ELECTION LAW JURISPRUDENCE-cd

 AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment

because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. Matibag v.
Benipayo et al. G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack
of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to
organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one
that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of
Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment of a by-passed appointee. Matibag v.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the
ad interim appointments of by-passed appointees. Matibag v.
 ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION, CHAIRMAN OF THE

COMELEC
The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is
expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or
reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is
not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC
en banc. Matibag v. Benipayo et al. G.R. No. 149036,
April 2, 2002
 ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION VS. QUASI-JUDICIAL

The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate
of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of
the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-
Election Jurisprudence Page 2
judicial functions. Cipriano v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No.

158830, August 10, 2004
The term “administrative” connotes, or pertains, to
“administration, especially management, as by managing or
conducting, directing or superintending, the execution,
application, or conduct of persons or things.” It does not
entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.
While a “quasi-judicial function” is a term which applies
to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Bautista v.
Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October 23, 2003
Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan

vs. The Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 153945.
February 4, 2003
 AFFIDAVITS AS EVIDENCE
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be

considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied
merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for
disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division
gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants.
Codilla v. De Venecia, Locsin G.R. No. 150605.
December 10, 2002
It is settled that no undue importance should be given to a

sworn statement or an affidavit as a piece of evidence
because, being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate. But, it is equally settled
that when there is an omission in an affidavit concerning a
very important detail, the omission can affect the affiant's
credibility. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FIDEL
RAGAY y DE ROSAS, DANILO ODANI y NATALON,
DOMINGO TUMAGOS y DINGLE and ZOSIMO GONZAGA
y AGENSI, G.R. No. 108234, 1997 Aug 11
Obviously, the evidence relied upon mainly by petitioners to

support their charges of fraud and irregularities in the
election returns and in the canvassing consisted of Affidavits
prepared by their own representatives. The self-serving
nature of the said Affidavits cannot be discounted. As this
Court has pronounced, reliance should not be placed on
mere affidavits. (Underscoring ours.) O’Hara v. Comelec,
428 Phil. 1051, G.R. Nos. 148941-42March 12, 2002
Indeed, as this Court pointedly observed in Velayo v.

COMELEC20 [G.R. No. 135613, 9 March 2000, p. 28, citing
Casimiro v. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468 (1989)] the "self-
serving nature of said Affidavits cannot be discounted. As
this Court has pronounced, reliance should not be placed on
mere affidavits." Domalanta v. Comelec , G.R. No.
125586, 2000 Jun 29; 334 SCRA 555
ANNULMENT OF ELECTION/FAILURE OF ELECTION
In Loong v. Commission on Elections we ruled that “a pre-

proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for
annulment of election results, or failure of elections.”
Ampatuan et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 149803, January
31, 2002
 ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION & ELECTION

PROTEST
Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of

proclamation suspend the running of the period for filing an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto. Villamor v.
Comelec, G. R. No. 169865, July 21, 2006
For it is not the relief prayed for which distinguishes actions

under § 248 from an election protest or quo warranto
proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based.
Villamor v. Comelec, G. R. No. 169865, July 21, 2006
 ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION & MANIFEST

ERROR
The COMELEC likewise did not commit grave abuse of

discretion when it treated private respondent Co’s petition
as one for annulment of proclamation although it was
denominated as also for correction of manifest errors. In
fact, it finds support in several cases decided by the Court.
For example, in Mentang v. COMELEC, we held that where
the relief sought is the correction of mathematical errors
which are not attributable to incorrect entries in any of the
election returns, statement of votes and certificate of
canvass but in the mere computation of the votes reflected
in those election documents, it is a petition for
annulment/declaration of nullity of proclamation, not a
petition to correct manifest errors. Alejandro v. Comelec
& Co, G.R. No. 167101, January 31, 2006
In Milla v. Balmores-Laxa, (G.R. No. 151216, July 18, 2003,

401 SCRA 679) we sustained the power of the COMELEC to
annul the proclamation, due to an alleged error in the
tabulation of the statement of votes, of a winning candidate
for municipal councilor who had taken his oath and assumed
office as such. Alejandro v. Comelec & Co, G.R. No.
167101, January 31, 2006
 ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION, WITHOUT

NOTICE & HEARING
Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate

cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of
any candidate, we also ruled in Fariñas vs. Commission on
Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo
vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without
power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing. Namil, et al., vs. Comelec, Kapina, et al.,
[G.R. No. 150540. October 28, 2003]
We held that, as the case involved a manifest error,

although the COMELEC erred in annulling the proclamation
of petitioner without notice and hearing, the expedient
course of action was for the Municipal Board of Canvassers
to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to
effect the necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass
and proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the
basis thereof. Castromayor v. COMELEC,12 [250 SCRA

298 (1995) as cited in Angelia vs. Commission on
Elections and Tan, G.R. No. 135468. May 31, 2000
 APPEAL, PERFECTION of
The subsequent payment of the filing fee on 28 January

2003 did not relieve Zamoras of his mistake. A case is not
deemed duly registered and docketed until full payment of
the filing fee. Otherwise stated, the date of the payment of
the filing fee is deemed the actual date of the filing of the
notice of appeal. Zamoras v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No.
158610; November 12, 2004
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary

period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and
failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain
the appeal. Zacate v. Comelec et Baldado , G.R. No.
144678. March 1, 2001
It is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the

manner and within the period laid down by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an
appeal within the prescribed period as required by the Rules
has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and
precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. So the High Court rules in Villanueva vs.
Court of Appeals, et.al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should
also be in the case at bar. Antonio v. Comelec, G.R. No.
135869, September 22, 1999
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21)

provides that from the decision rendered by the court, the
aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections
within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.
Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of Procedure further
provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in election
protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the
Commission for failure to file the required notice of appeal
within the prescribed period. Antonio v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 135869, September 22, 1999
 APPEAL, RIGHT TO
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and

a litigant may exercise such right to appeal only in the
manner prescribed by law. The requirement of an appeal fee
is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is
an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if there
was no appeal filed at all. Zamoras v. Comelec, et al.,
G.R. No. 158610; November 12, 2004
Suffice it to state that the period for filing an appeal is by no
means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential requirement without which the decision appealed
from would become final and executory as if no appeal was
filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the
law. Antonio v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135869, September
22, 1999
 APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country, as it is
the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional,
provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction
over election protests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials. In the absence of grave abuse of
discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the
factual findings, conclusions, rulings, and decisions rendered
by the said Commission on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court.
Balingit v. Comelec et al, G.R. No. 170300, Feb. 9,
2007
The 7,966 votes were correctly invalidated as written by one

person because aside from the observation that the ballots
bore similar/identical handwritings, the Minutes of Voting in
numerous precincts had no entries as to the names of the
illiterate voters and their respective assistors, contrary to

the aforecited rule applied by HRET. Abbubakar v. HRET
et al. G.R. No. 173609, March 7, 2007
A ballot indicates the voter’s will. There is no requirement

that the entries in the ballot be written nicely or that the
name of the candidate be spelled accurately. In the reading
and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed valid
unless there is a clear reason to justify its rejection. The
object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry
into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined
with reasonable certainty. Dojillo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
166542, July 25, 2006
We relied on the descriptions of the ballots given by the

parties, the trial court, and the COMELEC, and weighed their
assertions. Dojillo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 166542, July 25,
2006
Marked ballots, idem sonans, stray ballots. Dojillo v.

Comelec, G.R. No. 166542, July 25, 2006
It is well to remember the basic principle that the cardinal

objective of ballot appreciation is to discover and give effect
to, rather than frustrate the intention of the voters, thus,
every ballot shall be presumed valid unless clear and good
reasons justify its rejection. Extreme caution should be
observed before any ballot is invalidated and doubts in the
appreciation of ballots are resolved in favor of their validity.
Thus, it is a well-founded rule ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election
contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. De Guzman v. Comelec & Pulido G.R. No.
159713. March 31, 2004
[U]pholding the sovereignty of the people is what
democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people
expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this
Court to make a statement but it should do everything to
have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always
better than well said. Corollarily, laws and statutes
governing election contests especially the appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of

the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. De Guzman v. Comelec
& Pulido, G.R. No. 159713. March 31, 2004
Even assuming that the respondent judge erred in the
appreciation of the documentary evidence, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie, as no grave abuse
of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of
its alleged wrongful appreciation of facts and evidence.
Tadena v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162882. April 27, 2004
While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known
as “An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms,” requires the BEI
chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the
mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although
it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI
chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the
votes contained therein shall be nullified. Punzalan v.
Comelec G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election

documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country. It is
the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional,
provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction
over election protests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials. Punzalan v. Comelec G.R. No.
126669. April 27, 1998
It is axiomatic that the COMELEC need not conduct an
adversarial proceeding or a hearing to determine the
authenticity of ballots or the handwriting found thereon.
Neither does it need to solicit the help of handwriting
experts in examining or comparing the handwriting. In fact,
even evidence aliunde is not necessary to enable the
Commission to determine the authenticity of the ballots and
the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots as an
examination of the ballots themselves is already sufficient
Punzalan v. Comelec G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998
 APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS, MARKED BALLOTS

There are 34 marked ballots in the case at bar. Fourteen

(14) ballots are marked with the word “Joker”; six (6) ballots
with the word “Alas”; seven (7) ballots with the word
“Queen”; and, seven (7) ballots with the word “Kamatis.”
These ballots were all deducted by the trial court from the
votes of petitioner. While each of these words appears in
more than one ballot and may not identify a particular
voter, it is not necessary that the marks in a ballot should
be able to specifically identify a particular voter. We have
ruled that the distinction should always be between marks
that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which
do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed
thereon by the voter with a view to possible future
identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall be
considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which
the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the
purpose of identifying it thereafter. Villagracia v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 168296, January 31, 2007
 AUTOPTIC PROFERENCE
Autoptic proference, in legal parlance, simply means a

tribunal's self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.
2007
 BILLBOARDS, ADVERTISEMENTS
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or

agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a
private individual and had all the right to lend his name and
image to these products. However, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring
his name and image assumed partisan political character
because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.
Chavez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004
 BOARD OF CANVASSERS, POWER OF COMELEC
It should be added that the COMELEC possesses the power

of supervision and control over Angangan, as Chairperson of
the MBC, and the MBC. Alejandro v. Comelec & Co, G.R.
No. 167101, January 31, 2006
 BOARD OF CANVASSERS, JURISDICTION ON

CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERROR
The Board of Canvassers may correct manifest errors

committed under the circumstances enumerated therein
before proclamation of the winning candidate. In this case,
therefore, either the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Patikul, Sulu or the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Loong’s
Petition For Correction of Manifest Error. Since the
canvassing proceedings for the subject position were
already before respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sulu and the petition for correction was filed before it,
respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers correctly took
cognizance of the petition. Baddiri v. Comelec & PBOC of
Sulu, G.R. No. 165677, June 8, 2005
 BROAD POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of an election by means available
to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELEC’s
discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as
requiring the parties to present their side through position
papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory
hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to
shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a
settled rule that the COMELEC’s judgment cannot be
overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. ARADAIS V. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 157863. April 28, 2004
 BURDEN OF PROOF
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the

burden of proving the charge against the respondent by
substantial evidence - that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. Villarin v. Florido, A.C. No. 6046,
February 13, 2007
 CANDIDATE
Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a

certificate of candidacy” to an elective public office. Unless
one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a
“candidate.” Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio, G.R. No.
164858, November 16, 2006
 CANDIDATE AND PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the

applicable law prior to RA 8436, the campaign period for
local officials commences 45 days before election day. For
the 2004 local elections, this puts the start of the campaign
period on 24 March 2004. This also puts the last day for the
filing of certificate of candidacy, under the law prior to RA
8436, on 23 March 2004. Eusebio is deemed to have filed
his certificate of candidacy on this date for purposes other
than the printing of ballots because this is the interpretation
of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code most favorable
to one charged of its violation. Since Section 80 defines a
criminal offense, its provisions must be construed liberally in
favor of one charged of its violation. Thus, Eusebio
became a “candidate” only on 23 March 2004 for
purposes other than the printing of ballots.” Lanot v.
Comelec & Eusebio, G.R. No. 164858, November 16,
2006
 CAUSE OF ACTION
What determine a cause of action are the facts or
combination of facts alleged in a party’s pleading. Sison v.
COMELEC, 304 SCRA 170
 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, DENIAL OR

CANCELLATION
The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper

proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. Cipriano v. Comelec, et al.,
G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the

candidate must be notified of the petition against him and
he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in
his behalf. This is the essence of due process. Cipriano v.
Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004
As early as 1918, this Court, has pronounced that the rules
and regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory
before the election but after the elections, they become
merely directory. Corollarily, defects in the certificates of
candidacy should be questioned on or before the election
and not after the will of the people has been expressed
through the ballot. The reason for this is because innocent
voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on
their part. Thus, after the termination of the election, public
interest must prevail over that of the defeated candidate.
Gonzales v. HRET, G.R. No. 158001. June 10, 2003
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec
has jurisdiction to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after the
elections, if for any reason no final judgment of
disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives
the highest number of votes, and provided further that the
winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his
oath of office. Saya-ang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 155087
November 28, 2003
A petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard

summarily after due notice. Saya-ang v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 155087 November 28, 2003
In Lambonao v. Tero, the Court held that defects in the

certificates of candidacy should have been questioned on or
before the election and not after the will of the people has
been expressed through the ballots. It was further held in
the said case that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule
of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to
the will of the electorate. The rationale for this principle was
explained in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, where the Court said
that these various and numerous provisions were adopted to
assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the

government and not to defeat that object. When voters
have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be
nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to
direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not
do their duty. Saya-ang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 155087
November 28, 2003
 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, DENIAL AFTER

PROCLAMATION
These various and numerous provisions were adopted to

assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the
government and not to defeat that object. When voters
have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be
nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to
direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not
do their duty. Saya-ang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 155087
November 28, 2003
 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, FILING NOT IPSO

FACTO RESIGNATION
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),

expressly repealing Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. –
Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
is constitutional. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, et al. vs. The
Executive Secretary, Commission on Elections, et al.,
[GR No. 147387. December 10, 2003]; Cong. Gerry A.
Salapuddin, vs. Commission on Elections,[G.R. No.
152161. December 10, 2003]
See Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779 (1991)
 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, SUBSTITUTION
Junaid, having been nominated by REPORMA only after the

expiration of the period for filing of certificates of candidacy,
could not be considered as officially nominated by the latter.
Consequently he could not be substituted by petitioner, a
nominee of REPORMA, since the law requires that the
candidate to be substituted and the substitute should come
from the same party. Bacaraman vs. Comelec [G.R. No.
148153. November 18, 2003]
 CERTIFICATE OF VOTES
Apparently, respondent Reyes, Jr. is counting on the

certificate of votes to establish that he is the second highest
winning candidate. As we have pointed out earlier, a
certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish the true and
genuine results of the election. A certificate of canvass
issued on the basis of the election returns is required to
proclaim the elected candidate. KAISER B. RECABO, JR.,
petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FRANCISCO R. REYES, JR., respondents., G.R. No.
134293, 1999 Jun 21, En Banc)
Certificates of Votes are issued by Boards of Election

Inspectors (BEI) to watchers, pursuant to §215 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). While such certificates are
useful for showing tampering, alteration, falsification or any
other irregularity in the preparation of election returns, 16
there is no reason for their use in this case since the
integrity of the election returns is not in question. On the
other hand, in the canvass of votes, the MBC is directed to
use the election returns. 17 Accordingly, in revising the
Statement of Votes supporting the Certificate of Canvass,
the MBC should have used the election returns from the
precincts in question although in fairness to the MBC, it
proposed the use of election returns but the COMELEC en
banc rejected the proposal. The Statement of Votes is a
tabulation per precinct of votes garnered by the candidates
as reflected in the election returns. ([1997V261E] JOSE C.
RAMIREZ, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GIPORLOS,
EASTERN SAMAR and ALFREDO I. GO, respondents.,
G.R. No. 122013, 1997 Mar 26, En Banc)
 CERTIORARI
The office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct simple

errors of judgment but “capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and
despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal
hostility.” Pedragoza v. Comelec & Sumulong, G.R. No.
169885 July 25, 2006
Rule 18, Section 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

requires that a timely motion for reconsideration of a
COMELEC Division decision has to be filed with the
COMELEC en banc before a special civil action for certiorari
may be filed with this Court. Consequently, the filing of the
instant petition was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust
adequate administrative remedies available before the
COMELEC. Vicente v. Comelec & Sonza [G.R. No.
170255. January 31, 2006]
As a general rule, any decision, order or ruling of the

COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rules
64 and 65 of the Revised Rules of Court within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof. However, these decisions or
rulings refer to the decision or final order of the COMELEC
en banc and not of any division thereof. A motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the COMELEC Division has to
be filed first, which is resolved by the COMELEC en banc,
whose decision on the motion for reconsideration may then
be the subject of a petition for certiorari with this Court.
Vicente v. Comelec & Sonza [G.R. No. 170255. January
31, 2006]
In accordance with Rule 65 and other related provisions of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with
the Supreme Court, only petitions which are accompanied
by or which comply strictly with the requirements specified
therein shall be entertained. On the basis thereof, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for certiorari for
non-compliance therewith, particularly for failure to fully pay
the legal fees in violation of Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to
Rule 56, Section 2. Andueza vs. Bravo & HRET, G.R. No.
166187, January 25, 2005.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if

there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a)
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.
Aggabao v. Miranda G.R. No. 163756 January 26, 2005
Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion
or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law. San Juan v. HRET &
Cerilles, G.R. No. 160939. July 6, 2004
Generally, a motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite to

the viability of a special civil action for certiorari. However,
there are exceptions to the rule. The aggrieved party is not
obliged to first file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution before filing a petition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended where, as in this case, (1)
the question is purely legal, (2) judicial intervention is
urgent; (3) its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; and (4) the controverted acts violate due process.
Namil, et al. v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 150540.
October 28, 2003
We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present

petition because the resolution of the COMELEC in question
is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party
who disagreed with it only had one recourse, and that was
to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Angelia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135468.
May 31, 2000, 388 Phil. 560, 566
The instant controversy involves resolutions issued by the

COMELEC en banc which do not pertain to election offenses.
Hence, a special civil action for certiorari is the proper
remedy in accordance with Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court. Angelia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135468. May 31,

2000, 388 Phil. 560, 566
Even assuming that the respondent judge erred in the

appreciation of the documentary evidence, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie, as no grave abuse
of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of
its alleged wrongful appreciation of facts and evidence.
Tadena v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162882. April 27, 2004
In accordance with Rule 64 and other related provisions of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing
review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections, only petitions which are
accompanied by or which comply strictly with the
requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On the
basis thereof, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant
petition for certiorari for non-compliance therewith,
particularly for late filing of the petition and late payment of
the legal fees in violation of Rule 64, Sections 3 and 5 (4 th
par.) and Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to Rule 56, Section 2.
Siwa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 167731. May 10, 2005
The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the decision of the regional trial court in the election protest
case before it, regardless of whether it has appellate
jurisdiction over such decision. Carlos v. Angeles &
Serapio G.R. No. 142907. November 29, 2000
 CERTIORARI, NOT PROPER FOR INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS OF DIVISION, EXCEPTION
The most recent case involving interlocutory orders of a
COMELEC Division is the 2007 case of Rosal v. Commission
on Elections. In Rosal, the Court allowed the petition for
certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders rendered by a
COMELEC Division. It should be emphasized that the Rosal
case is unusual because while the petition for certiorari
questioning the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division
was pending before this Court, the main case which was
meanwhile decided by the COMELEC En Banc was likewise
elevated to this Court. Thus, we have a situation where the
petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of
the COMELEC Division and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc

on the main case were consolidated. The issues raised in the
petition for certiorari were also raised in the main case and
therefore there was actually no need to resolve the petition
assailing the interlocutory orders. Soriano et al. v.
Comelec et al., G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2, 2007
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC

Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory
order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the
division which issued the interlocutory order, except when
all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to
the COMELEC En Banc. Soriano et al. v. Comelec et al.,
G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2, 2007
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division

are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a
petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay
the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog
the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not
mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a
COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration.
The aggrieved party can still assign as error the
interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he
decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc.
The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity
because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory
order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary
restraining order without a time limit, which is the Repol
case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with
counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary
period, which is the Kho case. Soriano et al. v. Comelec
et al., G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2, 2007
This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental

Mindoro,that “it is the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7, Art.
IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari.” The exception provided in Kho and
Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and

Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First
Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed
orders in this case involve the interpretation of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case
apply because in that case the petition for certiorari
questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second
Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the
main case were already consolidated. Soriano et al. v.

Thus, it has been held that the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC in division, the jurisdiction to hear and decide all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
and in the COMELEC en banc to resolve motions for
reconsideration from decisions or rulings of the former. In
other words, the "decision, order, or ruling of" the COMELEC
which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
refers to that of the COMELEC en banc. As it is, the Court is
without jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Vicente, Jr. v. Comelec & Sonza [G.R. No. 170255.
January 31, 2006]
However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN

Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, we stated –
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this

procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration]
may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when
the issue involves the principle of social justice or the
protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to
be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and

speedy remedy available.
The Court further pointed out in ABS-CBN that an exception

was warranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case
since there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for
the 11 May 1998 elections. The same can be said in Repol’s
case. We rule that direct resort to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari is justified under the
circumstances obtaining in the present case. Repol v.
Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 161418. April 28, 2004
The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an

interlocutory order or even a final resolution of the Division
of the Commission on Elections. Estrella v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 154041. September 16, 2003; Ambil, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 344 SCRA 358 (2000).
It is settled that the Supreme Court can review on certiorari

the decisions, orders, and ruling of the COMELEC en banc.
But what is being assailed in the instant case are the
resolution and orders of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections.
Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration of the

order dated November 15, 2000 of the Second Division is
still pending resolution before the COMELEC en banc. The
present petition is thus premature. (Ambil, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections (First Division, Formerly Second Division), et al.,
G.R. No. 143398, Oct. 25, 2000) Borbon v. Comelec [G.R.
No. 147203. May 4, 2001]
 CERTIORARI AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
This situation is precisely what we are trying to avoid by

insisting on strict compliance of the rule that
an interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of an
appeal or a petition for certiorari. Soriano et al. v.
 CERTIORARI, NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR LOST APPEAL

We have said time and again that the special civil action of
certiorari is not a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of
appeal. Cantoria v. Comelec. G.R. No. 162035, Nov. 26,
2004.
 CERTIORARI, QUESTIONS OF FACT
In certiorari proceedings, questions of fact are not

generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to
whether or not the respondent tribunal had acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Here, petitioner is questioning respondent COMELEC’s
conclusion that there is a “tie between the two candidates.”
Definitely, this is a factual issue. Tugade v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 171063, March 2, 2007
 CERTIORARI, 30-DAY RECKONING PERIOD
In sum, the 30-day reglementary period must be reckoned

from the receipt of the decision, order or resolution and not
from the receipt of a dissenting opinion issued later. In the
instant case, the dissenting opinion was submitted and
promulgated 36 days after the assailed joint resolution. Tan
& Burahan v. Comelec et al., G. R. Nos. 166143-47,
Nov. 20, 2006
 CITIZENSHIP, QUALIFICATION
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that

the citizenship qualification must be construed as “applying
to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term.” Altarejos v. Comelec, G.R. No.
163256. November 10, 2004
In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in

favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex
legal issues involving private international law which may
well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727). MERCADO, vs.
MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 135083, May 26, 1999
 CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

TO RAISE
The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to

raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can
resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the
pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
Matibag v. Benipayo et al. G.R. No. 149036, April 2,
2002
 CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERROR, JURISDICTION
In this case, the petition filed by Caringal before the

COMELEC involves a pre-proclamation controversy and not
an election contest. Although the petition alleged fraud, the
remedy sought was merely for correction of erroneous
entries in the statements of votes which were based on the
election returns. Arbonida v. Comelec, G.R. No. 167137,
March 14, 2007
In the aforecited provision of law, the Board of Canvassers

may correct manifest errors committed under the
circumstances enumerated therein before proclamation of
the winning candidate. In this case, therefore, either the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu or the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent
Loong’s Petition For Correction of Manifest Error.
Since the canvassing proceedings for the subject position
were already before respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu and the petition for correction was filed
before it, respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers
correctly took cognizance of the petition. Baddiri v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 165677, June 8, 2005.
 DECISION, COMPLETENESS
The Court rules that a resolution or decision of the COMELEC

is considered complete and validly rendered or issued when
there is concurrence by the required majority of the
Commissioners. x x x x x
Put otherwise, with the required majority vote, the majority

opinion embodied in a decision or resolution duly
promulgated is validly rendered and issued despite dissent
or inhibition of the minority, and even if the reason for the
dissent or inhibition is submitted much later than its
promulgation. Tan & Burahan v. Comelec et al., G.R.
Nos. 166143-47, Nov. 20, 2006
Nonetheless, it has to be made clear that decisions,

resolutions or orders of collegiate courts must have
separate concurring or dissenting opinions appended
to the majority opinion before these are
promulgated. And it is the responsibility of the clerk of
court to ensure that these separate opinions are submitted
within the required period so that the decision, resolution or
order is timely promulgated. Tan & Burahan v. Comelec
et al., G.R. Nos. 166143-47, Nov. 20, 2006
 DECISION, SEPARATE OPINIONS
Separate opinions not approved by the required majority of

the court members, whether they be concurring or
dissenting opinions, must be distinguished from the opinion
of the court. Verily, the joint resolution is the ruling being
assailed and not the dissenting opinion. It is clear that, not
being essential to the assailed joint resolution, the
dissenting opinion merely serves to comply with the
constitutional proviso that any member who dissented from
a decision or resolution must state the reason therefore. Tan
& Burahan v. Comelec et al., G. R. Nos. 166143-47,
Nov. 20, 2006
 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; EFFECT OF DENIAL
In Election contests, the denial of a demurrer to evidence

amounts to a waiver of right to present evidence.
Gementiza v. Comelec, G.R. No. 140884, March 6,
2001, 353 SCRA 724
 DISQUALIFICATION
The case for disqualification exists, and survives, the

election and proclamation of the winning candidate because
an outright dismissal will unduly reward the challenged
candidate and may even encourage him to employ delaying

tactics to impede the resolution of the disqualification case
until after he has been proclaimed. Lanot v. Comelec &
Eusebio, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of

Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes, the
Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy
was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time
remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or
legal. Planas v. Comelec et al., G.R. No. 167594, March
10, 2006
Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is as clear as

day: the COMELEC is mandated to dismiss a complaint for
the disqualification of a candidate who has been charged
with an election offense but who has already been
proclaimed as winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a
definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases;
hence, should be applied and given effect. Albaña vs.
Comelec G.R. No. 163302 July 23, 2004 – This may
have been overturned. See the case of Lanot v.
Comelec, supra.
However, contrary to the COMELEC En Banc’s reliance

on Resolution No. 2050 in its 20 August 2004
resolution, the prevailing law on the matter is
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. Any
rule or action by the COMELEC should be in
accordance with the prevailing law. Lanot v. Comelec
& Eusebio, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006
Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the

qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility. Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos.
154796-97. October 23, 2003
Due process is required. Codilla v. De Venecia, Locsin

G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is

limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Codilla v. De Venecia, Locsin G.R. No.

150605. December 10, 2002
Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by

final judgment during the election day and was voted for,
the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides. Codilla v. De Venecia, Locsin G.R.
No. 150605. December 10, 2002
It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with,

under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even
without prior criminal conviction. (Sunga vs. Comelec,
288 SCRA 76); Nolasco vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 122250
and Blanco vs. Comelec G.R. No. 122258, 21 July
1997)
 DISQUALIFICATION, DEATH OF PETITIONER,
SUBSTITUTION/INTERVENTION
The law and the COMELEC rules have clear pronouncements
that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case is not
rendered inutile by the death of petitioner, provided that
there is a proper substitution or intervention of parties while
there is a pending case. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio,
G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006
There is no law or jurisprudence which says that

intervention or substitution may only be done prior to the
proclamation of the winning candidate. A substitution is not
barred by prescription because the action was filed on time
by the person who died and who is being substituted. The
same rationale applies to a petition-in-intervention. Lanot
v. Comelec & Eusebio, G.R. No. 164858, November 16,
2006
 DISQUALIFICATION, ELECTORAL & CRIMINAL

ASPECTS, Sec. 68 OEC
Relevant to this case is Codilla v. De Venecia, which held

that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in Sec. 68
of the Omnibus Election Code. Blanco v. Comelec &
Alarilla, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008
In Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258, the Court

held:
. . . Vote-buying has its criminal and
electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be
the subject of summary hearing. However, its
electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender
should be disqualified from office can be
determined in an administrative proceeding that
is summary in character.
Blanco v. Comelec & Alarilla, G.R. No. 180164, June

17, 2008
Indeed, the 20 August 2004 resolution of the COMELEC En

Banc betrayed its misunderstanding of the two aspects of a
disqualification case. The electoral aspect of a
disqualification case determines whether the
offender should be disqualified from being a
candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear
preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may
be disqualified even without prior determination of
probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The
electoral aspect may proceed independently of the
criminal aspect, and vice-versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines

whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for
an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the
COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the
proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction
shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may
even include disqualification from holding a future public
office.
The two aspects account for the variance of the rules on

disposition and resolution of disqualification cases filed
before or after an election. When the disqualification
case is filed before the elections, the question of
disqualification is raised before the voting public. If
the candidate is disqualified after the election, those
who voted for him assume the risk that their votes
may be declared stray or invalid. There is no such risk if
the petition is filed after the elections. The COMELEC En
Banc erred when it ignored the electoral aspect of the
disqualification case by setting aside the COMELEC First
Division’s resolution and referring the entire case to the
COMELEC Law Department for the criminal aspect. Lanot v.
2006
 DISQUALIFICATION, SECOND PLACER, EXCEPTION

The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle
the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to occupy the office vacated because of the
disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes, against whom a
petition for disqualification was filed before the election, are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was
qualified. For this reason, the second placer cannot be
declared elected.
The exception to this rule rests on two assumptions.
First, the one who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified. Second, the voters are so fully aware in fact
and in law of a candidate’s disqualification to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but nonetheless the
voters still cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Lanot and Benavides failed to prove that the
exception applies in the present case. Thus, assuming for
the sake of argument that Eusebio is disqualified, the rule
on succession provides that the duly elected Vice-Mayor of
Pasig City shall succeed in Eusebio’s place. Lanot v.
2006
 DOMICILE
Residence not a requirement for domicile. Co vs. HRET 199

SCRA 692
Domino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1995
Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado, G.R. Nos. 163619-20,
November 17, 2005
 DOUBLE REGISTRATION (Election Offense)
Baytan, et al., vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 153945.
February 4, 2003]
 DUE PROCESS
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to
explain one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all situations essential to
due process. Verily, “to be heard” does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence. One may also be
heard through pleadings and where opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. Alejandro v. Comelec & Co, G.R. No. 167101,
January 31, 2006
A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due
process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing,
through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no
denial of due process when a party is given an opportunity
through his pleadings. Alauya, Jr., vs. Comelec, et al.,
[G.R. Nos. 152151-52. January 22, 2003]
Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October
23, 2003
The right to due process is a cardinal and primary right

which must be respected in all proceedings. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play, the
cornerstone of every democratic society. In any proceeding,
the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. Saya-ang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 155087
November 28, 2003
 ELECTION
In this jurisdiction, an election means “the choice or

selection of candidates to public office by popular vote”
through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of
which are determined through the will of the electorate. “An
election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people.”
“Specifically, the term ‘election’, in the context of the
Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including
the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign,
and the casting and counting of votes.” The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid
votes cast in the election. “Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in
all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. Carlos v.
Angeles & Serapio G.R. No. 142907. November 29,
2000
 ELECTION OFFENSE, GUN BAN
Ampo v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 169091, Feb. 16,

2006
 ELECTION OFFENSE, JURISDICTION
Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve the

recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal
information for double registration against petitioners in the
instant case. There is no constitutional requirement that the
filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of
the divisions of the COMELEC. Baytan, et al., vs.
Comelec, [G.R. No. 153945. February 4, 2003]
The Comelec, through its authorized legal officers, has the

exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations of all
election offenses and to prosecute them. Peña, et al. v.
Judge Martizano, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1451. May 30,
2003
 ELECTION OFFENSE, MALA PROHIBITA

More importantly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2323 is a special

law and a violation of which is in the nature of a mala
prohibita crime. As such, regardless of petitioner’s intent,
mere carrying of the gun without the necessary permit is
already a violation of the COMELEC resolution. It is
hornbook doctrine that in mala prohibita crimes, the only
inquiry is whether the law has been violated. When the act
is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. Ampo v.
Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 169091, Feb. 16, 2006
 ELECTION OFFENSE, UNLAWFUL CAMPAIGNING

The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio, G.R. No.
164858, November 16, 2006
 ELECTION PROTEST
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed
with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is
to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board
of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was
the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication
of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but
paramount to their claims is the deep public concern
involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the
real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the people.
BARROSO V. AMPIG, G.R. No. 138218. March 17, 2000
 ELECTION PROTEST, EVIDENCE
In every other respect, the trial is summary and the court

may consider not only what has been presented formally as
evidence but also whatever may have been submitted to it
by virtue of the express provision of the law. (Reforma v. De
Luna, G.R. No. L-13242, July 31, 1958) Asis v. Ilao, G.R.
No. L-17451, Jan. 31, 1962
 ELECTION PROTEST, REVISION

In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast
for the candidates decides the election protest case. The
candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes
shall be proclaimed the winner. Carlos v. Angeles &
Serapio G.R. No. 142907. November 29, 2000
 ELECTION PROTEST & PRE-PROCLAMATION CASE
With respect to petitioner Montilla, indeed, he abandoned

his petition for correction of manifest errors when he filed an
election protest against respondent Datu Pax S.
Mangudadatu. Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections so
teaches. Cerbo et al. v. Comelec & Mangudadatu, G.R.
No. 168411, February 15, 2007
While the filing of a protest ex abundante ad cautela is not
considered an abandonment of the petition for correction of
manifest errors, this Court quotes with approval the
following observations of the COMELEC in brushing aside as
mere afterthought the claim of Montilla in a manifestation
he subsequently filed that his election protest was filed ex
abundante ad cautela and that he inadvertently omitted to
indicate in its caption that it was one such: Cerbo et al. v.
Comelec & Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 168411, February
15, 2007
The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo

warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment
of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the
authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation. Villamor v.
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of

certain exceptions, as where: (a) the board of canvassers
was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the
proper remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition
for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to
annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto
petition or an election protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made
ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void.

Dumayas v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, 2001 Apr
20
Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of
proclamation suspend the running of the period for filing an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto. Villamor v.
There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous
prosecution or adjudication of pre-proclamation
controversies and elections protests. Allowing the
simultaneous prosecution scenario may be explained by the
fact that pre-proclamation controversies and election
protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the
evidence admissible in each case 1 and the objective each
seeks to achieve. Moreover, the Court, under certain
circumstances, even encourages the reinforcement of a pre-
proclamation suit with an election protest. As we held in
Matalam v. Commission on Elections. Loong v. Comelec &
Jikiri, G.R. No. 166891, Nov. 20, 2006
Correlating the petitions mentioned in Section 248 with the
10-day period set forth in the succeeding Section 250, a
petition to suspend tolls the 10-day period for filing an
election protest from running, while a petition to annul
interrupts the running of the period. In other words, in a
Section 248 petition to suspend where the 10-day period
did not start to run at all, the filing of a Section 250 election
contest after the tenth (10th) day from proclamation is not
late. On the other hand, in a Section 248 petition to annul,
the party seeking annulment must file the petition before
the expiration of the 10-day period. Loong v. Comelec &
Jikiri, G.R. No. 166891, Nov. 20, 2006
 ELECTON PROTESTS, ALLEGATIONS

The Court, however, found the allegations embodied in the
election protest to be serious enough to necessitate the
opening of the ballot boxes to resolve the issue of fraud and
irregularities in the election. Saquilayan, vs. Comelec and
Oscar Jaro, G.R. No. 157249. November 28, 2003
1
Bandala v. Comelec, supra note 2.
 ELECTION PROTESTS, JURISDICTION
E. C. Case No. 15-24 is not governed by the Rules of Civil

Procedure. The Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not
apply to election cases. They apply only by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. Election contests are subject to the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election
contests involving elective municipal officials before the
Regional Trial Courts. Barroso v. Ampig, et al. [G.R. No.
138218. March 17, 2000]
An election contest therefore involves not only the

adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public
concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty
over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Barroso v. Ampig, et al. [G.R. No. 138218. March 17,
2000]
The Constitution itself grants to the trial court exclusive

original jurisdiction over contests involving elective
municipal officials. Gallardo v. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253
(1993)
 ELECTION PROTEST, RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
First, Batul’s reliance on Section 2, Rule 17 of the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure in asserting his alleged right to present
the testimonies of the 50 BEI chairpersons is not supported
by Section 2 of Rule 17.
The COMELEC First Division correctly exercised its discretion
in refusing to hear all 50 BEI chairpersons, as this would not
have been feasible and practical given the remaining time
until the next election. Procedural rules in elections cases
are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an
expeditious determination of the popular will of the

electorate.
Second, a formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in
all situations essential to due process. It is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present evidence on which a fair decision can be based.
Batul v. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 157687 & 158959, 26
February 2004.
 ELECTION PROTEST, EVIDENCE ALIUNDE,

AUTHENTICITY OF BALLOTS
We have repeatedly ruled that the ballots are the best
evidence of the objections raised and an inspection of these
ballots is sufficient. Moreover, there is no better authority
than the COMELEC itself to determine the authenticity of the
ballots, having itself ordered and supervised the printing of
all the official ballots. Batul v. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 157687
& 158959, 26 February 2004.
 ELECTION PROTEST, ESTOPPEL, TIE VOTE
The only case where this Court has held that a party is
estopped to contest the election of the winning candidate is
in the case of a tie where the candidates who were declared
to have obtained equal number of votes had voluntarily
submitted themselves to the drawing of lots to determine
the winner, as provided by law. It was ruled by this Court
that the candidate who lost in the drawing of lots is
estopped from contesting the election of the one who won in
the draw, because by submitting himself to the draw the
defeated candidate is considered to have admitted that the
announcement made by the board of canvassers regarding
the tie was the result of a valid and lawful canvass. The
candidate who submitted himself to the draw is considered
as having deliberately induced his opponent to believe that
canvass which resulted in a tie was legal and he had thereby
led his opponent to act upon such belief in the validity of the
canvass and the tie, so that he can not be permitted to
repudiate his own acts.
This court has even adopted a more liberal view on this

matter when in a latter case it held that a candidate who
has tied with another and who submits himself to the said
drawing of lots, stating that if the result of said drawing of
lots should be adverse to him, he would file a protest before
a competent court, is not estopped from doing so. The view
adopted by the Court in this latter case is in keeping with
the doctrine that an election protest involves public interest,
so that the court should allow all opportunity possible for the
ascertainment of the true result of the elections. (DE
CASTRO vs. JULIAN G. GINETE and UBALDO Y.
ARCANGEL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, 10th Judicial District, Branch I,
respondents., G.R. No. L-30058, 1969 Mar 28, En
Banc)
 ELECTION RETURNS, IF THERE ARE NO BALLOTS
Maruhom v. Comelec, GR No. 139357, 331 SCRA 473;
Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808
 EVIDENCE
Mere allegations not evidence. Luxuria Homes vs. CA 302
SCRA 315
Parole evidence not admitted to prove whom one voted.
Lomugdang v. Javier 21 SCRA 402
 EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases,
the following requisites must concur: a) there must be a
motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; b) there must be “good reasons” for the execution
pending appeal; and c) the order granting execution
pending appeal must state “good reasons. Carloto v.
Comelec, G.R. No.174155, January 24, 2007
The trial court may only grant discretionary execution while
it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
of the original record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, at the time of the filing of such motion. When not
all of the parties have perfected their appeal and the period
to appeal has yet to expire, the trial court still retains its so-
called “residual jurisdiction” to order discretionary
execution. Zacate v. Comelec et Baldado , G.R. No.

144678. March 1, 2001
While petitioner timely filed his motion for execution
pending appeal, petitioner belatedly filed the motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for execution
pending appeal rendering said denial final and executory .
Zacate v. Comelec et Baldado , G.R. No. 144678.
March 1, 2001
Lauban v. Comelec, G.R. No. 128473, Resolution

dated August 26, 1997
Policarpio v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135390, November 22,

1999
Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed

before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Asmala
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 126221. April 28, 1998
Executions pending appeal are exceptions to the rule, and,

therefore, must be restrictively construed to comply with the
stringent requirements of the law. The Commission looks
with disfavor on orders of execution pending appeal, without
clear and justifiable good reasons. Policarpio v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 135390. November 22, 1999
At the outset, we note that there is no dispute with respect

to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to rule on
motions for execution pending appeal filed within the
reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. Consequently,
the filing of a notice of appeal within the same period does
not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and
resolve pending incidents. Camlian v. Comelec, G.R. No.
124169. April 18, 1997
While execution pending appeal may be allowed under the

foregoing rule, the said provision must be strictly construed
against the movant as it is an exception to the general rule
on execution of judgments. Following civil law jurisprudence,
the reason allowing for immediate execution must be of
such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the
losing party should it secure a reversal of the judgment on
appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of execution
must be struck down as flawed with grave abuse of

discretion. Camlian v. Comelec, G.R. No. 124169. April
18, 1997
Not every invocation of public interest with particular

reference to the will of the electorate can be appreciated as
a good reason especially so if the same appears to be self-
serving and has not been clearly established. Public interest
will be best served when the candidate voted for the
position is finally proclaimed and adjudged winner in the
elections. Urgency and expediency can never be substitutes
for truth and credibility. Camlian v. Comelec, G.R. No.
124169. April 18, 1997
 EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, GOOD REASONS

Ramas v. Commission on Elections held that the following
constitute “good reasons” and a combination of two or more of
them will suffice to justify execution pending appeal: (1) public
interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness
of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office;
and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been
pending. Carloto v. Comelec, G.R. No.174155, January 24,
2007
 EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, QUESTIONED
JUDGMENT
With respect to the above contentions by petitioner, the
Court agrees with the COMELEC that they involve an alleged
error of judgment on the part of the trial court for which the
proper judicial remedy is an appeal from the decision
rendered by that court. It is settled that where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari. Carloto v. Comelec, G.R.
No.174155, January 24, 2007
 EXECUTION PENDING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Early last year, the Court, through Mr. Justice Antonio T.

Carpio in Batul v. Bayron, affirmed a similar order of the
COMELEC First Division directing the immediate execution of
its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect. Balajonda v. Comelec, February
28, 2005
As we have held before, only a more compelling contrary
policy consideration can prevent the suppletory application
of Section 2. The primary reason advanced by Batul – that
Section 2 does not apply to election contests involving city,
provincial and regional officials, simply because these cases
are originally cognizable by the COMELEC – cannot negate
this public policy. Such a reason cannot frustrate or further
delay the assumption of public office by the lawful choice of
the people as determined by the COMELEC. Batul did not
contest the good reasons cited by the COMELEC First
Division in granting immediate execution. Hence, we see no
reason to discuss the COMELEC’S findings on this matter.
Batul v. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 157687 & 158959, 26
February 2004.

2007
EXPERT OPINION
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense
that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their
testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in
character; the courts may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find
that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise
unreasonable. Punzalan v. Comelec G.R. No. 126669.
April 27, 1998
 FACTUAL FINDINGS OF COMMISSION

The familiar rule is that findings of fact of the [COMELEC]

supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-
reviewable. Villagracia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 168296,
January 31, 2007
The factual findings of administrative agencies which have

acquired expertise in their field are generally binding and
conclusive on the courts in the absence of grave abuse and
none has been shown in this case. Benwaren v. Comelec
& Crisologo, G.R. No. 169393, April 18, 2006.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by

evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality.
Cayetano v. Comelec, Buac & Bautista; G.R. Nos.
166388 and 166652, January 23, 2006
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will

not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support
of such findings should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC--created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself—on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs. The factual finding of
the COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the Court.
Dagloc vs. Comelec, Samad and Dilangalen, [G.R.
Nos. 154442-47. December 10, 2003]
Factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own

assessment and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive
upon the Court, more so, in the absence of substantiated
attack on the validity of the same (Mohammad vs.
Commission on Elections, 320 SCRA 258 [1999]). Bataga,
Sr. v Comelec & Tan [G.R. Nos. 150965-66. January
15, 2002]
The Supreme Court’s function is merely to check or to

ascertain where COMELEC might have gone far astray from
parameters laid down by law but not to supplant its factual
findings. So long as its findings are not arbitrary and
unfounded, the Court is not at liberty to discard and ignore
such findings Sarangani, vs. Commission on Elections &
Adiong [G.R. No. 155560-62. November 11, 2003]
 FACTUAL FINDINGS, EXCEPTION

Factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC
are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test
of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law. Thus, when they grossly misappreciate
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion,
their factual findings have been reversed. In the case at
bar, we agree with petitioner that respondent COMELEC
disregarded some glaring facts which give rise to a prima
facie showing of irregularity in the assailed election return.
Basarte v. Comelec, G.R. No. 169413, May 9, 2007
 FAILURE OF ELECTION
A scrutiny of the petitions filed before the COMELEC shows that
petitioners never alleged that no voting was held nor was voting
suspended in the subject municipalities. Neither did petitioners
allege that no one was elected. Petitioners only allege that there
was a sham election and similar sham canvassing. As noted
earlier, to warrant a declaration of failure of election, the alleged
irregularities must be proven to have prevented or suspended the
holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and
transmission, custody, and canvass of the election returns. These
essential facts should have been clearly alleged by petitioners before
the COMELEC en banc, but they were not. Tan & Burahan v.
Comelec et al., G. R. Nos. 166143-47, Nov. 20, 2006
It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election Carlos v. Angeles & Serapio G.R. No. 142907.
November 29, 2000
Bañaga vs. Comelec, 336 SCRA, 701
Petition to declare a failure of election and petition to annul
an election are one and the same thing.
Typoco vs. Comelec 319 SCRA 498

Carlos vs. Angeles, 346 SCRA 571
Section 4, Rep. Act No. 7166 provides that the COMELEC

sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may
decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election
and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code. Tan, et al., vs. Comelec,

Jikiri, et al., G.R. Nos. 148575-76. December 10, 2003
But Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lays down three

instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely, (1) the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (2) the
election in any polling place has been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; or (3) after the voting and during the preparation
and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous cases. In all instances there must have been a
failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios,
where the election was not held and where the election was
suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns, which give rise to
the consequence of failure to elect, must as aforesaid be
literally interpreted to mean that “ nobody emerged as a
winner. Tan, et al., vs. Comelec, Jikiri, et al., G.R. Nos.
148575-76. December 10, 2003
In the present case, the allegations-bases of both the
petition and Langco’s petition-in-intervention before the
COMELEC are mostly grounds for an election contest, not for
a declaration of failure of election. While there are
allegations which may be grounds for failure of election,
they are supported by mere affidavits and the narrative
report of the election officer. Bao vs. Comelec, et al.,
[G.R. No. 149666. December 19, 2003]
The power to declare a failure of elections should be
exercised with utmost care and only under circumstances
which demonstrate beyond doubt that the disregard of the
law has been so fundamental or so persistent and
continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what votes are
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain
result whatsoever; or that the great body of voters have
been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from
exercising their franchise. There is failure of elections only
when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot
be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the

same must as far as possible be respected. Batabor vs.
Comission on Elections et al. G.R. No. 160428. July
21, 2004
Two (2) conditions must exist before a failure of election
may be declared: (1) no voting has been held in any
precinct or precincts due to fraud, force majeure, violence or
terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to
affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure
may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day
of the election. Batabor vs. Comission on Elections et
al. G.R. No. 160428. July 21, 2004
Before Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to

declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned
on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and
second, the votes cast would affect the result of the
election. In Loong vs. Commission on Elections, this Court
added that the cause of such failure of election should have
been any of the following: force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. Ampatuan et al.
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 149803, January 31, 2002
 FAILURE OF ELECTION NOT A PRE-PROC
An action for declaration of failure of election cannot be

confused with a pre-proclamation controversy. Alauya, Jr.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al., [G.R. Nos.
152151-52. January 22, 2003]
 FAILURE TO APPEAL/FILE CERTIORARI
It is axiomatic that a party who does not ordinarily appeal,

or as in this case file a petition for certiorari, from the orders
of the COMELEC, is not entitled to any affirmative relief.
Alauya, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., [G.R.
Nos. 152151-52. January 22, 2003]
 FEES, MOTION FEES, FILING FEES
Not only was his motion filed beyond the five-day

reglementary period to file the same, the filing fee therefore
was paid way beyond the said period. His motion should
have been dismissed outright for failure to pay the filing fee
on time. Failure to pay filing fees will not vest the election
tribunal jurisdiction over the case and such procedural lapse
warrants the outright dismissal of the action. Alejandro v.
Comelec et al., G.R. No. 167101, September 12, 2006
 FILING FEES
The subsequent payment of the filing fee on 28 January

2003 did not relieve Zamoras of his mistake. A case is not
deemed duly registered and docketed until full payment of
the filing fee. Otherwise stated, the date of the payment of
the filing fee is deemed the actual date of the filing of the
notice of appeal. Zamoras v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No.
158610; November 12, 2004
The COMELEC filing fee, to distinguish from the other

mandatory fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is credited to the Court’s General Fund.
Navarosa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957. September
18, 2003
Soller vs. Comelec, 339 SCRA 685

Villota vs. Comelec, 362 SCRA 676
Bañaga v. Comelec, 336 SCRA 701
 FINAL ORDER; EN BANC/DIVISION
Salva v. Macalintal 340 SCRA 506

Gementiza v. Comelec, 353 SCRA
 FORUM SHOPPING
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an

adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Repol v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No.
161418. April 28, 2004
Forum shopping is a ground for the summary dismissal of a

petition. Santos v. Comelec & Asistio, G.R. No.
164439, January 23, 2006
The strict application of the non-forum shopping rule in the

case at bar would not work to the best interest of the parties
and the electorate. An election contest, unlike an ordinary
civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of
an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice
of the people. What is sought is the correction of the
canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the
winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves
not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests
of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep
public concern involved and the need of dispelling the
uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the
court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the
people. BARROSO V. AMPIG, G.R. No. 138218. March
17, 2000
 GOOD REASONS FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
Santos vs. Comelec, March 26, 2003

Fermo vs. Comelec, March 13, 2000
Ramas vs. Comelec, 286 SCRA 189
Not every invocation of public interest with particular

reference to the will of the electorate can be appreciated as
a good reason especially so if the same appears to be self-
serving and has not been clearly established. Public interest
will be best served when the candidate voted for the
position is finally proclaimed and adjudged winner in the
elections. Urgency and expediency can never be substitutes
for truth and credibility. Camlian v. Comelec, G.R. No.
124169. April 18, 1997
Obviously, the COMELEC cannot refer to the proximity of the
October 2005 elections since at the time it issued its
November 12, 2005 Resolution, the elections would have
already passed. Neither can the COMELEC refer to the
October 2007 elections because it would not then be
proximate (or immediate) because such elections will take
place a little less than two years after the issuance of the
November 12, 2005 Resolution. Balingit v. Comelec et al,
G.R. No. 170300, Feb. 9, 2007
 GOOD REASONS VS. VALIDITY OF DECISION
Gutierrez vs. Comelec, GR No. 126298, 25 March 1997
 GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically
by reason of passion or personal hostility. Such abuse must
be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Balingit v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 170300, Feb. 9, 2007
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically
by reason of passion or personal hostility. Such abuse must
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Cantoria v.
Comelec. G.R. No. 162035, Nov. 26, 2004.
Grave abuse of discretion exists when the questioned act of

the COMELEC was exercised capriciously and whimsically as
is equivalent to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Such
exercise of judgment must be done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not
sufficient that the COMELEC, in the exercise of its power,
abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. Batabor
v. Comelec, G. R. No. 160428. July 21, 2004
Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so grave

as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Suliguin v.
Comelec, MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna, G.R. No.
166046, March 23, 2006
Abbubakar v. HRET et al. G.R. No. 173609, March 7,

2007
 HONEST MISTAKE
There is a limit to what can be construed as an honest

mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of
official duty. Pimentel Jr. vs. Comelec, 325 SCRA 196;
Domalanta vs. Comelec, 334 SCRA 555
 HRET, JURISDICTION
With respect to petitioner Cerbo who ran for the position of

congressman, the COMELEC indeed had no jurisdiction over
his petition, his opponent respondent Suharto T.
Mangudadatu having been proclaimed as such. It is well
settled that once a candidate is proclaimed as
representative, the opponent’s recourse is to file an election
protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
which has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, and this holds
true even if there is an allegation of nullity of proclamation.
Cerbo et al. v. Comelec & Mangudadatu, G.R. No.
168411, February 15, 2007
The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate
procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it.
Roces v. HRET, G.R. NO. 167499, Sept. 15, 2005
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all

contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and

assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Aggabao v.
Miranda G.R. No. 163756 January 26, 2005
The general rule is that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in
favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without
exception. Planas v. Comelec et al., G.R. No. 167594,
March 10, 2006

House of Representatives. San Juan v. HRET & Cerilles,
G.R. No. 160939. July 6, 2004
The issue of the validity of the proclamation of a member of
the House of Representatives is still within the ambit of the
jurisdiction of the Comelec. Codilla v. De Venecia, Locsin
G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002
 ILLEGAL PROCEEDINGS
This Court is not persuaded. Non-compliance by a BOC of
the prescribed canvassing procedure is not an “illegal
proceeding” under paragraph (a) of Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code, given the summary nature of a
pre-proclamation controversy, consistent with the law’s
desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as
little as possible. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited
to an examination of the election returns on their face
and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the
face of the returns and investigate the alleged election
irregularities. Navarro v. Comelec, G.R. No. 150799,
February 3, 2003
See, however, Duremedes v. Comelec, 178 SCRA 746,
as cited in Agpalo, 2002 ed. Page 335 – 336
Failure of the Board of Canvassers to canvass votes from a
separate tally sheet, when the same are considered as valid
amounts to an illegal proceeding. Because “(A)n analysis of
the foregoing incidents shows that the separate tallies were
made to remedy any prejudice that may be caused by the
inclusion of a potential nuisance candidate in the Navotas

mayoralty race. Such inclusion was brought about by
technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion
for reconsideration, which prevented the April 30, 1998
resolution disqualifying him from becoming final at that
time.” Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840.
November 13, 1998
It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are
not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P.
Pardo himself, now a respected member of the Court, in his
May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed the segregation of the
votes for "Bautista", "Efren", and "Efren Bautista", and "E.
Bautista" into a separate improvised tally, for the purpose of
later counting the votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself
validated the separate tallies since they were meant to be
used in the canvassing later on to the actual number of
votes cast. Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840.
November 13, 1998
 IMPLEMENTING RULES VS. ELECTION LAWS
Being merely an implementing rule, the same must not
override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with
the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to
supplant nor to modify, the law. Grego v. Comelec, 274
SCRA 481 (1997).
 INCOMPLETE CANVASS
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the
basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not
reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board
of canvassers considers all returns and omits none.
However, this is true only where the election returns missing
or not counted will affect the results of the election.
Barbers v. Comelec, G.R. No. 165691. June 15, 2005
 INHIBITION
Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition
cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules
does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc
proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the
Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only

judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Estrella v. Comelec, G.R. No. 160465, April 28, 2004
Accordingly, we hold that the failure of Commissioners

Sadain and Tuason to state the reasons for their inhibition
from the 30 September 2005 Resolution does not affect the
validity of that ruling. Pedragoza v. Comelec &
Sumulong, G.R. No. 169885 July 25, 2006
 ISSUE NOT RAISED IN PLEADING

The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can
resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the
pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
Matibag v. Benipayo et al. G.R. No. 149036, April 2,
2002
 ISSUE RAISED FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
The aforementioned issue is now raised only for the first

time on appeal before this Court. Settled is the rule that
issues not raised in the proceedings below (COMELEC en
banc) cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Fairness
and due process dictate that evidence and issues not
presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on
appeal. Tan & Burahan v. Comelec et al., G. R. Nos.
166143-47, Nov. 20, 2006
It is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are

precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the
pleadings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a
motion for reconsideration or on appeal. Alejandro v.
See also Matugas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 151944,

January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365, 377
 JUDGMENT, VALIDITY OF
The Court agrees with private respondent. A decision

becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.
Consequently, if at the time of the promulgation of a

decision or resolution, a member of the collegiate court who
had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated his
office, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. The
Resolution, in this case, remains valid because it is still
supported by a majority of the COMELEC en banc.
Benwaren v. Comelec & Crisologo, G.R. No. 169393,
April 18, 2006.
Decision may no longer be promulgated after the ponente

has vacated his office. Consolidated Bank v. IAC, GR No.
73333-78
For a judgment to be valid, it must be duly signed and

promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who
signed it. People v. Labao, 220 SCRA 100 March 17,
1993
 JUDGMENT OF COMELEC
Besides, it is a settled rule that the COMELEC’s judgment
cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Aradais v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 157863. April 28, 2004
 JURISDICTION; ESTOPPEL
While it is true that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case

upon complete payment of the prescribed filing fee, the rule
admits of exceptions, as when a party never raised the issue
of jurisdiction in the trial court. Villagracia v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 168296, January 31, 2007
Alday v. FGU Insurance, 350 SCRA 113
Although a party cannot waive jurisdictional issues and may

raise them at any stage of the proceedings, estoppel may
bar a party from raising such issues. Navarosa v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 157957. September 18, 2003
Petitioner is estopped from questioning the issue of

jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Not only did she actively
participate in the proceedings before the First Division, but
she also sought affirmative relief by filing her Answer with
Counter-Protest wherein she asked that “all the precincts in

the 3 municipalities in the First District be placed under
protest.” It is certainly not right for a party taking part in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision to attack
the decision later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal
because the decision turned out to be adverse to him. De la
Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152080. November 28,
2003
 JURISDICTION OF COMELEC, EN BANC & DIVISION
The consistent ruling of the Court is that, the Commission

en banc does not have jurisdiction in the first instance,
whether original or appellate, over election cases, pre-
proclamation controversies, and incidents thereof. When
such disputes are filed before or elevated to the
Commission, they should be heard and adjudicated first at
the division level. This doctrine is anchored on Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which established the two-
tiered organizational and functional structure of the
COMELEC. The provision requires that election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies, should be heard
and decided first at the division level. Cambe v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating

to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to be
first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the
COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters
falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the
exercise of quasi-judicial powers is involved that the
COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and
then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc. Cambe v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
The Constitution clearly mandates that pre-proclamation

controversies must be first heard and decided by a division
of the COMELEC, and then by the en banc if a motion for
reconsideration were filed. This Court has consistently ruled
that the requirement of hearing and decision of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at the first
instance by a division of the COMELEC, and not by it as a
whole, is mandatory and jurisdictional. The constitutional
provision yields to no other interpretation other than what

its plain meaning presents. Arbonida v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 167137, March 14, 2007
Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC and reiterated in

subsequent cases, the most recent being Balindong v.
COMELEC, the Court has upheld this constitutional mandate
and consistently ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc
does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide
election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to
the divisions of the Commission and any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it
in the first instance is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
MBOC of GLAN, et al. vs. Comelec (En Banc) and
Benzonan, [G.R. No. 150946. October 23, 2003]
The COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en

banc has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97.
October 23, 2003
It is the Comelec en banc which has the exclusive power to

declare a failure of election. Bañaga v. Comelec, G. R.
No. 134696, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 701; Benito v.
Comelec, G. R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the

COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. The COMELEC’s administrative powers are found in
Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C.
The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC
should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc
or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC’s
administrative powers in the “Commission on Elections,”
while providing that the COMELEC “may sit en banc or in
two divisions.” Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.
Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Baytan, et al. v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 153945. February 4, 2003
The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul election

results and/or declare a failure of elections. Ampatuan et
al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 149803, January 31, 2002
The contested position in this case is that of a barangay

captain. The Municipal Trial Court of Calbayog City, a court
of limited jurisdiction, had the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the election protest, and the COMELEC has the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such protest. Beso v.
Aballe, G.R. No. 134932. February 18, 2000
At the outset, we note that there is no dispute with respect
to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to rule on
motions for execution pending appeal filed within the
reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. Consequently,
the filing of a notice of appeal within the same period does
not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and
resolve pending incidents. Camlian v. Comelec, G.R. No.
124169. April 18, 1997
 JURISDICTION, COVERAGE

House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate
procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it.
This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to
determine whether it has the authority to hear and
determine the controversy presented, and the right
to decide whether that state of facts exists which
confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters
which arise in the case legitimately before it.
Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or
inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to
parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions,
whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to
determine the question of jurisdiction. One of the three
essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must
be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its
exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a
proper party to contest the election of Roces. Roces v.
HRET, G.R. NO. 167499, Sept. 15, 2005
 JURISDICTION, RETENTION OF
The exception to the rule of retention of jurisdiction after

proclamation applies when the challenged candidate
becomes a member of the House of Representatives or of
the Senate, where the appropriate electoral tribunal would

have jurisdiction. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio, G.R. No.
164858, Nov. 16, 2006
 LACK OF INNER PAPER SEALS

The lack of inner paper seals in the election returns does not
justify their exclusion from the canvassing. Bandala v.
Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 159369. March 3, 2004
 LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY

“Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to the absence
of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government.
Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests
identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.” Ang
Bagong Bayani et al. v. Comelec G.R. No. 147589,
June 26, 2001
 LAPSE OF TIME; TECHNICAL RULES
Hofer v. HRET, May 12, 2004
 LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF RULES

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a
liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
 MALA PROHIBITA
More importantly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2323 is a special
law and a violation of which is in the nature of a mala
prohibita crime. As such, regardless of petitioner’s intent,
mere carrying of the gun without the necessary permit is
already a violation of the COMELEC resolution. It is
hornbook doctrine that in mala prohibita crimes, the only
inquiry is whether the law has been violated. When the act
is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. AMPO vs
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169091, 2006
Feb 16, 1st Division
 MANIFEST ERROR
A petition for correction of manifest errors filed directly with
the COMELEC should thus pertain to errors that could not
have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the
exercise of due diligence. Petitioner Arzagon, however,
together with the other petitioners, initially filed a petition
for correction of manifest errors with the PBOC, evidently
showing that the errors sought to be corrected were
discovered during the canvassing. Cerbo et al. v. Comelec
& Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 168411, February 15, 2007
A manifest clerical error is “one that is visible to the eye or

obvious to the understanding and is apparent from the
papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does
not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the
record be shown to have been committed. Suliguin v.
166046, March 23, 2006
It found that there was manifest error in the addition of

votes for Baddiri resulting in the addition of 2000 votes in
his favor. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes from the
Municipality of Patikul, Sulu, reflected 4,873 votes in favor
of petitioner, but the supporting Statement of Votes by
Precincts showed that the correct total votes garnered by
him is only 2,873, as admitted by the members of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of the said municipality.
Baddiri v. Comelec & PBOC of Sulu, G.R. No. 165677,
June 8, 2005
Torres v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 583 (1997)

Indeed, even if the truly manifest errors were corrected
using the data presented by petitioner herself, the
proclamation of private respondent as the winning Vice-
Mayoral candidate of Taytay, Rizal will still stand. Tamayo-
Reyes v. Comelec & Cabitac, G.R. No. 175121, June 8,
2007
The correction of manifest errors has reference to errors in

the election returns, in the entries in the Statement of Votes
(SOV) by precinct per municipality or in the certificate of
canvass. For errors to be manifest, they must appear on the
face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought
to be corrected, and objections thereto must have been
made before the Board of Canvassers and specifically noted
in the minutes of their respective proceedings. This Court
defined "manifest" as evident to the eye and understanding;
visible to the eye; that which is open, palpable, and
incontrovertible; needing no evidence to make it more clear;
not obscure or hidden. Tamayo-Reyes v. Comelec &
Cabitac, G.R. No. 175121, June 8, 2007
 MANIFEST ERROR, ANNULMENT OF
PROCLAMATION
We held that, as the case involved a manifest error,
although the COMELEC erred in annulling the proclamation
of petitioner without notice and hearing, the expedient
course of action was for the Municipal Board of Canvassers
to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to
effect the necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass
and proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the
basis thereof. Angelia vs. Comelec & Tan, G.R. No.
135468. May 31, 2000
In Milla v. Balmores-Laxa, (G.R. No. 151216, July 18, 2003,

401 SCRA 679) we sustained the power of the COMELEC to
annul the proclamation, due to an alleged error in the
tabulation of the statement of votes, of a winning candidate
for municipal councilor who had taken his oath and assumed
office as such. Alejandro v. Comelec & Co, G.R. No.
167101, January 31, 2006
Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation

of petitioner for being based on an erroneous computation
of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections, where the proclamation is null and void, the
proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive
the Commission the power to declare such proclamation a
nullity. We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office. Suliguin v. Comelec, MBOC
of Nagcarlan, Laguna, G.R. No. 166046, March 23,

2006
O’Hara v. Comelec, 428 Phil. 1051, G.R. Nos. 148941-

42March 12, 2002
 MANIFEST ERROR IS A PRE-PROCLAMATION

CONTROVERSY
It should be noted that what petitioner filed was a petition

for correction of manifest errors and nullification of
proclamation, which is a pre-proclamation controversy. A
pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition or political parties
before the board or directly with the COMELEC, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code, in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the
election returns. It is limited to an examination of the
election returns on their face and the COMELEC, as a
general rule, need not go beyond the face of the returns and
is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate the alleged election irregularities. Tamayo-
2007
Also noteworthy is that relative to the five other
irregularities raised in her petition before the COMELEC
which were deemed improper for correction of manifest
errors, petitioner claimed that the election returns and the
statements of votes had been tampered with and falsified.
This claim would be appropriate in a pre-proclamation
contest proper, not in a petition for mere correction of
manifest errors. Tamayo-Reyes v. Comelec & Cabitac,
G.R. No. 175121, June 8, 2007
 MANIFEST ERROR, FACTUAL FINDING

Rather, the COMELEC Second Division and en banc have
found that the manifest errors consisted in the tabulation of
the votes from the election returns to the statement of
votes. They based their findings on, among others, the
admission of the election officer herself that such errors

were indeed committed. This factual finding of the
COMELEC, which is supported by substantial evidence, is
binding on the Court. Alejandro v. Comelec et al., G.R.
No. 167101, September 12, 2006
 MAXIMS
Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights. Ampo v. CA & Pp, G.R. No. 169091, FEBRUARY
16, 2006
 MINUTE RESOLUTION
To be sure, minute resolutions denying or dismissing

unmeritorious petitions are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the Members of the Court although they
are promulgated through the Clerk of Court. They need not
be signed by the Members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations thereon, nor do they require the Certification
of the Chief Justice (unlike decisions and signed resolutions)
in order to avoid undue delay in the disposition of cases.
Petitioner would prefer a resolution which spells out why and
how the Court arrived at its conclusions. Suffice it to state
that minute resolutions denying or dismissing unmeritorious
petitions affirm the assailed resolution/decision of the lower
court or tribunal. Valencia v. Comelec & Cua, G.R. No.
168418, March 28, 2006
 MOOT AND ACADEMIC
Well-entrenched is the rule that courts of justice constituted
to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in
which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controvery, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioner would be entitled. Socrates v. Yap-Hernandez,
G.R. Nos. 139308-09. May 10, 2005
Garcia vs. Comelec 258 SCRA 754 (1999)
Brillantes vs. Comelec G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004
Even if moot and academic, courts can review
questions if capable of repetition yet evading review.
Where the issues have become moot and academic, there is

no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts
will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. Albaña vs.
Comelec G.R. No. 163302 July 23, 2004
Altarejos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163256. November 10,
2004
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; FIRST DIVISION

The COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of decisions of a Division, meaning
those acts of final character and not interlocutory.
Gementiza v. Comelec, G.R. No. 140884, March 6,
2001, 353 SCRA 724
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, PROHIBITED

PLEADING
Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), the

trial court cannot entertain a motion for reconsideration of
its decision in an election contest affecting municipal
officers filed by the aggrieved party. Villamor v. Comelec,
G. R. No. 169865, July 21, 2006
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, ELECTION

OFFENSE
Faelnar v. People & Comelec, May 4, 2000
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, PRO FORMA
The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its
filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for
certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and
passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro
forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a
reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other
remedy. But, as we have held in another case:
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is

addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its
ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the
evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of
necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a
motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the
losing party would be confined to filing only motions for
reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was

held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it
was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not
comply with the rule that the motion must specify the
findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate
the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision
in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was
not given notice thereof. The 16-page motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc
suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error
for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations
raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his earlier pleadings or
did not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the motion
suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the
petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done
within the reglementary period provided by law. Coquilla v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, REQUIREMENT

FOR CERTIORARI, EXCEPTIONS
The Court holds that direct resort to this Court through a

special civil action for certiorari is justified in this case since
the Resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity. The
holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. Setting aside the resolution of the
issue will only postpone a task that could well crop up again
in future elections. Blanco v. Comelec & Alarilla, G.R.
No. 180164, June 17, 2008
Rule 18, Section 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

requires that a timely motion for reconsideration of a
COMELEC Division decision has to be filed with the
COMELEC en banc before a special civil action for certiorari
may be filed with this Court. Consequently, the filing of the
instant petition was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust
adequate administrative remedies available before the
COMELEC. Vicente, jr. v. Comelec & Sonza [G.R. No.
170255. January 31, 2006]

Thus, it has been held that the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC in division, the jurisdiction to hear and decide all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
and in the COMELEC en banc to resolve motions for
reconsideration from decisions or rulings of the former. In
other words, the "decision, order, or ruling of" the COMELEC
which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
refers to that of the COMELEC en banc. As it is, the Court is
without jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Vicente, jr. v. Comelec & Sonza [G.R. No. 170255.
January 31, 2006]
The Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for being

premature as no motion for reconsideration was filed with
the Commission on Elections en banc, and there are no
sufficient allegations to bring the case within the recognized
exceptions (Villarama vs. NLRC, 236 SCRA 280 [1994];
Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for National
Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681 [1995]; Philippine
National Construction Corp. vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 668
[1995])." Wilfredo Reyes Sibayan vs. Kim Mikael G.
Amador and Commission on Elections G.R. No.
170953 January 31, 2006
Generally, a motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite to

the viability of a special civil action for certiorari. However,
there are exceptions to the rule. The aggrieved party is not
obliged to first file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution before filing a petition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended where, as in this case, (1)
the question is purely legal, (2) judicial intervention
is urgent; (3) its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; and (4) the controverted acts
violate due process. Namil, et al., vs. Comelec &
Kapina et al., [G.R. No. 150540. October 28, 2003]
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, SUSPENSION OF

IMPLEMENTATION
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioner Alejandro, his
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division did not ipso facto have the effect
of suspending the execution of the latter as the same was
defective. Not only was his motion filed beyond the five-day
reglementary period to file the same, the filing fee therefore
was paid way beyond the said period. His motion should
have been dismissed outright for failure to pay the filing fee
on time. Failure to pay filing fees will not vest the election
tribunal jurisdiction over the case and such procedural lapse
warrants the outright dismissal of the action. Alejandro v.
 NATURE OF ACTION
The long-standing rule is that the nature of an action and

the jurisdiction of the tribunal are determined by law and
the allegations in the petitions regardless of whether or not
the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought. Abdusakur
M. Tan, et al, vs. Commission on Elections, Jikiri et al.,
G.R. Nos. 148575-76. December 10, 2003
In determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its

averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper
gauges. De la Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152080.
November 28, 2003
The prayer in a pleading does not constitute an essential

part of the allegations determinative of the jurisdiction of a
court. The question of jurisdiction depends largely upon the

determination of the true nature of the action filed by a
party which, in turn, involves the consideration of the
ultimate facts alleged as constitutive of the cause of action
therein (Bautista vs. Fernandez, L-24062, April 30, 1971).
The prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, cannot
create a cause of action, hence it cannot be considered a
part of the allegations on the nature of the cause of action.
De la Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152080. November
28, 2003
Elementary is the rule that the real nature of a criminal

charge cannot be determined from the title of the complaint;
the designation of the offense charged; or the particular law
or part thereof allegedly violated, which are mere
conclusions of law. What is controlling is the description of
the crime or the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. Peña, et al. v. Judge Martizano, A.M. No.
MTJ-02-1451. May 30, 2003
 NEIGHBORHOOD RULE
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc. In each of these
ballots (Exhibits “1,” “2,” “5” and “6”), the space for Punong
Barangay is blank. “Tibong Co” is written on the first line of
the space for Barangay Kagawad. The votes are valid for Co
under the neighborhood rule. Abad v. Comelec, G.R. No.
167438, July 25, 2006, citing Ferrer v. Comelec, 386
Phil. 431, (2000)
 NEW MATTERS
The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were
never raised by the petitioners during the proceedings
before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings
in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Matters, theories
or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings
cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are
raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and
arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on
the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.
Dicman et al. v. Cariño, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006
 NOMINATION, SUBSTITUTION
Junaid, having been nominated by REPORMA only after the

expiration of the period for filing of certificates of candidacy,
could not be considered as officially nominated by the latter.
Consequently he could not be substituted by petitioner, a
nominee of REPORMA, since the law requires that the
candidate to be substituted and the substitute should come
from the same party. BACARAMAN V. COMELEC, G.R. No.
148153. November 18, 2003
As the earlier quoted Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides, "only a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party" may substitute the
candidate who, in Junaid's case, died. In petitioner's case, he
was officially nominated by "PPC REPORMA." While Junaid
was also "nominated" by said party, the nomination came
only on February 12, 2001 or after the period for filing of
certificates of candidacy had expired on January 14, 2001.
BACARAMAN V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148153.
November 18, 2003
 NON-FORUM SHOPPING CERTIFICATION, FAILURE
TO COMPLY
Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure suppletorily, the failure
to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements of
Section 5 of Rule 7 does not automatically warrant the
dismissal of the case with prejudice as petitioner insists. The
Rule states that the dismissal is without prejudice. The
dismissal may be with prejudice but only upon motion and
after hearing. Barroso v. Ampig, et al. [G.R. No.
138218. March 17, 2000]
 NOTICE, CANVASSING
Sabeniano v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 289; Quilala v.
Comelec, 188 SCRA 502
 NUISANCE CANDIDATES
The rationale for the prohibition against nuisance candidates
and the disqualification of candidates who have not
demonstrated a bond fide intention to run for office is the
State's compelling interest in ensuring that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Chavez vs.
Comelec; [G.R. No. 162731-32. April 13, 2004]
We have ruled that a nuisance candidate is one whose

certificate of candidacy is presented and filed to cause
confusion among the electorate by the similarity of names
of the registered candidate or by other names which
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate. (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36
SCRA 1 [1970]) Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840.
November 13, 1998
 OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE VS. COMELEC RULES OF

PROCEDURE
Loong vs. Comelec, 216 SCRA 760
 OMNIBUS RESOLUTION ON PENDING CASES
In the instant controversy, the case filed by petitioner
involving Election Return No. 9601666 which the MBC found
to be fraudulent, tampered, and statistically improbable, is a
pre-proclamation case requiring the COMELEC’s exercise of
quasi-judicial powers. The same should have been decided
at the first instance by a division of the COMELEC, especially
so that petitioner filed his appeal not with the en banc but
with a division of the COMELEC. Failing to comply with the
constitutional and jurisprudential requirements, Resolution
No. 8212 must therefore be declared void insofar as
the instant case is concerned. Cambe v. Comelec et
al., G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
 PARTY-LIST PARTICIPANTS, GUIDELINES
Ang Bagong Bayani et al. v. Comelec G.R. No. 147589,
June 26, 2001
BA-RA7941 v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007
 PLEBISCITE
The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result
have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the
regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of
ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an
independent constitutional body exclusively charged with
the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,

initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. Cayetano v.
Comelec, Buac & Bautista; G.R. Nos. 166388 and
166652, January 23, 2006 citing Buac vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 1555855, January 26, 2004, 421
SCRA 92, 106
The COMELEC Resolutions are correct in limiting the

plebiscite for the conversion of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa
into a component city to qualified voters of Sta. Rosa only,
to the exclusion of the other voters/residents of the Province
of Laguna. Valera v. Comelec, G.R. No. 164076.
November 22, 2005
 POLITICAL PARTY
The law defines “political party” as “an organized group of

citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which,
as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.” Ang Bagong
Bayani et al. v. Comelec G.R. No. 147589, June 26,
2001
 PONENTE, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Petitioner correctly points out that the assailed COMELEC en

banc Resolution violates Section 1, Rule 4 of the COMELEC
Rules which states that “no Member shall be the ponente of
an en banc decision/resolution on a motion to reconsider a
decision/resolution written by him in a Division.” In
Agbayani v. COMELEC, we held that a violation of this rule
is a reason for the reversal of the acts of the COMELEC as
COMELEC “should be the first to respect and obey its own
rules, if only to provide the proper example to those
appearing before it and to avoid all suspicion of bias or
arbitrariness in its proceedings.” Basarte v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 169413, May 9, 2007
 POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules

and regulations to enforce and administer election laws.
This power includes the determination, within the
parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the
accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system. AKLAT
- Asosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan At
Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc., v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
162203. April 14, 2004]
It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to

ascertain the true results of an election by means available
to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELEC’s
discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as
requiring the parties to present their side through position
papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory
hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to
shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a
settled rule that the COMELEC’s judgment cannot be
overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Aradais vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 157863. April 28, 2004
If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official

canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-
President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited
from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.
Brillantes, Jr. v. Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose de Venecia,
Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan, Franklin
M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan, Norberto M. Gonzales,
Honesto M. Isleta, and Jose a. Bernas, v. Commission
on Elections, [G.R. No. 163193. June 15, 2004]
However, the duties of the COMELEC under the Constitution,

Rep. Act No. 7166, and other election laws are carried out,
at all times, in its official capacity. There is no
constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent
COMELEC to undertake a separate and an “unofficial”
tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically.
Indeed, by conducting such “unofficial” tabulation of the
results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the level
of a private organization, spending public funds for the
purpose. Brillantes, Jr. v. Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose de
Venecia, Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan,

Franklin M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan, Norberto M.
Gonzales, Honesto M. Isleta, and Jose a. Bernas, v.
Commission on Elections, [G.R. No. 163193. June 15,
2004]
As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed

with the three powers of government - executive or
administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers.
Cipriano v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 158830, August
10, 2004
Power of Comelec to promulgate rules and regulations.
Gallardo v. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253 (1993)
Power of the Commission to investigate and prosecute

election offenses. Gallardo v. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253
(1993)
Being merely an implementing rule, the same must not

override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with
the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to
supplant nor to modify, the law. Grego v. Comelec, 274
SCRA 481 (1997).
The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers,
involving not only the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but
also the resolution and determination of election
controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the power and
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the
primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of
election cases. Concomitant to such powers is the authority
of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases
filed before it. De la Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No.
152080. November 28, 2003
It is the primary duty of the COMELEC and the courts to

ascertain by all means the will of the electorate. Thus, when
the COMELEC treated respondent’s petition as one for
correction of manifest errors, it was merely complying with
its duty. De la Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152080.
November 28, 2003
Usman vs. Comelec, 42 SCRA 667
 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Kilosbayan v. Comelec, GR No. 128054, October 16,

1997
Baytan, et al., vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 153945.

February 4, 2003]
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
It is clear from the foregoing that after the board has ruled
on the petition for exclusion, it is duty bound to suspend the
proclamation to give the other party an opportunity to
question the ruling by filing a notice of appeal with the
board within 48 hours from the suspension of the
proceedings, and of an appeal with the COMELEC, within five
days from the same suspension. Failure to comply with
these requirements renders the proclamation void ab initio.
Cambe v. Comelec et al., G.R. No. 178456, January 30,
2008
Moreover, the prevailing rule that as long as the returns

appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face,
the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them
to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the
counting of the votes presupposes that the returns “appear
to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.” This
principle does not apply in cases like the one at bar where
there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine,
several entries having been omitted in the assailed return.
Basarte v. Comelec, G.R. No. 169413, May 9, 2007
Section 2, Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure

provides that matters raised under Sections 233 (when the
election returns are delayed, lost, or destroyed), 234 (when
there are omissions on the election returns), 235 (when the
election returns appear to be tampered with or falsified),
and 236 (when there are discrepancies in the election
returns) of the Omnibus Election Code shall be brought in
the first instance before the Board of Canvassers only. This
provision is mandatory. Thus, petitioner’s failure to raise
these matters before the MBOC of Taytay, Rizal barred her
from questioning the same before the COMELEC. Tamayo-

2007
Suffice it to state that the above provision applies only

where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation
controversy, not where, as in the present case, it raises or
deals with no such controversy. Bandala v. Comelec, et
al., G.R. No. 159369. March 3, 2004
Outright exclusion of election returns on the ground that

they were fraudulently prepared by some members or non-
members of the BEI disenfranchises the voters. Hence,
when election returns are found to be spurious or falsified,
Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the
procedure which enables the COMELEC to ascertain the will
of the electorate. Dagloc v. Comelec, Samad &
Dilangalen [G.R. Nos. 154442-47. December 10,
2003]
Barroso v. Ampig, March 28, 2001, 328 SCRA
As correctly ruled by the COMELEC en banc and the Second

Division, the word “simultaneous” must not be given a
strict and constricting meaning. Submission of the written
objection within 24 hours from when the oral objection
was made is substantial compliance with the law. Espidol v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 164922, October 11, 2005
The requirement that the board of canvassers reduce to

writing its rulings is mandatory. Espidol v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 164922, October 11, 2005
The absence of these signatures and thumbmarks

rendered the said election returns materially defective and,
therefore, proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy
particularly falling under paragraph (b) of Section 243 of the
OEC. Espidol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 164922, October 11,
2005
Assuming that the ground of lack of inner paper seals in

election returns is a proper issue in a pre-proclamation
controversy, the COMELEC cannot investigate and receive
evidence to determine why those inner paper seals are

missing.
A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination

of the election returns on their face and the COMELEC as a
general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and
investigate the alleged election irregularities. Bandala vs.
Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 159369. March 3, 2004
When the exclusion or inclusion of returns will not anymore

affect the results of election, proclamation can be made.
April 18, 2006.
Well-settled is the rule that issues relative to the

appreciation of ballots cannot be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Appreciation of ballots is the task
of the board of election inspectors, not the board of
canvassers, and questions related thereto are proper only in
election protests. Sinsuat v. Comelec, G.R. No.
169106, June 23, 2006
Anent the allegation that the COMELEC abused its discretion
when it excluded 72 election returns without looking at
other available evidence and without strictly following the
procedure laid down in Section 235 of the Omnibus Election
Code, suffice it to state that resort to the Commission’s
handwriting experts is not indispensable, as the Commission
can undertake the examination of each and every
questioned return by itself, using only common sense and
perception, especially in the instant case where the
irregularities are clearly discernible from the face of the
documentary exhibits of record. They must be excluded for
they were found by Commission to be indeed obviously
manufactured and fabricated returns (Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, Nos. L-49705-09, February 8,
1979, 88 SCRA 251, 281). Bataga Sr. V. Comelec, G.R.
Nos. 150965-66. January 15, 2002
Clearly, Talib did what was required of him by Sec. 20 of R.A.
No. 7166 as far as the circumstances would allow. He made
oral objections to the inclusion of the election returns. It was
then incumbent on the MBC to immediately make a
categorical ruling on the said objections, even without the
benefit of additional evidence considering that Talib’s basic

evidence consists of the questioned election returns
themselves, as they clearly depict on their face the stark
absence of the printed names and signatures of the
members of the BEI in violation of Sec. 212 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself.
Jainal v. Comelec, Talib & Ahajan, G.R. NO. 174551,
March 7, 2007
These actions of the MBC rendered it impossible for Talib to

comply with Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 any further. It should
be noted that the forty-eight (48)-hour period for filing a
verified notice of appeal with the MBC is reckoned from
suspension of the canvass. The appeal to the COMELEC is
also reckoned five (5) days from suspension of the canvass.
Understandably, Talib had no other recourse but to go
directly to the COMELEC. Jainal v. Comelec, Talib &
Ahajan, G.R. NO. 174551, March 7, 2007
Parenthetically, the absence of the required signatures and

thumbmarks rendered the election returns concerned
materially defective. The crucial circumstance also served
as a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy,
particularly falling under paragraph (b) of Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which the COMELEC resolved in the
assailed issuances. Jainal v. Comelec, Talib & Ahajan,
G.R. NO. 174551, March 7, 2007
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY, ISSUES THAT

MAY BE RAISED
Section 243 of the Code enumerates the specific issues that

may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy as follows:
xxx
The above enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Thus, in

Sanchez vs. COMELEC,[3] this Court held x x x Belac v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 145802. April 4, 2001 (356 SCRA
394)
In Matalam vs. COMELEC,[4] this Court held that “in a pre-

proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is
restricted to an examination of the election returns and is
without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and

investigate election irregularities. Indeed, in the case of
Loong vs. COMELEC,[5] the Court, through Mr. Justice Regino
Hermosisima, Jr., declared that “the prevailing doctrine in
this jurisdiction xxx is that as long as the returns appear to
be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board
of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify
allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of
the votes.”
xxx xxx xxx
In concluding that there were serious irregularities,
tampering and falsification of the questioned election
returns; and that they were manufactured, respondent
COMELEC looked beyond the face of the documents, hence,
exceeding its authority, contrary to the mandate of Loong,
reiterated in Matalam and Sebastian. Belac v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 145802. April 4, 2001 (356 SCRA 394)
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY, JURISDICTION

EN BANC/DIVISION
The consistent ruling of the Court is that, the Commission en

banc does not have jurisdiction in the first instance, whether
original or appellate, over election cases, pre-proclamation
controversies, and incidents thereof. When such disputes are
filed before or elevated to the Commission, they should be
heard and adjudicated first at the division level. This
doctrine is anchored on Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which established the two-tiered organizational
and functional structure of the COMELEC. The provision
requires that election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, should be heard and decided first at the
division level. Cambe v. Comelec et al., G.R. No.
178456, January 30, 2008
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY, MISSING

PAGE – ELECTION RETURNS, OMISSIONS
The aforestated restrictive doctrine on the examination of

election returns presupposes that said returns appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their face. But when
there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine,
as where several entries were omitted in the questioned
election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC

is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the
exclusion of the controverted election return. Cambe v.
Comelec et al., G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
In Lee v. COMELEC which similarly involves an election

return with omitted entries, we held:
Votes for an important position such as
congressman do not simply vanish into thin
air. Those who are mandated by law to
account for such votes, if mistakenly
omitted, are at least expected to give a
fairly reasonable account of why and how
then they have been omitted. Absent such
explanation, doubt arises as to the
authenticity of the returns and the manner
of their preparation, specially in this case
where a party watcher was allowed to take part in
the preparation of the election return.
But precisely, the unexplained omission appears on the face

of the election return. Basarte v. Comelec, G.R. No.
169413, May 9, 2007
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY, ELECTION

RETURN WOULD MATERIALLY AFFECT ELECTION
Section 243 (d) of the Omnibus Election Code requires that

for a pre-proclamation controversy to prosper, it must be
shown that the election return sought to be annulled would
materially affect the results of the election . Basarte v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 169413, May 9, 2007
When the exclusion or inclusion of returns will not anymore

affect the results of election, proclamation can be made.
April 18, 2006.
 PRE-PROCLAMATION, EXCESS VOTES
In the instant case, Election Return No. 9601666 cannot be

considered as regular or authentic on its face inasmuch as
the total votes cast for the vice-mayoralty position, which is

288, exceeded the total number of the voters who actually
voted (230) and the total number of registered voters
(285). The COMELEC therefore is clothed with ample
authority to ascertain under the procedure outlined in the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) the merits of the petition to
exclude Election Return No. 9601666. Cambe v. Comelec
et al., G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
 PRE-PROCLAMATION , SEC. 235

Utilizing the first procedure contained in the first sentence of
Sec. 235, the COMELEC used other copies of said suspect
election returns, namely the election returns submitted by
Talib. When this was not enough, it even resorted to an
examination of the COMELEC copies. And when it was
evident that the election returns for the nine (9) precincts
were manufactured or fabricated because the printed names
and signatures of the members of the BEI were absent, it
was only then that the COMELEC annulled the said election
returns and petitioner’s proclamation. Jainal v. Comelec,
Talib & Ahajan, G.R. NO. 174551, March 7, 2007
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY, SPEEDY

RESOLUTION
Pre-proclamation controversies are mandated by law to be

summarily disposed of.
Here, the COMELEC failed to comply with this mandate. Let

it be reminded that pre-proclamation controversies, by their
very nature, are to be resolved in summary proceedings
which obviously should be disposed of without any
unnecessary delay. Belac v. Comelec, G.R. No. 145802.
April 4, 2001 (356 SCRA 394)
 PRE-PROCLAMATION, TECHNICAL EXAMINATION
Technical examination of voting paraphernalia involving

analysis and comparison of voters’ signatures and
thumbprints thereon is prohibited in pre-proclamation cases
which are mandated by law to be expeditiously resolved
without involving evidence aliunde and examination of
voluminous documents which take up much time and cause
delay, defeating the public policy underlying the summary

nature of pre-proclamation controversies. Cambe v.
Comelec et al., G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY V. ELECTION

PROTEST/ protest ad cautelam
Verily, the order of the trial court in the election protest case
does not conflict with nor diminish the legal effect of the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of 18 September 2006,
invalidating eight (8) of the nine (9) questioned election
returns. Particularly, the order is not inconsistent with the
directive of the COMELEC to the Election Officer of Indanan
to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount,
after notice to the parties and after ensuring that the
integrity of the ballot boxes are not compromised. Jainal v.
Comelec, Talib & Ahajan, G.R. NO. 174551, March 7,
2007
With respect to petitioner Montilla, indeed, he abandoned

his petition for correction of manifest errors when he filed an
election protest against respondent Datu Pax S.
Mangudadatu. Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections so
teaches. Cerbo et al. v. Comelec & Mangudadatu, G.R.
No. 168411, February 15, 2007
While the filing of a protest ex abundante ad cautela is not

considered an abandonment of the petition for correction of
manifest errors, this Court quotes with approval the
following observations of the COMELEC in brushing aside as
mere afterthought the claim of Montilla in a manifestation
he subsequently filed that his election protest was filed ex
abundante ad cautela and that he inadvertently omitted to
indicate in its caption that it was one such: Cerbo et al. v.
15, 2007
There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous

prosecution or adjudication of pre-proclamation
controversies and elections protests. Allowing the
simultaneous prosecution scenario may be explained by the
fact that pre-proclamation controversies and election
protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the

evidence admissible in each case and the objective each
seeks to achieve. Moreover, the Court, under certain
circumstances, even encourages the reinforcement of a pre-
proclamation suit with an election protest. As we held in
Matalam v. Commission on Elections. Loong v. Comelec &
Jikiri, G.R. No. 166891, Nov. 20, 2006
PRE-PROCLAMATION, ILLEGAL COMPOSITION
Under paragraph (b) of Section 5 of Rule 27 of the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure, if the petition involves the illegal
composition of the board of canvassers, it must be filed
immediately when the board begins to act as such, or at the
time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to
sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of
the board, or immediately at the point where the
proceedings are or begin to be illegal. Villamor v.
 PRE-PROCLAMATION, JURISDICTION OF COMELEC
The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies. Re: COMELEC Resolution No.
2521, 234 SCRA 1(1994) See also Libardos v. Casar,
234 SCRA 13 (1994)
RTC has no authority to order by mandamus the Board of

Canvassers to proclaim a candidate. Re: COMELEC
Resolution No. 2521, 234 SCRA 1(1994)
MTC has no jurisdiction to order the suspension of the

canvassing of election returns. Libardos v. Casar, 234
SCRA 13 (1994)
 PRE-PROCLAMATION, MANDATORY PROVISIONS
We rule that Go’s proclamation is invalid for non-compliance
with the mandatory requirements of Section 20 of R.A. No.
7166. Cambe v. Comelec et al., G.R. No. 178456,
January 30, 2008
 PRE-PROCLAMATION, PETITION (AFTER

PROCLAMATION)
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation

of the winning candidate for the position contested would be
to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo
warranto. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, to wit:
(1) where the board of canvassers was improperly
constituted; (2) where quo warranto was not the proper
remedy; (3) where what was filed was not really a petition
for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to
annul the proclamation; (4) where the filing of a quo
warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made
without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or
was made ad cautelam; and (5) where the proclamation was
null and void. Lorenzo v. Comelec & Magno, G.R. No.
158371. December 11, 2003
The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment
of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the
authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation. Villamor v.
As a rule, the filing of an election protest (1) precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or (2)
amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and
pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. Sinsuat v. Comelec, G.R. No. 169106,
June 23, 2006
The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the
COMELEC is, logically, no longer viable after a proclamation
has been made. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as
when the proclamation is null and void. Jainal v. Comelec,
Talib & Ahajan, G.R. NO. 174551, March 7, 2007
 PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY V.
ANNULMENT OF ELECTION

31, 2002
 PRESCRIPTION
The liberal construction of punitive laws in relation to the

prescription of offenses cannot be invoked to prejudice the
interest of the State to prosecute election offenses,
especially those which the COMELEC described as “ruffling
the electoral system. Reynato Baytan, et al., v.
Comelec, GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003
Zaldivia v. Reyes, GR No. 102342, July 3, 1992
 PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
As stated by HRET, the presumption of regularity in the

public official’s performance of his duty holds true only when
it is not found to be inconsistent with the facts. Abbubakar
v. HRET et al. G.R. No. 173609, March 7, 2007
 PROBABLE CAUSE
Probable cause is merely based on opinion and reasonable

belief, and so it is enough that there exists such state of
facts or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing
is so. Pimentel Jr. vs. Comelec 325 SCRA 196
See Lacson vs. Posadas, 72 SCRA 168, (Admin. Matter
No. 74, July 30, 1976)
A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is

only the means to discover who may be charged with a
crime, its function being merely to determine probable
cause. Reynato Baytan et al. vs. Commission on
Elections G. R. No. 153945. February 4, 2003]
 PROCEDURAL RULES
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly

administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system
that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. The enforcement
of procedural rules is not antithetical to the substantive
rights of the litigants. The policy of the courts is to give
effect to both procedural and substantive laws, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution
of the dispute between the parties. Balindong et al. v.

Court of Appeals, GR No. 159962, December 16, 2004.
Because of the special and expeditious nature of election

cases, the early resolution of the same should not be
hampered by any unnecessary observance of procedural
rules. Gementiza v. Comelec, G.R. No. 140884, March
6, 2001, 353 SCRA 724
 PROCLAMATION, JURISDICTION HRET/SET
With respect to petitioner Cerbo who ran for the position of

congressman, the COMELEC indeed had no jurisdiction over
his petition, his opponent respondent Suharto T.
Mangudadatu having been proclaimed as such. It is well
settled that once a candidate is proclaimed as representative,
the opponent’s recourse is to file an election protest with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal which has the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, and this holds true even if there is an
allegation of nullity of proclamation. Cerbo et al. v.
15, 2007
 PROCLAMATION PENDING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION
Even assuming that petitioner had availed of the proper

remedy, still the proclamation of Sanchez by the MBC did
not have to await the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration by the Comelec en banc since it was validly
made upon the authority of the order issued by the
Comelec’s Second Division, ordering the MBC to reconvene
and include the 37 election returns in the canvass and
thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate. In this respect,
our ruling in Casimiro vs. Comelec is squarely in point. We
held in this case that the proclamation of the winning
candidate by the board of canvassers was authorized by the
ruling of the Comelec’s Second Division ordering the board
to “reconvene, complete the canvass if not yet completed,
and proclaim the winning candidates…” even though such
proclamation was made before the filing of the motion for
reconsideration with the Comelec en banc. Chu v.
Comelec, MBOC of Uson, Masbate and Salvadora O.

Sanchez [G.R. No. 135423. November 29, 1999]
 PROCLAMATION, COURT V. BOARD OF CANVASSERS
It is the court’s decision that should prevail between the

determination by the trial court of who of the candidates
won the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers
as to whom to proclaim. Dojillo v. Comelec & Vidal, G.R.
No. 166542, 2006 Jul 25, En Banc)
 PROCLAMATION, RETENTION OF JURISDICTION
The exception to the rule of retention of jurisdiction after

proclamation applies when the challenged candidate
becomes a member of the House of Representatives or of
the Senate, where the appropriate electoral tribunal would
have jurisdiction. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio, G.R. No.
164858, November 16, 2006
 PROCLAMATION, SUSPENSION OF
The COMELEC has the discretion to suspend the

proclamation of the winning candidate during the pendency
of a disqualification case when evidence of his guilt is
strong. However, an order suspending the proclamation of a
winning candidate against whom a disqualification case is
filed is merely provisional in nature and can be lifted when
warranted by the evidence. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio,
G.R. No. 164858, Nov. 16, 2006
 PROCLAMATION, VOID
It is clear from the foregoing that after the board has ruled
on the petition for exclusion, it is duty bound to suspend the
proclamation to give the other party an opportunity to
question the ruling by filing a notice of appeal with the
board within 48 hours from the suspension of the
proceedings, and of an appeal with the COMELEC, within five
days from the same suspension. Failure to comply with
these requirements renders the proclamation void ab initio.
Cambe v. Comelec et al., G.R. No. 178456, January 30,
2008
The proclamation of petitioner in this case is void for three
(3) reasons: (1) it was based on a canvass that should have
been suspended with respect to the contested election
returns; (2) it was done without prior COMELEC authorization
which is required in view of the unresolved objections of
Talib to the inclusion of certain returns in the canvass; and
(3) it was predicated on a canvass that included unsigned
election returns involving such number of votes as will affect
the outcome of the election. Jainal v. Comelec, Talib &
Ahajan, G.R. NO. 174551, March 7, 2007
 PROMULGATION
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections, this Court held that the
5-day period for the filing of an appeal commences from the
date of receipt of copy of the decision. As correctly ruled by
the COMELEC: (SALLY A. LEE vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA, , G. R. No.
157004, 2003 Jul 4, En Banc)
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-
list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to
numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized
and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration
in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.” Ang Bagong Bayani et al. v. Comelec
G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
 QUOROM
To begin with, even if the votes of Commissioners Sadain
and Tuason are disregarded (for whatever reason), a quorum
still remains, with three of the then five COMELEC
Commissioners voting to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Pedragoza v. Comelec & Sumulong,
G.R. No. 169885 July 25, 2006
However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would

materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a
party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the
decision a nullity. In the present case, with the cancellation
of the votes of retired Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani,
the remaining votes among the four incumbent
commissioners at the time of the resolution’s
promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of
respondent. Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners
still constituted a quorum. In our view, the defect cited by
petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of
respondent Commission’s disposition of the controversy. The
nullification of the challenged resolution, in our view, would
merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily. Dumayas v.
Comelec G.R. Nos. 141952-53, 2001 Apr 20
Estrella v. Comelec, April 28, 2004

Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134163-64, Dec. 13, 2000
 RECALL
The specific purpose of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was

to remove Amelita S. Navarro as the elected Vice-Mayor of
Santiago City since PRA Resolution No. 1 dated July 12, 1999
expressly states that "…it is hereby resolved to invoke the
rescission of the electoral mandate of the incumbent City
Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro for loss of confidence through
a recall election to be set by the Commission on Election as
provided for under Section 71 of the Local Government Code
of 1991." However, the said PRA Resolution No. 1 is no
longer applicable to her inasmuch as she has already
vacated the office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when
she assumed the position of City Mayor of Santiago City.
Afiado et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 141787. September
18, 2000
 REGISTRATION of PARTY LIST

Akbayan et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066 March
26, 2001
 REMEDY
If there is a right, there must be a remedy. Roces v. HRET,

G.R. NO. 167499, Sept. 15, 2005
 REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

Removal from office entails the ouster of an incumbent
before the expiration of his term. In G.R No. 122258,
petitioner was disqualified from continuing as a
candidate for the mayoralty position in the May 8, 1995
elections. The suspension of his proclamation was made
permanent, so petitioner never held office from which he
could be removed. Blanco v. Comelec & Alarilla, G.R.
No. 180164, June 17, 2008
 REPATRIATION, REQUISITE
The law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration.” Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration
of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry
and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
the repatriation of a citizen. Altarejos v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 163256. November 10, 2004
 REPUBLIC ACT 8436

The AES provided in Rep. Act No. 8436 constitutes the entire
“process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local
elections” corresponding to the Phase I, Phase II and Phase
III of the AES of the COMELEC. The three phases cannot
be effected independently of each other. The
implementation of Phase II of the AES is a condition sine qua
non to the implementation of Phase III. The nullification by
this Court of the contract for Phase II of the System
effectively put on hold, at least for the May 10, 2004
elections, the implementation of Phase III of the AES.
Brillantes, Jr. v. Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose de Venecia,
Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan, Franklin
M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan, Norberto M. Gonzales,
Honesto M. Isleta, and Jose a. Bernas, v. Commission
on Elections, [G.R. No. 163193. June 15, 2004]
 RESIDENCE SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE

The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s
qualification is already a settled matter. For election
purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.
Dumpit – Michelena vs. Boado et al., G.R. Nos.
163619-20, November 17, 2005
 RESOLUTION, FINALITY
Section 3, Article IX-C, in authorizing motions for
reconsideration to be heard by the COMELEC en banc,
necessitates the conclusion that a decision by a COMELEC
division, such as that of the First Division in this case, is not
yet final and executory unless no motion for reconsideration
thereto has been filed before the COMELEC en banc. Tiu v.
Comelec, G. R. No. 168795, August 2, 2005
 RESOLUTION, PROMULGATION, IF EQUALLY
DIVIDED
The Court agrees with private respondent. A decision
becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.
Consequently, if at the time of the promulgation of a
decision or resolution, a member of the collegiate court who
had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated his
office, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. The
Resolution, in this case, remains valid because it is still
supported by a majority of the COMELEC en banc.
April 18, 2006.
We hold that the failure of Commissioners Sadain and

Tuason to state the reasons for their inhibition from the 30
September 2005 Resolution does not affect the validity of
that ruling.
Pedragoza v. Comelec & Sumulong, G.R. No. 169885
July 25, 2006
Acting on the issue, the COMELEC correctly applied our

ruling in Lindo v. COMELEC that the failure to give advance
notice of the promulgation does not render the decision
invalid. At most if at all, it is a procedural lapse that does not
vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor of the
promulgation. Tadena v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162882.

April 27, 2004
In Jamil vs. COMELEC,[8] this Court ruled:
“x x x A decision becomes binding only

after it is validly promulgated.
Consequently, if at the time of the
promulgation of a decision or resolution, a
judge or a member of the collegiate court
who had earlier signed or registered his
vote, has vacated his office, his vote is
automatically withdrawn or cancelled.
Belac v. Comelec, G.R. No. 145802. April 4, 2001 (356

SCRA 394)
Upon their retirement, Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani

had been stripped of all authority to participate in the
promulgation of the February 22, 2000 Resolution. Pursuant
to Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, earlier
quoted, the Resolution dated June 4, 1998 of the First
Division is therefore deemed affirmed as the votes of
Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani are considered
cancelled. Belac v. Comelec, G.R. No. 145802. April 4,
2001 (356 SCRA 394)
 RESOLUTION NO. 6520, dated January 6, 2004

Section 32 thereof on billboards and campaign propaganda
is valid and constitutional. Chavez v. Comelec, G.R. No.
162777, August 31, 2004
 REVIEW OF COMELEC RESOLUTIONS BY HRET

Petitioner contends that the HRET cannot review decisions
of the COMELEC and that COMELEC decisions, orders, or
rulings may be solely reviewed by the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. It is true that generally, the
method of assailing a judgment or order of the COMELEC is
via petition for certiorari. As aforestated, however, it was
petitioner who submitted these resolutions to the HRET as

proofs that Mrs. Ang Ping was not a proper party. These
same resolutions were collaterally attacked by Mrs.
Ang Ping before the HRET when she alleged that
these violated her right to due process. A void
judgment or resolution may be impeached through
collateral attack. A direct attack on a judgment or
resolution is defined as an attempt to avoid or correct it in
some manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for
that very purpose, in the same action and in the same
tribunal. Conversely, a collateral attack is an attempt to
impeach the judgment or resolution by matters dehors the
record, before a tribunal other than the one in which it was
rendered, in an action other than that in which it was
rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or
deny its force and effect, in some incidental
proceeding not provided by law for the express
purpose of attacking it; any proceeding which is not
instituted for the express purpose of annulling,
correcting, or modifying such decree; an objection,
incidentally raised in the course of the proceeding, which
presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the
pleadings. The rule that a void judgment or decree is subject
to collateral attack at any time is based upon a court's
inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.
Roces v. HRET, G.R. NO. 167499, Sept. 15, 2005
 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE VS. COMELEC RULES
It should be underscored that the nature of an election

protests differs from an ordinary civil action. Because of this
difference, the Rules of Civil Procedure on demurrer to
evidence cannot apply to election cases even “by analogy or
in a suppletory character” especially because the
application of said Rules would not be “practicable and
convenient.” GEMENTIZA V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140884,
March 6, 2001, 353 SCRA 724
In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently
recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial
court. The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC
that “the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election
protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.” Antonio v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135869,

September 22, 1999
The rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election

cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Villamor v.
 RULES & REGULATIONS
Rules on reglementary periods, perhaps, like any rule issued
by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, are prescribed to
ensure stability in the administration of justice, as well as to
promote substantive justice. Indeed, they should be
disregarded when they pose obstruction to the attainment
of such lofty ends, which, in election-related cases, as here,
is the determination of the popular will. Loong v. Comelec
& Jikiri, G.R. No. 166891, Nov. 20, 2006
Rules and regulations for the conduct of elections are

mandatory before the election but after the elections, they
become merely directory. Gonzales v. HRET, G.R. No.
158001. June 10, 2003
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure itself provides the rules

are to be construed liberally “in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding” Tiu v. Comelec, G.R. No. 168795.
August 2, 2005

It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over

rules of procedure promulgated by administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies and that rules of procedure should be

consistent with standing legislative enactments. Antonio v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 135869, September 22, 1999
 RULES OF PROCEDURE, COMELEC
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure:
Unconstitutional. Tan & Burahan v. Comelec et al., G. R.
Nos. 166143-47, Nov. 20, 2006
 SECOND PLACER CANNOT BE DECLARED WINNER,

EXCEPTION
It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving

majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office. The votes intended for the
disqualified candidate should not be considered null and
void, as it would amount to disenfranchising the electorate
in whom sovereignty resides. Albaña v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 163302, July 23, 2004
It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim

as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible
or disqualified. This rule admits an exception. But this
exception is predicated on the concurrence of two
requisites, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate. Sinsuat v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 169106, June 23, 2006
It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim

as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible
or disqualified. The exception to this well-settled rule was
mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and
reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC. Bautista v. Comelec,
G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October 23, 2003
The candidate who obtains the second highest number of

votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people’s
choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed
will must at all times be given effect. When the majority
speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the
highest number of votes cast in the election for the office,
no one can be declared elected in his place. Codilla v. De
Venecia, Locsin G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002
In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC this Court ruled

that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after
winning the election, based on personal circumstances or
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the
second placer could not take the place of the disqualified
winner. Codilla v. De Venecia, Locsin G.R. No. 150605.
December 10, 2002
 SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a

dispute or contest relating to the election returns of
members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such
dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET. Barbers
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 165691. June 15, 2005
 SEPARATE TALLY SHEET
It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are

not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P.
Pardo himself, now a respected member of the Court, in his
May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed the segregation of the
votes for "Bautista", "Efren", and "Efren Bautista", and "E.
Bautista" into a separate improvised tally, for the purpose of
later counting the votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself
validated the separate tallies since they were meant to be
used in the canvassing later on to the actual number of
votes cast. Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840.
November 13, 1998
 SOVEREIGN WILL OF THE PEOPLE

[U]pholding the sovereignty of the people is what

democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people
expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this
Court to make a statement but it should do everything to
have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always
better than well said. Corollarily, laws and statutes
governing election contests especially the appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. De Guzman v. Comelec
& Pulido, G.R. No. 159713. March 31, 2004
 STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER
In line with Repol v. Commission on Elections, the Status
Quo Ante Order automatically ceased to have effect on 19
May 2003 since the COMELEC En Banc did not issue a writ of
preliminary injunction. Dojillo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
166542, July 25, 2006
A cursory reading of the Order dated 12 January 2004 or the

so-called status quo ante Order reveals that it was actually a
temporary restraining order. It ordered Repol to cease and
desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the
post in the meantime. The status quo ante Order had a life
span of more than 20 days since the directive was qualified
by the phrase “until further orders from this Commission.”
This violates the rule that a temporary retraining order has
an effective period of only 20 days and automatically
expires upon the COMELEC’s denial of the preliminary
injunction. Thus, the status quo ante Order automatically
ceased to have any effect after 1 February 2004 since the
COMELEC First Division did not issue a writ of preliminary
injunction. Repol v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 161418.
April 28, 2004
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Election protests are guided by an extraordinary rule of
interpretation that statutes providing for election contests
are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. Tiu v. Comelec, G.R. No.

168795. August 2, 2005
The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the

rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results. Suliguin v. Comelec,
MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna, G.R. No. 166046, March
23, 2006
Finally, Zamoras cannot invoke the argument that courts
must liberally construe technical rules of procedure to
promote the ends of justice. The right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and a litigant may exercise such right to
appeal only in the manner prescribed by law. The
requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from
would become final and executory as if there was no appeal
filed at all. Zamoras v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No.
158610; November 12, 2004
Barroso v. Ampig, et al. [G.R. No. 138218. March 17,
2000]
 SUBSTITUTION, COC
Not to be overlooked is the Court’s holding in Miranda vs.
Abaya, that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has
been cancelled or not given due course cannot be
substituted by another belonging to the same political party
as that of the former. Ong v. Alegre & Comelec, G.R. No.
163295, January 23, 2006
 SUBSTITUTION, DISQUALIFICATION CASE
The law and the COMELEC rules have clear pronouncements

that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case is not
rendered inutile by the death of petitioner, provided that
there is a proper substitution or intervention of parties while

there is a pending case. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio,
G.R. No. 164858, Nov. 16, 2006
 SUBSTITUTION, Election Protest
Public office is personal to the public officer and not a

property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Poe v.
Macapagal Arroyo. P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29,
2005
While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to

the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that
the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. [13] Hence, we have
allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real
party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the
party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Poe v.
Macapagal Arroyo. P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29,
2005
 SUFFRAGE, RIGHT TO
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of

suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy
of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be
exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws
skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all
intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such
so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the
democratic institutions our people have, for so long,
guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and
abuse. Akbayan et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066
March 26, 2001
 SUMMARY PROCEEDING
A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC

could do away with the requirements of notice and hearing.
Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October
23, 2003
 SURVIVAL OF ACTION, PROCLAMATION OF WINNER

The case for disqualification exists, and survives, the
election and proclamation of the winning candidate because
an outright dismissal will unduly reward the challenged
candidate and may even encourage him to employ delaying
tactics to impede the resolution of the disqualification case
until after he has been proclaimed. The exception to the rule
of retention of jurisdiction after proclamation applies when
the challenged candidate becomes a member of the House
of Representatives or of the Senate, where the appropriate
electoral tribunal would have jurisdiction. There is no law or
jurisprudence which says that intervention or substitution
may only be done prior to the proclamation of the winning
candidate. A substitution is not barred by prescription
because the action was filed on time by the person who died
and who is being substituted. The same rationale applies to
a petition-in-intervention. Lanot v. Comelec & Eusebio,
G.R. No. 164858, Nov. 16, 2006
 SUSPENSION OF PROCLAMATION
While we agree with the petitioner that the COMELEC can

suspend the proclamation pending the resolution of the
petition to declare a failure of election, the same order,
however, is merely provisional in nature and can be lifted
when the evidence so warrants. In Nolasco v. COMELEC,
275 SCRA 762 [1997], it is said to be akin to a temporary
restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under
exigent circumstances. Tan, et al., vs. Comelec, Jikiri, et
al., G.R. Nos. 148575-76. December 10, 2003
 SUSPENSION OF RULES
Jaramilla v. Comelec, 23 October 2003
Cometa v. CA, 351 SCRA 294
The COMELEC thus has the discretion to suspend its rules or

any portion thereof in the interest of justice such that even if
the petition was filed 12 days after the proclamation, the
COMELEC may, in the interest of justice, disregard the
reglementary periods provided by the rules and resolve the
matter filed before it. Barot v. Comelec, G.R. No.
149147. 18 June 2003
Thus, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of

discretion when it entertained respondent’s petition by
suspending its own Rules of Procedure. De la Llana v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 152080. November 28, 2003
Indeed, the Comelec has the discretion to liberally construe

its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice. Suliguin v.
166046, March 23, 2006
 TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF VRR, ANNULMENT OF
ELECTION
Thus, the public respondent, in the case of actions for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, may conduct a technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters’ signatures and
fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the
elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.”
However, the exercise of this authority presupposes that the
petition has properly been acted upon on account of the
existence of any of the grounds provided under Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Where, as in this case,
elections had been held and winners had been duly
proclaimed, the proper recourse of the respondents should
have been to file regular election protest cases to ventilate
the veracity of the alleged election fraud and irregularities
of the election in the subject precincts with the consequent
determination and declaration of the real winners in the
elections. TAN, ABDULWAHID SAHIDULLA, BRAHAM
BURAHAN, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, YUSOP H.
JIKIRI, ABDEL S. ANNI, DEN RASHER I. SALIM, TALIB L.
HAYUDINI, RIZAL TINGKAHAN, BARLIE NAHUDAN,
ABRAHAM DAUD, LUKMAN OMAR, ONNIH AHMAD and
BASARON M. BURAHAN, G.R. Nos. 148575-76.

December 10, 2003
31, 2002
 TECHNICAL RULES V. WILL OF ELECTORATE
In a catena of cases, we have held that one cannot put
premium on technicalities over and above the noble and
paramount duty of determining the will of the electorate.
Alejandro v. Comelec & Co, G.R. No. 167101, January
31, 2006
 TERM OF OFFICE (THREE TERM LIMITATION)
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. Latasa, vs. Comelec & Sunga, [G.R.
No. 154829, December 10, 2003]
Petitioner Latasa is NOT ANYMORE eligible to run as
candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created
City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
Latasa, vs. Comelec & Sunga, [G.R. No. 154829,
December 10, 2003]
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining
the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does
not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
Socrates v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November
12, 2002
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official

cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the
same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. Socrates
v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November 12, 2002
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must

be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 295 SCRA 157,
163 (1998)
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. Lonzanida v. COMELEC
311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999).
Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC

in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998
election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To
bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member,
stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is
elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the
number of successive terms allowed.”
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’

comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is
no recall election provided for members of Congress.
Adormeo v. COMELEC 376 SCRA 90 (2002).
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for

Francis, “service for the full term”, and should be counted as
a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,
supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same
position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in

Election Protest Case No. 6850,[17] that it was Francis’
opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race
and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San
Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was
without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than
a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of
the three-term rule. Ong v. Alegre & Comelec, G.R. No.
163295, January 23, 2006
 VERIFICATION, LACK OF
We can find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in countenancing the lack of verification of the
motion for reconsideration in view of what the poll body
deemed as the higher interest of justice. Tiu v. Comelec,
G. R. No. 168795, August 2, 2005
 VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION
…The second sentence of the constitutional provision under

scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official

full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not
by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Lonzanida
v. COMELEC 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999).
 VOTES, DISCREPANCY BY MORE THAN 50%

BETWEEN PHYSICAL COUNT & ER
HRET correctly considered the examination of ballots as the

best evidence. In this case, the ballots were available and
their integrity was unquestioned. In an election contest
where what is involved is the correctness of the number of
votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves. 2 It is only when the
ballots cannot be produced or are not available that
recourse is made to the election returns as evidence.
Abbubakar v. HRET et al. G.R. No. 173609, March 7,
2007
 VSAT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As it stands, the COMELEC “unofficial” quick count would be

but a needless duplication of the NAMFREL “quick” count, an
illegal and unnecessary waste of government funds and
effort. Brillantes, Jr. v. Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose de
Venecia, Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan,
Franklin M. Drilon, Frisco San Juan, Norberto M.
Gonzales, Honesto M. Isleta, and Jose a. Bernas, v.
Commission on Elections, [G.R. No. 163193. June 15,
2004]
2
Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 97105, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 808,
 VOID JUDGMENT
A void judgment is defined as one that, from its inception,

is a complete nullity and without legal effect. A void
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is
attended by none of the consequences of, a valid
adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be
recognized by anyone, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal
in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no
legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any
place. It cannot affect, impair, or create rights, nor can any
rights be based on it. All proceedings founded on the void
judgment are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective
for any purpose. Needless to stress, the HRET did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction
over the election protest as the COMELEC Resolution dated
April 30, 2004, Order of May 5, 2004, and Resolution No.
6823 were void ab initio. Roces v. HRET, G.R. NO.
167499, Sept. 15, 2005
 WILL OF THE PEOPLE
Clearly, the people have expressed their will honestly and

we cannot declare now the election of respondent was
illegal and that he should quit the office for which he was
elected, simply by reason of an alleged defect in his
certificate of candidacy. To rule otherwise will result in the
disenfranchisement of the electorate which is precisely what
our election laws are trying to prevent. Gonzales v. HRET,
G.R. No. 158001. June 10, 2003
The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not

subject to the discretion of any official of the land. Codilla
v. De Venecia, Locsin G.R. No. 150605. December 10,
2002
Thus, where a candidate has received popular mandate,

overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility for
to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above
and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or
of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the
democracy we continue to hold sacred. Sinaca vs. Mula

and Comelec, GR No. 135691, Sept. 27, 1999, 315
SCRA 266, 282

ELECTION LAW JURISPRUDENCE-cd

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

ELECTION LAW JURISPRUDENCE-cd

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

 AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment

 ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION, CHAIRMAN OF THE

 ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION VS. QUASI-JUDICIAL

judicial functions. Cipriano v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No.

Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be

It is settled that no undue importance should be given to a

Obviously, the evidence relied upon mainly by petitioners to

Indeed, as this Court pointedly observed in Velayo v.

ANNULMENT OF ELECTION/FAILURE OF ELECTION

In Loong v. Commission on Elections we ruled that “a pre-

 ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION & ELECTION

Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of

For it is not the relief prayed for which distinguishes actions

 ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION & MANIFEST

The COMELEC likewise did not commit grave abuse of

In Milla v. Balmores-Laxa, (G.R. No. 151216, July 18, 2003,

 ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION, WITHOUT

Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate

We held that, as the case involved a manifest error,

basis thereof. Castromayor v. COMELEC,12 [250 SCRA

The subsequent payment of the filing fee on 28 January

Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary

It is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21)

The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and

The 7,966 votes were correctly invalidated as written by one

illiterate voters and their respective assistors, contrary to

A ballot indicates the voter’s will. There is no requirement

We relied on the descriptions of the ballots given by the

Marked ballots, idem sonans, stray ballots. Dojillo v.

It is well to remember the basic principle that the cardinal

ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of

The appreciation of the contested ballots and election

 APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS, MARKED BALLOTS

There are 34 marked ballots in the case at bar. Fourteen

Autoptic proference, in legal parlance, simply means a

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or

 BOARD OF CANVASSERS, POWER OF COMELEC

It should be added that the COMELEC possesses the power

 BOARD OF CANVASSERS, JURISDICTION ON

The Board of Canvassers may correct manifest errors

 BROAD POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the

Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a

 CANDIDATE AND PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the

 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, DENIAL OR

The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper

It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the

A petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard

In Lambonao v. Tero, the Court held that defects in the

assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the

 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, DENIAL AFTER

These various and numerous provisions were adopted to

 CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, FILING NOT IPSO

Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),

Junaid, having been nominated by REPORMA only after the

Apparently, respondent Reyes, Jr. is counting on the

Certificates of Votes are issued by Boards of Election

The office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct simple

Rule 18, Section 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure