Norsok Standard Z-008: Edition 3, June 2011

NORSOK STANDARD Z-008
Edition 3, June 2011
Risk based maintenance and consequence

classification
Provided by Standard Online AS for trihasco+utama 2014-04-15
This NORSOK standard is developed with broad petroleum industry participation by interested parties in the
Norwegian petroleum industry and is owned by the Norwegian petroleum industry represented by The Norwegian
Oil Industry Association (OLF) and The Federation of Norwegian Industry. Please note that whilst every effort has
been made to ensure the accuracy of this NORSOK standard, neither OLF nor The Federation of Norwegian
Industry or any of their members will assume liability for any use thereof. Standards Norway is responsible for the
administration and publication of this NORSOK standard.
Standards Norway Telephone: + 47 67 83 86 00
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N-1326 Lysaker Email: petroleum@standard.no
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NORSOK standard Z-008 Edition 3, June 2011
Foreword 4
Introduction 4
1 Scope 6
2 Normative and informative references 6
2.1 Normative references 6
2.2 Informative references 7
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations 7
3.1 Terms and definitions 7
3.2 Abbreviations 11
4 Methodology for risk based maintenance management 11
4.1 General 11
4.2 Safety functions 12
4.3 Static process equipment 12
4.4 Risk decision criteria 13
5 Maintenance management – Application of consequence classification 13
6 Technical hierarchy 16
7 Consequence classification 17
7.1 General 17
7.2 Principles and work flow 17
7.3 Consequence classification of main and sub function 18
7.4 Documentation of consequence classification 19
8 Maintenance programme 20
8.1 General 20

8.2 Work flow for establishing preventive maintenance (PM) programme for new plants 20
8.3 Unsafe failure modes 22
8.4 Generic maintenance concept 22
8.5 Update maintenance programme 23
8.6 Maintenance programme and handling of ageing 24
9 Maintenance planning 24
9.1 Maintenance planning and scheduling 24
9.2 Prioritising maintenance activities 24
10 Reporting, analysis and improvements 26
10.1 General 26
10.2 Reporting 26
10.3 Key performance Indicators for maintenance management 26
10.4 Analysis and Improvement 27
11 Spare parts evaluation 27
11.1 General 27
11.2 Work flow for evaluation of spare parts 27
11.3 Spare part categories 28
11.4 Location and holding 28
11.5 Reorder level and order quantity 29
12 Personnel and resources 29
Annex A (informative) Main function (MF) description and boundaries 30
Annex B (informative) Simplifying consequence assessment of standard sub functions 33
Annex C (informative) Risk assessment criteria 34
Annex D (informative) Practical examples 37
NORSOK standard Page 3 of 45

Foreword
The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry to ensure adequate safety,
value adding and cost effectiveness for petroleum industry developments and operations. Furthermore,
NORSOK standards are, as far as possible, intended to replace oil company specifications and serve as
references in the authorities’ regulations.
The NORSOK standards are normally based on recognised international standards, adding the provisions
deemed necessary to fill the broad needs of the Norwegian petroleum industry. Where relevant, NORSOK
standards will be used to provide the Norwegian industry input to the international standardisation process.
Subject to development and publication of international standards, the relevant NORSOK standard will be
withdrawn.
The NORSOK standards are developed according to the consensus principle generally applicable for most
standards work and according to established procedures defined in NORSOK A-001.
The NORSOK standards are prepared and published with support by The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
(OLF), The Federation of Norwegian Industry, Norwegian Shipowners’ Association and The Petroleum Safety
Authority Norway (PSA).
NORSOK standards are administered and published by Standards Norway.
Introduction
The purpose of this NORSOK standard is to provide requirements and guidelines for

x establishment of technical hierarchy,
x consequence classification of equipment,
x how to use consequence classification in maintenance management,
x how to use risk analysis to establish and update PM programmes,
x how to aid decisions related to maintenance using the underlying risk analysis,
x spare part evaluations.
This NORSOK standard is applicable for different purposes and phases such as:
x design phase: establish initial maintenance programme as an input to manning requirements and system
configuration. Selection of capital spare parts;
x preparation for operation: development of initial maintenance programmes for implementation into
maintenance management systems and selection of spare parts;
x operational phase: updating and optimisation of existing maintenance programmes. Guidance for
prioritising work orders. Lifetime extension.
As a basis for preparation and optimisation of maintenance programmes for new and in service facilities all
risk elements shall be taken into account, i.e. risks related to
x personnel,
x environment,
x production loss,
x direct and indirect cost including reputation.
The term "criticality analysis" is removed from Edition 2 of this NORSOK standard and replaced with
consequence classification. This is due to a conflicting use of criticality analysis in the industry; some use it to
describe a consequence analysis and some to describe a risk (probability and consequence) analysis.
This NORSOK standard is meant to define level of how this shall be done and deviations shall only provide
better solutions with regards to maintenance management. This NORSOK standard should also be seen in
conjunction with ISO 20815.

The standard describes the key work processes with explanation and requirements to each of them, and is
organized in the following way:
Section 4. Methodology for risk based maintenance management
Section 5. Maintenance management
Section 3. Detailed methodology

Definitions Section 6. Technical hierarchy
Section 7. Consequence classification
Section 8. Maintenance programme
Annex A-D
Section 9. Maintenance planning
Section 10. Reporting, analysis and improvements
Section 11. Spare parts evaluation
Section 12. Personnel and resources

1 Scope
This NORSOK standard is applicable for preparation and optimisation of maintenance activities for plant
systems and equipment including
x offshore topside systems,

x sub-sea production systems,
x oil and gas terminals.
The systems involving the following types of equipment:
x mechanical equipment:
x static and rotating equipment;
x piping.
x instrumentation;
x electrical equipment.
Excluded from the scope of this NORSOK standard are
x load bearing structures,

x floating structures,
x risers and pipelines.
In principle, all types of failure modes and failure mechanisms are covered by this NORSOK standard.
This NORSOK standard covers

x definition of relevant nomenclature,
x brief description of main work flow related to maintenance and which elements this typically involves,
x definition of risk model and failure consequence classes,
x guidelines for consequence classification, including
x functional breakdown of plants and plant systems in MFs and sub functions,
x identification of MF and sub function redundancy,
x assessment of the consequences of loss of MFs and sub functions,
x assignment of equipment to sub functions and associated consequence classes.
x description of how to establish an initial maintenance programme, and how to update an existing
programme,
x description on how to use the classification in combination with probability for decision making related to
prioritising work orders and handling spare parts.
2 Normative and informative references

The following standards include provisions and guidelines which, through reference in this text, constitute
provisions and guidelines of this NORSOK standard. Latest issue of the references shall be used unless
otherwise agreed. Other recognized standards may be used provided it can be shown that they meet the
requirements of the referenced standards.
2.1 Normative references

API RP 580, Risk-Based Inspection
DNV RP-F-206, Riser Integrity Management
DNV RP-F-116, Integrity Management of Submarine Pipeline System
DNV RP-G-101, Risk Based Inspection of Topside Static Mechanical Equipment
IEC 60300-3-11, Dependability Management Part 3-11: Application guide – Reliability centred
maintenance
IEC 61508, Functional safety for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems
IEC 61511, Functional Safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
ISO 17776, Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production installations – Guidelines
on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment

1
ISO 20815 , Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries – Production assurance and
reliability management
ISO 13702, Petroleum and natural gas industries – Control and mitigation of fires and explosions
on offshore production installations – Requirements and guidelines
ISO 14224, Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries – Collection and exchange of
reliability and maintenance data for equipment
NORSOK S-001, Technical safety
NORSOK Z-013, Risk and emergency preparedness analysis
OLF 070, Guidelines for the Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the petroleum
activities on the continental shelf
OLF 122, Life extension guideline
2.2 Informative references

BS 3811, Glossary of terms used in terotechnology
EN ISO 12100, Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk
reduction
EN 13306, Maintenance – Maintenance terminology
EN 15341, Maintenance – Maintenance Key Indicators
NORSOK Z-DP-002, Coding system
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

For the purposes of this NORSOK standard, the following terms, definitions and abbreviations apply.
3.1 Terms and definitions

3.1.1

availability
ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant of
time or over a given time interval, assuming that the required external resources are provided (see EN
13306)
3.1.2
can
verbal form used for statements of possibility and capability, whether material, physical or casual
3.1.3
condition monitoring
continuous or periodic measurement and interpretation of data to indicate the degraded condition (potential
failure) of an item and the need for maintenance (see BS 3811)
NOTE Condition monitoring is normally carried out with the item in operation, in an operating state or removed, but not subject to
dismantling.
3.1.4
consequence
outcome from an event
NOTE There may be one or more consequences from an event. Consequences may range from positive to negative. However,
consequences are always negative for safety aspects. Consequences may be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively (see API RP
580).
3.1.5
consequence classification
quantitative analysis of events and failures and assignment of the consequences of these.
NOTE See definitions in 3.1.6, 3.1.7 and 3.1.8.
1
NORSOK Z-016 was replaced by ISO 20815 in 2008.

3.1.6
consequence HSE
health, safety and/or environmental consequence of an event
3.1.7
consequence production
effect with regard to production of a functional failure where effects of mitigation (e.g. spares, manning, tools)
and compensation measures are not considered (= unmitigated consequence)
3.1.8
consequence other
other consequences as a result of a functional failure other than HSE or production consequence
NOTE May also include monetary losses and loss of reputation.
3.1.9
corrective maintenance
maintenance carried out after fault recognition and intended to put an item into a state in which it can perform
a required function (see EN 13306)
3.1.10
equipment class
class of similar type of equipment units (see ISO 14224)
NOTE E.g. all pumps.
3.1.11
failure

termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function (see EN 13306)
NOTE 1 After failure the item has a fault which may be complete or partial.
NOTE 2 “Failure” is an event, as distinguished from a “fault”, which is a state.
3.1.12
failure cause
circumstances during design, manufacture or use which have led to a failure (see ISO 14224)
3.1.13
failure impact
impact of a failure on an equipment's function(s) or on the plant (see ISO 14224)
NOTE On equipment level, failure impact can be classified in three classes: critical, degraded, and incipient.
3.1.14
failure mechanism
physical, chemical or other processes which lead or have led to failure (see EN 13306)
3.1.15
failure mode
effect by which a failure is observed on the failed item (see ISO 14224)
3.1.16
failure rate
number of failures of an item in a given time interval divided by the time interval (see EN 13306)
NOTE 1 This value is an approximation.

NOTE 2 In some cases time can be replaced by units of use.
NOTE 3 In most cases 1/MTTF (where MTTF is mean time to failure) can be used as the predictor for the failure rate, i.e. the
average number of failures per unit time in the long run if the units are replaced by an identical unit at failure. Failure
rate can be based on operational or calendar time.

3.1.17
fault
state of an item characterized by inability to perform required function, excluding such inability during PM or
other planned actions, or due to lack of external resources (see ISO 14224)
3.1.18
generic maintenance concept
GMC
set of maintenance actions, strategies and maintenance details, which demonstrates a cost efficient
maintenance method for a defined generic group of equipment functioning under similar frame and operating
conditions
3.1.19
hazard
potential source of harm (see ISO 17776)
NOTE In the context of this NORSOK standard, the potential harm may relate to human injury, damage to the environment, damage
to property, or a combination of these.
3.1.20
hidden failure
failure that is not immediately evident to operations and maintenance personnel (see ISO 14224)
NOTE Equipment that fails to perform an “on demand” function falls into this category. It is necessary that such failures be detected to
be revealed.
3.1.21
inspection
activity carried out periodically and used to assess the progress of damage in a component

NOTE 1 Inspection can be by means of technical instruments (e.g. NDT) or as visual examination.
NOTE 2 EN 13306 has been deviated from in order to apply to the most common use of the term “inspection” in the oil and gas
industry, which relates inspection and inspection management to the activity of checking the conformity of the
equipment by NDT instruments or visual examination at regular intervals.
3.1.22
item
any part, component, device, subsystem, functional unit, equipment or system that can be individually
considered (see EN 13306)
NOTE 1 Item is also known as tag or functional location.
3.1.23
maintainable item
item that constitutes a part, or an assembly of parts, that is normally the lowest level in the hierarchy during
maintenance (see ISO 14224)
3.1.24
maintenance
combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions during the life cycle of an item intended to
retain it in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform the required function (see EN 13306)
3.1.25
maintenance effectiveness
ratio between the maintenance performance target and the actual result (see EN 13306)
3.1.26
maintenance management
all activities of the management that determine the maintenance objectives, strategies, and the
responsibilities and implement them by means such as maintenance planning, maintenance control and
supervision, improvements of methods in the organisation including economical aspects (see EN 13306)

3.1.27
maintenance strategy
management method used in order to achieve the maintenance objectives (see EN 13306)
3.1.28
may
verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of this NORSOK standard
3.1.29
modification
combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions intended to change the function of an item
(see EN 13306)
3.1.30
performance standard
PS
the performance standard describes the role of the barrier as a risk reducing measure and its relations to
other safety systems managing a potential hazard. The performance standard outlines the requirements of
the specific system in terms of its functionality (i.e. the essential duties that the system is expected to
perform), integrity (i.e. reliability and availability parameters of the particular barrier) and survivability (i.e. the
functionality of the barrier under the conditions of a major accident when the system is required to operate)
3.1.31
preventive maintenance
PM
maintenance carried out at predetermined intervals or according to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce
the probability of failure or the degradation of the function of an item (see EN 13306)

3.1.32
production assurance
activities implemented to achieve and maintain a performance that is at its optimum in terms of the overall
economy and at the same time consistent with applicable framework conditions (see ISO 20815)
3.1.33
redundancy
existence of more than one means at a given instant of time for performing a required function in an item
(see EN 13306)
NOTE 1 Active redundancy; redundancy wherein all means for performing a required function are intended to operate
simultaneously.
NOTE 2 Standby redundancy; redundancy wherein a part of the means for performing a required function is intended to operate,
while the remaining part(s) of the means are inoperative until needed.
3.1.34
reliability centred maintenance
RCM
method to identify and select failure management policies to efficiently and effectively achieve the required
safety, availability and economy of operation (see IEC 60300-3-11)
3.1.35
repair time
part of active corrective maintenance item during which repair is carried out on an item (see EN 13306)
3.1.36
risk
combination of the probability of an event and the consequences of the event (see ISO 17776)
3.1.37
risk based inspection
RBI
risk assessment and management process that is focused on loss of containment of pressurized equipment
in processing facilities, due to material deterioration

NOTE These risks are managed primarily through equipment inspection (see API RP 580).
3.1.38
safety function
physical measures which reduce the probability of a situation of hazard and accident occurring, or which limit
the consequences of an accident (see NORSOK S-001)
3.1.39
safety system
system which realises one or more active safety functions.
3.1.40
shall
verbal form used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to this NORSOK standard
and from which no deviation is permitted, unless accepted by all involved parties
3.1.41
should
verbal form used to indicate that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable,
without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily
required
3.1.42
unsafe failure modes
failure modes dangerous to personnel but which do not threaten the MF of the equipment
3.2 Abbreviations
API American Petroleum Institute

BoM bill of material
BS British Standard
CMMS computerized maintenance management system
DNV Det Norske Veritas
EN European Standard
FMECA failure mode, effect and criticality analysis
GMC generic maintenance concept
HSE health, safety and environment
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
KPI key performance indicator
MF main function
NDT non destructive testing
OLF Oljeindustriens Landsforening
OREDA® offshore and onshore reliability data
P&ID process and instrumentation diagram
PM preventive maintenance
PS performance standard
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority
PU parallel unit
QRA quantitative risk analysis
RBI risk based inspection
RCM reliability centred maintenance
SAR safe analysis report
SIL safety integrity level
4 Methodology for risk based maintenance management
4.1 General
Risk assessment shall be used as the guiding principle for maintenance decisions. This NORSOK standard
describes how to apply this in an efficient manner. The key elements of this methodology are as follows:

a) consequence classification of functional failure;

b) use of GMCs in combination with classical RCM methods. The GMCs are developed by RCM analysis
including plant experience. The GMCs will implicit express the probability of failure via the maintenance
tasks and the maintenance interval assigned. It is recommended that the GMCs are adjusted to the local
conditions via a cost-benefit assessment and including other local conditions;
c) in case no GMCs are applicable or the purpose of the study requires more in-depth evaluations, an
FMECA/RCM/RBI analysis should be carried out. Identification of relevant failure modes and estimation of
failure probability should primarily be based on operational experience of the actual equipment.
Alternatively generic failure data from similar operations may be used with sufficient reliability data
qualification in accordance with ISO 20815, Annex E.2;
d) the application of the consequence classification and additional risk factors for decision making related to
corrective maintenance and handling of spare parts.
As important as the risk assessment, is having well defined work processes and company/management
commitment. This NORSOK standard describes the main work flow and sets minimum requirements to each
of the steps in this process. Further the process points out the importance of continuous improvement based
on reporting and analysis of the plant condition.
4.2 Safety functions

Establishment of function requirements for the safety functions should be based on risk evaluations of
accidental events, which will determine the safety systems and their performance. The overall performance
shall be documented in the form of PSs or equivalent. The PS will set requirements with respect to
availability, capacity and performance of safety functions. Reference is made to NORSOK S-001, ISO 13702,
IEC 61508, IEC 61511, OLF 070 and ISO 20815. ISO 14224, F.3, lists the most common safety
systems/components for an oil and gas installation with definition of critical/dangerous failure modes.
One of the most important tasks for the maintenance organisation is to maintain this performance during the
lifecycle of the plant. Availability requirements should be used to determine the programme for PM activities

and the required contingency plans in the event of failure.
The inherent availability of the safety functions should be controlled and documented. The development of
failure rate and system unavailability should be used as the basis for changing of test intervals and other
mitigating actions to ensure compliance with function requirements.
4.3 Static process equipment

Static process equipment (containment function) has a dual function, i.e. a safety function related to leak
failures and a production function related to storing and transporting gas or liquids, see Clause 7.
In order to establish an inspection programme for this equipment, it is necessary to perform detailed
evaluations similar to an FMECA, usually named RBI. The process requires knowledge of
x damage mechanism which depends on material properties, internal fluid compositions and the external
operational environment – determining the probability of failure,
x consequence of leak failure with respect to personnel, environment damages and financial losses
The combination of the above represents the risk of failure which should be mitigated.
The consequence classification methodology could be applied for screening of static mechanical equipment
with the purpose of excluding non-critical equipment for further analysis and prioritise other equipment for in-
depth risk evaluations as the basis for preparation of inspection programmes. The result of the RBI process
is determination of
x location and extent of inspections and condition monitoring,

x inspection methods,
x inspection intervals.
There exist several standards for performing RBI analysis depending on type of object. Reference is made to
DNV RP-G-101 for topside systems, DNV RP-F-206 for risers, and DNV RP-F116 for submarine pipeline
systems. For refineries the API RP 580 can be applied.

4.4 Risk decision criteria

Risk based decisions have to be done against defined criteria. The definition of the criteria should be done in
accordance with overall company policy for HSE, production and cost. The criteria shall be properly defined
and communicated.
This NORSOK standard will not define any generic criteria, but describe an example of such criteria. See also
NORSOK Z-013 and ISO 17776. The level of detailing in any risk matrix used is company specific, and can
typical vary from a course 3x3 matrix to 5x10.
The following principles should apply:
x the risk matrix should as far as possible be the same for all operation for a company in order to aid
common companywide optimisation and devote resources accordingly as well as having a common
language for communicating risk;
x further, the same criteria should be used for all equipment and systems (also those excluded from this
standard). This is in particular important for topside maintenance and inspection planning which are
handling basically the same hardware;
x the consequence of loss of functionality (both loss of MF and sub functions) should take into account the
standby redundancy (see 3.1.33) and reduce the impact accordingly.
Annex C gives example of criteria which can be used for classification, development of preventive work tasks
and for prioritisation of work orders, as well as for optimisation of spares.
5 Maintenance management – Application of consequence classification

The purpose of this clause is
x to describe the key elements and expectations of the overall maintenance management work process,

x to describe where consequence classification is applicable in the maintenance management work
process,
x highlight how risk management aspects are taken into account in the different steps in the process,
x link the main steps to the rest of the document where risk assessment details are described.
This description is not a comprehensive description of maintenance management in its wider sense.
However, it gives a short description of what each step typically involves.
Maintenance management is illustrated as a work process where products are produced with low HSE risks
and high production performance. The basic model proposed as industry best practice is shown in
2
Figure 1 .
On an overall level there are resources, management of work processes and results. Each of the elements
in the management process may be detailed into a set of sub processes and products. In the following a brief
description of the different elements in the maintenance management process is given. Those elements,
where risk assessment, use of consequence classification and probability for failure assessment are
important, are further described in this document and referenced below.
2
The model is based on PSA “Basisstudie” from 1998

Resources Management of work processes Results
Goals and Maintenance Maintenance

Planning
Requirements Programme Execution
Risk level
Organisation
Resource Management Technical

Materials
needs and Verification Condition
Documentation
Production
and IT systems
performance
Improvements Analysis Reporting
Figure 1 – Maintenance management process
Goals and Goals should be established that commit the organisation to a realisable level of
requirements: performance. The goals should focus on ambition level for
x risk, production and cost,

x regulatory requirements,
x technical condition of the facility in particular the performance of safety systems
and critical processes,
x improvement of overall maintenance process.
Maintenance strategies should be defined for the asset.

Maintenance Failure modes, failure mechanisms and failure causes that can have a significant
programme: effect on safety and production shall be identified and the risk determined in order
to establish a maintenance programme. The maintenance programme includes
maintenance interval and written procedures for maintaining, testing, and preparing
the various components within the plant.
This activity will typically involve the following:
x performing consequence classification for functions. The consequence class is
inherited by the equipment relevant for the function;
x for equipment representing high consequence in case of failure, the failure
mode, failure cause and the connected maintenance programme should be
developed, documented and made traceable;
x safety barriers and/or safety functions should be identified, reliability
requirements defined for the functions, and a testing programme to maintain the
functionality should be developed;
x criteria for when the maintenance programme are to be updated based on time,
experienced failures or similar should be defined. In particular failures of safety
critical systems shall be analysed and the programme updated on a regular
basis.
See Clause 7 and Clause 8.

Planning: A maintenance plan is a structured set of tasks that include the activities,
procedures, resources and the time required to carry out maintenance. Planning
consists of budgeting, long term planning, day to day planning and prioritising.
This will typically involve the following:
x have a defined method and criteria for planning and prioritising of both
preventive and corrective work based on its impact on HSE and production;
x the plans are regularly monitored and reviewed to access achievement, backlog,
and efficiency.

See Clause 9.
Execution: Execution includes preparations, work permits, carrying out work and reporting
mandatory information on the work order. Maintenance and inspection work shall
be executed in a safe and a cost-effective manner. System and equipment
conditions shall be reported before/after repair for continuous improvement. Risk
assessment shall be the basis for operational priorities.
x work execution shall be performed by competent personnel according to plans,
procedures and work descriptions relevant for the actual case;
x the complexity of the work (both for individual jobs and for a set of jobs) should
be taken into account;
x a plan for verifying the quality of work executed should be in place;
x the condition of the equipment should be reported after completion of work. For
barriers with defined reliability targets, the failure data should be reported to aid
analysis and comparison vs. PSs.
See Clause 10.

Reporting: Reporting involves collection and quality assurance of maintenance data, and
presenting these to maintenance departments and management in the form of
defined indicators. In particular technical integrity data for safety functions shall be
known and reported at appropriate levels to aid decision making.
x a set of KPIs should be defined for monitoring and follow up of performance;
x key performance indicator performance outside set goals should be reported
and acted upon;

x reports of safety performance, production and cost versus goals/budget should
be available and communicated in the organization;
x a set of performance data should be reported and compared to established PSs.
See Clause 10.

Analysis and This activity involves carry out analysis of historical maintenance data, and
unwanted incidents related to maintenance, e.g. trend analysis, root cause failure
Improvements: analysis. Further the information should be evaluated and implement actions
suggested based on the conducted analysis.
x a defined analysis process shall be in place addressing trigger values, analysis
technique and responsibilities. The work shall be documented and monitored;
x the analysis process should include evaluation of maintenance effectiveness, i.e.
to what extend the maintenance programme are handling the risks and
performance requirements for individual systems or key components;
x the identified improvements, actions should be implemented and the effect
should be monitored.
See Clause 10.

Organisation The organisation consists of the people, their training, competence, job descriptions
(Resources): and work processes.
This will typically involve requirements to organisation, competence and
roles/responsibilities.
Materials Material resources include consumables, spare parts and tools required to carry out
(Resources): maintenance.
This will typically involve the spare part availability shall be optimized based on
demand, consequence of failure, repair time and cost, and linked to the
maintenance planning activity.

See Clause 11.

Documentation Documentation in this context includes all documentation required to carry out and
(Resources): manage maintenance in an effective manner. This includes, but are not limited to,
equipment/tag register, drawings and design details, historical maintenance data,
maintenance task descriptions, spares lists.
x maintenance data are organized into a database where technical information,
plans and historic performance are readily available for users and decision
makers;
x this documentation needs to be controlled, updated and made available to the
relevant user.
Management and A key to good maintenance is a well organized management team taking
verification: responsibilities in implementing the principles herein and verifying the results. The
management team should ensure that the maintenance work processes are
followed. This will typically involve the following:
x the leaders should define roles and responsibilities and qualification
requirements within the area of maintenance;
x the leaders should possess knowledge related to risk based maintenance
management and make sure that the main work flow is followed;
x the leaders should monitor defined indicators (KPIs) and act upon deviations
from set goals;
x in addition, the leaders should plan and institute audits of the organisation,
suppliers and contractors.

Risk level The risk level is a result of the operation and maintenance work done to the asset.
(Technical Risk can be measured as HSE performance, barrier reliability status or related
condition): indicators.
Production The plant’s production assurance is a result of the activities implemented to achieve
assurance and maintain a performance that is at its optimum in terms of the overall economy
(Technical and at the same time consistent with applicable framework conditions. An indicator
condition): of this would be the achieved production availability.
Cost (Technical Cost is here related to man cost for preventive and corrective work, spares and
condition): consumables, lost/deferred production that is under the control of the maintenance
function.
6 Technical hierarchy
The technical hierarchy is a corner stone in maintenance management. It describes the technical structure of
the installation by giving functional locations unique identifiers. The technical hierarchy provides an overview
of equipment units that belong together technically, and shows the physical relationship between main
equipment, instruments, valves, etc. The technical hierarchy should be established at an early phase to give
an overview of all the tags/equipment and how they are related. The purpose of the technical hierarchy is as
follows:
x show technical interdependencies of the installation;

x retrieval of tags, equipment and spare parts;
x retrieval of documents and drawings;
x retrieval of historical maintenance data from CMMS;
x planning of operations (e.g. relationships due to shutdown etc.);
x cost allocation and retrieval;
x planning and organization of the maintenance programme;
x planning of corrective work.

The level on which the maintenance objects are established is governed by practical execution and the
individual need to monitor and control the different maintenance programmes. For corrective maintenance
where the work orders can be assigned to any tagged equipment, the cost will be traceable to a lower level,
but even this costing should be possible to summarise to the same level as for the maintenance objects used
for the PM programmes.
See Annex D for detailed information and practical examples of the work process for establishing a technical
hierarchy.
Reference is made to public coding standards:
x ISO 14224
x NORSOK Z-DP-002
7 Consequence classification
7.1 General
This clause describes how consequence classification should be done, its workflow and relation to
maintenance programmes. Consequence classification expresses what effect loss of function can have on
HSE, production and cost/other. The classification is done according to a consequence scale which is a part
of the risk model, see Clause 4 and Annex C.
The consequence classification together with other key information and parameters gives input to the
following activities and processes:
x selection of equipment where detailed RCM/RBI/FMECA analysis is recommended (screening process);

x establish PM programme;

x preparation and optimisation of GMCs;
x design evaluations;
x prioritisation of work orders;
x spare part evaluations.
7.2 Principles and work flow

Figure 2 shows an overall workflow related to classification. The following principles apply:
x The consequence classification is done to identify critical equipment for HSE, production and cost
x All systems and/or tags related to an installation should be classified using the same classification scale –
regardless which method and standard is used for the classification.
x A functional hierarchy is established (MFs and sub functions). This is normally not stored in the CMMS but
used during the classification process. See Annex D. Sub functions are linked to equipment/maintenance
object in the technical hierarchy
x The classification feeds in to a common risk model used for operational decision making thus they need to
be comparable.
x The static process equipment consisting of pipes, vessels, valves are normally consequence classified via
an RBI analysis. The classification of HSE leakage may be done as a part of the RBI analysis or as a
separate activity together with the overall classification of all functions and equipment. The containment
has a dual function, i.e. a safety system with a PS and a production system with its production functions.
x Safety functions are defined via safety analysis (e.g. quantitative risk analysis) in the design or
modification process. As such these systems and equipment are already identified and its function
defined, normally with high consequence for HSE.
x The outcome of the classification will be a set of attributes assigned to each tag. The set of parameters
should be aligned to the decision model. Examples of information to be assigned to each tag are
x safety function identifier,

x leakage HSE consequence,
x functional failure/loss of function – HSE consequence,
x functional failure/loss of function – production consequence,
x functional failure/loss of function – cost/other consequence,
x redundancy.

Consequence classification process
Basic design Identify main & sub Consequence Mapping function to

equipment Output
documentation functions Classification
1. Technical
hierarchy incl
documentation
2. Identify main
functions
Common risk
3. Identify sub management
functions system and
8. Analyses results;
- Safety critical 4.- 7. Assign priority of actions
elements (barriers) consequences and (Fig. 5)
- Risk Based redundancy level to
Inspection (RBI) main- and sub
- Plant and systems functions 9. Mapping of
10. Result per
avaialbility studies equipment (tag) to sub
equipment (tag);
functions
- Safety function
- Leak HSE
- HSE conseq
- Prod conseq
- Other conseq
- Redundancy

Establish
Maintenance
Programme
(Fig. 3)
Figure 2 – Consequence classification process
7.3 Consequence classification of main and sub function

The functional classification work process is described stepwise below:
No Step Activity
1 Technical x The established technical hierarchy including documentation is used to

hierarchy identify systems and equipment which is subject to consequence
classification.
2 Identify MFs x Each plant system should be divided into a number of MFs covering the entire
system.
x The MFs are characterised by being the principal tasks in the process such as
heat exchanging, pumping, separation, power generation, compressing,
distributing, storing, etc. Annex A gives an overview of typical MFs for an oil
and gas production plant.
x Each MF is given a unique designation consisting of a number (if appropriate
a tag number) and a name that describes the task and the process.
3 Identify sub x MFs are split into sub functions. In order to simplify the consequence
functions assessment, the sub function level can be standardised for typical process
equipment with pre-defined terms. See Annex B.
x The standard list of sub functions has to be supplemented with other sub
functions relevant for the system configuration.
4 Assign MF x MF redundancy shall be specified, see Table C.2 for example of redundancy
redundancy definitions.

No Step Activity
x In case of safety systems or protective functions with redundancy due to

functional reliability or regulatory requirements, the redundancy effect should
not be counted for.
5 Assign MF x The entire MF failure consequence is assessed in terms of the state where
consequences the MF no longer is able to perform its required functions.
x Assuming that other adjacent functions and equipment are operating normally
x In this assessment any redundancy within the function is disregarded, as the
redundancy will be treated separately.
x Other mitigating actions are not considered at this stage, i.e. like spares,
manning, and tools.
x The most serious, but nevertheless realistic effects of a function fault shall be
identified according to set risk criteria. See Clause 4.
6 Assign sub x If there is redundancy within a sub function, the number of parallel units and
function capacity per unit shall be stipulated, see Table C.2 for example of redundancy
redundancy definitions.
7 Assign sub x The consequence on system/plant of a fault in a sub function is assessed

function with respect to HSE, production and cost according to the same principles as
consequences outlined for MF.
8 Input from x Structures/pipelines and risers: These systems are not covered by this
other analyses NORSOK standard, but the same classification systematic is proposed used.
x Containment: For the tags/systems that are containment related, results from

the RBI analysis are used to set the safety/environmental consequence of
failure (leakage HSE).
x Safety functions: Dedicated safety functions shall be identified via a risk
assessment where performance requirements are defined such as reliability
and survivability. In the classification process these systems are mapped to
the tag hierarchy for readily identification in the CMMS system. The functional
requirements are carried forward to the maintenance programme to maintain
these functions, primarily in the form of functional testing.
9 Equipment x The equipment (identified by its tag numbers, see Clause 6) carrying out the
mapping to sub functions shall be assigned to the respective sub functions.
function x If equipment performs more than one sub function (e.g. some instrument
loops), it should be assigned to the most critical sub function.
x All equipment (identified by its tag number) will inherit the same description,
consequence classification and redundancy as the sub function of which they
are a part. See Annex C for an example.
10 Result per x Consequence analysis should be documented according to 7.4 and the key
equipment data stored in CMMS readily available.
7.4 Documentation of consequence classification

A sound principle is to make the assessment available and traceable for updates and improvements of the
results, as more information and feedback from the operation become available. As a minimum, the following
should be documented:
x decision criteria;
x definition of consequence classes;
x MF description;
x sub function description;
x assignment of equipment (tags) to sub function;
x assessment of the consequences of loss of MFs and sub functions for all consequence categories,
including necessary arguments for assignment of consequence classes;
x assessment of MF and sub function redundancy;
x any deviations should be documented and explained.

8 Maintenance programme
8.1 General
The purpose of a maintenance program is to control all risks associated with degradation of equipment.
Maintenance includes e.g. calendar based activities, inspection, condition monitoring and testing. The
program shall include activities and maintenance intervals per equipment. The classical way of establishing a
maintenance programme is using RCM analysis, see IEC 60300-3-11. However, this NORSOK standard calls
for using GMCs in combination with more detailed RCM methods. The generic concepts are considered an
efficient way of capturing company knowledge for traditional technology where the maintenance tasks can be
standardized. It is important that the generic concepts are adjusted to local operational conditions as well as
the local risks associated with the plant in question.
8.2 Work flow for establishing preventive maintenance (PM) programme for new plants
The work flow for establishment of maintenance programme for new plants is described stepwise below and
illustrated in Figure 3.
No Step Activity
1 Grouping and Input to the process is the technical hierarchy and a functional grouping and
classification functional classification of the plant in question. See Clause 8.
2 Safety If the equipment is defined as a safety function, there should exist a Performance
functions Standard and a safety requirement specification defining basic requirements
including testing frequency for hidden failures. For safety functions with given
availability requirements, there exists models for how to estimate testing time, see
OLF 070 or IEC 61508. Further, for many safety systems there will exist additional
maintenance tasks to be done like cleaning, lubrication, etc. which should be
described in generic concepts for this equipment group. These data and tasks are

then input to the PM programme.
3 Generic The next step in the process is to determine if there exist generic concepts for the
concepts equipment. If that is the case, the applicability and relevance of the concept should
be checked as well as if there exist specific PM requirements from authority or
company.
4 Adjustment of The generic concepts should be evaluated for the actual case considering the
GMCs production value of the plant (deferred production) and repair capacity (man-
power, spares and tools) at hand to handle the most common failures. Any local
adjustments should be in addition to the generic concept.
5 Risk analysis/ In case no GMC is applicable or the purpose of the study requires more in-depth
Assignment of evaluations, it is recommended that an RCM/RBI/SIL analysis is carried out
maintenance according to IEC 60300-3-11 and DNV RP- G-101. Identification of relevant failure
activities modes and estimation of failure probability should primarily be based on
operational experience of the actual equipment, and alternatively on generic failure
data from similar operations. Again, the task will involve both safety assessment
and cost benefit to determine the maintenance tasks, as well as including
authority/company requirements. See 9.3 for unsafe failure modes.
Cost benefit Defining intervals are to a large extent based on engineering judgement The
analysis engineering judgement should be based on a form of cost-benefit assessment
including the following factors:
x consequences of function or sub-function failures and functional redundancy;

x probability of function or sub-function failures and its function of time or
frequency of PM activities;
x detectability of failure and failure mechanisms, including the time available to
make necessary mitigating actions to avoid critical function or sub-function
failure;
x cost of alternative preventive activities.
6 Developing The above RCM/RBI/SIL analysis can be transformed to a GMC for later use on

No Step Activity
generic similar equipment. Additional experience related to use of the concepts should be
maintenance included.
concepts
7 Low For equipments classified with low consequence of failure, a planned corrective
consequence maintenance strategy may be selected (run to failure). However, a minimum set of
items activities to prolong lifetime may also be considered. See 9.3 for unsafe failure
modes.
8 Establish Finally, all the maintenance tasks should be packed and scheduled considering
maintenance plant production plans, resources requirements, turnaround schedule, etc to derive
programme to the final maintenance plan.
Establish maintenance program – new plant

Assignment of Establish
Grouping and
Risk Analysis maintenance Cost/benefit analysis maintenance
classification
activities program
Technical
hierarchy and
consequence
classification
from fig. 3
Is this a safety Performance

function acc to IEC Yes standards & generic
61508 concepts

No
Use generic
maintenance concept
Does GMC exist
Yes and identify if any
for the equipment
company/authority
type?
requirements exist
Establish generic
No maintenance
concept
Local adjustment Establish

Identify
f maintenance
and Analysis to maintenance
Consequence Conduct FMECA/
A activities and
H/M determine description and
class RCM/RBI/SIL company/authority
maintenance resource
requirements.
(Cost/Benefit) requirements
Preventive
maintenance
program
Maintenance activities
Planned
to prolong the
Corrective
equipment’s lifetime
Maintenacne
should be considered.
Figure 3 – Establishing maintenance programme for new plants

8.3 Unsafe failure modes

Some equipment may suffer failure modes dangerous for personnel but which do not threaten the MF of the
equipment. Example is damage to electrical insulation causing short circuit dangerous for personnel touching
the equipment. The short circuit is usually not considered a functional failure but represents a dangerous
situation. These failure modes/causes risk shall be identified in the form of probability and consequence
assigned as well as PM tasks to control the risk. This is best documented in a GMC or a RCM analysis
The CE (Conformité Européenne) marking of equipment shall include an assessment of personnel risk as
part of the documentation. Relevant standard is EN ISO 12100.
8.4 Generic maintenance concept
8.4.1 General
A GMC is a set of maintenance actions, strategies and maintenance details, which demonstrates a cost
efficient maintenance method for a defined generic group of equipment functioning under similar frame and
operating conditions. The use of the GMC should ensure that all defined HSE, production, cost and other
operating requirements are met. The concept shall include relevant design and operating conditions and
should be documented by a RCM/FMECA analysis. A generic concept can be seen as a collection of best
practices for a company, and as such should be maintained and updated via a controlled process as new
experience and technology becomes available, see Annex D.
For safety functions: the performance requirements, the corresponding acceptance criteria and critical failure
modes shall be defined on the concepts.
8.4.2 Application of generic maintenance concepts (GMCs)

Generic maintenance concepts may be developed in order to

x establish a company’s minimum requirements to maintenance,
x reduce the effort in establishing the maintenance programme as similar equipments/technologies are pre-
analyzed,
x ensure uniform and consistent maintenance activities,
x facilitate analysis of equipment groups,
x provide proper documentation of selected maintenance strategies,
x ensure experience transfer between plants with similar technology and operation.
Generic maintenance concepts are applicable for all types of equipment covered by this NORSOK standard.
A GMC can be utilized when
x the group of equipment has similar design,

x the equipment has similar failure modes, failure rates and operating conditions,
x the amount of similar equipment justifies the development of a generic concept.
In case of significant differences between the actual equipment and the equipment which has been the basis
for the GMCs, the equipment in question has to be treated individually as a separate generic class of
equipment. Basically, equipment failure modes are independent of equipment functionality, i.e. which
functions the equipment supports. However, operational conditions, location and external environmental
impact may influence the probability of failure and should be assessed prior to use of GMCs.
8.4.3 Preparation and documentation of generic maintenance concepts (GMCs)

The extent of documentation will differ depending on the complexity of the equipment and the risk attached.
The concept should allow for adjustment of maintenance activities according to changes in the frame
conditions.
The GMC should be established based on a detailed generic maintenance analysis (see Figure 3) including
recommended maintenance interval and maximum allowed interval. In the local analysis, the generic
concepts are adjusted to local operational conditions as well as the local risks associated with the plant in
question. See Annex D for examples of how to document GMCs.

8.4.4 Local adjustments of a GMC

When a GMC is attached to a specific component/tag, the maintenance interval should be adjusted within the
maximum allowed interval in GMC based on factors like
x higher or lower consequence class than described in GMC,

x different level of redundancy than described in GMC,
x operational conditions.
This local adjustment could either be done by use of adjustment factors to calculate interval, or by expertise
statements.
8.5 Update maintenance programme

A maintenance programme needs updating at regular intervals. The triggers for such updating can be one or
more of the following:
x the observed failure rate is significantly different from what was expected, i.e.:
x higher failure rate is observed requiring a change in maintenance strategy or frequency – or
replacement of the unit;
x lower failure rate, or no observed damage at PM may point towards extension of intervals or omitting
certain tasks.
x the operational environment has changed causing different consequence and probability:
x less or more production;
x change in product composition.
x cost of maintenance different from expected;
x new technology that could make the maintenance more efficient (like new methods for condition
monitoring) is available;
x updated regulations;

x information from vendor;
x modifications.
The evaluation should be based on historical data and experience. A process diagram to update a
maintenance programme is shown in Figure 4. If it is a safety system, an evaluation of number of failures per
tests versus PS requirements should be performed. If there is a significant change in the safety system
performance stated in the PS, this information should be feedback to the overall risk assessment for the
plant.
For non-safety systems a cost-benefit analysis based on experience should be performed. Based on this
evaluation maintenance programme and GMC (if relevant) should be updated, and implemented in the
maintenance plan.
Plant total safety

Data/experience from anlysis (QRA) and
operation & mainteance production availability
analysis.
Analyse failure Update maintenance

Safety historical data actitivies; frequency Updated maintenance
Yes
Function? (#failures/#tests) vs PS (interval), man-hrs, program
requirements (SAR) work description, etc.
Analysis of historic
No data. Cost-benefit of
PM vs Risk. Update generic
maintenance concept
if relevant
Figure 4 – Process for updating maintenance program

8.6 Maintenance programme and handling of ageing

Most maintenance programmes are based on a relatively constant failure rate not considering the ageing
development that systems can suffer. However, the maintenance function should at any time have an
overview of the ageing development for its components, and do maintenance and upgrading to ensure safe
and reliable operation. This may require dedicated efforts beyond what is said in 9.5 when approaching the
intended lifetime for the plant. Such an effort involves the following:
a) evaluate operational and degradation history. Any incidents with large degradation, abnormal operation,
etc should be identified as well as any detrimental effect of modifications done to the unit. Collection and
verification of system documentation and “as-build” documentation;
b) assessment of current condition/”as-is” condition;
c) evaluate the future ageing in view of the planned future operation and load planned for the asset:
1) are there any ageing phenomena that have not been seen so far but are under development?
2) are the safety function status and development according to requirements?
3) will any equipment/system become obsolete so that spares no longer can be purchased?
d) based on c) decisions need to be made regarding
1) updated/more intensive maintenance programme as well as change in spares holding strategy;
2) replacement or modifications of single components or larger units;
3) any operational constrains for the unit in view of ageing;
4) dedicated analysis for e.g. structure.
e) finally, classification and maintenance programme should be updated, if relevant.
See OLF 122 for required documentation of maintenance and inspection in connection with extended lifetime.
9 Maintenance planning
9.1 Maintenance planning and scheduling

There shall exist a maintenance plan covering both preventive and corrective maintenance, and criteria for
prioritisation shall be used to establish the maintenance plan. A method for prioritising maintenance should
be in place. A PM program is established as described in Clause 8. This program consists of a list of
maintenance activities and intervals for a plant. At certain time, e.g. 30 days before due date of an activity, a
work order is generated in the CMMS system. The maintenance planner would then do the detailed planning,
order material, personnel and tools for the activity.
9.2 Prioritising maintenance activities

The results from the consequence classification are useful when defining criteria for prioritising work orders –
both preventive and corrective work. Preventive maintenance work orders should in principle be executed
according to the given maintenance plan. Backlog related to the plan should be prioritised based on risk, i.e.
probability and consequence of failure. Prioritization of corrective maintenance should be done based on the
risk the failure represents, described as consequence and failure impact/probability of failure. Some
companies call this process “Risk Based Work Selection”, and have implemented it in their maintenance
management system.shows an example of such a work flow, i.e. a selection of which corrective work orders
to prioritize.

Probability of
failure
Create failure (Failure Impact)
report for
Risk model with Priority of work
equipment with
criteria for action orders
description of
failure
Consequence of
failure for given
case
Consequence
classification of
equipment
Figure 5 – Priority of corrective work orders
The process involves the following:
x assigning the consequence of failure to the case. It can be assigned via the consequence classification of
equipment on overall functional level. This consequence should always be supplied by information
regarding the actual failure mode, the operational state of the plant, possibilities for re-routing the process,
etc. As such the process cannot be automatic, but requires involvement from personnel knowing the plant
and the actual case. E.g. unsafe failure modes (see 9.3) for low consequence equipment;
x assigning the failure impact. The failure impact is a coarse probability scale, see Table 1. A time to failure

scale may also be used, see Table C.3;
x for failure impact “degraded or incipient failure”, a time to failure shall be assigned and used in the setting
of priority (time) for the repair work;
x the risk associated with the consequence and probabilities as well as actions from this risk (priorities) shall
be defined in given criteria e.g. via a risk matrix. Table C.3 shows an example of a risk model described
as a risk matrix used to determine the priority;
x priority: Compensating operational actions used to temporarily maintain the function can be described as
redundancy;
x compensating measures shall be in place when failure on the safety critical functions.
Table 1 – Failure impact scale

Failure Definition Note

impact
Critical Failure of an equipment unit Includes failures requiring immediate action
failure that causes an immediate towards cessation of performing the function even
cessation of the ability to though actual operation may continue for a short
perform a required function. period of time. A critical failure may result in an
unscheduled repair.
Degraded Failure that does not cease The failure may be gradual, partial or both. The
failure the fundamental function(s), function may be compromised by any combination
but compromises one or of reduced, increased or erratic outputs. An
several functions. immediate repair can normally be delayed, but in
time such failures may develop into a critical
failure if corrective actions are not taken.
Incipient Imperfection in the state or
failure condition of an item so that a
degraded or critical failure
may (or may not) eventually
be the expected result if
corrective actions are not
taken
10 Reporting, analysis and improvements
10.1 General
Reporting and analysis of maintenance performance is required in order to ensure continuous improvement.

Below is described how this should be done.
10.2 Reporting
The ISO 14224 standard gives recommendations for reporting of data related to maintenance. Table 2 is
extracted from ISO 14224 and lists a minimum of information recommended to be reported related to
maintenance activities. For details, see ISO 14224. The need for reporting will vary between systems and has
to be taken into account in order to avoid overloading of the field personnel.
Table 2 – Reporting of maintenance data
Corrective maintenance Preventive maintenance

Failure mode Condition of equipment before PM work
Failure cause Man hours for activity
Failure mechanisms Spare parts used
Equipment down time Start and finish time
Spare parts used
Man hours for activity
Start and finish time of repair
10.3 Key performance Indicators for maintenance management

Setting up the right set of KPIs facilitates people to focus and prioritise in the same direction. KPIs should be
defined to support the overall goal and strategy for the operational phase.
As a minimum following KPIs should be established:
x failure fraction from functional testing of safety critical equipment;

x PM man-hours;
x corrective maintenance man-hours;
x backlog PM, total number of hours;
x backlog PM, number of hours HSE critical;
x backlog corrective maintenance, total number of hours;

x backlog corrective maintenance, number of hours HSE critical.
See ISO 14224, Annex E, and EN 15341 for examples of KPIs.
10.4 Analysis and Improvement

Based on reported maintenance data the effectiveness of maintenance shall be evaluated systematically.
The organization should have established a set of key performance indicators to evaluate against – KPIs
reflecting the goals and requirements for the operation, see Clause 5. For practical reasons some trigger
levels should be applied above which a more detailed investigation is done aiming at finding the root-cause
for the failure. The triggers can be related to
x HSE related equipment failure,

x unacceptable production losses,
x cost of single failure events in terms of downtime, repair cost or spare cost,
x number of repeated failures over a give time period for key components,
x hidden failures (exceeding requirements) detected during test,
x technical condition assessments.
Based on the event(s) the root cause(s) should be found and actions taken to avoid reoccurrence. The
problem at question can be either single discipline or multidiscipline. The team should be allocated to the
actual case, and will typically consist of personnel operating the equipment, maintenance engineers, and
equipment experts. Basic knowledge of the most common root-cause analysis techniques is advantageous.
Finally implementation of the actions identified is a key to sustained improvement, as well as measurement of
the effect via KPIs and equipment reliability data.
Learning from failure and events is a key to continuous improvement of performance of a plant and an

organisation. Dedicated efforts should be done to drive this process and avoid “fire fighting” as opposed to
systematic preventive work.
11 Spare parts evaluation
11.1 General
The spare part assessment defining need for spares, (number of, location and lead time) shall be based on
results from the consequence classification. Further, the PM programme should state the needed spares for
its activity giving estimate of the demand rate for spare parts used for PM.
The demand rate and which spare parts are needed for corrective maintenance is more challenging to
estimate for a new plant. The typical sources are historical maintenance and inventory transactions,
installation specific generic reliability data like OREDA®, vendor and maintenance personnel experience.
Further parameters such as procurement lead time and transportation time will have significant impact on the
ultimate quantities of spare parts to be hold, their quantities as well as location.
11.2 Work flow for evaluation of spare parts

Figure 6 gives an overview of the work flow for evaluation of spare parts. Subclause 11.3 to 11.5 details the
content in each box.

Spare part evaluation
Basic design Identify spare part

Risk assessment Output
documentation category
Consequence
Spare part list/
classification
BoM
(Section 8)
Identify spare part

category
Demand rate
Location and holding
from preventive
based on risk
and corrective
assessment
maintenance
Reorder level and Result;

order quantity (incl - spare part category
capital spare part - location
analysis) - re-order level

Inventory/
Procurement
management
system
Figure 6 - Evaluation of spare parts
11.3 Spare part categories

Spare parts can be categorised as follows:
x capital spare parts:

x vital to the function of the plant, but unlikely to suffer a fault during the lifetime of the equipment;
x delivered with unacceptably long lead time from the supplier and usually very expensive;
x often these spare parts are characterised by a substantially lower cost if they are included with the
initial order of the system package.
x operational spare parts;
Spare parts required to maintain the operational and safety capabilities of the equipment during its
normal operational lifetime.
x consumables.
Item or material that is not item specific and intended for use only once (non-repairable).
11.4 Location and holding

Spare parts are normally held at various locations. Determining the optimum location for a spare part can be
done by use of a risk model where the dimensions are consequence of not having the spare parts in place
and the demand rate. See Annex C, for an example of a risk matrix for use to determine location. Demand
rate can be estimated from preventive and corrective maintenance. The consequence of not having the spare
part in place can be established for this purpose, or by use of the functional classification, see Clause 7.

11.5 Reorder level and order quantity

The re-order level and order quantity are important parameters to control that spare parts are available
without under- or overstocking. Traditional inventory methods and formulas can be used to estimate these
parameters for operational spare parts and consumables. Capital spare parts are evaluated case by case
based on a risk assessment. The output is a level of spare parts which incurs the minimum combination of
costs and risks.
Reorder level is based on demand rate and delivery time, adjusted by a safety factor due to uncertainty.
Order quantity is estimated based on demand rate, cost per order, and holding cost.
12 Personnel and resources

In order to get quality in the programme development, acceptance for changes and create a basis for
continuous improvements, it is necessary to involve maintenance personnel and production operators in the
risk assessment and preparation of the maintenance activities. A dynamic maintenance programme requires
proper documentation of the evaluations for future adjustments and improvements according to new
experience and changes of operational conditions. This applies irrespective of whether GMCs are applied or
the maintenance programme has been developed on basis of the RCM/RBI/SIL analysis. The following type
of personnel/experience should be involved:
x maintenance personnel with specific experience from different type of systems/equipment. Typically this
will involve mechanical, instrument, electrical and corrosion/inception qualification on senior level;
x maintenance planners and/or maintenance supervisors;
x operation and process personnel with process/production experience handling the production impact of a
failure;
x personnel with specific experience related to risk assessment and maintenance analysis – often acting as
facilitators driving the process;
x maintenance engineers.

The above personnel may be employed by the operating organisation, by vendors or consultants.

Annex A
(informative)
Main function (MF) description and boundaries
Descriptions of MFs should aim to describe an active function (i.e. ’Pumping‘ instead of ’Pump‘). Descriptions
commonly used for MFs are shown in Table A.1. Normally a further specification is required to describe the
MF sufficiently. If relevant, the availability, capacity and performance should be specified.
Table A.1 – Examples of MF descriptions
MF description Sub title, examples

Accumulation Instrument/plant air, heating/cooling medium
Cementing
Circulating Heating/cooling medium
Compressing Gas export/injection
Cooling
Detecting Fire and gas
Distributing (Main/emergency) power, hydraulic, tele
Drying Air, gas
Expanding
Filling Lubrication oil
Filtering
Fire fighting Sprinkler, deluge, water spray, foam, aqueous film foaming foam, hydrants

Generating (Main/emergency) power
Heating
Injecting Chemicals, gas, water
Life Saving Mob, lifeboat, basket, raft, escape chute
Lifting Deck crane, personnel, goods
Logging Well, production, mud
Manoeuvring
Metering Fiscal (gas/oil), CO2
Pumping Oil/gas export, bilge, seawater

Regenerating Glycol
Scrubbing
Separating Production, test, cyclone- (water/sand/oil), centrifuge
Storing Chemicals, potable water, lubrication/seal oil
Transferring Oil/gas pipe (riser)
Examples displaying the MF HF2020 (along with others) with boundaries marked on a flow diagram, and the
same MF with boundaries marked on the more detailed P&ID is shown on Figure A.1 and Figure A.2.

Figure A.1 – Flow diagram showing borderlines between MFs (HF2017, HF2020)

Figure A.2 – P&ID showing borderlines for MF HF2020

Annex B
(informative)
Simplifying consequence assessment of standard sub functions
The consequence assessment of the MF already performed may be used as a basis for establishing
the consequence assessment for the standard sub functions. It is recommended that these evaluations
are verified by experienced process personnel and adjusted individually, if needed.
An example of guidelines for the standardised sub functions for one project is shown in Table B.1.
NOTE – ’Other functions‘ have to be assessed independently.
Table B.1 – Project guideline example of consequence assessment of standardized sub

functions, based on the MF consequence assessment
Standard sub Classification of loss of function

Comment
function RED HSE PROD Other
Main task MF MF MF MF
Pressure, relief Configu H L L RED: No redundancy for the failure

ration mode ‘Fail to operate on demand’
Shut down, process A H L L RED: No redundancy for the failure

mode ‘Fail to operate on demand’.
Shut down, equipment MF M L MF Other: Inherits the highest
consequence from the MF
Controlling MF MF MF MF
Monitoring MF M L L
Local indication MF L L L
Manual shutoff MF (MF) (MF) (MF)
HSE/PROD/Other See examples and definitions in Annex C

H/M/L Consequence “High”, “Medium” or “Low”
MF Will inherit MFs
RED Redundancy, see definition in Table C.2.
() Reduce with one level from MF

Annex C
(informative)
Risk assessment criteria
C.1 Risk assessment using risk matrix

An example of a risk decision matrix is shown in Table C.3 for use in consequence classification,
maintenance planning, inspection planning and for prioritising work orders. The risk matrix used for
maintenance purposes should be harmonized with risk matrices used for evaluation of risk in other
areas within a company. Table C.3 uses three classes for consequences, four for probabilities and four
classes for risk. However, the company is free to choose the number of classes, and it is not
necessary to use the same number of classes for consequences as for probabilities. It should also be
mentioned that often the risk scale (low, medium, high) or the colour scheme (red, yellow, green)
implicitly introduces risk acceptance criteria, thus should be carefully selected. ISO 14224, Table C.1
gives another example of failure consequence classification.
C.2 Risk decisions based on risk assessment
As important as the risk scale is the use of the risk for decision making. Table C.1 shows a set of
criteria for prioritising time to repair connected to corrective work. The scale for time to repair should be
based on company standard for maximum allowable time to complete repair and the mean time to
failure.
Example: A failure is observed and the development time to critical failure (full functional outage) for

this function is expected to be 2 years (corresponding to category 3 on the probability scale in Table
C.3). The time to repair should be some fraction of this time, like 9 months for the highest
consequence C3 and 18 months for the lower consequence C1.
Table C.1 – Example of priority of time to repair based on risk
Risk Priority/time to repair Comment

H 5 days Always highest priority for safety function failure.
M 30 days
L 180 days
VL 360 days
Table C.2 – Example of redundancy definitions
RED Redundancy degree definition

A No redundancy i.e. the entire system is required to avoid any loss of function.
B One parallel unit can suffer a fault without influencing the function.
C Two or more parallel units can suffer a fault at the same time without influencing the function

Table C.3 – Example of risk matrix used for consequence classification and for decisions
Freq. Freq. per Mean

cat. year (*), time
(**) between RISK
failure
(year)
F4 >1 0 to 1 M H H
F3 0,3 to 1 1 to 3 M M H
F2 0,1 to 0,3 3 to 10 L M H
F1 < 0,1 Long L L M
Loss of function leading to:
Consequence category C1 C2 C3
No potential for Potential for injuries Potential for serious
injuries. requiring medical personnel injuries.
treatment.
Consequence safety No effect on safety Limited effect on safety Render safety critical
systems. systems. systems inoperable.
Consequence containment Non-flammable media Flammable media below Flammable media

flashpoint above flashpoint
Non toxic media Moderately toxic media Highly toxic media
High pressure/
Natural/normal temperature media Extremely high pressure

pressure /temperature (>100 bar/80 °C) /temperature media
media
Consequence, No potential for Potential for moderate Potential for large
Environment; restitution pollution (specify limit) pollution. pollution.
(***)
time < 1 month 1 month – 1 year > 1 year
Consequence production No production loss Delayed effect on Immediate and
production (no effect in x significant loss of
days) or reduced production
production
Consequence other No operational or cost Moderate operational or Significant operational
consequences cost consequences or cost consequences
(*) Based on failure mode

(**) Typical failure rate ref OREDA(®: 1-100 * 10^-6 for rotating equipment (0.01-1 1/yr)
(***)The consequences to the external environment differ significantly depending on the chemical composition of the released
substance, volume and the recipients (open sea, shore, earth or atmosphere). Here restitution time is used as a common
denominator.
C.3 Risk assessment of spare parts

An example of consequence classes which can be used to determine the optimum location for spare
parts is given in Table C.4. Input from the consequence classification can be used or modified for this
purpose. The consequence classes combined with demand rate gives location of spare parts as shown
in Table C.5.

Table C.4 – Example of consequence classes for spare parts
Consequence Description
High Equipment of a system that shall operate in order to maintain
operational capability in terms of safety, environment and
production.
Medium Equipment of a system that have installed redundancy, of which
either the system or its installed spare must operate in order to
maintain operational capability in terms of safety, environment
and production.
Low No consequence for safety, production or environment.
Table C.5 – Example of risk matrix for spare parts

Consequence
Consequence
Low High
Low Medium High
Demand rate
Demand rate
First line spare Minimum stock Minimum stock

Minimum stock at site
parts. Frequently at site
First line spare parts,
at site, and any
and any additional
used. Minimum stock at site additional spare Adequate stock at site
frequently used. spare parts at central
parts at central
warehouse

warehouse
Not frequently Central
used. warehouse, no
Central warehouse, no
warehouse,
Central and
warehouse
Not frequently used. No stock stock at site andminimum
minimum stock
stock at
stock at site
site if convenient
at site if
convenient
Insurance spare No stock No stock Holding
parts.spare
Capital Seldom
parts.or optimised
Holding by use
optimized by
Seldomused.
never or never No stock No stock useofofrisk
risk assessment
used. case by case
by case

Annex D
(informative)
Practical examples
D.1 Technical hierarchy

The level of detail with regards to tagging is in many ways a deciding factor to ensure that the
equipment will receive the adequate maintenance. On the Norwegian Continental Shelf there is an
industrial heritage of tagging to a detailed level where even instrumentation and equipment in support
of MFs and sub functions are tagged The tagging is to be consistent from drawings, the actual
equipment in the installation and the CMMS and is an important part of documenting the equipment
through its life cycle.
Figure D.1 illustrates the workflow to establish a technical hierarchy.
Technical drawings/
Identify systems
P&IDs

Any skids or main
Any instruments or
equipment on No
valves on system?
system?
Yes Yes
Use skids and main Establish

equipment as administrative tag
superior tag and link as superior tag and
them to system link it to system
Link instruments, No
valves and related
equipment to
corresponding
superior tag
Establish
Any pipe lines on administrative tag
Yes
system? as superior tag and
link it to system
No
Link pipe lines to

Go to next system
superior tag
Figure D.1 – Work process technical hierarchy

To establish a technical hierarchy it is necessary with a set of technical drawings, e.g. flow and one-line
diagrams, P&IDs etc. and a list of tags and a tool for linking tags to each other.
The top of the technical hierarchy normally starts with the installation code with the system numbers
listed in Figure D.2. The usage of system numbers may vary from plant to plant NORSOK Z-DP-002
uses system numbers between 00 and 99. Other standards like SFI [Ship research institute of Norway
(Skipsteknisk Forskningsinstitutt)] would have a 3 digit numbers as system numbering, but the
principles may be similar.
Technical drawings can be used to identify skids, packages and main equipment that can work as a
superior tag for the connected instruments, valves and other kinds of equipment. There can be several
levels beneath a level, e.g. a skid that contains 2 pumps with electric motors. The skid will then be the
top level, the pumps will be the 2nd level, and the electric motors will be the 3rd level to the
corresponding pump. Each level can hold corresponding instruments and valves. See Figure D.2.
Start with a system by identifying skids and main equipment. Then link all the skids and main
equipment that will be used as a superior tag to the system number in the tree structure. Next step is to
identify the instruments, valves and other kinds of equipment on the system and connect them to the
corresponding skid or main equipment. If there are no skids or main equipment, but only e.g.
instruments or valves, then administrative tags should be established to form the level above. The
instruments, valves and other kinds of equipment are then linked to the administrative tags. In
instrument loops one of the components can represent the whole loop e.g. a transmitter or valve, while
the rest of the loop lie beneath.
Figure D.2 – Technical hierarchy

D.2 Functional hierarchy

The functional hierarchy is a logical diagram linking all the plant functions noted as MF and sub functions, see
Annex A. The level of detailing of the functional hierarchy may vary, but usually 2 to 3 levels are sufficient.
The plant system 27 (gas export) is shown in Figure D.3 in a schematic diagram of a plant (platform) which
has been broken down into equipment identified by its tag number. The defined MFs covering part of this
system and the standardised sub functions for one of these MFs are illustrated as an example.
Each tag within one sub function is given the same classification because a fault on any of these units
(identified by the tag numbers) will cause the same consequence on the MF.
D.3 Documentation of consequence analysis
A typical example of a consequence analysis of a MF (2701 Scrubbing), with standard sub functions listed, is
shown in Figure D.4. This MF consists of two parallel units, each able to perform 100 % of the scrubbing
function in relevant operating mode. Although this example identifies 100 % redundancy for this MF,
redundancy is ignored at this time. For the purpose of determining the consequence class all MFs should be
considered as single, irrespective of their design redundancy. A fault which prevents the MF from operating
will affect the system (Gas export) immediately (within ‘0’ hours) with a 100 % loss of functionality. This time
is called ’Critical time in the list of sub functions. The consequence classification is 3 (high), 2 (medium) and 1
(low). The degree of redundancy is set by characters A, B or C for the relevant operating mode. The degree
of redundancy for sub-functions is set based on number of PUs and capacity (Cap: 50 %,
100 %).

PLANT PLATFORM
SYSTEM System 27 – Gas export Other systems
Cons=232→3B
Other main functions within
MAIN FUNCTION 2701 Scrubbing (2x100%) 2702 Compression (2x100%) 2703 Cooling (2x100%)
system
2701 MAIN 2701 PSD 2701 EQSD 2701 2701 IND 2701 VALVE 2701 PV
SUB FUNCTION 2701 PSV 2701 ALARM
Scrubbing Shut down Shut down CONTROL Local Manual shut- Containment
”Standard” Pressure relief Monitoring
(2x100%) process equipment Controlling indication off proc vapour
Cons=232→3B Cons=333→3A Cons=333→3A Cons=212→2A Cons=232→3B Cons=211→2B Cons=111→1B Cons=232→3B Cons=333→3B
27-VG01A 27-PSV006 27-XV001 27-LIC005 27-FO003 27-001PV 4"-PV-27037-CC1

27-VG01B 27-PSV053 27-XY001 27-LT005 27-LG004 27-002PV 4"-PV-27072-CC1
27-ZSLH001A 27-LV005 27-PI007 27-004PL 8"-PV-27036-CC1
27-ZSLH001B 27-LY005 27-FI012 27-005PV
27-ZSLH001C 27-FI048 …..etc
+27-XV002 27-LE055 27-FO051
+27-XV011 27-LIC055 27-LG054
+27-XV050 27-LT055 27-PI057
EQUIPMENT
+27-XV052 27-LY055
(TAG)
+27-XV056
27-HCV079
27-PAHH008
27-PSHH008 27-PIC257
+27-LSHH009 27-PT257
+27-LSLL010 27-PV257
+27-LSHH049 27-PY257
Explanation: Cons = Consequence. Figures: 3=High, 2=Medium, 1=Low HSE, Production and Cost respectively. Last result is a combination of the highest
Consequence and Redundancy degree (A – No spare, B – One spare, C – Two or more spares) in operational phase.
Figure D.3 – Functional hierarchy, example with standard sub function and classification

NORSOK standard X-0XX Edition 3, June 2011
Z-008 CONSEQUENCE OF MAIN FUNCTIONS AND ITS FUNCTIONS

System 27. GAS EXPORT AND METERING
Main Function: 2701 SCRUBBING Parallel Unit 2 Capacity per unit: 100 Redundant grade B
Documents Doc A: C-F027-P-*P-002-01 Doc. B: C-F027-P-*E-001\004-01 PID: C025-C-FO27-P-*E-001-01 Rev: B Last updated: 21.02.00
Critical failure which affects system in 0 hours with 100 % reduction Classification
Failure mode System effect: Installation effect S P O H
Does not System in shut down/is not available. Max. 4 Gas production is shut down and flared. CO2 tax (100.000 – 1 mill. NOK), and 2 3 2 N
work hours (valve/instrument failure). environment consequence. Oil production to be maintained according to tariff
quotas.
Works Reduced condensate separation No immediate effect 1 1 1 N
improperly
Crit. Does not

Function Description Reduction time PU*Cap!Re work Works improperly Classification
2701 MAIN Scrubbing 100 % 0 2*100!B 232-N 111-N 232!3
2701 ALARM Monitoring 0% 168 2*100!B 211-Y 111-N 211!2
2701 CONTRO Controlling 100 % 0 2*100!B 232-N 111-Y 232!3
2701 IND Local indication 0% 720 2*100!B 111-N 111-Y 111!1
2701 PSD Shutdown, Process 100 % 0 2*100!A 333-Y 111-N 333!3
2701 EQSD Shutdown, Equipment 100 % 0 2*100!A 212-Y 111-N 212!2
2701 PSV Pressure relief 100 % 0 2*100!A 333-Y 111-N 333!3
2701 VALVE Manual shut-off 100 % 0 2*100!B 232-N - 232!3
2701 PV Containment, Process 100 % 0 2*100!A 333-N - 333!3
Vapour
Table key
Classification (S: Safety; P: Production; O: Other)

3: High
2: Medium
1: Low
Hidden failure (H)
Y: Yes
N: No
Figure D.4 – Consequence assessment of a MF. The example is shown with some key data and the classification of the sub functions listed below

D.4 Documentation of generic maintenance concept (GMC)

A GMC is a set of maintenance actions, strategies and maintenance details, which can be seen as a collection of best practices for a company. The GMC should be
defined by a structured RCM analysis where failure modes and failure causes are identified.
All tags should be linked to a relevant GMC and should be available for reference directly in the CMMS. Use of dummy concepts should be restricted to a minimum
and only linked to tags where a detailed generic maintenance analysis has revealed no need for any maintenance activity. Equipment which is part of an instrument
loop, but no concept is applicable, should be linked to same concept as the superior tag, i.e. instrumented valve.
Each concept shall specify which type of equipment the concept is covering and which type of equipment that is excluded. Each concept should be detailed at such
level that it provides sufficient information, as keywords or by a short description, about relevant maintenance activities and intervals of such activities in order to
maintain the equipments intended function. It should be avoided to specify maintenance activity at the concept which is not relevant for the actual functional location
which the concept are linked to.
The table below shows the final result and not the documentation of the entire process.
Generic maintenance concept

Equipment class: Pump
Equipment type: Centrifugal
Dominating failure mode Spurious stop
Operating and frame 25-500 KW
conditions for concept:
Responsible: Mechanical static equipment leader
Revision: Rev1, 22.09.2009
Comments:

Sub unit x Activity x Activity x Ref. to x Discipline x Req. from x Shu x Generic
description maint.doc. Gov/Comp? x Interval
x
x
x
x
x own?
Pump unit Visual check Brief routine xx-yy-zz Oper. N N 1 1
check for leak,
dirt, noise,
vibration
Control and Monitoring Evaluate vibration xx-yy-zz Mech. N N 6 6
monitoring data
Lubrication Replace Replace oil xx-yy-zz Mech. N Y 6 1

system
Etc.
D) Discipline
M) Requirement from Government/Company
N) Shutdown required to undertake repair, and possibly production shutdown depending on redundancy and HSE requirements
Equipment class ISO 14224 provides a recommended structure for equipment class
Equipment type ISO 14224 provides a recommended structure for equipment type
Dominating failure The dominating failure mode used in the maintenance analysis. ISO 14224 provides recommended failure modes.
mode
Operating and frame Physical operating and frame conditions for the concept
conditions
Responsible Responsible person/discipline for this concept
Revision Revision number

Sub unit ISO 14224 provides a recommended structure for sub unit
Consequence class Consequence class for maintainable item from consequence classification
Redundancy Redundancy for maintainable item from consequence classification
Activity Preventive maintenance activities
Activity description Description of PM activities
Ref to main doc Reference to detailed description of maintenance activity
D) Discipline Craft/competence (e.g. Mech: mechanic, El: electric, Oper: operator)
M) Requirement from Regulations and company requirements.
government/company For safety functions:
Safety critical failure with connected testing interval
SIL requirement (acceptance level)
N) Shutdown Need for equipment shutdown
required
Generic Interval Generic maintenance interval established based on consequence classification, operating conditions etc.
Interval unit Months, years, hours etc.


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NORSOK STANDARD Z-008

Edition 3, June 2011

Risk based maintenance and consequence

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NORSOK standard Page 3 of 45

NORSOK standards are administered and published by Standards Norway.

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NORSOK standard Page 4 of 45

Section 4. Methodology for risk based maintenance management

Section 5. Maintenance management

Section 3. Detailed methodology

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NORSOK standard Page 5 of 45

x offshore topside systems,

The systems involving the following types of equipment:

Excluded from the scope of this NORSOK standard are

x load bearing structures,

This NORSOK standard covers

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2 Normative and informative references

2.1 Normative references

NORSOK standard Page 6 of 46

2.2 Informative references

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Terms and definitions

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NOTE See definitions in 3.1.6, 3.1.7 and 3.1.8.

NORSOK standard Page 7 of 46

NOTE May also include monetary losses and loss of reputation.

NOTE E.g. all pumps.

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NOTE 1 This value is an approximation.

NORSOK standard Page 8 of 46

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NOTE 1 Item is also known as tag or functional location.

NORSOK standard Page 9 of 46

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NORSOK standard Page 10 of 46

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4 Methodology for risk based maintenance management

NORSOK standard Page 11 of 46

a) consequence classification of functional failure;

4.2 Safety functions

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4.3 Static process equipment

x location and extent of inspections and condition monitoring,

NORSOK standard Page 12 of 46

4.4 Risk decision criteria

The following principles should apply:

5 Maintenance management – Application of consequence classification

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NORSOK standard Page 13 of 46

Resources Management of work processes Results

Goals and Maintenance Maintenance

Resource Management Technical

Improvements Analysis Reporting

Figure 1 – Maintenance management process

x risk, production and cost,

Maintenance strategies should be defined for the asset.

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See Clause 7 and Clause 8.

NORSOK standard Page 14 of 46