despite the reduction of Monreal’s penalty. But we must
reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The
CA granted only ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as actual damages, and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and
moral damages should each be raised to ₱75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case
law;37 and that exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 due to the attendance of
treachery should be further awarded,38 to accord with the pronouncement in Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken
People v. Catubig,39 to wit: on this decision within five days from service.
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it SO ORDERED.
breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier Associate Justice
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. WE CONCUR:
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, Associate Justice
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which Chairperson
is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not ARTURO D. BRION MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little Associate Justice Associate Justice
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is Associate Justice
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance ATTESTATION
is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the Court’s Division.
offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Article 2230 of the Civil Code. Associate Justice
The award of actual damages of ₱30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the Chairperson
record. CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following modifications: in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight RENATO C. CORONA
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period; Chief Justice
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately
release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on
him, unless he is being held for other lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of
Roger L. Llona ₱75,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱30,000.00 as actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The
G.R. No. L-335 February 12, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T. PASTOR, defendants-appellees.
Assistant Solicitor General Gianzon and Solicitor Feria for appellant.
Enrique Medina for appellees.
HILADO, J.:
The question presented here is whether or not, in view of the express repeal of
sections 1458 and 1459, in relation with section 2723, of the Revised
Administrative Code, and of Act No. 3243, by section 369 of Commonwealth Act
No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, and in view of
the later enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503 (vide section 5), violations of
the provisions of the repealed acts, while they were in force, could be legally
prosecuted after the repeal but also after the enactment of Commonwealth Act
No. 503.
The accused Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were, on June 4,
1941, charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Negros in an information filed
with the Justice of the Peace Court of Dumaguete, capital of the province, with a
violation of sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation
with Act No. 3243, and section 2723 of the same Code. The accused waived their
right to a preliminary investigation, whereupon the proper information was lodged
against them with the Court of First Instance of the province on July 11, 1941.
Probably as a consequence of the Pacific war having supervened, no further
proceedings were taken until January 27, 1946, when the accused filed a motion to
quash. The motion was upheld by the trial court in its order dated February 12,
1946 (Appendix A of appellant's brief).
The Government, not agreeing with such order, interposed this appeal.
The business of the accused in connection with which they are thus being
prosecuted was that of owners, managers or administrators of the "Magazine
Center", an establishment devoted to the selling of newspapers, magazines and
stationery, according to the information.
The information alleges that these defendants during the period comprised
between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, being such owners, managers and
administrators of said "Magazine Center", with the deliberate purpose to evade the
payment of the percentage tax upon their receipts, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally neglected to make a return of their sales within the time prescribed by
law.
Counsel for appellant makes the following express admission in his brief (p. 3):
It is an admitted fact that the provisions of law under which the accused are being
prosecuted, namely, sections 1458 and 1459 in relation with section 2723, of the
Revised Administrative Code and Act No. 3243, had been expressly repealed by
section 369 of Commonwealth Act No. 466. It is likewise admitted that the above-
mentioned provisions of the Revised Administrative Code were no longer in force
at the time the present action was instituted.
The trial court, in passing upon the motion to quash, inter alia, said (trial court's
order, appendix A, appellant's brief):
This kind of business not being now subject to the payment of percentage tax, and
for that matter not being required under the present law to file a quarterly return
of their receipts and sales, is no longer within the penal provisions of section 209 of
the Internal Revenue Code which supersedes the provisions of section 2725 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Appellant's counsel says (brief, pp. 6-7):
Without the enactment of amendatory Act No. 503, the conclusion reached by the
trial court would be correct, because it would then be clear that under
Commonwealth Act No. 466, only the manufacturer, producer or importer is liable
for the payment of the percentage tax. But with the enactment of the above-
mentioned amendatory Act, the intention of the legislature to subject all
merchants to the payment of the privilege tax, in the same way that they were
subject thereto under the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, becomes
perfectly clear.
It results from this that according to the Government itself, without the enactment
of Commonwealth Act No. 503, the present defendants would not have been liable
to prosecution under the facts alleged in the information for the reason that under
the National Internal Revenue Code only the manufacturer, producer or importer is
liable for the payment of the privilege tax. But it is contended for the prosecution
that in the enactment of said Commonwealth Act No. 503 the intention of the
legislature was "to subject all merchants to the payment of the privilege tax, in the
same way that they were subject thereto under the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code". The section of Commonwealth Act No. 503 particularly relied
upon by the prosecution is the following:
SEC. 5. As used in sections 184, 185 and 186 of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four
hundred sixty-six, the phrase "original sale, barter, or exchange" shall be construed
to mean the first sale, barter, or exchange of article by every manufacturer,
producer, or importer: Provided, however, That where the taxes prescribed in said
sections have not been collected on articles, the original sales of which are subject
to tax, in the possession of any merchant, the first sale, barter, or exchange of said
articles on or after the approval of this Act shall be considered as an original sale,
barter, or exchange and shall be subject to tax at the rates prescribed in said
sections 184, 185, and 186. (Emphasis supplied.)
The underscored portion of the proviso of the aforequoted section determines
what sale, barter or exchange of articles subject to the taxes prescribed in sections
184, 185 and 186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 shall be considered as an original
sale, barter or exchange and shall be subject to the tax, and it determines the
question by saying that it shall be the first sale, barter or exchange on or after the
approval of said Act. Commonwealth Act No. 503 was approved on October 16,
1939. Therefore, the sales made by the present defendants between January, 1936,
and March 31, 1938, were not covered by the provisions of section 5 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 503 which was not in existence when they took place.
Under sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 1 of
Act No. 3243, defendants were required to make a return of their sales and to pay
the percentage tax therein provided for.
With respect to the newspapers, magazines and stationery sold by them, as
"merchants" under the definition of section 1459, during the period alleged in the
information, the penalty for their failure to make the required return was fixed by
section 2723 of the same Code at a fine not exceeding P2,000 or imprisonment for
a term not exceeding one year, or both. Those provisions were, however, expressly
repealed by section 369 of Commonwealth Act No. 466.
While it is true that under section 186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 those
newspapers, magazines and stationery would come within the meaning of the term
"articles" used therein (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 131, definition No. 6
of "article"), the fact is that by the said section the one made liable to pay the tax is
the manufacturer, producer or importer and the tax is therein expressly made
collectible only once, i. e., on every original sale, barter, exchange and similar
transaction intended to transfer ownership of, or title to, the articles therein
referred to. And, as regards the newspapers and magazines, persons, like
defendants, engaged in the business of selling them, but who were not the printers
or publishers thereof, could not have made the original sale, barter, exchange or
similar transaction within the meaning of the oft-repeated section 186. Moreover,
even the printer or publisher can hardly be considered as the "manufacturer or
producer" thereof. And even if we direct attention to section 191 of
Commonwealth Act No. 466, in so far as it relates to publishers, we will find that
the tax of 1½ per cent thereby imposed is only upon the publishers who are not
covered by the exception therein made, and not upon the merchant or by the
person who acquires the newspapers, magazines, reviews or bulletins therein
spoken of from the publisher for purposes of resale. This means that defendants
herein would not come under the purview of said section 191 either.
From the foregoing it results that neither under section 186 nor under section 191
of the National Internal Revenue Code — nor under any other sections of said Code
for that matter — would defendants liable for the percentage tax therein created.
Radical changes from the aforesaid and other provisions of the former Internal
Revenue Law, upon the enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code, are: (a)
the increased rate from 1½ per cent under section 1459 of the Revised
Administrative Code and section 1 of Act No. 3243 to 3½ per cent under section
186 of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the change in the incidence of the
tax, namely, its imposition only upon the manufacturer,producer or importer on
the original sale, barter, exchange, etc. effected by him, pursuant to section 186 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of upon every person making any sale,
barter, exchange, etc., no matter how many times these transactions were
successively repeated, under sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative
Code and section 1 of Act No. 3243; (c) the increase from 1 per cent under section
1461 of the Revised Administrative Code to 1½ per cent under section 191 of the
National Internal Revenue Code in the tax or publishers, lithographers and printers;
etc.
Consequently, we are of opinion that the provisions of sections 1458 and 1459 of
the Revised Administrative Code and section 1 of Act No. 3243 were not reenacted,
even substantially, in the National Internal Revenue Code.
But it is contended for the Government that the order appealed from is erroneous
because of the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, particularly section 5
thereof, transcribed in appellant's brief and also in an earlier part of this decision.
However, we must not lose sight of the proviso of said section 5 which is in the
words and figures following:
Provided, however, that where the taxes described in said sections (sections 184,
185, and 186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466) have not been collected on articles,
the original sales of which are subject to the tax, in the possession of any
merchant, the first sale, barter, or exchange of said articles on or after the approval
of this Act shall be considered as an original sale, barter, or exchange and shall be
subject to the tax. . . .
This proviso was evidently designed to cover the case of those articles on whose
original sale, barter, or exchange the percentage tax would have been collectible
from the manufacturer, producer or importer if it had been effected upon or after
the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 466, but which were so sold, bartered or
exchanged before said enactment: and for such a case it was provided that the first
sale, barter, or exchange of said articles on or after the approval of the Act (No.
503) shall be considered as the original sale, barter or exchange thereof and shall
be accordingly taxable. The sales made by the herein defendants, having taken
place between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, we effected more than one year
before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, that is, October 16, 1939.
It will, therefore, appear from the foregoing considerations that upon the
enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code defendants herein ceased to be
bound to make a return of their sales in question or to pay the percentage tax
under consideration. And not only this, but even after the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 503, such obligation could not in any sense be considered
as reviewed — hypothetically supposing that such revival would have been valid —
since by the express terms of the proviso of section 5 of the last mentioned act, the
sales thus made by defendants would not, at any rate, have been considered as
"the first sale, barter, or exchange" of the aforesaid newspaper, magazines and
stationary. In other words, after the approval of the National Internal Revenue
Code the continuity of the obligation, and therefore of the penal sanction for its
violation, was broken. In consequence, the authorities cited by the Solicitor
General on page 8 of his brief, predicated upon the re-enactment, literal or
substantial, of the repealed provision by the repealing act, are not in point. In Ong
Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States (40 Phil., 1046; 218 U.S., 272; 54 Law
ed., 1040, 1041)), wherein the United States Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
of conviction by this Court, the former tribunal said:
It appears that the new Act No. 1757, which took the place of the repealed act,
article No. 343 of the Philippine Penal Code, did not undertake to wipe out the
offense of gambling, or keeping a gambling house in the Philippine Islands,
but substantially re-enacted the former law with more elaboration and detail in its
provisions than were contained in the former law. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the following page of the report, the same tribunal had the following to say of
the effect of the decision of this Court:
. . . The effect of the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court is to hold that under
the law and local statutes, the repealing act re-enacting substantially the former
law, and not increasing the punishment of the accused, the right still exists to
punish the accused for an offense of which they were convicted and sentenced
before the passage of the later act. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), the earliest Philippine case
cited in the Solicitor General's brief, this Court declared (p. 245):
. . . In other words, that the enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact
that they contain general repealing clauses, does not deprive the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the old
law prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law
wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and
penalized in the repealed law.
In accordance with this doctrine, where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize
the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law,
the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.
This is our case, since, as already seen, the National Internal Revenue Code, and for
that matter even Commonwealth Act No. 503, wholly fails to penalize the acts
imputed upon the herein defendants.
Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the order appealed from be, as it is
hereby, affirmed with costs de officio. So ordered.
Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla and
Tuason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-5318 December 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL BUMANGLAG, ET AL., defendants. - GREGORIO BUNDOC, appellant.
Iñigo Bitanga for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, an inhabitant of the pueblo of
San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte, missed 4 baares or 40 bundles of palay which
were kept in his granary, situated in the place called "Payas," barrio No. 16 of the
said pueblo, and on proceeding to search for them on the following morning, he
found them in an inclosed filed which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance of
about 100 meters from his granary; thereupon, for the purpose of ascertaining
who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio
Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for
the person who might return to get the palay. A man, who turned out to be
Guillermo Ribis, made his appearance and approaching the palay, attempted to
carry it away with him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted
the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the
struggle which ensued the person attacked fell down and died instantly, Bumanglag
and his companions believing that Guillermo Ribis was the author of several
robberies and thefts that had occurred in the place.
In view of the foregoing, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint on January 15, 1909,
charging Rafael Bumanglag, Gregorio Bundoc, and Antonio Ribao with the crime of
homicide, and the trial judge, on February 5 of the present year, rendered
judgment in the case, sentencing the three accused persons to the penalty of
fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusión temporal, with the
accessories, and to the payment of an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the
deceased, and the costs in equal parts, from which decision only Gregorio Bundoc
appealed.
From the facts above mentioned, fully proven in this case, the commission of the
crime of homicide, defined and punished by article 404 of the Penal Code, is
inferred, inasmuch as Guillermo Ribis was violently deprived of his life in
consequence of serious wounds and bruises, some of them of a mortal nature, as
appears from a certificate issued by a physician who examined the body of the
deceased, and who ratified said certificate at the trial under oath.
The accused Bundoc, the only appellant, pleaded not guilty, but, in the absence of
justification, and his exculpatory allegation being unreasonable, it is not proper to
hold that he assaulted and killed the deceased, with the help of his codefendants,
in order to defend himself from an attack made by the former with a bolo.
Both Gregorio Bundoc and his codefendants Bumanglag and Ribao declared that,
during the fight with the deceased Ribis, they only beat the latter with sticks,
because he unsheathed the bolo he carried; but from the examination made of the
body it appeared that several serious wounds had been inflicted with cutting and
stabbing weapons, besides some bruises, and according to the declaration of the
health officer Felipe Barba, which declaration was confirmed by the municipal
president of Laoag, the bolo worn by the deceased was in its sheath and hanging
from his waist; therefore it can not be concluded that the deceased even intended
to assault his murderers with his bolo either before he was attacked by them or
during the fight, because, had Ribis made use of the bolo he carried sheathed, the
bolo would have been found unsheathed at the place where the fight occurred,
and it is not reasonable to believe that, before falling to the ground in a dying
condition he succeeded in sheathing his bolo, in which condition it was found on
his body.
It is therefore indisputable that, without any prior illegal aggression and the other
requisites which would fully or partially exempt the accused from criminal
responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted Guillermo Ribis with
sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-
principal by direct participation, fully convicted, together with his codefendants
who are already serving their sentence.
In the commission of the crime we should take into account the mitigating
circumstance No. 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, because the defendant acted
with loss of reason and self-control on seeing that Guillermo Ribis was taking
material possession of the palay seized and hidden by him on the previous night,
thus committing one of the numerous unlawful acts perpetrated at the place, to
the damage and prejudice of those who, by their labor endeavor to provide
themselves with the necessary elements for their subsistence and that of their
families. The special circumstance established by article 11 of the same code
should be also considered in favor of the accused, in view of the erroneous and
quite general belief that it is legal to punish, even to excess the thief who, in
defiance of law and justice, while refusing to work, devotes himself to depriving his
neighbors of the fruits of their arduous labors; these two circumstances are
considered in the present case as especially admissible, without any aggravating
circumstance, and they determine, according to article 81, rule 5, of the Penal
Code, the imposition of the penalty immediately inferior to that prescribed by the
law, and in its minimum degree, and therefore —
By virtue of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that, the judgment
appealed from being reversed with respect to Gregorio Bundoc only, the latter
should be, and is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of six years and one day
of prisión mayor, to the accessories of article 61 of the code, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased jointly or severally with his codefendants, in the sum of P1,000,
and to pay one-third the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
The defendants in this case were convicted of the crime of homicide in causing the
death of Guillermo Ribis, and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusión temporal, accessories, indemnification, and costs.
Gregorio Bundoc is the only one who appealed.
On the night of the 21st of February, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, a resident of the
pueblo of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte, found missing from his granary,
situated at a place called Payas, barrio No. 16 of said pueblo, 4 baaresand
40 manojos of palay, and the inclosure within which the palay was situated torn
down and partly destroyed. The following morning he discovered a portion of the
missing palay in a field of sugar cane about 100 meters from the granary from
which it was taken. For the purpose of discovering who was the author of the crime
and of bringing him to justice, he secured the assistance of Gregorio Bundoc,
Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, the first being his cousin and the others in
his neighbors and friends, to watch with him the succeeding night in the vicinity of
thepalay, acting upon the expectation that the robber would return to secure it.
Some time after dark of the night succeeding the robbery, Bumanglag, and the
other persons mentioned, gathered together in said field of sugar cane, near to
the palay in question, placing themselves so as to surround it in a measure, and
awaited the appearance of the malefactor. At about 10 o'clock there came into the
field the deceased, Guillermo Ribis, who approached the palay, picked it up, and
started to carry it away. At this moment Bumanglag presented himself in front of
Ribis, stopping his further progress, whereupon Ribis attacked him viciously with a
bolo and they engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle. Bumanglag, upon finding that
he was likely to be killed by the robber because of his great strength and the fact
that he was armed with a bolo, called for assistance, whereupon his three
companions rushed forward and seeing the extremity in which Bumanglag was,
joined in the struggle for the purpose of his protection. Within a few minutes Ribis
fell to the earth mortally injured and soon expired.
The only proofs in the trial relating to the death are the statements and testimony
of the defendants themselves. Immediately after the death of Ribis, they, acting
voluntarily, went to the nearest justice of the peace and stated what had occurred.
Each one signed a statement of the facts constituting the occurrence as he
understood them. Later each one of defendants testified on the trial.
Bundoc, in the written statement made by him before the justice of the peace, said
that at about 10 o'clock of the night in question he saw Ribis enter the field, going
toward the place where the palay was located, and a little while afterwards
Bumanglag called him and his companions to come to his assistance because a man
was attacking him and that thereupon he, Bundoc and his companions, "went to
the assistance of Bumanglag, who was fighting with Ribis, and, in view of the fact
that it appeared that Bumanglag was not able to resist his adversary because he
had a bolo and Bumanglag had only a bamboo stick," he and his companions took
part in the fight solely to protect his cousin and that, during the struggle that
followed, the decedent was killed. He said further that he recognized the deceased,
Ribis, as a resident of San Nicolas, and that he was a person of bad character and
was known as the author of various robberies and burglaries which had occurred in
that vicinity.
The statements of the other defendants are substantially the same as that of
Bundoc.itc-alf
Upon the trial Bumanglag testified, relative to the acts of defendants from which
the death of Ribis resulted, that Ribis came into the field, arranged the palay in
handy form picked it up, and started to go away with it; that thereupon Bumanglag
told him to halt; that Ribis instantly dropped his bundle to the ground and
immediately attacked Bumanglag with a bolo, striking at him several times but
failing to hit him on account of stalks of sugar cane which Bumanglag interposed
between himself and his assailant; that, while Ribis was trying to kill him with his
bolo, he called to his companions for help, at the same trying to defend himself
with blows of his bamboo stick; that his companions soon arrival, and, between the
three, they struck him several blows, from which he died immediately; that they
carried no weapons except bamboo sticks, while the deceased was armed with a
large bolo.
The statement of Bumanglag made upon the trial is somewhat different from his
statement made before the justice of the peace but is more in accord with the
statements of the other defendants in the case, both before the justice of the
peace upon the trial of the case. Bundoc testified that Bumanglag called for help
because he was being attacked by the robber, who was armed with a bolo, and that
he was likely to be killed at any instant, and that he and his companions, desiring to
defend Bumanglag from his imminent peril, ran forward to his assistance, and that
during the fight which occurred, the deceased was killed.
These are the only proofs before us relative to the manner in which Ribis met his
death. The court below, however, refused to believe the story of defendants
because of certain alleged contradictory circumstances which appear in the proofs.
These circumstances, as presented by the court below and here argued by the
fiscal, are that (1) while the defendants claim in their statements and testimony
that the deceased attacked Bumanglag with his bolo, nevertheless, when the body
of the decedent was the nest day taken possession of by the justice of the peace,
the bolo was still in its sheath; and (2) that while the defendants stated and
testified that they were not armed with any kind of weapons except bamboo sticks
or clubs, still the testimony of Barba, the sanitary inspector of that district, shows
that some of the wounds upon the deceased were made with sharp instruments.
Upon these two circumstances, impugning, as it is alleged they do, the evidence of
the defendants in their own behalf, the court below found the defendants guilty of
homicide.
The only evidence in relation to these two circumstances is that of the justice of
the peace and the sanitary inspector, who assert that when they went to examine
the body and take charge of it, the next day after the death, they found the bolo in
its sheath. It appears, however, that no one watched the body during the interval
running between the time when the death occurred and when the body was first
examined, and therefore no one knows how it was handled or what was done with
or to it. As to the other point, namely, that the wounds were made with sharp
instruments, it may be said that the witness Barba, the sanitary inspector, who is
the only one who testified in relation to that matter, stated that the only two
wounds that were mortal were located, one in the right side of the head, caused by
a sharp instrument, the other a contusion at the base of the neck upon the left
side, not made with a sharp instrument. He does not say which one of the wounds
caused the death of the decedent, neither does he state the fact upon which he
bases his claim that the wounds were made with sharp instruments. He is simply
states his conclusions, without presenting the facts from which such conclusions
naturally spring. It is well known, however, that a wound, smooth edged and clean
cut, and simulating with remarkable closeness a wound made with a sharp cutting
instrument, may be and frequently is produced by a wooden instrument or club,
particularly where, as in this case, said instrument or club is extremely hard and
has a sharp edge. The witness Barba was not a physician or surgeon and had had
little experience with wounds. His judgment was scarcely better than that of the
average man. In no sense was he qualified as an expert. Besides, and this is very
important, the only wounds found upon the person of deceased were about the
head, neck, and face. No wound was found on any other part of the person. Does
this look like the use of knives or bolos by the defendants? If they had been using
such weapons it is almost certain that the fatal wound would have been found in
the body and not the head; or, if in the head, the wound made would have been far
more extensive and ghastly than any of those found.
It appears from the undisputed testimony (if we except the two circumstances
above referred to ) that the decedent was a man of bad reputation; that he was a
thief, a robber, and a convicted criminal, having served at least one term in prison
for robbery; that he was known in all that country as a leader of criminal bands and
as an all-around desperado; that he was a man of exceptionally large stature and of
unusual strength; that at the time of his attack upon Rafael Bumanglag he was
armed with a bolo; that on the evening before his death he had robbed the granary
of Bumanglag, taking a part of the property which he had stolen away with him at
the time and leaving the other portion, which he was unable to carry, in a place
where it would be easily accessible when he desired later to remove it; that on the
night of the event he had returned to carry away the balance of the property which
he had stolen the night before; that while in the act of taking it he was surprised
and confronted by the owner thereof; that he immediately assailed said owner
viciously with his bolo, and to pressed him that, for the protection of his life, he
called upon his friends for assistance; that his companions, on arriving, saw that he
was likely to be killed at any instant and they, endeavoring to save his life, attacked
the decedent.
It is not known who among the defendants killed the decedent or what blow
caused his death. All that is known is that in the struggle which occurred, resulting
from the efforts of three of the defendants to save the life of the fourth, the
decedent met his death.
It nowhere appears, except from the fact of death itself, that the defendants
sought or intended to kill the decedent. Their sole purpose appears from the
evidence to have been accomplished as well by disabling as by killing him; and it
must not be forgotten in this connection that the effect produced by the use of
their bamboo sticks was not that which is ordinarily produced. This consideration
was regarded by this court as having much importance in the case of the United
States vs. Sosa (4 Phil Rep., 104). This court has, moreover, held that a piece of
bamboo (una simple caña partida), exactly what was used by defendants in the
case at bar, was a weapon insufficient ordinarily to put the life of a person attacked
in imminent peril. (U. S. vs. De Castro, 2 Phil. Rep., 67; U. S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep.,
701).
I am convinced that there is a strong doubt of the criminal responsibility of the
defendants, particularly of the appellant. Article 8 of the Penal Code reads in part
as follows:
The following are not delinquent and are, therefore, exempt from criminal liability:
5. He who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided the first and second circumstances mentioned in the
foregoing number are attendant, and provided that in case the party attacked first
gave provocation, the defendant took no part therein.
6. He who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided the first
and second circumstances mentioned in No. 4 are attended and that the defender
is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other illegal motive.
Subdivision 4 is as follows:
4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.lawphi1.net
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
That there was an unlawful aggression seems to me to be undisputed under the
evidence. The great preponderance of the testimony, in fact the undisputed
evidence, is to that effect. Every witness who touched the subject testified
positively that the assault upon Bumanglag was made with a bolo . It is admitted
that the decedent had one at the time of the assault. Nevertheless the fiscal
contends that the assault was not made with a bolo and bases that contention
upon the single fact, before adverted to, that, many hours after the assault, the
bolo was found in its sheath on the dead man's body. The probative effect of that
fact is founded purely in an inference which necessarily presupposes that the bolo
had not been replaced in its sheath by anyone after the death of Ribis, his body
having been left unwatched, as before stated, for a considerable period of time. It
seems to me, however, that that inference is met and sufficiently overcome by the
manifest and perfect unreasonableness of the assumption, which must necessarily
arise from that inference, that a man f the character f the decedent, having been
caught red-handed in the commission of a robbery by the owner of the property
against which the felony had been and was being committed, and that owner
armed with a club, would attack such owner with his naked hands when he carried
at his side a formidable weapon with which to defend himself in precisely such an
emergency. It is wholly unreasonable, if not positively unbelievable, that the
decedent, under all the circumstances of this case, did not draw his bolo. That he
did unsheath it and did attack Bumanglag therewith is the sworn statement of
every witness who testified on that subject. This proof, taken in connection with
the unreasonableness of the claim that the decedent, caught red-handed in felony,
attacked with his bare hands a man armed with a club, the man against whose
property he was in the very act of perpetrating a felony, and permitted himself to
be beaten to death, when he carried at his side a formidable and effective weapon
of aggression as well as defense, can not be overcome by a mere inference
deduced from the circumstance that the bolo, many hours after the event, was
found in its sheath. The entire evidence, fairly considered, reasonably establishes it
seems to me, not only an unlawful but a dangerous aggression. (Supreme court of
Spain, 17 November, 1897; 6 July, 1898; 16 March, 1892; 11 December, 1896; 26
January, 1897; 11 December, 1896; 6 April, 1904; 27 June, 1894; 30 January, 1904;
16 February, 1905; 10 July, 1902; 27 June, 1903; 28 February, 1906; 17 March,
1888; 29 May, 1888; 13 February, 1890; 20 January, 1894; 24 October, 1895; 27
January, 1896; 11 December, 1896; 26 January, 1897; 30 September, 1897; 10
February, 1898; 6 July, 1898; 21 December, 1898; 24 January, 1899; 29 September,
1900; 12 January, 1901; 21 April, 1902; 20 December, 1902; 4 February, 1903; 11
July, 1903; 11 July, 1904; 22 March, 1905; 8 July, 1905.)
In the case of Stoneham vs. Commonwealth (86 Va., 523, 525, 526), where the
defendant was being followed up by deceased who was wholly unarmed and
without any demonstration of violence except raising his fist, and the defendant
shot and killed him, the court said:
The accused was closely pressed by an attacking man, who was his superior in
strength, and his situation was one which justified his fear of grievous bodily harm;
and, if the jury had found the facts as certified by the court, they should have
found the homicide to be excusable self-defense under all the circumstances of this
case. (Parishe's case, 81 Va., 1.)
Moreover it is admitted that the defendant, Bumanglag, was upon his own land
and was, therefore, defending his habitation against a violent and wrongful
invasion when the assault upon him was made in the manner proved.
A person may repel force by force in defense of his habitation or property, as well
as in defense of his person, against one who manifestly intends and endeavors by
violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either, and, if need be, may kill
his adversary. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L., 275.)
In the case of United States vs. Brello (9 Phil. Rep., 424), the court said (p. 425):
The evidence of the defendant and his witnesses was to the effect that at 10
o'clock at night Candelario came to the house of the defendant, knocked at the
door, and instead upon the defendant coming out saying that if he did not he
would burn the house. The defendant refused to go out and thereupon Candelario
broke the door down, came in and attacked the defendant with a cane, throwing
him to the ground two or three times. He defended himself as well as he could and
finally seized a bolo and struck Candelario in the stomach. Immediately after the
affair the defendant presented himself to the authorities of the town, stating that
had happened. It does not appear that Candelario had any other weapon than a
cane.
These facts to our mind constitute a complete defense.lawphi1.net Candelario
committed a crime in entering the house as he did, the defendant was justified in
protecting himself with such weapons as were at his hand, and if from that defense
the death of the aggressor resulted, that result must be attributed to his own
wrongful act and can not be charged to the defendant.
(The italics do not appear in the original.)
If the defendant in the above case was in danger of death or of great bodily harm,
and that danger was imminent, and if the means employed by him to repel the
assault were reasonably necessary to attain that result, then, how much more
perfectly were these conditions present in the case at bar! If the defendant in the
case cited was entitled legally to be relieved from all criminal liability, upon what
subtle distinction, and, above all, upon what principles of justice, shall we found a
judgment declaring guilty the appellant at bar?
While the premises upon which the assault occurred were not, strictly speaking,
the habitation of the defendant, Bumanglag, still as matter of law no substantial
distinction is made between habitation and premises. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held directly (Beard vs. United States, 158 U. S., 550) that for the
purpose of self-defense there is no difference between one's habitation and his
premises. In that case the court said, in part, Mr. Justice Harlan writing (p. 559):
But the court below committed an error of a more serious character when it told
the jury, as in effect it did by different forms of expression, that if the accused could
have saved his own life and avoided taking the life of Will Jones by retreating from
and getting out of the way of the latter as he advanced upon him, the law made it
his duty to do so; and if he did not, when it was in his power to do so without
putting his own life or body in imminent peril, he was guilty of manslaughter. The
court seemed to think if the deceased had advanced upon the accused while the
latter was in his dwelling house and under such circumstances as indicated the
intention of the former to take life or inflict great bodily injury, and if, without
retreating, the accused had taken the life of his assailant, having at the time
reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believing, that his own life would
be taken or great bodily harm done him unless he killed the accused, the case
would have been one of justifiable homicide. To that proposition we give our entire
assent. But we can not agree that the accused was under any greater obligation,
when on his own premises, near his dwelling house, to retreat or run away from his
assailant, than he would have been if attacked within his dwelling house. The
accused being where he had a right to be, on his own premises, constituting a part
of his residence and home, at the time the deceased approached him in a
threatening manner, and not having by language or by conduct provoked the
deceased to assault him, the question for jury was whether, without fleeing from
his adversary, he had, at the moment he struck the deceased, reasonable grounds
to believe, and in good faith believed, that he could not save his life or protect
himself from great bodily harm except by doing what he did, namely, strike the
deceased with his gun, and thus prevent his further advance upon him. Even if the
jury had been prepared to answer this question in the affirmative — and if it had
been so answered the defendant should have been acquitted — they were
instructed that the accused could not properly acquitted on the ground of self-
defense if they believed that, by retreating from his adversary, by "getting out of
the way," he could have avoided taking life. We can not give our assent to this
doctrine. (Erwin vs. State, 29 Ohio St., 186, 193, 199 Runyan vs. State, 57 Ind., 80,
84; Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1 par. 850; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, par. 1019,
7th ed.; Gallargher vs. State, 3 Minn., 270; Pond vs. People, 8 Mich., 150, 177;
State vs. Dixon, 75 N.C., 275, 295; State vs. Sherman, 16 R. I., 631; Fields vs. State,
32 N. E. Rep., 780; Eversole vs.Commonwealth, 26 S. W. Rep. 816; Haynes vs. State,
17 Ga., 465, 483; Long vs. State, 52 Miss., 23, 35; Tweedy vs. State, 5 Ia., 433;
Baker vs. Commonwealth, 19 S. W. Rep., 975; Tingle vs. Commonwealth, 11 S. W.,
812; 3 Rice's Ev., par. 360.)
In the case of State vs. Cushing (14 Wash., 530), the court lays down the
proposition that a defendant while on his own premises outside of his dwelling
house, was there he had a right to be, and if the deceased advanced upon him in a
threatening manner and the defendant at the time had reasonable grounds to
believe, and in good faith did believe, that the deceased intended to take his life or
do him great bodily harm, the defendant was not obliged to retreat nor to consider
whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any
attack made upon him in such way and with such force as, under all the
circumstances, he at the moment honestly believed and had reasonable to believe
was necessary to save his own life or protect himself from great bodily harm.
It is also admitted that the defendant, Bumanglag, was defending his property from
one who by surprise and violence was endeavoring to commit a felony against it.
Under such circumstances, if necessary to prevent the felony, he could lawfully kill
the person attempting it. (See 25 Am. & Ency. of Law, 275, above quoted; U.
S. vs.Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas., 727, 729; Commonwealth vs. Pipes, 158 Pa. St., 25,
30; Stoneham vs. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 523, 525; Ayers vs. State, 60 Miss., 709,
714; Crawford vs. State, 35 Am. St. Rep., 242; People vs. Stone, 82 Cal., 36, 37, 38.)
It must not be forgotten that the undisputed evidence in the case at bar shows that
Bumanglag, when attacked by deceased, although on his own premises and
defending his own property, did all he could to avoid an encounter, retreating as far
as safety permitted, and interposing between himself and his assailant stalks of
sugar cane to impede the blows aimed at him, at the same time warding off the
bolo thrusts with his bamboo stick.
It appears, therefore, that there was not only an unlawful against the defendant,
Bumanglag, personally, but also that there was a wrongful invasion of his
habitation and an attempt to commit a felony against his property.
It fairly appearing that there was an unlawful aggression, it is evident that the
danger to Bumanglag was imminent and certain. It is difficult to conceive how, with
a weapon in the hands of decedent no more deadly than a bolo, the defendant
could have been in danger more imminent and certain. A notorious desperado
(Hood vs. State, 27 So. Rep., 643) had been caught red-handed in a felony. He was
large, powerful (Stoneham vs. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 523, 525), and vicious. It
was dark. So far as he knew, he was alone with his discoverer. He carried a fighting
bolo. His discoverer had only a bamboo stick. A long term in State prison stared
him in the face. There was one way to avoid it and only one — to kill his discoverer.
If Bumanglag escaped, his arrest and conviction would surely follow. Can any one
doubt, under these circumstances, what such a man do? Bumanglag, as he
confronted and recognized the man with whom he had to deal, realized instantly
the imminence and certainty of his danger; and, assault, Bumanglag knew that,
without assistance from appreciated and realized by his companions when they
heard his cries for help. They knew Ribis, his criminal record, his desperate
character, his unusual strength. (People vs. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73; State vs. Martin,
9 Ohio Dec., 778; State vs. Broussard, 39 La. Ann., 671; State vs.Bowles, 146 Mo., 6;
State vs. Knapp, 45 N. H., 148.) They knew he was armed and their companion was
not. They knew it lay with them whether Bumanglag was killed or not. From their
viewpoint was not their participation in the struggle fully justified?
It has been suggested that the means used by the defendants were not reasonably
necessary for the protection of their companion, and that, being so many against
one, they should not have struck the decedent with their clubs, but rather, should
have seized him with their hands, disarmed him and made him prisoner. Among all
the reasons assigned by the prosecution to sustain the conviction in this case this,
to my mind, is the only one that in anywise appeals to reason or judgment. In fact
it is the only ground presented by the Government upon which such conviction can
be sustained, if it can be sustained at all. Still, giving that contention all of the
weight which it justly carries, I yet am entirely lacking in confidence that it is sound
under the circumstances of this case and established law applicable thereto, and is,
I believe, fully and fairly met by the substance of the following observations:
I remember, on occasion, seeing, in the public square in my native town, a large
and powerful American attacked by a diminutive Italian armed with a stiletto. I
remember seeing the American running backward, leaping and dodging frantically
to avoid the vicious thrusts aimed by the pursuing Italian at a vital part. I remember
also that at least a half dozen other Americans were at the rear of the Italian,
closely following him and yelling to him at the top of their voices to desist, but not
one daring to grapple with him to save the person attacked; and it was only when
another American, having rushed into the yard of the hotel and secured a stick of
wood, returned to the scene and gave the Italian from behind a heavy blow over
the head with the club, stretching him senseless, that the assault was terminated.
The question naturally arises, Why did not some one seize the Italian? The answer
is, for the simple reason that a furious and vicious man armed with a dagger and
skilled in its use is an individual dangerous to the very extreme, and the man who
seizes him with his naked hands runs the chances of his life. This is known to all.
But, comes the reply. Why not all seize him at once and thus avoid the danger to
one? The suggestion is simple but the execution is most difficult — in most cases
little short of impossible. On such an occasion the time within which action must
be secured is of the very shortest. Everything is excitement and confusion.
Everybody yells and dreads, but no body thinks. If there happens to be one who
does think, he has no companions in the process. There is, and in the vast majority
of cases there can be, no concert of action. The aid rendered in such cases is
almost invariably individual.
In the case at bar, as in the illustration, there was a fierce struggle between two
men. The one was defending his own property on his own premises and
performing a service to society by doing his part to render amenable to the law a
desperate and reckless criminal. The other was an invader, a despoiler, wholly
unrestrained by conscience or deterred by law — an inveterate enemy of society
and his kind. He was armed with a dangerous weapon. He was desperate, vicious,
criminal, and powerful, surprised in an act of felony. It was dark. He was attempting
to take the life of his opponent. It was unknown, and unknowable, when, in that
struggle, the fatal blow would be delivered. It might come at any instant. Ought it
fairly to be required as a matter of law that the defendants, rushing forward to
assist their companion, should, under these circumstances, attempt the seizure of
this powerful and desperate man with their naked hands, in the dark, without the
ability, be reason of the conditions, to see the weapon and the manner in which it
was being used? Would not such a requirement put them in great danger of being
themselves seriously wounded, even if it did not add to the danger of their
companion? It is the unquestioned law, and it be rigorously enforced, that life can
not be taken except in necessity, but it is as unquestioned that he who in danger of
his life from an assault, as well as the one who comes to his assistance, is not
required to do anything which will increase his danger or enhance the opportunity
of the aggressor to accomplish his end. (U. S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep., 701; U.
S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. Rep., 367; supreme court of Spain, 25 September, 1875; U.
S. vs. Herbert, 26 Fed. Cas., No. 15354a; State vs. Robertson, 50 La. Ann., 92; 25
Am. & Eng. Ency. of L., 273.) Moreover if the life of Bumanglag was to be saved at
all, the aggressor must be dealt with quickly and summarily. Events were unrolling
rapidly. There was a life in danger, every instant becoming more imminent. There
was no time to think; no time for deliberate, careful judgment and nice precision;
no opportunity to devise means or lay plans. Under such circumstances the law
does not hold men to the standards of careful thought and calm judgment.
(Allen vs. U. S., 150 U. S., 551; State vs. West, 45 La. Ann., 14, 23;
Brownell vs. People, 38 Mich., 732; supreme court of Spain, 7 December, 1886;
Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 157-160.)
In order to make perfectly available the defense that they were rightfully defending
Bumanglag, and that the means they employed were reasonably necessary, it is not
essential that there should be absolute and positive danger to the person whose
protection is attempted. If there is a wellgrounded and reasonable belief that the
person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend
him by means which appear reasonably necessary is justifiable. The reasonable
appearance is the important thing. (Shorter vs. People, 2 N. Y., 193, 197;
Brown vs. Com., 86 Va., 466; Logue vs. Com., 38 Pa. St., 265; Murray vs. Com., 79
Pa. St., 311, 317; Pond vs.People, 8 Mich., 149, 150; Hurd vs. People, 25 Mich., 404,
405; People vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207; People vs. Herbert, 61 Cal., 544;
Campbell vs. People, 16 III., 17; Enlow vs. State, 154 Ind., 664; Hubbard vs. State,
37 Fla., 156; Alvarez vs. State, 37 Fla., 156; Oliver vs. State, 17 Ala., 587;
Stewart vs. State, 1 Ohio St., 66, 71; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 262, 263; U.
S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. Rep., 367.)
In deciding this case we must, therefore, under the law, put ourselves in the
position of the defendants at the time of the event. It is from their point of view
that they are to be judged.
If they honestly believed, and had apparently reasonable grounds for that belief,
that the life of their companion was in imminent danger or that he was likely to
suffer great bodily harm, and that the means which they used to protect him were
reasonably necessary to that end, they can not be convicted. (Viada, Penal Code,
vol. 1, 98; People vs.Bruggy, 93 Cal., 476; Harris vs. State, 96 Ala., 24; U.
S. vs. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy, (U. S. Circ.), 620.) I am convinced that the facts and
circumstances of this case were sufficient to induce and support the belief in the
minds of the defendants that their companion's life was in imminent danger and
that the means which they employed were reasonably necessary to secure his
protection. (Supreme court of Spain, 2 January, 1873; 5 April, 1873; 30 April, 1874;
31 May, 1879; 17 March, 1885; 26 November, 1886; 26 November, 1886; 2 March,
1888; 4 April, 1889; 5 July, 1890; 6 December, 1890; 30 December, 1890; 11
February, 1896; 9 December, 1896; 24 May, 1898; 28 May, 1889; 10 December,
1898; 15 November, 1899; 9 January, 1900; 1 June, 1901; 16 April, 1902; 3 January,
1903; 14 January, 1903; 20 March, 1903; July, 1909; 26 October, 1904; 17
November, 1904; 20 October, 1904; 29 October, 1904; 8 March, 1905.) In other
words, it would seem under all the circumstances, that it can not fairly be charged
that the defendants, particularly the appellant, acted otherwise than as reasonable
men would have acted in the same situation; and after all this is the real test.
(Allen vs. U. S., 150 U. S., 551; Hickory vs. U. S., 151 U. S., 303; Christian vs. State, 96
Ala., 89; People vs. Hurley, 8 Cal., 390; Gainey vs. People, 97 III., 270;
State vs. West, 45 La. Ann., 14.)
While most of the authorities above cited refer to self-defense only, the principles
they enunciate are fully applicable to the case at bar, because, generally speaking,
what one may do in his own defense another may do for him. (25 Am. & Ency. of
Law, 274, and cases there cited.)
Under the circumstances of this case I can not feel that the fair and impartial
administration of justice requires that we should refine doctrines, draw uncertain
distinctions, invoke doubtful presumptions, employ fine analyses, or seize upon
equivocal circumstances for the purpose of the convicting the appellant of
homicide, of for the purpose of establishing a doctrine which may have as a result
that a criminal, invading his neighbor's premises feloniously and in the nighttime
for the purpose of robbery, and surprised and taken in his wanton act, may feel
that he is in any way or to degree privileged under the law when, in attempting to
make his outrage against man and society secure from detention and punishment,
he seeks by every means in his power to destroy the life of his discover. Every man
ought to lend his hand in assisting society to apprehend and punish offenders
against its institutions and laws, and while the wanton or illegal destruction of
human life, under the guise of such assistance, ought to be promptly, vigorously,
and unrelentingly punished, still, where such person, acting in the honest belief
that he is saving the life of one who is viciously attacked by a criminal whose
recognition or apprehension is attempted, in the defense of such person, causes
the death of the criminal, the court ought not to be drawn from its usual, even and
steady course in order to provide a punishment. (Supreme court of Spain, 5
February, 1887; Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 160, 161.)
This court has gone very far in the direction of liberality in lying down the principles
governing the defense of self-defense and the means that may be legally employed
to make that defense effective — very much further, indeed, than it is necessary to
go absolved the appellant in the case at bar. In the case of United States vs.
Patala (2 Phil. Rep., 752), the court says, page 756:
It appears from the testimony of the defendant that at the time of the occurrence
he was cleaning fish on board the steamship Compañía de Filipinas; that without
any provocation on his part the deceased, who was the cock of the boat, believing
that some of the fish was missing, slapped him and kicked him; that no being
satisfied with this, when the defendant started to run away from him, the deceased
pursued him and attacked him with a knife; that the defendant, taking advantage of
some favorable chance during the struggle, succeeded in wresting the knife from
the deceased and inflicted upon him a wound in the left side, from the result of
which he died a few hours later.
. . . The aggression on the part of the deceased was in every respect unjustified,
and the defendant had a perfect right to repel the attack in the most adequate
from within his power under the critical circumstances of a sudden assault.
. . . He had reason to believe that he was placed in the alternative of killing or being
killed when he was being attacked and pursued with a deadly weapon. This was the
only weapon used during the struggle and it necessary had to be either in his
possession or in the hands of the deceased. If through a fortunate accident he
came into possession of the knife, he could have lost control of it through a similar
accident and then found himself at the mercy of his assailant. Therefore the act of
the defendant rendering his assailant powerless as well as he could under the
critical circumstances of the moment, and repelling his aggression, constitute, in
our opinion, a true case of self-defense, which exempts the defendant from any
criminal liability under paragraph 4 of articles 8 of the Penal Code.
The same doctrine is laid down in the similar case of the United States vs.
Salandanan (1 Phil. Rep., 478). (See also U. S., vs. Brello, 9 Phil. Rep., 424; U.
S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. Rep., 517; U. S. vs. Bailon, 9 Phil. Rep., 161.)
There is neither claim nor evidence that any of the defendants were actuated in
their defense of Bumanglag by revenge, resentment, or other illegal motive, and
from this point of view the case requires no discussion.
As to the question of reasonable doubt.
In discussing the questions of burden of proof and reasonable doubt in cases
involving self-defense, the courts have stated various confusing and apparently
contradictory propositions, but the general rule deducible from the authorities
seems to be that when the prosecution has made a prima facie case against the
accused, it is for him to introduce evidence showing self-defense, if he sets up the
plea; but that if upon the whole testimony, both on the part of the State and the
accused, the jury has a reasonable doubt whether he acted in self-defense or not,
he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and to an acquittal. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 283.)
The doctrine above stated is fully supported by the authorities.
In the case of Lillinienthal vs. United States (97 U. S., 237, 266), the court said:
In criminal cases the true rule is that the burden of proof never shifts; that, in all
cases, before a conviction can be had, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the affirmative of the issue presented in the
accusation, that the defendant is guilty in the manner and form as charged in the
indictment. . . . Where the matter of excuse or justification of the offense charged
grows out of the original transaction, the defense is not driven to the necessity of
establishing the matter in excuse or justification by a preponderance of the
evidence, and much less beyond a reasonable doubt. If, upon a consideration of all
the evidence, there be a reasonable doubt of guilt of the party, the jury are to give
him the benefit of such doubt.
To the same effect are Tweedy vs. State (5 Iowa, 433); Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, p. 236; Tiffany vs.Commonwealth (121 Pa. St., 165); People vs. Coughin
(65 Mich., 704).
The section casts upon the defendant that burden of proving circumstances of
mitigation, or that justify or excuse the commission of the homicide. This does not
mean that he must prove such circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence,
but that the presumption that the killing was felonious arises from the mere proof
by the prosecution of the homicide, and the burden of proving circumstances of
mitigation, etc., is thereby cast upon him. He is only bound under this rule to
produce such evidence as will create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of
his guilt of the offense charged." (People vs. Flanagan, 60 Cal., 3; 44 Am. Rep., 52;
People vs. Smith, 59 Cal., 607.) "It can make no difference whether this reasonable
doubt is the result of evidence on the part of the defendant tending show
circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the killing, or from other
evidence coming from him or the prosecution. The well-settled rule that a
defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case, no
matter whether it is as to the act of killing, or the reason for a manner of its
commission. (People vs. Bushton, 80 Cal., 160, 164; Alexander vs. People, 96 III.,
96; People vs. Riodan, 117 N. Y., 71.)
Reading the evidence in this case in the light of reason and of the principles
enunciated by the courts, I can not but feel that, under all the circumstances, there
is a strong doubt of appellant's legal responsibility for the crime charged. In my
opinion, therefore, the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the
appellant acquitted.
Carson, J., concurs.
G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 122677
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 122776
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot
first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never
has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is
never predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts
of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident
on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused
the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva).
Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan,
Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated
National Police (INP)2 stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay
captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes
and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson
(Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were
either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer
officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three
Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains,
Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to
information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did
then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack
the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw
jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which
are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct
and immediate death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 16613:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains,
Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to
information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did
then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera,
Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly
at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R.
de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the
commission of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the
murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains,
Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to
information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did
then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter
with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney
driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are
necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have produced
the crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the
defendants’ will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel
C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities,6 the accused – except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,7 
and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed8 – entered individual pleas of not
guilty.9 A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at
his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.10 In the meantime, Mario Reyes,
Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for
Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.11 Said motion was heard on the premise,
as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that these
cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would
automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.12 On May 10, 1991,
the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.13 Yapyuco likewise
applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21,
1991.14 Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,15 and accordingly, the charges
against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial
inquest. 16 Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the
presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores,
Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests
at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided
to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As
they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel,
to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With
Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his
Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst
of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding
profusely.17
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did
not see any one on the road flag them down.18 In open court, Flores executed a
sketch19 depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the
residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the
right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn;
he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen
allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell
how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware
that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw
from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Naron’s house. Frantic
and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for
not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried
out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were
wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to
the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup
were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.20 This was
corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two
armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and
Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.21
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very
rapidly succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all
contrary to what the defense would say.22 He professed that he, together with his
co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and
inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the
driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off
at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with
his two armed companions.23 He further narrated that the day after the shooting,
he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7,
1988.24 He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him
prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s
uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for
that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. 25 He claimed the
bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there
were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.26
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the
presence of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and
corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’ narration of the events immediately
preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after
the procession had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on
the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley
of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores’ frantic call for help.
He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the
lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s house where, inside, he noticed a
congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize. 27At this
point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney
occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys
of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother’s
house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the
wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the
same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in
patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his mother’s house and in
the morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however, he was not
able to talk.28
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric
post in front of Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none
of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to
whether it was Yapyuco’s group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured
companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao
jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured
companions to the hospital.29
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to
have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for
gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms
were discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that
night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to
administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the
opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having
also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most
of which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique
and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets
that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a
standstill or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the
curve on the road.30 Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply
officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of
firearms and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO
members, identified in court the memorandum receipts for the firearms he had
issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco.31
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined
the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal
shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior
aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity
would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the
front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be
caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant and
the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired
from the level of the assailant’s waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of
his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming from his front, the
trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would
come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and
exit at a lower level.32
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the
patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head – one
consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted
three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright
when fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle
lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another, through-and-through
wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the
abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He
hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg
must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in front of him holding
the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that
the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and
exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at
Licup’s left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in
the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his
position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the
leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at the victim’s back and hit the jeepney
at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface prior.33
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have been caused
by a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim.
Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen,
considering that he might have changed position following the infliction of the
other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple shots
from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the
possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered
very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet
it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others
because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head
lying low and steady.34
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno
had been administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a
consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted
investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their
dismissal from service.35 Dolly Porqueriño, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM,
testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the
report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously
prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the sketch showing the
relative position of the responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at the
scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for
consideration.36 The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents
together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified
himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the
accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He
narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a
physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance
from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported
presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their
main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men
could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put
on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.37
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with
Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long
firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated
that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought
in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened
at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of
his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the
road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make
an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it
was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged
it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney
accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow
police officers Cunanan and Puno,38 to fire warning shots but the jeepney
continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron’s
house directly at the subject jeepney.39
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and
exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees.
Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but
found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his
jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men
returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired
directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise
gone.40
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at
the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in
the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,41 and that he
frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified
armed men therein.42 That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene
were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police
Substation, 43 the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team
headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself,
were armed.44 He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because
otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. 45 
He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not
come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members
assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when
the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.46
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of
the accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did
know that his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police station
in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.47 
He admitted an administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of
which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision
was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation
independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. 48
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando,
Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his
jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by
lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted investigations on
the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to infiltrate the
employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly
conducted "clearing operations" in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He
intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted
of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s declaration,
he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making a report on it in
which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuan’s statement referring to
Flores as being "married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan" and found after
surveillance to be "frequently visited by NPA members." He affirmed having found
that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to
gather bullet shells from the scene. 49
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of
Yapyuco as well as the latter’s documentary evidence.50 Mario Reyes, Andres
Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and
submitted their memorandum as told.51
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in
the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace
and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF,
and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11
(5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the
victims with the intent of killing them.52 With the evidence in hand, it found
Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-
principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted
homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It
acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June
30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages
and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate
shares of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in
the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y
Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben
Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of
Multiple Attempted Murder charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined
and penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each
of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount of
₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of
said action.
SO ORDERED.53
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva
and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners
herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order;54that the acts
performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of
their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the
occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action
deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official
duty;55 that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners
because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or
probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA
members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or
gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;56 that there was
insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the
jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-
coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and
amateurish attempt to gain commendation.57
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of
prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the
circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that
the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down
as claimed by Yapyuco especially since – as it turned out after the search of the
vehicle – they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be
scared of.58 It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide
residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan,
barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses
which were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of
the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that evening could
not have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuan’s
Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as
to the identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and
whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. 59 It surmised how the defense,
especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group
of armed men – which allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring
barangays – were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners
were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it
inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be
coming from the direction of Salangsang’s house – such knowledge is supposedly
evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves
at the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the
fact that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred
to by prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.60
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the
position of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded
that judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the
declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva
and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Naron’s residence and the shots
were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight
to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of
petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue,
therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged.61
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial
evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the
bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the
trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the
number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of
the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street
and inside the front yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights
in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the
firearms of petitioners. 62
This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified
petitioners’ admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a
predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a
common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims.
Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several accused had
actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the
Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to
have discharged their firearms that night – petitioners herein.63 Interestingly, it
was speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and individually
acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the shooting indicated
that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge against
the employees of San Miguel Corporation;64 and that on the basis of the self-
serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a
massive cover-up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in
Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.65 It likewise found very consequential
the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this,
supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their
participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the prosecution evidence,
their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of official duty
and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits to the effect that they had
been deployed that evening in the front yard of Naron’s residence from which the
volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.66
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was
supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing
injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second,
this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious
adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or
from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds
true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the
summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his
men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for
the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.67
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from
work for 60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits;68  appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.75 He
that he was earning ₱8,350.00 monthly;69 and that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for
the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney.70 Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family
had spent ₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during the wake,
₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the
prosecution of these cases.71 He also submitted a certification from San Miguel
Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.72 On these bases, the
Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a)
Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and ₱120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the
heirs of deceased Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and
₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the
action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of
conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a
quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended to participate
in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation
in a supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at
the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were
taken to the hospital on his jeepney.73 He also points out the uncertainty in the
Sandiganbayan’s declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a
well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish
attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter
alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated
homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. 74He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated
because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the
police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the incident was in line with
the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof – a
fact which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on
also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the
responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained
the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.76
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim
that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced
at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were
two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David,
Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of evidence.
They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu,
Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to
present evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused
barangay officials and CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence
by the accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired upon
the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.77 Also, they believe
that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible
evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those presented
in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural
and suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a
criminal prosecution.78 Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no
basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with
the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who
fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of
the crime.79
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy.
They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan
as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police operation or a
careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution
has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever been part
of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed
decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely followed orders from
their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the
latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting. They posit they could
hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal design with the rest of the
accused.80 They affirm Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots at the
subject jeepney,81 but only after it had passed the place where they were posted
and only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that
it was going to speed away – as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis
and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof
of ill motives that would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes
charged, especially since none of the victims had been personally or even remotely
known to either of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they
believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the
passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their fire when
Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel Corporation. They
conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily fired at the
victims directly.82
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the
finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them
armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though
having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsang’s residence. It
posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a
community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged.83 It believes
that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on
the road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the
trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.84 This intent was
supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were
wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence.85 It refutes the
invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual
basis to support the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the
NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had previously verified the
whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had
merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through
David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they
fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals
instead.86
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the
evidence adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon
should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together
with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their
motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as
to them with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due
process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the
evidence on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation
to forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present
witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies in court,
the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter has failed to
register his objection thereto.87
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that
seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case
and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the
situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in
his testimony – which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in
evidence by the prosecution,88 explained that their presence at the scene was in
response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel
elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were
reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that
petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by
accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it
became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention
arises as to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual
death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the
criminal.89 To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the
joint counter-affidavit90 of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit91  who among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report
of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit92 of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-
affidavit93 of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit94 of Yapyuco, Cunanan and
Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and
Puno stated therein that "[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" when
it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyuco’s
signal for it to stop;95 in their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco,
declared that they were "constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing
vehicle."96Yapyuco’s open court declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and
Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject
jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires
thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape.97 He suggested –
substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was "the whole team [which
fired] at the fleeing vehicle" 98 – that the bullets which hit the passenger side of
the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard
of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken
post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.99
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give
warning shots,100 and that it was the "policemen [who] directly fired upon" the
jeepney.101 Manguerra himself shared this statement.102 Yet these accounts do
not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger
door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to
have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This
evidence in fact supports Yapyuco’s claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire
directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already moved past
them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an oblique
angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots
came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno
had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of
Naron’s house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of
fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.103
While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to
pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the
irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed
sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek
to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to them as it
is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may not evade
the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their
agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of the
testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.104
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the
declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in
this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused
because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.105 It is thus perplexing
why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as
the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to
waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed
proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We,
therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard,
as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the
truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions
of their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on
proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful
exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.106 The justification is based on the complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a
felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.107 Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the
offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting
injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or
the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the
accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the
burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a
legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the
claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF
members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as
they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality.
Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect
vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had
received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe
that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit
a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is
interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting
under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all
circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having
launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused,
or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the
accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their
firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to
show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the
victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were
probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and
whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry
inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides,
even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations
of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable
expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties.
The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not
require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be
accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move,
and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires
nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of
the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.108
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm.109 United States v. Campo110 has laid down the rule that in the
performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force,
except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and
finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and
obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such
force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the
offender if the officer had used necessary force.111 He is, however, never justified
in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.112  claiming that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal
People v. Ulep113 teaches that –
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort,
and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken
without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to
arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes
find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate
and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the
judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must
be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In
the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in
conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and
purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are
apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with
criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are
also human beings with human rights.114
Thus, in People v. Tabag,115 where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four
members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA
members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the
justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in
dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be
considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office
or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other
than "suspicion," there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife
Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they were
members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful
night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of
another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and
unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but
a merciless vigilante-style execution.116
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by
for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney had
been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights
dimmed missed petitioners’ signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact
that the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to,117 
still, we find incomprehensible petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms when
in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned
by Yapyuco – which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom
they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity
justifies the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the
employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force,
petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational
necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No
explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at
their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their
careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of
police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with
a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the
passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb – all of which could not
have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces
certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission
which is the subject of the prosecution.118 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact
is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime.119 It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent.120 The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121  man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to
and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. 122 A
proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;123 (b) that it be a matter of fact;124 and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.126
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in
United States v. Ah Chong,127 but in that setting, the principle was treated as a
function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally
manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There,
the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door
being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to
kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed
against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally
stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide,
he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused
had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of
fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil
in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always
there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The
guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x
x responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.133 By reasonable doubt
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord
with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he
does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the
facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a
him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends
himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will
not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion
for the extreme measure. x x x 128
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the justification
of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must
preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused.131 Thus, Ah Chong
further explained that –
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.132
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated
homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal
cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The
weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its
is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of
guilt.134 The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.135
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt
either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.136 Corpus
delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency
in the commission of the act.137 In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases,
the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that
the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and
was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act
which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use
of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the
time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.138 In
such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for
all the consequences thereof. 139 Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a
finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element
of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as
that required of the other elements of said offenses.140
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is
interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to
kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan,
whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one:
petitioners’ affidavits as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions
that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it
was he who their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a
mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court
that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan),
was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation
plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members.
He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a number of ambuscades
launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the
neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident.
But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died
during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court
emerged.141
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an
element of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is
established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.142 The
question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no
doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is
not so important to know the reason for the deed.143
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not
intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service
firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side
of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for
the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound
where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a
finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant
circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by
intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific
act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act
itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the
evidence.144
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .
30 caliber carbine.145 While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level
the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the
possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed
that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that
moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to
imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the
gunfire was aimed at the tires – especially considering that petitioners do not
appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with
lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the
firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact
even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the
least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred
to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this,
their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the
tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The
evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’ actuations leaned
towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who
was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel,
together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of
the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not
attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State146 tells
that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men
generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from
the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts,
until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed
another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it
was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the
deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show
that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the
deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyuco’s
alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found
guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act
performed without malice.147 People v. Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 
declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,150 we held that
that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as
reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime
of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by
the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need
not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and
unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.151
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior
to the occurrence.1a\^/phi1 From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the
time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.152 The instant case requires no proof of any previous
agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon
their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the
moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and
strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we
nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to
let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred
to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated
despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point,
petitioners were confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no
chances by preventing the jeepney’s supposed escape even if it meant killing the
driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their
concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the
posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the
suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did
achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the
passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed,
there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their
weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva
and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since
only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service
firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held collectively
responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation which
had gone terribly wrong.153
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of
Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve
an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder
with respect to the unharmed victims.154 The allegation of evident premeditation
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent
with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as
instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and
evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and
indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately
adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion
temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51,
warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a
consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the
penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same
as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had
committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The
penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated
homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision
correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual
damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva,
petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of
₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and ₱20,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27,
1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby
modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in
 moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual
and compensatory damages, and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.***
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial,
resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8,
1970, with the following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor, and to
pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay
the costs (p. 48, rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and
Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia,
were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The
place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George
Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the
place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp.
179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he
heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw
the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented
from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the
group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will
talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's
compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go
ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and
knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him
(pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of
the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal
battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the
secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand,
and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on
certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following
antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to
Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a
separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built
his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then
President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes
Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for
distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an
American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June
3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes
Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual
survey in 1941 but the survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the
outbreak of the second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares
Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for Sales
Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6
hectares each to be distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was
declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the
public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the
only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the settlers the
corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was
sent by the Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty.
Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable settlement signed by the
representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the
settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved
the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and
Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance
of Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the
order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the
order of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to the company. The
settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they
had repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit,
misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of the company. They
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on
August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance
dated September 24, 1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about
30 years. Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily
dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred
to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second
house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store
operated by Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also
transferred his store from his former residence to the house near the highway.
Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the
house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used
for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V.
Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award
with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the pendency of this case, appellant
on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby
he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No.
38 from the company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a
consideration of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract
although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble,
until the question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental,
although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment.
On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land
in which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on
February 21, 1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of
collection made by Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no
alternative but to terminate our agreement on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water
pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall
expire on December 31, 1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month
period, the company shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p.
2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced
fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the
highway. Some posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby
cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post
just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished,
would have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice
mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The
fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of
four strands of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working
on his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house
was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one
of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a
crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire
and deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the
deceased was parked on the highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the
People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter,
bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. Pp.
31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following
errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-
appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting
defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's
Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant
admitted having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which
he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in
defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from
criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art.
11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the
following requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
(Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased
Fleischer of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his
request addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto
mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6).
This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being
chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the
ground doing the fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his
window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused
this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the
bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr.
Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot,
Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran
towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking
that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis
supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the
prosecution. They claim, however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise of
their rights of ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that
sealed off appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence
reveals that five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were
doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they
were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of
barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be
lethal weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar,
and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they
used in going to the place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a
gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of
the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he
saw the damage being done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house
and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He
therefore appealed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were
doing and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily
with 'gademit' and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the
fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's
house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which
were not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is no question,
therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was
ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed
aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right
to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his
ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence
his land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for
annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case
would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, as it was
dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in
1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment
of the award to the company, between the same parties, which the company won
by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by
the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also
carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the
Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the
corresponding certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the
Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the
government's supplemental petition was premised on the ground that after its
filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with
whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the
contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was
explained by him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place
because even though we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid
trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that
time, it was not known who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until
things will clear up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay
rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2,
Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have allowed
appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of
chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the
highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should
he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by
the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or
cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway
while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault
on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as
contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of
immediate and imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property
which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis
supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article
11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window,
killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e.,
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his
property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he
was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims
and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things
over with him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since
not all the elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held
responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of
provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz
(55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method
of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to
the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that
the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where the
slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident
premeditation not sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to prove
this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married,
resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company,
which may be summarized as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was
drying corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing,
Maitum, South Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs.
Narvaez asked him to help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further
told him that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be broken.
Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer because
there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be the one.' He relayed this
to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle
threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must
be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not
enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must
be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the
crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that
the accused premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his)
premeditated act; and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation
and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the
consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased
Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or
preparation to kill the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and
clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of
such circumstance may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to
stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before the
shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the
authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the
crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to
the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house
being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack
of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when
his first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining
house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason
causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights.
Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years
earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of
relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of
the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much
for any man-he should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not
being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by
the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide
as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or
two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the
lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the
majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may
be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of
Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto
mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan
American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced
because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case
at bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack by
damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in
the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations
were apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records
disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases
and detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to the
killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution
dated October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on
November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer
and Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to
extend its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato.
Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land
accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their
native soil in Luzon to take advantage of the government's resettlement program,
but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners, were the ones prejudiced.
Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency
as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted
of prision correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which
to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1)
day for each P 2.50. However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465
on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and
costs of proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the
accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY
TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION,
WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED
TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO
INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA
IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST
22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Plana, J., in the result.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression
on persons, not property Plana, J., in the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in
part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner
or legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation
of his property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending
his property is an indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but
what is basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of
property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide
must be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person
defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was
attempted, much less made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No,
gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant
to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is
homicide but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
homicides, mitigated by the two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, maximum the
sentence the appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the
indemnification to each group of heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of
the sum of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment,
but without any award for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years
now since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression
on persons, not property Plana, J., in the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in
part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner
or legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation
of his property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending
his property is an indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but
what is basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of
property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide
must be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person
defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was
attempted, much less made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No,
gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant
to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is
homicide but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
homicides, mitigated by the two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, maximum the
sentence the appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the
indemnification to each group of heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of
the sum of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment,
but without any award for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years
now since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
SYLLABUS
1. HOMICIDE; ATTEMPTED RAPE; DEFENSE BY A WOMAN AWAKENED FROM SLEEP
AND BELIEVING HERSELF ATTACKED. — When a sleeping woman is awakened at
night by some one touching her or grasping her arm, and she, believing that some
person is attempting to abuse her asks who the intruder is and receives no reply,
attacks the said person with a pocketknife, and the nature of the wound shoes that
she was either standing up or sitting up at the time, it is concluded that,
notwithstanding the woman’s belief in the supposed attempt, there was not
sufficient provocation to justify her in using a deadly weapon; although she actually
believed it to be the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not warranted in
making such a deadly assault, as the injured person did not insist or repeat any act
which could be considered as an attempt against her honor.

2. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — Under the above circumstances, it is further concluded that
she is not entitled to complete exemption from responsibility, as there does not
enter into the act any of the requisites contained in subdivision 4 of article 8 of the
Penal Code; but as she is shown to be an ignorant woman, devoid of education, she
should be allowed the benefit of article 11 of the Code, as amended by Act No.
2142, without any aggravating circumstance, and the penalty, two degrees lower as
prescribed by article 86, should be imposed in the minimum degree.

Per TRENT, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. HOMICIDE; ATTEMPTED RAPE; DEFENSE BY WOMAN AWAKENED FROM SLEEP

AND BELIEVING HERSELF ATTACKED. — The defendant, a single woman, twenty-five
years of age, lived with her married sister. The spouses returned to their house one
night where the defendant was sleeping, and failing to awaken her they ascended
the stairs and entered the house. The husband, in groping around in the dark,
[G.R. No. 7929. November 8, 1912. ] stumbled over the sleeping woman and touched her left arm. The woman, under
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENOVEVA APEGO, Defendant- the impression that she was being assaulted with intent to commit rape, stabbed
Appellant. her brother-in-law with subsequent fatal results. Immediately after delivering the
Tirso de Irureta Goyena for Appellant. blow, her sister lit a lamp and the defendant then for the first time became aware
Attorney-General Villamor for Appellee. of the identity of her supposed assailant. Held: The mistake of the defendant was
excusable under the circumstances.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — Where the mistake of fact is excusable, punishment, if
any is due, must be predicated upon the operative facts constituting the mistake of
the defendant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID., ATTEMPTED RAPE; SELF-DEFENSE. — This court has already held that
a would-be ravisher takes his life in his own hands in attempting to commit the
crime of rape, and that the woman attacked is entitled to an absolute acquittal for
any defense she may make: this in a case where the woman was physically the
superior of her assailant and a way of retreat was open to her.
4. ID.; ID.; I.; SELF-DEFENSE; UNITED STATES v. AH CHONG (15 Phil. Rep., 488), this
court held that the murder of the deceased by his male friend, committed while
laboring under the misapprehension that the deceased was a robber attempting to
enter the house at night, was excusable and acquitted the defendant, even though
the evidence showed that the defendant attacked the deceased with intent to kill.
In the case at bar it is held that a woman in practically the same situation, but
believing that the attack is made with intent to rape her, is not justified in going so
far in the exercise of her right of self-defense as to kill her assailant, this although
there is a strong presumption from the evidence that the blow which she struck at
her assailant was fatal by the merest chance.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
This case comes to us on appeal from a judgment of February 15, 1912, by which
the Honorable Mariano Cui, judge, sentenced the appellant to the penalty of
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to the accessories, to pay an
indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the costs.
At about 8 o’clock in the evening of December 24, 1911, the spouses, Pio Bautista
and Maria Apego, coming from the municipality of Nasugbu, returned to their
house, situated in the barrio of Sampaga, pueblo of Balayan, Batangas, and before
entering the same called to Genoveva Apego, the woman’s sister, who they knew
was therein, and, as they received no reply, went up into the house; the husband
led the way and opened the door; he was followed by his wife who, once inside, lit
a match and then a small kerosene lamp there was in the house. In the meantime
the husband approached the place where Genoveva was, who, startled,
immediately awoke, seized a pocketknife used in spinning hemp, which was in a
box at her side, and with it attacked and struck Bautista, who was near her, a blow
in the breast; thereupon her sister Maria, who was not aware of the aggression,
asked Genoveva why empty tin cans and other articles were scattered about the
azotea of the house, to which Genoveva replied by saying: "What! have you arrived
already?" and at once got up in front of the said spouses; at this moment Maria
advised her to cogitate and reflect, but Genoveva immediately ran out of the
house, asking for help; it was then that the wife noticed that her husband was
seriously wounded, and when he was afterwards examined by a physician it was
ascertained that he bore a downward, penetrating wound, in the shape of a T, in
the intercostal space between the second and third ribs of the left side, that it
reached one of the lungs and the heart, was necessarily fatal, and was inflicted
with a sharp-pointed cutting instrument. A few moments after its infliction the
injured man died.
By reason of the foregoing, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, on January 8, 1912, by the provincial fiscal, charging Genoveva Apego
with the crime of murder, and upon the institution of this case the aforementioned
judgment was rendered.
We accept the classification of homicide given by the trial judge to the facts
involving the violent death of Pio Bautista, since, in the commission of the crime, it
does not appear that there was present any of the qualifying circumstances that
determine a more serious crime and penalty.
It is unquestionable and beyond all doubt that Genoveva Apego, an unmarried
woman of about 25 years of age, inflicted upon the deceased with a pocketknife a
serious wound of a necessarily mortal nature, for he died shortly afterwards. This
wound penetrated the left nipple, extended between the second and third ribs of
the same side from an upper toward and an outward toward an inner direction and
reached the heart and one of the lungs.
The record does not show whether the deceased was able to make any ante-
mortem statement, nor does it appear to have been ascertained what was the
motive of the fatal aggression of which the said Pio Bautista was the victim.
The following conclusions of fact are derived from a careful study of this case: upon
the arrival of Maria Apego and her husband, Pio Bautista, at the stairs of their
house, and as Genoveva Apego did not reply to the call made to her from the
outside by her sister Maria, the said spouses went to the upper floor of the house;
Bautista led the way and, in order to enter, opened the outside door, a sliding door,
and as there was no light inside stumbled against Genoveva Apego, who was
sleeping near the said door, and touched her left arm; thereupon, Genoveva awoke
and believing, as she testified, that somebody was trying to abuse her, seized the
pocketknife aforementioned, asking at the same time who was beside her, and as
she did not receive a reply immediately, she got up and struck the person before
her a blow with the said knife; in the meanwhile Maria Apego had separated from
her husband to light a match and then a kerosene lamp there was in the house and
was not aware of the assault made upon her husband by her sister, and only when
the light had been lit did she see her sister Genoveva in front of Bautista, who had
already been wounded and was in an attitude indicating that he was about to fall
to the floor; thereupon Genoveva went down out of the house, calling for help, and
ran to the house of an aunt of hers where she was arrested by the policeman,
Manuel Peinado, to whom she then and there delivered the pocketknife with
which she had assaulted her brother-in-law.
In view of the shape and direction of the wound received by the deceased and the
part of the body where it was inflicted, according to the detailed report of the
medical examination, it is unquestionable that the wound was inflicted by the
defendant after she had arisen from the place where she had been sleeping, or, at
least, when she had raised up in a sitting posture or was seated on the floor, at the
time that the deceased perhaps stooped over, in stumbling against her, touched
her left arm; but in no manner may it be presumed that she assaulted her brother-
in-law, Bautista, while she was still lying on the floor of the house; such a
presumption is precluded by a consideration of the direction the weapon took in
penetrating the deceased breast.
Maria Apego testified that, during the two years her sister Genoveva lived in their
house, the latter had conducted herself correctly, that they had always gotten
along well and harmoniously together and had never had the least
misunderstanding between them. The record does not show whether there had
been any trouble or there existed any resentment between the defendant and the
deceased who, before he died and during the few moments he lived after he was
wounded, make no statement whatever relative to this point or to the conduct
observed by the defendant with respect to the assault of which he was the victim,
and, therefore, the defendant’s testimony must be accepted, to wit, that she struck
a blow with the pocketknife at the person beside her, and who afterwards turned
out to be her brother-in-law, Pio Bautista, without knowing who he was and in the
belief that, since he touched her left arm, he was about to commit an attempt
against her honor.
Under this hypothesis, it can not be denied that, upon the defendant’s awakening,
startled at feeling somebody grasp her left arm and believing that an attempt was
being made against her honor, as she received no reply whatever to her question
as to who was beside her in the darkness of the house, she understood that there
was a positive unlawful aggression from which she had to defend herself with the
said pocketknife, and it is also undeniable that there was no previous provocation
on her part; but it is unquestionable that, in making use of this deadly weapon,
even in the defense of her person and rights, by decidedly wounding him who had
touched her or caught her by the arm, the defendant exceeded her right of
defense, since there was no real need of wounding with the said weapon him who
had merely caught her arm, and perhaps did so to awake her, as she was asleep
and had not replied to her sister’s calls; and as the party who she believed was
making an attempt against her honor, because he had caught her by the arm,
performed no other act of aggression such as might indicated a decided purpose to
commit an attempt against her honor than merely to catch her by the arm, and
although the defendant believed that it was the commencement of such an
attempt and that she had to defend herself therefrom, it is true that, once awake Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
and provided with an effective weapon for her defense, there was no just nor Separate Opinions
reasonable cause for striking a blow therewith in the center of the body, where the
principal vital organs are seated, of the man who had not performed any act which
might be considered as an actual attempt against her honor. CARSON, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

From the foregoing consideration it is concluded that in the commission of the
crime there was present the circumstance of incomplete exemption from
responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in subarticle 4 of article 8 of the
Penal Code are not applicable; wherefore the criminal act is not altogether
excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said requisites, although a
majority of them were present, that is, the first and the third requisites; and
therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 86 of the code, a penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by article 404 of the code, in the
discretion of the court, must be imposed upon the defendant.
In view of the fact that the accused is an ignorant woman, wholly uneducated, and
that it was not shown that, at the time when she was assaulted the deceased, she
knew that he was her brother-in-law, account must be taken of the circumstance
prescribed by article 11 of the code, in connection with Act No. 2142, as no
aggravating circumstance whatever was present to counteract the effects of the
said extenuating circumstance; therefore, the penalty applicable to the defendant
is the one lower by two degrees and in the minimum period.
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, the defendant, Genoveva Apego, should be, as she is hereby,
sentenced to the penalty of two years of prision correccional, to the accessories of
article 61, to pay an indemnity of five hundred pesos to the heirs of the deceased,
and, in case of insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment which shall not exceed one-
third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of both instances. In
computing the time of the sentence, credit shall be allowed for one-half of the
time of imprisonment suffered by the defendant while awaiting trial. So ordered.
I dissent. I am of opinion that there was no criminal intent on the part of the
accused, and that she did what she did in the reasonable belief that she was acting
in defense of her virtue. (U. S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. Rep., 488.)
TRENT, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent. I think the appellant should be acquitted upon the facts stated in the
majority opinion. This court says:
"The following conclusions of fact are derived from a careful study of this case:
Upon the arrival of Maria Apego and her husband, Pio Bautista, at the stairs of
their house, and as Genoveva Apego did not reply to the call made to her from the
outside by her sister Maria, the said spouses went to the upper floor of the house;
Bautista led the way and, in order to enter, opened the outside door, a sliding door,
and as there was no light inside stumbled against Genoveva Apego, who was
sleeping near the said door, and touched her left arm; thereupon, Genoveva awoke
and believing, as she testified, that somebody was trying to abuse her, seized the
pocketknife aforementioned, asking at the same time who was beside her, and as
she did not receive a reply immediately, she got up and struck the person before
her a blow with the said knife; in the meanwhile Maria Apego had separated from
her husband to light a match and then a kerosene lamp there was in the house and
was not aware of the assault made upon her husband by her sister, and only when
the light had been lit did she see her sister Genoveva in front of Bautista, who had
already been wounded and was in an attitude indicating that he was about to fall
to the floor; . . .
". . . the defendant’s testimony must be accepted, to wit, that she struck a blow
with the pocketknife at the person beside her, and who afterwards turned out to
be her brother-in-law, without knowing who he was and in the belief that, since he
touched her left arm, he was about to commit an attempt against her
honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court further finds that the appellant immediately upon discovering what she
had done ran out of the house calling for help, and that she, her sister, and the
deceased were on the very friendliest of terms. The result is that the appellant, a
single woman 25 years of age, was alone in the house when the deceased and his
wife arrived. The entry was made without the appellant’s knowing anything about
it, and she was awakened by someone stumbling against her and touching her left
arm. She then realized that someone was in the house, and, it being so dark that
she could not distinguish the person, and believing as the court says, that the
person had entered for the purpose of raping her, she arose and struck in the dark
with the knife. It later developed that she had struck her own brother-in-law and
killed him.
The very moment she awoke was when she conceived the idea that some one had
entered the house for the purpose of raping her. In the short interval of time
between her awakening and the striking of the fatal blow, was there any possibility
of her disabusing her mind of such a belief, which, to her, must have amounted to
an over-powering her? The wife of the deceased did not strike the match nor light
the lamp until after the appellant had struck the blow. All was in darkness. It was,
then, impossible for her to ascertain the identity of the deceased before she had
used the knife. So far as the record shows, no word was spoken by either of the
spouses until after the blow had been delivered, and the accused received no reply
to her inquiry as to who was beside her. We must appreciate, therefore, the
entrance of the spouses with more or less noise, their groping around in darkness
of the interior of the house, the awakening of the defendant from a sound sleep,
her being alone in the house, her instant thought that some one is coming toward
her intent upon committing a rape, increased by the failure of the deceased to
answer her question, and the utter absence of anything to disabuse her mind of
such an idea. With her mind still somewhat sluggish, she realizes the presence of
some one bending over her; she knows she is not alone in the house; the person
bending over her has not uttered a word; he makes no reply when she asks him
who he is; and she is unable to recognize him. What more natural than that a
virtuous woman would instantly arrive at the conclusion that she was about to be
made the victim of an immoral and lewd assault? The court says that in the
absence of any evidence showing resentment existing between the deceased and
the accused, her testimony to the effect that she believed an attempt was being
made against her honor must be believed. I fail to see what possible bearing
resentment entertained by the accused toward the deceased would have. She did
not recognize her assailant until after the light had been struck. The identity of the
deceased did not enter into her belief that she was about to be raped. Had her
assailant been her worst enemy she would not have known it until after the harm
had been done. But the facts of the case conclusively show that the accused
entertained no resentment toward the deceased. The wife of the deceased
testified that her sister had lived in the house for a long time and that she and her
sister had always been on the most amicable of terms. After the accused became
aware of the identity of the deceased she made not the slightest move to continue
her attack or defense. I therefore agree with the conclusion of the court — but
without reservation — that the testimony of the defendant that she struck the
blow under the impression that she was about to become the victim of an
unchaste assault must be accepted as true.
If the defendant believed that she was subjected to such an unlawful attack, the
question arises, was such a belief excusable under the circumstances?
"The party killing, to justify, must have reasonable apprehension or fear of death or
serious bodily harm, at the time of the killing. . . . But to whom must he
appearance of danger — the apprehension of the party killing — reasonably
appear? To the jury after hearing all the evidence — after ascertaining the real
facts? . . . Or, must the real or apparent danger appear to the defendant at the time
of the homicide to be reasonable? We think the latter correct. The jury must view
the facts upon his standpoint. Each juror must place himself in the position of the
defendant at the time of the homicide, and determine from all the facts, as they
appeared to defendant at the time of the killing, whether his apprehension or fear
of death or serious bodily harm was reasonable; and, if so, they should acquit."
(Bell v. The State, 20 Tex. App., 445, and other authorities cited in the monographic
note to The States v. Sumner, 74 Am. St. Rep., 707, 723.)
I think that the circumstances of the case at bar, so far as the appellant could
perceive them at the time, were perfectly applicable to an assault with intent to
commit rape, and that, therefore, the only possible way to arrive at a decision in
this case on the merits is to view the whole affair from the moment the defendant
awoke until the fatal blow was struck as an attempt to commit rape, which resulted
in the death of the ravisher. The court does not expressly state its views on this
branch of the case. I understand, however, that the sentence of conviction is based
upon the theory that the accused exercised her right of self-defense to a
disproportionate degree. At least such would be gathered from the following
language:
". . . and although the defendant believed that it was the commencement of such
an attempt and that she had to defend herself therefrom, it is true that, once
awake and provided with an effective weapon for her defense, there was no just
nor reasonable cause for striking a blow therewith in the center of the body, where
the principal vital organs are seated, of the man who had not performed any act
which might be considered as an actual attempt against her honor."cralaw
virtua1aw library
As a matter of fact, the acts of the deceased were perfectly harmless. There was, as
a matter of law, based upon those actual facts, no unlawful aggression. Based upon
those actual facts of the case, there was no excuse whatever for the homicide.
Based upon those actual facts, the crime of homicide was committed with several
aggravating circumstances. The court, however, has imposed a sentence of two
years imprisonment and accessories. I must therefore believe that the court has
tacitly, at least adopted the view that the sentence of conviction should be
predicated; upon the following operative facts: A would be ravisher approached
the accused in the house where she was sleeping alone,. etc.; in exercising her right
of self-defense, she exceeded the limits of reasonable resistance against her
assailant. In this view of the case, the question arises as to whether a woman may
ever go so far in defense of her chastity as to kill her assailant, and if so, whether
such extreme action was warranted in view of the circumstances as they presented
themselves to the accused at the time she killed the deceased. To the first part of
this question the answer must be, yes. In repulsing a felonious attack a person may
go as far in his self-defense as may reasonably be necessary, viewing the
circumstance of the case from his point of view. The books are full of cases where
this principle has been applied; but it is doubtful if any may be found where the
victim of an attempted rape was tried for the murder of her assailant. In the case of
United States v. Santa Ana (22 Phil. Rep., 249), this court, in banc, said:
"When a man becomes so debased as to lose every instinct of manhood and
engages himself in the commission of so serious a crime (rape), he certainly takes
his life and liberty in his own hands, and if he loses the latter or receives serious
personal injuries, his loss is no greater than he deserves. The appellant is therefore
entitled to an absolute acquittal upon the ground of self-defense."cralaw virtua1aw
library
As to the second part of the question, it is necessary to again view the
circumstances of the case as they appeared to the appellant at the time she struck
the blow with the knife. The court is of the opinion that she was not justified in
striking that blow because it says the man "had not performed any act which might
be considered as an actual attempt against her honor." This statement is
inexplicable. The only acts which the deceased performed at all were those of
stumbling against her body and touching her left arm, and the court had already
arrived at the conclusion that the woman believed an attack was being made
against her honor. In other words, the attempt had progressed to the point where
her assailant had come in physical contact with her. Due either to willfulness or
negligence, he did not reassure her as he should have done by answering her
inquiry as to who he was. He was not merely standing at a distance threatening her
or making indecent gestures. She was alone in the house. There was no possible
way of retreat. Her physical inferiority muse be conceded. In another instant he
would have grasped her by the arms and thus prevented her from using the knife
at all. Was this the time to temporize, to threaten, to plead for mercy, or to strike
halfheartedly with a weapon which would be useless to her in another moment of
time? The court would have had her select a less vital part of the body for the
blow; this in the darkness and most probably without being able to distinguish
even the outlines of the human being who had attacked her. This would have called
for deliberation and cool and discriminating but instant action. Every indication
points to the fact that she struck wildly, perhaps while not yet fully awake, and, by
the merest chance, with fatal results.
In the case of United States v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. Rep., 488), the defendant, Ah
Chong, and Pascual Gualberto, were employed at the officers’ mess in Fort
McKinley, the former as a cook and the latter as a muchacho. The two occupied the
same room and no one else occupied the same building. On the night of August 14,
1908, Gualberto had gone out for a walk, leaving Ah Chong alone in the room.
About 10 o’clock on that night Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by some one
trying to force open the door of the room. He called out, "Who is there?" Receiving
no reply, he said: "If you enter the room I will kill you." He then seized a knife and
went to the door, which was suddenly pushed open, and Gualberto entered. It was
very dark in the room. Ah Chong struck out wildly at the intruder, and inflicted
blows upon Gualberto which very shortly thereafter resulted in his death. Ah
Chong thought the intruder was a ladron. He was tried for the killing of Gualberto
and found guilty of homicide and sentenced to six years and one day of presidio
mayor. Upon appeal he was acquitted. This court said, pp. 492, 493:
"Under these provisions (Art. 8, Penal Code) we think that there can be no doubt
that defendant would be entitled to complete exemption from criminal liability for
the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door
of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or ladron as the defendant believed
him to be.
x x x
"But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or ladron. That
neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge
was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no
such ’unlawful aggression’ on the part of a thief or ladron as defendant believed he
was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real ’necessity’ for the use of the
knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In this case a strong man, Ah Chong, was acquitted for killing his friend upon the
ground that he believed that the intruder was a thief or a ladron seeking entrance
for the purpose of larceny or robbery. In the case at bar, a woman is convicted
because she exceed the means necessary to defend her honor. Had she stated that
she believed that the person who touched her arm had entered for the purpose of
larceny or robbery, the two cases would have been, mutatis mutandis, identical;
and under the former, the court had followed the doctrine laid down in that case,
she would have been acquitted. But as she was defending her honor she has been
convicted. The court squarely places the loss of the property in the former case
above the loss of the honor and virtue of a woman in the latter case. To my mind
there is no comparison between the gravity of the two offenses. The loss of a few
personal articles, either by theft or robbery, cannot compare with the loss of a
woman’s virtue taken from her forcibly. Rape is one of the most heinous crimes,
from a moral standpoint, known to the human race. A virtuous woman had rather
die than be raped. Yet, under the doctrine enunciated by this court, she is not
authorized to use the same means in repelling a vicious attacked upon her honor
that she would be in defending her personal property. Considering the cases
together, this court has said that a man may kill a person whom he believes to be
entering his premises at nighttime for the purpose of robbery, but that a woman
must not go to that extent to defend her honor. I cannot assent to such a holding.
The appellant should be, in my opinion, acquitted.

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings
rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or
to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the
doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased,
was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a
detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house
except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the
door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy
growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In
the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown
back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him
in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers
who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages
to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and
gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants
employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The
three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano
stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few
moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps
fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and
called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he
forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on
his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the
room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong
believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following
day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to
do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim
of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in
fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one,
under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and
repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness
of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing
upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using
any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the
first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was
no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for
the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact
is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even
though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an
essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions
there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do
not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may
be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to
the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of
crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that
malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general
rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference
between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of
them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore,
the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows
by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless
the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he
had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary"
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant,
being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1,
p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only
be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
(Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon
by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where
there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal
Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice
which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury
which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or
their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal,
is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and
decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are
as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it
shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they
may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the
actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute
to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the
milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable
excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe
the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means
"not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In
English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious,"
"maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely
technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;"
the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence
toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal
justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously"
"with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to
imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will
always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute
a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position
with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule
as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which
a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only
from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was
so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other,
that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is
distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said,
criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the
happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may,
we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground,
we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among
its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every
guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man,
no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil
mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is
credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds,
that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of
certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime
exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil
in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always
there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The
guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen,
8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is
to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in
forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord
with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he
does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the
facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a
man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to
him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends
himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will
not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion
for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of
cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application
of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night
and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled
pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and
that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No
one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from
criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the
life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or
criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of
homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption
established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed
"voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it
should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but
it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his
life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who
has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded
with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any
reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had
been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man
so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol
is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the
party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger
can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night,
in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and
that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly
entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the
person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck,
and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and
left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-
law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having
acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of
the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he
was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not
exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance
with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he
was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering,
from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her
child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no
other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when
the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was
unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he
use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and
was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the
consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given
him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the
arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there
existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the
voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from
his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had
before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening
to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel,
speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a
joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as
the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two
of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means
employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight
years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused
on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the
means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme
court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night,
by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his
money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing
in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found
dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law?
The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority
of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to
twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal,
the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to
the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned
and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.) the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and
the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property
and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances,
as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence
or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in
the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes
that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed,
inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was
done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real
negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the
aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused G.R. No. 193507 January 30, 2013
that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00457 dated 3 December 2009 affirming in toto the Decision2 of Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catarman, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-
3460 dated 18 October 2005 finding herein appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person
committed against AAA,3 thereby imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA in an
Information4 dated 30 April 2003, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at about 7:00 o’clock in the
evening in Bgy. XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellant, actuated by
lust and with lewd design, with force and intimidation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, 12 years old
and is suffering from mental disorder or is demented or has mental disability,
without the consent and against the will of said victim.5 [Emphasis supplied].
On arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT
GUILTY6 to the crime charged.
At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense failed to make any
stipulation of facts.7 The pre-trial conference was then terminated and trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the private offended
party; (2) BBB, mother of AAA; (3) Analiza Pait (Analiza), neighbor and friend of
AAA; (4) Dr. Jesus Emmanuel Nochete (Dr. Nochete), Medical Officer IV, Northern
Samar Provincial Hospital; and (5) Dr. Vincent Anthony M. Belicena (Dr. Belicena),
Medical Specialist II, Northern SamarProvincial Hospital. Their testimonies
established the following facts:
AAA is a mental retardate and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the
rape incident.8 She and appellant, who was then 17 years old,9 are neighbors −
their respective houses are adjoining each other.10
In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of
the sari-sari store of AAA’s mother, BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of
their house adjacent to the said sari-sari store. Shortly, thereafter, appellant invited
AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their house. AAA acceded and went
ahead.11
Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to look for
her one peso coin, followed them until she reached a papaya tree located three
and a half meters away from the place. Analiza hid under the papaya tree and from
there she saw appellant undress AAA by removing the latter’s shorts and panty.
Appellant, however, glanced and saw Analiza. Frightened, Analiza ran away and
went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling BBB what she saw.12
Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant
made her lie down. He then placed himself on top of AAA and made push and pull
movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit down for a while
and then sent her home.13
When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her mother,
BBB, where she came from and why she came home late. AAA replied that she was
at the back of their house as appellant brought her there and had sexual
intercourse with her.14
The following day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and then to the Northern
Samar Provincial Hospital where AAA was examined by Dr. Nochete.15 The medical
examination yielded the following:
The findings are:
= Confluent abrasion 1 x 1 inches, 2 inches below the umbilicus.
Genitalia Exam:
= Admits 1 finger with ease.
= (-) vulvar swelling, (-) erythema.
= (+) complete healed hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock, 7 o’clock & 10 o’clock
position.
Gram Stain Result: Negative for spermatozoa.16
Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have possibly sustained those complete
healed hymenal lacerations more than a month prior to the date of the
examination. He also clarified that even though AAA has no fresh hymenal
laceration it does not necessarily mean that no sexual intercourse was committed
on her on 9 December 2002. It is possible that AAA did not sustain any fresh
hymenal laceration because the vaginal canal has become loose. He did not also
find any trace of spermatozoa on AAA’s vagina, its presence being dependent on
whether the appellant did ejaculate or not.17
AAA was also examined by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar
Provincial Hospital, who found that AAA is suffering from moderate to severe
mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the specific form of below
average intelligence that has a low reproduction functioning resulting in impaired
functioning. This finding was obtained through mental examination and actual
interview of AAA. Dr. Belicena, however, recommended a full battery of
psychological testing to determine AAA’s exact mental age.18 Dr. Belicena’s finding
was reduced into writing as evidenced by a Medical Certificate19 dated 18 May
2004.
For its part, the defense offered the testimonies of (1) Pio Campos (Pio), neighbor
and friend of appellant; (2) Cesar Monticalvo (Cesar), appellant’s father; (3)
Alexander Sanico (Alexander), Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar; and
(4) appellant, who invoked the defense of denial and alibi to exonerate himself
from the crime charged.
Appellant denied having raped AAA. He claimed that on 9 December 2002, at
around 1:00 p.m., he, together with Pio and a certain Dinnes Samson, was having a
drinking spree in the house of one Adolfo Congayao (Adolfo). They finished
drinking at around 6:00 p.m. As he was too drunk, Pio assisted him in going home.
He went to sleep and woke up only at 12:00 midnight as he needed to urinate. He
went back to sleep and woke up at 6:00 a.m. of the following day, i.e., 10
December 2002. He was surprised that AAA charged him with rape. He was then
arrested at around 3:00 p.m. of 10 December 2002.20
Appellant disclosed, however, that the house of Adolfo, where they had their
drinking spree, is more or less six (6) meters away from the house of AAA. In fact,
he could still see the house of AAA even when he was in the house of Adolfo. He
similarly admitted that he knew very well that AAA is suffering from mental
abnormalities. He also divulged that he asked Pio to testify on his behalf.21
Appellant’s testimony was corroborated on all material points by Pio and his father,
Cesar, who also admitted that he personally knew AAA as she is their neighbor.
Cesar also knew that AAA is suffering from mental disorder.22 Both Pio and Cesar
confirmed that on 9 December 2002, they brought appellant to his bedroom and
let him sleep there because he was too drunk. Thereafter, Pio and Cesar engaged in
a drinking spree inside the latter’s house, particularly at the kitchen that is more
than two (2) meters away from appellant’s bedroom, which lasted until 11:00 p.m.
Pio and Cesar likewise stated that there was no moment that appellant went out of
his bedroom since the time they brought him there.23
Alexander, another defense witness, presented appellant’s Certificate of Live
Birth24 to prove that the latter was only 17 years old during the commission of the
crime, i.e., 9 December 2002.25
The trial court, convinced about the merits of the prosecution’s case rendered a
Decision on 18 October 2005, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape of a demented person and sentenced him to an imprisonment
term of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify AAA in the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
On appeal, the following errors were assigned:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
OF RAPE OF A DEMENTED PERSON DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE APPELLANT’S AGE, BEING A MINOR,
ATTHE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY.26
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 3 December 2009 affirming
in toto the trial court’s Decision dated 18 October 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete were
replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Firstly, while the Information
stated that appellant raped AAA on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at
around 7:00 p.m., Analiza testified that it was in the afternoon of the same day
when she saw and heard appellant calling AAA to go to the kiln at the back of their
house, and while she saw appellant undress AAA, she did not actually see the
sexual intercourse because the appellant saw her watching them, so she ran away.
Secondly, BBB’s testimony that on 9 December 2002, AAA confided to her that she
was raped by appellant early that night was inconsistent with the testimony of
Analiza that it was in the afternoon of the same day when she saw appellant and
AAA going to the kiln, where the former undressed the latter. Thirdly, Dr. Nochete’s
testimony clearly stated that the hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina could have
possibly been sustained by her a month ago, which does not support AAA’s claim of
rape on 9 December 2002. Even granting that appellant, indeed, raped AAA on 9
December 2002, it is highly implausible that the hymenal lacerations on her vagina
were already completely healed when she was examined by Dr. Nochete on 10
December 2002, which was only after less than 24-hours from the date the alleged
rape was committed.
Appellant also questions the credibility of AAA as a witness given her condition as a
mental retardate. Appellant opines that AAA, could not perceive and is not capable
of making known her perception to others. As such, she can be easily coached on
what to say or do.
Appellant finally avers that granting arguendo that he is guilty of the crime
charged, he was only 17 years old at the time of its commission as evidenced by his
Certificate of Live Birth. This fact was even attested to by the Local Civil Registrar of
Bobon, Northern Samar. Given his minority at the time of the commission of the
crime charged, the court should have considered the same as privileged mitigating
circumstance in imposing the penalty against him.
This Court affirms appellant’s conviction.
At the outset, paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353,27provides for two (2) circumstances when carnal
knowledge of a woman with mental disability is considered rape. Subparagraph (b)
thereof refers to rape of a person "deprived of reason" while subparagraph (d)
refers to rape of a "demented person."28 The term "deprived of reason" has been
construed to encompass those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or
retardation.29 The term "demented," on the other hand, means having dementia,
which Webster defines as mental deterioration; also madness,
insanity.30 Dementia has also been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as a "form of
mental disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are
prominently affected; x x x total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is
involved."31 Thus, a mental retardate can be classified as a person "deprived of
reason," not one who is "demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is
considered rape under subparagraph (b), not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.32
In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly used the word
demented to characterize AAA’s mental condition and mistakenly categorized the
rape committed by appellant under subparagraph (d), Article 266-A(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, instead of under subparagraph (b) thereof.
Nonetheless, the mistake would not exonerate appellant. Otherwise stated, his
conviction or criminal liability for rape stands though not under subparagraph (d) of
Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but under subparagraph
(b) thereof.
Neither can it be said that appellant’s right to be properly informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware
that the Information was worded, as follows: "AAA is suffering from mental
disorder or is demented or has mental disability." This fact, however, will not
render the Information defective and will not bar this Court from convicting
appellant under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court pronounced that:
x x x In People v. Rosare,34 the information did not allege that the victim was a
mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. This
Court however sustained the trial court’s judgment of conviction holding that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the basis of the
information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that the offended party is
suffering from mental retardation. It ruled that there was substantial compliance
with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against
him. Thus:
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact
that the victim was a mental retardate was never alleged in the information and,
absent this element, the acts charged negate the commission of the offense for
which he was convicted by the lower court.
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to motu
proprio take cognizance of the resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in
I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2, 1992, which formed the basis of and a copy of which
was attached to the information for rape filed against herein appellant. Therein, it
is clearly stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. We
hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a substantial compliance with the
constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge
against him x x x (citation omitted).35 [Emphasis supplied].
In this case, both the Complaint36 and the Resolution37 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Northern Samar, which formed the basis of the Information and copies of
which were attached in the records, stated that AAA is suffering from mental
abnormalities – she looked like a retardate and her focus is not normal. Even, the
Resolution38 of the Acting Provincial Prosecutor concurred with the aforesaid
findings. From the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAA’s mental disorder or
mental disability is that of being a mentally retarded and not demented. Thus,
there was substantial compliance with the mandate to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation.39 More so, as discussed hereunder, the prosecution was
able to prove that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate. Even the appellant affirmed
the said mental condition of the victim.
To repeat, the term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.40 Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under subparagraph (b) not subparagraph
(d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.41
The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will or without her consent.42 Article 266-A(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, specifically states that:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.[Emphasis
supplied].
From the foregoing, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman through any of the four
enumerated circumstances. Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a
mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or
intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent
to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between
the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.43
In People v. Dalandas,44 citing People v. Dumanon,45 this Court held that mental
retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such
as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.46
In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a
mental retardate through, (1) the testimony of her mother; (2) the trial court’s
observation; and (3) the mental examination and actual interview of AAA
conducted by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital,
who found AAA to be suffering from moderate to severe mental retardation,
meaning, AAA is suffering from the "specific form of below average intelligence
which has a low reproduction functioning which result to impairment
functioning."47 It is also worthy to note that the defense did not dispute, even
admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from mental retardation. The findings of the
lower courts about AAA’s mental condition must be upheld.
The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual congress between
appellant and AAA. Despite the latter’s mental condition, she narrated before the
court in the best way she could her ordeal in the hands of appellant. As stated by
the appellate court, AAA conveyed her ideas by words and demonstrations.48 AAA
recounted how the appellant sexually abused her on 9 December 2002 by inviting
her to go to the kiln at the back of their house. Thereupon, appellant suddenly
undressed her by removing her shorts and panty. This fact was attested to by
Analiza, one of the prosecution witnesses, who actually witnessed appellant
undressing AAA by removing the latter’s shorts and panty. AAA further testified
that after undressing her, appellant made her lie down, placed himself on top of
her and made push and pull movements. Thereafter, appellant stopped, made her
sit down and sent her home.49 This testimony of AAA was correctly found by the
trial court and the appellate court as coherent and given in a detailed manner.50
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of mentally
deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is
shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather
than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater
credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could
speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact
suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it has been
jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony
alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict
the accused.51
Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAA’s testimony, she positively
identified the appellant as the person who raped her.52 Thus, the straightforward
narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification
of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution.53
The allegation of inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr.
Nochete as regards the exact date and time the alleged rape incident happened, as
well as the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, pointed to by
appellant cannot work in his favor.
Evidently, these inconsistencies refer only to trivial and inconsequential matters
that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.54 A witness is not
expected to remember with perfect recollection every minute detail of her
harrowing experience. A minor mistake as to the exact time of the commission of
the rape is immaterial and cannot discredit the testimony of a witness. This Court
has repeatedly held that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime.55 Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission.56 What is decisive in a rape charge is that
the commission of the rape by the accused against the complainant has been
sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which
are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for
acquittal.57
In the same way, the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations and spermatozoa on
AAA’s vagina do not negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen, as well as the
presence or absence of spermatozoa, is not also an essential element of rape.58 As
clarified by Dr. Nochete, the absence of fresh hymenal laceration on AAA’s vagina
does not necessarily mean that she did not engage in sexual intercourse on 9
December 2002. Possibly, AAA did not sustain any fresh hymenal laceration as her
vaginal canal had become loose. And, he did not find any trace of spermatozoa
because its presence depends on whether or not the appellant ejaculated.
Indeed, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, be disqualified
from testifying in court.59 Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A
mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony
depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them
known to the court.60 If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same
is admissible in court.61
Neither can it be said that AAA was merely coached as a witness by her mother. It
is highly unthinkable that a mother would draw her daughter, a mental retardate at
that, into a rape story with all its attendant scandal and humiliation if the rape did
not really happen. No mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her
child with the stigma that follows the despicable crime of rape.62 Moreover,
appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA and her mother to falsely
testify against him.
In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA, her positive
identification of appellant as her assailant and the lack of ill-motive on her part to
falsely testify against appellant, the latter’s defense of denial and alibi must
necessarily fail.
Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with
disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a
defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused, as in this
case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution’s
evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, mere
denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving
evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters.63
Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot
prevail over witnesses’ positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the
accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its commission, it is
likewise essential that he show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus
delicti,64 which the appellant in this case failed to do.
As aptly observed by the trial court:
The houses of the offended party and the appellant are only divided by a fence and
the place of the incident is only at the back of the house of the appellant. The
defense of alibi must fail. In addition to the positive identification made by AAA and
the place of the incident is adjacent to the houses of the victim and the appellant,
being neighbors, the fact that the appellant alleged that he was having drinking
spree at that time and that he was dead drunk at around 6:00 p.m. of that date,
there is no impossibility for the appellant to be physically present at the scene of
the incident, because of its proximity.
Corroborative testimony is not credible if tainted with bias particularly in cases
where the witnesses are closely associated to the appellant as to be interested in
the appellant’s acquittal. In this case, the appellant’s witnesses are his alleged
drinking buddy and his father. Considering that they are bound by friendship and
affiliation, it is conceivable that they would be inclined to make excuses for him
appellant from culpability.65
All told, appellant’s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, thus, his conviction stands.
As to penalty. Under Article 266-B66 in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
However, when rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the
victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. But this circumstance
must be alleged in the information being a qualifying circumstance which increases
the penalty to death and changes the nature of the offense from simple to
qualified rape.67 In the case at bench, while appellant categorically admitted that
he knew AAA to be suffering from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to
allege this fact in the information. As such, even if it was proved, it cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, appellant’s conviction is only for
simple rape for which he should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the modification
of the penaltyof reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower courts upon the
appellant.
This Court finds merit in appellant’s assertion that he was a minor during the
commission of the crime charged. During trial, upon order of the trial court, the
Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar, brought before it their office
records, particularly appellant’s Certificate of Live
Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth
shows that he was born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of the
commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only 17 years
old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,68 which
specifically states that:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. –
When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
xxxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.69 [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty
upon appellant is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion
perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape. Being a divisible penalty,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.70
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision
mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal), that is 6 years and
1 day to 12 years, and maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period (there being no other modifying circumstances
attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months.71 With that, the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be
imposed upon the appellant. However, the case of appellant does not, as it
normally should, end at this point. On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect.
Section 68 thereof specifically provides for its retroactive application, thus:72
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences
shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable law. [Emphasis supplied].
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even though the crime was
committed four (4) years prior to its enactment and effectivity. Parenthetically, with
more reason should Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this case as the 2005 conviction
by the lower courts was still under review when the law took effect in 2006.73
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced.74It reads, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of
the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided
in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. [Emphasis
supplied].
However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that suspension of
sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:75
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds
that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. [Emphasis supplied].
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court
was promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already moot and academic.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344,
the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even
to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she committed
the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right
to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No.
9344 in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law
at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age.76 The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows:77
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that SO ORDERED.
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
To conform to this Court’s ruling in People v.Sarcia,78 the case shall be remanded
to the court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or
other training facility.79
As to damages. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not
affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in
accordance with law.80 This Court affirms both the civil indemnity of P50,000.00
and moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded by the lower courts in favor of AAA.
Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages,
is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Case law also requires automatic
award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the
nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity.81
In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary
damages are awarded to set a public example and to protect hapless individuals
from sexual molestation, this Court likewise affirms the lower courts award of
exemplary damages but increased the same from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to
conform to recent jurisprudence.82
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (I)
appellant is found guilty of rape under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A( I) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not under subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in
view of the privileged mitigating circumstance appreciated in favor of appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion temporal and being a divisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies and the indeterminate penalty of
I 0 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon the appellant; and (3) the amount of
exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages both in the amount
of P50,000.00 are maintained. This case, however, shall be REMANDED to the court
a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.
G.R. No. L-2254 April 20, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE O. DEL ROSARIO and NATALIO B. BACALSO, defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista
for appellant.
TUASON, J.:
The question for decision is whether a libelous publication affecting more than one
person constitutes one crime or more. This is an appeal from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu sustaining the first theory and dismissing a complaint for
libel on a motion to quash.
The alleged defamatory writing was printed in one sheet of paper in Visaya, which
was translated in the complaint into English as follows:
MY PLEA TO THE CEBUANOS
Because Morelos, as head of the PRRA wanted to sell flour outside of Cebu
preferring that the Chinese could make money, notwithstanding that the
inhabitants of the City would suffer;
Because Morelos, as President of the Municipal Board of the City of Cebu, made
money out of the copra ordinance;
Because, Morelos has a gang in which Zapanta, Seno and companions are
members, who, instead of serving the people are only serving for their own good, I
plead, with great humility, to all upright Cebuanos, not to elect these men that I
mentioned above.
Because Espina; was merely appointed Mayor of the City of Cebu in order to be
made a Herod to go after and dismiss policemen and employees who are without
guilt;
Because Espina, now is to be transferred to the capitol in order to be made
Executioner (Berdugo) of the employees whom they want to be executed;
Because, even when he was still in Ormoc, Espina was nearly killed by his tenants
because he grabbed lands, I plead that Espina should be buried by all upright
Cebuanos.
President Roxas in his speech made yesterday, when he mentioned about the
candidates for councilors in the City of Cebu, said; "Give me honest men in the city
Board, and I will cooperate with them." These men mentioned above are not
honorable and we should cast them aside on election day.
It will be seen that the leaflet attacked Morelos and Espina. Espina instituted a
criminal action against the herein defendants, action which was assigned to one
branch of the court presided by Judged Moscoso. The case at bar was later
commenced by Morelos and corresponded to Judge Felix Martinez, presiding
another branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. It was the latter case which
was dismissed on motion of the defendants.
Judge Martinez, citing article 48 of the Revised Penal Code ruled that, although two
persons claimed to be aggrieved by the libel, yet, he said, "the two libels ... were
the result of a single act," "hence should be subject of a single information, the
crime being complex one." His Honor argued thus: "A written defamation becomes
punishable the moment, and only when, it is given publicity. Hence, the writing
alleged to be defamatory on Espina and Morales has become punishable following
its publication. And it is admitted that the leaflet in question has been published by
a single act." To bolster its opinion, the court also cited Stated vs. Hoskins, 60 Minn.
168, in which it was held that "A libel on two or more persons contained in one
writing and published by a single act constitutes but one offense so as to warrant a
single indictment thereafter."
If the act of publishing the libel were the sole or main element of the crime, the
court's reasoning would be faultless. But is it?
In the case of States vs. Hoskins, supra, the ratio decidendi was that the gist of the
offense libel at common law is the publication of something which tends to affect
injuriously the peace and good order of society regardless of its effect upon the
person concerned. We cull these thoughts from the decision: "The general policy of
the law is to leave the care of men's reputations to themselves. No damage done
to a reputation (at least, unless the further element of conspiracy enters into the
act) is, at common law, in and of itself, a foundation for a criminal prosecution."
"The law makes the publication of libel punishable as a crime, not because of injury
to the reputation, but because the publication of such articles tends to affect
injuriously the peace and good order of society."
So also was the interest of public peace and order given the controlling and private
interest secondary consideration in State vs. Hosmer (142 Pac., 581, 585, cited in
37 C. J., 147). The court said: "When a libel has been committed, the State in its
sovereign capacity seeks to avenge the wrong, not because the commission of the
act tends to affect injuriously the good order of society and the dignity of the
State," but "because it tends to produce a breach of peace." "The number libelled
in the article is immaterial, and the libeler is punished for his own act of publishing
a libel calculated to produce violence."
That is the common-law rule. Such rule has been discarded in many states of the
Union. Referring to State vs. Hoskins, supra, the footnote in 27 L. R. A., 412 says
that "The above decision is a rare one and almost without precedent as appears
from the opinions of the judges." American Jurisprudence (Vol. 33, p. 292) explains
that "Under the common-law theory, which is embodied in some of the statutory
provisions on the subject, the criminality of a defamatory statement consist in the
tendency thereof to provoke a breach of the peace," but, it adds, "many of the
modern enactments, ... ignore this aspect altogether and make a libelous
publication criminal if its tendency is to injure the person defamed, regardless of its
effect upon the public."
The present Philippine law on libel conforms to this modern tendency. For a little
digression on the present law of libel or defamation, let it be noted that the
Revised Penal Code has absorbed libel under Act No. 277 and calumny and insult
under the old Penal Code. (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Guevarra, p.
764.) The new Penal Code includes "All kinds of attacks against honor and
reputation, thereby eliminating once and for all the idle distinction between
calumny, insult and libel."(Idem, p. 765.)
The subject is treated in Chapter I, entitled "Libel" in the English text and
"Defamation" in the Spanish, under Title Thirteen entitled "Crimes Against Honor."
Judge Albert and Judge Guevarra in their respective commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code criticize the use of the term "libel" in the English version, correctly
observing that libel and defamation are not synonymous terms and that the latter
is the more appropriate of the two and should have been adopted in both editions.
They point out that libel is confined to written insults while defamation includes
insults both in written and oral forms.
However that may be, the prosecution for libel upon the initiative of the
prosecuting attorney, as was the practice under Act No. 277, has been abolished
with one exception. Now libel or defamation, like insults and calumny under the
old Penal Code, is prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party or parties,
unless the imputation constitutes a crime that should be the subject of
prosecution de oficio. (People vs. Martinez, 43 Off. Gaz., 1351) The last paragraph
of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, thus provides:
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of
and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
Construing this rule in People vs. Martinez ante, this Court said:
Esta disposicion es clara, terminante. Bajo su fraseologia, solamentecuando la
difamacion consiste en la imputacion de un delito perseguible de oficio cabe
deducir accion criminal contra el difamador mediante simple querella del fiscal, sin
necesidad de instancia ni denuncia escrita de parte de la persona ofendida. Cuando
la defamacion imputa un delito no perseguible de oficio, o bien una cosa
deshonrosa, si, pero no delictiva como en el caso que nos ocupa, la instancia y
denuncia escrita de la parte ofendida es absolutamente indispensable. (E.
U. contra De la Cruz. 17 Jur. Fil., 140.)
The libel or defamation under consideration does not fall within the class of cases
indictable without the concurrence of the aggrieved persons.
The requirement that prosecution for libel must be upon complaint of the offended
party amply illustrates the intendment and purpose to make injury to the honor
and reputation of the persons libelled the dominant factor in the offense. The
meaning of this requirement is that there are as many offenses of libel as there are
persons libelled, and the computation of the number is not the publication but the
writing or composing of the libel. From this point of view there can not be only one
defamation when more than one person are defamed. The inclusion of several
persons in a libel can not, in the nature of things, be the product of one and the
same act.
The fusion of calumny, insult and libel in one definition and the adoption for the
resultant offense (defamation or libel) of the procedure indicated for the
indictment for the crimes of insult and calumny before the Penal Code was revised,
make available for our guidance decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court in the
matter of multiplicity of action. Two of such decisions, reported and digested by
Viada, will suffice.
Cuestion 6. ¿Cuando en un folleto se injuria a cinco personas y todas ellas ejercitan
la oportuna accion criminal. existiran cinco delitos de injurieas? — El Tribunal
Supreme ha resuelto la afirmativa: Considerando que a pesar de hallarse parties who were absent or for one reason or another were not ready to prosecute
contenidas en el mismo folleto todas las frases calificadas de injuriosas, no cabe the libeler at the time other offended parties commenced action. It would deprive
estimar que constituyan un solo delito, porque refiriendose, como se refleren, a them of their right to vindicate their honor and reputation by proving the falsity or
cinco personas distintas, todas las cuales han ejercitado para perseguirlas la accion malice of the defamatory imputation. It would bar them from recovering damages
criminal correspondiente, la imputacion que a cada una de ellas se dirige de vicios in the criminal proceeding, right which is theirs under the penultimate paragraph
o faltas de moralidad perjudiciales a su credito y fama ha de ser como lo ha sido, of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
juzgada, aunque en la misma causa con separacion de las restantes, puesto que da Upon the foregoing considerations, the order appealed from is reversed and the
lugar a responsabilidades independientes, y mayormente si se atiende a que la case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding according to law,
indole de estos delitos reserva exclusivamente a la iniciativa particular el derecho with costs of this appeal against the appellees.
de instar y seguir el procedimiento, etc. (S. de 23 de septiembre de 1902, Gaceta Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
de 16 de enero de 1903.) (2 Viada, 5th ed., p. 608.)
Cuestion 11. ¿Aun cuando en un mismo acto, o sea en una disputa puta habida MORAN, C.J.:
entre dos personas, la una dirige expresiones injuriosas a la otra, y sucesivamente Mr. Justice Padilla voted to reverse.
otras calumniosas, o sea imputandole falsamente la comision de delitos concretos,
persiguibles de oficio,deberan penarse dos hechos distintos, con arreglo al articulo
88 del Codigo, o solo el delito mas grave en el grado maximo, con sujecion al
articulo 90? — Esto entendio la Sala de 10 criminal de la Audencia del Coruña, la
que impuso al procesado la pena del dilito mas grave de calumnia en el grado
maximo, con arreglo a dicho articulo 90; mas el Tribunal Supremo declaro haber
lugar al recurso de casacion interpuesto contra dicha sentencia por infraccion del
citado articulo, fundandose en que a esta disposicion legal no puede ni debe
darsele mayor extension que la que alcanza el literal con texto de sus palabras,
como excepcion que es de otra regla general, refiriendose terminantemente al caso
en que de un solo hecho, es dicir, de una sola accion, resulten distintas
infracciones, no cuando son distintos los hechos que producen las infracciones,
aunque en el mismo acto se produczcan, como ocurre cuando en una riña el
procesado hiere a una persona y mata a otra, lo cual produce dos delitos distintos
que deben penarse separadamente, sin que en tal caso sea posible aplicar el
articulo 90, cuya disposicion es evidente que infringio la Sala al aplicarla al caso de
autos, en que se produjeron dos distintos delitos. (S. de 1.º de febrero de 1879
Gaceta de 1.º de abril.) (2 Viada, p. 635.)
The theory that only one prosecution may be instituted even though several
persons are affected would lead to injustice to the offended parties, defeat of some
of the law's aims, and great inconvenience. It would deprive of their right, offended
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to
the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of
having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from
the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so
held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or
has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored
in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is
the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did
not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country,
but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p.
255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.)
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty
through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may
be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of
the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on
the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that
felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right
to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land
is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no
the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into
the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.
an international treaty. The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far to costs. So ordered.
as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1,
page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely
to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into
the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively;
also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively
shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1,
Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at
anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
G.R. No. 124922 June 22, 1998
JIMMY CO, doing business under the name & style DRAGON METAL
MANUFACTURING, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BROADWAY MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
On July 18, 1990, petitioner entrusted his Nissan pick-up car 1988 model 1 to
private respondent — which is engaged in the sale, distribution and repair of motor
vehicles — for the following job repair services and supply of parts:
— Bleed injection pump and all nozzles;
— Adjust valve tappet;
— Change oil and filter;
— Open up and service four wheel brakes, clean and adjust;
— Lubricate accelerator linkages;
— Replace aircon belt; and
— Replace battery 2
Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21, 1990 fully serviced
and supplied in accordance with the job contract. After petitioner paid in full the
repair bill in the amount of P1,397.00 3private respondent issued to him a gate
pass for the release of the vehicle on said date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter
could not release the vehicle as its battery was weak and was not yet replaced. Left
with no option, petitioner himself bought a new battery nearby and delivered it to
private respondent for installation on the same day. However, the battery was not
installed and the delivery of the car was rescheduled to July 24, 1990 or three (3)
days later. When petitioner sought to reclaim his car in the afternoon of July 24,
1990, he was told that it was carnapped earlier that morning while being road-
tested by private respondent's employee along Pedro Gil and Perez Streets in Paco,
Manila. Private respondent said that the incident was reported to the police.
Having failed to recover his car and its accessories or the value thereof, petitioner
filed a suit for damages against private respondent anchoring his claim on the
latter's alleged negligence. For its part, private respondent contended that it has no
liability because the car was lost as result of a fortuitous event — the carnapping.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed that:
(T)he cost of the Nissan Pick-up four (4) door when the plaintiff purchased it from
the defendent is P332,500.00 excluding accessories which were installed in the
vehicle by the plaintiff consisting of four (4) brand new tires, magwheels, stereo
speaker, amplifier which amount all to P20,000.00. It is agreed that the vehicle was
lost on July 24, 1990 "approximately two (2) years and five (5) months from the
date of the purchase." It was agreed that the plaintiff paid the defendant the cost
of service and repairs as early as July 21, 1990 in the amount of P1,397.00 which
amount was received and duly receipted by the defendant company. It was also
agreed that the present value of a brand new vehicle of the same type at this time
is P425,000.00 without accessories. 4
They likewise agreed that the sole issue for trial was who between the parties shall
bear the loss of the vehicle which necessitates the resolution of whether private
respondent was indeed negligent. 5 After trial, the court a quo found private
respondent guilty of delay in the performance of its obligation and held it liable to
petitioner for the value of the lost vehicle and its accessories plus interest and
attorney's fees. 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the
lower court and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's damage suit. 7 The CA ruled
that: (1) the trial court was limited to resolving the issue of negligence as agreed
during pre-trial; hence it cannot pass on the issue of delay; and (2) the vehicle was
lost due to a fortuitous event.
In a petition for review to this Court, the principal query raised is whether a repair
shop can be held liable for the loss of a customer's vehicle while the same is in its
custody for repair or other job services?
The Court resolves the query in favor of the customer. First, on the technical aspect
involved. Contrary to the CA' s pronouncement, the rule that the determination of
issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other issues on appeal,
except those that may involve privilege or impeaching matter, 8 is inapplicable to
this case. The question of delay, though not specifically mentioned as an issue at
the pre-trial may be tackled by the court considering that it is necessarily
intertwined and intimately connected with the principal issue agreed upon by the
parties, i.e., who will bear the loss and whether there was negligence. Petitioner's
imputation of negligence to private respondent is premised on delay which is the
very basis of the former's complaint. Thus, it was unavoidable for the court to
resolve the case, particularly the question of negligence without considering
whether private respondent was guilty of delay in the performance of its
obligation.
On the merits. It is a not defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to escape
liability simply because the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its
possession was due to carnapping. Carnapping per secannot be considered as a
fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from
another's rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give
rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping entails more than
the mere forceful taking of another's property. It must be proved and established
that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that
neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any
participation. 9 In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the burden of proving
that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it 10 — which
in this case is the private respondent. However, other than the police report of the
alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was presented by private
respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its fault. A police report
of an alleged crime, to which only private respondent is privy, does not suffice to
establish the carnapping. Neither does it prove that there was no fault on the part
of private respondent notwithstanding the parties' agreement at the pre-trial that
the car was carnapped. Carnapping does not foreclose the pissibility of fault or
negligence on the part of private respondent.
Even assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly established as a fortuitous
event, still private respondent cannot escape liability. Article 1165 11 of the New
Civil Code makes an obligor who is guilty of delay responsible even for a fortuitous
event until he has effected the delivery. In this case, private respondent was
already in delay as it was supposed to deliver petitioner's car three (3) days before
it was lost. Petitioner's agreement to the rescheduled delivery does not defeat his
claim as private respondent had already breached its obligation. Moreover, such
accession cannot be construed as waiver of petitioner's right to hold private
respondent liable because the car was unusable and thus, petitioner had no option
but to leave it.
Assuming further that there was no delay, still working against private respondent
is the legal presumption under Article 1265 that its possession of the thing at the
time it was lost was due to its fault. 12 This presumption is reasonable since he
who has the custody and care of the thing can easily explain the circumstances of
the loss. The vehicle owner has no duty to show that the repair shop was at fault.
All that petitioner needs to prove, as claimant, is the simple fact that private
respondent was in possession of the vehicle at the time it was lost. In this case,
private respondent's possession at the time of the loss is undisputed.
Consequently, the burden shifts to the possessor who needs to present
controverting evidence sufficient enough to overcome that presumption.
Moreover, the exempting circumstances — earthquake, flood, storm or other
natural calamity — when the presumption of fault is not applicable 13 do not
concur in this case. Accordingly, having failed to rebut the presumption and since
the case does not fall under the exceptions, private respondent is answerable for
the loss.
It must likewise be emphasized that pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the New
Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if "the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk". 14 Carnapping is a normal
business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just as the
owner is exposed to that risk so is the repair shop since the car was entrusted to it.
That is why, repair shops are required to first register with the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) 15 and to secure an insurance policy for the "shop covering the
property entrusted by its customer for repair, service or maintenance" as a pre-
requisite for such registration/accreditation.16 Violation of this statutory duty
constitutes negligence per se.17 Having taken custody of the vehicle private
respondent is obliged not only to repair the vehicle but must also provide the
customer with some form of security for his property over which he loses
immediate control. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses or attributes
of ownership — the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to
accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits — 18 is
a crippled owner. Failure of the repair shop to provide security to a motor vehicle
owner would leave the latter at the mercy of the former. Moreover, on the
assumption that private respondent's repair business is duly registered, it
presupposes that its shop is covered by insurance from which it may recover the
loss. If private respondent can recover from its insurer, then it would be unjustly
enriched if it will not compensate petitioner to whom no fault can be attributed.
Otherwise, if the shop is not registered, then the presumption of negligence
applies.
One last thing. With respect to the value of the lost vehicle and its accessories for
which the repair shop is liable, it should be based on the fair market value that the
property would command at the time it was entrusted to it or such other value as
agreed upon by the parties subsequent to the loss. Such recoverable value is fair
and reasonable considering that the value of the vehicle depreciates. This value
may be recovered without prejudice to such other damages that a claimant is
entitled under applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the court a quo is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Registered in the name of petitioner with Plate No. PJK-666.
2 Rollo, p. 81.
3 Covered by CBC Receipt No. 691148; Rollo, p. 10.
4 Rollo, pp. 28-29.
5 Rollo, p. 29.
6 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
"Accordingly, this Court finds the defendant liable to the plaintiff for the value of
the vehicle in question. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the value of the
vehicle in the amount of Three Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
representing the acquisition cost of the vehicle plus the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos representing the cost of the four brand new tires, magwheels,
pioneer stereo speakers, air-conditioner, which were installed by the plaintiff in his
vehicle after the plaintiff bought the vehicle from the defendant. While it is true
that plaintiff purchased from the defendant the vehicle about two years and five
months before the same was lost, and therefore the vehicle had already
depreciated from its original value at the time it was lost, it is also true as agreed
upon by the parties in the pre-trial, that the present value of brand new vehicle of
the same type has at this time increased to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos without
accessories, so whatever is awarded by this Court to the plaintiff in this decision
would not even be sufficient to purcahse a brand new vehicle at the present prices.
This Court believes that the amount awarded to the plaintiff above-stated
represents a fair compromise, considering the depreciation of the vehicle from the
time it was purchased and to the time it was lost and which is off-seted by the
increase cost of a brand new vehicle at the present time. Defendant is likewise
ordered to pay plaintiff legal interest in the amount above-stated from the date of
the finality of this decision until full payment of the obligation. Further, defendant
is ordered to pay plaintiff Ten Thousand Pesos by attorney's fees." (sic was not
included so as no to clutter the narration); Rollo, pp. 78, 94.
7 CA Decision promulgated August 31, 1995 penned by Justice Austria-Martinez
with Justices Lantin and Salas, concurring; Rollo, pp. 26-32.
8 Caltex v. CA, 212 SCRA 448; Bergado v. CA, 173 SCRA 497 citing Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 26 SCRA 332. In the Bergado case (p. 501), the
court reiterated the rule that the specific exceptions to the general rule to be
observed in pre-trials emphasized in Gicano v. Gegato, 157 SCRA 140 is "that trial
court have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be
indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an
answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground
is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even
if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found
in the pleadings, or where a defendant had been declared in default. What is
essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the
prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the
record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's, or otherwise established by the
evidence."
9 Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657; General Enterprises, Inc., v. Llianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc., 120 Phil. 702; Tugade v. CA, 85 SCRA 226.
10 Sec. 1, Rule 131, 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence provides: "Burden of proof. —
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on he facts in issue
necessary to establish hisclaim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law." (Emphasis supplied).
11 Art. 1165. xxx xxx xxx
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more
persons who do not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for fortuitous
event until he has effected the delivery. (Emphasis supplied).
12 Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be
presumed that the loss was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary,
and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1165. This presumption does not
apply in case of earthquake, flood, storm, or other natural calamity. (Emphasis
supplie).
13 New Civil Code, Article 1265.
14 Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Art. 1262. xxx xxx xxx
When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous event, the loss
of the thing does not extinguish the obligation, and he shall be responsible for
damages. The same rule applies when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk. (Emphasis supplied).
15 P.D. 1572 (EMPOWERING THE SECRETARY OF TRADE TO REGULATE AND
CONTROL THE OPERATION OF SERVICE AND REPAIR ENTERPRISES FOR MOTOR
VEHICLES, HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND ENGINES AND ENGINEERING WORKS;
ELECTRONICS, ELECTRICAL, AIRCONDITIONING AND REFRIGERATION; OFFICE
EQUIPMENT; MEDICAL AND DENTAL EQUIPMENT; AND OTHER CONSUMER
MECHANICAL AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT; APPLIANCES OR DEVICES, INCLUDING
THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL EMPLOYED THEREIN).
Section 1. Accreditation. All enterprises and technical personnel employed therein
engaged in the service and repair of motor vehicles, heavy equipment, engines and
engineering works; electronics, electrical, air-conditioning and refrigeration; office
equipment; medical and dental equipment; and other consumer industrial electro-
mechanical, chemical and gaseous equipment, machinery, appliances or devices
should apply for accreditation with the Department of Trade within ninety (90)
days from the promulgation of this decree and should apply for renewal on or
before the 31st day of January of every year thereafter. No such service or repair
enterprices and technical personnel shall be licensed or permitted to operate in the
Philippines for the first time without being accredited by the Department of Trade.
16 DTI Ministry Order No. 32, Rule III
Sec. 1. REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION:
(1) Enterprise applying for original accreditation shall submit the following:
1.1 List of machineries/equipment/tools in useful condition;
1.2 List of certified engineers/accredited technicians mechanics with their personal
data;
1.3 Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the property entrusted by its
customer for repair, service or maintenance together with a copy of the official
receipt covering the full payment of premium;
1.4 Copy of Bond referred to under Section 7, Rule III of this Rules and Regulations;
1.5 Written service warranty in the form prescribed by the Bureau;
1.6 Certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Articles of
Incorporation or Partnership in case of corporation or partnership;
1.7 Such other additional documents which the director may require from time to
time.
Sec. 8. INSURANCE POLICY
The insurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and loss
should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment engines
electronics, electrical, airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines, and data
processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other consumer mechanical
and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or in the premises of the applicant."
(Emphasis supplied).
17 Cipriano v. CA, 263 SCRA 711 citing F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. CA, 164 SCRA 731
and Teague v. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181.
18 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, 1989 ed., vol. II, p. 70; De
Leon, Comments and Cases on Property, 1983 ed. p. 77; See also Article 428 of the
New Civil Code which states that "The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of
a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
"The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing
in order to recover it."
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the
decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused
petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693
to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court
under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense
charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor
General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April
1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture
workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this
entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra
Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as
Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he
had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng)
referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for
brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able
to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a
warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the
pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner
could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal
level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the
warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who
advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a
short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment,
the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A
to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of
the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article.
(Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing
agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner
would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the
documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in
turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured,
Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno)
was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated
checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the
four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated
charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the
request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks
were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated
August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of
P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of
P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it
pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner
became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit.
Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter
but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they
were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the
accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases,
as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year
in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to
complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the
court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the
cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the
private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the
30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of
Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of
the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair
service equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very
beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to
30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it
is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who
was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner
opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the
lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of
the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the
transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being
paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor)
when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints
or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not
be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to
even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping
of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the
corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know
that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose
operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke
suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she
specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it
was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out
the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of
transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in
simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in
the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as
in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need
petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances
victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law,
by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also
fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement
when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of
the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court
system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala
prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and
opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to
above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the
cases, were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez,
petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS
Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that
after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be
refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
"warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the
alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to
shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law.
Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness
transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning
businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that
the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual
and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered
as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense
charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs.
Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should
also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be
failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987
Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is
founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are
immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which
depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is
inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only
an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of
punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v.
Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v.
Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed
upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be
directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is
no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for
value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for
mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace
to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused,
however, by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the
ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused
was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to
complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement —
by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was
refundable to the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither
made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may
he assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these
allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and
established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on account
or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be a
conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to
the element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on
account or for value — it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being
present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment of an
obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of
the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued,
would have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the
prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was
such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that
appellant had not adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced
by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned
to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the
cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-
appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged.
But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already
been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest
in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line.
Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she
would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the
checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature
of the warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP
Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The
court relied on the rule that in cases ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether
or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for
the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy
and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated
checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on
account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed
against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for
which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime
could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain
facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . .
(Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless
excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the
performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may
constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or
as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and
regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the
depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and
generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits
payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not,
may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time.
(Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning,
petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up
the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital
conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by
Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated
to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of
which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J.,, concurs in the result.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-496 December 31, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellant.
William Lane O'Neill, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of
champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the
transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne
formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay,
and which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same,
without violence or intimidation, and without the consent of the owner, against the
statute in the case made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being
present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented a
demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try
the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime
was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the
territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to
which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that
the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the
court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six
month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders
of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all
crimes committed on board vessel flying the flag of the United States has been
vested in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and
orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the
United States Civil Commission. He argued that the President of the United States
had unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding general and the Civil
Commission to establish a judicial system with authority to take cognizance of
maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this Archipelago,
which is now analogous to the status of some of the States of the Union during the
Mexican war and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the
court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have been
committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of
the defendants, with the costs to the Government. Against this order the
prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the
high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil
Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly
confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes
committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are
clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true
with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true
meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such
doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the
Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven
paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes
and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country,
or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship
or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in
accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the
jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The
transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with
the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.