Cebu Shipyard v William Lines

Facts:
This case is about the fire that broke out in M/V Manila, causing it to capsize during its rescue operation.
M/V Manila is owned by William Lines. It docked the ship with Cebu Shipyard for some repairs. However, fire broke out
and the vessel capsized while firemen were trying to put out the flames. William Lines filed case for damages against
petitioner. In their complaint were testimonies of several witnesses who were onsite. They allege that the people of
petitioner were doing unauthorized work which caused the fire. Petitioner on the other hand brought expert witnesses
who relied on testimony.
RTC found petitioner guilty of negligence and this was afiirmed by the CA.
Petitioner now comes to this court stating that both RTC and CA erred in not relying on the expert witnesses.

Issue: WON, the expert witnesses have more weight than ordinary witnesses who were on site.
Held: No, expert witnesses have less weight here.
The court did not give credence to the expert witnesses because those who were present were more reliable than those
who were not. Besides, expert opinion is discretionary on the judges.
“The word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness as evidence is a prerogative of the courts. It is
never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to expert testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on record, a
conclusion is readily ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In the case under
consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available evidence on the probable cause and origin
of the fire. There were witnesses who were actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred. Between the
testimonies of the fire experts who merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of those
present during the fire, the latter are of more probative value. Verily, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err
in giving more weight to said testimonies.”

People v Abriol
Facts:
Respondents were accused of killing Alejandro Flores. The respondents were apprehended and found to be in
possession of firearms. Below are the profile of the accused and the victim:
At the time of the incident, appellant Abriol, a policeman previously detailed as a jailguard at the Bagong Buhay
Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) in Cebu City, was himself a detention prisoner in BBRC.
Appellant Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had served time for grave threats
Dosdos had been convicted by the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, of highway robbery.
The victim, Alejandro Flores alias "Alex," was a former policeman. He was dismissed from the PNP in August 1992 after
testing positive for prohibited drugs.
Dizon v Tuazon
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that a property sold by respondents was null and void because the signature of Segundo, the
owner of the property was forged. They present as evidence:
(i) the NBI Report which concluded that the "S. Espinosa" in the Agreement of Subdivision and the "Segundo Espinosa" in
the sample signatures were not written by one and the same person;
(ii) the combined testimony of Soledad and Theodore, who both claimed familiarity with Segundo’s signature, that the
signatures appearing in the questioned documents were affixed by Segundo;
(iii) the memorandum of the barangay lupon proceedings captioned "Isang Paglilipat Pansin (Endorsement)" dated 27
September 1989 relative to the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale;34 and
(iv) the fact that the rent payments on the land purportedly sold to respondents were being paid to petitioners despite
the alleged sale.
On the other hand, respondents present the following evidence:
1. testimonies of Marino Tabaquero (Tabaquero), the secretary of the notary public who personally witnessed Segundo
affix his signature
2. respondent Rodrigo, the buyer of the subject property who was likewise present when Segundo signed the document
3. Notarized deed of sale.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners but it was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON, the CA erred in not giving more credence to the expert witnesses.

Held: Petition is without merit.

To recapitulate, petitioners rely on the following evidence in support of their case: (i) the NBI Report which concluded
that the "S. Espinosa" in the Agreement of Subdivision and the "Segundo Espinosa" in the sample signatures were not
written by one and the same person; (ii) the combined testimony of Soledad and Theodore, who both claimed familiarity
with Segundo’s signature, that the signatures appearing in the questioned documents were affixed by Segundo; (iii) the
memorandum of the barangay lupon proceedings captioned "Isang Paglilipat Pansin (Endorsement)" dated 27
September 1989 relative to the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale;34 and (iv) the fact that the rent payments on the land
purportedly sold to respondents were being paid to petitioners despite the alleged sale.
However, these pieces of evidence, these are not enough to overcome the presumption of regularity in the execution
and validity of the questioned deeds. Hence, we are inclined to agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals.
In the first place, the court is not bound by the findings of a handwriting expert. Expert opinion evidence is to be
considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the light of its own general knowledge and experience
upon the subject of inquiry.35 The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for
his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.36 The handwriting expert gave only a
definitive conclusion as to Segundo’s signature in the Agreement of Subdivision, and not in the Affidavit of Non-tenancy
or more importantly in the Deed of Absolute Sale.37 An accurate examination to determine forgery should dwell on both
the differences and similarities between the questioned signatures.38 Obviously, the abbreviated signature is different
from the full signature presented by petitioners. However, we find that there are only slight dissimilarities between the
surname "Espinosa" in the questioned documents and in the samples. These slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery
for these are natural, expected and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the same person.39 Even
Segundo’s sample signatures submitted by petitioners show clear variations in structure, flourish and size. The passage
of time and a person’s increase in age may have decisive influences in his writing characteristics and so, in order to bring
about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point and time
to the suspected signature.40 This was in fact the reason why the handwriting expert stated in her report that no definite
opinion of falsification/forgery could be rendered on the questioned signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale
since the sample signatures submitted could not serve as sufficient basis for a scientific comparative examination. We
also note that petitioners were unable to rebut the genuineness of the full signature appearing on the second page of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, which signature we observe to be similar to Segundo’s sample/specimen signatures.

People v Baligod

Facts:
Salvador Baligod, Macario Malagyab alias Baliling, and ten other persons whose identities and whereabouts are
unknown were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
What happend on that fateful day was the accused brought George in front of his house and asked him to call
out his father Federico. Federico was having coffee at that time with George’s sister. When Federico came out, the
accused started shooting killing Federico. They also fired shots at George but he survived. The court found the
petitioner’s guilty relying on the testimonies of George and her sister. Hence, they appealed and sought to discredit the
opinion of the ordinary witnesses.
Issue: WON, the ordinary witnesses testimony are reliable.
Held: Yes.

Said the court:

Appellant's assails the testimony of the prosecution witnesses Mildred Narcisa and George Narcisa that appellant was
one of the 12 armed men who ransacked their house and killed their father Federico Narcisa on the ground that their
testimony as to the clothes he (appellant) was wearing at the time of the incident is conflicting. Mildred Narcisa testified
that appellant was wearing a long-sleeve shirt and maong pants while George Narcisa testified that appellant was
wearing a checkered short-sleeve shirt with maong pants. This inconsistency is a minor matter which does not militate
against the veracity of Mildred Narcisa and George Narcisa. Inconsistencies on minor details do not indicate
prevarication and will not adversely affect the credibility of witnesses.
In another flimsy attempt to discredit the testimony of Mildred and George, appellant points out that their testimony do
not tally as to the exact number of persons presented to them at the PC barracks. There is no conflict between the
testimony of Mildred and that of George for the simple reason that they did not go to the barracks on the same day and,
therefore, would not have been the same persons, detained or otherwise, who were presented as possible suspects.
Appellant casts doubt on Mildred's testimony that she recognized appellant by way of his voice despite the fact that the
man she identified as appellant was wearing a mask during the incident. Identification by the sound of the voice of the
person identified is sufficient and acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the
accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of years (U.S. vs. Manabat), 7 Phil. 209 [1906]). It is
not disputed that Mildred had known appellant since 1977, or ten year prior to the assault, when Mildred regularly rode
appellant's Ford Fiera to and from school for a number of years. On these occasions, appellant used to engage Mildred
in conversation, exchanging jokes with her and his other passengers. Mildred entertained no doubts whatsoever as to
the identity of appellant. Immediately after the incident she told her brother that one of the masked men was appellant.
When she went to the PC barracks, and conversed with appellant and heard his voice, their conversation bolstered her
conclusion that appellant was one of the masked men.
Delay or vacillation in making an accusation does not impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained (People vs. Elizaga, 73 SCRA 524 [1976]; People vs. Roxas, 73 SCRA 583 [1976]) Mildred's failure to
immediately reveal to the authorities the identity of appellant is fully justified under the circumstance of the case.