1. Lazo v. Judge Tiong A.M. No.

MTJ-98-1173, 300 SCRA 173 , December 15, 1998

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

FACTS: A complaint was filed against respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan for grave misconduct and abuse of authority relative to the case
filed by the complainant Carlitos Lazo against Danilo D. Lazo for falsification and use of
falsified document, which was assigned to respondent judge. Complainant charged
that respondent did not inhibit himself from the case until after two (2) months despite the fact
that respondent judge and the accused are related within the fourth degree of affinity, the wife of
the accused being the first cousin of the judge.

ISSUE: W/N Judge Tiong acted improperly in handling the case of his cousin?

RULING: Yes. Under Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to party in a case is disqualified from the sitting in the
case without the consent of all parties, expected in writing signed by them, and entered upon the
record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties
but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent
judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only
a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge
should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he
should administer justice impartially and without delay. The respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong
is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same or similar act
or omission will bedealt with more severely.
2. Spelmans v. Judge Ocampo A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, 616 SCRA 539 , March 26, 2010

Ponente: Abad, J.

Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans, a Belgian, filed a complaint for theft and graft and corruption against
respondent MTC Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo of Polomolok, South Cotabato The petitioner alleged that his wife,
Annalyn Villan, filed a complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio and his wife, from whom Spelmans rented a
house, but that this complaint was his wife's scheme to take out his personal properties from that house. Judge
Ocampo held an ocular inspection of that rented house and another one where Spelmans kept some of the personal
belongings of his late mother, where he allegedly took pieces of antique: a marble bust of Spelmans’ mother; a
flower pot; a statue, and a copper scale of justice. A week later, Judge Ocampo went back and took six Oakwood
chairs and its table, four gold champagne glasses, and a deer horn chandelier. Judge Ocampo insists that Villan
gave him the personal items mentioned by Spelmans for safekeeping before she filed in his court the complaint for
theft against Rencio.

The Ombudsman, Mindanao, referred Spelmans’ complaint against Judge Ocampo to the Office of the Court
Administrator, which found Judge Ocampo guilty of committing acts of impropriety and maintaining close
affinity with a litigant in violation of Canons 1 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.

W/N Judge Ocampo violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct?

Ruling: Yes. Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all people in Polomolok, South Cotabato, Spelmans’ wife,
Villan, would entrust to him, a municipal judge, certain personal items for safekeeping. This is essentially suspect
because she would subsequently file, according to Judge Ocampo, a case of theft of personal items that Rencio
supposedly took from Spelmans’ houses. Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon
2, and Section 1 of Canon 4. From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. He was not a
warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept Spelmans’ properties
had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of covetousness. It affected the performance of his
duties as an officer of the court and tainted the judiciary’s integrity. He should be punished accordingly.

He was found GUILTY of gross misconduct and IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION from office
without salary and other benefits for six (6) months.17 He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
3. Gacad v. Clapis, Jr. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257 676, SCRA 534, July 17, 2012

Ponente: Per Curiam

FACTS: Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave Misconduct and
Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of
Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case. Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the
Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the case of her brother. The prosecutor of the
said case, Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her
favor but on the pretext that in return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the
meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount, told
her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato nisila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush
them.)When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to the petitioner
only after the date of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an
application for bail and granting the same without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a preliminary conference seven months from
the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. However, the
judge claimed that notices were made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he
stressed that both sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings,
petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open court. He admitted that his personnel
inadvertently scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.

HELD: YES. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties.
For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The acts of Judge
Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling those
words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial
reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by
shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible
for order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the
judge’s responsibility.
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality,
integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2,Section 1 and 2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and
Canon 4, Section 1.We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for
conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without
affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong.
DISMISSED.
4. Seludo v. Fineza A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, 447 SCRA 73, December 16, 2004

Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts: Atty. Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 131, with violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Atty. Seludo alleged that respondent judge filed with the same court (Branch 128), a
complaint for revocation of notarial commission against him. During the hearing on July 8, 2003,
respondent judge uttered “vulgar and insulting words” against complainant.
In his comment, respondent judge admitted that he uttered derogatory words during the
proceeding. He, however, explained that he has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes,
causing him considerable anxiety and pain. This must be the reason why he could not control his
outburst.
Besides, the incident was precipitated by the conduct of the complainant and the Executive
Judge. Complainant was unkind and impolite to him. He kept on interrupting him. In fact, after
his oral manifestation, complainant began to laugh and ridicule him. Moreover, when he asked
the Executive Judge to cite complainant in contempt of court, the latter stood up with clenched
fists and acted in a menacing manner.
Complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on the ground that he is no longer interested
in pursuing the case since respondent has retired from the judiciary.

Issue: W/N Judge Fineza is guilty of gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
Ruling: Yes. In ascribing the words “moronic attitude,” “stupid,” “if he knows how to read
English” and “putang ina mo” to complainant during the proceedings before the Executive
Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so unbecoming of a magistrate. The remarks uttered are
patently defamatory and outrageous. That respondent was suffering from heart ailment and
diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the assistance of a lawyer to represent him in
prosecuting the case. As correctly observed by the Court Administrator, his disgraceful behavior
tainted the good image of the judiciary he is expected to uphold at all times.
We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires that they must at all
times be temperate in their language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from
resorting “to the language of vilification.”
In the same vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos, we held that although, respondent judge may attribute his
intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands
from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate,
patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.
He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) to be deducted from
his retirement benefits.
5. Tabora v. Carbonell A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145, 621 SCRA 196, June 18, 2010

Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts: Civil Case No. 6840 entitled “Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay Rural Bank, Inc.” was raffled
to the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26 presided by Judge Tabora. However, due
to the prolonged absence of Judge Tabora caused by a serious illness, Judge Antonio A.
Carbonell took over the case from beginning to end. When Tabisula found out that Judge
Carbonell had already rendered a decision, she requested for a copy but was denied. Upon her
return to work Judge Tabora then issued an order requiring the parties to submit their respective
memorandums 15 days upon receipt of order. Judge Tabora informed Tabisula that even if the
pairing judge was the one who heard the case from beginning to end, the prerogative of
rendering the decision still rests entirely on the presiding judge.
On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case adverse to Tabisula.
Tabisula then wrote a letter to Judge Carbonell requesting for a copy of his decision, through
which she later found out that Judge Carbonell decided in Tabisula’s favour.
Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case and found out that Judge
Carbonell’s decision was not in accordance with the facts of the case and the applicable law and
appeared to have unjustly favored Tabisula.
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and deliberately changing,
altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction.
Tabisula added that this has caused her undue injury since the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840,
and that Rang-Ay Rural Bank Inc. was represented by its President, Ives Q. Nisce, who was
allegedly a relative of Judge Tabora’s husband.

Issue: W/N Judge Carbonelle violated the Code of Judicial Conduct?

Ruling:: Yes. Judge Carbonell should have sought the conformity of Judge Tabora in rendering his
own decision to the case as a matter of judicial courtesy and respect. Judge Carbonell had no
authority to render a decision on the subject civil case. Judge Carbonell for violating Section 2,
Canon 3 of the New Code is guilty of simple misconduct and FINE him P10,000.00, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits which have been withheld.
6. Ortiz v. Jaculde A.M. No. RTJ-04-1833, 461 SCRA 361, June 28, 2005

Ponente: Azcuna

Facts: Alexander B. Ortiz was a respondent in a case filed before the sala of Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr., where
Atty. Richard Enojo, who is the son-in-law of respondent Judge represented the plaintiff in the same case. A
compromise agreement was entered into by the parties, for which the plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution which was hastily granted by Judge Jaculbe without holding a hearing to prove the failure of
defendants to comply with the compromise agreement. Complainant further claims that the relationship between
Judge Jaculbe and Atty. Richard Enojo is within the third degree of affinity.

W/N Judge Jaculbe violated the Code of Judicial Conduct?

Ruling: Yes. The prohibition against the Judge’s sitting in the case is found in the Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as quoted above and in Sec. 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The prohibition under the rules is
clear. Therefore, Judge Jaculbe’s failure to inhibit himself when his son-in-law appeared as counsel in a case he
was trying is a patent violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court. In Sales v. Calvan, the
Court found that Judge Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of judges as set out in the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Rules of Court when he conducted the preliminary investigation of a criminal case where his wife
was the niece of the private complainant. A FINE of P11,000 is hereby imposed on him.
7. Benancillo v. Amila A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, 645 SCRA 1, March 09, 2011

Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Facts: Benancillo avers that the Judge Amila of the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) against her live-in partner which included a directive to turn over to her personal effects,
including properties in their diving business.
The Benancillo states that the Amila constantly ruled in her favor but Amila refused to enforce
the TPO. Amila called Benancillo and her counsel to a meeting in Amila’s chambers but they
did not proceed when Benancillo learned that intervenors were joining them. Amila later issued
an Order rescinding the initial order granting the TPO.
Benancillo argues that Judge Amila’s conduct smacks of impropriety and partiality. Benancillo
then charged the judge with grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law and procedure
and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for issuing the questioned Orders. OCA
found that Judge Amila acted inappropriately for: calling for a meeting in his chambers using
derogatory and irreverent language in presenting complainant as an opportunist, a mistress in an
illegitimate relationship, and that she was motivated by insatiable greed. Amila explained that he
called for the meeting in his chambers because he wanted to advice the parties that he will
rescind his initial order granting the TPO.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Amila, is found guilty of impropriety?

Ruling: Yes. Calling meeting to his chambers Judge Amila acted inappropriately in calling for a meeting inside his
chambers. This act would logically create an impression to Benancillo that the meeting of the judge with the
intervenors had turned his views around towards issuing a revocation of the initial Order.
For derogatory and irreverent language. It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The
act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language.
He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger
community as such. Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than
attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust. Judge Venancio J. Amila GUILTY of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him P21,000.00.
8. Co v. Plata A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501, 453 SCRA 326, March 14, 2005

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts: Complainant Co was the private offended party in 2 Criminal Cases against spouses Milagros and Jose
Villaceran, which were raffled to the respondent Judge. Respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest and fixed
their bail at P100,000 each. The accused Villacerans voluntarily appeared and separately filed Applications for
Bail. Respondent Judge granted bail to the accused Villacerans in the reduced amount of P50,000 each. By virtue
of the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans, respondent Judge recalled the Warrant of Arrest issued
against them. Judge Plata was not aware that one of the papers that he had signed was one of the applications for
bail of Sps. Villaceran until he received a copy of the complaint of Co. Judge Plata was likewise not aware that his
staff failed to completely fill up all the necessary data in the forms in accordance with his instructions prior to filing
them.
Complainant Co charged respondent Judge with grosspartiality by pointing out irregularities in the Applications
for Bail. Complainant Co filed a motion for the respondent Judge to inhibit himself, which was granted but he
maintained that he had not been partial and biased.

Issue: W/N respondent judge showed partiality?

Ruling: No. (1) the respondent Judge is guilty of simple negligence for his failure to scrutinize the
documents he had signed and to follow the proper procedure for fixing the amount of bail, for
which he is meted a fine of P2,000.00; (2) the respondent Judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Ethics for his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he is
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely; and
(3) the charge of inefficiency in office against respondent Judge to be without basis and is hereby
dismissed.

The rights of the accused Villacerans to bail and to the reduction thereof to a reasonable amount
were not questioned herein; rather, at issue was the manner the reduction of the bail was granted.
In the cases of Te v. Perez and Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas, referred to by the OCA in its
Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004, this Court held that there should be a hearing before
granting bail, whether bail was a matter of right or discretion; and the Judge should notify the
prosecutor of the date of the hearing or require the prosecutor to
submit his recommendation.
9. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, 628 SCRA 626, August 24, 2010

Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Facts: Complainant sent a memorandum to Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to invite his attention
to the irregular arrangement being adopted by the Fourth Division in conducting its provincial
hearings.
In conducting provincial hearing, the Fourth Division has adopted a different procedure. They do
not sit as collegial body, instead they divide the division into two. In such a manner, the
Chairman will hear some of the cases alone and the other members will hear other cases,
conducting hearing separately and simultaneously.
During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial body. Instead,
Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada heard the
other cases together. Complying with Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio’s instructions, the
complainant objected to the arrangement, but her objections were brushed aside.
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made intemperate and discriminatory utterances
during hearings, such as asking lawyers from which law schools they had graduated.

Issue: W/N the justices are guilty of gross misconduct?

Ruling: No. Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as
members of the Fourth Division “in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto.” It is simply not
enough that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one
another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of
them sat together in session. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent
Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of
the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings. For this reason alone, respondent
Justices’ adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in
judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross
misconduct or gross ignorance of the law.
The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct—defined as the transgression of
some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal
rules—considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not
refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings
within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of
the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-
motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for
the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired
by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which law
schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective
law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite
humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We point out that
publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no
matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for
or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise
to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ONG is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper
procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
10. Correa v. Belen A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, 627 SCRA 13 , August 06, 2010

Ponente: Nachura, J.

Facts: Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in Special
Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled Intestate Estate of Hector Tan.
He revealed that during the hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the
Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report covering the said estate, and immediately ruled that
they should be disallowed. Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her
as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants.

Issue: is respondent judge guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge?

Ruling: Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in his language
in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must
behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the
most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system. A judge must
consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belen’s insulting
statements, tending to project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from
his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly
insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and authority could only invite
disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue that members of the bench
should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always called for.
GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him P10,000.00, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
11. Dagudag v. Paderanga A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, 555 SCRA 217, June 19, 2008

Ponente: Per Curiam

Facts: Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. wereseized by the DENR. The items
were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by the unknown owner.
Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated products. Respondent
Judge issued the writ despite thefact that an administrative case was already pending before the DENR.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the lawand for conduct unbecoming a
judge?

Ruling: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He
went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Second, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. Judge
Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross
ignorance of the law. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall
take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial
duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws. The
rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There
was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of
the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the
replevin suit outright.

DISMISSED him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
12. Espineli vs Español A.M. No. RTJ-03-1785, 453 SCRA 96, March 10, 2005

Ponente: Corona, J.

Facts: Espineli was the accused in a murder case that was tried by respondent judge. After the prosecution rested its
case, Espineli’s lawyer filed a demurrer to evidence on without leave of court.
Respondent judge ordered the assistant provincial prosecutor to file his comment to the demurrer within ten days.
She then set the continuation of the trial of the case. On the date of the hearing, respondent judge ordered that the
case be considered submitted for decision in view of the demurrer to evidence submitted, without leave of court,
by the accused’s counsel. However, after accused’s counsel left the courtroom, Espineli arrived with his NBI
escorts so respondent judge set aside her previous order, reopened the case and set it for hearing. She decided the
case and convicted the Espineli.
Espineli filed a motion for reconsideration but it remained unresolved. Respondent judge averred that she did not
act on it because she was still waiting for the comment of the prosecution. Espineli surmised that respondent judge
falsified her certificate of service by not indicating that there was, in her branch, a matter that remained unresolved
even beyond the 90-day period set by law, for otherwise she could not have collected her salary.
Respondent judge said that the delay was merely an oversight “which could be attributable to the maze of record
that could not be properly kept, managed and reviewed considering the limited space being occupied by the court
and its staff.” She further alleged that she could not act on the accused’s motion because the prosecution had not
yet filed its comment.

Issue: W/N respondent judge is guilty of inefficiency?

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution provides that all cases or matters filed before lower courts must be decided or
resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct requires that “a judge should administer justice without delay.” Rule 3.05 thereof
provides that “a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.”
A judge is mandated by the Constitution to render judgment and resolve pending incidents not more than 90 days
from the time the case is submitted for resolution.
No amount of explanation can justify respondent’s failure to decide the case beyond the 90-day
period prescribed by law and to resolve the motion for reconsideration for 23 months. The noble
office of a judge is to render justice not only impartially, but expeditiously as well, for “delay in
the judiciary lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.”
She was found liable for inefficiency and neglect of duty. She is fined the amount of P11,000 to
be deducted from her retirement benefits