EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 138874-75

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO,
- versus - PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
"PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN CORONA,
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO CARPIO MORALES,
CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL CALLEJO, SR.,
BALANSAG, DAVIDSON VALIENTE AZCUNA,
TINGA,
RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG";
NAZARIO, and
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias
GARCIA, JJ.
"WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW
UY alias "MM",
Promulgated:
Accused-Appellants.
July 21, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco
Juan Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4)
James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004

convicting them of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which

reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu

City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN

LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY;
ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape
and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN

LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY;
ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY,

who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is
declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as MAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy
and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
(b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and
(d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
 Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise
of Her Excellencys pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

A. LARRAAGA

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL
DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;

II

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;

III

LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;

IV

THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY

DEFENSE EVIDENCE;

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF

MARIJOY; AND

VI
 [1]
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.

B. AZNAR

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL

COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID

RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE
APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
RUSIA.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE

OF APPELLANT AZNAR.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH

[2]
PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.

C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A

STATE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17
OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

II

RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION

WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND
 UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.

III

BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE

GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY
AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

IV

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME

CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
[3]
DOUBT.

D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER

BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE
OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN

TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
[4]
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;

In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larraaga submitted a

separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the

examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar
is inadequate.

[5]
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration , Aznar submitted to this Court the
Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National

Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was

flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because
he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.

[6]
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment praying that the

four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He

responded to appellants assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged

Decision.

[7]
In his consolidated comment to Aznars supplemental motion for reconsideration, the

Solicitor General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarins Affidavit should not be given
consideration. On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General read out

of context certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the

Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest,

there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating

that Aznars reply actually supports the undersigned counsels (Solicitor Generals) position that Atty.

Villarins Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on

reasonable doubt, thus, it would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit. On

March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due

consideration.

Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrews alleged

minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.

At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not

impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant

which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated

[8]
in our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, we

ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of
the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by

the movant."

The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larraaga, Aznar,

Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters

demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their

respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the

Decision sought to be reconsidered.

However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it

necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.

The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:

This Court erred

first, in according credence to Rusias testimony;

second, in rejecting appellants alibi;

third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded

the testimony of other defense witnesses; and

fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.

In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its

entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed,

thus, averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a

[9]
criminal case opens its entire records for review.

I
 Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusias testimony hook,

line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that

Rusias testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusias testimony, the trial

court took into consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of other

witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial courts findings.

We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusias testimony worthy of

belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest

[10]
degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. The presence of

Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and

handcuffs on her wrists certainly

bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan.
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness

who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its

corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo

and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacquelines two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala

Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired

from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte

saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nenes Store while the white van, driven by

Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of quarreling male and female

emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence

of Larraaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of

story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical evidence and

the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony?

Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his

character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the prosecution.
 II

Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts rejection of

their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of

[11]
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Being evidence

that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of

[12]
prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. On top of its inherent

weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or

[13]
close friends of the accused.

This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi supported

by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the

positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any

way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance

must tilt in favor of the latter.

Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the

[14]
appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.

They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them

to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the

evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within

the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.

Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical

impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane

from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the
defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved

to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two

men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that

on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and

Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacquelines prior

story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larraaga since she had seen

him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16,

1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West

Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them

several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center.

Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing
testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar,

declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter

[15]
was leaning against the hood of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically

identified Larraaga as one of the participes criminis.

Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we

are convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes

and was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.

At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larraaga was

charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before

the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about

Larraagas attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It

happened just near the gate of Rochelles school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion

of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:

ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:

Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a
 Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of
San Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and
Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San
Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I will read the content:

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high

school student of your University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are
writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our
daughter and another student of your school.

xxxxxx

That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates,
Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a
ride home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five young
male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and
simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed
Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted
and got away from him. Sensing some people were watching what they
were doing, they hurriedly sped away.

We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is suffering
the shock and tension that she is not supposed to experience in her
young life. It is very hard for us parents to think about what shed been
[16]
through.

The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larraagas

chance of securing an acquittal.

III

Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion of Professor
Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor

Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And

second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already

several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that

his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated

May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said

Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong

case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such

immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor Generals observation

that such Affidavit is neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznars cause. We quote his keen reflection

on the matter:

xxxxxx

Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged

that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion
immediately conflicts with accused-appellant Aznars claim in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoys. Surely, something is amiss in
accused-appellant Aznars recollection of his defense.

Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-

appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this
statement completely supports this Honorable Courts findings in its Decision dated
February 3, 2004.

Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated that: The arrest of

Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case
because witnesses came out and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those
allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared. Hence,
accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in the
Chiong sisters celebrated abduction and killing.

Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: x x x I did

not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get
Juzman Aznar as we were already placing him under surveillance because I
knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve the crime x x x.
Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police
undertook in the subject crimes.
 Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged
influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the
purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police officers who unearthed the
evidence against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the latter. In
executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to impress
that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.

Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due
solely to the prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an
argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin
has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to make a mockery
of the criminal proceedings.

And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the quality of a

smoking gun that would acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been
convicted. For he did not finish the police investigation of the subject crimes; this is
the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by the
substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is held
on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own
unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his
self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get
[17]
a promotion when almost everyone else did.

Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the examination

conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as

newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga could have produced

it during trial had he wished to.

IV

Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia testimony, appellants

endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan,

Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such

[18]
argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of

[19]
the corpse match those of Marijoy. Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the

dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.
[20] [21]
Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted. And

[22]
fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy

which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and

every place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still fail

to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body

was not that of Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy

would have surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusias narration

that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josmans instruction "to get

rid" of her.

On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen (17)

years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records

bear that on March 1, 1999, James Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part

[23]
of the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence, with the statement that he was eighteen (18)

years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the

Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years

[24]
old.

Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the

proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2)

Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James

Anthony.

The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely difficult

for us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant

factor in the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure

from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and
legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment

on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James

Andrews claim of minority.

Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there being

nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.

In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of evaluating

every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants plea for

the reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by

appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions.

Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of

appellants clear culpability which demands retribution.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan

Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED.

The Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City,

as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth

Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the motion for

reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of

minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
[1]
As summarized by the Solicitor General, Rollo at 1881. It was filed on March 4, 2004.
[2]
Rollo at 1517. It was filed on March 5, 2004.
[3]
Id. at 1480. It was filed on March 3, 2004.
[4]
Id. at 1789. It was filed on March 23, 2004.

[5]
Dated May 5, 2004, Id., at 1841-1845.
[6]
Id., at 1879-1924.
[7]
It was filed on January 12, 2005.

[8]
G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.

[9]
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997,266 SCRA 281.
[10]
People. v. Bardaje, G.R. No. L-29271. August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 3881 ; G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999;. People v.
Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, 309 SCRA 741; People v. Sacabin, G.R. No. L-36638, June 28,1974, 57
SCRA 707; People v. Demeterio, G.R. No. L-48255, September 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 914.
[11]
People vs. Rollon, G.R. No. 131915, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 295.

[12]
Ibid.
[13]
People v. Datingginoo, G.R. No. 95539, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 331; People v. Abatayo, G.R. No. 139456. July 7, 2004,
433 SCRA 562.

[14]
People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754.

[15]
TSN, September 15, 1998 at 26-47.
[16]
At 43-46.
[17]
Consolidated Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, at 2-4.
[18]
Inspector Lenizo finished Law and Criminology. He worked for the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police where
he was trained in finger-print examination and where he conducted around 500 finger-print examinations, 30 of which
involved dead persons. At the time he testified, Inspector Lenizo was head of the Fingerprint Identification Branch of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Region 7.
[19]
TSN, September 22, 1998 at 31-40.
[20]
See also TSN, September 23, 1998 at 13, 20.
[21]
TSN, August 18, 1998 at 62; August 19, 1998 at 115; September 23, 1998 at 13, 20.
[22]
TSN, August 18, 1998 at 62; August 19, 1998 at 57, 60.
[23]
Rollo, at 1894.
[24]
Id., at 1948.