[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996.

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES

CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED
ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.,
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS,
INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME
VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.

FACTS

Complainants lodged a formal complaint with the

National Bureau of Investigation and sought its assistance
in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private
researchers made discreet surveillance on various video
establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home
Video Inc.

According to petitioners, after complying with what the

law then required, the lower court determined that there
was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant,
and which determination in fact led to the issuance and
service of the Search Warrant. It is further argued that any
search warrant so issued in accordance with all applicable
legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not
possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the
time of such determination, on December 14, 1987, and is,
the doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case that was
promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over eight months
later.

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 Private respondents predictably argue in support of the
ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of the
search warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th
Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very essence
of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search
warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had
not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law on
the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an
application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that
there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since the law
had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th
Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine
promulgated at the time of the solution of private respondents'
motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search
warrant for failure of the trial court to require presentation of the
master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would
have constituted grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE
WON the retroactive application to the present controversy of the ruling
in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, necessary.

HELD|||
NO. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that judicial
decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines." Judicial decision, though not
laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is
for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The principle of prospectivity applies not only to

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original or amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and
circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a
part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so
when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied
on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication.

[G.R. No. 174238. July 7, 2009.]

ANITA CHENG, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and

TESSIE SY, respondents.

FACTS
Petitioner filed two estafa cases against respondent spouses for issuing to her
Philippine Bank of Commerce, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored
upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.|||
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, , filed against respondents two cases
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

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 The RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime. The order dismissing the first criminal case contained no
declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. On the other hand, the second order in
criminal case contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused,
the same is purely 'civil', not criminal in nature.
Later, the MeTC dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order on
account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court.
The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents.
Petitioner lodged against respondents a complaint for collection of a sum of
money with damages based on the same loaned amount covered by the two PBC
checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order, the RTC, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section l, paragraph (b) of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE
WON petitioner is barred from her money claims. (ikaw nalang buhat sa issue kung naa
ka lain issue babe)
HELD
NO. The possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject
of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg.
22, simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against forum
shopping. Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the
complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil. Petitioner’s recourse pursuant to
the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the
amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said
civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of
petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a
waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However,
due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg.22 cases, we are constrained
to digress from this rule. It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission of their counsel. But this rule admits of exceptions—(1) where the counsel’s
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court,
or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation
of liberty or property without due process of law. Tested against these guidelines, we
hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.