Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
ARTICLES 105-133 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
OF GAINS
Topic: Liabilities of the conjugal partnership
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305|February 12, 1998
By: Akiatan, Karl Christian R.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December
1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness
to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence
filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The
RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount with interests. Pending the
appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service
upon respondent spouses of the notice of
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on
May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction
against petitioners on the ground that subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of the said
conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP
enjoining lower court from enforcing its order
paving way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties. A
certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the
only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and
obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership” and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of PBM and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that
Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a
personality distinct and separate from the
family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate
entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt
and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only
to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings
of the court, “if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”. The contract of loan or services
is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. Ching only
signed as a surety for the loan contracted with
AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession, it is not embarking in a
business. Hence, the conjugal partnership
should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of
PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the
petitioner that a benefit for the family may
have resulted when the guarantee was in favor
of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure,
appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in
Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly
resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere
by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Ching VS CA
423 SCRA 357
By: Ampatuan, Mustapha Simeon E.
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.
(PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive
Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC for the
payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted
in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI.
Trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the
sheriff of to attach all the properties of said
Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the
loans.
The wife of Alfredo Ching set aside the levy on
attachment. She alleged that the 100,00 stocks
levied on by the sheriff was from their conjugal
funds. According to her, the suretyship
obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of
the petitioner-husband’s profession or business. 1
Issue: Whether or not the payment of loans can
be legally attached to the stocks of Alfredo
Ching?
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Held: No. The CA erred in holding that by
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the
payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-
husband was in the exercise of his profession,
pursuing a legitimate business.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted
by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to
prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-
husband’s act of executing a continuing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the
petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby
be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.
Francisco vs. Spouses Gonzales (2008)
565 SCRA 638|G.R. 177667
By: Aportadera, Angelo Abelardo
Subject: Property relations of the spouses
Francisco is governed by the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains; Conjugal asset may not be
bound to answer for the wife's personal
obligation; Sheriff may only execute on the
property belonging to the judgment debtor;
Facts:
Petioners (Cleodia and Ceamantha) are the
minor children of Cleodualdo and Michele
Francisco. In the Civil Case for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the RTC approved the
Compromise Agreement entered into by the
estranged couple, which provided as follows:
“Title and ownership of the conjugal property
consisting of a house and lot (TCT No. 167907)
located in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila shall be transferred by way of a deed of
donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and
eighteen (18) years old, respectively.”
Meanwhile, in a case for Unlawful Detainer
filed by spouses Jorge and Purificacion
Gonzales (spouses Gonzales) against George
Matrai and Michele Francisco, the MeTC
rendered a Decision ordering Matrai and
Michele to vacate the premises leased to them
located in 264 Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa City, and to pay back
rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorney's
fees.
Pending appeal with the RTC, an order was
issued granting the spouses Gonzales' prayer for
the execution of the MeTC Decision. A notice of
sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff
covering the real property under TCT No.
167907 in the name of the spouses Francisco
When petitioners' grandmother learned of the
scheduled auction, she, as guardian-in-fact of
petitioners, filed with the RTC an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to
Stop Sale by Execution but the RTC denied the
same. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the
petition. Hence, the present petition.
Held:
Property relations of the spouses Francisco is
governed by the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains
1. The Court finds that it was grave error for the
RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and
sale of the subject property. The power of the
court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone, in the present case to
those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One
man's goods shall not be sold for another
man's debts.
2. The RTC should not have ignored that TCT No.
167907 is in the name of "Cleodualdo M.
Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco."
On its face, the title shows that the registered
owner of the property is not Matrai and
Michele but Cleodualdo, married to Michele.
This describes the civil status of Cleodualdo at
the time the property was acquired.
2
3. Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele
were married on June 12, 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. As such, their property relations are
governed by the Civil Code on conjugal
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

partnership of gains. Conjugal asset may not
be bound to answer for the wife's personal
obligation
1. The CA acknowledged that ownership of the
subject property is conjugal in nature;
however, it ruled that since Michele's
obligation was not proven to be a personal
debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal
and redounded to the benefit of the family,
and hence, the property may be held
answerable for it.
2. The Court does not agree. A wife may bind
the conjugal partnership only when:
(i) she purchases things necessary for
the support of the family, or
(ii) when she borrows money for that
purpose upon her husband's failure
to deliver the needed sum;
(iii) when administration of the
conjugal partnership is transferred
to the wife by the courts or by the
husband; or
(iv) when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity.
3. Failure to establish any of these
circumstances means that the conjugal asset
may not be bound to answer for the wife's
personal obligation.Considering that the
foregoing circumstances are evidently not
present in this case as the liability incurred by
Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an
unlawful detainer case against her and her
partner Matrai.
Sheriff may only execute on the property
belonging to the judgment debtor
4. Even prior to the issuance of the Notice of
Levy on Execution, there was already
annotated on the title the provision on the
Compromise Agreement where the subject
property shall be transferred by way of a Deed
of Donation to the petitioners. This annotation
should have put the RTC and the sheriff on
guard, and they should not have proceeded
with the execution of the judgment debt of
Michele and Matrai.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
5. While the trial court has the competence to
identify and to secure properties and interest
therein held by the judgment debtor for the
satisfaction of a money judgment rendered
against him, such exercise of its authority is
premised on one important fact: that the
properties levied upon, or sought to be levied
upon, are properties unquestionably owned by
the judgment debtor and are not exempt by
law from execution. Also, a sheriff is not
authorized to attach or levy on property not
belonging to the judgment debtor, and even
incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the
property of a third person. A sheriff has no
authority to attach the property of any person
under execution except that of the judgment
debtor.
6. It should be noted that the judgment debt for
which the subject property was being made to
answer was incurred by Michele and her
partner, Matrai. By no stretch of one's
imagination can it be concluded that said
debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership or that some
advantage accrued to the welfare of the
family. Michele, who was then already living
separately from Cleodualdo, rented the house
in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own
benefit. In fact, when they entered into the
lease agreement, Michele and Matrai
purported themselves to be husband and wife.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO
V.S. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 145222|February 24, 2009
By: Carmelia Coline B. Arceo
FACTS:
Civil case for damages that arose from slander
filed by the spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol.
RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her
to pay for damages, which was affirmed by the
CA and SC. Court issued a writt of execution,
directing the sheriff to collect indemnification
from Erlinda. Finding out that Erlinda’s personal
properties are insufficient, sheriff designed to
issue a notice of levy on real property on
execution, and thereafter a notice of sheriff’s 3
sale was issued.Two days prior the bidding, a
third party claim was received at the Sheriff’s
Office from one Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses
Buado to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. Sale
proceeded with the spouses Buado emerging as
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

the highest bidder. A year after the sale, Romulo
Nicol, husband of Erlinda Nicole, filed a
complaint for annulment of certificate of sale
and damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioners and the department sheriff, alleging
that the property was directly levied upon
without exhausting the personal properties of
Erlinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol
arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to
the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
NO. Erlinda Nicol’s liability is not chargeable to
the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of
absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict
is chargeable to the absolute community of
property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-
spouse. Petitioners argue that the obligation of
the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. The
Supreme Court does not agree to the contention
of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. In Guadalupe v. Tronco,
this Court held that the car which was claimed
by the third party complainant to be conjugal
property was being levied upon to enforce “a
judgment for support” filed by a third person,
the third-party claim of the wife is proper since
the obligation which is personal to the husband is
chargeable not on the conjugal property but on
his separate property. Hence, the filing of a
separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
PANA vs HEIRS OF JUANITE
GR No. 164201|December 10, 2012
ASESOR, KHAYZEE J.
FACTS:
PetItioner , his wife Melecia, and others were
accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but
Melecia and another person was found guilty and
was sentenced to the penalty of death and to
pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and
P150,000.00 actual damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution, claiming that the
levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of the
spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the civil liability of Melecia?
RULING:
YES. Art. 122. The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts
contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them, as well as the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall
be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding
that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own the above applies. The civil indemnity that
the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered.
4
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Topic: Administration, enjoyment, and
disposition/encumbrance of the conjugal
property
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
BA FINANCE v. CA
161 SCRA 608 |May 28, 1988
By: Auñgon, Danielle Fay S.
Facts:
In July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo
secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount
of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory
note he signed in his own behalf and as
representative of the A & L Industries.
Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special
power of attorney executed by his wife,
respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A&L
Industries and under whose name the said
business is registered, purportedly authorizing
Augusto Yulo to procure the loan and sign the
promissory note. About two months prior to the
loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily
Yulo and their children and had abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due
and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the
same.
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer
with counterclaim, alleging that although.
Augusto Yulo and she are husband and wife, the
former had abandoned her and their children
five (5) months before the filing of the
complaint; that they were already separated
when the promissory note was executed; that
her signature in the special power of attorney
was forged because she had never authorized
Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any
business for and in behalf of A & L Industries,
which is owned by her as a single proprietor,
that she never got a single centavo from the
proceeds of the loan mentioned in the
promissory note; and that as a result of the
illegal attachment of her properties, which
constituted the assets of the A & L Industries,
the latter closed its business and was taken over
by the new owner.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ
of attachment alleging that said spouses were
guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of
Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles
and interests over a construction contract
executed by and between the spouses and A.
Soriano Corporation.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Issue: Whether or not the obligation contracted
by Augusto Yulo be charged against his conjugal
properties with respondent Lily Yulo.
Held:
No. There is no dispute that A & L Industries was
established during the marriage of Augusto and
Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed
conjugal and the fact that it was registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not
destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the
said property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under
Article 161 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, the obligation which the
petitioner is seeking to enforce against the
conjugal property managed by the private
respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted
by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at
the time he incurred the obligation he had
already abandoned his family and had left their
conjugal home.
Worse, he made it appear that he was duly
authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L
Industries, to procure such loan from the
petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries
liable now for the said loan would be unjust and
contrary to the express provision of the Civil
Code.
The judgment is therefore set aside insofar as it
holds the petitioner liable for P500,000.00 actual
damages representing unrealized profits,
P150,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees. As stated earlier,
the attached properties, should be released in
favor of the petitioner.
HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118784|September 2, 1999
By: Richelle B. Batzar
Facts:
Christina and Rafael Ayuste were married in
1961. They lived in Manila but operated a
machine shop in Lucena City. The couple
bought a 180-sqm house and lot in Lucena City
from spouses Pedro and Aida David, on which a
temporary residence may be built for Rafael, as
he manages their business. And where the title 5
to which was in the name of Rafael Ayuste
married to Christina Ayuste.
Rafael sold the property to Viena
Malabonga in 1987 for ₱ 40,000 without the
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

consent of his wife. The deed of sale was
registered and a TCT was issued in the name of
the buyer during the same year.
After her husband’s death in 1989, Christina
discovered the unauthorized sale. In 1990, she
filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the
sale against the buyer and for the payment of
moral, exemplary and actual damages. In
her complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that
her signature on the deed of sale was forged.
The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste.
The CA however, reversed the decision invoking
Art. 172 Civil Code, holding that the right of
Christina to bring an action for the annulment
of the sale is barred for failure to file the same
during the existence of the marriage.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are
entitled to the annulment of the contract
of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste
without the consent of Christina Ayuste?
Held: The trial court erred in giving due
course to the action for annulment of sale.
The Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
February 27, 1987 by and between defendant-
appellant and plaintiff-appellant’s husband is
declared valid and binding upon the plaintiff-
appellant.
The only issue which remains to be
resolved is whether petitioners are entitled
to the annulment of the contract of sale
entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the
consent of Christina Ayuste.
Under the Civil Code, although the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal
partnership without his wif’s consent, subject
only to certain exceptions specified in the
law. The remedy available to the wife in case
her husband should dispose of their
conjugal property without her consent is
laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code
which states that:
The wife may, during the marriage, and
within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment
of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair
her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband. A sale of real property of the
conjugal partnership made by the husband
without the consent of his wife is voidable.
The action for annulment must be brought
during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife.”
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
In the present case, the deed of sale was
executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael
Ayuste died on October 13, 1989. However, it
was only on March 2,1990 that Christina
Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower
court asking for the annulment of the sale.
Although the action was filed within ten
years from the questioned transaction, it
was not brought during the existence of the
marriage which was dissolved upon the death
of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action
for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was
barred for having been filed out of time. The
fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the
sale after the death of her husband is not
material. Under Article 173 of the Family Code
DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA* B. PELAYO,
Petitioners,
vs.
MELKI E. PEREZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 141323|June 8, 2005
By: Cunanan, Luis Antonio R.
Facts:
David Pelayo executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conferring upon a certain Melki Perez two
parcels of agricultural lands. His wife Loreza
Pelayo and an eligible witness signed the deed of
sale to comply with requirements of such a
transfer.
However, it was later found out that Loreza only
signed the third page where the witnesses were
supposed to. Being the spouse, she needed to
sign all the pages.
When asked by Melki Perez to remedy the
situation by affixing her signatures on the
document, Loreza said that she did not know
what Perez was talking about and refused to sign
the papers.
Thus, Perez filed a complaint for specific
performance against the spouses.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was null
and void for lack of marital consent.
Held: No.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by
mere consent, which may either be express or
implied. A wife’s consent to the husband’s
disposition of conjugal property does not always
have to be explicit or set forth in any particular
6
document, so long as it is shown by acts of the
wife that such consent or approval was indeed
given. In the present case, although it appears
on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza
signed only as an instrumental witness,
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

circumstances leading to the execution of said
document point to the fact that Lorenza was
fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property
and consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to
Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which
was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the
deed in question was executed, the lack of
marital consent to the disposition of conjugal
property does not make the contract void ab
initio but merely voidable. Said provisions of law
provide:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a
non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal property without
the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably
to give her consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid
until the court annuls the same and only upon an
action brought by the wife whose consent was
not obtained. In the present case, despite
respondent’s repeated demands for Lorenza to
affix her signature on all the pages of the deed
of sale, showing respondent’s insistence on
enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file
a case for annulment of the deed of sale. It was
only when respondent filed a complaint for
specific performance on August 8, 1991 when
petitioners brought up Lorenza’s alleged lack of
consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the
transaction was indeed entered into without
Lorenza’s consent, we find it quite puzzling why
for more than three and a half years, Lorenza did
absolutely nothing to seek the nullification of the
assailed contract.
Ros and Aguete vs PNB – Laoag
GR 170166|April 6, 2011
By: Derogongan, Norhaima B.
Facts : The Civil Code was the applicable law at the
Plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of
₱115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October
14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-
appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land – Lot No. 9161 of the
Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the
improvements thereon described under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding.
As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,
Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being
redeemed, the property was consolidated and
registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on
August 10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella
Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained
by her husband nor she consented to the
mortgage instituted on the conjugal property – a
complaint was filed to annul the proceedings
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property.
The trial court rendered its Decision in favor of
the petitioners. It declared the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure
proceedings conducted thereon null and void. It
also ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
transfer certificate title in the name of PNB and
revert the same to spouses Ros and Aguete.
PNB filed its Notice of Appeal of the trial court’s
decision.
The appellate court rendered its Decision and
granted PNB’s appeal. The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s decision, and dismissed
petitioners’ complaint.
Petitioners filed a petition for review of the
appellate court’s decision.
Issues :
Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the
conjugal property of Ros and Aguete.
Ruling :
Yes, the the loan is chargeable to the conjugal
property of Ros and Aguete.
time of the mortgage. The subject property is
thus considered part of the conjugal partnership
of gains. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code
provide:
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership 7
property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during
the marriage at the expense of the common
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or
work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of
them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due
during the marriage, coming from the common
property or from the exclusive property of each
spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife,
also for the same purpose, in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage,
from obligations which constitute a charge upon
property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made
during the marriage upon the separate property
of either the husband or the wife; major repairs
shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of both husband and
wife, and of legitimate children of one of the
spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a
professional, vocational or other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared
a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably
to give her consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and
within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after
the dissolution of the marriage may demand the
value of the property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.
There is no doubt that the subject property was
acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros
and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954,
while the subject property was acquired in
1968. There is also no doubt that Ros
encumbered the subject property when he
mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October
1974.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any
conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the
husband do so, then the contract is
voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows
Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article
does not guarantee that the courts will declare
the annulment of the contract. Annulment will
be declared only upon a finding that the wife did
not give her consent.
In their memorandum before the trial court,
petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged
Aguete’s signatures.
Joe A. Ros in legal effect admitted in the
complaint that the signatures of his wife in the
questioned documents are forged, incriminating
himself to criminal prosecution. If he were alive
today, he would be prosecuted for forgery. This
strengthens the testimony of his wife that her
signatures on the questioned documents are not
hers.
The application for loan shows that the loan
would be used exclusively "for additional working
[capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia
tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete confirmed
that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed
to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was
also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did
not know where he "wasted the money." Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the
exercise of the industry or profession by which
he contributes to the support of the family
cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and
private debts.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
8
the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls
within the term "x x x x obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does
not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to
the conjugal partnership.
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ vs MINGOA
G.R. No. 146548|2009-12-18
By: MERLENE E. ELUMBA
Facts:
The petitioners are the heirs of Domingo
Hernandez Sergia Hernandez (surviving spouse),
Domingo, Jr. and Maria Leonora Wilma
(children).
Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez were awarded a real
property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHCC) by way of salary deduction
(Central Bank).
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of
real property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the
government's housing program at the time. Title
over the said property was issued in 1966 in the
name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for
the property was received by the PHHC.
Hernandez, Sr. was awarded by the PHHC the
Right to Purchase the property in question;
however, the late Hernandez, Sr. failed to pay
all the installments due on the said property.
Thus, afraid that he would forfeit his right to
purchase the property awarded to him,
Hernandez, Sr. sold to Dolores Camisura his
rights for the sum of P6,500.00 on February 14,
1963, through a deed of transfer of rights,
seemingly a printed form from the PHHC.
Simultaneous to this, Hernandez, Sr. and his
spouse executed an irrevocable special power of
attorney, appointing Dolores Camisura as their
attorney-in-fact with express power to sign,
execute and acknowledge any contract of
disposition, alienation and conveyance of her
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
right over the aforesaid parcel of land. Dolores
Camisura later on sold the said property to the
Mingoa spouses.
Neither [petitioners, heirs] nor Hernandez, Sr.,
took possession of the said property. On the
other hand, the [respondents, Mingoa] took
possession of the said property in 1966 and are in
actual and physical possession thereof up to the
present, and have made considerable
improvements thereon, including a residential
house where they presently reside. The realty
taxes have been paid by [respondents], albeit in
the name of Hernandez, Sr., but all official
receipts of tax payments are kept by the
[respondents].
In April 1983, Mr. Hernandez died intestate.
When Mr. Hernandez died, his heirs found out
that the title of the property was already
registered to the respondents.
The purported SPA appear to be merely a grant
of authority to Camisura (and then to Plaridel
Mingoa) to sell and dispose of the subject
property as well as a grant of right to purchase
the said property; but in essence, such SPA are
disguised deeds of sale of the property executed
in circumventing the retention period restriction
over the said property. Verily, the parties knew
that the land in question could not be alienated
in favor of any third person within one (1) year
without the approval of the PHHC.
Having ruled that the SPA in favor of Camisura
was a contract of sale, the next question is
whether or not such sale was valid.
The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the
contract is undisputed. However, the consent of
his wife, Sergia Hernandez on the SPA was found
to be falsified, forged.
Issue: WON the sale of the property was valid
despite falsity of the wife’s signature
Ruling:
Sergia's lack of consent to the sale did not
render the transfer of her share invalid.
The subject matter involves conjugal property.
The property when awarded to Hernandez Sr. 9
(1958), sale of property and issuance of new title
to Mingoa (1978), all occurred before the Family
Code took effect in 1988. The provisions of the
New Civil Code govern these transactions.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of
the conjugal partnership.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a
non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same. x x x.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage,
and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest
in the conjugal partnership property. Should the
wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
Art 124, Family Code. Any alienation or
encumbrance made by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the wife is void.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the
disposition of conjugal property without the
wife's consent is not void but merely voidable.
(1) From 1966 (the time when the
[respondents] were able to possess the
property) to 1983 (the time when the
[petitioners] had knowledge that the
TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had
already been cancelled by the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost
a span of 17 years;
(2) and from 1983 to 1995 (the time when
the Heirs filed the original action) is a
period of another 12 years.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the
wife may file for annulment of a contract
entered into by the husband without her
consent within ten (10) years from the
transaction questioned. Petitioners filed the
action for reconveyance in 1995.
Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with
her children, filed the action for reconveyance,
the conjugal partnership of property with
Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by
virtue of the latter's death on April 16, 1983.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Clearly, therefore, petitioners' action has
prescribed.
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file
with the courts an action for annulment of the
contract during the marriage and within ten
(10) years from the transaction necessarily
barred her from questioning the sale of the
subject property to third persons.
In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses
Hernandez over the subject property were
validly transferred to respondent Dolores
Camisura. Since the sale of the conjugal property
by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his
wife, Sergia, the same is voidable; thus, binding
unless annulled.
Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her
right to ask for the annulment of the sale within
the prescribed period, she is now barred from
questioning the validity thereof. And more so,
she is precluded from assailing the validity of the
subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel
Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa.
Therefore, title to the subject property cannot
anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by
reason of prescription and laches. The issues of
prescription and laches having been resolved, it
is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues
raised in this petition.
CORAZON KO vs. VIRGINIA DY ARAMBURO
GR#190995 | AUGUST 9, 2017
By: Engracia, Vreecel J.
FACTS:
Respondent Virginia Dy Aramburo (Virginia) is
Corazon Aramburo Ko's (Corazon) sister-in-law,
the former being the wife of the latter's
brother, Simeon Aramburo (Simeon). Corazon
and Simeon have another sibling, Augusto
Aramburo (Augusto), who predeceased them.
Virginia and the heirs of Augusto filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with
Declaration of Nullity and/or Alternatively
Reconveyance and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against Corazon.
The complaint alleged that Virginia and
Simeon, together with Corazon and her
husband Felix, acquired the subject properties 10
through a Deed of Cession.
They executed a Deed of Cession in favor of
Augusto’s heirs, subject of which is the one-
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

third pro-indiviso portion of the subject
properties.
However, allegedly with the use of falsified
documents, Corazon was able to have the
entire subject properties transferred
exclusively to her name, depriving her co-
owners Virginia and Augusto’s heirs of their
pro-indiviso share, as well as in the produce of
the same.
Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon
share one-half portion each of the subject
properties. She alleged that Simeon sold and
conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-
owned properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon
became the sole owner thereof and
consequently, was able to transfer the titles of
the same to her name.
During trial, it was established that Simeon and
Virginia’s marriage had been on bad terms and
they’ve been living separately. The trial court
was highly suspicious that Virginia would sign a
deed of sale, consenting to her husband’s
decision to sell their conjugal assets to
Corazon. Virginia vehemently disowned the
signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute
Sale.
Without the conformity of Virginia, according
to the trial court, Simeon cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership.
The trial court concluded, thus, that the Deed
of Absolute Sale, being falsified, is not a valid
instrument to transfer the one- third share of
the subject properties.
The trial court rendered a Decision (1)
declaring the plaintiffs Virginia as owner of
ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the subject
property, and the heirs of Augusto as owners of
ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the subject
property, (2) cancelling the TCT’s in the name
of Corazon, (3) that Corazon reimburse the
plaintiffs TWO-THIRDS (2/3) of the produce of
the properties, subject matter of this case from
the time she appropriated it to herself in 1974
until such time as the 2/3 share are duly
delivered to them, and (4) to pay damages in
favor of the plaintiffs.
The trial court’s Decision was affirmed in toto
by the CA.
ISSUES:
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
(1) Whether or not the parties are co-owners
of the subject properties.
(2) Whether or not there was a valid sale
between Corazon and Simeon.
(3) If co-ownership of the subject properties
exist, whether or not the co-owners are
entitled to the recovery of their share in the
subject properties.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
(1) The law which governs the instant case is
the Old Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Proceeding, thus, to the issue of ownership, we
find no reason to depart from the RTC’s ruling
as affirmed by the CA.
“Augusto’s heirs own one-third pro-indiviso
share in the subject properties”
Respondents, (Augusto’s heirs) claim one-third
of the subject properties.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the
courts a quo‘s findings as to the existence and
effectivity of the Deed of Cession giving rights
to Augusto’s children over the one-third portion
of the subject property.
“Simeon’s heirs, which include Virginia, also
own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject
properties”
Respondent Virginia’s claim as to the other
one-third portion of the subject properties is
ultimately anchored upon the Deed of Cession.
We uphold the courts a quo‘s conclusion that
one-third portion of the subject properties is
indeed part of Simeon and Virginia’s conjugal
properties.
In this case, the subject properties, having
been acquired during the marriage, are still
presumed to belong to Simeon and Virginia’s
conjugal properties.
(2) We now proceed to determine the validity
of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by 11
Simeon in favor of Corazon, covering one-half
of the subject properties which was his
purported share.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

As for the one-third portion of the subject
properties pertaining to Augusto’s heirs, we
are one with the CA in ruling that the Deed of
Absolute Sale is void as the said portion is
owned by Augusto’s heirs as above-discussed
and thus, Simeon had no right to sell the
same.
It is basic that the object of a valid sales
contract must be owned by the seller. Nemo
dat quod non habet, as an ancient Latin maxim
says. One cannot give what one does not have.
However, as to the one-third portion
commonly-owned by Spouses Simeon and
Virginia, Simeon’s alienation of the same
through sale without Virginia’s conformity is
merely voidable.
Article 166 of the Old Civil Code explicitly
requires the consent of the wife before the
husband may alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership except
when there is a showing that the wife is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or in
like situations.
Accordingly, without Virginia’s conformity,
the Deed of Absolute Sale between Simeon
and Corazon purportedly covering one-half of
the subject properties is voidable.
(3) For the share of Augusto’s heirs, the sale
of the same is void as the object of such sale,
not being owned by the seller, did not exist
at the time of the transaction. Being a void
contract, thus, the CA correctly ruled that
the action to impugn the sale of the same is
imprescriptible.
As for the share pertaining to Simeon and
Virginia, We must emphasize that the governing
law in this case is the Old Civil Code. Under
the said law, while the husband is prohibited
from selling the commonly-owned real
property without his wife’s consent, still,
such sale is not void but merely voidable.
Article 173 thereof gave Virginia the right to
have the sale annulled during the marriage
within ten years from the date of the sale.
Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand,
after dissolution of the marriage, only the
value of the property that Simeon
erroneously sold.
As far as Virginia is concerned, the Old Civil
Code applies, and the CA erred in ruling that
the subject Deed of Absolute Sale is void for
the lack of the wife’s conformity thereto. The
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
10-year prescriptive period under Article 173
of the Old Civil Code should be applied in this
case.
SUMMARY OF THE RULING:
In fine, while We uphold the courts a quo‘s
findings that the parties herein are co-
owners of the subject properties.
We reverse and set aside the said courts’
ruling, ordering the cancellation of titles of
the entire subject properties and the transfer
of the two-thirds portion of the same to the
respondents.
While Augusto’s heirs are entitled to the
recovery of their share in the subject
properties, Virginia is only entitled to
demand the value of her share therefrom
pursuant to Article 173 of the Old Civil Code.
UNDER FAMILY CODE
GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
291 SCRA 372|June 26, 1998
By: Tresha Anne C. Forto
FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the
consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale
null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes
it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda
Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment (with the consent of her husband),
her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their
conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence
and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to
Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and
went back to the subject property. Petitioners
filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there
was an amicable settlement between the
parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of
the bargain, respondent filed an Amended
Complaint against her husband and petitioners.
The said Complaint sought the declaration of a
certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal
12
property of private respondent and her husband,
null and void.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife
is void
HELD:
Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition
or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
Respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of
their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is
premised on the absence of private respondent’s
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent,
the last element being indubitably absent in the
case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.
Neither can the “amicable settlement” be
considered a continuing offer that was accepted
and perfected by the parties, following the last
sentence of Article 124. The order of the
pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the
barangay authorities secured an “amicable
settlement” and petitioners filed before the MTC
a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer to
sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that
private respondent would vacate the property.
By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court
interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124
Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa (2002)
G.R. No. 147978 | 2002-01-23
By: Fredeluces, Danessa Faith P.
Facts:
Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across an
advertisement placed by respondents, the
Spouses Norma Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa
in the newspaper for the sale of their
apartments in Makati and Rizal. She became
interested in buying the two properties so she
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
negotiated for the purchase through a real
estate broker authorized by respondent
spouses. Petitioner met with the vendors who
turned out to be respondent spouses. She made
a definite offer to buy the properties to
respondent Edilberto, with the knowledge and
conformity of his wife. Eventually, petitioner
and Edilberto agreed on the purchase price for
the properties to be paid on installment basis.
Their agreement was handwritten by petitioner
and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner
pointed out the conjugal nature of the
properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's
conformity and consent to the sale. The formal
typewritten contracts were thereafter signed
and the checks were delivered. After sessions
of clarifications, petitioner was surprised that
they were backing out of the agreement.
Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that
the contracts to sell had already been duly
perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma
refused to sign the contracts. Petitioner then
filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against respondent spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati to compel
respondent Norma to sign the contracts to sell.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code,
the court cannot intervene to authorize the
transaction in the absence of the consent of
the wife since said wife who refused to give
consent had not been shown to be
incapacitated. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal of the case by the trial court.
Held:
The Written Consent of the Wife is Required in
the Disposition of a Conjugal Property by the
Husband
1. The law requires that the disposition of a
conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the
written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void.
2. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. (Article 124,
Family Code)
3. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated 13
or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Article
124, Family Code)
4. The properties subject of the contracts in
this case were conjugal. Hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of
both husband and wife must concur.
Mere Knowledge of the Transaction Does Not
Equate Consent
5. Respondent Norma admittedly did not give
her written consent to the sale. Even granting
that respondent Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity.
6. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that
Norma refused to sign the contracts to
sell.Respondent Norma may have been aware
of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties. However, being merely
aware of a transaction is not consent.
Court Authorization is Resorted only when the
Spouse who Does Not Give Consent is
Incapacitated
7. Petitioner argues that since respondent
Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures
to the contracts to sell, court authorization
under Article 124 of the Family Code is
warranted.
8. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges
that if the written consent of the other spouse
cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the
matter may be brought to court which will give
such authority if the same is warranted by the
circumstances.
9. However, it should be stressed that court
authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to
in cases where the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated.
10. In the case, petitioner failed to allege and
prove that respondent Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such showing of
the wife's incapacity, court authorization
cannot be sought.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO
G.R. No. 153802|March 11, 2005
By: Darlyn J. Galido
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr
were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot
situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for
tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and
lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on
the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the
execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place withoutthe knowledge and consent
of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding.
As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
petitioner as the highest bidder. After the
lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In
one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already
employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the
mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil
Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and 14
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damagesagainst petitioner. In the
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the property in question was
the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a Decision declaring the said
documents null and void and further ordered
the defendant is ordered to reconvey the
property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum
representing the value of the car which was
burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and
exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s Decision, but deleted the award for
damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE
LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS
TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY
THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME
HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides
in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this
Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were
married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between
respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already
been acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to
the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory
manner. The regime of conjugal partnership
of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place
in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in
the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is
silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of
his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By
express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal 15
property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes
the disposition or encumbrance in the same
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

manner that the rule on co-ownership under
Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the
appellate court are correct in declaring the
nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondent’s
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code,
“[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
...
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership
respond for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to
show the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such.Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat(he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case
reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property
was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer
filed with the trial court was it alleged that the
proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit
of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never
claimed that the family benefited from the
proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he will not
be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process. A party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.
Tan v. Hosana
GR # 190846|February 3, 2016
By: Gascon, Nyll Gabrylle R.
Facts:
Respondent Jose Hosana married to Milagros
Hosana bought a house and lot located at
Tinago, Naga City. Milagros sold to the
petitioner Tomas Tan Jr. the property by virtue
of a Special Power of Attorney executed by
Jose in her Favor. The Deed of Sale stated that
the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.
Jose averred that Milagros conspired with
Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s
signature. Jose’s Brother testified that Jose’s
signature was forged and presented documents
containing the signature of Jose for
comparison.
Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good
faith and for value. Tomas made partial
payment of 350,000 and another 350,000 upon
execution of Deed of Sales. Tomas inquired why
the written consideration was lower than the
actual consideration paid. Milagros explained
that it was done to save taxes.
Issue:
WoN the forged deed of sale can be used as the
basis for consideration paid.
Ruling
Yes, the force and effect of a void contract is
distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.
While the terms and provision of a void
contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed
inexistent, it does not preclude its admissibility
as evidence to prove matters of fact for mutual
restitution.
In the case at bar, the deed of sale was
declared null and void by positive provision of
law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property
without the spouse’s consent. It does not,
however, preclude the possibility that Tomas
paid the consideration stated therein. The
admission of the deed of sale as evidence is
16
consistent with the liberal policy of the court
to admit evidence; which appears to be
relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Fuentes vs. Roca
G.R. No. 178902|April 21, 2010
By: Gregorio, Loie Joyce Shaira L.
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in
Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her
son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed
of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They met in the office of Atty.
Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare
the documents of sale and signed an agreement
to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It expressly
stated that the sale was to take effect in six
months. Within six months, Tarciano was to
clear the lot of structures and occupants and
secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarciano’s compliance with
these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to
take possession of the lot and pay him an
additional pay besides the downpayment,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If
Tarciano was unable to comply with
these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would
become owners of the lot without any further
formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with
Atty. Plagata who then worked on the
other requirements of the sale. According to
the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his
trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent. After 6 months, a new title was issued
in the name of the spouses who immediately
constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter
Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of
Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents(collectively, the Rocas), filed an
action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance
of the land against the Fuentes spouses before
the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses
was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not
give her consent to it. Her signature on the
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus
prayed that the property be reconveyed to
them upon reimbursement of the price that the
Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations.
They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that
he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at
her residence. He admitted, however,that he
notarized the document in Zamboanga City four
months later. All the same, the Fuentes
spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery
was personal to Rosario and she alone could
invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud
had already lapsed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rocas’ action for the
declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed?
RULING:
No, It did not prescribe. the law that applies to
this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in
1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to
the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the
Civil Code on Property Relations Between
Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already
existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights. In contrast to
Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the
Family Code does not provide a period within
which the wife who gave no consent may assail
her husband’s sale of the real property.
It simply provides that without the other
spouse’s written consent or a court
order allowing the sale, the same would be
void. Here, the Rocas filed an action against
the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of
sale and re-conveyance of the real property
that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his
wife’s) written consent. The passage of time
did not erode the right to bring such an action.
17
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

DOLORES ALEJO, Petitioner
v.
SPOUSES ERNESTO CORTEZ and PRISCILA SAN
PEDRO, SPOUSES JORGE LEONARDO and
JACINTA LEONARDO and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF BULACAN, Respondent
G.R. NO. 206114
By: Jamaica P. Hechanova
FACTS: The subject property of this case is a
parcel of land measuring 255 square meters
belonging to the conjugal property of Spouses
Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo.
[March 29, 1996] Jacinta executed a
Kasunduan with petitioner for the sale of the
property for a purchase price of PhP500,000.
Under the Kasunduan, petitioner was to pay
PhP70,000 as downpayment while the
PhP230,000 was to be paid on April 30, 1996,
and the remaining PhP200,000 to be paid at the
end of the year. The Kasunduan was signed by
Jacinta and Ricardo as witness. Jorge did not
sign the agreement. Appearing that the
downpayment and the PhP230,000 was paid by
petitioner on the agreed dates, petitioner was
allowed to possess property and introduce
improvements therein.
[July 3, 1996] First letter: Jorge wrote
a letter to petitioner denying knowledge and
consent of the Kasunduan. Further, petitioner
was informed that Jacinta was retracting her
consent to the Kasunduan because she was
unable to comply with the remaining obligation
of PhP200,000.
[Sept. 29, 1996] Second letter: Jorge
demanded petitioner to pay the balance on or
before October 5, 1996, otherwise the purchase
price shall be increased to PhP700,000.
Petitioner refused to sign the agreement. Jorge
filed cases of ejectment and annulment of sale,
reconveyance, and recovery of sale against
petitioner which were later dismissed by trial
court.
During the pendency of these cases,
both Jorge and Jacinta sold to Spouses Cortez
the property. A new TCT was issued. At the
time of the sale, petitioner was still in
possession of the property.
RTC ruled that the second letter
reveals that Jorge later accepted the
Kasunduan. The CA, contrary to RTC, held that
such is only a qualified acceptance.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
ISSUE: W/N the Kasunduan is a perfected and
binding contract as it was allegedly accepted
by Jorge through his overt acts -- demand of
payment in the second letter sent to
petitioner.
RULING: No, the Court affirmed the decision of
the CA which held that the second letter
cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge’s
consent and acceptance of the sale.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides
that when a conjugal property has been
disposed or encumbered by one spouse without
the consent of the other, such disposition or
encumbrance is void. However, the transaction
between the consenting spouse and third
person is construed as a continuing offer which
may be perfected upon written acceptance of
the other spouse or judicial authorization,
provided that either or both have not yet
withdrawn the offer.
In this case, Jorge’s first letter was
clearly an outright and express repudiation of
the Kasunduan. The second letter is not
construed as an acceptance of the sale because
it varied in terms of material points (date of
payment of balance and purchase price) from
the Kasunduan. It is settled that where the
other spouse’s putative consent of the conjugal
property appears in a separate document which
does not contain the same terms and conditions
as that of the first, a valid transaction would
not have arisen. Moreover, neither can Jorge’s
second letter be a ratification of the
Kasunduan because a void contract is not
susceptible to ratification.
Hence, the petition is denied and
petitioner shall be reimbursed with
PhP300,000.
Topic: Reimbursement of conjugal partnership
funds
Josefa Ferrer vs. Manuel Ferrer
G.R. 166496 | November 29, 2006
By: Louie Andrei G. Jamito
FACTS: The late Alfredo Ferrer acquire a piece
of land. Through a loan, he introduced several
improvements including a residential house and
a 2-door apartment building. However, it was 18
only during his marriage with petitioner Josefa
that he was only able to pay the loan using the
couple’s conjugal funds. From their conjugal
funds, Josefa claimed, they constructed a
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner
averred that respondent Manuel Ferrer
occupied one door of the apartment building,
as well as the warehouse; however, he stopped
paying rentals, alleging that he had acquire
ownership over the property by virtue of Deed
of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of
respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their
spouses.
It is petitioner’s contention that when her
husband was already bedridden, respondents
Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a
document, purportedly to be his last will and
testament. The document, however, was a
Deed of Sale covering Alfredo’s lot and the
improvement thereon. Learning of this
development, Alfredo filed a Complaint for
Annulment of the said sale against respondents.
The RTC dismissed the same and ruled that the
terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and
public policy, and should be complied with by
the parties in good faith, there being no
compelling reason under the law to do
otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the CA’s decision, herein petitioner
filed another case claiming that, based on the
RTC decision, when Alfredo died on 29
September 1999, or at the time of liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, she had the right
to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements on Alfredo’s lot. She alleged that
the cost of the improvements amounted to
P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be
reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are
now the registered owners of Alfredo’s lot.
ISSUE:
W/N respondents have the obligation to
reimburse petitioner.
RULING: Yes. Article 120 provides the solution
in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on separate
property of the spouses at the expense of
partnership or through acts or efforts of either
or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property
at the time of improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner – spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, the said property
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
shall be retained in ownership by the owner –
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of
the cost of the improvement. The subject
property was precisely declared as the
exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of
Article 120 of the Family Code.
MULLER VS. MULLER
GR No. 149616 | 2006-08-29
By: Leynes, Janna Kadmiel N.
Facts: Helmut Muller (respondent) were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September
22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany but
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent
had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds
for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000 and the
construction of a house amounting to P2.3
Million. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner (TCT No. 219438)
Due to respondent's alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. Respondent filed a
petition for separation of properties before the
RTC of Quezon City.
The RTC rendered a decision which terminated
the regime of absolute community of property
between the couple and decreed the
separation of properties between them. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of
the respondent, however, respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution which provides that "save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain."
The Court of Appeals modified the RTC decision
and considered petitioner's ownership over the
property as 'in trust' for the respondent. As
regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled
that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property
HELD: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution states: “Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
19
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands, The primary purpose of
the constitutional provision is the conservation
of the national patrimony.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an
implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner's
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent's disqualification from owning lands
in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where
the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would
allow circumvention of the constitutional
prohibition.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared
that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said
property cannot be sustained.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a
court of law but also a court of equity, is
likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity
as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. He who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. The
latter is a frequently stated maxim which is
also expressed in the principle that he who has
done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies
that a litigant may be denied relief by a court
of equity on the ground that his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue. Thus, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
The distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a
futile exercise on respondent's part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is
likewise proscribed by law.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
ARTICLES 130 NATURE OF DISPOSITION OF
CONJUGAL ASSETS AFTER DEATH OF ONE OF
THE SPOUSES WITHOUT LIQUIDATION
HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v.
SERVACIO and GO
G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
By: Lucmayon, Ma. Dorothy Joy N.
FACTS:
- In the year 1976, Gaviola and Protacio,
Jr. entered into a contract of sale of a
parcel of land. Twenty-three years
later, Protacio, Jr. executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver
affirming under oath that it was his
father Protacio Go, Sr. (Married to
Marta Go) who purchased the said
property. Subsequently in 1999,
Protacio Sr. together with his son Rito
Go sold a portion of the property to
herein respondent Ester Servacio. On
March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property,
but Servacio refused to heed
their demand; hence this case for the
annulment of sale of the property.
- The contention of the petitioner was
that following Protacio, Jr.’s
renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that
the sale of the property to Servacio
without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio,
Sr. and Marta was null and void
pursuant to Article 130 of the Family
Code.
- The defendants countered that Article
130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not
render the sale invalid, because the
sale was valid to the extent of the
portion that was finally allotted to the
vendors as his share; and that the sale
did not also prejudice any rights of the
petitioners as heirs, considering that
what the sale disposed of was within
the portion of the property that the
vendors were entitled to as heirs.
- The RTC declared that the property was 20
the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and
Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio,
Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

of the sale of the property to the respondent
(Servacio).
ISSUE:
W/N Article 130 of the Family Code is
applicable.
HELD:
YES. Article 130 of the Family Code is
applicable. Petitioner’s appeal lacks merit.
- Under Article 130 in relation to Article
105 of the Family Code,
any disposition of the conjugal property
after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership (death of
spouse) must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise,
the disposition is void.
- Upon Marta’s death in 1987,
the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil
Code, and an implied ordinary co-
ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr.
and the other heirs of Marta with
respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation.
- Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-
owner with his children in respect of
Marta’s share in
the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion of Marta’s share without an
actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Nonetheless, a co-
owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right
to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest
of his co-owners. Consequently, the
sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily
void, for the rights of the selling co-
owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making
the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of
Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family
Code, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules
on dissolution of
the conjugal partnership is “without
prejudice to vested rights already
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.”
- Proper action in the case at bar is not for the
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from
the third person who substituted the co-owner
or co-owners who alienated their shares, but
the DIVISION of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the
co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra]
- In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee
for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in
respect of any portion that might not be validly
sold to her.
DOMINGO V. MOLINA G.R. No. 200274|APRIL
20, 2016
By: Lusañez, Leonido II S.
FACTS
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and
Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a 1/2 undivided portion
over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money
from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina (spouses Molina).
On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora’s
death4, Anastacio sold his interest over the
land to the spouses Molina to answer for his
debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was
annotated at the Original Certificate of Title of
the subject property.5 In 1986, Anastacio died.6
In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest
was registered under a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) and transferred the entire 1/2
undivided portion of the land to the spouses
Molina.
Melecio (one of the Domingos’ children)
learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses
Molina on May 17, 1999, arguing the following:
1) That Anastacio gave the subject property
to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral 21
for the money that Anastacio borrowed.
Anastacio could not have validly sold the
interest over the subject property without
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at
the time of the sale.
2) That Genaro Molina must have falsified the
document transferring Anastacio and Flora’s
1/2 undivided interest over the land.
3) That he occupied the subject property from
the time of Anastacio’s death up to the time he
filed the Complaint.
He presented the Records Officer of the
Register of Deeds in Tarlac and his nephew,
George, as witnesses.
The former said that he could not locate the
instrument that documents the transfer of
ownership from Anastacio to the Molina
spouses. He also said that the sale as annotated
when Genaro Molina’s brother was Register of
Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac.
George, on the other hand, testified that he
has been living on the subject property owned
by Anastacio since 1986. He also said there
were four other occupants on the subject
property, namely Jaime Garlitos, Linda
Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and Manuel Ramos.
The Molina spouses offer the following
counterarguments:
1) Anastacio surrendered the title to the
subject property to answer for his debts and
told the spouses Molina that they already own
half of the land. The spouses Molina have been
in possession of the subject property before the
title was registered under their names and have
religiously paid the property’s real estate
taxes.
2) That Melecio knew of the disputed sale since
he accompanied Anastacio several times to
borrow money. The last loan was even used to
pay for Melecio’s wedding.
3) That Melecio built his nipa hut on the
subject property in 1999, without their
knowledge or consent.
Jaime Garlitos, the Molinas’ sole witness,
testified that Elena Molina permitted him to
build a house on the subject property in 1993.
Together with the other tenants, they planted
trees on the subject property and gave portions
of their harvest to Elena Molina without any
complaint from Melecio.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Jaime further testified that Melecio never lived
on the subject property and that only George
Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses
Molina, has a hut on the property.
The RTC dismissed the case since Melecio
failed to establish that Anastacio did not sell
said property to the Molinas. To them,
Anastacio’s disposal of the property was valid
since the sale was necessary to answer for
conjugal liabilities.
The CA also dismissed the case because
Melecio failed to prove fraud in the conveyance
of properties to the Molinas. Flora’s death was
immaterial since Anastacio sold his rights,
excluding Flora’s interest. “There is no
prohibition against the sale by the widower of
real property formerly belonging to the
conjugal partnership of gains.”
ISSUE
W/N the sale of the Domingo spouses’ property
by Anastacio to the Molina spouses was valid
and legal, even without Flora’s consent
RULING
YES, it was valid. Anastacio had the right to
sell the property.
On the Law Governing Their Conjugal
Partnership
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora
Domingo married before the Family Code’s
effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their
property relation is a conjugal partnership.
Conjugal partnership of gains established
before and after the effectivity of the Family
Code are governed by the rules found in
Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of
Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband
and Wife) of the Family Code. This is clear
from Article 105 of the Family Code which
states:
x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256. 22
On the Effects of Flora’s Death
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and
Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968,
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil
Code22 (now Article 126 (1) of the Family
Code).
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon
death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition
or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior
to the conjugal partnership liquidation, to
quote:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the
marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extrajudicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon
the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides
that any disposition involving the conjugal
property without prior liquidation of the
partnership shall be void, this rule does not
apply since the provisions of the Family Code
shall be "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
RAFAEL C. UY vs ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ
G.R No. 200612|April 5, 2017
By: MARTINEZ, CORNELIO III E.
FACTS:
Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated in Jaro, Iloilo
City. Vipa and her husband Levi Lahaylahay
have two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances.
In 1990, a contract of lease was executed
between Vipa and Rafael Uy over the subject
property and the improvements thereon to
which Rafael bound himself to pay the amount
of P 3,000/mo with provision for a 10% every
year thereafter.
On 1995, Vipa died leaving no will or testament
whatsoever, Grace Joy became the de facto
administrator of the estate of Vipa. In 1998,
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents.
Consequently, the estate of Vipa filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC
against Rafael. Accordingly, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, unpaid rents amounted
to P271,150.00.
MTCC rendered a decision ordering Rafael to
vacate the premises and to pay the amount of
unpaid rents with 12% interest per annum.
On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC
and dismiss the complaint for unlawful
detainer. According the RTC, Grace was the
plaintiff not the estate and it had failed to the
bring the dispute to the barangay conciliation;
that the property is part of conjugal property
and after Vipa’s death the conjugal partnership
was terminated. Levi sold his property to
Rafael, thus making him co-owner of the
property.
Estate filed a petition for review to CA and
reinstated the decision of MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the
RTC’s decision?
RULING:
The petition is partially granted.
Levi and Vipa were married on March 24,
1961 and, in the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of conjugal partnership
of gains governs their property relations. It is
presumed that the subject property is part of
the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi
considering that the same was acquired during
the subsistence of their marriage and there
being no proof to the contrary.
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal
partnership was automatically
terminated. Under Article 130 of the Family
Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon
its dissolution due to the death of either
spouse, should be liquidated either in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the
surviving spouse within one year from the
death of the deceased spouse. That absent any 23
liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of
the conjugal partnership property is void. Thus:
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Article 130. Upon the termination of the
marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within six months
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon
the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation
is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of
the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a
subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already
established between the spouses prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code pursuant to
Article 105 thereof,
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in
the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage, the
provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply
to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws as provided in
Article 256. (Emphasis ours)
Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the
subject property in consideration of
P500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of
Sale dated December 29, 2005. At that time,
the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and
Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such
disposition, notwithstanding the absence of
liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties, is not necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and
wife are co-owners of all the property of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, upon the
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains due to the death of either spouse, the
surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-
half undivided share of the properties, which
does not consist of determinate and segregated
properties until liquidation and partition of the
conjugal partnership. With respect, however,
to the deceased spouse's share in the conjugal
partnership properties, an implied ordinary co-
ownership ensues among the surviving spouse
and the other heirs of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
disquisitions, the petition for review
on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 26, 2010 and
Resolution dated January 24, 2012 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04481
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
CARLOS V TOLENTINO
G.R NO 234533|JUNE 27, 2018
By: Namoc, Cherry Ann C.
FACTS: Without Juan's knowledge and consent,
Mercedes and Kristoff, who were then residing
in the subject property, allegedly forged a
Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011,
thereby making it appear that Juan and
Mercedes donated the subject property to
Kristoff. Thus, by virtue of the alleged forged
Deed of Donation, Kristoff caused the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-90764 (116229), and
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 004-2011003320 was
issued in his name on March 9, 2011.
In April 2011, Kristoff offered the sale of the
subject property to Julieta's brother, Felix
Bacal (Felix), who is also the administrator of
the lot owned by Julieta which is adjacent to
the subject property
Kristoff surrendered to Felix copies of the title
and tax declaration covering the said property
Kristoff and Julieta executed a Memorandum of
Agreement11 (MOA) dated April 12, 2011
stating that Kristoff is selling the subject
property to Julieta in the amount of Two
Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,300,000.00), payable in two (2)
installments.
24
On May 28, 2011, Julieta made the first
payment in the amount of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) 12 while the second payment
in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Pesos (P300,000.00) was made on June 30,
2011. On the same day, a Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed between Kristoff and
Julieta.
Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which
was annotated on TCT No. 004-2011003320 on
July 15, 2011, claiming for the rights, interest
and participation over the property.
ISSUE: W/N spouses Carlos has the better to
right to claim ownership over the subject
property.
HELD: The court held that while it has been
settled that the congruence of the wills of the
spouses is essential for the valid disposition of
conjugal property, it cannot be ignored that
Mercedes' consent to the disposition of her one-
half interest in the subject property remained
undisputed. It is apparent that Mercedes,
during her lifetime, relinquished all her rights
thereon in favor of her grandson, Kristoff.
Furthermore, Mercedes' knowledge of and
acquiescence to the subsequent sale of the
subject property to Spouses Carlos is evidenced
by her signature appearing in the MOA33 dated
April 12, 2011 and the Deed of Absolute Sale34
dated September 12, 2011.
We are also mindful of the fact that Spouses
Carlos had already paid a valuable
consideration in the amount of Two Million
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,300,000.00)
for the subject property before Juan's adverse
claim was annotated on Kristoff’ s title. The
said purchase and acquisition for valuable
consideration deserves a certain degree of legal
protection.
We deem it proper to uphold the validity of the
Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011 but
only to the extent of Mercedes' one-half share
in the subject property.
Accordingly, the right of Kristoff, as donee, is
limited only to the one-half undivided portion
that Mercedes owned.
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been
married before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. There being no
indication that they have adopted a different
property regime, the presumption is that their
property relations is governed by the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
The Deed of Donation insofar as it covered the
remaining one-half undivided portion of the
subject property is null and void, Juan not
having consented to the donation of his
undivided half.
ARTICLES 134-141 JUDICIAL PROPERTY
DURING MARRIAGE
Topic: Grounds 1. Sufficient cause
Maquilan v. Maquilan
June 8, 2007 | GR no. 155409
By: Alex Christian C. Namoca
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private
respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to
have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having
illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which
thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the
latter's paramour. Consequently, both the
private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment.
Thereafter, private respondent, through
counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages
on June 15, 2001, imputing psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner
and private respondent entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the following
terms, to wit:
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal
partnership of gains, the parties agree to the
following:
 P500,000.00 of the money deposited in
the bank jointly in the name of the
spouses shall be withdrawn and
deposited in favor and in trust of their
common child, Neil Maquilan, with the
deposit in the joint account of the
parties.
The balance of such deposit, which
presently stands at P1,318,043.36, shall
be withdrawn and divided equally by
the parties;
 The store that is now being occupied by
the plaintiff shall be allotted to her
while the bodega shall be for the
defendant. The defendant shall be paid 25
the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in
the stocks of the store in full
settlement thereof.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy
the bodega until the time the owner of
the lot on which it stands shall
construct a building thereon;
 The motorcycles shall be divided
between them such that the Kawasaki
shall be owned by the plaintiff while
the Honda Dream shall be for the
defendant;
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without
prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal
properties that have not been mentioned;
Issue: WON not a compromise agreement
entered into by spouses, one of whom was
convicted of adultery, giving the convicted
spouse a share in the conjugal property, valid.
Held: Yes. The Compromise Agreement is valid.
The contention that the Compromise
Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of
the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in
the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing
law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code,
separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to
judicial approval. The questioned Compromise
Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed
under the law. This conclusion holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity
of marriage was still pending. However, the
Court must stress that this voluntary
separation of property is subject to the rights
of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family
Code.
Also, the conviction of adultery does not carry
the accessory of civil interdiction. It is clear,
therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that
the crime of adultery does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter
vivos.
Noveras vs. Noveras
GR No. 188289|Aug. 20, 2014
Maria Elisa Fe S. Navarro
Facts:
In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia
got married. They lived in California and
eventually granted with American citizenship.
Out of this marriage, they produce two children
and also several properties both in USA and
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Philippines. In 2001, David returned to the
Philippines to supervise their business. But
after a year, Leticia learned that David had an
extra-marital affair with other woman. She
then filed a petition for divorce in California
and in 2005 the court granted the decree of
nullification of their marriage. Also, the
California court granted to Leticia the custody
of her two minor children, as well as all the
couple’s property in USA. In Aug. 2005, Leticia
filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
property in Baler, Aurora. In his answer, David
filed for a petition to grant him all of their
properties in the Philippines considering that
Leticia got all of their properties in USA.
Issue:
Whether or not David is right in claiming all of
their properties in the Philippines?
Ruling:
The court held no, David was wrong in
claiming all of their properties in the
Philippines. Article 91 of this Code, provides
that property owned before and during
marriage are under ACP of Absolute Community
Property.
In this case their marriage contracted in Dec.
1988, therefore ACP governs. But, considering
that they are both American citizen, the
California court decision with regards to their
property in USA governs. The property in the
Philippines will be equally divided between
them.
ARTICLES 147-148 REGIMES OF UNIONS
WITHOUT MARRIAGE OR UNDER A VOID
MARRIAGE
Topic: Liquidation/division and sharing of
properties acquired during the cohabitation
1. When proof of actual contribution to
the acquisition thereof is required
2. Forfeiture – Distinctions between
forfeiture under Article 147 and
forfeiture Article 43 (2), Family Code
26
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

UNDER ARTICLE 147
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, Petitioner, v.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDES, Respondents
G.R. No. 122749|July 31, 1996.
By: PANGILINAN, CHARLEEN P.
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez
were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration
of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code, which was granted
hence, marriage is null and void on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella
and Joaquin are placed under the custody of
their mother while the other 3 siblings are free
to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that
portion in the decision regarding the procedure
for the liquidation of common property in
“unions without marriage”. During the hearing
on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their
father.
With this, the trial court made the
following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be
owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their ‘family home’ and all
their other properties for that matter in equal
shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the
properties owned in common by the plaintiff
and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership
found in the Civil Code shall apply."
In addressing specifically the issue regarding
the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
court said:
"Considering that this Court has already
declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant
to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner
and respondent shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code finds no application since Article
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership property and
Article 129 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the absolute community of
property."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
Issue: Whether or not Article 147 of the Family
Code apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated
Held: Yes.
The trial court correctly applied the
law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
As Article 147 states:
“ART. 147. When a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other,
until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void
27
marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation."
Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party’s "efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household."
8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple’s separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos.
127449|March 31, 2005
By: Piañar, Jullie Ann
Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for
the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage
entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and violation ordered the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises, and
awarded the care and custody of the minor to
his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the
appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s
motion issued a resolution increasing the
support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is
applicable to valid marriage.
Held: Since the present case does not involve
the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for
the dissolution of the absolute community or
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule
applies, which is in case a marriage is declared
void ab initio, the property regime applicable
to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is
that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed
by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC
and the CA, to have been acquired during the
union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a
separate property of one of the parties appear
to have been included or involved in said
distribution.
JOHN ABING, petitioner,
vs.
JULIET WAEYAN, respondent
07-31-06
By: Plania, Madelaine S.
Facts:
Together, the couple bought a 2-storey
residential house from one Benjamin Macua
which was erected on a lot owned by a certain
Alejandro Diño on Aurora Street, Mankayan,
Benguet. Consequent to the purchase, the tax
declaration of the 2-storey house was
transferred in the name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for
overseas employment in Korea. She would send
money to John who deposited the same in their
joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey
residential house underwent renovation. To it
was annexed a new structure which housed a
sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-
sari store thereat are the properties involved in
this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and
continued to live with John. She managed the
sari-sari store while John worked as a mine
employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining,
Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the
two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they
decided to partition their properties. For the
purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a
Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the
document was left unsigned by the parties
although signed by the witnesses thereto. 28
Under their unsigned agreement, John shall
leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying
him the amount of P428,870.00 representing
John's share in all their properties. On the same
date – October 7, 1995 – Juliet paid John the
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment
of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34
to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly
installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good
the balance. On account thereof, John
demanded of her to vacate the annex structure
housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused,
prompting John to file an ejectment suit
against her before the MTC of Mankayan,
Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he
alone spent for the construction of the annex
structure with his own funds and thru money he
borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added
that the tax declaration for the structure was
under his name. On this premise, John claimed
exclusive ownership of the subject structure,
which thereby gave him the right to eject
Juliet therefrom upon the latter's failure to pay
the agreed balance due him under the
aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their
original house was renovated thru their
common funds and that the subject structure
annexed thereto was merely an attachment or
an extension of their original residential house,
hence the same pertained to the two of them
in common.
Rule:
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they
acquired certain properties which must be
divided between them upon the termination of
their common law relationship.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . their property relations cannot be
governed by the provision of the Civil Code on
conjugal partnership... but by the rule on co-
ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the parties' share in respect of the
properties they have accumulated during their
cohabitation shall be equal unless there is
proof to the contrary.
Court’s ruling;
First and foremost, it is undisputed that
the parties hereto lived together as husband
and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit
of marriage. Neither is it disputed that
sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for
Korea and worked thereat, sending money to
John which the latter deposited in their joint
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
account. In fact, Juliet was still in Korea when
the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that
he alone, thru his own funds and money he
borrowed from his relatives, spent for the
construction of the annex structure, evidence
is wanting to support such naked claim. For
sure, John even failed to reveal how much he
spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the
names of the alleged relatives from whom he
made his borrowings, let alone the amount of
money he borrowed from them. All that
petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing his
claim of spending his own funds and borrowed
money in putting up the subject structure was
the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel
Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner
borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then,
Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was
sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said
amount from him. With the petitioner's own
admission that the subject structure was
constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even
doubtful whether the amount he allegedly
borrowed from the latter went into the
construction of the structure in dispute
More, it is noted that while petitioner
was able to present in evidence the Macaraeg
affidavit, he failed to introduce similar
affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from
whom he claimed to have made similar
borrowings. For sure, not a single relative
came forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In
short, there is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support
petitioner's self-serving allegation that the
annex structure which housed the sari-sari
store was put up thru his own funds and/or
money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has
in his favor the tax declaration covering the
subject structure. We have, however, ruled
time and again that tax declarations do not
prove ownership but at best an indicia of
claims of ownership. Payment of taxes is not
proof of ownership, any more than indicating
possession in the concept of an owner. Neither
tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for
taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or
of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family
Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall 29
be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition by
other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of
proofs to the contrary, any property acquired
by common-law spouses during their period
of cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned
by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned
their properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner of the structure in
question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA,
may not be ejected therefrom.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the
CA that the subject Memorandum of
Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and John,
has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said
Agreement, Juliet did pay John the amount of
P232,397.66, as initial payment for John's share
in their common properties, with the balance
of P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly
installments beginning November 1995. It is
also a matter of record that the Agreement was
signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the
irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement
was left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot
adversely affect its binding force or effect
between them, as evidently, Juliet's initial
payment of P232,397.66 to John was in
fulfillment of what the parties had agreed upon
thereunder. However, and as correctly held by
the CA, Juliet's failure to pay John the balance
of the latter's share in their common properties
could at best give rise to an action for a sum of
money against Juliet, or for rescission of the
said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED, except that
portion thereof denying effect to the parties'
Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned
by both.
Costs against petitioner.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
METROBANK v. PASCUAL
547 S 246|February 29, 2008
By: Refold Andre R. Raga
Facts:
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were
married on January 19, 1985. During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and
Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a
three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for
the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On April 30,
1997, Florencia, together with spouses
Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58
million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the
obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
executed several real estate mortgages (REMs)
on their properties, including one involving a
lot. Florencia secured a waiver from Nicholson.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it
fell due, Metrobank, initiated a foreclosure
proceedings over the properties. Getting wind
of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed
on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati
City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the
mortgage of the disputed property. Nicholson
alleged that the property, which is still
conjugal property, was mortgaged without his
consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties in contest form
part of the conjugal properties of Nicholson
and Florencia.
Ruling:
The property is deemed conjugal. While the
declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and
Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the
character of the properties acquired before
such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the
liquidation and partition of the partnership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the
mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997,
or a little less than two years after the 30
dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July
31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed
the property relations of the former spouses
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

when the mortgage was given is the
aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has
the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half
(1/2) undivided interest in the disputed
property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However,the rights of Metrobank, as
mortgagee, are limited only to the
1/2undivided portion that Florencia owned.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of
the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having
consented to the mortgage of his undivided
half.
DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044| January 19, 2011
By: Sagarino, Christine Joy P.
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. In
this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January
1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a
psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the
ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared their
marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial
reconsideration of petitioner, modified its
decision holding that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered
that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with
modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the
trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be
capacitated to marry each other;
31
2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

3. Their union is without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and
there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code
that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the
marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership
of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to
respondent was declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In
Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, RESPONDENT.
2013-09-23 | G.R. No. 202370
By: Napoleon L. Sango III
Facts:
 On September 7, 1985, petitioner and
respondent were married. On June 7,
1986 Aguila gave birth to their
daughter, but 5 months later, Salas left
their conjugal dwelling and no longer
communicated with them
 On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
psychological incapacity under Art. 36
of the Family Code. The petition states
that they “have no conjugal properties
whatsoever”. The RTC granted the
petition and declared the nullity of the
marriage between the petitioner and
respondent.
 On September 10, 2007, Aguila
discovered two properties wherein the
registered owner is “Juan S. Salas,
married to Rubina C. Salas.” The
properties discovered are (a) two 200-
square-meter parcels of land with
improvements located in San
Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and
(b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land
with improvement located in Tondo, 32
Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373
(collectively, “Discovered Properties”)
 Aguila claims that the discovered
properties should be partitioned
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

between them because these
properties were acquired during their
marriage prior to their annulment.
 On February 8,2008, Salas filed an
Opposition to the Manifestation alleging
that there is no conjugal property to be
partitioned based on Aguila’s petition.
Salas claimed that Aguila waived her
right to the Discovered Properties.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila and
ordered the properties to be
partitioned between the petitioner and
respondent. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling
Issue: Salas seeks a reversal and raises the
following issues for resolution:
1. W/N the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision ordering the partition of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A
and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as the
property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373
between petitioner and respondent.
2. W/N the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision in not allowing Rubina C.
Cortez to intervene in this case
Ruling:
1stissue : No
Aguila proved that the discovered properties
were acquired by Salas during their marriage.
Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to
the Discovered Properties but he failed to
prove the existence and acquisition of the
waived properties during their marriage. We
held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, as in this case. Article 147 of
the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Under this property regime, property acquired
during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have beenobtained through the couple’s joint
efforts and governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In the present case, Salas did not
rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the
properties acquired during the union of the
parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA,
would be governed by co-ownership.
2ndissue: No
On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that
Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we
likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The
TCTs state that “Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas” is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties.The phrase “married to”
is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not
initially dispute the ownership of the
Discovered Properties in his opposition to the
manifestation. It was only when Rubina
intervened that Salas supported Rubina’s
statement that she owns the Discovered
Properties.Considering that Rubina failed to
prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case.
VENTURA vs. SPS ABUDA
G.R. No. 202932|October 23, 2013
By: Santillas, Leonora
FACTS:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes
(Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980.
Although Socorro and Esteban never had
common children, both of them had children
from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter 33
named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and
Socorro had a son, who was the father of
Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the
petitioner in this case.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior
subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin)
when she married Esteban. Socorro married
Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not
annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of
Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.
Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand,
was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in
1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in
1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot
situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street,
Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The
remaining portion was thereafter purchased by
Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in
1970.The Vitas property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated
11 December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes,
of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro
Torres."
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978,
Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan
Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas
and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino). According to
Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer
sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the
Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline.
Evangeline continued paying the amortizations
on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan
Street. The amortizations, together with the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php
200,000.00), which Esteban requested as
advance payment, were considered part of the
purchase price of the Delpan properties.
Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the
purchase of the Vitas properties and she
shouldered his medical expenses.
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997,
while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora),
the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale.
Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed
a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale
before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that
the sale of the properties was fraudulent
because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of
sale was forged. Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage
to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither
Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or
interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.
ISSUE:
WON there was an actual contribution from
Socorro to the Vitas and Delpan properties
RULING:
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a
man and a woman who are incapacitated to
marry each other, the ownership over the
properties acquired during the subsistence of
that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties. He even quoted our
ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to
prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not
apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the
Family Code, which the CA applied in the
assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other],
only the properties acquired by both of the 34
parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences
of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and
Delpan properties can be considered common
property if:
(1) these were acquired during the cohabitation
of Esteban and Socorro; and
(2) there is evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties’ actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title
covering the Vitas property shows that the
parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and
Socorro because:
(1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
on 11 December 1980, or several months after
the parties were married; and
(2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro
Torres."
We disagree. The title itself shows that the
Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The
phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely
descriptive of his civil status, and does not
show that Socorro co-owned the property. The
evidence on record also shows that Esteban
acquired ownership over the Vitas property
prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the
certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under
the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title. This was admitted by
Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein he
quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
fact of its existence with notice to the world at
large. Certificates of title are not a source of
right. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property.
Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the
titles of the disputed properties in her name
does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply
to respondent. A certificate of title implies
that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are
well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when
the transferee is not a holder in good faith and
did not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual
contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since
Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the
acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the
RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of
Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan
property was made by Evangeline, such
payment was made on behalf of her father.
Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person
who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which
requires the debtor s consent. But the payment
is in any case valid as to the creditor who has
accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf
of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented
receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations for the Delpan property. On the
other hand, Edilberto failed to show any
evidence showing Socorro’s alleged monetary
contributions. As correctly pointed out by the
CA:
35
settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the
burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to
prove the allegations in the complaint which
undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 195670|December 3, 2012
By: JOSEPH ELI SIDAYA
FACTS:
Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married
Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980.
Their marriage was declared null by the RTC
on November 10, 2000 by reason of
psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
and distribution of properties which he claimed
were acquired during their marriage.
BY PURCHASE:
a.Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of
Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
including a residential house constructed
thereon
b.Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
including a residential house constructed
thereon
c.Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre
d.Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of
Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre
BY INHERITANCE:
a. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete
Cadastre(the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
b. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete
Cadastre(the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
The respondent averred that she and
petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
properties during their marriage, the truth
being that she used her own personal money to
purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by
way of inheritance.
During trial, petitioner testified that while
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he received from the
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Dutch government as his disability benefit12
since respondent did not have sufficient income
to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
During trial, petitioner testified that while
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit12
since respondent did not have sufficient income
to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision
of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may
not own lands in the Philippines. However,
there are no restrictions to the ownership of
buildings or structures on lands of foreigners.
As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are
considered co-owned by the parties.
While admitting to have previously executed a
joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds
were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise
claimed that his personal disability funds were
used to acquire the same. The Court cannot,
even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject
properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase
A contract that violates the Constitution and
the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates
no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all.
36
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

VIRGINIA OCAMPO, PETITIONER VS.
DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 198908|2015-08-03
By: Alia Molly P. Sira
FACTS:
On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage between
Virginia and Deogracio as null and void from the
beginning on the ground of psychological
incapacity following Article 36 of the Family
Code.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the
parties to submit a project partition of their
inventoried properties. Having failed to agree
upon a project partition of their conjugal
properties, the trial court rendered the
assailed order stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of
them on a 50-50 sharing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should be
deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.
RULING:
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in
those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in this case.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies
when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It
is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to
operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit
of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the
instant case.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
Any impediment to marry has not been shown
to have existed on the part of either Virginia or
Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each
other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court
correctly held that the parties will share on
equal shares considering that Virginia failed to
prove that the properties were acquired solely
on her own efforts.
Likewise, we note that the former spouses both
substantially agree that they acquired the
subject properties during the subsistence of
their marriage. The certificates of titles and
tax declarations are not sufficient proof to
overcome the presumption under Article 116 of
the Family Code. All properties acquired by the
spouses during the marriage, regardless in
whose name the properties are registered, are
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.
The presumption is not rebutted by the mere
fact that the certificate of title of the property
or the tax declaration is in the name of one of
the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides
that the presumption remains even if the
property is "registered in the name of one or
both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of
Virginia to rebut this presumption, said
properties were obtained by the spouses' joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former
spouses' properties on the basis of co-
ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the
appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
UNDER ARTICLE 148
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA PALANG and
HERMINIA DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 116668 | July 28, 1997
By TORAL, AISAIA JAY B.
Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first 37
marriage on 16th July 1949 when he took
private respondent Carlina as a wife at the
Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in
Pangasinan and they were blessed with a child.
Few months after the wedding, he left to work
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

in Hawaii. Miguel returned in 1954 for a year
and his next visit to the Philippines was in
19664 but during the entire duration of his
year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with
his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and
child. The trial court found evidence that as
early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in
1972, he refused to live with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
In 1973, the then 63-year old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with 19-year
old Erlinda, herein petitioner. Two months
earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a
parcel of agriculture land located at San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan as evidenced by
the Deed of Sale. Consequently, Trasfer
Certificate of Title of said rice land was issued
in their names. A house and lot in Binalonan,
Pangasinan was likewise purchased in 1975
allegedly by Erlinda as sole vendee and a
Transfer Certificate of Title of said property
was issued in her name.
In 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement to settle and end a case filed by the
latter. They agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to
their only child, Herminia. Meanwhile, Miguel
and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son. In
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two
years later, Miguel died.
In 1981, Carlina and Herminia
instituted an action for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against Erlinda.
They sought to get back the rice land and the
house and lot both located in Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with Erlinda. Erlinda
contended that while the rice land is registered
in their names (Miguel and Erlinda, she had
already given her half of property to their son
Kristopher and added that the house and lot is
her sole property having bought it with her own
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded
from claiming aforesaid properties since the
latter had already donated their conjugal
estate to Herminia.
The lower court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint after declaring that
there was little evidence to prove that the
subject properties pertained to the conjugal
property of Carlina and Miguel. It confirmed
the ownership of Erlinda of the residential lot
including the house therein and ½ portion of
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
the agricultural land. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the lower court
declaring the respondents as the owners of the
properties in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
should sustain the validity of Erlinda’s
ownership of the disputed two pieces of
property?
Ruling:
No, the Court affirms the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The provision of law applicable to the
sale of rice land made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda is Article 48 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage under a void marriage. While Miguel
and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union
was void because of the subsisting prior
marriage of Miguel and Carlina. Under this
article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common proportion
to their respective contributions.
Erlinda tried to establish that she is engaged in
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
store but failed to prove that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject rice
land. Consequently, there is no basis to justify
her co-ownership with Miguel and so the rice
land should be reverted to the conjugal
partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and
Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of their daughter
Herminia. Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda
allegedly bought it when she was 22 years old.
The testimony of the notary public who
38
prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of the claim and
testified that Miguel provided money for the
purchase of said property and directed that
Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

The transaction was a donation made by Miguel
to Erlinda but it is void and inexistent by
express provision of law as it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of donation. Article 87
of the Family Code provides the prohibition
against donations between spouses living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Concerning the status of Kristopher and claim
as illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate,
the Court ruled that the lower court erred in
making pronouncement adjudicating to
Kristopher as his inheritance from the deceased
Miguel the one-half portion of the rice land.
Inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs
of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of
the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in the proper probate
court or in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the
instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession.
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. vs. MA. ELVIRA
CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803|June 16, 2000
TRAYA, Chesa F.
FACTS:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio
Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition
and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share,
Accounting and Damages" against respondent
Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial
Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner
and respondent, both married and with
children, but separated from their respective
spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship
sometime in 1979 while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union,
they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation, with petitioner as president and
chairman of the board of directors, and
respondent as vice-president and treasurer.
The business flourished and petitioner and
respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in
respondent's name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple
separated. Petitioner demanded from
respondent his share in the subject properties,
but respondent refused alleging that said
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
properties had been registered solely in her
name.
She denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife because the fact was that
they were still legally married to their
respective spouses. She claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real personal properties
involved in petitioner's action for partition on
the ground that they were acquired entirely
out of her own money and registered solely in
her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance
with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. She
contended that summary judgment was proper,
because the issues raised in the pleadings were
sham and not genuine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not couples capacitated to marry
each other at the time they are living together
could own common properties?
HELD:
Yes.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to
cases in which a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage provided they are not
incapacitated or are without impediment to
marry each other, or in which the marriage is
void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art.
144, therefore, does not cover parties living in
an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148
of the Family Code now provides for a limited
co-ownership in cases where the parties in
union are incapacitated to marry each other. It
states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint 39
contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that,
because the parties in this case were not
capacitated to marry each other at the time
that they were alleged to have been living
together, they could not have owned properties
in common. The Family Code, in addition to
providing that a co-ownership exists between a
man and a woman who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage,
likewise provides that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed
to be equal. There is thus co-ownership
eventhough the couple are not capacitated to
marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership
between the parties herein. Consequently,
whether petitioner and respondent cohabited
and whether the properties involved in the case
are part of the alleged co-ownership are
genuine and material. All but one of the
properties involved were alleged to have been
acquired after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. With respect to the property
acquired before the Family Code took effect if
it is shown that it was really acquired under the
regime of the Civil Code, then it should be
excluded.
JACINTO SAGUID VS CA
G.R. No. 150611.|June 10, 2003
By: Uy, Michelle Nicole M.
SUBJECT: The regime of limited co-ownership
of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares
shall be presumed to be equal.
FACTS: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was
married, but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto
Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987.
After a brief courtship, the two decided to
cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on
a lot owned by Jacintos father. Their
cohabitation was not blessed with any children.
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers.5 Gina, on the
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan
from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with
Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic
absence, however, did not ebb away the
conflict with petitioners’ relatives. In 1996, the
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-
year cohabitation.
Respondent filed a complaint for partition and
recovery of personal property with receivership
against the petitioner. She prayed that she be
declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of Php
70,000.00, representing her contribution of
their house be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited
part of her earnings in her savings account with
First Allied Development Bank. Gina declared
that said deposits were spent for the purchase
of construction materials, appliances and other
personal properties.
To the complaint, petitioner claimed that the
expenses for the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that
private respondent’s meager income as fish
dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the
construction of said house. Besides, selling fish
was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was
contented with the small quantity of fish
allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner
further contended that Gina did not work 40
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but
only for a 6-month duration each year. When
their house was repaired and improved
sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did
not share in the expenses because her earnings
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

as entertainer were spent on the daily needs
and business of her parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are actual
contributions from the parties
RULING: Under the property regime governed
by Art 148 “only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions”.
Thus, proof of actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, nowhere in Gina’s testimony
did she specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts on her
name for the purchase of construction
materials on 11/17/95 and 12/23/95 in the
amount of Php 11, 413.00. With respect to the
disputed personal properties both claimed that
the money used in the purchase thereof came
partly from their joint account. There is
however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares in the said
account. And pursuant to Article 148 of the
Family Code, in the absence of proof of the
extent of the parties’ respective contribution,
their share shall be presumed to be equal.
ATIENZA V. DE CASTRO
508 S 593
By: Velasco, Krizza Mae F.
Facts:
Lupo Atienza and Yolanda de Castro married on
November 29, 2006. During their marriage,
allegedly acquired a real property and
registered under the name of the wife
(Yolanda). Until such time their marriage
became sour so they decided to separate. Lupo
filed an action for partition contending that
they owned the said property under the
concept of limited co-ownership. Yolanda
contended that she alone acquired it through
her own savings as a businesswoman.
Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for
a judicial partition of a land between them in
the Bel-Air subdivision
Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property
with his own funds Yolanda on the other hand
said she bought it with her own funds.
Trial Court said that the contested property is
owned common by him and Yolanda and
ordered the partition into two equal parts.
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the
exclusive property of Yolanda.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed property is
the exclusive property of Yolanda
Held:
Yes, Since they are not capacitated to marry
each other in their cohabitation, FC 148
applies. Under this regime only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall be owned by
them in proportion to their contributions.
Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be
presumed to be equal. He did not show any
evidence that he contributed in the parcel of
land while the accountant showed bank
accounts which apparently shows that she was
capacitated to buy the said land.
Evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending, and jewelry retail,
promisorry notes of dealings with clients, bank
account statements, and business transactions
= had financial capacity on the other hand
Atienza merely provided evidence that Yolanda
had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t provide
for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay
for such property.
CAMILO BORROMEO v ANTONIETTA
DESCALLAR
February 24, 2009
John Carlo A. Villamor
Property regime of unions without marriage –
unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in relation to FC
49 (2) and FC 50, 37, 38 and 44
Property relations of mixed marriages
FACTS:
In 1984 in Cebu, Wilhelm Jambrich (Austrian),
met Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated
(BUT NOTE: STILL LEGALLY MARRIED) mother of
two boys and waitress at a hotel at that time.
They fell in love and lived together. Later, they
bought a house and lots in Agro-Macro Subd,
Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell, both of
them were referred to as the buyers of the
Agro-Macro properties (1985 and 1986). A Deed
of Sale was executed in their favor (1987). 41
However, the Register of Deeds refused to
register the Deed on the ground that Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable
lands of the public domain. Jambrich’s name
was erased from the document, though his
Persons and Family Relations | 1-Wigmore

signature remained on the left-hand margin of
page 1 beside Antonietta’s as buyer. The TCTs
were issued in Antonietta’s name alone.
They broke up in 1991.
In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from petitioner
Camilo Borromeo. He became indebted to the
latter for P150,000.00. To pay for the debt, he
sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro
properties to the petitioner thru a Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment for P250,000.00.
However, in 1991, when Camilo sought to
register the Deed, he discovered that the titles
to the three lots were transferred to
Antonietta, and that the property has already
been mortgaged.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
for recovery of property before the RTC. He
claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the properties do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since Antonietta was
not in fact the buyer, but Jambrich alone.
Respondent claimed, on the contrary, that she
solely and exclusively used her own personal
funds for the purchase, and that Jambrich, as
an alien, was prohibited under the Constitution
from acquiring such properties.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. It held that it
is highly improbable that respondent could
acquire the properties (which accordingly are
worth more than P700,000.00) while she was
still working as a waitress earning P1,000/mo
salary as she could not even provide for the
daily needs of her family. It also held that the
only probable reason why her name appeared
in the contracts to sell was because as
observed by the Court, “she being a scheming
and exploitative woman, she has taken
advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at
that time was still bewitched by her beauty,
sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to
him xxx”
CA ruled in favor of respondent. It held that
respondent was the owner as the title of the
property is in her name, not Jambrich’s.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent and Jambrich are
considered as co-owners of the subject
property
Ruling:
Jambrich was the owner of the properties,
since evidence clearly shows that it was he who
Persons and Family Relations
Atty. Lydia C. Galas
had the financial capacity at the time to
acquire said properties, not respondent.
Jambrich’s monthly salary at the time of the
acquisition of the properties was at P50,000.00.
It then increased to P90,000.00 when he was
assigned to Syria for almost a year. On the
other hand, respondent’s salary as a waitress
was not more than P1,000.00. Other than being
financially distressed, other evidence also
disclosed that she affirmed, under oath that
Jambrich was the owner of the properties but
that his name was subsequently deleted
because of legal constraints, and that the
money used for payment was in postdated
checks issued by Jambrich. Thus, Jambrich has
all authority to transfer all his rights, interests
and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner Borromeo.
The fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also
does not help respondent. The rule that co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, but are
otherwise capacitated to marry each other,
does not apply. Here, respondent was still
legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship, no co-ownership exists between
the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution
to the acquisition of property in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of
it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
The fact that the properties were registered in
respondent’s name also does not conclusively
make her the owner. Registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title
implies that the title is quiet, and that it is
perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However,
there are exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did
not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration (as in this case).
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo
in the acquisition of the properties. She had no
income of her own at that time, nor did she
have any savings.
42
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