BRILLANTE vs.

CA and People complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the

FACTS
This case was about Jejomar Binay who filed a libel case against
Roberto Brillante for circulating an open letter which described
in detail the plot to assassinate Augusto Syjuco, another
mayoralty candidate in Makati City.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position
of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati
Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the
course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay and Dr.
Nemesio Prudente (Prudente), then President of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines of plotting the assassination of
Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and
harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated
among the journalists copies of an open letter to President
Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay.
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote
news articles about the same. The open letter was subsequently
published under the title "Plea to Cory--Save Makati" in
newspapers.
Brillante was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4)
counts, as author or writer, of LIBEL by the RTC. Brillante
appealed to the CA contending that informations were filed by
the prosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense had already
prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the
publication of the open letter on January 10, 11 and 12, 1988.
period of prescription of criminal responsibility.
Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. CA clarified that the filing
of the complaint with the fiscal’s office also suspends the running
of the prescriptive period of a crime. It held that like the
proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation,
a proceeding in the fiscal’s office, may terminate without
conviction of acquittal.
There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in Olarte
and Francisco as Brillante erroneously suggests. Olarte laid
down the doctrine that a complaint filed for purposes of
preliminary investigation tolls the running of the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense. The criminal complaint for libel in
that case was filed, for the purpose of preliminary investigation,
with the justice of the Peace Court in Pozzorubio, Pangasinan.
Hence, in setting the doctrine, the Court referred to the “filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court.” The question of whether
the doctrine laid down in Olarte also applies to criminal
complaints filed with the prosecutor’s office was settled in
Francisco. Specifically, the Court in Francisco amplified the
Olarte doctrine when it categorically ruled that the filing of a
complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Thus, the CA was correct in ruling that the offense of libel had
not yet prescribed when the informations against Brillante and
his co-accused where filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-
Makati.

The appellate court held that the offense of libel had not yet
prescribed because the one-year prescription period should be
reckoned from the time that the private complainant Prudente
filed his complaint with the fiscal’s office on January 15, 1988
and not when the Informations were filed by the prosecutor on
January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals added that under
Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect during the pendency of
the cases against Brillante, the institution of the complaint before
the fiscal’s office or the courts for preliminary investigation
interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense charged. It held
that being a procedural rule, Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the
cases against Brillante.

ISSUE

WON the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office interrupted
the period of prescription of criminal responsibility

HELD

Yes.

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the "crime of

libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." In
determining when the one-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same
code which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive
periods of offenses. It expressly states that prescriptive period
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.
The meaning of the phrase “shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information” in Article 91 has been settled in
People v. Olarte, where the Court settled divergent views as to
the effect of filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for
purposes of preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period
of the offense. The court therein held that the filing of the
 PEOPLE vs. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon
the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's
PRINCIPLE recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint
It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint
was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that
with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive
respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
period

FACTS

On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his

co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private
complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.

On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of

the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries
against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting
the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong
issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999
recommending the filing of an Information against herein
respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be
found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only
on June 20, 2000.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the

ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day
period of prescription from the date of the commission of the
crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC
ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.The RTC denied
said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC.

The CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the

60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended
party filed a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August 16,
1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had
prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC.

ISSUE

Whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the

investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper
criminal information against respondent was approved by the
City Prosecutor.

HELD

NO. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of

prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is

absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

The Court does not agree with the CA and respondent that upon
approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for
the filing of an information against respondent, the period of
prescription began to run again.
 SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED vs. LIM
DOCTRINE
In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The
Factual Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary Investigations Will
Not Be Disturbed
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not interfere
with the results of such proceedings. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is appropriate only when the prosecutor
has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
FACTS
Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese corporation, is the
copyright owner of various animated characters sold locally by
its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated, which allowed
local entities to manufacture petitioner’s products. On May 30,
2000, a search warrant was issued against respondent Lim
alleged to be selling imitations of petitioner’s products. As a
result thereof, various Sanrio Products were seized.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on April 4, 2002 for
copyright infringement with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual
Property Piracy (TAPP) of the DOJ. TAPP, however, found that
the items in the possession of herein respondent are not
infringing copies of herein petitioner’s products. Thus, the
complaint was dismissed.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an appeal in the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor (OCSP) of the DOJ. It was however dismissed
for lack of reversible error.
Upon appeal with the CA, it affirmed the ruling of the OCSP and
further held that the offense had already prescribed. According
to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two
years after the commission of the alleged violation, the offense
had already prescribed. The same court further ruled that the
DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Petition for Review .26 To be criminally liable for violation of
Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must be
present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the
genuine article.
The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent knew that the merchandise he sold was counterfeit.
Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show that he
obtained these goods from legitimate sources.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the action had prescribed
(2) Whether or not there is copyright infringement
HELD
(1) NO, the action had not yet prescribed
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for
violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was
committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4,
2002 or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI
searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio
merchandise therefrom. Although no information was
immediately filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had not
yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,31 we
affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of
criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the prescriptive period for the
prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by
petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the
TAPP.
(2) NO, there is no copyright infringement
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable
cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.34Because a public prosecutor is the one
conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the
existence of probable cause.35Consequently, the decision to
file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a complaint
depends on his sound discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude
of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. For
this reason, courts generally do not interfere with the results of
such proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the
sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause
justifying the filing of a criminal information against the
respondent.37 By way of exception, however, judicial review is
allowed where respondent has clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.38 Otherwise
stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.39
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable
cause existed against respondent for violation of the IPC. They
were in the best position to determine whether or not there was
probable cause. We find that they arrived at their findings after
carefully evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and
respondent. Their conclusion was not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
 MIAQUE vs. PATAG
FACTS
This is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.
Five Informations for libel were filed in the RTC of Iloilo City,
These Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction over
the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to
allege either that private respondent actually held office in Iloilo
City at the time of the commission of the offenses or that the
alleged libelous remarks were printed or first published in Iloilo
City.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the filing of new amended Informations for libel
against petitioner and his co-accused. Accordingly, five new
Informations for libel were filed against petitioner and his co-
accused in the RTC of Iloilo City, presided by respondent Judge
Patag.
Petitioner filed his motions not to issue warrants of arrest and, if
already issued, to recall them and remand the Informations to
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge denied petitioner's motions on the ground
that petitioner was beyond the court's jurisdiction as he was not
under the custody of the court. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the
quashed Informations were merely amended, A new preliminary
investigation was therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of
arrest, the OSG alleges that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8, 2005 motions.
The filing of the motions supposedly was tantamount to
voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the court
ISSUE
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against
the persons accused. xxx
The Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:[14]
[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge
of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations
of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and
in the Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall discharge all
the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law
upon provincial fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have
the necessary informations or complaints prepared against the
persons accused. city, and shall discharge all the duties in
respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial
fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have
the necessary informations or complaints prepared against the
persons accused. Xxx
The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly
lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor's Office. The Iloilo
Provincial Prosecutor's Office was clearly bereft of authority to
file the new Informations against petitioner. An Information,
when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer,
cannot be filed by another
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August
25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 are hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of new
Informations by an authorized officer. The warrants of arrest
issued are likewise QUASHED.

Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office over Informations

for offenses to have been committed in the City.

HELD

Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275 provide:

SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals' Staffing. -

- There shall be in each province and each subprovince; one
provincial fiscal and such number of assistant provincial fiscals
as may hereinafter be provided for.

There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number of
assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.

xxx

SEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and

Functions. - The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:

a) Xxx

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges

of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
 NELSON CHUA vs. PADILLO Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control
and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the
FACTS Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public
prosecutor’s decision may even be reversed or modified by the
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the Office of the President.9
owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money
lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-
Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the
Chua, served as the firm’s manager. Marissa is married to
Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
Wilson Chua. One of Marissa’s functions was to evaluate and
recommend loan applications for approval by respondents. the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.10
was found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some
of the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for
approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were The Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and
spurious. Marissa’s modus operandi was to alter the name of circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable
the payee appearing on the check by adding another name as cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of Appeals
an alternative payee. The cash amounts received were turned identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa’s consistent practice of
over to Marissa or her husband for deposit on their personal depositing checks with altered names of payees to the
account. The total amount embezzled reached ₱7 million. respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2)
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the NBI. considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it
NBI, then, forwarded their complaints to the Office of the City can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and
Prosecutor for preliminary Investigation. After the preliminary (3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of
investigation, the prosecutor filed and information for estafa Marissa.
against Marissa, Wilson and Renita. Believing that a more
serious offense should have been charged against petitioners,
respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
The Secretary of Justice modified the resolution of the City
Prosecutor. SOJ directed to file the information of complex crime
of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The
SOJ also found that the participation of Wilson Chua was not
clearly established by the evidence and as to Renita Chua, the
SOJ found no proof of conspiracy. Respondents then filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding
that there was no conspiracy among the petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. The
motion was granted by the CA. The Court of Appeals, on motion
for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that
only Marissa should be charged.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in

compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the Information
Wilson and Renita.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals eered in ruling that the Secretary

of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that
only Marissa should be charged.

HELD

Yes.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as

amended, partly provides that "All criminal actions either
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."

We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s exercise

of his discretionary powers is not absolute.

First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to

appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the
 COBBARUBIAS vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
 Petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was charged
with:
Frustrated Homicide (Criminal
Case No. 94-5036),
Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-
5038),
Violation of Section 261(Q) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Section 32 of Republic Act No.
7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392),
and Illegal Possession of
Firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case
No. 94-5037).
 Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the
charges and trial followed.
 Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the charges of frustrated
homicide and Illegal possession of
firearms because the prosecutor failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
 Criminal cases of homicide and violation of
sec. 261 of the Omnibus Election Code
was set for trial.
 Petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion
for Correction of Clerical Error,4 alleging that
in the dispositive portion of the Order,
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide)
should have been dismissed instead of
Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms), which should
have been the case set for further trial.
 Petitioner maintained that there was a
typographical error in the dispositive portion
considering that in the body of the Order, the
trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioner in the charges for Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide.
 Respondent Acting Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda5 denied the motion, holding that the
alleged error was substantial in nature which
affected the very merit of the case.
 Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals to
set aside the orders of respondent Judge
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for failure to submit with the petition a
clear duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed Order and for failure
of petitioner’s counsel to indicate his
current official receipt number and date of
payment of the current Integrated Bar of
the Philippines membership dues,
pursuant to SC Bar Matter No. 287.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which
the CA granted. Petitioner was directed to
implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent, but failed to do so, which
resulted to the dismissal of his petition once
more.
ISSUES
 Whether or not the dismissal of Cobarrubias’
petition on grounds of technicality, despite
subsequent compliance, was valid;
 Whether or not the clerical error in the
dispositive portion of decision by judge
respondent was substantial in nature
HELD
1. No. Although petitioner’s failure to implead the
Republic of the Philippines may fall under Sec. 8, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which provided that manifest delay is a ground
for dismissal, Sec. 6 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court also provided
that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective in securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding.
In this case, the Court finds the petitioner’s failure to
implead the People of the Philippines as respondent not so
grave as to warrant dismissal of the petition. After all, petitioner
rectified his error by moving for reconsideration and filing an
Amended Petition, impleading the People of the Philippines as
respondent. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals should have
granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and given due
course to the petition in view of petitioner’s subsequent
compliance by filing an Amended Petition, impleading the
People of the Philippines as respondent. Technicalities may be
set aside when the strict and rigid application of the rules will
frustrate rather than promote justice
2. No. The trial court inadvertently designated the
wrong criminal case numbers when they were cited in the
decision. In the dispositive portion, the trial court erroneously
dismissed Criminal Case No. 94-5037 which refers to the charge
for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866, while Criminal Case No. 94-5038 which refers to the
charge for Homicide was set for further trial.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict
between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of the
decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo
is the final order and becomes the subject of execution, while
the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or
conclusions of the court ordering nothing.
However, where one can clearly and unquestionably
conclude from the body of the decision that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will
prevail, as is in this case. The body discussed the
prosecution’s failure to prove accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide. Hence, it is only just and proper to correct the
dispositive portion to reflect the exact findings of the lower
court
 GO vs. LOOYUKO

FACTS

Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Respondent Alberto T. Looyuko

were business associates. Respondent Looyuko is the
registered owner of Noah’s Ark Merchandising, a sole
proprietorship, which includes other field of businesses that are
collectively known as the Noah’s Ark Group of Companies.
Petitioner Go was the business manager or chief operating
officer of the group of companies.

Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out that

spawned numerous civil law suits. Among these actions are Civil
Case No. 67921 – an action for specific performance,
accounting, inventory of assets and damages and Criminal
Case No. 98-1643 – a case for estafa.

However, the criminal case has been dismissed by reason of the

death of the respondent Looyuko without prejudice to the filing
of a separate civil action. The Court of Appeals explained that
the petition was initiated solely by the petitioner and was
dismissible for it did not implead nor have the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE

Whether or not the case reflects conformity of the trial

prosecutor assigned to said criminal case.

HELD

No. It can be observed from the two petitions that they do not
reflect the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned to the said
criminal case. This is in breach of Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court which states that:

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal

actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to
the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer,
or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
may prosecute the case. This authority ceases upon actual
intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to
the Regional Trial Court.

Although in rare occasions, the offended party as a “person

aggrieved” was allowed to file a petition under Rule 65 before
the CA without the intervention of the Solicitor General, the
instant petitions before the CA, as a general rule, should be filed
by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State and not solely by
the offended party. For it must observed that for non-compliance
with the rules, the twin petitions could have been rejected
outright.

However, in view of the death of the respondent Looyuko, these

procedural matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.
 PEOPLE vs. DUCA

FACTS

Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were

charged of the crime of Falsification of Official Document. Upon
being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’.

MCTC finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification. RTC affirmed. CA,
via petition for review, ruled that “However, the prosecution
failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by
Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary, the
defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly
authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on
the house erected on the land registered under their mother’s
name.

ISSUE

WON prosecution was denied due process when the CA

resolved the respondent’s appeal without notifying the People of
the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency
of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his
comment.

HELD

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases

before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor

General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of
the Philippines and as such, should have been given the
opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records
show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his
Comment on Duca’s petition.

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent

without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his
comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of
its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed
before the CA.
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing
of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.
 FIRAZA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS

Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI Caraga

and was issued a firearm and a mission to gather and report to
the NBI such information as may be relevant to investigations
undertaken by it. In his private capacity, he is a manager for RF
Communications. On August 11, 2000, he met with Rivas at his
restaurant for a business matter. A heated exchange ensued.
Firaza pointed a gun at Rivas.

The information however contained a description to the Crime:

Expired license or permit to carry outside residence renewed
from the government authority concerned. The lower court
however convicted him of Unauthorized Carrying of Licensed
Firearm outside Residence.

Firaza appealed the case contending that the lower court

convicted of an offense different from that charged in the
complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the information/complaint was sufficient?

HELD

The allegations in a Complaint or Information determine what

offense is charged. The alleged acts or omissions complained
of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the statute
determining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment

Petitioner cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated. For the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings before the trial court shows that the, through his
counsel, was duly informed of the nature of the case against
him.

The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry

firearms “In connection with confidential(illegible) cases
assigned to him.” Admittedly, petitioner was at Rivas’ restaurant
in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally,
the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to carry his duly
issued firearm outside of his residence.
 MALTO vs. PEOPLE The designation in the information of the specific statute violated
is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
FACTS the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However,
the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the
That on or about and sometime during the month of November
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information
Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence,
charged. What controls is not the title of the information or the
relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor
information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense,
conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has
that determines the crime being charged in the information.
carnal knowledge.
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother lodged
correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article
a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City.
III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed
Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an
the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be
Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610.
convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient information and duly proven during trial.
to sustain petitioner’s conviction and rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article
III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced
him to reclusion temporal.

In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if

it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.

ISSUE

WHETHER the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on

the grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual
intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart”
relationship.

RULING

NO. The complaint or information shall state the designation of

the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

The designation of the offense in the information against

petitioner was changed from "violation of Section 5(b), Article III"
of RA 7610 to "violation of Section 5(a), Article III" thereof.

The information against petitioner did not allege anything

pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It did not aver
that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that
petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced
and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge
in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-
year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation
of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA
7610.
 PEOPLE vs ARMANDO RODAS and JOSE RODAS, SR.
FACTS
• For the death of one Titing Asenda, accused-appellant
Jose Rodas, Sr., together with his sons Charlito, Armando, and
Jose Jr., all surnamed Rodas, were charged with murder.
• When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.
• By agreement of the parties, pre-trial conference was
terminated on 6 December 1996. Thereafter, trial on the merits
commenced.
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances." Section 8 merely
requires the Information to specify the circumstances. Section 8
does not require the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified
by" to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an
offense. It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified
by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the
essential element raising the crime to a higher category.
• Hence, appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas,
Sr. are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery.

• The prosecution presented five witnesses.

• Before the prosecution could rest its case, accused

Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr. withdrew their previous
pleas of "NOT GUILTY" and entered their respective pleas of
"GUILTY" for the lesser crime of Homicide. Both were sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty (17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years and were each ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the victim).

• On 9 July 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision

finding accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas,
Sr. guilty of the crime of Murder.

• In finding accused-appellants guilty, the trial court gave

credence to the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alberto Asonda
and Ernie Anggot. It found accused-appellants and the other two
accused conspired in the killing of the victim and that treachery
attended the same. It gave no weight to accused-appellants’
defense of alibi and denial arguing that they were positively
identified as the perpetrators and that they failed to adduce
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be present
at the crime scene when the killing happened. It added that their
unsubstantiated denial will not be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters.

• Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision

ISSUE

• WON they are guilty of homicide and not murder

HELD

• We find no reason to reverse the findings of the trial

court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We affirm appellants’
conviction.

• In this case appellants argue that assuming arguendo

they are guilty, they are liable only for the crime of homicide, not
murder. They contend that treachery was absent since they,
together with Charlito and Jose Jr., met the victim casually in the
dance hall.

• In People v. Aquino, we have held that even after the

recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive
words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an
offense.

• Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information

shall "state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
PO3 SOMBILON vs. PEOPLE
PEOPLE vs. CHING
 PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ
FACTS
Appellant Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco was charged with three
counts of Rape committed sometime in June 1997 (AAA then
12 years old), in January to December 1998 (AAA then 13
years old) and in April 1999 (AAA then 14 years old) against
his own daughter.
AAA testified that on several occasions in the above-
mentioned dates, her father raped her in their house while her
mother was at work. She did not tell her mother because she
was afraid of appellant. After the rape incident sometime in
April 1999, she told a cousin what happened and the latter
brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where
her complaint-affidavit was executed.
The NBI’s medical examination revealed that AAA’s hymen
had an old-healed laceration at the four o’clock position and
that the hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that
he was often away from home and usually returned only four
days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He
would usually return home in the morning after his wife had
gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA would already be
in school. He admitted being in a rehabilitation center for
sometime, but continued to take drugs upon his release. He
also admitted that he would beat and threaten his wife if she
did not give him money for drugs.
When found guilty by the lower court of the crime of rape in
charged under two criminal cases, appellant contends that he
should have been acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 7197-99
and 7199-99. He avers that the informations are not explicit
and certain as to the dates of the rape. He argues that such
uncertainties run afoul of the constitutionally protected right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that the two criminal informations filed against
appellant are sufficient to inform appellant of the accusations
against him. The OSG contends that Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court merely requires that the information state "the
approximate time of the commission of the offense." Further,
Section 11 of the same rule provides that the precise date of
the commission of the offense needs to be alleged in the
information only when "it is a material ingredient of the
offense."
ISSUE
Whether or not the precise dates of the commission of the rape
be alleged in the information.
HELD
No, the precise dates of the commission of the rape need not
be alleged in the information.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an
essential element of the crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution
for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is
the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The
precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its
commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in
the information with ultimate precision.
The allegation in the informations that the appellant committed
the rape "sometime in June 1997" and "sometime in April
1999" was sufficient to inform appellant that he was being
charged of qualified rape committed against his daughter. The
allegation adequately afforded appellant an opportunity to
prepare his defense. Thus, appellant cannot complain that he
was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
At any rate, it is now too late for appellant to question the
sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding the dates of
the commission of the offense. Appellant could have filed a
motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a
motion to quash on the ground that the informations alleged
erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea. However, he did not.
Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case, appellant has
waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of
an error as to the time of the alleged rape.
Also, the Supreme Court is not persuaded by apellants’s
allegation that AAA filed the rape cases to have him
imprisoned because of his failure to fulfill his paternal
obligations. When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to constitute the commission of the crime that has
been inflicted on her. This doctrine applies with more vigor
when the culprit is a close relative of the victim, and her father
at that. Besides, no woman, least of all a minor, would concoct
a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the
wrong done to her.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 31, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals finding appellant Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death meted out on the appellant is reduced
to RECLUSION PERPETUA, for each count of rape, without
eligibility for parole as provided under Rep. Act No. 9346; and
(2) the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages against appellant are set at P75,000,
P75,000, and P25,000, respectively, for each count of rape, or
a total of P150,000 as civil indemnity, another P150,000 as
moral damages, and P50,000 as exemplary damages, for the
two counts of rape, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE vs. JALBUENA
FACTS
Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa was charged and convicted with
rape of his daughter, AAA, who is a minor. On appeal, Jalbuena
contends that the testimony of his daughter was inconsistent.
He also questions as fatally defective the information for failure
to allege the date and time of the commission of the offense
charged, thus violating his constitutionally protected right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
and depriving him of the opportunity to prepare for his defense.
Appellant questions as fatally defective the information for
failure to allege the date and time of the commission of the
offense charged, thus violating his constitutionally protected
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and depriving him of the opportunity to prepare for
his defense.
At all events, accused-appellant participated in the trial and
never objected to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution that the rape was committed "on or about the month
of August 1996."
Appellant likewise never objected to the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution to prove that the offenses were
committed "on or about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and
subsequent thereto." He cannot now pretend that he was unable
to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the allegation in
the Information as to when the crimes were committed, as it was
shown to the contrary that he participated in the trial and was
even able to give an alibi in his defense.

ISSUE

Whether his argument is tenable

HELD

No.

Prior to its substantial incorporation in the Revised Rules of

Court in 2000, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, reads:

Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not

necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
time at which the offense was committed except when the time
is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged
to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date
at which offense was committed as the information or complaint
will permit.

In rape, the gravamen of the offense, being the carnal

knowledge of a woman, the date is not an essential element,
hence, the specification of the exact date or time of its
commission is not important.

In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the
information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years
of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her.

If accused-appellant found the information defective as it bears

only the month and year of the incident complained of, he should
have filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, as provided for under
Rule 116,before he entered a plea. His failure to do so amounted
to a waiver of the defect or detail desired in the information.

Indeed, in the case at bar, the criminal complaint states that the
rape was committed "on or about the month of August 1996."
Such an allegation in the criminal complaint as to the time of the
offense was committed is sufficient compliance with the
provisions of Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Besides, if the appellant was of the belief
that the criminal complaint was defective, he should have filed a
motion for a bill of particulars with the trial court before his
arraignment. The appellant failed to do so. It was only when the
case was brought to this Court on automatic review that he
raised the question of the supposed insufficiency of the criminal
complaint, which is now too late by any reckoning.
 PEOPLE vs. RAFON

Rule 110 Sec. 11: Date of the commission of the offense

FACTS

Lamberto Rafon was found guilty of raping his minor daughter

and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

Rafon challenges the two Informations filed against him for

being ambiguous as they did not specify the date or at the very
least the month as to when the rape incidents allegedly took
place. This, so he stresses, is a denial of due process as no
less than the Constitution guarantees that the accused must be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. The allegations that he committed two counts of rape,
one in 1994 and another in 1998, deprived him of the chance
to interpose the defense of alibi, he concludes.

ISSUE

Were the informations filed against Rafon sufficient?

HELD

Yes. It is unnecessary to state in the information the

precise date that the offense was committed, except when
it is an essential element of the offense. The date of
commission is not an element of the offense of rape. The
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the circumstances provided by law. When the time given in
the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not
be proven as alleged and x x x the complaint will be sustained
if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.” In said case, Rafon was
charged with raping his stepdaughter several times before and
until 15 October 1994 but was convicted of his dastardly acts
committed in 1993. The Court therein held that the victim’s
Sworn Statement which categorically stated that she had been
raped by the accused in 1993 when she was in grade three
substantially cured the vagueness in the information and
considered accused to have been sufficiently informed thereby.
Thus, a statement of the year of the commission of the offense,
as in the instant case, would suffice. Furthermore, it is too late
in the day for Rafon to raise this issue. He should have made
his objection before he was arraigned. Sec. 9, Rule 117
provides, to wit: “The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in par (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Sec. 3 of this Rule.”
Rafon cannot be said to have been deprived of his right to be
informed. He did not timely object to the alleged defects in the
Informations and he actively participated in the trial, defending
himself and confronting the witnesses against him. Hence,
there was no denial of due process.
 RICARZE vs CA

FACTS
Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service
Corporation. He was assigned to collect checks payable to
Caltex. He then opened a bank account in the name of Dante
Gutierrez, a regular customer of caltex. He did so by forging the
signatures of the dorsal portions of the stolen check and
deposited it in that same bank account. Upon knowledge of his
crimes, he was charged by the officers of Caltex with estafa
through falsification of commercial documents.

In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex

appeared to be the only offended party because the prosecutor
was not informed that PCI Bank credited certain amount to
Caltex.

After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank appeared

as the complainant. Then, Ricarze averred that the information
can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original information, and that doing so would
place him in double jeopardy.

PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to

Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private
complainant.

ISSUE

Whether or not an information can be amended even after the

accused had been arraigned and had entered his plea.

HELD

Yes, because the amendment in the name of the

complainant is one of form. Before the accused enters his plea,
a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry
of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave
of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed
except if the same is beneficial to the accused.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the

amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. An amendment to an information which does not change
the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held
to be one of form and not of substance.

In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as

private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The
documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks
remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.