Sante vs Claravall

Certitorari; Rule 65 assailing respondent’s decision.

Facts

Respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages4 against petitioners. In her complaint,
respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other
persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows,
"How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!" Bert refers to Albert
Gacusan, respondent’s friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station and who is
a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan
telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that
petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the MTC and not the RTC of Baguio, that had
jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the
jurisdictional amount of ₱300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total claim.

RTC: Denied; the total claim of respondent amounted to ₱420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount
for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. The trial court also later issued Orders on July 7, 2004 8 and July 19,
2004,9 respectively reiterating its denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 docketed as before the Court of
Appeals.

Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended Complaint 11 increasing the claim for
moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad
Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order 12 dated September 17, 2004.

Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 13 before the Court of Appeals, claiming that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase the
amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00.
CA:

Petition granted; the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was
seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional
amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for determining which court
had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages was not a
separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer
for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.

CA (Motion to Dismiss Cautelam Petition): Denied

 That the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners’ posture that the claims for exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees are merely incidental to the main cause and should not be included in the computation of the
total claim.

 The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the
amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the original complaint and respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right
under the Rules.

Issues:

1. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse by allowing the amendment.

Ruling:

1. Yes.

Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,17 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,18 states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses,

and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases

in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos

(₱200,000.00).
 Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and

Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos

(₱200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos

(₱300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be

adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00).

Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first adjustment in jurisdictional
amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila from ₱100,000.00 to ₱200,000.00 took effect on March 20,
1999. Meanwhile, the second adjustment from ₱200,000.00 to ₱300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004
in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004.

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the
MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to ₱300,000.00.

But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be
the sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed
regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorney’s fees, etc., be used?

In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive:

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a

consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of

the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the alleged
malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of
petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by
law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action.20 It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s
main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.1avvphi1

In Mendoza v. Soriano,21 it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the
said case, the respondent’s claim of ₱929,000.06 in damages and ₱25,000 attorney’s fees plus ₱500 per court
appearance was held to represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein
held that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the
jurisdictional amount.

Also, in Iniego v. Purganan,22 the Court has held:

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the

basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of

action.

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was ₱420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling
that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

2. No.

Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the
RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00 despite the
pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that
an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of
the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court,23 here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original
complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.
Sebastian vs Ng

Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing CA’s decision.

Facts

Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay, acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter Annabel Lagmay
Ngfiled a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from Michael
the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts,
and that they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was
working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after
Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting
the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.

The parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as "kasunduan''4 wherein
Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan was signed by Angelita
(on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo.

Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the
settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local Government
Code of 1991, and Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan,
Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the BarangayCaptain failed to enforce
the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action.

After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan, Angelita filed with the
(MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan.

Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita's alleged
violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

MCTC: Ruled in favor of Annabel.

Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
prematurely deciding the case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the petitioner to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the kasunduan.

RTC: Affirmed MCTC

RTC upheld the MCTC decision, finding Michael liable to pay Annabel the sum of P250,000.00. It held
that Michael failed to assail the validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute Annabel's
claims or the applicability of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160.

Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that:

(i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon within six (6) months from date of
settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial
Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and

(ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of
the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00. 7

RTC: Granted Michael’s MR

In its March 13, 2001 Order, the RTC granted Michael's Motion for Reconsideration, and ruled that there
is merit in the jurisdictional issue he raised. It dismissed Angelita's Motion for Execution, and set aside the
MCTC Decision.

Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13, 2001 Order, but the motion was subsequently denied.

On August 2, 2001, the CA initially dismissed the petition for review on a mere technical ground of failure to attach
the Affidavit of Service. Angelita moved for reconsideration, attaching in her motion the Affidavit of Service. The
CA granted the motion.

CA: Reversed

The CA declared that the "appropriate local trial court" stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of
R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael's contention, the MCTC has jurisdiction
to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount involved.

The CA also ruled that Michael's failure to repudiate the kasunduan in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160, rendered the kasunduan final. Hence, Michael can no longer assail
the kasunduan on the ground of forgery.

Petitioner’s Allegation:

 The kasunduan did not conform with the provisions of Katarungan Pambaranggay.
(1)there was no record of the complaint in the Barangay;

(2)there was no notice of mediation sent to him;

(3)there was no constitution of the Pangkat Ng Tagapagasundo;

(4)the parties were never called upon to choose the three (3) members from among the Lupon members;

(5)he had no participation in the execution of the kasunduan;

(6)his signature in the kasunduan was forged;

(7)he did not personally appear before the Barangay;

(8)there was no attestation clause;

(9)the kasunduan was neither reported nor filed before the MCTC; and

(10)Annabel, the real party in interest, did not personally appear before the Barangay as required by the law

 The kasunduan was merely a private document.

 Since the amount of P250,000.00 - the subject matter of the kasunduan - is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional
amount of P200,000.00, the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC's jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.

The Issues

1. Whether the remedy pursued by Angelita was correct.

2. Whether the Kasunduan can be enforced.

3. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment.

4. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved.

Ruling:

1. Yes

A perusal of the body of the motion for

execution shows that it is actually in the
nature of an action for execution; hence,
it was a proper remedy;

We note at the outset that Michael raised - in his brief before the C A - the issue of wrong remedy. He alleged that
Angelita's recourse should have been to file a civil action, not a mere motion for execution, in a regular court.
However, the CA failed to address this issue and only ruled on the issues of the kasunduan's irregularities and the
MCTC's jurisdiction.

Two-tiered mode of Enforcement of Amicable Settlement

A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement. The provision reads:

Section 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by

1. execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement.

2. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city
or municipal court. [Emphasis ours.]

Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period often (10)
days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of
the settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months
from the date of settlement has already elapsed.

Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on mere motion of the
party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay.10 The proceedings in this case are summary in nature and are
governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang PambarangayImplementing Rules and Regulations.

The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to through the
institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court.11The proceedings shall be
governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for execution,
which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45-99. The question for our resolution is:

Whether the MCTC, through Angelita's motion for execution, is expressly authorized to enforce the kasunduan
under Section 417 of the Local Government Code?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was captioned "motion for execution," rather than a
petition/complaint for execution.

The Motion for Execution Contains Material Requirements of An Initiatory Action

A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the material requirements of an initiatory
action.

First, the motion is sufficient in form12 and substance.

It is complete with allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action; the names and residences of the
plaintiff and the defendant; it contains the prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there
was also a verification and certification against forum shopping.

Furthermore, attached to the motion are:

1) the authenticated special power of attorney of Annabel, authorizing Angelita to file the present action on her
behalf; and

2) the copy of the kasunduan whose contents were quoted in the body of the motion for execution.

It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in the
body and not the caption.14

Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed was intended to be an initiatory pleading or an original
action that is compliant with the requirement under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.

Angelita's motion could therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely as a motion/special
proceeding. For this reason, Annabel has filed the proper remedy prescribed under Section 417 of the Local
Government Code.

However, Angelita should pay the proper docket fees corresponding to the filing of an action for execution. The
docket fees shall be computed by the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, with due consideration, of course, of what
Angelita had already paid when her motion for execution was docketed as a special proceeding.

3. Yes

The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration often (10) days from the date of its execution,
unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper
city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party's failure
to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the
settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.

In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by
the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment that is ripe for
execution.

Furthermore, the irregularities in the kasunduan's execution, and the claim of forgery are deemed waived since
Michael never raised these defenses in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Local Government Code.
Thus, we see no reason to discuss these issues in the present case.

4. Yes

The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.

The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration .award issued by the Lupon.

We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six
(6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for the execution
of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these
courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue
involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless of the amount. A basic principle of
interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where
the words of a statute are clear,' plain and free from ambiguity.
Barrido vs Nonato

Petition for Review assailing CA’s Decision

Facts:

In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to
acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido
for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the
(MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to their children,
Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC
lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

MTCC: In favor of Marietta Nonato

RTC: Reversed

CA: Affirmed

It held that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction.
Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive
portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.

Issue: Whether or not MTCC has jurisdiction.

Ruling:

YES

MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions

Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title
to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in

civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
 Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein

where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil

actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,

damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be

determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) 9

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the
required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
Brgy. San Roque vs Pastor

Facts

Petition for certiorari assailing RTC’s Decision

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of
the respondents. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that" [e]minent
domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an
action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The
fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court." 4

RTC: Dismissed; Jurisdiction is with MTC.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title
to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed
before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the
subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax declaration of the land involved that its
assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3),
of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it
is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property
involved is located.

"The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or
possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction
of the court. That the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real property is included in a real action affecting
title to or possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, ‘Real actions are those
affecting title to or possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of
mortgage on, real property. . . .’" 5

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. 6 In a Resolution dated July 28,
1999, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June
2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999." 7 In a
subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition. 8
ISSUE:
"Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed
value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?"

RULING

Petitioner’s Contention:
Section 19 (1) of BP 129, provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . ." It argues that the present action
involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Respondent’s Contention:

The Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the case
should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law
provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that involve title to or possession
of real property, the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and Costs.

An Expropriation Suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

"A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support,
or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts
of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary
were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901)."
The present casedoes not involve recovery of money, but government authority to expropriate.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.

Two pahses of Expropriation Proceedings

In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 12 the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two
phases:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of

the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the

public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the

filing of the complaint.’ An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the

action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one,

for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the right of

condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.’

"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of ‘the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)

commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners

would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court

regarding the issue. . . .’"

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine
the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In
the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Value of Property is merely incidental

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was decided
during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first
instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation." 15 The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.chanrobles.com : red

We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel
of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that
condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a
parcel of land.

Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His
discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar
lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under the
given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents’ title to or possession of the same. Indeed,
it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the
property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public
benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." 17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Gonzales vs GJH

Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing RTC decision.

Facts

Petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales filed a Complaint5 for "Injunction with
prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Damages" against respondents GJH Land, Inc. Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim,
Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II6 (respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to
enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010.
Essentially, petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the
books of S.J. Land, Inc.,7 but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's
stockholders,8 hence, their plea for injunction.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial
Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order, 9 and later, in an Order10 dated August
24, 2011, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

After filing their respective answers11 to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss12 on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus,
be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City. 13

RTC: Granted the MOtion to Dismiss by respondents

Branch 276 is not a Special Commercial Court. Branch 256

Petitioners filed MR

CONTENTION: The case was raffled to Branch 276; they do not have control over the raffle.

RTC: Denied; RTC has no power to order the transfer of the case to a Special Commercial Court.

Issue: Whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Ruling

Yes.
The present case is a commercial case.

At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a commercial case,
more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute, considering that it relates to petitioners' averred rights over the shares
of stock offered for sale to other stockholders, having paid the same in full.

Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit between the parties is clearly rooted in
the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation,24 hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as
provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC25 dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799.

The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be followed when a commercial case - such as the
instant intra-corporate dispute -has been properly filed in the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station.

As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter
is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the
Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court. 26 In Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was recently
held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over cases in Sec. 5 PD. 902-A transferred from SEC to RTCs.

Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 528 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A29 was transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general jurisdiction. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission.

5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree

No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional

Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the

Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.

The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction stems from Section 19 (6),
Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,30 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980":chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising

jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; x x x x

cralawlawlibrary

Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. CA:

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the

jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court,

fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

The jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the
courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts
To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was intentionally used by the legislature to particularize
the fact that the phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the phrase "the appropriate Regional
Trial Court." In other words, the jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A
was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial
Courts. This interpretation is supported by San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council,33 wherein the Court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same

significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or

expository of the preceding word.

Jurisdiction was transferred to RTC in general; not to particular branches only.

Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the transfer of jurisdiction was made only in favor of particular
RTC branches, and not the RTCs in general.

Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when the transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs was first
implemented, they were transmitted to the Executive Judges of the RTCs for raffle between or among its different
branches, unless a specific branch has been designated as a Special Commercial Court, in which instance, the
cases were transmitted to said branch.36 It was only on November 21, 2000 that the Court designated certain RTC
branches to try and decide said SEC cases37 without, however, providing for the transfer of the cases already
distributed to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus, on January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC
Administrative Circular No. 08-200138 directing the transfer of said cases to the designated courts (commercial SEC
courts). Later, or on June 17, 2003, the Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the commercial SEC
courts and the intellectual property courts39 in one RTC branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Special
Commercial Court, to streamline the court structure and to promote expediency.40 Accordingly, the RTC
branch so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as well as those involving violations of intellectual
property rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station
of the designated Special Commercial Courts, to wit:

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated
21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002 all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC;

(b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in

A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts

to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their

jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange

Commission:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective territorial

jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective provinces with

respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court

in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court;41

It is important to mention that the Court's designation of Special Commercial Courts was made in line with its
constitutional authority to supervise the administration of all courts as provided under Section 6, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution:

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel

thereof.cralawlawlibrary

The objective behind the designation of such specialized courts is to promote expediency and efficiency in
the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A. Such designation
has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first place, the
Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed, given that the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of legislative prerogative.42 Section 2,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the

various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
 hereof.

RTC Muntinlupa acquired jurisdiction from the time of filling; the only mistake was the raffle.
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the
RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the
action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, e.g., Branch
276, instead of being assigned44to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, which is Branch 256.

This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for Injunction with prayer
for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages," which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over
its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

According to jurisprudence, "it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading may be legally
characterized."47 However, so as to avert any future confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory
pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and the body, which parameters are defined in the dispositive
portion of this Decision.

Remedy: Referral, not Dismissal

Going back to the case at bar, the Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of
to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of
jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired.
In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter,
the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the
station, i.e.,Branch 256.

Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special
commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a commercial
case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among the said special branches.

Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then it
should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial
region.48 Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case,
and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the
sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off
the case among those special branches.

In all the above-mentioned scenarios, any difference regarding the applicable docket fees should be duly accounted
for. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.

NOTE:
At this juncture, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the RTC mistakenly relied on the Calleja case to support its
ruling. In Calleja, an intra-corporate dispute49 among officers of a private corporation with principal address at Goa,
Camarines Sur, was filed with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 instead of the RTC of Naga City,
which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur. Consequently, the Court
set aside the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur's order to transfer the case to the RTC of Naga City and dismissed the
complaint considering that it was filed before a court which, having no internal branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, i.e., intra-corporate disputes. Calleja involved
two different RTCs, i.e., the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur and the RTC of Naga City, whereas the instant case
only involves one RTC, i.e., the RTC of Muntinlupa City, albeit involving two different branches of the same
court, i.e.,Branches 256 and 276. Hence, owing to the variance in the facts attending, it was then improper for the
RTC to rely on the Calleja ruling.

Besides, the Court observes that the fine line that distinguishes subject matter jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction
had been clearly blurred in Calleja. Harkening back to the statute that had conferred subject matter jurisdiction, two
things are apparently clear: (a) that the SEC's subject matter jurisdiction over intra-corporate cases under Section
5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A was transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., the appropriate
Regional Trial Courts; and (b) the designated branches of the Regional Trial Court, as per the rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court, shall exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 provides

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - x x x

x x x x

5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction
or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over the cases, x x x.cralawlawlibrary

In contrast, the appropriate jurisprudential reference to this case would be Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,50which
involves a criminal complaint for violation of intellectual property rights filed before the RTC of Cebu City but was
raffled to a regular branch thereof (Branch 21), and not to a Special Commercial Court. As it turned out, the regular
branch subsequently denied the private complainant's motion to transfer the case to the designated special court of
the same RTC, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA reversed the regular branch and, consequently, ordered
the transfer of the case to the designated special court at that time (Branch 9). The Court, affirming the CA, declared
that the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter. In view, however, of the designation of another court
as the Special Commercial Court in the interim (Branch 11 of the same Cebu City RTC), the Court accordingly
ordered the transfer of the case and the transmittal of the records to said Special Commercial Court
instead.51Similarly, the transfer of the present intra-corporate dispute from Branch 276 to Branch 256 of the
same RTC of Muntinlupa City, subject to the parameters above-discussed is proper and will further the
purposes stated in A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC of attaining a speedy and efficient administration of justice.

For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out that the same principles apply to the inverse situation of
ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should then be referred to the Executive Judge
for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then order the raffling of
the case to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal rules, and the payment
of the correct docket fees in case of any difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a commercial case
only to branches designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated above, the re-raffling of an
ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact that a particular branch which has been
designated as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases
under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129.52To restate, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line
with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme
Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to
supervise the administration of all courts and the personnel thereof. 53 Certainly, an internal rule promulgated by the
Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first
discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC's general jurisdiction over
ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure.

In fine, Branch 276's dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside and the transfer of said case to Branch 256, the
designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City, under the parameters above-explained,
is hereby ordered.